Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

- Agenda / Grèce, France - Régions

Implementing the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda and mainstreaming gender have the potential to make UN peacekeeping operations more operationally effective, including by improving situational awareness and strengthening mission planning. Within this effort, military gender advisers (MGAs) play a central role in integrating a gender perspective across the military components of UN missions.

This policy paper examines the role of MGAs in UN peacekeeping operations, drawing on interviews and survey data from gender advisers and focal points across missions.

It discusses how MGAs are situated within the UN Peacekeeping Gender Architecture, variations in recruitment and training of MGAs, and the wide range of roles and responsibilities of MGAs. Furthermore, the paper identifies persistent challenges, including unclear job descriptions, short deployment cycles, limited training, and difficulties in coordination with civilian counterparts. The paper finds that the effectiveness of MGAs is shaped by factors such as leadership support, professional background, gender and cultural dynamics, and resource constraints. It underscores that as peacekeeping operations face financial pressures and structural reforms, ensuring that gender advisers are adequately trained, resourced, and integrated into mission planning will be critical to maintaining operational effectiveness.

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The post The Role of Military Gender Advisers in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Implications for Operational Effectiveness and The Future of Peacekeeping Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.

The African Union’s admission to the G20 as a permanent member in 2023 marked a major milestone in global economic governance, giving the continent its first collective seat at one of the most influential decision-making forums on debt, trade, climate finance, and development. While this corrected a long-standing imbalance in representation, key questions remain about whether this institutional presence will translate into substantive influence.

This issue brief examines how the AU organizes its participation in the G20 and assesses the progress made under South Africa’s 2025 presidency, particularly on debt sustainability. It highlights initiatives such as the ministerial declaration on debt and the Africa Expert Panel proposals for reforms to the global debt architecture, while underscoring the continued limitations of existing G20 mechanisms, and the structural challenges posed by high borrowing costs..

The brief finds that while Africa has generated momentum within the G20, sustaining progress will require stronger coordination within the AU, the operationalization of key institutional mechanisms, and a more focused and strategic approach to advancing continental priorities in a shifting geopolitical landscape.

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The post Africa in the G20 and Debt Sustainability appeared first on International Peace Institute.

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IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations cohosted a policy forum, “Examining the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund in UN Peace Operation Contexts” on April 9th.

The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is designed to support catalytic, timely, and risk-tolerant investments through projects that contribute to advancing national peacebuilding priorities. Over the past two decades, the PBF has supported programming in over twenty contexts where the UN has deployed a peace operation and has often played a crucial role during mission transitions. The purpose of this event is to examine the role of the Fund in UN peace operation settings. The event will also serve to launch an IPI publication, “UN Peace Operations and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund,” authored by Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst at IPI.

Building on the insights of the report, this forum brought together representatives of the UN Secretariat, member states, and civil society organizations to discuss how the PBF has been leveraged in peace operation settings and how it can “further enhance its support” to countries preparing for or undergoing transitions from peace operations, in line with the recommendations of the recent review of the UN peacebuilding architecture (PBAR).

Opening Remarks:
Djeyhoun Ostowar, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Political Affairs Section, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN

Speakers:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute
Bushra Hassan, Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser, Peacebuilding Fund Support Branch, Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office
Anayansi Lopez, Head of Pillar, Civil Affairs, Human Rights, Guidance and Learning, Policy and Best Practices Service, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peace Operations
Anees Ahmed, Director, Rule of Law Advisory Section, UN Mission in South Sudan (VTC)
Sheila Romen, Coordinator, Peacebuilding Fund Secretariat in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Resident Coordinators Office (VTC)

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, International Peace Institute

The post Examining the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund in UN Peace Operation Contexts appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Viele Hundebesitzer umarmen ihre Vierbeiner instinktiv und behandeln sie wie Familienmitglieder. Für Menschen ist Kuscheln ein Zeichen von Liebe und Schutz – Hunde interpretieren diese Geste jedoch oft anders.

In the second policy paper of the collection The Iran reckoning: Essays on a war the West was not ready for, Constantine Capsaskis examines the critical implications of the Iran crisis for Greece’s defence policy.

The ongoing conflict between Iran and the combined forces of the United States and Israel emphatically underlines that we are moving towards a new era of warfare. The mass use of Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAV), first witnessed on the battlegrounds of Ukraine, is set to become the defining instrument of war. The war in the Gulf has also revealed the substantial cost associated with intercepting these UAVs with sophisticated air and missile defence systems, with a single drone often costing just a fraction of the interceptors used to bring it down. Additionally, with stockpiles of these high-end defensive missile systems dwindling due to the protracted conflict, serious questions over their production rates are also being raised. This paper seeks to address these issues in detail and examine how they impact Greece’s defensive planning.

• The battlefields of Ukraine and Iran herald a new age of warfare, often dubbed “Precise Mass”. In this, state and non-state actors can engage in precise strikes en masse, at both short and long range.
• There is a substantial cost asymmetry in intercepting cheap Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAV) using high-end air and missile defence systems, including the United States’ Patriot and Israeli Arrow systems.
• With stockpiles being depleted rapidly in the Gulf, defence industry production lines that were already stressed due to the global increase in defence spending could face delays.
• Exacerbating the situation, core materials used in the production of these defence systems are facing acute shortages, in large part due to the introduction by China of export controls on processed rare earths.
• As Greece rehauls its overall defensive posture, as part of the wider “Agenda 2030” reforms, it must consider the opportunity cost of promoting planned projects, including “Achilles Shield”, to ensure it is not preparing for the wrong war.
• The Hellenic Armed Forces must be able to deal with mass produced one-way attack drones. This means ensuring both an adequate mix of high-low counter-UAV solutions, with an emphasis on cost-effective interceptions being paramount.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Constantine Capsaskis, Reasearch Fellow at the Mediterranean Progeamme of ELIAMEP.

The first paper of the collection is available here.

Introduction

On February 28th, the United States and Israel launched operations “Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion” respectively, jointly striking military, political, and limited economic targets across Iran. In response, Iran retaliated not just by attacking Israel and US military assets in the region but also civilian infrastructure in several neighbouring states, including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Complementarily, Iran has also sought to leverage the strategic Strait of Hormuz to raise the cost of the conflict, effectively disrupting traffic across a waterway that is critical for global energy security.

At the time of writing, on the fourth week of the conflict, the likely duration of the war remains difficult to predict as there continue to be contradictory messaging and signalling from all parties involved. What is clear is that a return to the status quo ante bellum is unlikely even if the Iranian regime survives, with long-lasting diplomatic and economic ramifications.[1]

Greece, located on the southern flank of both NATO and the European Union, faces several challenges from the war in the Gulf, beyond its relative geographic proximity to the conflict.

Even at this stage, it is important to examine how the conflict impacts Greek security policy. Greece, located on the southern flank of both NATO and the European Union, faces several challenges from the war in the Gulf, beyond its relative geographic proximity to the conflict. Primary among them is that two of its main security partners and defensive suppliers, the United States and Israel, are both primary combatants, whose own defensive stockpiles have been drained.

In the case of prolonged conflict in the Gulf, several of the points raised in this paper will only become more pressing as disruption to key supply lines will be further exacerbated and munitions stockpiles will be further depleted. Additionally, some of the issues covered in this paper can be extrapolated to the wider European Union, but the analysis of problems and recommendations will be tailored to the case of Greece.

Defence Issues

Greece is upgrading its deterrence capabilities at a time where there is mounting evidence that we are entering a new era of warfare, one of technology-enabled mass volume UAV strikes.

The need to replace Greece’s aging air and missile defence systems, which still include several Soviet-era weapons systems, is increasingly pressing as global insecurity has made defensive capabilities a priority in most countries. Additionally, Greece’s main strategic rival continues to expand its domestic ballistic missile and UAV production capabilities, a threat that must be addressed. But it is important to note that Greece is upgrading its deterrence capabilities at a time where there is mounting evidence that we are entering a new era of warfare, one of technology-enabled mass volume UAV strikes, raising the question of whether we are preparing for the wrong war.

The choice of partners in the modernization of the Hellenic Armed Forces is underpinned by wider strategic considerations. Greece’s current three main procurement partners, France, Israel, and the United States, are also the country’s main security partners.

In the case of France, the acquisition by Greece of four of Naval Group’s FDI frigates (with the first, F-601 Kimon, joining the Hellenic Navy in January 2026, and another two expected the same year) helped cement the growing defensive ties between the two countries. Today, France included Greece in its expanded nuclear doctrine,[2] highlighting the interplay between industrial and defence relationships.

The acquisition of Israeli-made systems undeniably has a wider strategic value for Greece beyond their tactical capabilities. However, with the ongoing conflict in the Middle East offering a possible glimpse into what the future of war may look like, several issues are raised, including the threat of shortages, cost asymmetry, and possible production difficulties, that are worth considering when estimating their contribution to the country’s deterrence capabilities.

Finally, defensive rearmament and modernization is increasingly becoming a global feature. Already, this would create important logistical challenges, exacerbated by China’s decision to control the exports of its processed rare earths such gallium and germanium. Demand has shot up, but the ability of the defence industry to increase its production has yet to be proven. Even worse, the rate of usage in the current conflict in the Gulf (indicatively, more Tomahawk missiles have been fired during Epic Fury than any other US campaign)[3] raises serious concerns over the sustainability of the current defence production model, with significant knock-on implications for Greece’s capability to maintain an adaquete defensive stockpile.

Issue #1: “Precise Mass” and cost asymmetry

The battlegrounds of Ukraine, the Middle East, and now the Gulf herald a new age of warfare, often dubbed as the “era of precise mass”.

The battlegrounds of Ukraine, the Middle East, and now the Gulf herald a new age of warfare, often dubbed as the “era of precise mass”.[4] In essence, as defined by the Council of Foreign Relations’ Michael C Horowitz, this means that technological and industrial advances have allowed an increasing number of international actors, even non-state actors rather than just the traditional military superpowers, to field systems that enable them to carry out precise strikes, once considered the purview of only the most advanced militaries. These strikes can be launched en masse at both short and long range, and, critically, at limited cost.[5]

The mass production of OWA drones by other countries with strong defence industrial capacities is, presumably, only a matter of time.

