Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The USAID cuts put strain on Africa’s underfunded civil society organizations and fuel debates about their legitimacy. While CSOs need to diversify their funding sources, European donors should invest in narratives that support an independent civil society and shift their funding to advocacy.

The USAID cuts put strain on Africa’s underfunded civil society organizations and fuel debates about their legitimacy. While CSOs need to diversify their funding sources, European donors should invest in narratives that support an independent civil society and shift their funding to advocacy.

Deutsche Wirtschaft in diesem Jahr nur mit Mini-Wachstum – Spürbare Beschleunigung in Jahren 2026 und 2027 – Finanzpakete als Konjunkturmotor für Deutschland – US-Zollpolitik wirft Schatten auf Weltwirtschaft Nach dem Zickzackkurs im ersten Halbjahr findet die deutsche Wirtschaft fortan in die ...

Spyros Blavoukos, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business

& Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

The content of the Commission President’s speech is inevitably connected to the current year’s action programme, but it must also respond to international developments.

This year, the Commission is focusing on two main pillars: the competitiveness of the European economy, and the strengthening of European security and defence. With regard to the first, the EU is aiming to speed up the simplification of procedures, and the development of strategies, aimed at improving European competitiveness. Preparing the productive base for the challenges (and opportunities) presented by globalization, digitization and the green transition was a key point of last year’s State of the Union address, in which the President presented her vision for her second term of office to the plenary of the European Parliament. In relation to the second pillar, the White Paper on the future of European defence and the plan to rearm Europe, of which the SAFE Regulation is an integral part, have dominated the effort to consolidate European security. The main priority and common denominator remains the creation of a coherent framework for the development of European defence capabilities that will help the bloc achieve the strategic autonomy it seeks.

International developments—with the return of President Trump and the (neo)-protectionism he advocates, the continuing need to support Ukrainian resistance, but also the volatility of the global geo-economic and geopolitical environment—require similar objectives for the EU and the Commission. The two aforementioned pillars are thus expected to dominate von der Leyen’s speech this year. However, security is not limited to its military dimension. It is also linked to European society’s preparedness in the face of various forms of crises, the diversification of supply chains, energy autonomy, economic growth, and the resilience of democratic institutions and values—all of which are expected to emerge as priorities for the next programming period. The Union’s new (existential?) narrative is therefore taking shape around a “comprehensive defence” in which security and defence cut across every aspect of its internal policies, from energy to social cohesion, and the implementation of the proposals in the Letta and Draghi reports is a key priority to prevent the EU becoming the “grass that’s trampled when elephants fight”.

Alekos Kritikos, Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP; Former senior official, European Commission; former Secretary General, Ministry of the Interior

This year’s State of the Union address by the Commission President will be delivered at a juncture when Europe is seemingly being reduced ever more to the role of an observer of global developments rather than a protagonist in them. The Trump system’s dismissive treatment of the EU and the Shanghai summit are just two examples that point to this being the case.

The EU’s room for manoeuvre has narrowed dishearteningly—if it has not already been eradicated entirely—and it is of existential importance that the Union take immediate and comprehensive action. Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech should respond to this need by adopting the proposals made in the Letta and Draghi reports, and summarized afresh in Mario Draghi’s recent speech at the Rimini meeting, without further delay, hesitation or pettiness.

The completion of the internal market, the boosting of EU competitiveness, the development of a wide-ranging industrial policy, the unification of Europe’s capital markets, the pursuit of strategic and defence autonomy, the coordinated Research and Technology development, and the ongoing promotion of economic and social cohesion are the most fundamental, and there are certainly others of crucial importance. The implementation of these proposals will need to be accompanied by the defence of democratic values and the European social model, and by an immigration policy which, while respecting European values, preserves social cohesion while also helping the EU secure the human resources it needs for its economic and demographic growth. All of this will be very hard to achieve, however, unless it is accompanied by a bold political and institutional reorganization of the EU, leading to new forms of European integration.

On 10 September, we will know whether the European Commission has got the message.

Stella Ladi, Panteion University and Queen Mary University of London; Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

In the annual State of the Union address by the Commission President, we should focus not only on what is said, but also on what is left unsaid. The tense international situation, with its multiple conflicts but especially those in Gaza and Ukraine, and the new transatlantic (im)balance make it near certain that the common defence and security of Europe will be the main theme. And we would expect our partnerships and trade relations to figure centrally—those with Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, now that it is clear the EU needs to diversify and expand its trading networks. However, the most interesting question will be how much emphasis is placed on the two former flagships of European policy: the green economy and the regulation of new technologies and artificial intelligence. Because this year more than any other, the audience will not only be European citizens; it will also be the President of the United States, who would like to see backpeddling on both. It is critical for Europe’s dignity and global credibility that these priorities remain centre-stage, even if only at the symbolic level of this annual address.

Elena Lazarou, Director General, ELIAMEP

2025 finds the European Union facing external challenges and the threat of internal rifts. The annual State of the Union address by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, is an opportunity to chart a strategic course, but also to reinforce the conviction that the Union can respond to the political, economic, social and geopolitical challenges of our times.

At the heart of the speech is the long-term budget (2028-2034), which is causing political tensions between member states, agricultural and industrial interests, and political groups. Von der Leyen will be seeking to balance liberal and green priorities and issues such as re-industrialisation, social cohesion and immigration, and will also voice support for the proposed (enhanced) budget, with its added flexibility.

The key points of the speech, however, will relate to foreign policy: support for Ukraine and the need to strengthen European defence. Presenting a targeted plan for transatlantic relations will pose a major challenge to the Commission President, as the recent EU-US trade agreement has already come in for harsh criticism from many parts of the EU.

The President will reaffirm the importance of democracy and the international legal order, as well as the need for the EU to support both in an era in which anti-democratic forces are on the rise and international and humanitarian law is breaking down.

The European Union is presented with a choice: advance towards strategic autonomy and unity, or be immobilized by internal contradictions and external coercion.

Manos Matsaganis, Professor, Polytechnic University of Milan; Head of ELIAMEP’s Greek and European Economy Programme

The threats Europe is currently facing have no precedent in its 80-year history.

Some may have arrived suddenly, but their roots run deep: Russian aggression, American antipathy, Chinese expansionism, conflict in the Middle East.

