Africa

- Agenda / Région parisienne

The Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement to improve the efficiency of the EU External Action Guarantee under NDICI-Global Europe.

The 25th meeting of the Accession Conference with Montenegro provisionally closed chapter 32 on financial control.

Der Rat und das Parlament haben eine vorläufige Einigung zur Verbesserung der Effizienz der EU-Garantie für Außenmaßnahmen im Rahmen des Instruments „NDICI/Europa in der Welt“ erzielt.

La présidente de l’Association France-Algérie, Ségolène Royal, est arrivée lundi soir à Alger, a indiqué la télévision nationale. Cette visite de l’ancienne ministre française et […]

L’article Ségolène Royal arrive à Alger : un tournant pour les relations Algérie-France ? est apparu en premier sur .

Following an investigation some of the 16 detained last year are accused of planning to unseat President Bola Tinubu.

Prosecutors say Paul Mackenzie lured the latest victims to their deaths by writing notes from his prison cell.

Written by Saša Butorac.

CONTEXT

Timely, cost-efficient expansion and modernisation of the European energy infrastructure is one of the key challenges in the EU’s ongoing energy transition. Grid development is needed to ensure energy supply security, increase the resilience of Europe’s energy system and integrate the rapid roll-out of renewable energy sources. Cross border infrastructure plays a vital role in connecting national energy networks..

Meeting the 2030 interconnection targets is particularly important for completing the energy union and reaching European Union energy and climate goals. Given the scale of investment required, the persistent governance challenges around cross‑border projects and the need to enhance the robustness of the scenarios on which they are based, the European Commission has put forward a proposal to revise the TEN‑E regulation, as part of the European grids package published on 10 December 2025. The proposal is one of two legislative initiatives forming the core of the package (the other is on accelerating permit‑granting procedures).

Legislative proposal

2025/0399(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942, (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2024/1789 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2022/869 – COM(2025) 1006, 10 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:

2025/0399(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure Revision of the TEN E Regulation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Die Schauspielerin ist 68 Jahre alt, ihr Körper ist durchtrainiert und muskulös. Grund dafür ist eine strenge Ernährung, an die die Serbin sich seit Jahrzehnten hält. Ausserdem entschied sie sich bewusst gegen Kinder – und die Ehe.

Das Anwesen von Gene Hackman in Santa Fe steht zum Verkauf. Letztes Jahr wurde die Hollywood-Legende und seine Ehefrau tot in der Villa aufgefunden.

Damit in Luzern ein neues Buskonzept umgesetzt werden kann, braucht es beim Bahnhof neue Busperrons. Der Kantonsrat hat am Montag mit 84 zu 23 Stimmen den dazu nötigen Kredit von 3,8 Millionen Franken genehmigt.

La stimulation cérébrale est utilisée depuis longtemps pour traiter des maladies comme la maladie de Parkinson et est actuellement testée pour d'autres affections telles que les pertes de mémoire.

OPINION on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU – Commission for the financial year 2024
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Evin Incir

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Dauer des Videos : 90'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Selon le cabinet fiscal Deloitte, Liverpool est devenu pour la première fois l'équipe la plus rentable de Premier League.

Les autorités fédérales et locales présentent des versions contradictoires de l'incident qui a coûté la vie au manifestant Alex Pretti.

Depuis l'effondrement mortel de l'auvent de la gare de Novi Sad, le 1er novembre 2024, la Serbie se soulève contre la corruption meurtrière du régime du président Vučić et pour le respect de l'État de droit. Cette exigence de justice menée par les étudiants a gagné tout le pays. Suivez les dernières informations en temps réel et en accès libre.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Vucic, Serbie, Politique, Société, Gratuit

The UN mission says it is gravely concerned by "inflammatory rhetoric calling for violence against civilians".

Written by Victoria Martin de la Torre.

Commemoration of the liberation of Auschwitz

On 27 January 1945, the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp was liberated, after some 1.1 million people – mostly Jews, but also Poles, Roma, Soviet prisoners of war and people of other nationalities – were murdered there. This year, survivor Tatiana Bucci, who was six years old when she was deported to Auschwitz with her family, will address MEPs, recalling that around 1.5 million Jewish children were murdered in the Holocaust.

Role of the European Parliament

In 1995, Parliament called for a Holocaust Remembrance Day in all Member States, and in January 2005 proposed 27 January as the EU’s Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust. In November 2005, the United Nations General Assembly designated 27 January as an international day of commemoration to honour Holocaust victims. Since 2005, Parliament has marked this date every year.

Parliament’s Vice-President responsible for Holocaust Remembrance Day and the fight against antisemitism is Pina Picierno (S&D, Italy). The House of European History, established at Parliament’s initiative in Brussels, features a permanent exhibition on the Holocaust and offers the Hidden Children – Survivors of the Holocaust in Brussels, a guided educational and commemorative walk for young people.

In October 2017, Parliament called on the Member States to mark 2 August as the date to remember the victims of the Roma Holocaust and to include this community in Holocaust Remembrance Day. In June that year, Parliament called on the Member States to adopt and apply the working definition of antisemitism employed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, so as to identify and prosecute antisemitic attacks more efficiently and effectively. In October 2018, in relation to the rise of neo-fascist violence in Europe, Parliament drew attention to growing violence against Jews, and called on the Member States to counter Holocaust denial and trivialisation, and to mainstream Holocaust remembrance in education.

Parliament regularly adopts resolutions on fundamental rights in the EU, addressing a wide range of issues such as human dignity, freedom, minority rights and antisemitism. Its September 2022 resolution on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU (2020-2021), for instance, provided an overview of antisemitism, racism, discrimination against LGBTIQ persons, anti-gypsyism and xenophobia.

