Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Das DIW-Graduiertenzentrum bietet in Kooperation mit Berliner Universitäten ein hochkarätiges Doktorandenprogramm in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften an. Es hat derzeit rund 50 junge und motivierte Doktorand*innen aus der ganzen Welt.

Dafür sucht die Abteilung zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine*n

Koordinator*in (w/m/div) (Vollzeit)

The racist ideas that led to the January 2024 demonstrations in Germany illustrate the problem with racialisation of space, which means the use of race to determine belonging. The racialised anti-immigration rhetoric in countries that see themselves as inundated by migrants is oblivious to both historical and contemporary migration trajectories and trends.

Migration is not uni-directional and there is no binary division of roles in which countries either send or receive migrants. Rather, countries, regardless of their economic status, fall into a complex intertwinement of roles in which they are simultaneously sending, receiving and serving as transit countries. The ahistorical, binary, and reductionist conceptualisation of human mobility is spawned by a disconnect between the anti-immigration racialisation of space and the historical and contemporary realities of migration. People who hold anti-immigrant sentiment can learn from these realities.

The racialisation of space thrives on conflation of racial difference with deficiency and danger. It generates a correspondingly racialised migration lexicon that uses binary terminologies to name and describe people moving in different directions. This lexicon depicts migrants from high- to low- and middle-income countries as benefactors and an asset to their host countries and cloaks them in positive terminologies such as expatriates, lifestyle migrants, global citizens and cosmopolitans. In contrast, it portrays people migrating from low- and middle-income to high-income countries as asylum seekers and refugees who are beneficiaries of and a threat to their host countries. These categories are accompanied by verbs that follow the same contours of the high-income-low-income divide, in which the former travel from “normal” places and are wanted and welcome, while the latter flee  from “deviant” ones and are undesirable and not welcome. Migration from high-income countries enjoys normalised and celebrated visibility where migration from low-and middle-income countries suffers from problematised and criminalising visibility. This boils down to a tenuous distinction between racialised mobile people from high-income countries who ostensibly move legally with good intentions and racialised migrants from low- and middle-income countries whose movement is presumably illegal and motivated by “stealing” jobs from citizens, terrorism and other sinister agendas.

Segments of society that hold anti-immigration views can learn from historical migrations that have reconfigured the racial composition of countries around the world. Historical and contemporary migration trajectories show that migration is not as simplistic as it is portrayed by individuals who see their countries as exclusively receiving migrants. It is complex and contradictory. Colonial history is characterised by migration of European settlers. When the colonised countries became independent, this did not lead to deportation of European settlers in an attempt to turn the clock back to the precolonial demographic composition.

In contrast to the imagination of the so-called Sub-Saharan Africa as black, parts of this region are multi-racial due to historical and contemporary migrations from outside the continent. Although racial tensions persist because of historical grievances surrounding the land question, former settler colonies such as Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe embrace descendants of the colonial settlers and contemporary immigrants from Europe and other parts of the world as citizens who represent them in, for example, business, politics, sports and culture. Yet, in some kind of distorted reading of history, anti-immigrant views in former colonial powers equate the individual motivations of contemporary migrants from disparate “non-white” backgrounds with the same dispossession and cultural dislocation that characterised colonisation.

Repudiating history and promoting racialised notions of citizenship and belonging have global ramifications. The world needs co-operation among societies rather than globally polarising racist views reminiscent of Idi Amin’s expulsion of South Asians from Uganda in 1972 or, in recent times, the racially charged land reform in Zimbabwe, the sharp increase in attacks on refugees and their accommodation in Germany and the racially motivated attacks on Asians in the US. People who express racialised views on citizenship and belonging in countries that present themselves as citadels of democracy and human rights can learn from indigenous people in former settler colonies. For example, the former settler colonies in Southern Africa cited above, in spite of their tortured colonial histories, welcome migrants and take an all-inclusive non-racialised understanding of citizenship, belonging and human rights. To insist on racialisation of one’s own country is to insist on the same elsewhere.

The racist ideas that led to the January 2024 demonstrations in Germany illustrate the problem with racialisation of space, which means the use of race to determine belonging. The racialised anti-immigration rhetoric in countries that see themselves as inundated by migrants is oblivious to both historical and contemporary migration trajectories and trends.