Others are the product of internal weaknesses that were not addressed in time, and have now festered: economic sluggishness, an innovation deficit, ageing populations, institutional inertia, political fragmentation.

Their combined impact means that our children and our children’s children are at risk of growing up in a continent that is vulnerable and insecure, unable to defend itself, with an obsolete economy, stagnant living standards, and angry societies.

The train of events that would make this a grim reality can be easily described. A Le Pen (or Bardella) victory in the 2027 presidential elections puts France on a collision course with the EU, while simultaneously paralyzing any attempt at a coherent European response. In the confusion that follows, each country tries to salvage what it can. I leave it to the reader’s imagination to work out what this might mean for Estonia, or for Denmark (and — why not? — for Cyprus or Greece).

The alternative scenario begins with the acknowledgement that no country can go it alone. This implies the need for close cooperation in defence, the economy, and immigration. It isn’t the likeliest scenario. It will be politically demanding. But it is the only thing that can save us from worse trouble ahead.

 

 

Ursula von der Leyen’s second term at the helm of the European Commission is structured around seven thematic priorities that reflect the executive branch’s effort to integrate diverse policy areas in pursuit of the prosperity of the European citizenry. The Commission’s 2025 Work Programme introduces 51 new initiatives and places particular emphasis on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden, highlighting the shift towards “a faster and simpler Union”. At the same time, there is a clear tendency for the EU to assume a more active role in policy domains where supranational involvement has traditionally been limited. For Greece, both the Union’s achievements to date and its forthcoming actions have a direct impact on key national sectors. Meanwhile, the Greek government is preparing for the decisive role it will play in the negotiations on the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034.

• The forthcoming State of the European Union address, though generally framed in broad terms, provides a clear indication of the EU’s trajectory for member states, citizens, businesses, and external partners, enabling them to adapt and align with upcoming initiatives.
• It is not merely a stock-taking exercise; rather, it represents a critical test of credibility, as it will raise the question of whether and to what extent the Commission can translate its announcements and ambitions into tangible measures. The shift from theory to action will determine both the Commission’s institutional credibility and citizens’ trust in the European project.
• At the same time, the new structure of the Commission will also come under scrutiny. Nine months after the creation of new portfolios within the College of Commissioners, it remains to be assessed whether these have delivered on their intended functions.
• Greece, holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2027, will be at the forefront of negotiations that will determine the scope of financial instruments across all policy areas. For Athens, the challenge will be not only to forge common ground among member states but also to advance its own national priorities.

The article is authored by Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Ursula von der Leyen’s second term at the helm of the European Commission is structured around seven thematic priorities, based on the political guidelines she presented before the European Parliament in July 2024. The priorities for the 2024–2029 period are as follows: sustainable prosperity and competitiveness, European defense and security, supporting people, strengthening societies and the social model, preserving quality of life, protecting democracy and safeguarding values, Europe in the world, and preparing the Union for the future.

The 2025 Work Programme was published in February 2025 and is organized around these political priorities, while also taking into account the guidelines and mission letters assigned to members of the College of Commissioners. In total, it introduces 51 new initiatives, at least 18 of which are legislative. Particular emphasis is placed on simplification, with more than 60% of the legislative proposals falling within this scope. The Commission President has repeatedly stressed the urgent need to reduce administrative burden and simplify legislation. In her political guidelines, she explicitly referred to her vision of “a faster and simpler Union.”

In view of this year’s State of the Union address, during which Ursula von der Leyen is expected to present the achievements of the College of Commissioners since taking office (1 December 2024), attention now turns to the analysis of the policies to be advanced in the near future. The address, though generally framed in broad terms, provides a clear indication of the EU’s trajectory for member states, citizens, businesses, and external partners, enabling them to adapt and align with forthcoming actions.

While awaiting the address, it is useful to examine what has been achieved so far. This analysis is structured around the Commission’s political priorities and presents illustrative examples of its most significant actions from December 2024 to the present. These actions have taken different forms (e.g. legislative proposal, strategy, action plan, roadmap, etc.), depending on the political maturity and objectives of each initiative.[1]

The analysis then turns to the Greek perspective on both the Commission’s achievements and its planned actions. The final section looks ahead to what can be expected in this year’s State of the Union address. 

Sustainable Prosperity and Competitiveness

Mario Draghi’s September 2024 report served as the foundation for the Competitiveness Compass, published at the end of January 2025. In short, the Compass sets out how the Union can: (a) strengthen innovation, (b) shift towards cleaner and more affordable energy, and (c) diversify its supply chains. In this direction, the Commission has released a series of strategies and other documents (e.g. the Clean Industrial Deal in February, the Startup and Scaleup Strategy and the Single Market Strategy in May, and the Quantum Europe Strategy in July). As expected, however, a considerable share of the Commission’s output consists of (proposals for) legislative initiatives aimed at simplification. In particular, six “Omnibus” packages covering a wide range of policy areas have been tabled. Moreover, the political agreement in principle reached in the trade negotiations with four MERCOSUR states (December 2024) underscores the Union’s continued commitment to promoting free and mutually beneficial trade. As shown in Table I, proposals for six legislative initiatives, one strategy, and one plan are expected to be submitted later this year.

Table I: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (sustainable prosperity and competitiveness)

Type Title Legislative proposal Revision of the Sustainable Finance Disclosures Regulation Legislative proposal Digital Package Legislative proposal European Business Wallet Legislative proposal Accelerating industrial decarbonisation Legislative proposal Revision of the REACH Regulation (on chemicals) Legislative proposal Digital Networks Strategy/Legislative proposal Bioeconomy Strategy Plan Sustainable Transport Investment Plan

 

European Defense and Security

European defense and security have become a top priority for the Commission due, among other factors, to the war in Ukraine, broader Russian assertiveness, and U.S. disengagement from Europe. In this adverse geopolitical environment, Ursula von der Leyen created the portfolio of the Commissioner for Defense and Space, signaling the importance of this new dimension. The Commission subsequently announced the White Paper on the Future of European Defense and the “ReArm Europe” plan, which could channel up to €800 billion into strengthening Europe’s defense readiness.

