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IPI’s Women, Peace and Security program, in partnership with the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations (led by Global Affairs Canada), the United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator on Improving the UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the Gender and Security Sector Lab, cohosted a virtual policy forum on July 30th on “Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (SEAH) in UN Peace Operations.”

As part of its ongoing partnership with the Elsie Initiative, IPI is launching two issue briefs that contribute to improving the United Nations’ approach to preventing sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and sexual harassment (SH) in UN peace operations.

One of the issue briefs, “Connecting Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment in UN Peace Operations,” examines the divide between SEA and SH, arguing for a shift toward the more holistic concept of sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEAH). This step could allow the UN to better prevent both SEA and SH by addressing the gendered power imbalances that lie at their root. The second issue brief, “Training on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse for Uniformed Peacekeepers: Effectiveness and Limitations,” published in collaboration with the Gender and Security Sector Lab, explores the effectiveness of UN-mandated training on SEA. The paper highlights key findings from an analysis of cross-national survey data representing more than 4,000 military and police personnel, considers the effectiveness and limitations of current SEA trainings, and provides recommendations for enhancing the prevention of SEA.

Panelists discussed recommendations for improving the UN’s approach to combating and preventing SEAH, making peacekeeping safer for peacekeepers and the populations they serve.

Welcoming and Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Peace Institute
Jacqueline O’Neill, former Women, Peace and Security Ambassador for Canada, Director, Global Affairs Canada
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute

Speakers:
Christian Saunders, Under-Secretary-General and Special Coordinator on Improving the UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
DeAnne Roark, Postdoctoral Scholar, Gender and Security Sector Lab
Olubuckola Awoyemi, Chief Conduct and Discipline Officer, MINURSO
Evyn Papworth, Policy Analyst, Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute
Aiko Holvikivi, Assistant Professor in Gender, Peace and Security, The London School of Economics and Political Science

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute

The post Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (SEAH) in UN Peace Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Hinweis: Gegenüber der ursprünglichen Version des Statements musste folgender Satz korrigiert werden (frühere Version in Klammern): "Zwar sind im aktuellen Haushaltsentwurf 37 (statt zuvor: 36) Milliarden Euro für dieses Jahr und über 55 Milliarden Euro für 2026 (statt zuvor: 2025) vorgesehen, doch die Erfahrung zeigt, dass das sehr ambitioniert ist." Wir bitten, den Fehler zu entschuldigen.

Das Statistische Bundesamt hat heute bekannt gegeben, dass das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in Deutschland im zweiten Quartal 2025 um 0,1 Prozent gegenüber dem ersten Quartal gesunken ist. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, Konjunkturchefin des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die deutsche Wirtschaft hat nach starkem Jahresauftakt leicht an Tempo verloren, der Aufschwung ist damit aber nicht abgeblasen. Jetzt ist Geduld gefragt. Produktion und Geschäftsklima im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe entwickeln sich positiv. Auch die Einigung im Zollstreit zwischen der EU und den USA sorgt für mehr Planungssicherheit, wenngleich – nach allem, was man bisher weiß – keine Entlastung bei den Zöllen zu erwarten ist. Im Gegenteil, die Belastungen werden wohl leicht steigen. Einen entscheidenden Beitrag zu einem stärkeren Aufschwung werden die geplanten Investitionen aus dem Sondervermögen für Infrastruktur und Klimaschutz leisten. Zwar sind im aktuellen Haushaltsentwurf 37 Milliarden Euro für dieses Jahr und über 55 Milliarden Euro für 2026 vorgesehen, doch die Erfahrung zeigt, dass das sehr ambitioniert ist. Es wäre schon eine Erfolgsgeschichte, wenn die Hälfte der geplanten Mittel abfließen würde. Die Umsetzung der Projekte braucht Zeit. Planung, Vergabe und Umsetzungsphase verzögern die Wirkung, sodass spürbare Impulse erst ab 2026 zu erwarten sind.

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sinkt im Juli leicht und liegt nun bei 92,3 Punkten – das ist knapp ein Punkt weniger als im Juni. Damals erreichte der Barometerwert ein Zwei-Jahres-Hoch. Nun entfernt er sich wieder etwas von der neutralen 100 ...

Geopolitische Spannungen und Handelskonflikte veranlassen Regierungen, ihre eigenen Währungen zu fördern – DIW-Studie zeigt am Beispiel des Handels zwischen China und Frankreich, wie Regierungen dabei vorgehen und Unternehmen reagieren – China konnte seine Währung zwar international stärker ...

Deutschlands Infrastruktur steht am Scheideweg. Ein 500-Milliarden-Euro-Fonds könnte sich als nutzlos erweisen, falls nachhaltige kommunale Reformen ausbleiben., Das Sondervermögen von 500 Milliarden Euro für Investitionen könnte Deutschlands Zukunft entscheidend beeinflussen. Es wird jedoch scheitern, zusätzliche Investitionen anzustoßen, wenn nicht gleichzeitig grundlegende Reformen der Kommunen umgesetzt werden: Entschuldung der Kommunen, Reform der ...

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IPI President Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein addressed the UN High-Level Conference on “The Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution” on July 28th, urging the international community to focus on moving past diplomatic gestures and vague visions. He stressed that short of clear and collective action with specific policy commitments based on a recognised sovereign and contiguous Palestinian state, the two-state solution will remain an abstraction.

Read his remarks in full:

Thank you, Your Highness, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, friends.

I am grateful to be joining Presidents Mary Robinson and Juan Manuel Santos, as the third external speaker to this morning’s session; and would like to begin by thanking our Co-chairs France and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – not only for their leadership on this topic, but also for their insistence this conference centres on the specific actions needed to realise a two-state solution.

Our Co-Chairs are also right to think the greatest threat to the viability of a two-state solution is a staggering international community that lacks an understanding of either what a workable two-state solution actually entails, or of the path we must all take to get there, once the terrible atrocities in Gaza stop.  In other words, how can we transition from rubble to renewal without a compelling and credible vision for what renewal means?

Others may argue this differently, claiming the main obstacle to peace is not so much the violent extremists on both sides who demand the complete removal or destruction of the other – that is perhaps too obvious a point – rather it is the filing down in both societies of those who believe peace is possible. Such is the depth of fear, anger, and fatalism that now marks the prevailing mood.

After all, virtually all Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, and many others accuse the Israeli leadership of committing acts of genocide in Gaza, this on top of a long and cruel military occupation of Palestine.  The Israeli government, the US Administration, and some European leaders see Israel as fighting a violent enemy which threatens it existentially, an enemy that murdered Israeli civilians cold-bloodedly almost two years ago, and took hostages.  Many people around the world see truth in both views.

Despite conceding the reality of the present moods and hatreds swirling within the two populations, what is fortunate about a vision of two states is that, like any other vision, it need not correspond exactly with the current psychology of Israelis and Palestinians.  A vision is not for today’s emotional audit, but for a tomorrow when new imperatives have inspired both populations, and not because the vision would be something utterly fanciful; quite the opposite, a two-state solution would have to be practical to gain support.

