Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Despite strategic rivalry, bureaucratic behavior in China and the United States follows strikingly similar logics. Drawing on comparative research across foreign aid, environmental governance, and pandemic response, we show that Chinese and U.S. bureaucrats are often driven by strikingly similar incentives. Career pressures, blame avoidance, political signaling, and risk aversion shape day-to-day decision-making on both sides — frequently producing comparable outcomes, despite very different political systems. Understanding these shared bureaucratic dynamics helps explain why the two superpowers can appear deeply polarized politically, yet are surprisingly predictable in practice. Beneath geopolitical rivalry, common administrative logics continue to anchor state action.

Das Postgraduierten-Programm (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) ist ein renommiertes, neunmonatiges Ausbildungsprogramm für Hochschulabsolvent:innen, das seit 1965 jährlich durchgeführt wird. Ziel ist die gezielte Vorbereitung auf Fach- und Führungsaufgaben in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Verbleibstudie wurde anlässlich des 60-jährigen Programmjubiläums 2025 durchgeführt, um erstmals systematisch die Berufswege und den Nutzen des Programms für die bislang fast 1.000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren. Die Studie basiert auf einer Online-Befragung aller Absolvent:innen der Jahrgänge 1965–2023. Es wurden rund 800 ehemalige Teilnehmer:innen erreicht, von denen sich 366 an der Befragung beteiligten (Rücklaufquote: 46 %). Die Auswertung erfolgte Kohorten vergleichend (10-Jahres-Gruppen), um Hinweise auf über die Zeit erfolgte Veränderungen zu gewinnen. Das PGP des IDOS/DIE hat sich in den Augen der Alumni und Alumnae des Programms als wirkungsvolles Sprungbrett in den Arbeitsbereich der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erwiesen. Es bietet nach ihren Einschätzungen gute Möglichkeiten für Kompetenzaufbau, Netzwerkbildung und persönliche Entwicklung. Die ehemaligen Absolvent:innen empfehlen das Programm überwiegend weiter, sehen aber auch Potenzial für mehr Praxisnähe, Diversität und gezielte Vernetzung. Ihre Aussagen decken sich mit Aussagen, die bereits in den letzten Jahren in Rückmeldungen von den jeweiligen Kursteilnehmenden geäußert wurden. Sie bestätigen damit die Stoßrichtung grundlegender Reformen des Programms im Jahr 2024. Die Ergebnisse dieser Verbleibstudie liefern weitere Hinweise für die Entwicklung des Programms, um es an die sich wandelnden Anforderungen des Arbeitsmarktes und an die Bedürfnisse künftiger Teilnehmender anzupassen. 

 

Das Postgraduierten-Programm (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) ist ein renommiertes, neunmonatiges Ausbildungsprogramm für Hochschulabsolvent:innen, das seit 1965 jährlich durchgeführt wird. Ziel ist die gezielte Vorbereitung auf Fach- und Führungsaufgaben in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Verbleibstudie wurde anlässlich des 60-jährigen Programmjubiläums 2025 durchgeführt, um erstmals systematisch die Berufswege und den Nutzen des Programms für die bislang fast 1.000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren. Die Studie basiert auf einer Online-Befragung aller Absolvent:innen der Jahrgänge 1965–2023. Es wurden rund 800 ehemalige Teilnehmer:innen erreicht, von denen sich 366 an der Befragung beteiligten (Rücklaufquote: 46 %). Die Auswertung erfolgte Kohorten vergleichend (10-Jahres-Gruppen), um Hinweise auf über die Zeit erfolgte Veränderungen zu gewinnen. Das PGP des IDOS/DIE hat sich in den Augen der Alumni und Alumnae des Programms als wirkungsvolles Sprungbrett in den Arbeitsbereich der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erwiesen. Es bietet nach ihren Einschätzungen gute Möglichkeiten für Kompetenzaufbau, Netzwerkbildung und persönliche Entwicklung. Die ehemaligen Absolvent:innen empfehlen das Programm überwiegend weiter, sehen aber auch Potenzial für mehr Praxisnähe, Diversität und gezielte Vernetzung. Ihre Aussagen decken sich mit Aussagen, die bereits in den letzten Jahren in Rückmeldungen von den jeweiligen Kursteilnehmenden geäußert wurden. Sie bestätigen damit die Stoßrichtung grundlegender Reformen des Programms im Jahr 2024. Die Ergebnisse dieser Verbleibstudie liefern weitere Hinweise für die Entwicklung des Programms, um es an die sich wandelnden Anforderungen des Arbeitsmarktes und an die Bedürfnisse künftiger Teilnehmender anzupassen. 