Beyond strictly military initiatives, the Union appears to be embracing the ideas of the Niinistö’s Report of October 2024 and promoting strategies linked to the concept of “total defense.” Within this framework, the Preparedness Union Strategy, the proposal for a Critical Medicines Act, the Medical Countermeasures Strategy, the Stockpiling Strategy, combined with the Internal Security Strategy, the proposal for a Common European System for Returns, and the Action Plan on Cybersecurity for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers, all aim to provide a holistic safety net against multiple threats. Preparedness has thus become a central concern within the European family. In several national capitals, discussions are underway on reviving military conscription, moving towards a Scandinavian-style “total defense” model combining military and civilian dimensions. While the implementation of the SAFE Regulation appears to be the Commission’s main priority, Table II presents the three initiatives expected to be announced in the near term.

Table II: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (European defense and security)

Type Title Legislative proposal New rules on drug precursors Legislative proposal Firearms Trafficking Directive Strategy Migration and Asylum Strategy Supporting People, Strengthening Societies and the Social Model

The cost of living, social inequalities, and the center–periphery divide have undermined the European way of life, while the modern era demands new skills for businesses and workers to adapt to evolving circumstances. With the aim of reinforcing the European social model, the Commission launched the Union of Skills in March, designed to upgrade citizens’ skills and enable the Union to attract and retain talent in critical sectors within its borders. Although the 2025 Work Programme does not include new initiatives on the housing crisis, the Commission President has pledged to: (a) present a plan for affordable housing, and (b) cooperate with the European Investment Bank to establish an investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing.[2] By the end of the year, three initiatives are expected to be published to strengthen the social dimension, as indicated in Table III.

Table III: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (supporting people, strengthening societies and the social model)

Type Title Action Plan European Pillar of Social Rights Roadmap Quality Jobs Agenda Consumer Agenda 2030 Preserving Quality of Life

Agriculture is considered an integral part of the European way of life. Its support is a prerequisite for the Union’s sustainable growth and competitiveness. With the goals of food self-sufficiency and support for the food value chain, the Commission has placed particular emphasis on simplifying the procedures of the Common Agricultural Policy, while announcing the Vision for Agriculture and Food (February) to make farming and food sectors more attractive to young people. At the same time, the Commission has tabled a proposal to amend the European Climate Law (July), seeking to establish a 2040 climate target. Finally, the Ocean Pact and the Water Resilience Strategy, both announced in June 2025, aim to boost the blue economy and protect water resources, whose resilience “is regarded by the EU as a matter of security and crisis preparedness”. According to the current Work Programme, no new initiatives are expected in this policy area.

Protecting Democracy and Safeguarding Values

At a time when liberal democracy is under challenge, strengthening democratic resilience and societal preparedness are key objectives for the Commission. Furthermore, the defense and reinforcement of the rule of law remain a central duty of the EU’s executive branch as the “guardian of the Treaties.” In this context, the Roadmap for Women’s Rights (March) seeks to eliminate gender-based violence and ensure equal treatment of women. By year’s end, three initiatives are expected to be presented, as shown in Table IV.

Table IV: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (protecting democracy and safeguarding values)

Type Title Communication European Democracy Shield[3] Strategy Strategy to Support, Protect and Empower Civil Society Strategy Equality Strategies for LGBTIQ and Anti-Racism Europe in the World

As the international environment grows increasingly dangerous and hostile to EU interests, the European family must be able to leverage its strength and build meaningful partnerships with like-minded actors. Accordingly, the Union unveiled its Black Sea Strategy (March), built on three pillars: (a) security, (b) sustainable development and connectivity, and (c) environment and preparedness. Beyond the eastern flank, however, the Union is also placing emphasis on its southern neighborhood, as evidenced by the creation of a dedicated Mediterranean portfolio within the College of Commissioners and the establishment of a new Directorate-General for the Middle East (DG MENA). At the same time, preparations for the announcement of a Mediterranean Pact and the development of a coherent Middle East strategy reflect the Union’s clear interest in its southern dimension. Additionally, the EU is seeking to deepen ties with other regions across the globe, illustrated by the growing number of security and defense partnerships.[4] In the field of transatlantic relations, the Union reached an agreement with President Trump in July 2025 on tariff levels, while also striving to secure U.S. support for any future peace-monitoring mission in Ukraine. Table V presents the two initiatives expected to be announced shortly.

Table V: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (Europe in the world)

Type Title Pact Pact for the Mediterranean Joint Communication EU–India Preparing the Union for the Future

One of the Commission’s most significant priorities is the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034. Early preparation of the proposal ensures stability and predictability in the Union’s resources. According to the Commission’s proposal, the new budget will approach €2 billion, representing on average 1.26% of the EU’s Gross National Income per year. The innovation lies in structuring the funds around four pillars: (a) national and regional partnership plans, including cohesion and agricultural policy; (b) cross-cutting programmes and instruments, such as EU funds; (c) external dimension and Common Foreign and Security Policy; and (d) European public administration. At the same time, the Commission is expected to table proposals to prepare the Union for potential enlargement.

The Greek Perspective: Priorities and Challenges

For Greece, the Union’s actions have a direct impact on key national sectors. In the field of security and defense, Athens supports the new European initiatives and, in July 2025, formally submitted a request for loans worth at least €1.2 billion under the SAFE Regulation, seeking to bolster its defense capabilities through low-interest borrowing. Nonetheless, certain contentious issues remain, the most sensitive being the partial involvement of the Turkish defense industry in European schemes. Regarding the Union’s interaction with third actors, Greece seeks closer cooperation with like-minded partners while promoting stability in relations with the United States for both strategic and trade reasons. The Black Sea Strategy holds particular significance for Greece, as it explicitly states that “it proposes multiple avenues to forge closer cooperation with… Turkey,” highlighting that coordinated engagement with the neighboring country is “important” and that Turkey is “an EU partner of strategic importance.” At the same time, Greece aims to draw the attention of other member states to regions that have been partly sidelined due to the war in Ukraine, such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which directly affect the Union’s overall policy agenda (e.g. the war in Gaza and the crisis in the Red Sea).