This is why one of the first lessons to draw on from decades of failed efforts to resolve this conflict is that wholesale vagueness about the endgame is not strategic— it is dangerous. It empowers rejectionists and weakens those who believe peace is still attainable.

Today, as we have heard many speakers say, leading figures in Israel’s far-right government are openly articulating a vision of permanent occupation, territorial annexation, and forced displacement. And they are acting accordingly, taking steps every day to implement their vision through concrete policies and actions on the ground.  The international community cannot counter this with carefully worded platitudes.  What is needed is a clear, collective affirmation of the two-state solution—not as an abstraction, but with specific policy commitments: a full end to the occupation, borders based on the 4 June 1967 lines, and a sovereign, contiguous Palestinian state.  Short of this, recognition of Palestine will remain symbolic and will do little to transform the lives of Palestinians on the ground and effect meaningful progress towards Palestinian self-determination.

Now this is not a fantasy.

Palestinians and Israelis, working together, have developed a vision for a two-state solution that can work, and they have devised elegant and symmetrical solutions to issues like settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem; core issues that have divided them in the past.

The first point this vision articulates is this: a viable peace must address the emotional and deep connection felt by both Israelis and Palestinians to all the land, from the river to the sea.  The vision also addresses the need for two distinct and sovereign states as a means of facilitating self-determination for two peoples and ensures a complete end of the military occupation. And it also overcomes past obstacles to the achievement of a two-state settlement, proposing a just solution for the Palestinian refugee population and a framework for Jerusalem while guaranteeing access to it.  And it achieves all of this in a way that ensures Israel can maintain a Jewish voting majority.

So how can this be done?

There would be two states, but one homeland.  The path to reach it entails, as a starting poin,t an acceptance of the Armistice Line as it was prior to 4 June 1967 as the border between the two states — with, at most, minor territorial adjustments, rather than more significant swaps or the sweeping annexation contemplated by other proposals. Israeli settlers who wish to remain in their homes would have the option of becoming permanent residents of the State of Palestine.  They would pay their taxes, abide by local law, and enjoy full protection of their rights, as is the case with permanent residents in almost all countries.  All Palestinian refugees will, in turn, have the right to become citizens of Palestine, but they would also have the option of becoming permanent residents of Israel, creating a path for return.  Israeli Arabs would remain Israeli citizens and would be guaranteed full equality.  Over time, there will be freedom of movement for all throughout and across both states.  Jerusalem would be given special status.  There will be some confederal institutions, including a human rights court as an appellate body.

A mechanism will need to be devised to bind the two states together—possibly through a cleverly designed, regionally anchored security arrangement—to prevent unilateral abrogation. As a first urgent transitional step, a reconstruction and rehabilitation mission should be established with an international mandate and based on a regional partnership. To succeed, this mission must prioritise restoring political and economic links between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which Israel and the PLO have recognized as constituting a single territorial unit.

Finally, Israel’s approach of achieving security through domination and fragmentation of Palestinian life— by imposing a stranglehold on Palestinian territory, institutions, and leadership, and by the undermining of UNRWA over the years — has hitherto produced only a notion of security for Israel. It has deepened Palestinian dispossession, inflicted great harm and degraded the Palestinian civilian population and threatened regional stability. Years of these measures, and the expensive fortified fences and sensor arrays surrounding Gaza, did not prevent the atrocious attacks of October 7.  The lesson for Israel is not to double down on fortification, separation, and militarisation — after all, there will always be new ways to inflict harm on Israeli citizens in the absence of a just peace.  What has worked has been mutuality —a sense of equality in status and obligation–and cooperation. This is why Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan have been so durable. They were born not out of dominance, but respect for sovereign equality and territorial inviolability.

It is on these foundations that this vision of meaningful and durable renewal, this vision of Two-States One Homeland, was conceived — not in abstraction, but grounded in law, shaped by pragmatism, and sustained by a shared attachment to the land that both Israelis and Palestinians call home.

I thank you for your attention.

The post Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein: The Two-State Solution Needs A Credible Path Forward appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Qui n’a jamais ressenti ce mélange d’excitation et d’appréhension face à un déménagement ? Cette étape marquante dans une vie symbolise souvent un nouveau départ, mais s’accompagne également d’une dose considérable de stress. Entre les cartons qui s’empilent dans le salon, la paperasse administrative qui s’accumule et toute la logistique à orchestrer, on peut vite […]

The new ALGREE thematic report entitled “Mapping the dominant media frames between Greece and Albania and exploring alternative frames to override negative stereotypes” is a key output of the “ALGREE – Albania-Greece: Understanding. Connecting. Partnering” project. Authored by Panagiotis Paschalidis and Kriton Kuci, and implemented by the South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP, the study investigates the ways in which Greek and Albanian media portray the other’s country and proposes constructive counter-narratives to challenge negative stereotypes.

Using a mixed-method approach that combines quantitative content analysis with qualitative frame analysis, the report explores media coverage through six case studies focused on politically and socially sensitive topics, such as Albania’s EU accession process, the Greek minority in Albania, maritime border disputes, regional dynamics, economic cooperation, and the high-profile “Beleri case.” It examines both the tone and framing of news stories and highlights how political alignment often influences media narratives on both sides.

Its key findings include a persistent politicization of media discourse, a strong focus on conflict-laden narratives, and a lack of attention to positive themes such as culture, society, and economic cooperation. While some progress is noted—particularly regarding regional cooperation and perceptions of economic partnership—the presence of stereotypes remains a significant obstacle to balanced representation.

The report offers a series of recommendations aimed at depoliticizing media narratives and encouraging more nuanced and constructive reporting. By fostering alternative frames that promote mutual understanding, the study contributes to the broader goals of ALGREE in support of evidence-based dialogue, informed policy-making, and improved bilateral relations between Greece and Albania.

You can read the thematic report here.

 

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for June 2025.

On June 5, 2025, the 15th Bilateral Military Cooperation between the Hellenic Navy and the United States Navy was held in Athens. The Greek delegation was headed by Commodore Stefanos Sarris HN, Director of Branch A, while the U.S. delegation was led by Rear Admiral Patrick S. Hayden, Director Maritime Headquarters (DMHQ), U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa. Discussions addressed issues of mutual interest and strengthening cooperation for stability and development in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region. On the sidelines of the talks, the head of the U.S. delegation held a brief meeting with the Deputy Chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff, Rear Admiral Spyridon Lagaras HN.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. State Department is formally moving forward with the nomination of Kimberly Guilfoyle as the next American ambassador to Greece, undercutting widespread media speculation that she had declined the post. In a move that clarifies the administration’s intent, the State Department issued on June 18 an official “Certificate of Competency” for the nomination, a standard step preceding a confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate. Guilfoyle is set to appear before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 9, 2025, as part of her confirmation process to become the next U.S. Ambassador to Greece.