 

Das Postgraduierten-Programm (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) ist ein renommiertes, neunmonatiges Ausbildungsprogramm für Hochschulabsolvent:innen, das seit 1965 jährlich durchgeführt wird. Ziel ist die gezielte Vorbereitung auf Fach- und Führungsaufgaben in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Verbleibstudie wurde anlässlich des 60-jährigen Programmjubiläums 2025 durchgeführt, um erstmals systematisch die Berufswege und den Nutzen des Programms für die bislang fast 1.000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren. Die Studie basiert auf einer Online-Befragung aller Absolvent:innen der Jahrgänge 1965–2023. Es wurden rund 800 ehemalige Teilnehmer:innen erreicht, von denen sich 366 an der Befragung beteiligten (Rücklaufquote: 46 %). Die Auswertung erfolgte Kohorten vergleichend (10-Jahres-Gruppen), um Hinweise auf über die Zeit erfolgte Veränderungen zu gewinnen. Das PGP des IDOS/DIE hat sich in den Augen der Alumni und Alumnae des Programms als wirkungsvolles Sprungbrett in den Arbeitsbereich der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erwiesen. Es bietet nach ihren Einschätzungen gute Möglichkeiten für Kompetenzaufbau, Netzwerkbildung und persönliche Entwicklung. Die ehemaligen Absolvent:innen empfehlen das Programm überwiegend weiter, sehen aber auch Potenzial für mehr Praxisnähe, Diversität und gezielte Vernetzung. Ihre Aussagen decken sich mit Aussagen, die bereits in den letzten Jahren in Rückmeldungen von den jeweiligen Kursteilnehmenden geäußert wurden. Sie bestätigen damit die Stoßrichtung grundlegender Reformen des Programms im Jahr 2024. Die Ergebnisse dieser Verbleibstudie liefern weitere Hinweise für die Entwicklung des Programms, um es an die sich wandelnden Anforderungen des Arbeitsmarktes und an die Bedürfnisse künftiger Teilnehmender anzupassen. 

 

This paper examines how citizens in a large middle-income country evaluate the design of cash transfer programmes, and whether these preferences shift when vulnerability is framed as climate-induced. Using a pre-registered online survey in Brazil, we combined a multi-attribute conjoint experiment with a climate information treatment. Respondents evaluated programmes varying in benefit level, eligibility, conditionalities, implementing actor, payment schedule and financing.
Support depends strongly on perceived fairness and financing choices. Expanding eligibility from extreme poverty to poverty substantially increases approval, while further expansion yields no additional gains. Conditionalities (in particular, empowering ones, such as financial training or health check-ups) raise support, whereas work requirements have heterogeneous effects across different social groups. Financing through personal income tax or cuts to existing programmes enjoys lower levels of approval, while corporate taxation and subsidy reductions are more acceptable. Climate information modestly increases solidaristic attitudes but does not eliminate underlying ideological divides. This study highlights how citizens update not only the extent but also the preferred form of redistribution under climate stress.

 

This paper examines how citizens in a large middle-income country evaluate the design of cash transfer programmes, and whether these preferences shift when vulnerability is framed as climate-induced. Using a pre-registered online survey in Brazil, we combined a multi-attribute conjoint experiment with a climate information treatment. Respondents evaluated programmes varying in benefit level, eligibility, conditionalities, implementing actor, payment schedule and financing.
Support depends strongly on perceived fairness and financing choices. Expanding eligibility from extreme poverty to poverty substantially increases approval, while further expansion yields no additional gains. Conditionalities (in particular, empowering ones, such as financial training or health check-ups) raise support, whereas work requirements have heterogeneous effects across different social groups. Financing through personal income tax or cuts to existing programmes enjoys lower levels of approval, while corporate taxation and subsidy reductions are more acceptable. Climate information modestly increases solidaristic attitudes but does not eliminate underlying ideological divides. This study highlights how citizens update not only the extent but also the preferred form of redistribution under climate stress.