Uncrewed systems are the main harbingers of this new era, with their proliferation being a defining characteristic of the battlefield in both Ukraine and the Gulf. At the heart of both conflicts are the Iranian Shahed drones, arguably the most influential agent of this new “precise mass” doctrine. Both Cold War-era superpowers have now adapted the one-way attack (OWA) Shahed-136 drone (a model developed by Iran’s Shahed Aviation Industries) as part of their arsenals, with Russia manufacturing its own variant (renamed Geran-2) with Iranian assistance[6] and the United States reverse engineering the Iranian drone for their Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS).[7] The mass production of OWA drones by other countries with strong defence industrial capacities is, presumably, only a matter of time.

Manufacturing Cost Operational Range Payload Shahed-136 $20,000 – $50,000 2,000 km 88 lbs FLM-136 LUCAS Approx. $35,000 1,500 to 2,000 km 40 lbs GERAN-2 $35,000 – $50,000 2,000 km 88 lbs

 

Figure 1: Comparative manufacturing cost, operational range, and indicative payload for OWA UAV models used by Iran, the USA, and Russia.[8]

This new Shahed-style type of drone has several benefits. Primarily, it is much easier to mass produce efficiently and several orders of magnitude cheaper than a cruise or ballistic missile, with estimations ranging from $20,000 to $50,000 per unit.[9] Their production volume also far outstrips those of widely used interceptors, including those of the US-produced Patriot surface to air system. Indicatively, in 2025 the Institute for the Study of War estimated that Russia was producing upwards of 5,000 Geran-type OWA drones a month,[10] with Ukrainian intelligence services having warned that it seeks to increase capacity to more than 1,000 OWA drones a day.[11] In comparison, the US produces somewhere in the region of 600 to 800 Patriot interceptor missiles a year, even if it has stated that it seeks to expand production to up to 2,000 by 2027.[12]

These production rates have also resulted in an increase of the firing rate of these systems, both in Ukraine and the Gulf. In the former, Russia was capable of launching more than 1,000 drones per week in 2025 while in the case of the latter, during just the first week of the current conflict, drones accounted for 71% of all Iranian strikes in the region, with the United Arab Emirates alone detecting 1,422 such attacks.[13]

OWA drone swarm attacks are very capable of penetrating existing, and costly, multi-layered defence systems despite high levels of recorded drone interception. 

The strategic and tactical benefits of utilizing Shahed-style OWA drones are obvious. On the field, it is clear that OWA drone swarm attacks are very capable of penetrating existing, and costly, multi-layered defence systems despite high levels of recorded drone interception. Drone saturation is increasingly becoming a feature of modern warfare, with the individual success rate of every OWA drone being insignificant as the key objective is the compound effect of potentially hundreds of drones.[14] This is evidenced by both the failure of traditional air defences in Ukraine, as well as Iran’s success in knocking out as many as 10 United States and allied radar stations in the Gulf,[15] even though the vast majority of Iranian drones launched in the region have been intercepted. As a corollary, this is also testament to the attritional warfare capabilities of OWA attack drones as any degradation of detection capabilities will only facilitate a higher success rate in future attacks.

Overall, the inevitable expansion of the use of drone saturation attacks, the increased employment of Artificial Intelligence and autonomous capabilities, and “precise mass” by more actors following the successes observed on the battlefield raises serious tactical implications for the future, particularly when considering the vulnerability of high-value assets to these weapon systems.[16]  Preparing for these must be a key area of planning and investment.

At a strategic level, planners must take also account of the significant cost discrepancy between an OWA drone and the interceptor used to stop it. 

At a strategic level, planners must take also account of the significant cost discrepancy between an OWA drone and the interceptor used to stop it. This cost asymmetry, apparent in both Ukraine and during Operation “Rough Rider” when the US conducted a sustained campaign against Yemen’s Houthis, has once again been a defining feature and one of the key takeaways of the current conflict in the Gulf.

Cost per interceptor Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) $12.7 million Patriot PAC-3 $3.7 million Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 $2-3 million David’s Sling Stunner[17] $1 million Barak 8[18] $553,435

 

Figure 2: Cost per interceptor of systems used in the current Gulf crisis, and the Barak MX set to be purchased by Greece.[19]

Several analysts have pointed out how the main interceptors used to bring down Iranian drones, primarily the PAC-3 missile munition of the Patriot system (with estimations of more than 1,600 such munitions having been used in the first 16 days of the conflict),[20] are almost one hundred times more expensive than their usual target.[21] Namely, a Patriot interceptor costs about $4 million to a Shahed’s average of $35,000, while each interceptor of Israel’s Arrow 3 system is also estimated to cost upwards of $2 million.[22]

The cost asymmetry in play in the Gulf has essentially turned the conflict into a war of attrition, regarding the financial cost of the systems being deployed as well as the resilience and industrial capacity of defence production lines.

The key question that must be considered in Greece is whether and how the country can afford to wage a defensive war with a similarly steep cost asymmetry.

The key question that must be considered in Greece is whether and how the country can afford to wage a defensive war with a similarly steep cost asymmetry.

On Monday, March 23rd, Greece’s Government Council on Foreign and Defence Affairs (KYSEA), the highest-level executive council on issues of security, approved the purchase of key elements of a planned multi-layered defence system, dubbed “Achilles Shield” as part of the wider “Agenda 2030” military modernization programme.[23] The goal of this planned defence system, according to the Ministry of National Defence, is to enable “the country to face modern threats”[24], critically by reinforcing the country’s anti-drone, anti-air and anti-missile capabilities.

The current purchase approvals, worth an estimated 3 billion euros, are for three Israeli weapons systems, namely Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI) Barak MX and Rafeal’s Spyder and David’s Sling. These three systems are set to complement the country’s existing Patriot batteries to form the backbone of “Achilles Shield”.

Unquestionably, the existence of a multi-layered defence system is a welcome addition to Greece’s deterrence posture in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, particularly against more conventional threats including missiles, aircraft, and medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) uncrewed aerial vehicles. However, it is also critical to prepare for the next war, not the last one.

The harsh reality is that Greece is unlikely to be able to rely on these defensive systems to sustain a protracted defensive engagement against an enemy equipped with a significant number of OWA UAVs.

The harsh reality is that Greece is unlikely to be able to rely on these defensive systems to sustain a protracted defensive engagement against an enemy equipped with a significant number of OWA UAVs, something that becomes apparent even with the most cursory glance at the rate at which the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states are burning through their interceptor munitions stock and the associated price tag. Indicatively, the cost of interceptors alone over the first sixteen days of the conflict is estimated to exceed $19 billion.[25] While countries with significant defence budgets like the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel are likely able to absorb the cost asymmetry in the short-run, Greece cannot afford to find itself on the wrong side of the asymmetry curve even if the Israeli systems it is purchasing are cheaper to acquire and operate than their American counterparts.

However, this is only half the picture because, ultimately, a prerequisite to spending billions on interceptors is that they exist in the first place.

Issue #2: Potential difficulties with defence procurement

Conventional military wisdom holds that logistics win wars, resulting in the oft-quoted maxim that “amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics”.

…in just the first sixteen days of the conflict, the United States, Israel, the Gulf states, and other allies expended more than 11,000 munitions, with several key types rumoured to be near depletion.

Even before the commencement of this latest round of hostilities, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine had expressed his concern over limited stockpiles of critical munitions.[26] Since then, in just the first sixteen days of the conflict, the United States, Israel, the Gulf states, and other allies expended more than 11,000 munitions, with several key types rumoured to be near depletion.[27]

Interceptor Munitions used in first 16 days Inventory prior to current crisis Percentage of stocks depleted Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 122 150 81.33% Patriot PAC-3 1,804 8,500 21.22% David’s Sling Stunner 135 250 54.00% THAAD 340 748 45.45%

Figure 3: Percentage of depletion of commonly used interceptors in the current crisis.[28]

In the report compiled by the Payne Institute for Public Policy, there are several types of estimated munitions shortages that stand out,[29] notably the near total depletion of Israel’s Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 interceptors (Israel denies any interceptor shortage)[30] as well as the high level of depletion (48%) of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-ballistic interceptors across all operators in the region (with each missile costing between $12 and $15 million[31]) . However, the more pressing issues for Greece are the high consumption of PAC-3 interceptors used by the Patriot system by both the US (16.08% depletion) and the Gulf states (32.13% depletion), and Israel having used an estimated 54% of its David’s Sling munitions.[32] In fact, the Israeli Defence Forces have stepped up their use of David’s Sling interceptors to counter Iranian threats, in an effort to conserve the more expensive and difficult to manufacture  Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 munitions (with the attacks on Dimona and Arad being attributed to the failure of the David’s Sling system to successfully neutralize incoming Iranian ballistic missiles).[33] Overall, the report by the Payne Institute notes that it will likely take years to replace the munitions expended by those engaged in the conflict in a matter of weeks.[34]

Even assuming fair-weather conditions for the production of defence system interceptors, it is clear that the existing industrial capacity is incapable of meeting demand. Increased geopolitical instability in recent years, best evidenced by the proliferation of conflict across various theatres of operation following the post-Cold War lull, as well as the aforementioned shift to “precise mass” have both substantially increased demand, straining production.

Industries are unlikely to commit to a massive overhaul of their production lines to meet short-term demand, rather focusing on requirements of militaries during peacetime.

The situation is exacerbated by the chronic inconsistency in demand for munitions, especially prior to 2022 and the global increase in defence spending, as there were limited incentives for businesses to ramp up production during times of limited conflict. Essentially, it is inherent in the very nature of the defence industry that increases in production capacity are only required when stockpiles are running low, usually during an active engagement, a fact which further disincentivizes businesses from committing to long-term investments.[35] Industries are unlikely to commit to a massive overhaul of their production lines to meet short-term demand, rather focusing on requirements of militaries during peacetime.

However, there has also been a clear miscalculation of the operational requirements of protracted engagement by both the United States and Israel regarding the necessary amount of munitions stockpiles.[36] Indicatively, it was only in January of this year that the United States Department of War and Lockheed Martin agreed to quadruple the production capacity of THAAD interceptors from 96 to 400 per annum.[37] Prior to February 28th, the United States military stockpile of these munitions consisted of approximately 500 THAAD interceptors in total, of which just under 200 were expended in just the first sixteen days of the conflict.[38] Similarly, as mentioned above, Israel is reportedly facing an acute shortage of Arrow interceptors.