During his visit to Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland from June 12 to 18, 2025, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yannis Loverdos conveyed a message of support from the Greek government to the Greek American community and of strengthening ties with Greeks abroad. During the visit, he had a series of meetings with prominent members of the Greek-American in several fields and informed them about the Greek government’s initiatives for the Greeks abroad.

At the NATO Summit, on June 25, 2025, Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis held a high-level meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, underscoring the growing importance of Greek-American cooperation in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape. U.S. Secretary of State Rubio emphasized Greece’s role as a reliable NATO ally and a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. He acknowledged the importance of Greece’s contributions to regional security, while Minister Gerapetritis praised U.S. efforts to de-escalate tensions in the broader Middle East. Both officials reaffirmed their intent to further deepen bilateral strategic relations.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini), an undisclosed number of Greek Patriot missile systems are being relocated to the Hellenic Navy and NATO base at Souda Bay, Crete, to provide anti-ballistic protection to American assets in the region. The move comes amid increased U.S. military activity in the area following the escalation of the Israel-Iran conflict. Several U.S. F-16 fighter jets have also been temporarily deployed to Crete ahead of their participation in the upcoming “Anatolian Eagle” exercise in Turkey in early July.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

• The imposition of higher tariffs by President Trump or the threat to do so, while seemingly contradicting economic orthodoxy is not out of sync with the President’s view of the world.

• Tariffs are used as bargaining tool to force US trading partners into bilateral negotiations.

• A so-called “Mar-a-Lago Accord”, in the spirit of the 1985 Plaza Accord, could, in Trump’s view, help in responding to the key challenges of the American economy.

• According to the existing literature, the potential effects of higher US tariffs on the EU are going to be small to medium (0.10%-0.66%).

• Macroeconomic projections by the IMF, which combine the effects of higher tariffs with uncertainty and tighter financial conditions, place the medium-term effect for the EU at 1.75% of GDP.

• The effect of US trade policy uncertainty (TPU) on EU GDP with a two-standard deviation increase of TPU will be up to a drop of EU GDP by 0.73% after three years (the cumulative loss reaching 6.49%).

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Panagiotis Konstantinou, Assistant Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business; Spyros Blavoukos, Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business; Head of the ‘Arian Contellis’ European Programme, ELIAMEP and Panagiota Pagoni, Research Assistant, ELIAMEP.

This policy paper is authored by Ioannis Armakolas, Head & Senior Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP, Dimitar Bechev, Senior Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP, and Ana Krstinovska, Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP is published in the context of the of the project EMBRACing changE – Overcoming Blockages and Advancing Democracy in the European Neighbourhood. EMBRACE is a multi-country research initiative that aims to enhance democracy promotion efforts in the EU’s neighbourhood by identifying key obstacles to democratisation and formulating evidence-based strategies to overcome them. The project draws on locally led research and stakeholder engagement across twelve case studies in five regions: the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa.

Focusing on Work Package 7 of the project, the report “The EU’s Democracy Promotion and Geopolitical Competition” examines how the European Union’s democracy promotion efforts are shaped and challenged by both external authoritarian actors, primarily Russia and China, and internal political dynamics within partner countries. The report offers an in-depth comparative analysis of five case study countries: Algeria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine.

The authors analyse how authoritarian rivals deploy various forms of coercion, subversion, and co-optation, often exploiting internal political vulnerabilities. They also highlight how domestic elites navigate this external competition, at times instrumentalising their ties with Russia and China to entrench their power and limit EU influence. In this geopolitical context, the paper finds that EU democracy promotion tools are most impactful when tied to credible enlargement prospects and implemented with consistency and strategic sensitivity to local conditions.

The paper concludes that democracy promotion is no longer merely a matter of institutional design or normative appeal, it has become a geopolitical contest where foreign influence and domestic agency intersect. As such, future EU strategies must account for this complexity and tailor instruments to local realities while remaining steadfast in their democratic commitments. The report closes with concrete policy recommendations aimed at refining the EU’s approach, particularly in geopolitically contested environments.

You can read the policy paper  in pdf here.

The European Union’s capacity to foster democracy in its neighbourhood is increasingly constrained by a dual challenge: the pushback from authoritarian powers like Russia and China and the domestic political dynamics in partner countries. This policy report draws on granular empirical evidence and comparative analysis from five states—Algeria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine—to seize the nuances in the approach (objectives, tools, tactics) of Russia and China and to identify patterns in how EU leverage is shaped by external authoritarian strategies and internal political conditions. The report draws conclusions about the conditions under which EU democracy promotion has the potential to be impactful when facing geopolitical challengers, offering ideas for its future design improvements.

This policy report finds that:

• The EU’s democracy promotion tools are most effective when paired with credible enlargement prospects and coherent conditionality.
• Authoritarian rivals, particularly Russia, deploy a mix of coercion, subversion, and co-optation, capitalizing on internal vulnerabilities.
• Domestic elites play a decisive role in shaping the direction of foreign alignment, often exploiting ties with Russia and China to cement their hold on power and dilute EU influence.
• Societal attitudes significantly condition the success of EU or authoritarian leverage.

The policy report argues that, beyond geopolitical competition and authoritarian diffusion, as the most common explanatory devices for the spread of authoritarianism to be found in the scholarly literature, democracy is often undermined as an “unintended consequence” of the domestic actors’ multiple engagements with external actors.

The report also concludes that democracy promotion is not merely a matter of institutional engineering but a geopolitical contest where domestic politics and external power plays intersect. The outcome is contingent on EU consistency, strategic adaptation, and the good understanding of the limitations and opportunities of the domestic political context in partner countries.

Finally, the report offers recommendations for tailoring EU democracy promotion policies in response to the challenges faced by increasingly emboldened geopolitical and authoritarian rivals. The recommendations pertain to the type of instruments the EU is fielding in geopolitically contested states, the relationship to domestic political elites and civil society in these countries, and the communication and economic instruments intended to appeal to the wider societies.

Introduction to the EMBRACE project

The EMBRACE research project (2022-25) collects evidence-based knowledge on the obstacles to democratisation and ways to overcome them in five regions of the European neighbourhood: Southern Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. Its aim is to strengthen the capacity of policy-makers and pro-democracy forces to develop effective strategies to promote democratic progress in the European neighbourhood. In addition to research reports and policy briefs, new policy tools for EUDP practitioners and pro-democracy activists are developed based on the project’s findings.

The EMBRACE consortium consists of 14 partner organisations based in 13 countries, and places particular emphasis on locally-led research with deep contextual familiarity and stakeholder access within the regions under study. It brings together partners with unique and complementary strengths as well as shared areas of interest, in order to foster joint learning and development.

