Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die EU-Erweiterung auf dem Westbalkan ist strategisch wichtig. Doch wer den Beitrittsprozess beschleunigen will, darf Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit nicht zur Nebensache machen. Ein Beitrag von Karina Mross.

This ETTG policy brief analyses the state of play of EU funding to and cooperation with the United Nations system, before considering future possibilities and challenges in relation to the ongoing negotiations of the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF, 2028–34), notably the Global Europe Instrument. Although neither the MFF nor the Global Europe Instrument Regulation are expected to include concrete provisions on EU funding to the UN system, they frame the political priorities and define legal boundaries and criteria through which the EU will shape its programming and select its implementation partners. Through these parameters, the question is whether the new MFF will operationalise and ensure the Union’s strategic defence of multilateralism and partnership with the UN, alone and through Team Europe, or if the new rules instead result in a de-facto reduction of the EU’s political and financial support to the UN system.

This ETTG policy brief analyses the state of play of EU funding to and cooperation with the United Nations system, before considering future possibilities and challenges in relation to the ongoing negotiations of the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF, 2028–34), notably the Global Europe Instrument. Although neither the MFF nor the Global Europe Instrument Regulation are expected to include concrete provisions on EU funding to the UN system, they frame the political priorities and define legal boundaries and criteria through which the EU will shape its programming and select its implementation partners. Through these parameters, the question is whether the new MFF will operationalise and ensure the Union’s strategic defence of multilateralism and partnership with the UN, alone and through Team Europe, or if the new rules instead result in a de-facto reduction of the EU’s political and financial support to the UN system.

This ETTG policy brief analyses the state of play of EU funding to and cooperation with the United Nations system, before considering future possibilities and challenges in relation to the ongoing negotiations of the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF, 2028–34), notably the Global Europe Instrument. Although neither the MFF nor the Global Europe Instrument Regulation are expected to include concrete provisions on EU funding to the UN system, they frame the political priorities and define legal boundaries and criteria through which the EU will shape its programming and select its implementation partners. Through these parameters, the question is whether the new MFF will operationalise and ensure the Union’s strategic defence of multilateralism and partnership with the UN, alone and through Team Europe, or if the new rules instead result in a de-facto reduction of the EU’s political and financial support to the UN system.

Since 1993, the Sámi have been the only recognized Indigenous people within the European Union. However, their official engagement with European politics has been limited. This has recently begun to change, as the EU’s ongoing Arctic pivot has drawn Sámi political actors to Brussels. Using the English School approach, this case study traces the evolution of Sámi–EU relations from the early 1990s to the present to explore and analysis the mechanisms of engagement the Sámi have used to gain access to high-level European decision-making and what the EU itself should hope to gain through stronger ties with this Indigenous people. The analysis of these events reveals a growing political relationship between the Sámi and the EU. However, shifting political conditions and the absence of a formal European-level framework for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, constrain the potential for more equitable relations both within the European sphere and Arctic.

Since 1993, the Sámi have been the only recognized Indigenous people within the European Union. However, their official engagement with European politics has been limited. This has recently begun to change, as the EU’s ongoing Arctic pivot has drawn Sámi political actors to Brussels. Using the English School approach, this case study traces the evolution of Sámi–EU relations from the early 1990s to the present to explore and analysis the mechanisms of engagement the Sámi have used to gain access to high-level European decision-making and what the EU itself should hope to gain through stronger ties with this Indigenous people. The analysis of these events reveals a growing political relationship between the Sámi and the EU. However, shifting political conditions and the absence of a formal European-level framework for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, constrain the potential for more equitable relations both within the European sphere and Arctic.

Since 1993, the Sámi have been the only recognized Indigenous people within the European Union. However, their official engagement with European politics has been limited. This has recently begun to change, as the EU’s ongoing Arctic pivot has drawn Sámi political actors to Brussels. Using the English School approach, this case study traces the evolution of Sámi–EU relations from the early 1990s to the present to explore and analysis the mechanisms of engagement the Sámi have used to gain access to high-level European decision-making and what the EU itself should hope to gain through stronger ties with this Indigenous people. The analysis of these events reveals a growing political relationship between the Sámi and the EU. However, shifting political conditions and the absence of a formal European-level framework for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, constrain the potential for more equitable relations both within the European sphere and Arctic.

