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In advance of the Security Council’s open debate on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), IPI, together with the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN, co-hosted a policy forum on April 17th on the topic of “Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Examining the Use of UN Sanctions.”

The purpose of this policy forum was to consider how sanctions have been used in response to CRSV. The discussion examined the relationship between the annual reports of the secretary-general on CRSV and sanctions designations and provided recommendations to enhance complementarity.

The policy forum also launched the IPI publication “UN Tools for Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analysis of Listings and Sanctions Processes,” written by Jenna Russo and Lauren McGowan. The event and publication were made possible with generous support from the government of Denmark.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Christina Markus Lassen, Permanent Representative of Denmark to the UN

Speakers:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute
Tonderai Chikuhwa, Senior Policy Adviser, UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
Natascha Hryckow, Associate Fellow, Global Fellowship Initiative of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Former Coordinator for the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia (VTC)
Francesca Cassar, Africa, Economic and Development Coordinator, Permanent Mission of Malta to the UN
Pauline Brosch, Policy Specialist, Protection and Transitional Justice, UN Women

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

Since the Security Council first recognized conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) as a threat to international peace and security in 2008, the UN has developed an increasing number of pathways to prevent and respond to such crimes. One of these is the annual report of the secretary-general on CRSV, which includes an annexed list of perpetrators who are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of CRSV violations in contexts on the agenda of the Security Council. In addition, perpetrators of CRSV may also be designated in UN sanctions regimes. Yet while both of these processes aim to prevent and respond to CRSV, they are not always coherent with one another.

This paper analyzes the relationship between the annual reports of the secretary-general on CRSV and sanctions designations to provide recommendations to enhance their complementarity. It provides an overview of the CRSV annual report and the process for listing parties. It then focuses on designations in sanctions regimes for crimes related to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), including the level of coherence between the reporting of the secretary-general and designations in sanctions regimes. Next, the paper analyzes the reporting and political barriers that inhibit more regular designations for SGBV in sanctions regimes. Finally, it provides recommendations to the UN and member states on how to improve the coherence, coordination, and effectiveness of these processes, including the following.

For member states:

• Explicitly list SGBV as a criterion within all sanctions regimes for contexts where sexual violence may be taking place.
• Prioritize utilizing existing SGBV-related criteria as appropriate with available evidence.
• Provide additional resources for panels of experts.
• Increase coherence between the parties listed in the annual reports on CRSV and the individuals and entities designated in sanctions regimes.
• Organize an annual field visit for sanctions committees to the context in question.
• Create a standing capacity within the UN to engage with designated parties, with the aim of encouraging compliance and facilitating de-listing.

For the UN Secretariat and panels of experts:

• Establish a platform for regularly coordinating and sharing information between the office of the special representative of the secretary-general on sexual violence in conflict and panels of experts.
• Institute more structured handover processes between incoming and outgoing members of panels of experts.
• Provide more robust training on SGBV for panels of experts.
• Strengthen CRSV expertise and capacity within the Security Council Affairs Division.

The establishment of a new Loss and Damage Fund and Funding Arrangements at COP27 and the Fund’s operationalization and initial capitalization at COP28 were milestones in the UN climate regime. The World Bank engaged in the Transitional Committee (TC) process as a potential host and trustee for the Fund, a member of a new “High-Level Dialogue,” and a direct provider of loss and damage (L&D) support. The implementation of the Fund and Funding Arrangements—the mosaic—is the first big test of the World Bank’s commitment to evolving its policies, practices, and relationships.

This paper discusses the World Bank’s engagement with loss and damage, including the context of broader reforms aiming to modernize the Bank, such as the Bank’s Evolution Roadmap, which identifies three guiding elements for the Bank’s evolution: a new mission and vision, a new playbook, and new resources. One of the key components of the Bank’s evolution is the introduction of climate-resilient debt clauses (CRDCs) or “pause clauses.” Pause clauses feature prominently in recent initiatives to reform the international financial architecture, such as Bridgetown 2.0, the Africa Climate Summit’s Nairobi Declaration, and the Vulnerable Twenty Group’s (V20) Accra-Marrakech Agenda.

The paper also discusses the debate over the World Bank’s hosting of the Fund and the set of conditions and safeguards, determined by developing countries, that the Bank would have to meet in order to host the Fund. Finally, the paper discusses priority actions for the High-Level Dialogue, including resource mobilization, institutional protocols, and the losses and damages of the future.

This paper discusses the growing potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities of UN peace operations. Fast-moving changes in the cyber capabilities of state and non-state actors, the changing nature of asymmetric warfare, and the positioning of the UN in relation to global and regional geopolitics are increasingly placing peace operations in the crosshairs of complex cybersecurity threats. In parallel to these external trends, internal trends in missions’ intelligence, surveillance, and data management technologies also make them more vulnerable to cyber threats. At the same time, there are opportunities for missions to leverage cybersecurity infrastructure to support the implementation of their mandates, including in the areas of mediation and political settlements and the protection of civil society actors.