Empirical data was gathered in twelve case study countries through a variety of research approaches, investigating episodes of political closure and opening to identify, analyse and explain behavioural, institutional and structural blockages, and the conditions under which they can be overcome. A new quantitative dataset was generated on the larger trends of EU Democracy Promotion and its effects on democratisation over the last two decades in all 23 neighbours.

The research is structured around four thematic clusters: the re-configurations for democratic policy shifts after popular uprisings; democratisation and economic modernisation in authoritarian and hybrid regimes; the nexus between democratisation and peace; and the geopolitics of EUDP and the competition that the EU encounters in its democracy promotion efforts. This report focuses on Work Package 7, which aims to understand the EU’s democracy promotion potential when confronted with geopolitical challenges by powerful and authoritarian geopolitical rivals. It analyses how all these forces interact, compete, clash or cooperate, and how such interplay raises obstacles or offers opportunities for democracy promotion by the EU.

Introduction to this Policy Report

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) has positioned itself as a champion of democratic norms and values, using a combination of economic assistance and political conditionality to push for institutional and political reforms in target countries. These efforts are particularly pronounced in regions such as the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and North Africa—areas characterized by fragile institutions, hybrid regimes, and complex geopolitical alignments. As immediate neighbours of the EU, those regions have been the primary target of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU enlargement process, which now covers Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in addition to the Western Balkans.

However, EU democracy promotion now unfolds in a hostile strategic environment. Authoritarian powers like Russia and China have expanded their regional footprints and actively challenge the EU’s normative agenda.  With its aggression against Ukraine culminating in a full-scale invasion, Russia has resorted to crude military power to assert its primacy.  Faced with this reality, political elites in countries next door to the EU increasingly adopt hedging strategies, playing with all external powers to maximize regime survival or economic gain. This interplay between external pushback and internal resistance complicates the EU’s ability to shape political trajectories in its neighbourhood.

This policy paper is the outcome of rigorous research on the geopolitical competition to EU democracy promotion conducted in the context of the EMBRACE project. It draws on a cross-regional comparison of five countries—Algeria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine. It highlights the limitations of EU influence, identifies the modes of authoritarian contestation, and explores how domestic political contexts determine the effectiveness of democracy promotion. The aim is not only to diagnose challenges but to propose strategies that could help recalibrate the EU’s external democracy promotion.

EU Leverage: Dense Ties, Uneven Impact

EU democracy promotion rests on a set of well-established instruments: political conditionality, economic incentives, technical assistance, and societal engagement. These instruments are operationalized through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) for Algeria and through the Enlargement Policy for Serbia, North Macedonia, Ukraine and Georgia. All five countries in question have dense trade and investment ties with the Union, in most cases their leading economic partner, and are also linked to member states thanks to large diaspora populations. In that sense, both linkage and leverage – two variables highlighted by the literature on international promotion of democracy (Levitsky and Way 2005) – favour the EU’s role as a driver of political and institutional reform.

However, the EU’s track record is, at best, mixed.  Success is rare and setbacks common. North Macedonia and Ukraine are two cases giving grounds for qualified optimism. In both countries, the EU has demonstrated its potential to support democratic breakthroughs. In North Macedonia, the European Commission and the European Parliament played an important role in resolving the 2015-2016 political crisis, combining mediation, support to civil society, and conditionality tied to the broader EU accession agenda. Moreover, the Prespa Agreement concluded between Skopje and Athens, which resolved the long-standing naming dispute, was conditioned by the attraction of EU membership (Armakolas 2023, Bechev 2022).  However, the Europeanisation process ground down to halt in 2020 owing to new hurdles North Macedonia confronted because of France delaying, and later of Bulgaria blocking, its progress.

Similarly, in Ukraine, post-Maidan governments embarked on reforms under the impetus of societal demand, EU encouragement and the prospect of becoming a member of the 28-strong bloc. Russia’s full-scale invasion has shifted the priorities of the Ukrainian state from governance and market reform to ensuring state survival in the face of a mightier adversary.  Yet it has also propelled Kyiv further on the path to membership, with formal negotiations launched in 2024. Despite the political, economic and institutional obstacles going forward, at present Ukraine has a chance to enter the EU in the following decade. Particularly if NATO membership is off the table, accession to the Union would provide the highly desired anchor to the West that Ukrainians have pursued for at least two decades.

Yet these successes do not tell the full story of the complex landscape of EU democracy influence and other cases illustrate the limits of EU’s policies. In Georgia, despite robust public support for membership in the EU, which hovers around 80% of the populace, the government of the Georgian Dream (GD) party has slowed down (and arguably reversed) the effort to secure accession together with Ukraine and Moldova. GD gradually distanced itself from the EU, especially when democratization has threatened its political dominance. The passage of a highly problematic foreign agents’ law in 2024, inspired by legislation Russia adopted in the 2010s, coupled with the alleged irregularities at the October 2024 general elections have deepened the rift with the EU. In Algeria, the EU has largely prioritized stability and energy cooperation over democracy promotion. The 2019 Hirak protests received lukewarm support from Brussels, revealing a strategic preference for regime continuity over democratic change.

Even in the EU accession countries, conditionality is inconsistently applied. Serbia continues to slide into hybrid authoritarianism with little EU pushback. President Aleksandar Vučić has managed to simultaneously negotiate EU accession and cultivate ties with Russia and China, taking advantage of the EU’s reluctance to prioritize democracy over regional stability as well as its dire need to access critical resources. Europe’s reaction to an unprecedented wave of popular protests, which unfolded after November 2024 and demanded greater transparency and accountability, has been half-hearted at best. The outreach by Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos to pro-rule-of-law protesters has not moved the needle for the overall policy of the EU, which prefers engagement over confrontation with President Vučić.

EU credibility oftentimes falls prey to internal divisions. Member states diverge in terms of geographical focus, with some looking at Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe, others prioritising the Western Balkans while still others interested in the Maghreb, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Though the Russian aggression has helped soften such divisions by creating a sense of a common threat, they have not been fully overcome. Historically, member states have variable levels of commitment to enlargement too. While some see it as compatible with their strategic interests, others are concerned it might undermine the EU’s internal cohesion.

There are also institutional factors at play. Unanimity rules in enlargement decisions allow individual countries —such as Hungary or Bulgaria—to block or delay progress over bilateral issues or political calculations, as seen in North Macedonia and Ukraine. Though there have been multiple proposals coming from think tanks and academic researchers to reform decision-making on enlargement by introducing qualified majority voting (QMV), there is no sufficient mass in the EU Council to support such a move. As a result of all that, the EU has often struggled to deliver on promises to aspirant countries.