The issue of limited production capacity is even more pronounced in export-focused defence industries which must juggle domestic demand (especially when the country is at war) without compromising their ability to fulfil orders from international buyers. This dilemma was laid bare on March 26th when the Washington Post reported that the Pentagon was considering diverting purchases made by European NATO members, including PAC-3 and THAAD missiles, through NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) to the Middle East to deal with dwindling supplies of interceptors in the region.[39]  At the time of writing, Israeli defence companies have a reported backlog of orders for their products worth an estimated $80 billion.[40] While production capacity has been increased significantly over the last three years and there are plans to expand it even further, this remains a time-consuming and costly process.

“To meet demand, companies will have to make structural changes, open new production lines and factories, and perhaps even acquire additional activities”, said Elbit Systems CEO Bezhalel Machlis when discussing the large volume of orders, adding that “this requires rethinking the entire supply chain in order to deliver the goods on time”.[41] And Elbit is not the only Israeli defence company trying to find a way to meet demand. On March 24, it was reported that Rafael Advanced Defence Systems was in negotiations with Volkswagen to convert its Osnabrück auto plant to a production centre for components of the Iron Dome defence system, a process that will likely take up to 18 months.[42] It must be stressed that no Israeli defence company has yet declared force majeure and reneged on its obligations to fulfil its contracts with foreign buyers,[43] nor does this paper seek to suggest that this is likely in the future. However, especially if hostilities with Iran continue, the potential knock-on effect on Greek planning must be taken into account.

Greece may find itself having to compete with other bidders for the limited output of the same industrial lines.

An additional factor worth noting here is that there is a serious risk that Greece finds itself pushed to the back of the line when looking to acquire munitions. Most of the Gulf states, which face an existential risk if their stockpiles continue to deplete at the current rate, are among the wealthiest in the world. Greece may find itself having to compete with other bidders for the limited output of the same industrial lines.

The situation is further exacerbated when shortages of key materials and components are considered, particularly now that rare earths from China and especially those destined for military use are facing export controls.[44] Beijing has been accused of “weaponizing” its stranglehold on the processing of rare earths,[45] and has implemented a policy where licenses must be secured for a list of more than 1,100 dual-use items.[46] Naturally, the United States has undertaken significant efforts to reduce its dependency on Chinese processed rare earths, including the Pax Silica initiative and strong investment in establishing a complete mine-to-magnet supply chain,[47] but it will take years to catch up with the mature supply chains of China.

In the short run, however, this means that the production lines of defensive systems are facing a serious shortage of materials, right at the time that both demand for them has increased and stockpiles are being depleted in the Gulf. They include minerals such as gallium, germanium, tungsten, and items such as neodymium magnets.[48] Just to replace the munitions used in the first 96 hours of the conflict will require approximately 92 tons of copper, 137 kilograms of neodymium, 18 kilograms of gallium, 37 kilograms of tantalum, 7 kilograms of dysprosium, and 600 tons of ammonium perchlorate.[49] This is without addressing the issue of sulphur, whose shipping and processing has been severely disrupted by the war with Iran.[50] Sulphur, a key component in the extraction of copper, has seen its price go up by 25% since the war started, exposing yet another weak point in the supply chain and raising concerns that replenishing used military stockpiles will be more expensive than their original price tag.[51]

…the global defence industry depends on whether Beijing will seek to step up its control of rare earths in a bid to facilitate any potential hostile action against Taiwan.

With China likely doing the “missile math” vis-à-vis future US capabilities in the Pacific following the depletion of several key systems,[52] the global defence industry depends on whether Beijing will seek to step up its control of rare earths in a bid to facilitate any potential hostile action against Taiwan.

Naturally, this means that prices for rare earths not originating from China are significantly higher. For example, dysprosium, a key component of neodymium magnets, processed in North America and the European Union is projected to be eight times more expensive than that offered by China.[53]

Compounded by increased demand from the United States, Israel, and the Gulf States, in order to replenish their exhausted stockpile, it seems likely that prices for interceptors are set to go up.

…upstream, even simpler and cheaper products like ammunition are still competing with other major manufacturing products including missile defence interceptors for materials like tungsten, explosives and propellant.

One possible solution to counter the increased cost and difficulty in manufacturing sophisticated weaponry would be to concentrate on lower-tech and cheaper alternatives. Notably, the Hellenic Navy frigate HS Psara, in the course of its operation in the Red Sea as part of EUNAVFOR Aspides, engaged two Houthi drones and chose to intercept them using its 127mm naval gun.[54] Additionally, both the Phalanx CIWS and its land based C-RAM variant have been successful in intercepting drone attacks on key targets during the current conflict in the Gulf.[55] However, as has been pointed out in an analysis published by the Royal United Services Institute, the supply chain does not differentiate between low-cost ammunition and expensive missile systems.[56] This means that upstream, even simpler and cheaper products like ammunition are still competing with other major manufacturing products including missile defence interceptors for materials like tungsten, explosives and propellant.[57]

The lack of access to readily available processed rare earths seems to be an increasingly pressing vulnerability in the supply chains of US, European, and Israeli defence industries, something that the European Commission has also pointed out. With production lines already stretched thin, Greece must be aware of the potential pitfalls facing its “Agenda 2030” procurement projects. Without strong domestic production capacity, the country is even more vulnerable to international tremors. Even if all projects are delivered on time without delays, it seems inevitable that costs will be higher than anticipated. The question that remains then is who will bear the brunt of these.

 Defence Recommendations

Recommendation #1: “Achilles Shield” and anti-OWA UAV capabilities

Even if you are unable, or unwilling, to field a strike force of “precise mass”, you must be able to defend against it.

We are likely witnessing a new era of warfare, in which one-way attack drones are set to become one of the main weapons in the arsenals of state and non-state actors alike. Even if you are unable, or unwilling, to field a strike force of “precise mass”, you must be able to defend against it.

Admittedly, multi-layered air and missile defence systems will form only one component part of “Achilles Shield”, which is also set to incorporate AI and UAV “soft kill” systems to counter potential threats.[58] Of the latter, the most notable are the domestically produced Centaurus system, which will be discussed in detail, and the still under development Iperion and Telemachus systems.

However, the question is one of priorities. The need to reinforce the country’s defensive posturing, particularly following the decade-long financial crisis that severely impacted defence spending, is understandable and undoubtedly the addition of the air and missile defence systems will bolster the country’s defensive capabilities.

The issue is that of opportunity cost. The government of Greece and the Hellenic Armed Forces have correctly identified the emerging importance of uncrewed weapons systems in their rhetoric and signalling, featuring significantly in both in “Agenda 2030” and the UVEX 1/26 naval exercise.[59]

However, it is interesting that when looking at the numbers this sense of urgency does not seem to have carried over.

However, it is interesting that when looking at the numbers this sense of urgency does not seem to have carried over. Out of the announced government’s €25 billion ten-year plan,[60] approximately €3 billion will be spent on the aforementioned Spyder, Barak MX, and David’s Sling systems. By comparison, according to Pantelis Tzortzakis, CEO of the Hellenic Centre for Defence Innovation (HCDI), approximately 800 million will be invested in defence innovation over the next decade.[61]

It is worth noting that the issue of underfunding domestic research and innovation as well as manufacturing is not a future problem, as it has a direct impact on the current production capacity of Hellenic Aerospace Industry, the producer of the aforementioned domestic counter UAV systems. “HAI is a public company, with its pros and cons,” said HAI CEO Alexandros Diakopoulos, adding that “the advantage is relative job security. The disadvantage is that we cannot offer competitive salaries”.[62] Non-competitive salaries for one of your main domestic producers of UAV and counter UAV weapon systems does not signal that it is a priority. Additionally, it means that highly trained, specialised, and experienced staff will likely be dissuaded from either staying at HAI or signing up in the first place.

…measures it must take measures to ensure that it attracts the best engineers to work on its national security and deterrence capabilities.

If Greece is serious about domestically produced counter UAV measures it must take measures to ensure that it attracts the best engineers to work on its national security and deterrence capabilities, including expanding operations by hiring more staff and offering higher salaries. While Greece has already included further development of the Centaurus and Iperion systems in its application to the European Union’s Security Action For Europe (SAFE) application,[63] a radical overhaul seems to still be required.

Additionally, the entire manufacturing process of the Centaurus system is currently done entirely by HAI, with Diakopoulos not ruling out collaborating with sub-contractors in the future.[64] With concerns having been raised in the past over HAI’s productive output and track record of delayed orders, perhaps involving the private sector in the production of the C-UAV system, following its development by HAI, will also help ramp up production to ensure Greece is ready.[65]

The concern is that by the time the air and missile defence systems of Achilles Shield are operational […] they may already face quick obsolescence. 

The concern is that by the time the air and missile defence systems of Achilles Shield are operational, with the risk of both price hikes and delays due to a possible protracted conflict in the Gulf, they may already face quick obsolescence.  It is paramount that Greece doubles down on the development and production of counter UAV systems, particularly against the threat of drone saturation (against which the Iperion system is being designed) and support their quick scalability.

An easy counterpoint to the above recommendation would be that the funds to follow through with expanding both the R&D and manufacturing of innovative projects do not exist. But it remains an issue of opportunity cost. For example, the David’s Sling system that Greece is set to acquire is Israel’s domestic replacement for the Patriot system, batteries of which Greece already operates and is considered amongst its most advanced and capable missile defence systems. Considering that the cost of acquiring just this Israeli system is, according to rough estimations, approximately the same as the entire budget for defence innovation, it is worth asking if the opportunity cost of essentially doubling up on similar systems was considered and whether these further funds could have been diverted towards domestic defence innovation and manufacturing. Being prepared for the war of tomorrow will always be a good return on investment.

Recommendation #2: Domestic production, cooperation with Ukraine and cost asymmetry

When relying on missile interceptors to do the heavy work, as we are witnessing now in the Middle East, the cost asymmetry will always favour the aggressor rather than the defender.

The Greek defence budget, while significant in relative terms when expressed as a percentage of GDP, remains relatively modest compared to those of its strategic rivals. When relying on missile interceptors to do the heavy work, as we are witnessing now in the Middle East, the cost asymmetry will always favour the aggressor rather than the defender, partly because the technical demands required of such missiles (including high speed, range, and sophisticated guidance components) make them costly.[66] Indicatively, in 2024, US budget documents suggest that interceptor missiles are roughly twice as expensive as their offensive counterparts.[67] To avoid this unfavourable ratio, Greek planners must prioritize high-efficiency but low-cost options to confront possible security threats in the future and ensure that the country has an adequate High-Low mix to respond to possible threats.