Migration is not uni-directional and there is no binary division of roles in which countries either send or receive migrants. Rather, countries, regardless of their economic status, fall into a complex intertwinement of roles in which they are simultaneously sending, receiving and serving as transit countries. The ahistorical, binary, and reductionist conceptualisation of human mobility is spawned by a disconnect between the anti-immigration racialisation of space and the historical and contemporary realities of migration. People who hold anti-immigrant sentiment can learn from these realities.

The racialisation of space thrives on conflation of racial difference with deficiency and danger. It generates a correspondingly racialised migration lexicon that uses binary terminologies to name and describe people moving in different directions. This lexicon depicts migrants from high- to low- and middle-income countries as benefactors and an asset to their host countries and cloaks them in positive terminologies such as expatriates, lifestyle migrants, global citizens and cosmopolitans. In contrast, it portrays people migrating from low- and middle-income to high-income countries as asylum seekers and refugees who are beneficiaries of and a threat to their host countries. These categories are accompanied by verbs that follow the same contours of the high-income-low-income divide, in which the former travel from “normal” places and are wanted and welcome, while the latter flee  from “deviant” ones and are undesirable and not welcome. Migration from high-income countries enjoys normalised and celebrated visibility where migration from low-and middle-income countries suffers from problematised and criminalising visibility. This boils down to a tenuous distinction between racialised mobile people from high-income countries who ostensibly move legally with good intentions and racialised migrants from low- and middle-income countries whose movement is presumably illegal and motivated by “stealing” jobs from citizens, terrorism and other sinister agendas.

Segments of society that hold anti-immigration views can learn from historical migrations that have reconfigured the racial composition of countries around the world. Historical and contemporary migration trajectories show that migration is not as simplistic as it is portrayed by individuals who see their countries as exclusively receiving migrants. It is complex and contradictory. Colonial history is characterised by migration of European settlers. When the colonised countries became independent, this did not lead to deportation of European settlers in an attempt to turn the clock back to the precolonial demographic composition.

In contrast to the imagination of the so-called Sub-Saharan Africa as black, parts of this region are multi-racial due to historical and contemporary migrations from outside the continent. Although racial tensions persist because of historical grievances surrounding the land question, former settler colonies such as Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe embrace descendants of the colonial settlers and contemporary immigrants from Europe and other parts of the world as citizens who represent them in, for example, business, politics, sports and culture. Yet, in some kind of distorted reading of history, anti-immigrant views in former colonial powers equate the individual motivations of contemporary migrants from disparate “non-white” backgrounds with the same dispossession and cultural dislocation that characterised colonisation.

Repudiating history and promoting racialised notions of citizenship and belonging have global ramifications. The world needs co-operation among societies rather than globally polarising racist views reminiscent of Idi Amin’s expulsion of South Asians from Uganda in 1972 or, in recent times, the racially charged land reform in Zimbabwe, the sharp increase in attacks on refugees and their accommodation in Germany and the racially motivated attacks on Asians in the US. People who express racialised views on citizenship and belonging in countries that present themselves as citadels of democracy and human rights can learn from indigenous people in former settler colonies. For example, the former settler colonies in Southern Africa cited above, in spite of their tortured colonial histories, welcome migrants and take an all-inclusive non-racialised understanding of citizenship, belonging and human rights. To insist on racialisation of one’s own country is to insist on the same elsewhere.

The racist ideas that led to the January 2024 demonstrations in Germany illustrate the problem with racialisation of space, which means the use of race to determine belonging. The racialised anti-immigration rhetoric in countries that see themselves as inundated by migrants is oblivious to both historical and contemporary migration trajectories and trends.

Migration is not uni-directional and there is no binary division of roles in which countries either send or receive migrants. Rather, countries, regardless of their economic status, fall into a complex intertwinement of roles in which they are simultaneously sending, receiving and serving as transit countries. The ahistorical, binary, and reductionist conceptualisation of human mobility is spawned by a disconnect between the anti-immigration racialisation of space and the historical and contemporary realities of migration. People who hold anti-immigrant sentiment can learn from these realities.