The paper provides an overview of the cyber threats facing peace operations and opportunities to leverage cybersecurity tools for mandate implementation. It also documents the operational and policy challenges that have arisen and the Secretariat’s efforts to address them. It concludes with several recommendations for the UN as peace operations seek to operate in an increasingly fraught political and cybersecurity environment:

• The Secretariat should develop cross-cutting operational concepts and guidance for cyber threat assessments.
• The Secretariat should articulate its understanding of its duty of care for staff privacy and develop operational guidance and expertise for mitigating threats to privacy.
• When facilitating political processes, peace operations should consider whether cybersecurity measures will be equally effective in deterring hacking attempts by all parties to ensure they do not exacerbate “information asymmetries.”
• The UN should explore the boundaries around missions evading or obstructing surveillance or intrusion activities by host states to secure their operations.
• The Secretariat should mitigate the volume of data exposed to cyber threats, including by deploying UN-owned and UN-operated intelligence and surveillance devices when possible.

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Since the first feminist foreign policy (FFP) was adopted by Sweden in 2014, sixteen countries have either published an FFP or announced their intention to do so. Some proponents of FFPs have indicated that these policies can be a way to democratize and transform multilateralism, integrating feminist approaches and principles into multilateral institutions and leading to more inclusive and equitable outcomes. This requires seeing FFPs as not just a “women’s issue” but also as a way to reinvigorate an outdated and inequitable system through transformational change and the interrogation of entrenched power dynamics, including in areas such as trade, climate, migration, and disarmament.

One obstacle to realizing the potential of FFPs is that there is no single definition of feminist foreign policy. Part of the challenge is that there are many interpretations of feminism, some of which reflect a more transformative, systemic approach than others. Ultimately, there is no single way to “do” feminism, and approaches to FFP should, and will, vary. If FFP is to survive and grow, it will encompass contradictions and compromises, as with all policymaking, and civil society and member states will have to collaborate to advance feminist principles in the multilateral arena.

To explore the future of FFPs, the International Peace Institute, in partnership with the Open Society Foundations and in collaboration with the co-chairs of the Feminist Foreign Policy Plus (FFP+) Group, Chile and Germany, convened a retreat on Feminist Foreign Policy and Multilateralism in July 2023. Drawing on insights from the retreat, this paper discusses five ongoing debates that FFP-interested states should meaningfully engage with:

• Militarization, demilitarization, and the root causes of violence;
• Global perspectives and postcolonial critiques;
• The branding and substance of FFPs;
• The domestication of FFPs; and
• Accountability and sustainability.

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IPI in partnership with the Life & Peace Institute and the Permanent Missions of the Republic of Kenya, Norway, and Sweden to the UN, cohosted a policy forum on March 21st assessing lessons learned from Kenya’s Peacebuilding Architecture Review.

The pursuit of peace, a foundational goal at the establishment of the UN in 1945, requires member states to assume primary responsibility for conflict prevention through initiatives that are nationally owned and people-centered, respect human rights, and enhance inclusivity and social cohesion. Its implementation requires a constant refreshing of peacebuilding and conflict prevention and resolution methods. This year, determining a way forward on these issues will be key to the impact hoped for in the Pact for the Future.

In 2023, in line with the push for national governments to take the lead in “identifying, driving and directing priorities, strategies, and activities for peacebuilding and sustaining peace,” the Government of Kenya commissioned a review of its national peacebuilding architecture. The initiative was spearheaded by the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and assisted by an Independent Panel of Advisors (IPA), with support from the United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office and other partners. Resulting from the highly consultative process involving Kenyans from diverse backgrounds, the IPA submitted to Kenya’s political leadership a report with a comprehensive set of observations and recommendations, structured around four pillars: (1) defining a national agenda for peace, (2) promoting political inclusion, (3) enhancing conflict prevention and resolution, and (4) proposing a new institutional architecture for peacebuilding. By pursuing an independent assessment that values the insights and contributions of local peacebuilders and civil society, Kenya demonstrates national ownership and leadership.

The audience heard from the IPA reflecting on its experiences on the review journey and the key findings and recommendations, with a particular emphasis on partnership opportunities in the implementation phase.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Andreas Løvold, Chargé d’affaires and Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the UN
Elizabeth Mary Spehar, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
Shamsa Abubakar, Deputy Chair for the Independent Panel of Advisors for the Peacebuilding Review

Speakers:
Raymond Omollo, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Interior and National Administration, Government of Kenya
Lesley Connolly, Team Leader, Global Policy, Life & Peace Institute
Rana Taha, Peace and Development Advisor, United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office, Kenya
Sheikh Abdullahi Abdi, Independent Panel of Advisors for the Peacebuilding Review

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

Closing remarks:
H.E. Martin Kimani, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kenya to the UN
H.E. Anna Karin Eneström, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN

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IPI together with the Permanent Missions of Finland and The Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN cohosted a policy forum on March 20th on the topic of “Specialized Police Teams in UN Peace Operations: A Survey of Progress and Challenges.”

United Nations police (UNPOL) efforts to support peace and security around the world have evolved significantly in the past decade. As the roles and responsibilities of UNPOL have become increasingly multifaceted, specialized police teams (SPTs) have emerged as a useful complement to individual police officers (IPOs) and formed police units (FPUs). SPTs provide specific policing expertise and deliver project-based programming in line with their skill sets. For UNPOL, they also allow for more flexible, nimble, and agile responses to specific police development requests under the umbrella of existing field missions and arrangements.

