Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Photos

jQuery(document).ready(function($){$("#isloaderfor-yjodob").fadeOut(300, function () { $(".pagwrap-yjodob").fadeIn(300);});});

Peacekeeping missions today operate in increasingly complex and volatile environments often characterized by fragile political processes, asymmetric warfare by non-state armed groups, transnational criminal networks, rapid technological changes, and the growing impacts of climate-related vulnerability. These evolving dynamics have heightened the risks faced by both civilians and peacekeepers, reinforcing the central importance of protection of civilians (POC) and the safety and security of personnel.

In this context, IPI convened T/PCCs for the first in a series of informal discussions on the future of peace operations on April 30th. This initial meeting explored T/PCCs’ perspectives on emerging threats to civilians and peacekeepers, as well as the measures, processes, and capabilities required to enable peacekeepers to deliver on their mandates. Drawing on the operational experience of T/PCCs, the discussion generated practical insights into how peacekeepers’ capabilities can be better aligned with evolving conditions on the ground and changing political and financial contexts to ensure their safety and security. It also considered the policy responses required from the UN.

Welcoming Remarks
Jenna Russo, IPI Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding
Lieutenant-Colonel Royal Marines Jonas van Hooren, Permanent Mission of  the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN

Opening Remarks
Lieutenant-General Mohan Subramanian, Director of the Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership, DPO

Moderator
Bitania Tadesse, Policy Specialist for Africa, IPI

The post Roundtable with Troop and Police Contributing Countries on Responding to Evolving Threats to Peacekeepers’ Safety and Security appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Am Donnerstagmittag kam es in Vivo Morcote TI zu einem schlimmen Unglück. Ein Kleinkind wurde in einen Swimmingpool gefunden und starb später im Spital.

Der Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) hat heute beschlossen, die Leitzinssätze unverändert zu belassen. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die EZB befindet sich in einem klassischen geldpolitischen Dilemma: Die Inflation steigt deutlich, vor allem bei Energie, während sich die Konjunktur eintrübt. Die Unsicherheit ist wegen des Iran-Kriegs enorm hoch, die Risiken einer weiter steigenden Inflation sind erheblich. Daher ist es klug, dass die EZB nun zunächst vorsichtig agiert und abwartet, ob es Grund zur Entwarnung gibt oder die geopolitischen Konflikte erneut eskalieren.

Die größte Gefahr für die EZB ist eine Abkopplung der Inflationserwartungen von der tatsächlichen Inflation. Einige Indikatoren, insbesondere bei den Konsumentinnen und Konsumenten, deuten auf einen zu starken Anstieg der Inflationserwartungen hin. Daher war es notwendig, dass EZB-Präsidentin Lagarde mit ihrer Kommunikation den Weg für eine erste Zinserhöhung im Juni geebnet hat.

Die EZB ist jedoch gut beraten, Vorsicht walten zu lassen und den Bogen bei den Zinserhöhungen nicht zu überspannen. Die Wirtschaft im Euroraum hat sich bereits erheblich abgeschwächt. Die Finanzierungsbedingungen haben sich verschlechtert, sodass diese Entwicklungen bereits einen Teil des Drucks von der Preisentwicklung nehmen. Zudem gibt es zunehmende Sorgen um die Staatsfinanzen mancher Mitgliedsländer und deren Implikationen für Risikoaufschläge und Finanzstabilität.

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have gained widespread popularity as a conservation strategy, promoted as a ‘win-win’ solution benefitting nature, local communities and economic development simultaneously. This chapter challenges the ideal vision of PES by examining common issues in watershed programmes, particularly in Latin America. Despite their theoretical appeal, PES schemes face fundamental challenges that undermine their promised benefits. Complex ecological systems resist the simplified economic models underlying PES, making accurate measurement and valuation of ecosystem services problematic. Power asymmetries enable wealthy downstream users to impose restrictions on marginalised upstream communities, perpetuating historical inequality rather than alleviating poverty. PES can also produce unintended environmental consequences through leakage, counterproductive incentives and erosion of intrinsic conservation motivations. Rather than offering a panacea, PES usually functions as a politically charged mechanism, consolidating resource control among powerful actors while deflecting environmental responsibility onto vulnerable communities, thus raises serious questions about its fairness and effectiveness.