The racialisation of space thrives on conflation of racial difference with deficiency and danger. It generates a correspondingly racialised migration lexicon that uses binary terminologies to name and describe people moving in different directions. This lexicon depicts migrants from high- to low- and middle-income countries as benefactors and an asset to their host countries and cloaks them in positive terminologies such as expatriates, lifestyle migrants, global citizens and cosmopolitans. In contrast, it portrays people migrating from low- and middle-income to high-income countries as asylum seekers and refugees who are beneficiaries of and a threat to their host countries. These categories are accompanied by verbs that follow the same contours of the high-income-low-income divide, in which the former travel from “normal” places and are wanted and welcome, while the latter flee  from “deviant” ones and are undesirable and not welcome. Migration from high-income countries enjoys normalised and celebrated visibility where migration from low-and middle-income countries suffers from problematised and criminalising visibility. This boils down to a tenuous distinction between racialised mobile people from high-income countries who ostensibly move legally with good intentions and racialised migrants from low- and middle-income countries whose movement is presumably illegal and motivated by “stealing” jobs from citizens, terrorism and other sinister agendas.

Segments of society that hold anti-immigration views can learn from historical migrations that have reconfigured the racial composition of countries around the world. Historical and contemporary migration trajectories show that migration is not as simplistic as it is portrayed by individuals who see their countries as exclusively receiving migrants. It is complex and contradictory. Colonial history is characterised by migration of European settlers. When the colonised countries became independent, this did not lead to deportation of European settlers in an attempt to turn the clock back to the precolonial demographic composition.

In contrast to the imagination of the so-called Sub-Saharan Africa as black, parts of this region are multi-racial due to historical and contemporary migrations from outside the continent. Although racial tensions persist because of historical grievances surrounding the land question, former settler colonies such as Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe embrace descendants of the colonial settlers and contemporary immigrants from Europe and other parts of the world as citizens who represent them in, for example, business, politics, sports and culture. Yet, in some kind of distorted reading of history, anti-immigrant views in former colonial powers equate the individual motivations of contemporary migrants from disparate “non-white” backgrounds with the same dispossession and cultural dislocation that characterised colonisation.

Repudiating history and promoting racialised notions of citizenship and belonging have global ramifications. The world needs co-operation among societies rather than globally polarising racist views reminiscent of Idi Amin’s expulsion of South Asians from Uganda in 1972 or, in recent times, the racially charged land reform in Zimbabwe, the sharp increase in attacks on refugees and their accommodation in Germany and the racially motivated attacks on Asians in the US. People who express racialised views on citizenship and belonging in countries that present themselves as citadels of democracy and human rights can learn from indigenous people in former settler colonies. For example, the former settler colonies in Southern Africa cited above, in spite of their tortured colonial histories, welcome migrants and take an all-inclusive non-racialised understanding of citizenship, belonging and human rights. To insist on racialisation of one’s own country is to insist on the same elsewhere.

Der Vorstand vertritt das Institut nach außen, ist zuständig für alle wissenschaftlichen Angelegenheiten des Instituts und übernimmt die kaufmännische, rechtliche sowie administrative Verantwortung. Dabei unterstützen den Vorstand u.a. drei Vorstandsreferent*innen.

Zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt suchen wir eine*n

Vorstandsreferent*in (w/m/div)

(Vollzeit mit 39 Stunden, Teilzeit möglich)

This policy brief discusses the Global Gateway investment programme launched by the EU to foster infrastructure projects connecting Europe with other parts of the world, particularly the Southern Neighbourhood. With an initial focus on generating €300 billion for investments by 2027, the programme aims to leverage the EU’s economic size and normative attractiveness to become a global power. However, it faces a dilemma when cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, where autocrats have tightened control despite past hopes for democratic change. Although the Global Gateway isn’t designed as a democracy promotion tool, the EU hopes its investments will indirectly promote democratic standards. Partnering with authoritarian governments nevertheless poses long-term geostrategic risks. This brief highlights the challenges of balancing investment opportunities with the EU’s democratic values, especially in regions where autocracy prevails.