SPTs are still described by many around UN policing as “new,” but more than thirteen years after their formal conceptualization, SPTs are now an established tool of UN policing in peace operations. Given the potential promise related to using SPTs, a more detailed assessment reflecting on these accumulated experiences is warranted. The event examined how SPTs have been used in a range of UN peace operations environments as well as the comparative advantages that SPTs offer in complement to IPOs and FPUs, including some of the challenges that need to be overcome to harness SPTs’ full potential in future deployments.

This policy forum launched an IPI publication on “Specialized Police Teams in UN Peace Operations: A Survey of Progress and Challenges,” written by Charles T. Hunt. The event and publication were made possible with generous support from the governments of Finland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as part of IPI’s broader workstream on A4P+.

Opening remarks:
H.E. Lauri Voionmaa, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Finland to the UN
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

Speakers:
Charles Hunt, Professor of International Relations, RMIT University and Senior Fellow (Non-Resident) at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research
Dmitri Alechkevitch, Policy Adviser, Strategic Policy and Development, United Nations Police Division
Christine Fossen, Police Commissioner, UNMISS
Jon Christian Møller, Director, KPMG Advisory, Former Specialized Police Team Leader for Haiti

Closing remarks:
Peter Slort, Police Advisor, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

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There is increasing evidence of the gendered outcomes and secondary effects of epidemics and pandemics. Women make up a disproportionate share of the healthcare workforce, absorb much of the additional unpaid labor during health crises, and are exposed to increased gender-based violence and insecurity around sexual and reproductive healthcare during pandemics, among other effects. A gender-sensitive approach to health emergencies is essential for pandemic preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery.

Despite the World Health Organization’s (WHO) awareness of these impacts, it does not systematically consider them in its pandemic preparedness and response. WHO’s historical “add women and stir” approach is evident in the proposed amendments to the International Health Regulations (IHR), whose attention to gender focuses primarily on committee representation. Gender sensitivity is also limited in the drafts of the WHO Convention, Agreement or Other International Instrument on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response (CA+), currently in development. Gender-inclusive language in the CA+ is essential for effective international coordination to prepare, prevent, respond to, and recover from health emergencies.

This paper examines the extent to which gender has been included in the zero-draft CA+ process through a desk review of the drafts that have been published (as of March 2024), focusing on explicit mentions of gender and women. The report documents the progress to date on integrating gender equality into the CA+ and offers the following recommendations for CA+ negotiators, WHO, and member states.

• Future drafts of the CA+ should have provisions that address a wider range of the gendered impacts of pandemics;
• WHO should develop an IHR/CA+ repository;
• INB negotiators should directly engage relevant UN entities to recommend methods of integrating gender into the CA+;
• States that claim to have a principled stance on gender equity should transparently champion gender-inclusive language; and
• The CA+ should consider and incorporate initial lessons learned from the implementation of the gender-inclusive language in the IHR’s Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of states.

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Over the past decade and a half, specialized police teams (SPTs) have emerged as an innovative complement to individual police officers (IPOs) and formed police units (FPUs) in UN police peacekeeping. In general, SPTs are comprised of police officers and civilian policing experts focused on “skills transfer” and capacity building through technical assistance and advice, training, and mentoring to host-state police in a specific area of police operations or administration.

This paper provides an overview of the benefits and challenges of SPTs as compared to IPOs. Some of the benefits include that SPTs are generally highly capable and meet high standards in specialized areas of policing, provide a more coherent and cohesive approach, and focus on objectives within a specific area. They also maximize capabilities by matching the work of officers to their skill sets, can be quick to deploy and adaptable, and maintain continuity by implementing longer projects. Moreover, SPTs facilitate relationship building with host-state police, use sustainable capacity-building approaches such as training of trainers, provide broader benefits to missions, and are more attractive to some police-contributing countries.

At the same time, several obstacles to greater effectiveness have emerged, including that SPTs confront high-level tensions over their development and administration, experience supply-side issues due to their reliance on voluntary contributions and shortages of specially trained officers and civilian experts, and are dominated by countries in the Global North. They also have inconsistent composition, plans, and modalities across and even within missions and phases; lack sufficient guidance on key operational aspects; and lack consistent and sufficient funding. Moreover, SPTs are disconnected from broader efforts, sometimes implement unsustainable programming that focuses on “quick wins,” and often lack adequate frameworks for monitoring and evaluation.

The lessons emerging from the experience of SPTs to date emphasize the need for innovation around deployment and implementation modalities for this specialized approach to capacity building. At the same time, they highlight the need for greater organizational flexibility and adaptability to empower and maximize the potential of SPTs.

IPI together with the Atlantic Council and the Malala Fund cohosted a high-level panel discussion on March 8th, addressing the deteriorating rights of girls, women, and individuals of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities in Afghanistan while also highlighting ongoing efforts to ensure justice and accountability for these abuses—in particular, the momentum around efforts to recognize and codify the crime of gender apartheid. This event was co-sponsored by the Global Justice Center, Rawadari, Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace & Security, Malta, and Mexico.