This means that Greek planners must ensure that they are in a position to rapidly adopt any significant counter UAV breakthroughs, including laser and microwave technology. Some examples include Lockheed Martin’s High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS)[68], Epirus’ Leonidas system,[69] and the under-development DragonFire Laser system.[70] It can also leverage a blossoming domestic defence technology start-up ecosystem. As noted above, the Greek state also has an actively involvement through HAI in the development of several counter UAV weapons systems.

The question is whether Greece can take the risk of finding out what happens if its stockpiles run low without the ability to replenish them.

The Centaurus system, which has already proven that it can be successful, with three confirmed kills against attacking UAVs in the Red Sea during Operation Aspides and has since been integrated into the Israeli Barak MX system,[71] is exactly the type of system that the Hellenic Armed Forces should be focusing on. Beyond its operational value however, it is important for another reason. As discussed already, the current war in the Gulf has also emphasized that this new era of war is one where attrition will once more be one of the primary considerations, in which conflict is also a competition of national industrial capacities. The United States, Israel, and Iran, all possess domestic capacity and are, as a result, in a better position to pursue their military goals. On the other hand, the vulnerability of the Gulf states, whose interceptor stockpiles are already running low, has been underlined, dependant as they are on external defence industries to ensure their security. In this case, the risk for these states is minimal as they are secondary, and very unwilling, participants in the conflict and on the same ‘side’ as their primary suppliers. Additionally, many of them figure among the wealthiest states in the world, giving them options to guarantee that they will have adequate defensive capabilities.  The question is whether Greece can take the risk of finding out what happens if its stockpiles run low without the ability to replenish them.

…much of what we know on how to deal with the threat of OWA UAVs has been learned at the crucible of the Ukrainian frontlines.

To further develop its domestic capabilities in this field, Greece must seek to expand co-operation with Ukraine, particularly on the issue of expanding its counter-UAV capabilities. Even more so as Ukraine has tremendous expertise in low-cost interceptors, each with an estimated cost of $3,000 to $5,000, that are crucial as they have been very successful in mitigating the issue of cost asymmetry while maintaining high rates of operational efficiency in defending Ukrainian airspace from UAV strikes, with Ukraine estimated to have produced more than 100,000 them in 2025.[72] In fact, much of what we know on how to deal with the threat of OWA UAVs has been learned at the crucible of the Ukrainian frontlines.

The incomparable value of the experience of Ukraine’s defence industry, and its drone operators, was emphatically underlined in the first days of the war in the Gulf, when Ukrainian operators were deployed in the Middle East to assist with defending the region from Iranian UAVs.[73] On Thursday, March 27th, President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Saudi Arabia where he held several meetings and stressed that “The key is not only producing new weapons – especially drones – not just technology, but also real experience in using it, and integrating it with radars, aviation, and other air defence systems. We have this experience”.[74] This was followed by the signing of a security agreement in which Ukraine agreed to share its drone defence expertise, underlining the importance of its experience in this new era of war.[75]  The BBC reported that several representatives from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, have approached Ukrainian manufacturers in an attempt to purchase Ukrainian drone interceptors.

Greece and Ukraine have already signed an agreement to co-produce uncrewed surface vessels at Greek shipyards, providing maritime drones for both the Ukrainian and Greek armed forces.

Greece and Ukraine have already signed an agreement to co-produce uncrewed surface vessels at Greek shipyards, providing maritime drones for both the Ukrainian and Greek armed forces.[76] Expanding this deal to provide a comprehensive framework that will allow for the exchange of technical know-how and field experience must be a priority.

Conclusion

The inclusion of modernized air and missile defence systems will undeniably add to Greece’s defensive posturing in the Eastern Mediterranean and will allow it to counter a wide variety of threats. This is true particularly for more traditional and mechanical instruments of war, including ballistic missiles. However, the war in the Gulf suggests that we are moving forward to the era of “precise mass”, for which these expensive and sophisticated systems are ill equipped.

The main problem is the issue of “mass”. The Patriot and Arrow system are undeniably precise and effective, but they are expensive and hard to produce in volume. Greece must find new and innovative solutions to counter the threat of a high-volume attack. Particularly at a time when there are reasons to be concerned over the viability and sustainability of overstretched supply chains and rising costs.

The fear is that the weapon systems of Achilles Shield will provide a welcome strengthening of Greece’s capabilities, but only in the short term, with the high cost in their acquisition having stymied the opportunity to prepare for the future of warfare.

 

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[1] Rana Foroohar, “Iran war will leave a complex geoeconomic legacy”, The Financial Times, 9/3/2026. https://www.ft.com/content/d2b243b8-0a36-4f48-b431-53101bea9699?ac

[2] Eleni Ekmetsioglou, “The French Doctrine of Forward Defense: Continuity and changes in France’s Nuclear Doctrinal Thinking “, The Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, 5/3/2026. https://www.eliamep.gr/en/the-french-doctrine-of-forward-defense-continuity-and-change-s-in-frances-nuclear-doctrinal-thinking-and-the-spill-over-potential-of-epaulement-eliameps-experts-share-th/

[3] Mark F. Cancian, Chris H. Park, “The 850 Tomahawks Launched in Operation Epic Fury Is the Most Fired in a Single Campaign “, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 27/3/2026.

[4] Michael C. Horowitz, “Battles of Precise Mass”, Foreign Affairs, 22/10/2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/battles-precise-mass-technology-war-horowitz.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Amy McAuliffe, “Russia’s drone pipeline: How Iran helps Moscow produce an ever‑evolving unmanned fleet”, The Conversation, 28/1/2026. https://theconversation.com/russias-drone-pipeline-how-iran-helps-moscow-produce-an-ever-evolving-unmanned-fleet-272016

[7] Haley Britzky, “US sets up one-way attack drone squadron in the Middle East after reverse-engineering Iranian drone”, CNN, 3/12/2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/03/politics/drones-us-iran-middle-east

[8] Adolfo Arranz, Ally J. Levine, Arathy J Aluckal, Mike Stone, Sudev Kiyada, Han Huang and Travis Hartman, “Cheap drones are reshaping the war in the sky”, Reuters, 17/3/2026. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/IRAN-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkyamxqpm/

[9] Michael C. Horowitz, Lauren Kahn, “First Ukraine, Now Iran: A New Era of Drone Warfare Takes Hold”, Council on Foreign Relations, 9/3/2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/the-new-era-of-drone-warfare-takes-root-in-iran

[10] Johanna Moore, “Adversary Entente Cooperation at Russia’s Shahed Factory Threatens Global Security”, Institute for the Study of War, 21/11/2025. https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-cooperation-at-russias-shahed-factory-threatens-global-security/

[11] Matthew Low, “Russia is pushing to build 1,000 of its localized Iranian Shahed drones every day, Ukraine’s military chief says”, Business Insider, 19/1/2026. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-oleksandr-syrskyi-russia-1000-shahed-per-day-2026-1

[12] Fareed Zakaria, “Iran and the New Arithmetic of War”, Foreign Policy, 20/3/2026. https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/20/iran-drone-war-lessons-fareed-zakaria/

[13] Ibid.

[14] Benjamin Jensen, Yasir Atalan, “Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign”, Center For Strategic & International Studies, 13/5/2025.  https://www.csis.org/analysis/drone-saturation-russias-shahed-campaign

[15] Damir Marusic, “Iran’s cheap, deadly drones have done the U.S. a favor”, Washington Post, March 23, 2026. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/03/23/iran-war-shahed-drone-military/

[16] Chris Kremidas-Courtney, “How to Spend It: European Defence for the age of mass precision”, European Policy Centre, 31/3/2025. https://d1xp398qalq39s.cloudfront.net/content/How_to_Spend_it_Chris_Kremidas-Courtney.pdf

[17] Rt. Hon. Rafael Hernández de Santiago, “The Price of Escalation: Accounting for the Military Costs of the 2025 Israel Iran Conflict”, Gulf Research Centre, 18/6/2025. https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/270

[18] “Missile Interceptors by Cost”, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, Accessed 8/4/2026. https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems/missile-interceptors-by-cost/

[19] Information from: Ari Cicurel, “Burn Rate: Missile and Interceptor Cost Estimates During the U.S.-Israel-Iran War”, The Jewish Institute for National Security of America, 21/7/2025. https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Cost-Estimates-During-the-U.S.-Israel-Iran-War-07-21-25.pdf

[20] Macdonald Amoah, Morgan D. Bazilian and Lieutenant Colonel Jahara Matisek, “Over 11,000 munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War: ‘Command of the Reload’ Governs Endurance”, Royal United Services Institute, 24/3/2026. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/over-11000-munitions-16-days-iran-war-command-reload-governs-endurance

[21] Horowitz, Kahn, “First Ukraine, Now Iran”, CFR.

[22] Emanuel Fabian, “David’s Sling system failed to down Iranian ballistic missiles that struck southern towns – IDF”, The Times of Israel, 23/3/2026. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/davids-sling-system-failed-to-down-iranian-ballistic-missiles-that-struck-southern-towns-idf/

[23] “Greek security council approves purchase of air defense system, upgrade of F-16 jets”, eKathimerini, 23/3/2026. https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1298927/greek-security-council-approves-purchase-of-air-defense-system-upgrade-of-f-16-jets/

[24] “Press Release by the Ministry of National Defence regarding press reports, and replying to questions by journalists on the meeting of Wednesday”, Hellenic Ministry of National Defence, 19/6/2025. https://www.mod.mil.gr/en/press-release-by-the-ministry-of-national-defence-regarding-press/

[25] Amoah, Bazilian and Lieutenant Matisek, “Over 11,000 munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War”, RUSI.

[26] John Hudson, “Trump’s top general foresees acute risks in an attack on Iran”, The Washington Post, 23/2/2026. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/02/23/dan-caine-iran-risk-trump/

[27] Amoah, Bazilian and Lieutenant Matisek, “Over 11,000 munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War”, RUSI.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Henry Bodkin, “Israel denies ‘running out’ of missile interceptors”, The Telegraph, 15/3/2026. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/03/15/israel-denies-it-is-running-out-of-missile-interceptors/

[31] Kremidas-Courtney, “How to Spend It”, EPC.