This policy brief discusses the Global Gateway investment programme launched by the EU to foster infrastructure projects connecting Europe with other parts of the world, particularly the Southern Neighbourhood. With an initial focus on generating €300 billion for investments by 2027, the programme aims to leverage the EU’s economic size and normative attractiveness to become a global power. However, it faces a dilemma when cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, where autocrats have tightened control despite past hopes for democratic change. Although the Global Gateway isn’t designed as a democracy promotion tool, the EU hopes its investments will indirectly promote democratic standards. Partnering with authoritarian governments nevertheless poses long-term geostrategic risks. This brief highlights the challenges of balancing investment opportunities with the EU’s democratic values, especially in regions where autocracy prevails.

This policy brief discusses the Global Gateway investment programme launched by the EU to foster infrastructure projects connecting Europe with other parts of the world, particularly the Southern Neighbourhood. With an initial focus on generating €300 billion for investments by 2027, the programme aims to leverage the EU’s economic size and normative attractiveness to become a global power. However, it faces a dilemma when cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, where autocrats have tightened control despite past hopes for democratic change. Although the Global Gateway isn’t designed as a democracy promotion tool, the EU hopes its investments will indirectly promote democratic standards. Partnering with authoritarian governments nevertheless poses long-term geostrategic risks. This brief highlights the challenges of balancing investment opportunities with the EU’s democratic values, especially in regions where autocracy prevails.

The development and adoption of innovations are important for economic growth, enhancing well-being and for a more sustainable management of land and natural resources. Globally, improvements in agricultural development have been achieved through the adoption of innovations targeting productivity, sustainability, resilience or product quality of farmers and other food system actors such as processors and consumers. The need to drive innovations among African smallholder farmers has never been more urgent. Africa has a  rapidly growing population, insufficient food production, high rural poverty and land degradation, which is exacerbated by climate and environmental changes and extreme weather events. Fostering new farming practices and innovation adoption among female and male  smallholder farmers, including marginalised groups requires addressing the economic, environmental and socio-cultural dimensions of development and contribute to social justice and gender equity. This is not a self-evident process as some innovations have contributed to adverse environmental or social effects, resulting in low adoption rates and unsuccessful scaling of innovations.

The development and adoption of innovations are important for economic growth, enhancing well-being and for a more sustainable management of land and natural resources. Globally, improvements in agricultural development have been achieved through the adoption of innovations targeting productivity, sustainability, resilience or product quality of farmers and other food system actors such as processors and consumers. The need to drive innovations among African smallholder farmers has never been more urgent. Africa has a  rapidly growing population, insufficient food production, high rural poverty and land degradation, which is exacerbated by climate and environmental changes and extreme weather events. Fostering new farming practices and innovation adoption among female and male  smallholder farmers, including marginalised groups requires addressing the economic, environmental and socio-cultural dimensions of development and contribute to social justice and gender equity. This is not a self-evident process as some innovations have contributed to adverse environmental or social effects, resulting in low adoption rates and unsuccessful scaling of innovations.

The development and adoption of innovations are important for economic growth, enhancing well-being and for a more sustainable management of land and natural resources. Globally, improvements in agricultural development have been achieved through the adoption of innovations targeting productivity, sustainability, resilience or product quality of farmers and other food system actors such as processors and consumers. The need to drive innovations among African smallholder farmers has never been more urgent. Africa has a  rapidly growing population, insufficient food production, high rural poverty and land degradation, which is exacerbated by climate and environmental changes and extreme weather events. Fostering new farming practices and innovation adoption among female and male  smallholder farmers, including marginalised groups requires addressing the economic, environmental and socio-cultural dimensions of development and contribute to social justice and gender equity. This is not a self-evident process as some innovations have contributed to adverse environmental or social effects, resulting in low adoption rates and unsuccessful scaling of innovations.

The present collection of short papers is an experimental, explorative and introspective German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) project on international and transnational cooperation for development and sustainability. It is the product of internal brainstorming discussions at IDOS in mid-2022 that aspired to conduct a preliminary, exemplary mapping of the use of “transnational lenses” and their understandings across various work strands at the institute. This might lead to new questions in our work, or it might simply be an attempt to look at our topics of interest with a different perspective. 