Since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021, they have implemented a range of laws, policies, and practices that systematically oppress women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons, including 85 decrees focused on curtailing girls’ and women’s rights. Under an increasingly entrenched, institutionalized legal system that curtails freedom, stifles potential, and erodes dignity, victims and survivors have endured and resisted. Reflecting on the lived experiences of Afghan women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons, the event promoted discussion on avenues for accountability for the crimes being perpetrated. One such avenue is the codification of the crime of gender apartheid under international and domestic law.

At the event, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center publicly launched its initiative “Inside Afghanistan’s Gender Apartheid,” an interactive audio timeline that allows listeners to hear directly from Afghan women and girls about the profound and harrowing impacts of the escalating gender apartheid in Afghanistan.

Full coverage of the event is forthcoming.

Opening/Closing Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Peace Institute
H.E. Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Malta to the UN
H.E. Alicia Buenrostro Massieu, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN

Speakers:
Malala Yousafzai, Nobel Peace Laureate
Nayera Kohistani, Afghan Activist and Expert
Penelope Andrews, John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law & Director, Racial Justice Project, New York Law School
Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, Chair, UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls

Moderator:
Jomana Karadsheh, International Correspondent, CNN

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In a timely discussion ahead of the 68th session of the Commission on the Status of Women on March 6th, IPI, in partnership with the Nordic Africa Institute, cohosted a hybrid policy forum. Panelists assessed the role of the Elected 10 (E10) member states in influencing UN Security Council policy outcomes and outlined strategies and challenges for these non-permanent states to advance the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda within the council. Researchers, policymakers, and former and current members of the E10 highlighted successful efforts and opportunities for growth alike to promote the WPS agenda in the face of an increasingly challenging global context. The discussion was anchored in the principles of Resolution 1325 as speakers offered their insights around the themes of centering women’s participation in peace processes, the importance of national and regional context, and the need for innovative tactics to advance the WPS agenda.

Ireland and Norway shared their best practices and lessons learned as former E10 members, emphasizing the importance of implementation beyond rhetoric. Reflecting on Norway’s recent tenure on the Security Council, Permanent Representative of Norway Merete Fjeld Brattested identified three key ways that Norway worked on Women, Peace, and Security including mainstreaming WPS language into all Security Council products, supporting and strengthening cross-regional collaboration, and prioritizing the safe and meaningful participation of women civil society briefers in formal and informal meetings.

Permanent Representative of Ireland Fergal Mythen spoke from his experience as an initiating member of the Presidency Trio of Ireland, Kenya, and Mexico: “Shoehorning women, peace, and security into one week in October is tokenizing—there needs to be more implementation, more meaningful and sustained participation of women.” He highlighted the elements of a cross-regional approach and a commitment to action as essential to the successes of the Trio, but noted the inclusion of women in peace processes as an area with much more room for improvement.

Representing the perspective of current elected member of the E10 and newly elected co-chair of the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace, and Security, Sierra Leone, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone Roselynn Finda Senesi offered a lucid set of objectives and actionable items. Working from the foundational idea that, “women on the frontlines don’t want good rhetoric, they need action, accountability, and change,” her objectives include: an improved collaborative link between the African Union and WPS actors in the region; processes of accountability to increase the representation of women in peace processes; clear, specific, and decisive language on WPS; and strong support and protection of women civil society briefers.

The event provided an opportunity to share the findings of the Nordic Africa Institute’s multi-year research project, “Shattering Glass: How Elected Members of the UN Security Council Fight for Women, Peace and Security,” undertaken with the Peace Research Institute Oslo. The project assessed the dynamics, politics, and processes that affect the WPS agenda in the UN Security Council, posing the question: How do the members of the E10 advance the WPS agenda within the council?

Based on this research, Louise Olsson, Research Director, Global Norms, Politics and Society, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), commented on the examples provided by other panelists and presented insights on the broader structure of the Security Council and the opportunities therein to influence WPS outcomes. One of her conclusions was that as the WPS agenda becomes further integrated into the council, the individual profile, including the position, credibility, history, and interests, of an elected member state as they come into the Security Council is an important factor in their ability to advance WPS objectives. Another factor to consider in the further incorporation of WPS is the resulting parallel rise in resource demands.

Independent Consultant and former Director of Programmes, Futurelect, Sithembile Mbete, reflected on the role of South Africa as a three-time elected member of the Security Council. Illustrating the geographic and regional significance of an E10 member articulated by many panelists, she spoke of how the nexus between domestic and foreign policy concerns, the implication of South Africa’s national interests with the interests of the African continent, and its unique history has shaped its approach to foreign policy and the advancement of WPS in its terms within the Council. One of the innovations of the E10 that Dr. Mbete highlighted was the “reform by stealth” of the Security Council.

The event concluded with a question-and-answer session open to audience members and closing remarks from Angela Muvumba Sellström, Senior Researcher of the Nordic Africa Institute and Project Lead of “E10, WPS, and the UN Security Council.”