 

This paper examines how citizens in a large middle-income country evaluate the design of cash transfer programmes, and whether these preferences shift when vulnerability is framed as climate-induced. Using a pre-registered online survey in Brazil, we combined a multi-attribute conjoint experiment with a climate information treatment. Respondents evaluated programmes varying in benefit level, eligibility, conditionalities, implementing actor, payment schedule and financing.
Support depends strongly on perceived fairness and financing choices. Expanding eligibility from extreme poverty to poverty substantially increases approval, while further expansion yields no additional gains. Conditionalities (in particular, empowering ones, such as financial training or health check-ups) raise support, whereas work requirements have heterogeneous effects across different social groups. Financing through personal income tax or cuts to existing programmes enjoys lower levels of approval, while corporate taxation and subsidy reductions are more acceptable. Climate information modestly increases solidaristic attitudes but does not eliminate underlying ideological divides. This study highlights how citizens update not only the extent but also the preferred form of redistribution under climate stress.

 

Bundesarbeitsministerin Bärbel Bas will das Renteneintrittsalter an die Beitragsjahre koppeln. Doch zu einer klugen Reform gehören ganz andere Schritte., Bundesarbeitsministerin Bärbel Bas regt für die geplante Rentenreform an, das Renteneintrittsalter an die Dauer der sozialversicherungspflichtigen Beschäftigung zu koppeln. Einige Ökonomen und Politikerinnen begrüßen den Vorschlag. Was auf den ersten Blick als fair erscheinen mag, entpuppt sich ...

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) ist eine der größten und am längsten laufenden multidisziplinären Panelstudien weltweit, für die derzeit jährlich etwa 30.000 Menschen in knapp 15.000 Haushalten befragt werden. Das SOEP hat den Anspruch den gesellschaftlichen Wandel zu erfassen und steht immer neuen vielfältigen Themen- und Aufgabenfeldern gegenüber. Zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt suchen wir eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 12 Wochenstunden.

Sie wirken am Projekt "RDCnet" mit, das den Zugang zu sensiblen Forschungsdaten, wie den Daten des SOEP, für Forschende erleichtern soll. Dafür sollen Datenzugangspunkte direkt an Universitäten und bei anderen Kooperationspartnern bereitgestellt werden. Zur Umsetzung soll eine groß angelegte Bedarfsumfrage durchgeführt werden, die den Fokus Ihrer Tätigkeit darstellt.

Es geht darum, Polen, Italien, Ungarn und Österreich zu instrumentalisieren, sagen Experten. Die Länder sollen viel enger mit den USA zusammenarbeiten. Was hat Trump vor?

The 2023 Tax Expenditures Report, published by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, estimates that Zambia forfeited revenue equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP, representing 7.5 percent of total taxes and levies collected in the year. It is important to note that this figure excludes Value Added Tax (VAT)-related tax expenditures, which, according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), are a substantial source of revenue forgone. Tax expenditures in Zambia are delivered through a variety of mechanisms, including reduced rates, exemptions, and suspensions, applied across both domestic and trade-based taxes.
Transparency: Zambia published its first tax expenditure report, covering fiscal years 2022 and 2023, in December 2024, a milestone toward improving fiscal transparency. To build on this progress, while reinforcing the legal requirement for timely disclosure under the Public Finance Management Act of 2018, Zambia should institutionalise mandatory annual reporting on the cost and effectiveness of tax expenditures, thereby strengthening continuity and public accountability and ensuring this is not a once-off effort.
Complex landscape: Over the years, Zambia has adopted a range of tax incentives through rate adjustments, exemptions, and deferrals—to encourage investment, promote industrial growth, and stimulate trade. These policy tools reflect the government’s broader commitment to using the tax system as a lever for achieving inclusive and sustainable development. However, while these measures serve noble goals, they also add complexity by introducing different rates, exemptions, and rules that make the system harder for taxpayers to navigate.
Evaluation challenges: The absence of a comprehensive evaluation framework requiring regular assessments limits systematic review of TEs. With only one tax expenditure report produced to date, limited historical data also restricts possible evaluations of the economic and fiscal impact of tax incentives. This undermines the ability to determine whether current tax expenditures are achieving their intended policy objectives.
Fiscal sustainability: The fiscal cost of tax expenditures, coupled with Zambia’s mounting debt obligations, pose risks to fiscal sustainability. Without careful monitoring and rationalisation, tax expenditures could erode the domestic revenue base, compromising the country’s ability to meet its development goals.
Policy recommendations:
• Mandate and institutionalise the annual publication of a comprehensive Tax Expenditure Report as part of the National Budget process to support evidence-based policy and fiscal accountability.
• Publish comprehensive reports by December 31 each year, in time to inform the national budget.
• Include detailed disclosures on the scope, legal basis, objectives, and outcomes of each tax expenditure to enable performance evaluation and policy refinement.
• Establish an inter-agency working group (including Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), MoFNP, and Zambia Development Agency (ZDA)) to coordinate the identification, recording, and review of TEs.
• Subject major tax expenditure provisions to periodic cost-benefit analysis to assess their effectiveness and fiscal trade-offs.