The present collection of short papers is an experimental, explorative and introspective German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) project on international and transnational cooperation for development and sustainability. It is the product of internal brainstorming discussions at IDOS in mid-2022 that aspired to conduct a preliminary, exemplary mapping of the use of “transnational lenses” and their understandings across various work strands at the institute. This might lead to new questions in our work, or it might simply be an attempt to look at our topics of interest with a different perspective. 

The present collection of short papers is an experimental, explorative and introspective German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) project on international and transnational cooperation for development and sustainability. It is the product of internal brainstorming discussions at IDOS in mid-2022 that aspired to conduct a preliminary, exemplary mapping of the use of “transnational lenses” and their understandings across various work strands at the institute. This might lead to new questions in our work, or it might simply be an attempt to look at our topics of interest with a different perspective. 

Bundeswirtschaftsminister Robert Habeck hat heute das europaweit erste Gebotsverfahren für sogenannte Klimaschutzverträge eröffnet. Die Verträge sollen Anreize setzen, in klimafreundliche Industrien zu investieren. Dazu eine Stellungnahme von Karsten Neuhoff, Leiter der Abteilung Klimapolitik im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Der Start der Klimaschutzverträge war längst überfällig. Energieintensive Unternehmen in der Stahl-, Zement-, Papier- oder Glasherstellung können den Umstieg auf klimaneutrale Produktionsprozesse nicht aus der Portokasse bezahlen. Ihre Margen sind gering und Unsicherheiten mit Blick auf CO2-neutrale Technologien groß. Die Schwerindustrie steht am Scheideweg: Klimaneutrale Optionen sind noch riskant, aber Investitionen in fossile Technologien auch nicht mehr wirtschaftlich. Klimaschutzverträge sichern jetzt CO2- und Energiepreisrisiken ab und ermöglichen so Investitionen in die grüne Transformation. Sie sind ein modernes Regulierungsinstrument auf dem Weg zur CO2-Neutralität – basierend auf langjähriger Forschung und umgesetzt vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz im intensiven Austausch mit Industrie und europäischen Partner*innen. Damit stellen Klimaschutzverträge einen fairen Deal zwischen Staat und Industrie und damit auch für die Gesellschaft dar.

Addressing the total energy cost burden of elderly people is essential for designing equitable and effective energy policies, especially in responding to energy crisis in an aging society. It is due to the double impact of energy price hikes on households—through direct impact on fuel bills and indirect impact on the prices of goods and services consumed. However, while examining the household energy cost burden of the elderly, their indirect energy consumption and associated cost burden remain poorly understood. This study quantifies and compares the direct and indirect energy footprints and associated total energy cost burdens for different age groups across 31 developed countries. It reveals that the elderly have larger per capita energy footprints, resulting from higher levels of both direct and indirect energy consumption compared with the younger age groups. More importantly, the elderly, especially the low-income elderly, have a higher total energy cost burden rate. As the share of elderly in the total population rapidly grows in these countries, the larger per capita energy footprint and associated cost burden rate of elderly people would make these aging countries more vulnerable in times of energy crises. It is therefore crucial to develop policies that aim to reduce energy consumption and costs, improve energy efficiency, and support low-income elderly populations. Such policies are necessary to reduce the vulnerability of these aging countries to the energy crisis.

Addressing the total energy cost burden of elderly people is essential for designing equitable and effective energy policies, especially in responding to energy crisis in an aging society. It is due to the double impact of energy price hikes on households—through direct impact on fuel bills and indirect impact on the prices of goods and services consumed. However, while examining the household energy cost burden of the elderly, their indirect energy consumption and associated cost burden remain poorly understood. This study quantifies and compares the direct and indirect energy footprints and associated total energy cost burdens for different age groups across 31 developed countries. It reveals that the elderly have larger per capita energy footprints, resulting from higher levels of both direct and indirect energy consumption compared with the younger age groups. More importantly, the elderly, especially the low-income elderly, have a higher total energy cost burden rate. As the share of elderly in the total population rapidly grows in these countries, the larger per capita energy footprint and associated cost burden rate of elderly people would make these aging countries more vulnerable in times of energy crises. It is therefore crucial to develop policies that aim to reduce energy consumption and costs, improve energy efficiency, and support low-income elderly populations. Such policies are necessary to reduce the vulnerability of these aging countries to the energy crisis.