Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt ist Voraussetzung für die Bewältigung der Umwelt-, Sicherheits- und  transformationsherausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts. Der WBGU empfiehlt daher, gesellschaftliche, wirtschaftliche und politische Teilhabe strukturell zu stärken, Bildungsfinanzierung als Zukunftsinvestition auszugestalten, Kommunen handlungsfähiger zu machen und politische Kommunikation auf Zusammenhalt statt Polarisierung auszurichten. So kann demokratische Handlungsfähigkeit gestärkt und Sicherheit umfassender gedacht werden.

Leitautor:innen: Jörg E. Drewes, Anna-Katharina Hornidge, Aletta Bonn, Kai Maaz, Karen Pittel,Hans-Otto Pörtner, Sabine Schlacke, Claudia Traidl-Hoffmann, Joscha Wullweber
Mitautor:innen: Julia Behrens, Mareike Blum, Kerstin Burghaus, Catharina Caspari, Astrid Dähn, Verena Engelhardt, Tallulah Gundelach, Paula Haufe, Magdalena Knabl, Katharina Michael, Alexander Mitranescu, Katharina Molitor, Jürgen Orasche, Marion Schulte zu Berge, Astrid Schulz, Jan Siegmeier, Nikola Tietze

Pressemitteilung der Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München e. V. in Kooperation mit dem Österreichischen Institut für Wirt­schaftsforschung (WIFO), Kiel ...

Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread, regressive, and environmentally costly, yet abrupt removal can raise poverty. To identify a practical reform pathway, we evaluate the effectiveness of compensatory policies grounded in existing national social protection systems. We develop a high-resolution global social accounting matrix to quantify how reallocating subsidies through actual social assistance impacts poverty, inequality, and CO2 emissions. Without compensation, reform lowers emissions but increases poverty, especially for low-income households in emerging economies. Redirecting funds via social assistance disproportionately benefits the bottom half and reduces national poverty, particularly under targeted cash transfers or expanded programs where savings are large. However, full revenue recycling is not always desirable: Once vulnerable households are adequately protected, additional recycling can weaken both fiscal and climate gains. We therefore treat full recycling through social assistance as an analytical benchmark rather than a policy prescription and show that partial, targeted recycling, as illustrated by retaining roughly 20% of savings while channeling the remainder through social protection, can still reduce poverty while preserving emissions cuts. Overall, fossil fuel subsidy reform is most effective when social assistance is used to compensate low-income households, not to absorb all fiscal savings, leaving residual revenues available for other public priorities.

 

Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread, regressive, and environmentally costly, yet abrupt removal can raise poverty. To identify a practical reform pathway, we evaluate the effectiveness of compensatory policies grounded in existing national social protection systems. We develop a high-resolution global social accounting matrix to quantify how reallocating subsidies through actual social assistance impacts poverty, inequality, and CO2 emissions. Without compensation, reform lowers emissions but increases poverty, especially for low-income households in emerging economies. Redirecting funds via social assistance disproportionately benefits the bottom half and reduces national poverty, particularly under targeted cash transfers or expanded programs where savings are large. However, full revenue recycling is not always desirable: Once vulnerable households are adequately protected, additional recycling can weaken both fiscal and climate gains. We therefore treat full recycling through social assistance as an analytical benchmark rather than a policy prescription and show that partial, targeted recycling, as illustrated by retaining roughly 20% of savings while channeling the remainder through social protection, can still reduce poverty while preserving emissions cuts. Overall, fossil fuel subsidy reform is most effective when social assistance is used to compensate low-income households, not to absorb all fiscal savings, leaving residual revenues available for other public priorities.

 

Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread, regressive, and environmentally costly, yet abrupt removal can raise poverty. To identify a practical reform pathway, we evaluate the effectiveness of compensatory policies grounded in existing national social protection systems. We develop a high-resolution global social accounting matrix to quantify how reallocating subsidies through actual social assistance impacts poverty, inequality, and CO2 emissions. Without compensation, reform lowers emissions but increases poverty, especially for low-income households in emerging economies. Redirecting funds via social assistance disproportionately benefits the bottom half and reduces national poverty, particularly under targeted cash transfers or expanded programs where savings are large. However, full revenue recycling is not always desirable: Once vulnerable households are adequately protected, additional recycling can weaken both fiscal and climate gains. We therefore treat full recycling through social assistance as an analytical benchmark rather than a policy prescription and show that partial, targeted recycling, as illustrated by retaining roughly 20% of savings while channeling the remainder through social protection, can still reduce poverty while preserving emissions cuts. Overall, fossil fuel subsidy reform is most effective when social assistance is used to compensate low-income households, not to absorb all fiscal savings, leaving residual revenues available for other public priorities.