In 2023, Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) began work on a report supporting the extension of the list of EU crimes in Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to include hate speech and hate crime, in response to a 2021 Commission communication. If the list is extended, Parliament and the Council may then establish minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and sanctions across the EU. Parliament endorsed the report in plenary on 18 January 2024.

The European Parliament’s Working Group against Antisemitism, bringing together more than 80 Members from across the political groups, cooperates with all EU institutions.

This is an update of an ‘At a glance’ note from January 2025 drafted by Alina-Alexandra Georgescu.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Holocaust Remembrance Day 2026: Through the eyes of a child‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Credit: Abubaker Lubowa/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jan 26 2026 (IPS)

When Ugandans went to the polls on 15 January, the outcome was never in doubt. As voting began, mobile internet services ground to a halt, ensuring minimal scrutiny as President Yoweri Museveni secured his seventh consecutive term. Far from offering democratic choice, the vote reinforced one of Africa’s longest-running presidencies, providing a veneer of democratic legitimacy while stifling competition.

Four decades in power

Museveni’s four-decade grip on power began with the Bush War, a guerrilla conflict that brought him to office in 1986. Single-party rule lasted for almost two decades, deemed necessary for national reconstruction. The 1995 constitution granted parliament and the judiciary autonomy and introduced a two-term presidential limit and age cap of 75, but maintained the ban on political parties.

With one-party rule increasingly called into question, Museveni restored multi-party politics in 2005. However, he simultaneously orchestrated a constitutional amendment to remove term limits. In 2017 he abolished the age restriction, allowing him to run for a sixth term in 2021.

Recent elections have been marked by state violence. Museveni’s 2021 campaign against opposition challenger Bobi Wine was defined by government brutality, with over a hundred people killed in protests following Wine’s arrest in November 2020. Another opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, has been arrested or detained more than a thousand times over the years.

Museveni promoted his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, to Chief of Defence Forces in 2024. Kainerugaba has openly boasted on social media about torturing political opponents, reflecting a regime that no longer bothers to conceal its brutality. His rise signals a potential hereditary handover.

Civic space shutdown

In the face of a credible opposition challenge, this year’s election required more than constitutional tinkering: it demanded the systematic restriction of civic space. The Trump administration’s dissolution of USAID in early 2025 helped Museveni here, because it was catastrophic for Ugandan civil society. Almost all US-funded Good Governance and Civil Society programmes were cancelled, hollowing out the civic education networks that once reached first-time and rural voters. State propaganda filled the vacuum.

A coordinated assault on dissent followed. Between June and October, climate and environmental activists were repeatedly denied bail, spending months in prison for peacefully protesting against the East African Crude Oil Pipeline. The regime’s reach extended beyond borders: in November 2024, Besigye was abducted in Nairobi and appeared days later at a military court in Kampala, charged with capital offences despite a Supreme Court ruling declaring military trials for civilians unconstitutional. Museveni simply legalised the practice in June 2025.

Intimidation intensified as the vote neared. Authorities arrested Sarah Bireete, executive director of the Center for Constitutional Governance, without a warrant, holding her for four days in violation of constitutional limits. In his New Year’s Eve address, Museveni explicitly instructed security forces to use more teargas against opposition supporters, whom he called criminals. In the days that followed, security forces used teargas, along with pepper spray and physical violence, to disperse opposition rallies. Hundreds of Wine supporters were abducted or detained.

The government dismantled the infrastructure needed for independent monitoring. Authorities suspended five prominent human rights organisations, and two days before voting, the Uganda Communications Commission implemented a nationwide internet shutdown, ostensibly to prevent disinformation. The blackout ensured election day irregularities would go undocumented.

Election irregularities and violence

Election day was plagued by technical failures, but Wine, again the major challenger, also claimed wholesale ballot stuffing and the abduction of polling agents. The Electoral Commission head admitted receiving private warnings from senior government figures against declaring some opposition candidates as winners.

International observers attempted diplomatic language, noting the environment was ‘relatively peaceful’ compared to 2021 while expressing serious concerns about harassment, intimidation and arrests. They recognised that the internet blackout hindered their ability to document irregularities.

Post-election violence claimed at least 12 lives. The deadliest incident occurred in Butambala district, where security forces killed between seven and 10 opposition supporters. Wine was placed under house arrest while the count was held in opaque conditions. Results were announced by region rather than polling station, limiting monitors’ ability to validate them. According to the official count, Museveni won with around 71 per cent, while Wine’s tally dropped to 25 per cent from 35 per cent in 2021. Turnout stood at just 52 per cent, meaning over 10 million eligible voters stayed home.

A generational breaking point

Ugandans’ median age is 17; 78 per cent of people are under 35. Most have known only one president. Wine, a 44-year-old singer turned politician whose music had long resonated with young Ugandans’ frustrations, campaigned on promises of change. But he’s now been defeated twice in a highly uneven race.

Young people have sought other ways to make their voices heard. In 2024, they took to the streets to protest against corruption, but they were met with security force violence and mass arrests.

Avenues for change appear blocked. Opposition parliamentary representation is insufficient for meaningful reform. Civil society groups face restrictive laws and lack international support. International partners are quiet because Uganda is strategically valuable: it provides troops for regional operations, shelters two million refugees, facilitates Chinese and French oil drilling and recently agreed to accept US deportees.

Given his advanced age, Museveni is unlikely to run again in 2031. But with authority increasingly concentrated on a tight inner circle of relatives, democratic transition may be less likely than an eventual transfer of power to his son. Uganda’s young majority faces a difficult choice: accept a status quo that offers no prospects or confront a security apparatus that has spent years perfecting its use of violence.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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