Opening remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute
Therese Sjömander Magnusson, Director, Nordic Africa Institute (NAI)

Speakers:
H.E. Merete Fjeld Brattested, Permanent Representative of Norway to the UN
H.E. Fergal Mythen, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN
Roselynn Finda Senesi, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the UN
Louise Olsson, Research Director, Global Norms, Politics and Society, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
Sithembile Mbete, Independent Consultant, former Director of Programmes, Futurelect
Pablo Castillo Díaz, Policy Specialist on Peace and Security, UN Women (virtual)

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of WPS, International Peace Institute

Closing remarks:
Angela Muvumba Sellström, Senior Researcher and Project Lead, “E10, WPS and the UN Security Council,” Nordic Africa Institute (NAI)

Although adaptation has historically received less attention than mitigation, finance, and more recently loss and damage, it remains a key aspect of climate action as we near the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C threshold. This paper discusses the agreement on a framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) as one of the most important outcomes of the twenty-eighth UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai, providing an overview of and key takeaways from the document.

The final decision text contains language on long-term transformational adaptation, which was seen as a success by many developing countries. It also sets targets for a finalized list of thematic areas—a contentious subject and another success for many developing countries. These targets explain what success looks like, ultimately aiming for the high-level objective of well-being for people and planet, while leaving the details of achieving this objective to countries. The text also includes targets for the iterative adaptation cycle. In addition, there were a number of paragraphs on means of implementation, though many developing countries saw these as a failure, as they provide little new or significant language.

The next step will be to develop indicators for the targets in the GGA framework. Ideally, the negotiators should set the strategic direction of this process while leaving the selection of indicators to experts. It will be important to keep the list of indicators short, account for data gaps, and draw on existing indicators to the extent possible. While there is much work to be done to give life to the GGA framework adopted at COP28, it has the potential to be the new guiding light for climate action.

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The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in March 2024. The upcoming negotiations among council members will unfold as South Sudan prepares to hold national elections in December 2024. Intercommunal violence remains pervasive across the country. Significant humanitarian concerns, further aggravated by the ongoing conflict in Sudan, pose multifaceted threats to civilians, and the limited presence of state institutions to provide basic services or security amplifies the magnitude of the challenges confronting South Sudan. The humanitarian situation is further exacerbated by the impact of climate change and the influx of refugees and returnees fleeing the conflict in Sudan.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report cohosted a roundtable discussion on February 6, 2024, to discuss UNMISS’s mandate renewal. This roundtable offered a platform for member-state representatives, UN officials, civil society stakeholders, and independent experts to share their assessments of the situation in South Sudan in a candid and collaborative manner. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions on prioritizing and sequencing UNMISS’s mandate, as well as the mission’s strategic orientation and actions on the ground.

Participants urged council members to consider the following issues in mandate renewal discussions on UNMISS.

• Calling for the full implementation of the 2018 peace agreement (R-ARCSS) without delay;
• Emphasizing the importance of implementing Chapter V of the R-ARCSS to enhance transitional justice and accountability, including through the establishment of the Hybrid Court;
• Reaffirming the four main pillars of UNMISS’s mandate, with the protection of civilians (POC) to remain a top priority;
• Strengthening national capacity and reinforcing UNMISS’s protection mechanisms and support for women at risk of and who have been victims of sexual and gender-based violence;
• Requesting that UNMISS monitor and report on the state of civic space and continue promoting inclusive political dialogue and civic engagement, including but not limited to the participation of women; and
• Encouraging international partners to scale up technical assistance, capacity building, and financial support to South Sudan.

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During a three-day conference in Baghdad entitled “Baghdad Dialogue: Exploring Regional Connectivity” organized by the Iraqi Institute for Dialogue and the Centre for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO, Germany), IPI MENA Senior Director Nejib Friji emphasized the strong need for regional cooperation towards building peace and security.

During the participants’ discussions with Iraqi President H.E Abdul Latif Rashid and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani, Mr. Friji highlighted the role of Iraq in bringing together neighboring countries to reinforce regional integration which in turn will ensure a more stable, prosperous, and interconnected region, building up on the Development Road project that would boost trade and exchanges between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and other Mideast Countries.

He stressed a home-grown framework in which conflict would be handled from a preventive approach as a logical result of interconnectedness and melding of countries’ political, economic, and social domains.

In a bilateral meeting with Sheikh Humam Hammoudi, Leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, former First Deputy Speaker of the Parliament and Chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, Mr. Friji stressed the critical importance of regional development projects that would cement ties of interdependence cooperation. The Development Road Project qualifies to bolster connectivity via economic and infrastructure linkages between Asia and Europe.

Building on the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Mr. Friji highlighted Iraq’s opportunities in partnering with the GCC, Levant, North Africa, and beyond for long-term regional integration based on human development strategy.

Mr. Friji also met with the Climate Envoy of Iraq and Advisor to the Prime Minister on Climate Change & Sustainable Development, Fareed Yasseen, to explore future opportunities for cooperation and build-up following COP27 in Cairo and COP28 in the United Arab Emirates.

He also underlined the need to tap into the technological developments of the twenty-first century during discussions with the CEO of Earthlink, Alaa Jasim Moussa, stressing the role of communications and tele-corporations in bringing nations together in the region via interlinkage of networks.

Speaking on a panel entitled “Regional Approaches Towards Human Security, Conflict Resolution & Reconciliation” during the second day of the conference, Mr. Friji pointed to water as a critical tool for regional peace and stressed the importance of the water-climate-agriculture nexus.