The 2023 Tax Expenditures Report, published by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, estimates that Zambia forfeited revenue equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP, representing 7.5 percent of total taxes and levies collected in the year. It is important to note that this figure excludes Value Added Tax (VAT)-related tax expenditures, which, according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), are a substantial source of revenue forgone. Tax expenditures in Zambia are delivered through a variety of mechanisms, including reduced rates, exemptions, and suspensions, applied across both domestic and trade-based taxes.
Transparency: Zambia published its first tax expenditure report, covering fiscal years 2022 and 2023, in December 2024, a milestone toward improving fiscal transparency. To build on this progress, while reinforcing the legal requirement for timely disclosure under the Public Finance Management Act of 2018, Zambia should institutionalise mandatory annual reporting on the cost and effectiveness of tax expenditures, thereby strengthening continuity and public accountability and ensuring this is not a once-off effort.
Complex landscape: Over the years, Zambia has adopted a range of tax incentives through rate adjustments, exemptions, and deferrals—to encourage investment, promote industrial growth, and stimulate trade. These policy tools reflect the government’s broader commitment to using the tax system as a lever for achieving inclusive and sustainable development. However, while these measures serve noble goals, they also add complexity by introducing different rates, exemptions, and rules that make the system harder for taxpayers to navigate.
Evaluation challenges: The absence of a comprehensive evaluation framework requiring regular assessments limits systematic review of TEs. With only one tax expenditure report produced to date, limited historical data also restricts possible evaluations of the economic and fiscal impact of tax incentives. This undermines the ability to determine whether current tax expenditures are achieving their intended policy objectives.
Fiscal sustainability: The fiscal cost of tax expenditures, coupled with Zambia’s mounting debt obligations, pose risks to fiscal sustainability. Without careful monitoring and rationalisation, tax expenditures could erode the domestic revenue base, compromising the country’s ability to meet its development goals.
Policy recommendations:
• Mandate and institutionalise the annual publication of a comprehensive Tax Expenditure Report as part of the National Budget process to support evidence-based policy and fiscal accountability.
• Publish comprehensive reports by December 31 each year, in time to inform the national budget.
• Include detailed disclosures on the scope, legal basis, objectives, and outcomes of each tax expenditure to enable performance evaluation and policy refinement.
• Establish an inter-agency working group (including Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), MoFNP, and Zambia Development Agency (ZDA)) to coordinate the identification, recording, and review of TEs.
• Subject major tax expenditure provisions to periodic cost-benefit analysis to assess their effectiveness and fiscal trade-offs.