The experience of the countries under investigation shows that inconsistencies in EU policies, ambiguity over strategy, principles and priorities, as well as occasional failures in implementation limit the effectiveness of the EU’s democracy promotion tools. Local leaderships recognise the opportunity presented by these challenges and often devise a strategy of “pick and choose” of aspects of EU integration that suit their agenda and benefit their political, economic and strategic interests, while at the same time increasingly resist those aspects of EU ties that may challenge their authority or upset domestic equilibria. Aspects of these conclusions can be observed to a greater or lesser extent in all countries investigated. But the cases of Algeria and Serbia stand out as the ones where the ruling elites have found unique ways to make ties with the EU beneficial to their regime and its survival prospects.

Overall, the democracy promotion toolkit of the EU has the potential to foster democracy and strengthen resilience against external authoritarian pressure in aspiring countries. But the likelihood for success increases significantly when the pro-democracy policies are paired with a credible EU membership prospect and conditionality. Analysis shows that close economic, political, and institutional ties to the EU alone do not guarantee democratization, especially when the accession outlook is uncertain. Inconsistent application of democracy promotion tools or conflicting EU priorities risk undermining both their effectiveness and the EU’s overall credibility. Finally, authoritarian states—especially Russia—have shown a keen interest in shaping the democratization trajectories and undercut the EU’s positive influence on the examined countries.

Authoritarian Rivals: Strategies of Pushback

The EU is coming to terms with the fact that it is no longer the only game in town when it comes to influencing domestic politics. Authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states such as Russia, China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are growingly present on the European periphery. Of these, Russia and China are the two most remarkable cases. As early as 2008, the prominent scholar of democratisation, Larry Diamond, noted that “[the a]uthoritarian regimes in Russia and China are acting as black knights, supporting autocrats and undermining democratic transitions by providing diplomatic cover, economic aid, and sometimes even security assistance to embattled regimes.”

Russia and China are not ideologically committed to spreading authoritarianism per se, but they actively contest the EU’s influence when it threatens their strategic interests. In the Russian case, the latter include influence over institutions and elites in adjacent countries that are considered by Moscow as its “privileged sphere of influence” or its “near abroad.”   Beijing’s policies are more low-key, undermining alignment with the EU when it goes against China’s (predominantly business) interests, while increasing its political and economic footprint, but still without adopting the aggressiveness that Russia often uses. Russian and Chinese objectives, strategies and methods vary. Russia aims to blunt the EU’s – and more broadly the collective West’s – leverage, undermine its normative standing and accordingly increase their own room for manoeuvre. China, on the other hand, aims to secure allies to pursue its global agenda and opportunities to advance its economic priorities. In that context, while its objectives do not clash with enlargement countries’ bid to join the EU, Beijing’s approach is not always compatible with EU norms and standards, and it sometimes exploits structural governance weaknesses.

Russia’s and China’s strategies fall into three categories:

• • Coercion

Coercion involves the use of tools designed to compel a significant shift in the target’s behaviour. This includes direct military action or the threat of force, intervention in internal conflicts, terrorism, cyberattacks, and various forms of economic pressure such as sanctions or embargoes. These instruments are intended to impose costs that alter the target’s strategic calculus.

Russia’s approach in Ukraine demonstrates how far it is willing to go to prevent EU integration. After the 2013 Euromaidan protests and the pro-European turn, Russia responded with the annexation of Crimea, support for separatists in Donbas, and eventually a full-scale invasion in 2022. In Georgia, the 2008 war was a similar move to destabilize a reformist government and maintain influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

• Subversion

Subversion (or soft coercion), by contrast, seeks to weaken an adversary—be it the EU, the broader West, or Western-aligned governments—from within. The ultimate aim is behavioral change, achieved through the erosion of institutions, norms, or public trust. This domain is extensively covered in the literature on “hybrid” threats, which span both overt and covert activities below the threshold of open conflict.

Russia presents many examples of subversion. It excels at using hybrid tools to undermine democratic institutions and pro-Western narratives. In North Macedonia, Russian-linked actors used disinformation and Orthodox Church networks to oppose the Prespa Agreement in 2018-2019. In Serbia, Russian-backed media outlets reinforce nationalist sentiment and scepticism toward the West. Their message is amplified by the mainstream media, including TV channels, news portals and tabloids that are linked to President Vučić. In a similar way, China has worked to undermine trust in Western-style democracy – e.g. propagating its success in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21 and presenting the performance of EU members and the United States in negative light.

• Co-optation

Co-optation operates through the cultivation of relationships with domestic elites—political parties, business lobbies, media outlets, or civil society groups—to shape a target country’s foreign policy or internal choices. This approach provides external actors with channels of influence embedded within local power structures. A well-documented example is Russia’s strategic presence in the energy sector across Eastern Europe and even within the EU’s core.

Similarly, China primarily uses economic tools—investment, loans, and trade partnerships—to create dependencies and cultivate elite networks. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and bilateral deals often bypass transparency mechanisms, contributing to state capture and corruption. This strategy is evident in Serbia, where Chinese investments have expanded rapidly, including in strategic sectors like energy and infrastructure. Algeria presents a case of strategic triangulation, where both Russia and China are welcomed as partners in arms sales, infrastructure, and diplomacy. While their influence remains mostly co-optative, it offers the regime a buffer against EU democratization demands. In Georgia, the ruling party has allowed increasing Chinese economic presence and has taken a softer line on Russia since 2022, to offset the increasing EU influence over the country’s democracy and reform agenda. Strengthened ties with authoritarian countries became the counterbalance to EU’s pro-democracy influence which had the potential to undermine the power base and authority of the ruling political elites in Tbilisi.

Domestic Elites and Public Attitudes

The five cases under examination demonstrate that Russia and China are effective in countering the EU policies and influence only because they find allies within the countries. Domestic political elites early on draw the conclusion that closer ties with the EU come with policy impact that may prove challenging for the survival of their regime or the longevity of their governments. They quickly adapt to the situation, incorporate the EU impact on their cost-benefit calculations, and develop counterbalances to influence that is potentially harmful to their interests, including by increasing ties with EU’s rivals. Thus, both Russia and China often find the political circumstances in different countries ripe for increasing their footprint and unfolding their agendas.

Both Russia and China maintain strong military, economic, and diplomatic ties with Algeria while avoiding overt interference. Their influence is primarily co-optative—built on elite networks and strategic infrastructure investments—rather than subversive. Russia leads in arms sales and military cooperation, whereas China focuses on infrastructure and surveillance technology. Both actors also engage in vigorous public diplomacy, targeting Algerian media to counter Western narratives. Importantly, the role of Algeria’s regime is crucial in making the co-optative policies possible. The Algerian ruling elite triangulates between the EU and these external players to maximize its autonomy and expand its room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. This balancing act reinforces internal cohesion and bolsters authoritarian resilience.

A similar dynamic is evident in Georgia. The ruling Georgian Dream party prioritizes regime survival over alignment with EU democratic standards. It combines formal EU ties with growing cooperation with China and a muted alignment with Russia, especially following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While Russia exploits political polarization and institutional fragility—classic subversive tactics—the more decisive factor remains the agency of domestic actors. In Georgia as in Algeria, co-optation is the principal strategy used by Russia and China to blunt EU-led democratization, though Moscow retains also coercion as a viable tool, given its military capabilities and economic leverage.