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have gained widespread popularity as a conservation strategy, promoted as a ‘win-win’ solution benefitting nature, local communities and economic development simultaneously. This chapter challenges the ideal vision of PES by examining common issues in watershed programmes, particularly in Latin America. Despite their theoretical appeal, PES schemes face fundamental challenges that undermine their promised benefits. Complex ecological systems resist the simplified economic models underlying PES, making accurate measurement and valuation of ecosystem services problematic. Power asymmetries enable wealthy downstream users to impose restrictions on marginalised upstream communities, perpetuating historical inequality rather than alleviating poverty. PES can also produce unintended environmental consequences through leakage, counterproductive incentives and erosion of intrinsic conservation motivations. Rather than offering a panacea, PES usually functions as a politically charged mechanism, consolidating resource control among powerful actors while deflecting environmental responsibility onto vulnerable communities, thus raises serious questions about its fairness and effectiveness.

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have gained widespread popularity as a conservation strategy, promoted as a ‘win-win’ solution benefitting nature, local communities and economic development simultaneously. This chapter challenges the ideal vision of PES by examining common issues in watershed programmes, particularly in Latin America. Despite their theoretical appeal, PES schemes face fundamental challenges that undermine their promised benefits. Complex ecological systems resist the simplified economic models underlying PES, making accurate measurement and valuation of ecosystem services problematic. Power asymmetries enable wealthy downstream users to impose restrictions on marginalised upstream communities, perpetuating historical inequality rather than alleviating poverty. PES can also produce unintended environmental consequences through leakage, counterproductive incentives and erosion of intrinsic conservation motivations. Rather than offering a panacea, PES usually functions as a politically charged mechanism, consolidating resource control among powerful actors while deflecting environmental responsibility onto vulnerable communities, thus raises serious questions about its fairness and effectiveness.

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) ist im April leicht auf 97,9 Punkte gestiegen. Nach dem Vier-Jahres-Hoch im Februar, gefolgt von einem deutlichen Rückgang im März, verharrt der Barometerwert damit weiter unterhalb der neutralen 100-Punkte-Marke, ...

Frauenanteil bei Polizei, Rettungsdienst und Feuerwehr meist nicht höher als ein Drittel – Zugangsvoraussetzungen und Geschlechterstereotype sind große Hürden – Berufsfeld muss für Frauen attraktiver werden, um Gleichstellung zu verbessern und Arbeitskräftemangel zu begegnen Frauen sind in den ...

Operational sustainability is a key component of IDOS’s institutional development. With this DNK declaration, we are presenting our first voluntary sustainability report for the year 2024. The report highlights our activities and progress in the areas of corporate governance, environment and society, and demonstrates how we systematically integrate sustainable practices into our institutional development.

Operational sustainability is a key component of IDOS’s institutional development. With this DNK declaration, we are presenting our first voluntary sustainability report for the year 2024. The report highlights our activities and progress in the areas of corporate governance, environment and society, and demonstrates how we systematically integrate sustainable practices into our institutional development.

Operational sustainability is a key component of IDOS’s institutional development. With this DNK declaration, we are presenting our first voluntary sustainability report for the year 2024. The report highlights our activities and progress in the areas of corporate governance, environment and society, and demonstrates how we systematically integrate sustainable practices into our institutional development.

Tuesday 28 April

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Keiner hat in einer Serie-A-Saison jemals mehr Vorlagen geliefert als Inter Mailands Federico Dimarco. Auch in der Bundesliga und in der Premier League könnte der Rekord noch fallen.

Verspätete Flüge, gestrichene Verbindungen: Was passiert dann mit der Mietauto-Buchung? Worauf du achten musst, wenn du dein Auto für die Ferien auswählst.