“Climate change poses additional pressures to an evolving context. The MENA region has the most expected economic losses from climate-related water scarcity, projected at 14% of its GDP by 2050,” he stated.

He also highlighted energy as a cornerstone of any regional integration project. “The transition of renewable energy will bring together the oil-producing and non-oil-producing; it will consolidate the interdependence that will boost the economy, trade, and infrastructure ties across countries in the region,” he underlined.

He concluded his remarks by pointing to mechanisms for conflict prevention: “Within each academic and higher education institution, we must have think tanks and research centers in place that would groom the future generations on management, good governance, and law frameworks,” he stressed. “Planting the seeds for critically aware youth means that we can better equip judiciary systems which contribute to fair dispute resolution, upholding rights, and further building citizen-state trust, social stability, and peace.”

In September 2024, the UN will hold the Summit of the Future in New York, bringing together world leaders to “forge a new international consensus” on how to “deliver a better present and safeguard the future.” One of the outcomes of the summit will be a Pact for the Future covering five key areas: sustainable development and financing for development; international peace and security; science, technology and innovation, and digital cooperation; youth and future generations; and transforming global governance. While the intergovernmental negotiations on the Pact for the Future are meant to be consultative, they could include a broader cross-section of perspectives, including from the African continent.

In this context, IPI and KAS New York hosted a hybrid workshop on February 1, 2024, to gather the perspectives of African states, multilateral institutions, and African civil society organizations on the summit and its outcome. This workshop provided a platform for exchange between member states, the African Union (AU), the UN, civil society organizations, and experts based in Addis Ababa and New York. The workshop was held in Addis Ababa in recognition of the important role of African multilateral institutions such as the AU in contributing to the reform of the international system and reinvigorating global cooperation. The convening aimed to foster a more inclusive and networked multilateralism by providing a platform for African stakeholders and by generating momentum around the summit outside the New York policy space.

The following points emerged as key considerations to ensure that the summit and pact deliver on revitalizing inclusive multilateral cooperation.

• Reform of the multilateral system is critical to restore its credibility and legitimacy and will require, at the very least, renewed commitment by member states to the foundational principles of the UN Charter
• Reform of the international financial architecture needs to include increasing Africa’s representation in international financial institutions and ensuring that Africa benefits from its own resources.
• International peace and security need to be underpinned by a broader toolbox for responding to conflicts and crises, a deeper AU–UN partnership, and greater representation for Africa on the Security Council.
• Reparations and historical justice should be the foundation of efforts to advance peace and development and meaningful reform of the multilateral system.
• Africa’s engagement in the summit should include active participation by African civil society organizations and academics in support of member states to advance key priorities for the continent.
• Monitoring and evaluation will be needed after the summit to hold member states accountable for delivering on their commitments and implementing outcomes.

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The UN Secretary General’s New Agenda for Peace places a strong emphasis on national action to prevent conflict and achieve sustainable development. As a result, national parliaments have an important role to play in the pursuit of a strengthened system of global governance and a more effective approach to collective security.

From February 8th-9th, over 200 parliamentarians from around the world convened for the 2024 edition of the annual Parliamentary Hearing between the UN and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The hearing took place as negotiations are ongoing for the Pact of the Future and in anticipation of a Summit of the Future that UNGA President Dennis Francis describes as a “once in a generation opportunity” to fast-track transformative solutions for improved multilateralism. This year’s theme, “Putting an end to conflicts: Prescriptions for a peaceful future,” shaped two days of wide-ranging conversations.

IPI Vice President and COO Adam Lupel spoke at the first meeting of the 2024 Parliamentary Hearing on the panel “The Future of Peace and Security: From good intentions to a renewed collective action.” Dr. Lupel identified the decay of universal commitments to international law and normative constraints on the use of force as the principal strategic threats to peace and security. Building on the New Agenda for Peace’s three core principles of trust, solidarity, and universality, he discussed the corrosive effect that geopolitical divisions and interests have had. Commenting on parliaments’ place in promoting universality, Dr. Lupel said “If we want to rebuild our capacity for collective security, we must demand that our leaders are morally and practically consistent in the application of international norms and the protection of civilians so that all countries, all peoples, feel that the system is there for them. And I think parliaments are well placed to make that demand.” Dr. Lupel also stressed that parliaments need to take a long-term view of cultivating the positive conditions of peace and that they have several tools of conflict prevention, such as preventive diplomacy, accountability mechanisms against excessive use of force, and the integration of a diverse range of actors at all levels of decision making. Similarly, he placed extra emphasis on the pursuit of gender equality and the eradication of gender-based violence as a core goal of the New Agenda for Peace that Parliaments are well-placed to effectively champion and achieve.

Humanitarian organizations have repeatedly called attention to the challenges that counterterrorism resolutions and UN sanctions regimes can pose to humanitarian action. In response, the council has progressively incorporated language that better takes into consideration international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), humanitarian principles, and the need to protect principled humanitarian action from the potential negative consequences of sanctions and counterterrorism measures. Most notably, in December 2022, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2664, which provides a cross-cutting humanitarian exemption to asset freezes under all its sanctions regimes, including the 1267 counterterrorism regime against ISIL/al-Qaida, to safeguard the timely and effective conduct of humanitarian activities.