Ukraine represents a contrasting scenario. There, Russia has long since abandoned co-optation and subversion in favour of direct coercion. Since 2014, military aggression has become the primary instrument to thwart Ukraine’s EU aspirations, overshadowing earlier tools such as economic pressure and disinformation. China, by contrast, has adhered to a strategy of co-optation, maintaining economic engagement (e.g., Belt and Road projects) while presenting itself as a neutral actor. Beijing avoids direct confrontation, diplomatically supports Russia, and carefully manages its relations with both Ukraine and the EU.

In the Western Balkans, Russia counters EU influence through a dual approach: exploiting societal divisions (subversion) and cultivating networks with local actors—politicians, civic groups, businesses, and national Orthodox Churches. Serbia offers a textbook case. Since the mid-2000s, political elites and influential societal actors have aligned with Russia. Moscow’s influence has benefited from enablers such as state capture, media control by President Aleksandar Vučić and his allies, aggressive nationalism, and the marginalization of opposition forces. As in Algeria and Georgia, Serbia’s leadership uses its ties with both Russia and China to pursue a “multi-vector” foreign policy. This strategy supports regime durability and dilutes the impact of EU democratic conditionality. In North Macedonia, Russia has deployed media manipulation, proxy actors, and disinformation—often via Serbian networks and Orthodox Church links—to disrupt Euro-Atlantic integration. Influence operations peaked in the late 2010s following the Prespa Agreement with Greece. Tactics included propaganda and intelligence-driven subversion.

In both Serbia and North Macedonia, China has pursued a quieter path. It avoids direct confrontation with the EU agenda, instead promoting economic cooperation through infrastructure projects and trade. Its involvement—often via opaque loans and non-transparent procurement—undermines good governance by reinforcing corrupt practices. During the COVID-19 pandemic, China successfully leveraged propaganda and disinformation to boost its image, often with the active participation of local actors such as President Vučić. Still, China’s approach remains firmly co-optative; subversion is rare, and coercion is not a preferred tool.

Overall, our analysis has found that significant EU influence on domestic political dynamics, including in the democratisation process, tends to be resisted by ruling elites through seeking geopolitical counterbalances. Such resistance is more effective, and EU’s influence less powerful, the more a country in question is geopolitically contested between the EU and its authoritarian rivals. Influence is also a function of the type of pressure coming from the EU. When the EU does not have the ambition to significantly influence and alter the domestic political landscape or when receiving countries already have well-established and consolidated autonomous international role and they avoid being tied to one only geopolitical option, then any influence coming from Europe will tend to be more limited. Conversely, countries and ruling elites with limited autonomous international role and less foreign policy clout are less likely to seek extensive geopolitical realignment and more likely to accept the geopolitical anchoring to the West and its democracy implications.

The autonomous role of domestic elites and their resistance to EU democracy influence tend to be facilitated and made easier by matching public attitudes in their respective countries. In every country case that we have studied, higher popular support for non-EU influence or for foreign relations that counterbalance the EU makes it much easier for political elites to challenge the conditions set by the EU and the democracy requirements that accompany EU ties. The resilience of (semi-)authoritarian elites is stronger in countries where the EU and its influence are not popular.

In contrast, the role of the economic dimension proved more complicated to gauge than what we had originally expected. Our analysis has shown that there is no straightforward correlation between economic ties and propensity to align politically or accept pro-democracy influence. Rather, what we have found is that political elites chart a policy path between economic benefits and political autonomy. Decisions are not determined by economic dependencies alone but are also highly influenced by domestic popular attitudes, historical legacies, ruling elites’ political strategies and broader geopolitical dynamics. The role of the economic dimension is dynamic and context specific, always shaped by political strategies, elite priorities and the broader societal context.

Conclusions

Across these three regions—North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Western Balkans—several core conclusions emerge:

• Domestic factors are the primary obstacles to democratic development. Authoritarian norms, institutions, practices, and societal preferences, in combination with structural governance weaknesses, often present a complex, self-sustaining and with deep roots reality that severely challenges the EU’s ambitions for transformative influence. The EU’s transformative power, that comes through leverage (democratic conditionality) or diffusion (economic and societal linkages), can be drastically limited by the strong presence of these internal conditions.
• External authoritarian actors benefit from these domestic conditions both relatively and absolutely. In relative terms, the EU is at a disadvantage, providing rivals with a comparative edge. In absolute terms, domestic deficits—polarization, institutional fragility, underdevelopment, and state capture—create openings for external authoritarian influence. The motivations of EU’s authoritarian rivals—whether geopolitical rivalry or authoritarian promotion—are secondary to the methods used to achieve influence, as well as the outcome.
• Co-optation is the preferred method for both Russia and China. It is cost-effective and relies on partnerships with local elites. Subversion and especially coercion are riskier and more costly, potentially provoking backlash from within target states or from the EU. Coercive actions, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, can have unintended consequences, including closer alignment between the target and Western actors.
• Policy Implications

The case studies suggest that democracy promotion is not a technocratic process but a political contest. The EU’s credibility and effectiveness depend on three pillars: coherence, consistency, and contextual awareness.

• Coherence: The EU must align its strategic interests with its normative agenda, and this should be reflected by all EU actors – institutions and member states. Prioritizing short-term stability (e.g., on energy or migration) at the expense of democratic values weakens long-term influence. EU and member states should also work more to have their positions and agendas aligned. Internal divisions within the EU, especially when it comes to policies and ties that have impact on democracy, tend to dilute the EU’s message, undermine its leverage and make it overall less credible and relevant.
• Consistency: Conditionality must be applied uniformly. Turning a blind eye to democratic backsliding, as for example in Serbia, undermines incentives for reform in other countries.
• Contextual Awareness: Democracy promotion must be tailored to local conditions. Where public support for EU integration is high (e.g., Georgia, Ukraine), civil society should be a strategic ally. Where sovereigntist sentiment is strong (e.g., Algeria), EU engagement must be more subtle but no less principled.

