This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Le 16 septembre, Moscou accueillera la première session de la commission intergouvernementale russo-burkinabè. Elle se tient dans un contexte budgétaire précis. Selon le Secrétaire général de la Primature, Abdou-Salam Gampéné, l'État burkinabè a consacré environ 60 milliards de F CFA à la subvention du gasoil sur les six premiers mois de 2026, un montant qui aurait pu dépasser 135 milliards d'ici la fin de l'année sans ajustement. C'est ce qui a conduit Ouagadougou à relever, le 10 août 2026, le prix du litre de gasoil de 675 à 750 FCFA - première hausse depuis 2022. Le gouvernement évoque aussi une « surconsommation transfrontalière » : le gasoil burkinabè, moins cher que chez ses voisins, attirerait des transporteurs étrangers venus faire le plein, avec une consommation nationale évaluée à 365 millions de litres sur le premier semestre.
Une Russie elle-même en pénurie
C'est dans ce contexte que la fiabilité de la Russie comme fournisseur énergétique mérite d'être examinée avec des chiffres. Les frappes ukrainiennes ont fait chuter le raffinage russe à son plus bas niveau depuis vingt ans - 3,6 millions de barils/jour en juillet 2026, environ un tiers sous la norme saisonnière, selon une analyse du Financial Times relayée par la presse spécialisée. Kyiv revendique avoir touché au moins 24 des 34 plus grandes raffineries russes en une cinquantaine de frappes. Résultat : Moscou a interdit ses exportations d'essence jusqu'à fin 2026 et, fait rare pour l'un des principaux producteurs mondiaux d'hydrocarbures, a dû commencer à importer du carburant - d'abord depuis l'Inde (une première cargaison de la raffinerie de Vadinar, en partie détenue par Rosneft, est arrivée début août), puis depuis le Maroc, avec des cargaisons acheminées jusqu'en Arctique. Selon le Kyiv School of Economics Institute, les exportations russes de diesel et de gasoil sont tombées à environ 580 000 barils/jour en juin, contre 900 000 à 1 million habituellement. Cette contraction expose particulièrement les pays qui dépendaient fortement du diesel et du gasoil russes entre janvier 2025 et juin 2026. Selon le KSE Institute, la Russie représentait 87 % des importations de ces produits en Turquie, 76 % en Tunisie, 61 % au Ghana, 54 % au Sénégal et 32 % au Maroc. Ces niveaux de dépendance révèlent une vulnérabilité importante face à la baisse des exportations russes, sans permettre d'affirmer, à ce stade, que chacun de ces pays connaît effectivement une pénurie.
Ce que cela signifie pour Ouagadougou
Le paradoxe est réel : au moment même où Moscou promet d'accompagner la souveraineté énergétique du Burkina Faso, elle importe elle-même du carburant étranger pour approvisionner son propre marché intérieur. Cela ne signifie pas que la coopération russo-burkinabè est vide de contenu - Moscou a multiplié les annonces dans la défense, les mines et les infrastructures électriques, et le Burkina a accordé en 2025 un permis d'exploitation d'or à la société russe Nordgold - Cependant cela pose une question factuelle simple, à vérifier lors de la session du 16 septembre : la Russie a-t-elle aujourd'hui la capacité industrielle excédentaire pour honorer un engagement carburant vis-à-vis d'un partenaire extérieur, alors qu'elle peine à couvrir sa propre demande intérieure et celle de clients de longue date comme la Turquie ou la Tunisie ? Pour le Burkina Faso, dont la SONABHY doit déjà arbitrer entre stabilité des prix et soutenabilité budgétaire, la réponse à cette question conditionne en partie la diversification de ses sources d'approvisionnement, actuellement tournées vers les ports d'Abidjan et de Lagos. C'est un point à surveiller concrètement lors de la commission intergouvernementale de septembre : les engagements pris seront-ils assortis de volumes, de délais et de mécanismes de financement vérifiables, ou resteront-ils, comme les précédents, de l'ordre de l'annonce ?
13. August 2026 – Die Blockade der Straße von Hormus ab Ende Februar hat den Ölmarkt in einer Konstellation weltweit schwacher Nachfrage und steigendem Ölangebot getroffen. Aufgrund des Angebotsschocks stieg der Ölpreis kurzzeitig auf über 110 US-Dollar pro Barrel. Die Konstellation von schwacher Nachfrage und Angebotsausweitung würde eigentlich zu einem sinkenden Ölpreis führen – zum Jahresende 2025 kostete ein Barrel Rohöl tatsächlich unter 60 US-Dollar, ein für manche Förderländer nicht mehr tragfähiger Preis. Bisher haben vor allem Nicht-OPEC-Länder ihr Angebot ausgeweitet. Auch innerhalb der OPEC ist die Geschlossenheit brüchig geworden: Die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate sind im Mai 2026 ausgetreten und planen mehr Öl zu fördern. Wenn Öltanker die Straße von Hormus wieder wie früher passieren können, dürfte erneut die Konstellation von steigendem Angebot bei schwacher Nachfrage zum Tragen kommen. Noch zeichnet sich indes keine vollständige und dauerhafte Öffnung der Straße von Hormus ab, zumal zunächst Minen geräumt und Sicherheitsgarantien geklärt werden müssen. Darüber hinaus bleiben Seewege anfällig, was künftig zu höheren Versicherungsprämien und volatileren Ölpreisen führen dürfte.