In this context, IPI and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in New York hosted a closed-door, hybrid roundtable on November 14, 2023, to assess the implementation and impact of Resolution 2664, including its potential application to counterterrorism measures. This roundtable provided a platform for exchanges between humanitarian organizations, member states, the UN Secretariat, civil society organizations, and independent experts, including those based in Geneva and New York.

There was broad agreement among participants that Resolution 2664 is a milestone achievement representing a fundamental policy shift within the Security Council. However, the resolution does not resolve all obstacles facing humanitarian actors seeking to provide aid in contexts where sanctions from the UN and autonomous regimes, as well as counterterrorism measures, apply. Participants thus provided the following recommendations on how to continue to safeguard principled humanitarian action:

• Member states should incorporate the obligations of Resolution 2664 into national and regional frameworks;
• Member states should take steps to apply the humanitarian exemption to autonomous sanctions regimes and counterterrorism measures;
• Donors should streamline reporting requirements for humanitarian actors;
• UN entities, humanitarian actors, and member states should invest in greater guidance and capacity building on the implementation of Resolution 2664; and
• UN entities, international and local humanitarian actors, member states, and the private sector should continue to engage in inclusive, multi-stakeholder dialogue at the national and global levels on the implementation of Resolution 2664 and risk-mitigation measures.

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The UN Security Council is expected to renew MONUSCO’s mandate on December 20, 2023. The upcoming negotiations will unfold against the backdrop of the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) request to the Security Council on September 1, 2023, for the mission’s accelerated withdrawal to commence at the end of 2023; the government and the mission’s signing in November of a disengagement plan to implement this accelerated withdrawal; and the general elections, slated for December 20, 2023. The past two months have also seen renewed fighting between the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), the M23 rebel group, and other armed groups. The Nairobi and Luanda peace processes were disrupted by the resumption of hostilities and heightened tension between the DRC and Rwanda. The security and humanitarian conditions continue to worsen in the eastern provinces of the DRC, with persistent threats to human rights and the protection of civilians.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), Security Council Report, and the Stimson Center cohosted a roundtable discussion on November 21, 2023, to reflect on MONUSCO’s mandate renewal. This roundtable offered a platform for member states, UN officials, civil society stakeholders, and independent experts to share their assessments of the situation in the DRC in a frank and collaborative manner. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions with respect to the prioritization and sequencing of MONUSCO’s mandate, as well as the mission’s strategic orientation and actions on the ground as it prepares for a drawdown.

Given the context of MONUSCO’s transition and withdrawal in the coming months, the mission will likely need to balance the following issues:

• Prioritizing the protection of civilians and safeguarding humanitarian access to prevent the widening of protection gaps during the mission’s drawdown;
• Enhancing engagement with local communities and civil society organizations to execute the withdrawal plan in line with specific needs in regions within and outside eastern DRC;
• Improving coordination between the UN and regional partners that are present in eastern DRC through regular communication, information sharing, and joint planning;
• Providing a clearer definition of and political guidance on security sector reform to ensure the appropriate and timely transition of security responsibilities to national actors;
• Reinforcing support to the Congolese government on the implementation of its Demobilization, Disarmament, Community Recovery and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS); and
• Supporting the revitalization of the Luanda and Nairobi processes following the December 2023 presidential election.

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Top diplomats, regional experts, academics, private sector actors and media representatives called on governments, NGOs, and other stakeholders to assert the role of the multilateral system and work towards a reformed and fit-for-purpose application of its principles to achieve a comprehensive and lasting peace in the MENA region.

On November 30th, IPI MENA hosted a webinar on “The Deepening Crisis in the Middle East and the Role of the Multilateral System.”

Opening the webinar, IPI MENA Senior Director Nejib Friji referenced the many crises plaguing the region, from Libya, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Sudan, to Palestine. He emphasized that these situations have one important thing in common: human suffering on a massive scale costing current generations decades of development delays.

He reminded the audience that the multilateral system emerged from a desire to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, but past decades have dealt major blows to people’s confidence. Multiple internationally-led conflicts have continued with no blessing or intervention by the Security Council.

“In the face of continuing conflicts and suffering, some instinctually reject the multilateral system. But we at IPI MENA believe there is a critical need for the vision it offers of the world – maybe more than ever.”

H.E Taïeb Baccouche, Secretary General of the Arab Maghreb Union and Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Former Minister of Education for the Republic of Tunisia, referred to the Israel-Palestine conflict, focusing on the way out of the current crisis. He said that the situation is defined by grave injustice, highlighting the continual encroachment on Palestinian territory by Israeli settlers.

He reflected on changing attitudes and approaches to the crisis amongst Arab leaders, outlining how they strongly rejected the 1947 partition plan and later accepted peaceful initiatives including the 1991 Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords.

In terms of solutions, Mr. Taïeb Baccouche suggested a return to the starting point, disregarding all illegally gained territory. He offered two models: either two states or one multiconfessional state. He emphasized that the UN must play a key role in helping both parties move towards a peaceful resolution.

Referring to the situation in his country, Libya, H.E Mohamad Dayri, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs for the State of Libya said: “The outcome of the regime change in 2011 led to serious concerns for Libya, its neighboring countries, and beyond in Africa and Europe.” He noted that the situation has been marred by civil wars and security dysfunctions, allowing terror groups to take sanctuary in Libya. The threat of these groups has since diminished. Nonetheless, Libyans were subjected to multiple unlawful acts at the hands of local militias, including killings, kidnappings, and torture.