The UN’s ongoing liquidity crisis has forced peacekeeping operations to implement contingency measures that have significantly reduced personnel, patrols, mission footprints, and programmatic activities. As missions adapt to these constraints, they face difficult trade-offs in maintaining mandate delivery while responding to increasingly complex security environments.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), in partnership with the permanent missions of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Pakistan to the United Nations, convened a workshop to examine how UN peacekeeping operations are adapting to contingency measures. The discussion brought together member-state representatives and UN officials from headquarters and the field to assess the operational implications of the cuts and identify lessons for the future of peacekeeping.

Key themes from the discussion included the growing reliance on mobile operational approaches, the impact of reduced mission presence on the protection of civilians and community engagement, increasing risks to peacekeeper safety and security, the opportunities and limits of digital technologies, the importance of strategic communication with host states and local communities, and the critical role of partnerships in sustaining mandate implementation amid resource constraints.

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The post How UN Peacekeeping Operations Are Adapting to Contingency Measures appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Cleopatra Kitti, Senior Policy Advisor to ELIAMEP and Founder of the Mediterranean Growth Initiative, offers a review of Cyprus’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which concluded a few days ago.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here.

Europäischen Ermittlern ist es gelungen, ein Vergewaltiger-Netzwerk zu zerschlagen. 156 Opfer und Täter konnten identifiziert werden. Ermittlungen in neun Ländern enthüllen Tausch von Anleitungen zu Betäubungsmitteln und Missbrauch.

Die Spitzen von Union und SPD haben sich auf ein Reformpaket für wirtschaftliches Wachstum und soziale Sicherheit verständigt. Es folgt eine Einordnung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die Einigung auf das Reformpaket beendet eine lange Hängepartie in der Bundesregierung. Sein Beitrag zur Lösung der strukturellen Probleme Deutschlands dürfte jedoch begrenzt bleiben. Das Paket enthält eine Reihe von guten und sinnvollen Elementen. Vor allem der Abbau von Bürokratie, die Ziele beim Wohnungsbau und die steuerliche Entlastung bis in die Mitte hinein sind positive Aspekte. Es ist aber nicht der große Wurf, sondern eher ein Symbolpaket. Es wird der deutschen Wirtschaft nicht den gewünschten Impuls für Wachstum und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit geben. Es handelt sich um einen politischen Kompromiss mit begrenzten Ambitionen, der die großen Differenzen innerhalb der Bundesregierung zeigt und drei Botschaften enthalten soll: die Entlastung der Mitte, die Flexibilisierung für Unternehmen und eine härtere Linie beim Sozialstaat.

Zudem mangelt es in dem Vorstoß an Gerechtigkeit. Es hat eine soziale Schieflage, da der Fokus auf der Entlastung von Unternehmen liegt, zum Teil zulasten der Beschäftigten. Die Ausweitung der sachgrundlosen Befristung und die teilweise Aufweichung des Kündigungsschutzes als großen Wurf zu verkaufen, ist nicht seriös. Auch durch die geplanten Reformen bei Rente, Gesundheit und Pflege werden vor allem Menschen mit wenig Einkommen und Ersparnissen harte Einschnitte erfahren. Die Begrenzung der Westbalkan-Regelung auf 25.000 Personen pro Jahr kann den Arbeitsmarkt in Engpassbranchen zusätzlich belasten. Unter dem Strich bedeutet das Reformpaket Einschnitte vor allem für Menschen mit geringen, aber auch mit mittleren Einkommen.

Die Steuerreform ist unambitioniert, nicht ausfinanziert und entlastet zwar auch Familien und mittlere Einkommen, aber in absoluten Euro-Beträgen profitieren vor allem höhere Erwerbseinkommen unterhalb der Reichensteuer-Schwelle. Eine echte Entlastung kleiner und mittlerer Einkommen müsste stärker bei Sozialabgaben, Transfers oder Erwerbstätigenzuschüssen ansetzen - dies fehlt jedoch größtenteils. Bei der Steuerreform hat sich die Union durchgesetzt, da die Erhöhung des Reichensteuersatzes ab 250.000 Euro Jahreseinkommen eher symbolisch ist und dem Staat nur geringe zusätzliche Einnahmen verschaffen wird. Der Steuerreform fehlt Ehrlichkeit, denn es gibt faktisch keine annähernd ausreichende Gegenfinanzierung. Dass der bayerische Ministerpräsident Söder die Verhinderung einer Kürzung des Dienstwagenprivilegs als großen Erfolg verkauft, spricht für sich.