The 2023 Tax Expenditures Report, published by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, estimates that Zambia forfeited revenue equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP, representing 7.5 percent of total taxes and levies collected in the year. It is important to note that this figure excludes Value Added Tax (VAT)-related tax expenditures, which, according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), are a substantial source of revenue forgone. Tax expenditures in Zambia are delivered through a variety of mechanisms, including reduced rates, exemptions, and suspensions, applied across both domestic and trade-based taxes.
Transparency: Zambia published its first tax expenditure report, covering fiscal years 2022 and 2023, in December 2024, a milestone toward improving fiscal transparency. To build on this progress, while reinforcing the legal requirement for timely disclosure under the Public Finance Management Act of 2018, Zambia should institutionalise mandatory annual reporting on the cost and effectiveness of tax expenditures, thereby strengthening continuity and public accountability and ensuring this is not a once-off effort.
Complex landscape: Over the years, Zambia has adopted a range of tax incentives through rate adjustments, exemptions, and deferrals—to encourage investment, promote industrial growth, and stimulate trade. These policy tools reflect the government’s broader commitment to using the tax system as a lever for achieving inclusive and sustainable development. However, while these measures serve noble goals, they also add complexity by introducing different rates, exemptions, and rules that make the system harder for taxpayers to navigate.
Evaluation challenges: The absence of a comprehensive evaluation framework requiring regular assessments limits systematic review of TEs. With only one tax expenditure report produced to date, limited historical data also restricts possible evaluations of the economic and fiscal impact of tax incentives. This undermines the ability to determine whether current tax expenditures are achieving their intended policy objectives.
Fiscal sustainability: The fiscal cost of tax expenditures, coupled with Zambia’s mounting debt obligations, pose risks to fiscal sustainability. Without careful monitoring and rationalisation, tax expenditures could erode the domestic revenue base, compromising the country’s ability to meet its development goals.
Policy recommendations:
• Mandate and institutionalise the annual publication of a comprehensive Tax Expenditure Report as part of the National Budget process to support evidence-based policy and fiscal accountability.
• Publish comprehensive reports by December 31 each year, in time to inform the national budget.
• Include detailed disclosures on the scope, legal basis, objectives, and outcomes of each tax expenditure to enable performance evaluation and policy refinement.
• Establish an inter-agency working group (including Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), MoFNP, and Zambia Development Agency (ZDA)) to coordinate the identification, recording, and review of TEs.
• Subject major tax expenditure provisions to periodic cost-benefit analysis to assess their effectiveness and fiscal trade-offs.

BMZ (Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development or Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) is consulting on how to implement a material reduction in its Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In this paper, we review where remaining funds would have the greatest impact, and propose a series of reforms accordingly. We recommend:

Focussed thematic allocation: Germany’s development projects have been substantially diluted over the last decade. We find that BMZ projects have progressively targeted a broader range of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The number of projects that target more than four goals, for example has risen almost nine-fold from 72 to over 600 in the last ten years. Evidence suggests that less complex measures would have been more efficient and effective.We suggest focussing on 4–5 SDGs that align with the Government’s priorities and BMZ’s expertise render overall ODA allocation more effective.

Strategic country allocations: BMZ currently funds projects in a 110 of the 141 ODA-eligible countries in total. It seems clear this will need to be reduced. Providing development finance makes the biggest difference to those in greatest need, so we undertake an analysis to ascertain the level of ODA that each of these recipients receives from other countries, expressed in terms of ODA per person in extreme poverty. We identify 31 BMZ partner countries that are under-prioritised—of which 13 are significantly under-prioritised. In contrast, we find 48 countries that are over-prioritised by other providers. We urge BMZ to fully protect budgets in the 31 under-prioritised countries, and concentrate reductions in the 48 over-prioritised. This enhances the impact of BMZ funding overall and enables German funding to represent a larger and more influential share of recipients’ economies.

Sharpening instruments: Over the last five years, funding for the “Multilateral and European development cooperation” federal budget instrument has been cut by 34 percent, while there has been 20 percent cuts in bilateral efforts. Germany is below average in the share of its international finance that is allocated multilaterally. We argue this split should be reversed. First, multilateral organisations are assessed as highly effective by independent assessments, and surveys of the German public also suggest they garner a high level of trust. But there is an additional compelling geopolitical case for allocating funding multilaterally. Following the abrupt withdrawal of the United States from a number of organisations, the international system is more vulnerable than ever. It is difficult envisage a future where Germany is secure and prosperous if the multilateral system fails to endure. We urge the German government to shield its multilateral contributions in from these cuts, refocus earmarked multilateral spend towards core funding, and increase its core multilateral share to at least 40 percent in the next two years. Regarding the remaining bilateral share, we propose that Germany reconsider its current approach to the volume and tendering of technical assistance.

BMZ (Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development or Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) is consulting on how to implement a material reduction in its Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In this paper, we review where remaining funds would have the greatest impact, and propose a series of reforms accordingly. We recommend:

Focussed thematic allocation: Germany’s development projects have been substantially diluted over the last decade. We find that BMZ projects have progressively targeted a broader range of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The number of projects that target more than four goals, for example has risen almost nine-fold from 72 to over 600 in the last ten years. Evidence suggests that less complex measures would have been more efficient and effective.We suggest focussing on 4–5 SDGs that align with the Government’s priorities and BMZ’s expertise render overall ODA allocation more effective.