Mr. Dayri enumerated the internal and external factors that led to the current state of Libya. Poor governance and the plundering of public funds worsened living conditions for Libyans. In addition, the influence of foreign stakeholders and their conflicting priorities have compounded the complex landscape in the country. He emphasized that, despite an extended finger-pointing exercise, all parties have contributed to the current situation.

Moving to the role of the international community, Mr. Dayri highlighted that, despite the multifaceted nature of the situation, mediation efforts led by the UN have exclusively resulted in power-sharing packages, ignoring other substantial components and priorities for the people of Libya. He concluded with his recommendations, including a national reconciliation process facilitated by the UN.

H.E. Mr. Luis Amado, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Former Minister of Defence for the Portuguese Republic pointed to the wider implications of geopolitical crises in the MENA region and beyond. He outlined the core challenge at the heart of the Israel-Palestine conflict: how can we address an old, crystallized conflict in a new geopolitical context, with changed regional dynamics and forces?

Taking a step back, he referred to the “dynamic of confrontation” between the great powers – the US, Russia, and China – that shapes and imposes global crises. This dynamic imposes on all the power structures of the world, creating circumstances that expose the weaknesses of all multilateral institutions, e.g., repeated impasses between veto powers in the Security Council.

Mr. Amado emphasized the importance of envisioning a role for the multilateral system, sketching out a long scenario of confrontation between the great powers given the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, and a looming cold war. Speaking more optimistically, he suggested a post-Western, multi-polar world emerging.

He concluded by affirming that the Israel-Palestine crisis must be faced on a UN legal basis. “We need to go back to the law. We have no alternative in political terms.” However, he implied that returning to past decisions is easier said than done, especially when it concerns removing 800,000 new settlers – is it possible to go back and undo the negligence of the international community over the past?

In answer to Mr. Friji’s question about the connections between the Libya crisis and the freezing process of the Arab Maghreb Union, Mr. Dayri referred to adverse effects on Tunisia, Algeria, Chad, Niger, and Sudan, stating that the disintegration of Libya has negatively impacted the integration of the Maghreb countries.

Mr. Naman, a reporter from the Gulf Daily News asked about how certain Middle Eastern countries’ economic ties to Israel affect their response to the crisis and whether an energy shift could lead to a geopolitical shift in the region.

Mr. Luis Amado responded, pointing to the experience in Europe where only economic integration could solve repeated clashes between France, the UK, and Germany. He said a similar integration could be a path forward for the Middle East. However, he stressed that regional economic integration requires parallel political stability, and this dynamic must be balanced to make a difference.

Ms. Desiree Custers, Project Manager at the Centre for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO), reflected on what channels could be opened to increase communication or capacity for dialogue, especially given a discrepancy in values and ideas for the future.

Anuja Jaiswal, IPI MENA Intern, unpacked an emerging strand in the discussion. She argued that given the various time scales at play, solutions rooted in transitional justice should be placed alongside those rooted in conflict resolution.

COP28 marks a pivotal point in the global response to the climate crisis, where countries will have the first opportunity to review and take stock of the Paris Agreement through the Global Stocktake (GST). This presents an opportunity to accelerate climate action and close the gaps needed to keep global warming below 1.5°C. To ensure a successful political outcome from the GST, the parties at COP28 could focus on the following:

• Keep 1.5°C alive through commitments in nationally determined contributions: Governments, especially major emitters and future major emitters, need to commit to ambitious measures to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. The GST outcome should provide specific guidance and actionable suggestions to countries as they prepare to submit their new or updated NDCs in 2025.
• Phase out fossil-fuel production: Parties should agree to call for a sustained and widespread phase-out of fossil-fuel production, including the elimination of subsidies for domestic and foreign fossil-fuel extraction. The goal should be to achieve net-zero carbon emissions as close as possible to 2040 (for developed countries) and 2050 (for emerging economies). An ambitious GST outcome would also include individual and collective commitments to triple global capacity for renewable energy by 2030.
• Price emissions: Parties should go beyond making pledges and develop mechanisms and frameworks that incentivize action. Carbon pricing is one such mechanism. A global carbon-pricing floor should differentiate between developed and developing countries, and the price should be set based on the markets rather than on a distinction between high and low emitters. Implementing a global carbon-pricing strategy could foster cooperation between developed and developing countries to safeguard the planet’s climate.
• Improve the quality and quantity of climate finance: Getting countries out of debt, especially those vulnerable to climate impacts, should be a priority. Donor countries can also explore innovative strategies for utilizing the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing rights to provide grants instead of putting countries more in debt. Bridgetown 2.0 highlights a path toward reforming the global financial system to better serve developing countries through currency exchange guarantees, disaster clauses for debt deals, and reforms to multilateral development banks to increase lending.
• Capitalize the Loss and Damage Fund: Now that countries have agreed to establish the Loss and Damage Fund, they should make pledges and pursue innovative finance, including taxes and levies on shipping, air travel, financial transactions, and fossil fuel extraction.

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