With regard to preserving quality of life, as a coastal state with a strong shipping and fisheries sector, Greece is particularly interested in the sustainability of oceans and the management of marine resources, in cooperation with Cyprus and the Cypriot Commissioner responsible. The agricultural sector also remains crucial, especially amid growing pressures. As a predominantly agricultural country, Greece advocates for policies that will support farmers’ incomes during this difficult period. Transport is likewise a Greek priority, with an emphasis on safe and sustainable networks, reflected in the country’s strong interest in key positions both in the College of Commissioners and in the European Parliament. In the field of tourism, Greece, as a major tourist destination, looks forward to the European strategy for sustainable tourism, which is expected to include proposals to enhance the sector’s resilience and competitiveness. Finally, the housing crisis is becoming one of the most pressing social challenges in Europe. In Greece, it creates a suffocating environment for young people and the middle class, both struggling to cope with housing costs. As a key factor of social cohesion and demographic stability, Athens is keen to see whether the Commission will advance more targeted housing policies, drawing also on EU financial instruments.

All of these political priorities are closely linked to the issue of the new MFF 2028–2034. Greece, holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2027, will be at the forefront of negotiations that will determine the scope of funding across all the aforementioned policy areas. For Athens, the challenge will be not only to find common ground among member states but also to advance its own priorities.

What Lies Ahead?

The multitude of initiatives launched by the Commission may be welcomed as a sign of dynamism and an eagerness to act across key policy domains. However, the central question is not the announcement of new strategies, but their timely and effective implementation. The shift from theory to practice will ultimately determine the credibility of the institutions and citizens’ trust in the Union. In this context, the role of member states becomes pivotal.

Against this backdrop, this year’s State of the Union address will not merely be a stock-taking exercise, but rather a “credibility test.” The key question will be whether, and to what extent, the Commission can turn its ambitions into concrete action for the Union’s collective good. At the same time, the new structure of the Commission will also come under scrutiny. The creation of the two new portfolios for Defense and Space, and for the Mediterranean signals the Union’s evolving priorities in critical sectors and regions where its previous contribution and involvement were comparatively limited. Nine months after their establishment, it will be assessed whether these portfolios have delivered on their intended r

[1] As provided by the Treaties (Article 17 TEU), the European Commission holds the “right of initiative” and is responsible for proposing new EU legislation in policy areas where it has competence. For such proposals to acquire the force of secondary law, they must be adopted either through the ordinary legislative procedure or a special legislative procedure. In parallel, there are non-legally binding acts that serve as documents outlining political direction in specific areas. These carry less weight than legislative acts (which are adopted by the European Parliament and/or the Council of the EU), as they primarily express the Commission’s views. Although they emerge following consultations with stakeholders and member states, these may not fully endorse the same positions (or their exact implementation). Strategies, usually framed as “communications” to other institutions, set out the Commission’s stance and priorities on specific issues. Action Plans, Pacts, and Roadmaps generally fall into this same category.

[2] In December 2024, the European Parliament established a temporary Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU, tasked with examining the causes of the current crisis and submitting specific proposals to address it.

[3] In December 2024, the European Parliament decided to create a Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield to assess existing and planned legislation and policies. According to an EPRS briefing, the communication is “widely expected to be postponed”.

[4] The EU currently has security and defense partnerships with eight partners (Albania, North Macedonia, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Moldova, Norway, and South Korea).

The REACH National Consultation Report for Greece presents the outcomes of a series of citizen dialogues held in Athens and Thessaloniki, culminating in a national consultation on 5 May 2025. Citizens from diverse backgrounds came together with experts and stakeholders to deliberate on the future of Greece and Europe, addressing key themes of rule of law, European integration, and environmental sustainability.

The report sets out ten policy proposals, ranging from Erasmus-style exchange programmes for schools and national media literacy initiatives to local youth environmental groups and a stronger focus on LGBTQIA+ rights in the curriculum. These recommendations reflect citizens’ aspirations for a more inclusive, transparent, and participatory Europe, while also highlighting national challenges and opportunities for change. The project has demonstrated the potential of citizen engagement to inspire policy at both national and European levels, offering innovative solutions and reinforcing trust in democratic institutions.

You can read the report here.

Ein US-Gericht hat gestern eine Zerschlagung von Google gestoppt. Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin und Vorsitzender der Monopolkommission, äußert sich dazu wie folgt: 

Das Urteil im US-Kartellverfahren gegen Google markiert einen Wendepunkt in der globalen Debatte über die Macht der Tech-Giganten. Statt struktureller Maßnahmen gibt es lediglich Verhaltensauflagen, die Google zum Teilen von Daten und Algorithmen verpflichten. Das ist zwar besser als nichts, doch die Vergangenheit zeigt, wie schwer solche Auflagen zu überwachen und durchzusetzen sind. Ob den US-Behörden gelingt, wo Europa oft gescheitert ist, bleibt abzuwarten – die Aussichten sind nicht rosig.

Der mit dem Fall befasste Richter Amit Mehta verzichtete zudem darauf, die Zahlungen zu verbieten, mit denen Google sich Standardplatzierungen in Browsern und auf Smartphones sichert. Zwar wurden einige Einschränkungen eingeführt, doch das Urteil fällt weit milder aus, als vom US-Justizministerium gefordert. Kein Wunder also, dass der Markt dies als Sieg wertete: Der Aktienkurs von Google sprang um acht Prozent nach oben.

Zusammen mit der jüngsten Entscheidung der EU-Kommission, die Geldbuße gegen Google im Adtech-Verfahren auszusetzen, verdeutlicht dieses Urteil den deutlichen Wandel im politischen und regulatorischen Klima des vergangenen Jahres. Richter Mehta führte Generative KI als einen Faktor für diese Entwicklung an - damit hat er vielleicht  einen Punkt. Doch der Einfluss massiven Lobbyings mächtiger Unternehmen und einer zunehmend unternehmensfreundlichen Politik, die manche zynisch als „Wettbewerb ist etwas für Verlierer“ bezeichnen, ist nicht zu übersehen. Jetzt ist der Moment für klare Entscheidungen: Wie viel Marktmacht sind wir bereit zu akzeptieren – und zu welchem Preis für Wettbewerb, Innovation und Demokratie? Statt sich zurückzuhalten, sollte die EU-Kommission mutig vorangehen und den digitalen Markt fairer gestalten. Die Zeit zu handeln ist jetzt.

Die rentenpolitische Debatte ist seit Jahren von Schwarz-Weiß-Denken, Alarmismus und moralischen Schlagworten geprägt. Das erschwert eine nüchterne Auseinandersetzung mit den realen Herausforderungen, die der Renteneintritt der Babyboomer unweigerlich mit sich bringt. Prognosen aus dem ...