Strategic country allocations: BMZ currently funds projects in a 110 of the 141 ODA-eligible countries in total. It seems clear this will need to be reduced. Providing development finance makes the biggest difference to those in greatest need, so we undertake an analysis to ascertain the level of ODA that each of these recipients receives from other countries, expressed in terms of ODA per person in extreme poverty. We identify 31 BMZ partner countries that are under-prioritised—of which 13 are significantly under-prioritised. In contrast, we find 48 countries that are over-prioritised by other providers. We urge BMZ to fully protect budgets in the 31 under-prioritised countries, and concentrate reductions in the 48 over-prioritised. This enhances the impact of BMZ funding overall and enables German funding to represent a larger and more influential share of recipients’ economies.

Sharpening instruments: Over the last five years, funding for the “Multilateral and European development cooperation” federal budget instrument has been cut by 34 percent, while there has been 20 percent cuts in bilateral efforts. Germany is below average in the share of its international finance that is allocated multilaterally. We argue this split should be reversed. First, multilateral organisations are assessed as highly effective by independent assessments, and surveys of the German public also suggest they garner a high level of trust. But there is an additional compelling geopolitical case for allocating funding multilaterally. Following the abrupt withdrawal of the United States from a number of organisations, the international system is more vulnerable than ever. It is difficult envisage a future where Germany is secure and prosperous if the multilateral system fails to endure. We urge the German government to shield its multilateral contributions in from these cuts, refocus earmarked multilateral spend towards core funding, and increase its core multilateral share to at least 40 percent in the next two years. Regarding the remaining bilateral share, we propose that Germany reconsider its current approach to the volume and tendering of technical assistance.

BMZ (Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development or Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) is consulting on how to implement a material reduction in its Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In this paper, we review where remaining funds would have the greatest impact, and propose a series of reforms accordingly. We recommend:

Focussed thematic allocation: Germany’s development projects have been substantially diluted over the last decade. We find that BMZ projects have progressively targeted a broader range of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The number of projects that target more than four goals, for example has risen almost nine-fold from 72 to over 600 in the last ten years. Evidence suggests that less complex measures would have been more efficient and effective.We suggest focussing on 4–5 SDGs that align with the Government’s priorities and BMZ’s expertise render overall ODA allocation more effective.

Strategic country allocations: BMZ currently funds projects in a 110 of the 141 ODA-eligible countries in total. It seems clear this will need to be reduced. Providing development finance makes the biggest difference to those in greatest need, so we undertake an analysis to ascertain the level of ODA that each of these recipients receives from other countries, expressed in terms of ODA per person in extreme poverty. We identify 31 BMZ partner countries that are under-prioritised—of which 13 are significantly under-prioritised. In contrast, we find 48 countries that are over-prioritised by other providers. We urge BMZ to fully protect budgets in the 31 under-prioritised countries, and concentrate reductions in the 48 over-prioritised. This enhances the impact of BMZ funding overall and enables German funding to represent a larger and more influential share of recipients’ economies.

Sharpening instruments: Over the last five years, funding for the “Multilateral and European development cooperation” federal budget instrument has been cut by 34 percent, while there has been 20 percent cuts in bilateral efforts. Germany is below average in the share of its international finance that is allocated multilaterally. We argue this split should be reversed. First, multilateral organisations are assessed as highly effective by independent assessments, and surveys of the German public also suggest they garner a high level of trust. But there is an additional compelling geopolitical case for allocating funding multilaterally. Following the abrupt withdrawal of the United States from a number of organisations, the international system is more vulnerable than ever. It is difficult envisage a future where Germany is secure and prosperous if the multilateral system fails to endure. We urge the German government to shield its multilateral contributions in from these cuts, refocus earmarked multilateral spend towards core funding, and increase its core multilateral share to at least 40 percent in the next two years. Regarding the remaining bilateral share, we propose that Germany reconsider its current approach to the volume and tendering of technical assistance.

Deutsche Wirtschaft nach zwei Rezessionsjahren in diesem Jahr mit kleinem Wachstum von 0,2 Prozent – Dank fiskalpolitischer Impulse geht es 2026 und 2027 deutlich stärker aufwärts, um 1,3 und 1,6 Prozent – Weltwirtschaft trotz US-Zollpolitik robuster als erwartet Die deutsche Wirtschaft nimmt einen ...