[32] Amoah, Bazilian and Lieutenant Matisek, “Over 11,000 munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War”, RUSI.

[33] Fabian, “David’s Sling system failed to down Iranian ballistic missiles”, The Times of Israel.

[34] Amoah, Bazilian and Lieutenant Matisek, “Over 11,000 munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War”, RUSI.

[35] Wes Rumbaugh, “The Depleting Missile Defense Interceptor Inventory”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 5/12/2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/depleting-missile-defense-interceptor-inventory#h2-anteing-up

[36] Ibid.

[37] “Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Department of War Expand THAAD Interceptor Production”, Lockheed Martin, 29/1/2026. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2026/Lockheed-Martin-and-the-U-S-Department-of-War-Expand-THAAD-Interceptor-Production.html

[38] Amoah, Bazilian and Lieutenant Matisek, “Over 11,000 munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War”, RUSI.

[39] Noah Robertson, Ellen Francis, “Pentagon considers diverting Ukraine military aid to the Middle East“, The Washington Post, 26/3/2026. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/26/us-iran-war-ukraine-missile-defense/

[40] Shiri Habib-Valdhorn, Meytal Vaizberg, “Israel’s defense companies report record $80 billion backlog as global demand surges”, The Jerusalem Post, 19/3/2026. https://www.jpost.com/defense-and-tech/article-890501

[41] Ibid.

[42] Laura Pitel, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Sebastien Ash, “VW in talks with Israel’s Iron Dome maker to shift from cars to missile defence”, The Financial Times, 24/3/2026. https://www.ft.com/content/1e41e6db-792f-4f60-b567-adb6458fb072?syn-25a6b1a6=1

[43] Seth J, Frantzman, “Despite war, Israel’s IAI hits record backlog for orders, sees IPO as ‘essential’: CEO”, Breaking Defense, 19/3/2026. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/03/despite-war-israels-iai-hits-record-backlog-for-orders-sees-ipo-as-essential-ceo/

[44] Gracelin Baskaran, “China’s New Rare Earth and Magnet Restrictions Threaten U.S. Defense Supply Chains”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 9/10/2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-rare-earth-and-magnet-restrictions-threaten-us-defense-supply-chains

[45] Heidi E. Crebo-Rediker, Mahnaz Khan, “Leapfrogging China’s Critical Minerals Dominance

How Innovation Can Secure U.S. Supply Chain”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2/2026. https://www.cfr.org/reports/leapfrogging-chinas-critical-minerals-dominance

[46] “China imposes export controls on 20 Japanese entities to curb ‘remilitarisation’”, Reuters, 24/2/2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-adds-20-japanese-entities-export-control-list-2026-02-24/

[47] Ibid.

[48] Amoah, Bazilian and Lieutenant Matisek, “Over 11,000 munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War”, RUSI.

[49] Macdonald Amoah, Morgan D. Bazilian and Lieutenant Colonel Jahara Matisek, “Over 5,000 Munitions Shot in the First 96 Hours of the Iran War”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3/2026. https://www.fpri.org/article/2026/03/over-5000-munitions-shot-in-the-first-96-hours-of-the-iran-war/

[50] Jason Wilson, “West Point analysis warns that strait of Hormuz blockade will strangle US defense industry”, 19/3/2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/19/west-point-analysis-iran-war-costs

[51] Ibid.

[52] Amoah, Bazilian and Lieutenant Matisek, “Over 5,000 Munitions Shot in the First 96 Hours of the Iran War”, FPRI.

[53] Matthew Bird, “Ex-China rare earths premium to grow, especially for heavies”, Benchmark Minerals, 24/3/2026. https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/ex-china-rare-earths-premium-to-grow-especially-for-heavies

[54] Stavros Ioannidis, “Φρεγάτα «Ψαρά»: Η στιγμή της κατάρριψης drone των Χούθι”, Kathimerini, 8/7/2024. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/foreign-policy/563115880/fregata-psara-i-stigmi-tis-katarripsi-drone-ton-choythi/

[55] Iain Boyd, “Not just Patriot interceptors: A defense expert explains the various weapons US and allies use to defend against missiles and drones”, The Conversation, 12/3/2026. https://theconversation.com/not-just-patriot-interceptors-a-defense-expert-explains-the-various-weapons-us-and-allies-use-to-defend-against-missiles-and-drones-278047

[56] Amoah, Bazilian and Lieutenant Matisek, “Over 11,000 munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War”, RUSI.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Vasilis Nedos, “AI to power Greece’s Achilles’ Shield”, eKathimerini, 13/2/2026. https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1295178/ai-to-power-greeces-achilles-shield/

[59] Vassilis Nedos, “Navy drills test unmanned systems”, eKathimerini, 18/3/2026. https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1298428/navy-drills-test-unmanned-systems/

[60] “Greece to spend 25 billion euros as part of multi-year defence plan”, Reuters, 2/4/2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/greece-spend-25-billion-euros-part-multi-year-defence-plan-2025-04-02/

[61] Lefteris Papadimas, “Anti-drone system propels Greek plans for home-grown defence industry”, Reuters, 6/8/2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/anti-drone-system-propels-greek-plans-home-grown-defence-industry-2025-08-05/

[62] Alexia Kalaitzi, “Inside the brain of Greece’s cutting-edge drone hunter”, eKathimerini, 18/3/2026. https://www.ekathimerini.com/economy/1298409/inside-the-brain-of-greeces-cutting-edge-drone-hunter/

[63] Stavros Ioannidis, “SAFE: Αίτημα για έξι προγράμματα υπέβαλε η Αθήνα – Ποια είναι τα επόμενα βήματα”, Kathimerini, 9/1/2026. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/amyna/564012973/safe-aitima-gia-exi-programmata-ypevale-i-athina-poia-einai-ta-epomena-vimata/

[64] Ibid.

[65] Pantelis Velissaropoulos, “ΕΑΒ, drones, και anti-drones”, Kathimerini, 20/3/2026.

[66] Wes Rumbaugh, “Cost and Value in Air and Missile Defense Intercepts”, Center for Strategic & International Sudies, 13/2/2024.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Amoah, Bazilian and Lieutenant Matisek, “Over 11,000 munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War”, RUSI.

[69] Yehoshua Kalisky, Iky Hazan, “Innovative Systems for Neutralizing Drone and UAV Swarms”, The Institute for National Security Studies, 11/12/2025. https://www.inss.org.il/social_media/innovative-systems-for-neutralizing-drone-and-uav-swarms/

[70] Robert Tikkast, “A Decade-Long Struggle to Thwart Iran’s Drones Carries Warnings for the UK”, Royal United Services Institute, 25/3/2026. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/decade-long-struggle-thwart-irans-drones-carries-warnings-uk

[71] Stavros Ioannidis, “Greek Centauros anti-drone system joins Israeli missile shield “, eKathimerini, 2/2/2026. https://www.ekathimerini.com/economy/1294259/greek-centauros-anti-drone-system-joins-israeli-missile-shield/

[72] Katie Livingstone, “Novel interceptor drones bend air-defense economics in Ukraine’s favor”, DefenseNews, 5/3/2026. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/03/05/novel-interceptor-drones-bend-air-defense-economics-in-ukraines-favor/

[73] “Ukraine war briefing: Kyiv deploys 200 anti-drone experts to Middle East”, The Guardian, 18/3/2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/18/ukraine-war-briefing-kyiv-deploys-200-anti-drone-experts-to-middle-east

[74] Vitaly Shevchenko, “Ukraine signs deal with Saudi Arabia offering drone expertise”, BBC, 27/3/2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2r4wxdw3no

[75] Ibid.

[76] Vassillis Nedos, “Athens and Kyiv seal naval drone deal”, eKathimerini, 18/11/2025. https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1287050/athens-and-kyiv-seal-naval-drone-deal/

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

Perspectives by ELIAMEP experts on Hungary’s forthcoming elections, analyzing their political significance and examining how the outcome may influence future developments within the European Union, as well as its internal balance and policy direction.

As the UN reexamines the future of its peace operations amid shifting geopolitical dynamics and financial constraints, greater attention is being paid to how to leverage peacebuilding tools, including to support more coherent and sustainable transitions. In this context, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has emerged as a central instrument for bridging operational, programmatic, and financial gaps—particularly in settings where peace operations are drawing down or have recently withdrawn.

This policy paper examines the role of the PBF in UN peace operations contexts. Since its inception, the PBF has invested over $1.3 billion through nearly 700 projects in countries hosting UN peace operations. The paper finds that the PBF has been leveraged as a support mechanism, a strategic enabler, and a political tool. It also finds that the PBF has played an important role in supporting sustainable UN transitions. At the same time, while the PBF is a flexible and catalytic instrument, it is not a substitute for peace operations, and expectations regarding its role must remain realistic.

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The post UN Peace Operations and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Zu den neuesten Entwicklungen im Iran-Krieg und den wirtschaftlichen Folgen eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Der Waffenstillstand ist ein wichtiger Schritt, markiert aber noch keineswegs ein Ende des Konflikts. Eine erneute Zuspitzung ist möglich. Die wirtschaftlichen Schäden sind bereits jetzt erheblich, und auch die stark verflochtene deutsche Volkswirtschaft wird die Folgen deutlich zu spüren bekommen.

Es ist daher richtig, dass die Bundesregierung weiterhin über Entlastungen diskutiert. Angesichts der hohen Preissteigerungen besteht nach wie vor Handlungsbedarf. Um Haushalte schnell, wirksam und sozial ausgewogen zu entlasten, sind direkte finanzielle Transfers – ähnlich wie 2022 mit der Energiekostenpauschale – das geeignete Instrument. Pauschale Maßnahmen wie eine Ausweitung der Pendlerpauschale oder eine Senkung der Kfz-Steuer wären hingegen wenig treffsicher und sozial unausgewogen, da sie vor allem höhere Einkommen begünstigen.

Weitaus gravierender als steigende Spritpreise ist derzeit der Anstieg der Lebensmittelpreise, der breite Bevölkerungsschichten trifft und insbesondere Haushalte mit geringen Einkommen stark belastet. Eine Senkung der Mehrwertsteuer auf Lebensmittel wäre daher ein sinnvoller Ansatz, um gezielt zu entlasten.