Germany's failure to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council is more than a diplomatic setback. It is a structural signal; and a credibility problem. For decades, Germany cultivated a reputation as an honest broker: a power that applied international law consistently. That reputation has taken damage. Germany's hesitant position toward Israel’s conduct in Gaza and Lebanon, and its evasive response to the US’ intervention in Venezuela, have seeded a perception of selectivity – that international legal norms are called for when politically convenient, and set aside when one’s own history or current dependencies make this difficult. In a world where countries from across Africa, Asia and Latin America are increasingly attentive to such inconsistencies, this matters. Credibility, once spent, is difficult to rebuild.

Germany's failure to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council is more than a diplomatic setback. It is a structural signal; and a credibility problem. For decades, Germany cultivated a reputation as an honest broker: a power that applied international law consistently. That reputation has taken damage. Germany's hesitant position toward Israel’s conduct in Gaza and Lebanon, and its evasive response to the US’ intervention in Venezuela, have seeded a perception of selectivity – that international legal norms are called for when politically convenient, and set aside when one’s own history or current dependencies make this difficult. In a world where countries from across Africa, Asia and Latin America are increasingly attentive to such inconsistencies, this matters. Credibility, once spent, is difficult to rebuild.

Germany's failure to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council is more than a diplomatic setback. It is a structural signal; and a credibility problem. For decades, Germany cultivated a reputation as an honest broker: a power that applied international law consistently. That reputation has taken damage. Germany's hesitant position toward Israel’s conduct in Gaza and Lebanon, and its evasive response to the US’ intervention in Venezuela, have seeded a perception of selectivity – that international legal norms are called for when politically convenient, and set aside when one’s own history or current dependencies make this difficult. In a world where countries from across Africa, Asia and Latin America are increasingly attentive to such inconsistencies, this matters. Credibility, once spent, is difficult to rebuild.

Zum Auslaufen des Tankrabatts äußert sich Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin und Vorsitzender der Monopolkommission, wie folgt:

Der Tankrabatt geht zu Ende, und die Bilanz fällt gemischt aus. Bis Mitte Juni wurde die Steuersenkung zum großen Teil, aber nicht vollständig weitergegeben – nach den Schätzungen der Monopolkommission zu etwa 85 bis 90 Prozent. In der vergangenen Woche jedoch zogen die Preise bereits spürbar an, und die Weitergaberate fiel unter 50 Prozent. Das ist ökonomisch besonders problematisch, weil gerade in diesen Tagen viele Verbraucher*innen noch einmal vollgetankt haben. Die Mehrbelastung traf also einen großen Teil des Absatzes. Und auch nach Auslaufen des Tankrabatts sind die Preise heute um 12 Uhr wieder sprunghaft und kräftig gestiegen – bei einzelnen Kraftstoffsorten um mehr als zehn Cent pro Liter. 

Für mich bestätigt das vor allem eines: Das eigentliche Problem sitzt nicht an der Tankstelle, sondern auf den vorgelagerten Stufen bei Raffinerien und Großhandel. Ein befristeter Rabatt ändert daran nichts: Er verschiebt nur, wann und bei wem das Geld landet. 

Am Ende bleibt festzuhalten: Der Tankrabatt war eine teure und sozial unausgewogene Maßnahme. Ein Teil davon – nach Schätzungen der Monopolkommission 100 bis 200 Millionen Euro, nach dieser Woche möglicherweise sogar mehr – ist bei der Mineralölindustrie hängengeblieben. Zudem haben Vielfahrer*innen am stärksten profitiert, die überproportional zu den einkommensstärkeren Haushalten zählen. In einer Knappheitssituation hat er außerdem die falschen Anreize gesetzt. Der Tankrabatt war damit von Anfang an das falsche Instrument – und es ist richtig, ihn auslaufen zu lassen.

How do grievances turn into collective action? This article examines how citizens' expectations in social contracts lead them to embark on street protests. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon and unpacks popular preferences about the states' obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people's grievances with their states' social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society's middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article's findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state-society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

How do grievances turn into collective action? This article examines how citizens' expectations in social contracts lead them to embark on street protests. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon and unpacks popular preferences about the states' obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people's grievances with their states' social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society's middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article's findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state-society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

How do grievances turn into collective action? This article examines how citizens' expectations in social contracts lead them to embark on street protests. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon and unpacks popular preferences about the states' obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people's grievances with their states' social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society's middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article's findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state-society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

Sicherheitenrahmen gibt vor, welche Vermögenswerte Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) als Sicherheit für Refinanzierungsgeschäfte von Banken akzeptiert – Lockerung dieses Rahmens lässt Aktienkurse der Banken steigen und senkt ihr Ausfallrisiko – Änderungen wirken aber asymmetrisch in verschiedenen ...