How does international assistance impact public attitudes towards donors in the recipient country when tied to strategic interests? European leaders increasingly highlight the strategic and transactional nature of international assistance. Yet, we still do not know much about how such shifts in the framing of international assistance are perceived by the recipient public, especially in contexts with prevalent anti-Western attitudes and propaganda that dismisses aid as hypocritical and disingenuous. I conducted an online survey experiment in Turkey to assess the attitudinal and quasi-behavioural effects of different types of international assistance post-disaster – conditional, unconditional, and strategic – and whether they help sway public attitudes in the face of authoritarian propaganda. Strategically distributed humanitarian aid decreased trust in the government as a defender of national interest among conservative, nationalist and Eurosceptic regime supporters, and also increased trust in European organisations. It did so partly by mitigating conspiracism and evoking positive emotions among pro-government voters whose views are hard to change. However, this comes at a cost: increased trade scepticism and decreased engagement with foreign media outlets among regime opponents. The findings have significant implications for international assistance strategies for increasing European soft power.  

How does international assistance impact public attitudes towards donors in the recipient country when tied to strategic interests? European leaders increasingly highlight the strategic and transactional nature of international assistance. Yet, we still do not know much about how such shifts in the framing of international assistance are perceived by the recipient public, especially in contexts with prevalent anti-Western attitudes and propaganda that dismisses aid as hypocritical and disingenuous. I conducted an online survey experiment in Turkey to assess the attitudinal and quasi-behavioural effects of different types of international assistance post-disaster – conditional, unconditional, and strategic – and whether they help sway public attitudes in the face of authoritarian propaganda. Strategically distributed humanitarian aid decreased trust in the government as a defender of national interest among conservative, nationalist and Eurosceptic regime supporters, and also increased trust in European organisations. It did so partly by mitigating conspiracism and evoking positive emotions among pro-government voters whose views are hard to change. However, this comes at a cost: increased trade scepticism and decreased engagement with foreign media outlets among regime opponents. The findings have significant implications for international assistance strategies for increasing European soft power.  

Governance theories offer a useful approach to policy by highlighting the need for multi-actor, multi-sectoral, and multi-level cooperation to deal with complex problems. Digitalisation, on the other hand, can be a means for managing networks, for helping to maintain the dynamics of meta-governance, and for generating problem-solving strategies based on knowledge exchange. Both seem to imply each other: governance requires tools to foster collaboration through the development of common understandings of problems, for which digitalisation can be instrumental. Effective digitalisation should foster governmental, social, and private steering towards public service, transparency, and the improvement of accountability. Digitalisation appears to require some basic conditions of governance related to fair access to services; beliefs and narratives that promote cooperation; processes of co-creation; and the interchange of information, as well as operative regulatory institutions. Governance and digitalisation together are fundamental for the management of complex policy problems. 
The aim of this Discussion Paper is theory advancement and refinement, linking assumptions about governance theories – particularly those resulting from the three waves of governance – to those of mainstream digitalisation literature. It formulates a research agenda to explore the possible mutual repercussions of those literature developments. The Discussion Paper is neither mainly descriptive nor prescriptive, but develops certain implications that stem from some fundamental problems of governance – defined as a process of multi-actor, multi-sector, multi-level cooperation – and digitalisation. The research agenda is presented in the form of conjectures relevant to the Mexican case, related to the roles, functions, and expected results of different actors dealing with governance problems within the context of increased digitalisation. The conjectures advance possible research areas related to the role of digitalisation in meta-governance carried out by governmental actors; in those of network cooperation maintained by academic institutions; in the improvement of problem-solving by non-governmental organisations; and in the possible co-creation of new knowledge through information-based interactions by the media.

Francisco Porras is a professor and full-time research fellow at the Mora Research Institute (Instituto Mora), Mexico City.

Governance theories offer a useful approach to policy by highlighting the need for multi-actor, multi-sectoral, and multi-level cooperation to deal with complex problems. Digitalisation, on the other hand, can be a means for managing networks, for helping to maintain the dynamics of meta-governance, and for generating problem-solving strategies based on knowledge exchange. Both seem to imply each other: governance requires tools to foster collaboration through the development of common understandings of problems, for which digitalisation can be instrumental. Effective digitalisation should foster governmental, social, and private steering towards public service, transparency, and the improvement of accountability. Digitalisation appears to require some basic conditions of governance related to fair access to services; beliefs and narratives that promote cooperation; processes of co-creation; and the interchange of information, as well as operative regulatory institutions. Governance and digitalisation together are fundamental for the management of complex policy problems. 
The aim of this Discussion Paper is theory advancement and refinement, linking assumptions about governance theories – particularly those resulting from the three waves of governance – to those of mainstream digitalisation literature. It formulates a research agenda to explore the possible mutual repercussions of those literature developments. The Discussion Paper is neither mainly descriptive nor prescriptive, but develops certain implications that stem from some fundamental problems of governance – defined as a process of multi-actor, multi-sector, multi-level cooperation – and digitalisation. The research agenda is presented in the form of conjectures relevant to the Mexican case, related to the roles, functions, and expected results of different actors dealing with governance problems within the context of increased digitalisation. The conjectures advance possible research areas related to the role of digitalisation in meta-governance carried out by governmental actors; in those of network cooperation maintained by academic institutions; in the improvement of problem-solving by non-governmental organisations; and in the possible co-creation of new knowledge through information-based interactions by the media.

Francisco Porras is a professor and full-time research fellow at the Mora Research Institute (Instituto Mora), Mexico City.

Development is a complex phenomenon that involves economic, social, and environmental transformations. In recent decades, sustainable development (SD) has gained prominence as a policy objective, emphasizing balanced progress in economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection. However, measuring SD progress remains challenging, given the need to consider such multiple dimensions, which often show trade-offs; this is especially true in developing countries such as Peru, where rapid socioeconomic changes coexist with environmental degradation. Traditional metrics, such as GDP or composite indicators such as the Human Development Index, often fail to capture the multidimensional and dynamic nature of SD, especially in terms of the environmental side. This paper employs a multivariate latent Markov model (LMM) to assess Peru's progress toward SD from 2004 to 2017, incorporating economic, social, and environmental indicators. LMMs are advantageous, as they account for unobserved heterogeneity and state transitions between sustainability levels over time, offering a nuanced understanding of SD dynamics. Our findings reveal that while Peru experienced economic and social improvements during the study period, the inclusion of environmental factors in the SD measure curbs overall progress, highlighting potential trade-offs between poverty reduction and environmental quality. The results underscore the importance of integrating environmental considerations into SD strategies, particularly in the context of rapid economic growth. This study contributes methodologically by applying a dynamic and data-driven approach to measuring SD and provides valuable information on the interaction among its dimensions.