Gleichzeitig sollte sich die Politik nicht auf kurzfristige Maßnahmen beschränken. Die aktuellen Entwicklungen unterstreichen, wie wichtig es ist, strukturelle Abhängigkeiten zu reduzieren und die Transformation voranzutreiben. Die Bundesregierung sollte daher Anreize setzen, den Verbrauch fossiler Energieträger zu senken. Maßnahmen wie ein Tempolimit, autofreie Sonntage oder eine stärkere Verlagerung auf den öffentlichen Nahverkehr können hierzu beitragen. Entscheidend wird sein, kurzfristige Entlastung mit langfristigen Reformen zu verbinden.

ELIAMEP is launching a new collection of Policy Papers titled The Iran reckoning: Four essays on a war the West was not ready for on the war on Iran, aiming to deliver concise and rigorous analysis of a critical contemporary geopolitical crisis. The papers examine the conflict’s strategic, legal, and economic dimensions, while assessing its implications for regional stability and the international order. 

The first policy paper of this collection; titled  “The bill will come due: The short, medium and long-term consequences of the Iran war- From oil shock to strategic realignment” argues that while the immediate energy shock has captured global attention, the conflict is generating deeper, structural damage to global food security, energy geography, and the Western security architecture that will persist for decades.

The 2026 Iran War has triggered a structural erosion of the global order, beginning with the immediate suspension of maritime insurance in the Strait of Hormuz that disrupted 20% of global petroleum, one-fifth of LNG trade, and one-third of the world’s seaborne fertiliser shipments. While Brent crude’s peak at $126 per barrel dominated headlines, there is a critical “analytical gap” regarding an impending food security crisis in the Global South, where the loss of agricultural inputs will manifest as compromised harvests and potential regional recessions within 6-12 months. This conflict has fundamentally compromised the 50-year “energy-for-security” compact between the U.S. and Gulf states, leading regional monarchies to perceive Washington more as a source of unpredictability than as a protector, and to accelerate “multi-alignment” security strategies and partnerships with China, India, and Russia.

• Immediate economic and logistics destabilisation. The conflict triggered a collapse of the maritime insurance and logistics systems in the Persian Gulf. Brent crude peaked at $126 per barrel, and while the release of 400 million barrels from strategic reserves provided a temporary cushion, these are “one-use buffers”.
• The fertiliser-food crisis nexus. A critical analytical gap exists regarding the disruption of agricultural inputs. Because agricultural cycles are inflexible, the current disruption will manifest as compromised harvests in 4-6 months and acute food insecurity in 6-12 months. Policy responses must prioritise emergency financing and the creation of strategic fertiliser reserves to mitigate recessions.
• Strategic realignment in the Gulf. The war has fundamentally compromised the energy-for-security compact that governed US-Gulf relations. Consequently, Gulf monarchies are accelerating multi-alignment strategies to secure strategic predictability.
• Long-­term structural shifts. The conflict is driving a permanent recomposition of global energy geography. Additionally, the crisis has transformed decarbonisation from an environmental objective into a strategic imperative to eliminate dependency.
• Policy recommendations for Europe. It is imperative that the EU links reconstruction funding to strategic conditionality to ensure they do not finance a stabilisation effort shaped by external actors without securing meaningful influence over the resulting regional order.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Dr Andréas C. Hatzidiakos, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Co-director of OPEWI (Europe’s War Institute).

WITHIN DAYS OF THE CONFLICT’S OPENING PHASE, the Joint War Committee[1] designated the Persian Gulf a high-risk zone, effectively suspending standard marine insurance coverage for commercial vessels and triggering force majeure clauses across thousands of shipping contracts. Tanker operators declined to route through an uninsured conflict zone. Charter rates for available tonnage outside the Gulf spiked to record levels. The commodity flows transiting the Strait of Hormuz – approximately 20 percent of global petroleum consumption and one-fifth of global LNG trade[2], alongside one-third of the world’s traded fertilisers[3] – were disrupted within days, not weeks.

The energy market response generated the headlines. Brent crude reached a peak of $126 per barrel – a level not seen since the 2008 energy crisis – representing a near-50 percent increase from pre-conflict levels within the space of four weeks, carrying immediate political visibility. What received far less attention was the second category of cargo: the ammonium nitrate, urea, and phosphate shipments[4] that underpin agricultural supply chains from South Asia to Sub-Saharan Africa[5], and whose disruption operates on a timeline measured not in trading days but in growing seasons. Less visible still is a third category of consequence – one that will not appear in any commodity price index – the accelerating reconfiguration of Gulf security partnerships. When a protective power becomes a source of instability, the states that depend on it do not wait for the conflict to end before drawing conclusions.

This is the analytical gap this article addresses. The most visible consequences of the 2026 Iran war are severe because they are immediate, tangible and measurable by the average consumer. They are not the most structurally significant. The deeper damage is accumulating in sectors that do not generate equivalent political urgency, at a pace the standard instruments of crisis management are not calibrated to track. The full cost of this conflict will not be presented for months – in some dimensions, for years. When it is, the figure will substantially exceed current estimates.

The immediate shock: energy, markets, and the limits of strategic reserves

The energy market response to the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz was swift, severe, and entirely consistent with pre-conflict scenario modelling that had been available to governments for over a decade. Brent crude rose above $100 per barrel within days of the conflict’s opening phase. Gulf state oil production – representing approximately one-third of global supply – was immediately disrupted: not primarily through the physical destruction of extraction infrastructure, but through the rapid collapse of the insurance, logistics, and maritime crewing systems on which tanker operations depend. War-risk premiums rendered routine commercial voyages economically inviable within hours of the first engagements. The consequence was a de facto market-imposed embargo, operative before any formal blockade was declared.

The coordinated release of strategic petroleum reserves – approximately 400 million barrels mobilised through American and International Energy Agency frameworks – provided a temporary price cushion and a degree of political cover for affected governments. The limits of this instrument, however, are structural and must be acknowledged clearly: the strategic reserve is a one-use buffer, not a solution. Its drawdown buys weeks, not months. The only genuine resolution to the supply disruption is physical – the reopening of the strait to commercial traffic – and that outcome remains, as of this writing, contingent on a political or military resolution that has yet to materialise.

The immediate shock, considered in isolation, remains within the range of policy management. The problem lies in what follows.

The financial consequences extend well beyond the energy sector. The risk premium now embedded in global asset pricing – the persistent upward pressure reflecting the possibility of further escalation – will not dissolve with a ceasefire announcement. It becomes structural. Institutional investors are repricing long-term infrastructure exposure across the Gulf region. Shipping companies are restructuring route networks and procurement chains. Insurance markets are recalibrating their political-risk models for all Gulf-adjacent maritime corridors. These adjustments, once institutionalised, are not easily reversed. The immediate shock, considered in isolation, remains within the range of policy management. The problem lies in what follows.

The propagation effect: food, fertiliser, and the forgotten supply chain

The Persian Gulf is not solely an oil corridor. This fact – well-documented in commodity trade literature and agricultural economics – has received insufficient attention in the strategic commentary surrounding this conflict.

Α disruption to transit that begins today translates into compromised harvests within four to six months, and into a measurable food price crisis in global commodity markets within six to twelve months.

Gulf states account for approximately half of globally traded urea exports and roughly 30 percent of globally traded ammonia exports. Collectively, approximately one-third of global seaborne fertiliser trade – spanning nitrogen, phosphate, and sulphur compounds – transits the Strait of Hormuz[6]. The agricultural supply chain operates on a timeline that admits no flexibility: fertilisers must be applied at defined intervals within the growing cycle. A disruption to transit that begins today translates into compromised harvests within four to six months, and into a measurable food price crisis in global commodity markets within six to twelve months. The conflict began within that window. The agricultural consequences are already in motion.

The differential impact across economies is stark and deeply inequitable. For energy-exporting nations – the United States, Australia, Norway, Canada – the war represents a significant but manageable cost increase. For energy-importing emerging economies, the compounding effect of elevated energy prices and fertiliser scarcity constitutes a structural crisis. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and large portions of Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia face the simultaneous deterioration of energy affordability, agricultural input availability, and rising food prices[7]. Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly exposed: over 90 percent of the fertilisers used across the region are imported, and maise – the primary staple crop across much of the continent – is acutely dependent on nitrogen inputs now unavailable at predictable cost. For households already operating near subsistence margins, this convergence does not represent a policy challenge. It represents acute food insecurity. At the macroeconomic level, several of these economies face the conditions for recession.

By that point, the window for preventive action will have closed.

The markets and governments of developed economies are currently pricing in an energy shock. They have not yet adequately priced in a food shock. That misjudgement carries significant policy risk. The necessary responses – emergency agricultural financing for the most exposed economies, alternative supply routing for nitrogenous fertilisers, and the development of strategic fertiliser reserve mechanisms comparable to existing energy reserves – require lead times that the political calendar is not currently accommodating. The harvest data, when it arrives in autumn 2026, will confirm what the supply chain data already indicates. By that point, the window for preventive action will have closed.

The reshaping of Gulf security architecture

A consequential conversation is underway in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait, Muscat and Manama. It concerns whether the security architecture that has governed the Gulf for five decades continues to serve the interests of the states it was designed to protect. This conversation deserves more serious analytical attention than it has received.

The Gulf states did not choose this war. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman are hosting American Western military assets, providing forward logistical infrastructure, and absorbing Iranian retaliatory strikes – against their desalination facilities, their port infrastructure, and the energy corridors their national economies depend upon – as a direct consequence of a decision taken in Washington without their prior consultation. The implicit architecture underpinning the US-Gulf relationship has, for five decades, rested on a mutual compact: Gulf states provided the United States with territorial access and preferential energy arrangements; in return, they received security guarantees against external aggression, principally from Iran. That compact was institutionalised through a dense basing architecture: Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar – CENTCOM’s forward headquarters, housing approximately 10,000 troops and the largest American installation in the Middle East – the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, and Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE[8].

The United States is not the only Western power to secure a military foothold in the region – though the nature of those arrangements differs. France and the United Kingdom pursued explicitly contractual defence partnerships, negotiated as bilateral agreements rather than implicit strategic compacts. France has maintained a permanent base in Abu Dhabi (Camp de la Paix) since 2009, its first permanent overseas military installation in five decades, established under a formal Defence Cooperation Agreement with the UAE[9]. The United Kingdom formalised its regional presence through the 2019 UK-Oman Joint Defence Agreement, operating a Joint Logistics Support Base at Duqm – deliberately positioned outside the Strait of Hormuz – alongside long-standing training arrangements across the Gulf[10]. These European partnerships were built on treaty frameworks with defined mutual obligations, not on the implicit energy-for-security logic that has characterised the American relationship with the Gulf. That distinction now carries considerable weight. The implicit American compact functioned as long as the United States was perceived by its partners as a net provider of stability – a protective power whose presence reduced regional risk. That perception has been fundamentally altered by the 2026 Iran War. Washington is no longer seen, from Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, primarily as a guarantor. It is seen as a variable – a source of unpredictability whose strategic decisions can destabilise the region as readily as they can protect it.