Policy Recommendations

The changed geopolitical reality and pressing need for the EU to re-assert its influence in its immediate neighbourhood mandate a bolder approach in re-imagining the EU’s democracy support. Support for continuous democratization of the EU’s neighbourhood is an investment in the EU’s own security, reducing the space for manoeuvre of EU’s geopolitical rivals and building stronger allies that will be able to resist external actors’ pressure that indirectly affects EU’s interests (e.g., reducing migratory pressures, securing energy supplies, closing enforcement gaps in sanctions/restrictive measures, reducing disloyal competition for EU and local actors et al.). This is even more important as these countries progress towards EU membership, but also as means to address current loopholes and build resilience. The improved understanding of the specific links between democratization and geopolitics should translate into targeted policy improvements in several areas:

• Step up the geopolitical game: As both Russia and China speak the language of multipolarity, the EU needs to step up the game in demonstrating that its neighbourhood is its own “sphere of influence”. On the medium to long term, this can be achieved through a credible and consequential enlargement policy. On the short term, however, the European institutions and local EU actors (e.g, EU Delegations in the neighbourhood) need to be more vocal on geopolitical topics and call foul all direct attempts by both external and domestic actors to undermine democracy and European values, membership-related reforms and alignment with the acquis.
• Streamline gradual accession in CFSP: The gradual accession, that is the inclusion of negotiating countries in specific EU-level policies and instruments before membership, should extend to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Candidate countries with full CFSP alignment should be allowed to seat as observers in Council meetings where decisions are discussed. This will serve as encouragement to maintain full alignment, as well as incentive, through peer pressure, to candidate countries who are not fully aligned.
• Re-imagine democracy support in light of geopolitical needs: The new design and significant reduction in the volume of US Government funding has adversely affected democratization programs and projects in the EU’s neighbourhood. To mitigate the consequences, which are especially dire for civil society actors, the EU should re-design its democracy support programs in parallel with the adoption of the new MFF. While this would necessitate an increase in funding, streamlining to maximise the impact and better target the priorities is even more important, considering both the Court of Auditors’ recommendations and geopolitical challenges.
• Encourage local ownership: If they want to make progress in the accession process, candidate countries should take ownership of democracy promotion and contribute alongside the EU in supporting pro-democracy actors. While the EU should remain in charge of the rules, procedures and oversight, national governments should be asked to provide some amount of financial contribution (co-financing) to national democracy promotion programmes.
• Enhance resilience against foreign information manipulation: The EU should encourage candidate countries for EU membership to prioritise the adoption of its Foreign Interference and Manipulation of Information (FIMI) toolkit and align with the Digital Services Act, implementing stricter policies related to media and social media platforms’ control over information manipulation (content transparency, inorganic activity, state-controlled entities etc.). This should be teamed with support for media literacy programs, investigative journalism focusing on the dealings of third actors and their proxies, and media projects devising counter-narratives to the propaganda of external actors.
• Build economic resilience: The EU’s Economic Security Strategy should expand to include, both at the level of design and implementation, the countries in the EU neighbourhood. Their adoption of and alignment with specific instruments, like foreign direct investment screening mechanism or foreign subsidies regulation, have the potential to limit the economic penetration of external actors through their companies that often benefit from subsidies and/or undue practices, distorting the level-playing field to the disadvantage of local and EU companies.
• Improve strategic communication: While it cannot be expected that different EU actors, especially member states, speak with one voice on all topics of interests related to the EU’s neighbourhood, there should be clear strategic communication plans in place for each country. They should be regularly updated to identify and distinguish between (i) messages that form a clear consensus and need to be amplified, (ii) messages that may create unnecessary divisions, block democratization or empower external actors, hence need to be reviewed and addressed.

References

Armakolas, Ioannis 2023. “The Promise of European Integration: Breathing New Life into the Settlement of Bilateral Disputes”, Institute for Human Sciences – Europe’s Futures, www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/the-promise-of-european-integration-breathing-new-life-into-the

Bechev, Dimitar 2022. “The EU and Dispute Settlement: The Case of the Macedonian Name Issue”, East European Politics and Societies, 37 (2), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/08883254221101905

Diamond, Larry 2008. “The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State”, Foreign Affairs, 87 (2), https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032579

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way 2005. “International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy, 16(3): 20–34, www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/international-linkage-and-democratization/

 

The authors would like to thank EMBRACE project partners Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), Ukrainian European Studies Association (UESA) and Ilia State University for analysis of country cases that informed this policy paper and Isabelle Ioannides for feedback to earlier versions of this text. The authors alone are responsible for any errors.

 

Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers continues to undermine the organization’s legitimacy and effectiveness. While training on SEA is required for all UN personnel deploying to UN peace operations, there is little data available on how effective these trainings are. This paper presents the first quantitative analysis of SEA training’s effectiveness, using original survey data from more than 4,000 uniformed personnel in ten countries.

The analysis reveals that SEA training has a significant positive impact on attitudes and knowledge about SEA. Personnel who completed pre-deployment SEA training were substantially more likely to recognize that SEA would violate their national policy, to consider SEA to be serious, and to express willingness to report SEA. The analysis also found that UN deployment increases the likelihood that personnel will receive various gender-related trainings beyond SEA. However, despite pre-deployment SEA training being mandatory, a significant proportion of deployed peacekeepers reported never receiving this training.

Although the quantitative analysis shows positive links between SEA training and views on SEA and reporting, the paper also explores limitations in current approaches to SEA training. Interviews and workshops with training experts underscored the need for SEA trainings to contextualize and apply the material rather than focus on prescriptive instruction. SEA training also needs to focus on behavioral and cultural change rather than mere policy compliance. The paper concludes that while current SEA training shows measurable positive effects on attitudes and knowledge, improvements in delivery methods and enforcement of training requirements are necessary to maximize this training’s effectiveness and create lasting institutional change.

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IPI, together with the Permanent Missions of the Republic of Korea, Denmark, and Pakistan to the United Nations, cohosted a policy forum on the “Ten-Year Review of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report” on July 8th.

The purpose of this event was to revisit the findings and recommendations of the 2015 HIPPO report in light of current policy discussions. The event also served to launch an IPI publication on the ten-year review of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations Report written by Jenna Russo, IPI Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations; Bitania Tadesse, IPI Policy Specialist for Africa; and Ilianna Kotini, IPI intern at the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.

This event and publication are part of IPI’s workstream on the HIPPO report funded by the Republic of Korea.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Hyunwoo Cho, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations
H.E. Sandra Jensen Landi, Deputy Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations

Speakers:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser Emeritus, International Peace Institute, and former HIPPO panel member (VTC)
Ian Martin, former HIPPO panel member and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General (VTC)
Eugene Chen, Senior Fellow, New York University’s Center on International Cooperation
Dirk Druet, Non-resident Fellow, International Peace Institute

Moderator:
Bitania Tadesse, Policy Specialist for Africa, International Peace Institute

Closing Remarks:
H.E. Muhammad Usman Iqbal Jadoon, Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations

The post Ten-Year Review of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations Report appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Ten years after the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) released its landmark report “Uniting Our Strengths for Peace,” UN peace operations face new challenges that test the UN’s capacity to adapt to an evolving global landscape. As the UN examines the future of peace operations, it is timely to review the recommendations of the HIPPO report, many of which remain pertinent to today’s policy discussions.