 

Die Forschungsgruppe Gender Economics ging aus dem Forschungsbereich Gender Studies hervor und untersucht Gender Gaps am Arbeitsmarkt sowie die gleichstellungspolitischen Auswirkungen von Steuer-, Sozial- und Familienpolitik. Die Forschung im Bereich Gender Gaps am Arbeitsmarkt konzentriert sich auf die Unterschiede in den Verdiensten von Frauen und Männern sowie auf die geringe Repräsentation von Frauen in Führungspositionen in der Wirtschaft. Zudem forscht die Gruppe in mehreren Projekten zu den Auswirkungen familienpolitischer Maßnahmen wie z.B. Elterngeld, Kita-Ausbau und Ehegattensplitting in Bezug auf die Erwerbsbeteiligung und Lohnentwicklung von Frauen. Die Forschungsgruppe ist Teil der Abteilung Staat.

Zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt suchen wir für Projektarbeiten einen Wissenschaftlerin (w/m/d) (Für den Zeitraum 1. November 2026 bis 31. Januar 2028, Teilzeit mit 75 % der regulären Arbeitszeit).

DIW-Studie stellt Screening-Verfahren vor, um Wettbewerbsverstöße aufzudecken – Auffällige Aussagen zu Strategie und Wettbewerb in Analystenkonferenzen werden herausgefiltert – Verwenden mehrere Wettbewerber gleichzeitig oder wiederholt dieselben auffälligen Formulierungen, ist das ein Indiz für ...

This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.

This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.

This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.

Nach den Landtagswahlen in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Berlin kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), die Wahlergebnisse wie folgt: 

Dieser Wahltag war ein weiterer schlechter Tag für unsere Demokratie. Die AfD hat in beiden Bundesländern stark zugelegt. Da in beiden Ländern nun Dreierkoalitionen zur Regierungsbildung nötig sein werden, dürfte die Umsetzung dringend notwendiger Reformprogramme noch schwieriger werden.

Diese Wahlergebnisse sind ein weiteres Misstrauensvotum für die Bundesregierung. Für die Bundesregierung wird es nun noch schwieriger werden, den Mut und die politische Unterstützung für ein grundlegendes Reformprogramm zu mobilisieren. Wenn CDU, CSU und SPD weiterhin an ihren roten Linien festhalten, wird sich die politische Lähmung verfestigen, die wirtschaftliche Schwäche fortsetzen und die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Wahlsiegs der AfD 2029 weiter steigen.

Das Versprechen eines Tankrabatts zwei Tage vor der Wahl hat wohl weder der CDU noch der SPD entscheidend geholfen. Die falsche Lehre für die Bundesregierung wäre nun der Versuch, die Bürgerinnen und Bürger mit Wahlgeschenken wie dem Tankrabatt ruhigzustellen. Die Energiekrise wird sich mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit verschärfen. Die Bundesregierung braucht jetzt einen überzeugenden Plan, wie sie Menschen und Unternehmen sozial und wirtschaftlich ausgewogen entlastet. Dafür wird sie das Steuersystem reformieren und Subventionen abbauen müssen. Genauso wichtig sind Strukturreformen, die Deutschland wirtschaftlich voranbringen und die Sorgen der Menschen nachhaltig beantworten.

Deutschland hat noch immer alle Karten in der Hand, um seine eigene Zukunft zu bestimmen. Dafür braucht es jetzt jedoch einen Pakt zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft: mutige Reformen umzusetzen und auch seitens der Wirtschaft mehr Verantwortung zu übernehmen. Stetes Klagen über die Politik wird nicht ausreichen, um Deutschland zukunftsfähig zu machen.