Development is a complex phenomenon that involves economic, social, and environmental transformations. In recent decades, sustainable development (SD) has gained prominence as a policy objective, emphasizing balanced progress in economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection. However, measuring SD progress remains challenging, given the need to consider such multiple dimensions, which often show trade-offs; this is especially true in developing countries such as Peru, where rapid socioeconomic changes coexist with environmental degradation. Traditional metrics, such as GDP or composite indicators such as the Human Development Index, often fail to capture the multidimensional and dynamic nature of SD, especially in terms of the environmental side. This paper employs a multivariate latent Markov model (LMM) to assess Peru's progress toward SD from 2004 to 2017, incorporating economic, social, and environmental indicators. LMMs are advantageous, as they account for unobserved heterogeneity and state transitions between sustainability levels over time, offering a nuanced understanding of SD dynamics. Our findings reveal that while Peru experienced economic and social improvements during the study period, the inclusion of environmental factors in the SD measure curbs overall progress, highlighting potential trade-offs between poverty reduction and environmental quality. The results underscore the importance of integrating environmental considerations into SD strategies, particularly in the context of rapid economic growth. This study contributes methodologically by applying a dynamic and data-driven approach to measuring SD and provides valuable information on the interaction among its dimensions.

Viele Ältere haben Angst vor einem verpflichtenden sozialen Jahr. Dabei wäre es für niemanden so sinnvoll wie für sie selbst. Und das ist keine Strafe., Mein Vorschlag eines Pflichtjahres für Rentnerinnen und Rentner, insbesondere für die Babyboomer-Generation, hat heftige Kritik ausgelöst. Viele empören sich angesichts der Idee, ältere Menschen nach Eintritt in den Ruhestand noch einmal verpflichtend in den Dienst der Gesellschaft zu stellen – etwa ...

Bonn, 1. September 2025. Deutschland und die Europäische Union verfolgen ehrgeizige Strategien zur Dekarbonisierung ihrer Gesellschaften, mit Wasserstoff als Energieträger und Rohstoff für industrielle Prozesse. Im Einklang mit den Klimazielen muss der verwendete Wasserstoff in kohlenstoffarmen Verfahren hergestellt werden. Idealerweise ist dies grüner Wasserstoff, der durch Elektrolyse unter ausschließlicher Verwendung erneuerbarer Energien gewonnen wird. In dem lange vorherrschenden optimistischen Diskurs wäre die globale Versorgung mit Energieträgern künftig nicht mehr an die vorhandenen Öl-, Gas- oder Kohlevorkommen gebunden. Vielmehr könnte Wasserstoff überall dort hergestellt werden, wo ein gutes Potenzial für Wind-, Solar- oder Geothermie besteht. Dies würde neue Möglichkeiten für Länder mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen eröffnen. Die in den Strategien festgelegten Ziele sind sehr ehrgeizig. In der Wasserstoffstrategie von 2023 rechnet Deutschland für 2030 mit einer Elektrolyseurkapazität von 10 GW. Da dies nicht ausreichen würde, um die erforderlichen Mengen an H2 zu produzieren, könnten Importe 50 % bis 70 % des gesamten Wasserstoffbedarfs decken.

Fünf Jahre nach Veröffentlichung der Wasserstoffstrategien ist die Euphorie der Enttäuschung gewichen. In Deutschland waren bis zum ersten Quartal 2025 nur 170 MW Elektrolysekapazität installiert worden, und das Ziel von 10 GW bis 2030 gilt als nicht mehr erreichbar. Aus internationaler Sicht ist die Lage nicht besser. Laut der Internationalen Energieagentur haben derzeit nur etwa 7 % aller weltweiten Wasserstoffprojekte eine endgültige Investitionsentscheidung durchlaufen und werden daher wahrscheinlich umgesetzt.

In den letzten Monaten gab es zahlreiche Berichte über gestrichene H2-Projekte. Dies betrifft alle Elemente der Lieferkette: Im Juli 2025 stoppte das spanische Energieunternehmen REPSOL ein 200-MW-Projekt in einer Raffinerie in Puertollano, eines der größten geplanten H2-Projekte in Europa. Monate zuvor hatten Equinor (Norwegen) und RWE (Deutschland) ihre gemeinsamen Pläne für eine Wasserstoffpipeline durch die Nordsee annulliert. Diese Pipeline hätte eine zuverlässige Versorgung von Industriekunden in Deutschland und Europa mit Wasserstoff ermöglicht. Kürzlich lehnte der zweitgrößte Stahlproduzent der Welt, ArcelorMittal, ein Angebot der deutschen Regierung ab, mehr als eine Milliarde Euro an Subventionen für die Dekarbonisierung von zwei Stahlwerken zu beziehen. Das Unternehmen sieht die langfristige Versorgung mit Wasserstoff als unsicher an und befürchtet, dass grüne Technologien ihm einen Wettbewerbsnachteil gegenüber internationalen Konkurrenten verschaffen könnten.

Es gibt viele Gründe für die strukturelle Krise beim Ausbau der Wasserstoffwirtschaft. Besorgniserregend ist, dass die beteiligten Unternehmen nicht nur weiche Faktoren (wie unklare Vorschriften) anführen, die bei entsprechenden politischen Willen schnell überwunden werden könnten. Vielmehr argumentieren sie mit den wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen der H2-Wertschöpfungsketten: Wasserstoff ist nach wie vor deutlich teurer als fossile Brennstoffe wie Erdgas. Potenzielle Kunden sind nicht bereit oder in der Lage, für Wasserstoff deutlich höhere Preise zu zahlen als für weniger klimafreundliche Alternativen. Darüber hinaus sind mehrere Elemente der Wasserstoffversorgungsketten technologisch noch nicht ausgereift, wie beispielsweise das Cracken von Ammoniak, um den Transport von H2 in Form eines besser geeigneten Derivats zu ermöglichen.