The gap between the stated American commitment to Gulf stability and the observable consequences of American strategic decisions is now too large to paper over.

This contradiction has not appeared suddenly. Its roots are traceable across several decades of American Middle East policy. What the 2026 conflict has done is render it impossible to manage through the customary instruments of alliance diplomacy – reassurance language, bilateral security memoranda, arms sales, and summit-level consultations. The gap between the stated American commitment to Gulf stability and the observable consequences of American strategic decisions is now too large to paper over.

When the entity responsible for managing a principal risk becomes itself a primary source of that risk, rational actors diversify.

The logic that follows is not ideological. It is actuarial. When the entity responsible for managing a principal risk becomes itself a primary source of that risk, rational actors diversify. They do not necessarily abandon the relationship – the American security architecture remains too deeply embedded, and the alternatives too immature, for a clean break[11]. But they hedge, they build redundancy, and they cultivate alternatives. This is precisely what the Gulf monarchies have been doing, with increasing deliberateness, for the better part of a decade.

The 2023 Saudi-Iran normalisation agreement brokered by Beijing was not a rupture with Washington nor a diplomatic anomaly. It was a deliberate signal from Riyadh that the kingdom was prepared to pursue strategic relationships outside the framework of the American alliance architecture when doing so served its interests. It is a premium paid on a new insurance policy. The acceleration of defence partnerships with France, the United Kingdom, India, and China is not anti-American sentiment. It is portfolio management. Beijing does not impose governance conditions on its partners. It does not threaten sovereign wealth funds with secondary sanctions. It does not initiate regional military campaigns without prior consultation with affected neighbouring states. From the perspective of Gulf leadership calculating long-term regime and state security, Chinese partnership offers an attribute that American partnership has demonstrably ceased to provide: strategic predictability. China’s strategic objective is not to replace the United States as security guarantor – a role for which it currently lacks the regional military infrastructure – but to entrench itself as an indispensable defence-industrial partner, driving Gulf domestic manufacturing capacity and technology transfer while reducing Western leverage.

The architecture of multi-alignment – systematic hedging across major power relationships – was already a feature of Gulf strategic practice before this conflict. It will accelerate significantly in its aftermath.

Russia maintains active military and commercial relationships across the region. India, as the world’s most populous state and a significant energy importer with deep historical ties to Gulf economies, represents a partnership of growing importance to Gulf diversification strategies[12]. India has pursued a deliberate strategy of defence deepening with Gulf states, driven by its own energy dependency and its growing strategic competition with China[13]. At the same time, Pakistan is also positioning itself, by backing Saudi Arabia through a mutual defence cooperation agreement signed in September 2025, featuring a NATO-like article 5 collective defence clause. Turkey, formally a NATO member, has pursued its own Gulf relationships with a degree of strategic independence that pre-existing alliance frameworks have proven unable to constrain. The architecture of multi-alignment – systematic hedging across major power relationships – was already a feature of Gulf strategic practice before this conflict. It will accelerate significantly in its aftermath.

Water security has emerged as an underestimated strategic variable. The desalination facilities of the Arabian Peninsula supply the majority of drinking water for the populations of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman[14]. These installations are coastal, energy-intensive, and – as demonstrated in the current conflict – targetable by Iranian-affiliated forces operating with conventional munitions and drone systems. For states in which water supply depends overwhelmingly on desalination, the military targeting of this infrastructure is not a peripheral concern. It represents a direct threat to population welfare and, consequently, to state stability. The exposure of this vulnerability under the conditions of the American security umbrella will not be readily forgotten.

The Hormuz dilemma facing Gulf governments is structurally acute. Their dependence on the strait – for oil export revenues, for food imports, for the full range of consumer and industrial goods their economies require – is as great as that of any state on earth. And yet the political constraints operating on Gulf governments prevent any public acknowledgement of this dependency in the context of the current conflict, for fear of being perceived as taking a position against Washington or in favour of Tehran. Gulf states are, in effect, trapped in a conflict they did not initiate, whose costs they are absorbing, and whose resolution they cannot publicly advocate. Strategic entrapment of this kind, sustained over time, generates deep institutional resentment. And institutional resentment, in the strategic context, becomes the precondition for realignment.

The United States may succeed in its military objectives against Iran. If that outcome is achieved while permanently eroding the confidence of Gulf partner states in American reliability as a security provider, the strategic ledger will record a tactical success and a generational loss.

The long-term recomposition: energy routes, the transition, and American credibility

The structural consequences of the Hormuz disruption extend well beyond the Gulf region and will prove resistant to reversal once the underlying investment decisions have been made.

Asian energy consumers – China, India, Japan, and South Korea, which collectively absorb over 80 percent of the crude oil and LNG transiting the strait – are not adopting a passive posture while awaiting the strait’s reopening. China is accelerating overland pipeline imports from Russia and Central Asia, and has formally incorporated the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline through Mongolia into its 2026–2030 strategic development plan[15]. India’s four major state energy companies – Indian Oil, Bharat Petroleum, Hindustan Petroleum, and GAIL – are in active negotiations with Angola’s Sonangol for alternative LPG and LNG supply, while simultaneously deepening procurement agreements with Australian producers[16], whose delivery times to Indian ports are less than a third of those from the United States. Japan and South Korea signed a bilateral LNG cooperation and supply-chain resilience pact in March 2026, coordinating alternative sourcing and reducing single-supplier exposure, while Japan accelerates nuclear restarts as a structural hedge[17]. These are not emergency contingency measures. They are capital investment decisions with twenty-year operational horizons. Once the physical infrastructure is built and the long-term supply contracts executed, the strategic geography of global energy does not revert to its prior configuration simply because a ceasefire has been reached in the Persian Gulf.

The position of the United States in this dynamic is characterised by a sharp and consequential divergence between short-term commercial gain and long-term strategic cost.

The position of the United States in this dynamic is characterised by a sharp and consequential divergence between short-term commercial gain and long-term strategic cost. As the world’s largest oil and gas producer, the United States benefits commercially from elevated crude prices driven by Gulf supply disruption. American shale exports are reaching markets at a significant premium. In the near term, Washington is in the position of a major supplier monetising a crisis whose conditions it helped to create. For some constituencies within the current administration, this represents an acceptable or even desirable strategic outcome.

The longer-term calculation, however, runs in the opposite direction. The credibility of American maritime leadership – the foundational proposition that has underpinned the international trading order since 1945 – rests on the premise that the United States is both willing and able to maintain freedom of navigation in international waterways. The 2026 Hormuz crisis has placed that premise under serious strain. Not because of any demonstrated deficiency in American naval capability, but because the United States is now perceived, across a significant portion of the international community, as an actor capable of precipitating the maritime crisis it formally claims to prevent. This perception – once established in the institutional memory of governments, port authorities, shipping companies, and commodity markets – is not readily reversed by subsequent reassurances.

The energy transition is likely to emerge as one of the more durable unintended structural consequences of this conflict.

The energy transition is likely to emerge as one of the more durable unintended structural consequences of this conflict. European and Asian policymakers have, for over a decade, framed the decarbonisation agenda in predominantly environmental and climate terms. The political coalitions required to sustain that argument have been difficult to construct and prone to erosion under short-term economic pressure. The 2026 Hormuz disruption introduces a new and politically far more powerful argument into the policy calculus: dependency on Gulf hydrocarbons is a strategic liability, not merely an environmental one. The political consensus required to accelerate investment in renewable capacity, nuclear energy, grid storage, and demand-side efficiency – a consensus that has been frustratingly incomplete in the face of energy sector lobbying and short-term industrial interests – is now available in a form that no previous policy argument had been able to generate.

What Europe must do – and is not doing

Europe will not be insulated from the consequences of this conflict by the fact of its non-participation. The migration flows, energy market repricing, nuclear proliferation risk, regional fragmentation, and hybrid security threats that this war is generating do not terminate at the EU’s external borders. They will manifest in European capitals regardless of the decisions, or failures of decision, made in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris.

The G7 Foreign Ministers’ meeting of 26-27 March 2026 produced language, from several European participants, invoking the concept of a “new world order”. The impulse behind this formulation is understandable – the scale of the strategic disruption underway does carry the character of rupture. The formulation is, however, analytically imprecise in ways that have policy consequences. The foundational architecture established in 1945 – the United Nations Charter, the prohibition on aggressive war as an instrument of state policy, the principle that international peace constitutes a common good subject to collective security (not defence) – has not been formally abrogated. What has changed is something more specific: the recognition, now no longer deniable, that while the strategic tempo in international affairs continues to be set by Washington, Washington’s tempo is no longer reliably aligned with European interests, strategic priorities, or conceptions of international order.

Europe must now make choices it has postponed for a generation.

This is not, in fact, a new world. It is the world as it has been for a considerable period – one that European institutions and governments have consistently chosen not to engage with in its full complexity, because doing so would have required politically costly decisions about defence investment, strategic industrial policy, and the development of a European strategic autonomy and capacity. What this conflict has done is eliminate the space for continued deferral. The comfort of strategic ambiguity is no longer available. Europe must now make choices it has postponed for a generation.

The post-conflict reconstruction phase will represent the point at which European leverage is most concentrated and most actionable.

The post-conflict reconstruction phase will represent the point at which European leverage is most concentrated and most actionable. The economic reconstruction of a post-conflict Iran – or the stabilisation of a fragmenting one – will require financial frameworks, governance architecture, sanctions relief mechanisms, and diplomatic recognition processes that only the European Union, with its combination of market scale, institutional capacity and, above all, normative credibility, can provide at the necessary level. That leverage is real. It is also conditional: it exists only to the extent that Europe arrives at the negotiating table with a coherent, unified position, a defined set of political conditions, and both the institutional and political will to link its reconstruction contribution to outcomes that serve European strategic interests.