Trotz all dieser Schwierigkeiten gehen wir davon aus, dass H2 eine Zukunft hat und sich ein Wasserstoffmarkt entwickeln wird, sobald die Umsetzungslücke überwunden werden kann. Die meisten Länder fühlen sich an ihre Klimaschutzverpflichtungen gebunden, und einige Sektoren können ohne Wasserstoff als Energieträger oder Rohstoff kaum dekarbonisiert werden. Darüber hinaus wird die angewandte technische Forschung fortgesetzt, mit dem Potenzial, den Wasserstoffausbau wieder auf die Tagesordnung zu setzen.

Wie sollten Länder mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen und die internationale Zusammenarbeit auf den aktuellen „Wasserstoff-Limbo“ reagieren? Eine abwartende Haltung würde unnötig Zeit kosten. Sinnvoll ist, die Umsetzung von H2-Projekten fortzusetzen und sich dabei auf H2-basierte Lösungen für Herausforderungen der nachhaltigen Entwicklung zu konzentrieren. Zwei Beispiele: 1) Wasserstoff kann zur Dekarbonisierung der Düngemittelindustrie beitragen. Eine dezentrale Düngemittelproduktion auf Basis von emissionsarmem Wasserstoff kann die Ernährungssicherheit in Afrika unterstützen, Treibhausgasemissionen reduzieren und zur Weiterentwicklung der Wasserstofftechnologien beitragen. 2) Als Alternative zur Elektrolyse kann Wasserstoff aus Abwasser gewonnen werden, z. B. durch Fermentation. Dadurch können Umweltbelastungen (z. B. die Eutrophierung von Gewässern) und Gesundheitsrisiken im Zusammenhang mit städtischen Abwässern verringert werden.

Werden verschiedene Entwicklungsziele gleichzeitig verfolgt, verlieren die Kostenunterschiede zwischen Wasserstoff und konventionellen Technologien an Bedeutung. Die skizzierten alternativen Technologien sollten in Forschungspartnerschaften mit dem Globalen Süden entwickelt werden; als wichtiger Bestandteil einer multilateralen Wasserstoffstrategie zur Bewältigung globaler Herausforderungen.

Bonn, 1. September 2025. Deutschland und die Europäische Union verfolgen ehrgeizige Strategien zur Dekarbonisierung ihrer Gesellschaften, mit Wasserstoff als Energieträger und Rohstoff für industrielle Prozesse. Im Einklang mit den Klimazielen muss der verwendete Wasserstoff in kohlenstoffarmen Verfahren hergestellt werden. Idealerweise ist dies grüner Wasserstoff, der durch Elektrolyse unter ausschließlicher Verwendung erneuerbarer Energien gewonnen wird. In dem lange vorherrschenden optimistischen Diskurs wäre die globale Versorgung mit Energieträgern künftig nicht mehr an die vorhandenen Öl-, Gas- oder Kohlevorkommen gebunden. Vielmehr könnte Wasserstoff überall dort hergestellt werden, wo ein gutes Potenzial für Wind-, Solar- oder Geothermie besteht. Dies würde neue Möglichkeiten für Länder mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen eröffnen. Die in den Strategien festgelegten Ziele sind sehr ehrgeizig. In der Wasserstoffstrategie von 2023 rechnet Deutschland für 2030 mit einer Elektrolyseurkapazität von 10 GW. Da dies nicht ausreichen würde, um die erforderlichen Mengen an H2 zu produzieren, könnten Importe 50 % bis 70 % des gesamten Wasserstoffbedarfs decken.

Fünf Jahre nach Veröffentlichung der Wasserstoffstrategien ist die Euphorie der Enttäuschung gewichen. In Deutschland waren bis zum ersten Quartal 2025 nur 170 MW Elektrolysekapazität installiert worden, und das Ziel von 10 GW bis 2030 gilt als nicht mehr erreichbar. Aus internationaler Sicht ist die Lage nicht besser. Laut der Internationalen Energieagentur haben derzeit nur etwa 7 % aller weltweiten Wasserstoffprojekte eine endgültige Investitionsentscheidung durchlaufen und werden daher wahrscheinlich umgesetzt.

In den letzten Monaten gab es zahlreiche Berichte über gestrichene H2-Projekte. Dies betrifft alle Elemente der Lieferkette: Im Juli 2025 stoppte das spanische Energieunternehmen REPSOL ein 200-MW-Projekt in einer Raffinerie in Puertollano, eines der größten geplanten H2-Projekte in Europa. Monate zuvor hatten Equinor (Norwegen) und RWE (Deutschland) ihre gemeinsamen Pläne für eine Wasserstoffpipeline durch die Nordsee annulliert. Diese Pipeline hätte eine zuverlässige Versorgung von Industriekunden in Deutschland und Europa mit Wasserstoff ermöglicht. Kürzlich lehnte der zweitgrößte Stahlproduzent der Welt, ArcelorMittal, ein Angebot der deutschen Regierung ab, mehr als eine Milliarde Euro an Subventionen für die Dekarbonisierung von zwei Stahlwerken zu beziehen. Das Unternehmen sieht die langfristige Versorgung mit Wasserstoff als unsicher an und befürchtet, dass grüne Technologien ihm einen Wettbewerbsnachteil gegenüber internationalen Konkurrenten verschaffen könnten.

Es gibt viele Gründe für die strukturelle Krise beim Ausbau der Wasserstoffwirtschaft. Besorgniserregend ist, dass die beteiligten Unternehmen nicht nur weiche Faktoren (wie unklare Vorschriften) anführen, die bei entsprechenden politischen Willen schnell überwunden werden könnten. Vielmehr argumentieren sie mit den wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen der H2-Wertschöpfungsketten: Wasserstoff ist nach wie vor deutlich teurer als fossile Brennstoffe wie Erdgas. Potenzielle Kunden sind nicht bereit oder in der Lage, für Wasserstoff deutlich höhere Preise zu zahlen als für weniger klimafreundliche Alternativen. Darüber hinaus sind mehrere Elemente der Wasserstoffversorgungsketten technologisch noch nicht ausgereift, wie beispielsweise das Cracken von Ammoniak, um den Transport von H2 in Form eines besser geeigneten Derivats zu ermöglichen.