What European institutions cannot afford is to finance, yet again, stabilisation efforts shaped by other actors’ strategic objectives without securing meaningful influence over the political outcomes those efforts are intended to produce. 

What European institutions cannot afford – and what precedent from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya suggests remains the default – is to finance, yet again, stabilisation efforts shaped by other actors’ strategic objectives without securing meaningful influence over the political outcomes those efforts are intended to produce. The post-conflict order of the broader Middle East and Gulf region will be the defining strategic question of the next decade. The decisions made in the coming eighteen months regarding sanctions architecture, nuclear verification, Gulf security guarantees, and the political future of Iran will shape regional order for a generation – pending resolution of the conflict. If European engagement in that process is limited to the provision of reconstruction funding without strategic conditionality, the cost will be borne by European citizens for years without a commensurate return in security, stability, or influence.

[1] The Joint War Committee (JWC) is a body of senior underwriters from Lloyd’s of London and the International Underwriting Association (IUA) that assesses maritime conflict risk globally. It publishes periodically updated “Listed Areas” – zones requiring advance notification to insurers and attracting substantially elevated war-risk premiums, often negotiated on a single-voyage basis. Its designations carry no regulatory authority but function in practice as the industry standard: when the JWC lists a zone, standard hull war-risk coverage for transiting vessels is effectively suspended, with immediate systemic consequences for commercial shipping decisions. In March 2026, the Committee extended its Listed Areas to cover the Persian Gulf and Gulf states hosting US military assets, triggering the cascade of insurance and logistics disruptions described in this article.

[2] US Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Amid Regional Conflict, the Strait of Hormuz Remains Critical Oil Chokepoint”, Today in Energy, 16/06/2025.

[3] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Other Global Crisis Stemming from the Strait of Hormuz’s Blockage”, Emissary, 12/03/2026.

[4] The three primary fertiliser categories transiting Hormuz are nitrogenous fertilisers (urea and ammonium nitrate, derived from Gulf-produced ammonia), and phosphate-based fertilisers. Gulf states collectively account for 43-49 percent of global seaborne urea exports, approximately 25-30 percent of globally traded ammonia, and a significant share of phosphate exports. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are disproportionately exposed: India sources over 40 percent of its urea and the majority of its ammonia imports from the region, while Sub-Saharan Africa – where fertiliser application rates are already among the world’s lowest – depends on Gulf states for approximately 25-35 percent of total fertiliser supply.

[5] See CSIS, “Chokepoint: How the War with Iran Threatens Global Food Security”, 10/03/2026.

[6] See above: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Other Global Crisis Stemming from the Strait of Hormuz’s Blockage”, Emissary, 12/03/2026.

[7] Reuters, “Which Economies Will Hurt Most from Iran War?”, 20/03/2026.

[8] Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Mapping the Military Presence”,  23/06/2025.

[9] The defence relationship between France and the United Arab Emirates is anchored in a bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement signed on 18 January 1995 after two decades of close political and military ties. Under that agreement, France committed to the UAE’s defence in the event of external aggression, and the UAE granted France permanent military basing rights. The arrangement was formalised into a permanent military installation – Camp de la Paix, Abu Dhabi – inaugurated by President Sarkozy in May 2009. The base hosts between approximately 500 to 700 French Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel and is positioned to face the Strait of Hormuz directly, giving France a permanent operational footprint at the Gulf’s most strategically sensitive point. The partnership encompasses regular joint exercises, defence industrial cooperation – including the landmark 2021 order for 80 Rafale fighter jets, the largest single French arms export in history – and a mutual assistance clause that, in principle, obligates France to respond to a military attack on the UAE – which it did at the highest of the Hormuz crisis.

[10] The United Kingdom’s defence relationship with Oman is among the longest-standing bilateral security partnerships in the Gulf, rooted in historical ties predating Omani independence. It was substantially updated and formalised through the Joint Defence Agreement (JDA) signed in Muscat on 21 February 2019 by UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson and Omani Minister for Defence Affairs Badr Bin Saud, and ratified by Royal Decree 42/2019. The JDA provides the UK with long-term access to the Duqm Port Joint Logistics Support Base – a deep-water facility deliberately located south of the Strait of Hormuz, outside the primary Iranian threat envelope – and to the Omani-British Joint Training Area (OBJTA) near Duqm, enabling large-scale combined-arms exercises, armoured manoeuvres, and integrated air support training. In exchange, the UK committed £3 billion over ten years to Gulf regional security. A further annex agreement was concluded in 2023, refining access arrangements and implementation modalities. Unlike the US basing framework – which rests on an implicit energy-for-security compact – the UK-Oman arrangement is a formally ratified treaty with defined mutual obligations, placing it on a qualitatively different legal and political footing.

[11] China’s defence relationship with the Gulf has evolved from arms sales into a comprehensive strategic architecture. Saudi Arabia and the UAE both signed Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreements with Beijing – the UAE in 2018, Saudi Arabia in December 2022 during Xi Jinping’s state visit to Riyadh.

[12] The foundational instrument is the UAE-India Defence Cooperation Agreement (2003), which established frameworks for military training, naval cooperation, and maritime pollution control. That agreement was substantially upgraded on 19 January 2026, when UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s state visit to New Delhi produced a bilateral Strategic Defence Partnership letter of intent, a $3 billion Indian arms procurement package, and a ten-year LNG supply contract between ADNOC Gas and Hindustan Petroleum.

[13] The rivalry between IMEC – the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, championed by the United States and its Western partners – and BRI – China’s Belt and Road Initiative, developed alongside Russia, Pakistan, and Iran – reflects a broader struggle to shape the arteries of global trade and influence. The current military conflict involving Iran risks directly threatening the strategic calculus underpinning both projects, as it disrupts Gulf energy flows and forces regional states to recalibrate their alignments. For India, such instability confirms the necessity to anchor Gulf partners – particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia – within the IMEC framework, deepening New Delhi’s strategic and economic footprint in a region where China has also made significant inroads. Beijing, conversely, stands to lose a key BRI node and a critical energy supplier, compelling it to intensify its courtship of Gulf monarchies to preserve its supply chain resilience. As indicated by Zaki Laïdi and Yves Tiberghien in their article “Hedgers : les nouveaux non-alignés”, Le Grand Continent, 30/03/2026, over the past three decades, virtually eight countries studied (India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, South Africa, and Qatar) have reduced their trade dependence on the United States. All eight countries have massively expanded their trade ties with China, which is now the primary source of imports for six of them (accounting for between 17% and 39% depending on the country). This commercial shift illustrates the decline of American economic centrality to the benefit of Beijing across the Global South, a trend that the Trump administration’s trade war risks amplifying even further. The Iran war thus risks transforming the Gulf into a theatre of intensified Sino-Indian competition, where infrastructure investment, energy diplomacy, and security partnerships become instruments of geopolitical positioning.

[14] Gulf states supply over 90 percent of drinking water through desalination for Kuwait and Bahrain, 86 percent for Oman, 70 percent for Saudi Arabia, and over 99 percent of Qatar’s drinking water. See Arab Center Washington DC, “The Costs and Benefits of Water Desalination in the Gulf”, 12/04/2023.

[15] See Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, “Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz: Implications for China’s Energy Security”, Michal Meidan, March 2026. See also The Diplomat, “How the Iran War Could Boost Russia’s Role in Asia’s Energy Future”, 17/03/2026.

[16] See for example Business Today (India), “Why India Will Look at Australia, Russia over US for LNG”, 19/03/2026.

[17] See Energy Intelligence, “Gulf Crisis Exposes Japan, South Korea’s Transition Strategies”, 25/03/2026

Die aktuelle Situation rund um die Energieversorgung und die Energiepreise schätzt Claudia Kemfert, Energieökonomin und Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt ein:

Die Aussage des Chefs der Internationalen Energieagentur, wonach die Welt noch nie eine Unterbrechung der Energieversorgung im derzeitigen Ausmaß erlebt habe, klingt drastisch, stimmt aber. Wir erleben gerade die schwerste fossile Energiekrise unserer Zeit. Es handelt sich um einen multiplen Schock aus steigenden Öl-, Gas- und Nahrungsmittelpreisen, der die Verwundbarkeit unseres Systems schonungslos offenlegt. Wenn zentrale Lieferwege ausfallen und Fördermengen einbrechen, gerät die Weltwirtschaft ins Wanken.

Das ist kein einmaliger Ausnahmefall, sondern typisch für ein fossiles Energiesystem, das auf geopolitischen Abhängigkeiten basiert. Diese Krisen sind systemimmanent – ein energiepolitischer Kurzschluss, bei dem immer wieder versucht wird, das fossile System zu stabilisieren, statt es zu überwinden. Strategische Reserven können den Druck kurzfristig etwas lindern, lösen aber nicht das Problem. Solange wir an Öl und Gas festhalten, bleiben wir erpressbar und anfällig für massive Preisschocks.

Gerade bei steigenden Spritpreisen zeigt sich: Pauschale Tankrabatte sind eine teure Scheinlösung. Sie verpuffen oft und entlasten nicht gezielt. Besser sind direkte Entlastungen wie ein Klimageld, mehr Markttransparenz und eine stärkere Kontrolle überhöht­er Preise. Kurzfristig helfen Tempolimit, mehr Homeoffice und ein günstiger öffentlicher Verkehr, um die Nachfrage zu senken und Preise zu stabilisieren.

Die einzige nachhaltige Antwort auf diese Krise ist klar: Raus aus fossilen Abhängigkeiten. Erneuerbare Energien sind der beste Schutzschild – sie müssen nicht importiert werden, sind ausreichend vorhanden und taugen nicht als Erpressungsmittel. Wer jetzt weiter auf fossile Lösungen setzt, verschärft die Krise und verspielt die Zukunft.

Heiner Janus and Daniel Esser argue that the rush to devise a strategy for Iran is bound to run into bureaucratic pathologies that drive failures in intelligence and foreign aid alike: manufactured urgency and institutional whitewashing.

Heiner Janus and Daniel Esser argue that the rush to devise a strategy for Iran is bound to run into bureaucratic pathologies that drive failures in intelligence and foreign aid alike: manufactured urgency and institutional whitewashing.

Heiner Janus and Daniel Esser argue that the rush to devise a strategy for Iran is bound to run into bureaucratic pathologies that drive failures in intelligence and foreign aid alike: manufactured urgency and institutional whitewashing.