Trotz all dieser Schwierigkeiten gehen wir davon aus, dass H2 eine Zukunft hat und sich ein Wasserstoffmarkt entwickeln wird, sobald die Umsetzungslücke überwunden werden kann. Die meisten Länder fühlen sich an ihre Klimaschutzverpflichtungen gebunden, und einige Sektoren können ohne Wasserstoff als Energieträger oder Rohstoff kaum dekarbonisiert werden. Darüber hinaus wird die angewandte technische Forschung fortgesetzt, mit dem Potenzial, den Wasserstoffausbau wieder auf die Tagesordnung zu setzen.

Wie sollten Länder mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen und die internationale Zusammenarbeit auf den aktuellen „Wasserstoff-Limbo“ reagieren? Eine abwartende Haltung würde unnötig Zeit kosten. Sinnvoll ist, die Umsetzung von H2-Projekten fortzusetzen und sich dabei auf H2-basierte Lösungen für Herausforderungen der nachhaltigen Entwicklung zu konzentrieren. Zwei Beispiele: 1) Wasserstoff kann zur Dekarbonisierung der Düngemittelindustrie beitragen. Eine dezentrale Düngemittelproduktion auf Basis von emissionsarmem Wasserstoff kann die Ernährungssicherheit in Afrika unterstützen, Treibhausgasemissionen reduzieren und zur Weiterentwicklung der Wasserstofftechnologien beitragen. 2) Als Alternative zur Elektrolyse kann Wasserstoff aus Abwasser gewonnen werden, z. B. durch Fermentation. Dadurch können Umweltbelastungen (z. B. die Eutrophierung von Gewässern) und Gesundheitsrisiken im Zusammenhang mit städtischen Abwässern verringert werden.

Werden verschiedene Entwicklungsziele gleichzeitig verfolgt, verlieren die Kostenunterschiede zwischen Wasserstoff und konventionellen Technologien an Bedeutung. Die skizzierten alternativen Technologien sollten in Forschungspartnerschaften mit dem Globalen Süden entwickelt werden; als wichtiger Bestandteil einer multilateralen Wasserstoffstrategie zur Bewältigung globaler Herausforderungen.

Die Unterstützung des Wiederaufbaus in der Ukraine hat sich seit dem Frühjahr 2022 als wichtiges Element der deutschen Ukraine-Politik herausgebildet. Aufseiten der Bundesregierung hat die Unterstützung des Wiederaufbaus – auch als wesentlicher Teil der zivilen Kriegsunterstützung für das Land – eine hohe Priorität, insbesondere für das in vielen Aspekten federführend tätige BMZ. Gleichzeitig geht das deutsche Engagement für den Wiederaufbau in der Ukraine weit über die Unterstützung durch die Bundesregierung hinaus. Von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen hin zu Städten und Gemeinden gibt es eine große Solidarität mit der ukrainischen Gesellschaft und ihrem unbändigen Willen, das Land gegen die russische Aggression zu verteidigen und schnellstmöglich wieder aufzubauen. Vom weiteren Verlauf des Krieges wird abhängen, wie sich der Wiederaufbau und damit auch seine Unterstützung von Partnern wie Deutschland zukünftig gestalten wird. Unabhängig von den nächsten Kriegsmonaten ist jedoch bereits jetzt klar, dass der Wiederaufbau der Ukraine langfristige internationale Unterstützung über mehrere Jahre erfordern wird. Der Beitrag zeichnet die bisherigen Debatten und Weichenstellungen zum Wiederaufbau der Ukraine systematisch nach und untersucht, wie Deutschland und die Europäische Union den Wiederaufbau bisher unterstützt haben. In einer Bewertung dieses Engagements wird auch ein Blick auf die Herausforderungen und möglichen Grenzen des deutschen und internationalen Engagements geworfen.

Die Unterstützung des Wiederaufbaus in der Ukraine hat sich seit dem Frühjahr 2022 als wichtiges Element der deutschen Ukraine-Politik herausgebildet. Aufseiten der Bundesregierung hat die Unterstützung des Wiederaufbaus – auch als wesentlicher Teil der zivilen Kriegsunterstützung für das Land – eine hohe Priorität, insbesondere für das in vielen Aspekten federführend tätige BMZ. Gleichzeitig geht das deutsche Engagement für den Wiederaufbau in der Ukraine weit über die Unterstützung durch die Bundesregierung hinaus. Von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen hin zu Städten und Gemeinden gibt es eine große Solidarität mit der ukrainischen Gesellschaft und ihrem unbändigen Willen, das Land gegen die russische Aggression zu verteidigen und schnellstmöglich wieder aufzubauen. Vom weiteren Verlauf des Krieges wird abhängen, wie sich der Wiederaufbau und damit auch seine Unterstützung von Partnern wie Deutschland zukünftig gestalten wird. Unabhängig von den nächsten Kriegsmonaten ist jedoch bereits jetzt klar, dass der Wiederaufbau der Ukraine langfristige internationale Unterstützung über mehrere Jahre erfordern wird. Der Beitrag zeichnet die bisherigen Debatten und Weichenstellungen zum Wiederaufbau der Ukraine systematisch nach und untersucht, wie Deutschland und die Europäische Union den Wiederaufbau bisher unterstützt haben. In einer Bewertung dieses Engagements wird auch ein Blick auf die Herausforderungen und möglichen Grenzen des deutschen und internationalen Engagements geworfen.

Why do business allies (not) defect from authoritarian regimes? An emerging scholarship shows that connected businesses face high political risk, and the autocrat can financially pressure business allies during economic crises. And yet, despite their disruptive power, the business elite rarely switch to opposition. I argue that this unexpected loyalty does not always stem from credible power-sharing. The more material quid pro quo the business elite engage in with the dictator, the less they can credibly threaten the dictator with defection. I present a bargaining game between the dictatorship and its business allies and test it using a country-year-level dataset of 76 countries for 1992–2019. The results indicate that higher degrees of patrimonial co-optation lower the risk of business opposition. This effect is partly mediated through the government’s control over the media landscape. These findings suggest that even informal, non-institutional tools of co-optation can effectively deter defection.