This report reassesses the findings of the HIPPO report in light of today’s peace operations contexts, analyzes where there has and has not been progress, and considers how the HIPPO report can be useful to current discussions. Overall, today’s peace operations operate in a more challenging environment than in 2015, facing a more divided Security Council, severe financial constraints, and questions about the UN’s legitimacy. Nonetheless, the report concludes that many of HIPPO’s core insights remain relevant, and the findings and recommendations of the HIPPO report can help inform current policy discussions on the future of peace operations:

• UN80 Initiative: The secretary-general should articulate a clear vision guided by the New Agenda for Peace and Pact for the Future, ensuring cuts do not compromise the UN’s readiness to deploy peace operations or institutional memory.
• Review on the Future of Peace Operations: The Secretariat should use this review to identify what forms of peace operations the UN is best positioned to support and the capacities needed to backstop these efforts effectively.
• Modular Approaches: The Secretariat should develop frameworks for implementing modular mission designs while ensuring critical areas of work like the protection of civilians, gender, and human rights remain prioritized in streamlined mandates.
• Peacebuilding and Prevention: All member states should develop national prevention strategies as called for in the Pact for the Future, and the UN should consider pooling early-warning resources with regional organizations.
• Political Primacy: The secretary-general should clarify what the primacy of politics means in contexts without viable peace processes, encompassing politics beyond the signing of a formal agreement at the national level.
• Advancing Partnerships: The UN should embrace more ambitious partnerships that leverage its normative independence while drawing on regional organizations’ proximity to crises, focusing on prevention and mediation alongside peace enforcement.

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Sudan’s war has left millions in need of protection, as civilians continue to endure mass displacement, famine, widespread violence, and grave human rights violations. Despite commitments to international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, both the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces have persistently targeted civilians, and international efforts to protect them have so far been insufficient. While ceasefire negotiations remain stalled, the protection of civilians cannot wait, and the international community must act now.

This report examines the policy options available to member states, the UN, and regional actors to support the protection of civilians in Sudan. It highlights feasible measures that can be taken even as ceasefire negotiations remain elusive, including the following:

• Navigating a Divided Security Council: Security Council members, particularly the three African members, could pursue a new resolution on Sudan with backing from the African Union (AU); utilize informal mechanisms like Arria-formula meetings and subsidiary bodies of the council to build consensus; and organize a field visit to Sudan to engage stakeholders and elevate international attention.
• Leveraging the Role of the General Assembly: The General Assembly could continue to hold the Security Council accountable by convening debates following any future vetoes, support UN and AU fact-finding missions, and exercise normative power by adopting a resolution on civilian protection in Sudan.
• Foresight and Planning by the UN Secretariat: The UN Secretariat could undertake proactive scenario-based planning for the deployment of a future protection force or ceasefire monitoring mechanism, including by developing a comprehensive political strategy and implementation framework.
• Joint Efforts with Regional Actors: The AU should ensure it has a cohesive approach to the protection of civilians in Sudan by enhancing communication among African capitals and between Addis Ababa and New York. The UN and AU should also ensure their efforts are complementary, including by collaborating on their fact-finding missions and improving engagement between their genocide prevention offices.
• Contact Group to Steer the Protection Agenda in Sudan: A coalition of committed member states could establish a contact group on Sudan to develop a coherent political strategy, engage the warring parties and their backers with sustained diplomatic pressure, and create a dedicated mediation track for civilian protection.

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Le surplus militaire en France suscite un engouement constant, porté par la passion de ceux qui cherchent des pièces à la fois solides et chargées d’histoire. Derrière l’uniforme, il y a souvent une utilité précise, un savoir-faire hérité, une technicité discrète. Pourtant, face à la diversité des équipements proposés, il devient difficile de savoir vers […]

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IPI and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) cohosted an event on “Modular, Effective, and Sustainable? Leveraging Insights from Security Sector Governance to Shape Tomorrow’s Peace Operations” on June 3rd.

Recent discussions at the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin emphasized the urgent need for more modular peace operations, improved mission effectiveness, and strengthened sustainability, particularly in the context of transitions and long-term peacebuilding. As the UN undertakes the review on the future of all forms of peace operations mandated by the Pact for the Future and undertakes efforts to shift toward more focused, adaptable models, key questions arise about how to reshape peace operations to meet today’s challenges.

Insights from peace operations’ support to security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) offer critical lessons. One concern is that modularity may lead to fragmented efforts, particularly if SSG/R continues to be treated as a stand-alone activity rather than a means to achieve broader strategic goals. DCAF’s recent study, “Review of Security Sector Reform Language in the Mandates of UN Peace Operations,” commissioned by Switzerland, highlights missed opportunities and recommendations to improve such efforts.

Opening Remarks:
Riccarda Chanda, Deputy Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations
Beatrice Godefroy, Deputy Director of DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (virtual)

Speakers:
Vincenza Scherrer, Head of Policy Engagement, DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance
Daniel Prins, Chief of SSR Unit, UN Department of Peace Operations
Carole Baudoin, Security Sector Reform Chief, MINUSCA
David Haeri, Director, Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peace Operations

Closing Remarks:
Ed Caelen, Military Advisor, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

The post Modular, Effective, and Sustainable? Leveraging Insights from Security Sector Governance to Shape Tomorrow’s Peace Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Informal “minilateral” coalitions of the willing and interested have long been a feature of peacemaking. Groups of states identified as “friends” of the mediator or a particular peace process and contact groups bringing together interested powers date back to concert diplomacy traditions and proliferated at the end of the Cold War as conflict resolution activity surged. The incidence of such informal mechanisms grew exponentially between 1990 and 2009.

This report assesses how these mechanisms have evolved in the years since 2010 and investigates their place in parallel to the UN’s efforts to mediate internationalized internal conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen; peace processes in the Philippines, Colombia, and Mozambique taking place in relatively benign regional settings, as well as the anomalous case of Venezuela, where efforts toward a peaceful resolution of the political crisis were mired in international divisions; the geopolitically contested contexts of Myanmar and Afghanistan; and the democratic transition and descent into war in Sudan.

The report concludes that groups have the potential to build internal coherence among their members, as well as to elevate public messaging and facilitate information sharing, but they can also become a forum for competition between their members. In this context, the report offers lessons to help those considering whether a group is appropriate. The “right” group structure will depend on the context, and the adage of “form follows function” is critically important. It is key to set realistic expectations and, in some cases, accept that the “right” structure will be no group at all. Successful groups and partnerships all point to the importance of skilled individual mediators committed to working with each other, whether within a group or without an established mechanism. Finally, some contexts may defy attempts to design or deliver a coherent international peace architecture. In these cases, more modest goals related to specific or localized gains and incremental support to conflict parties and other affected communities should be pursued.

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Radio remains the most popular medium of communication in many countries where UN peacekeeping operations are deployed, and several missions have leveraged UN radio stations to communicate with local populations. UN strategic communications via radio can help reduce violence against civilians, both during and after armed conflict. This protective effect of UN radio is evident even in areas where no UN military peacekeepers are deployed.

This issue brief examines the protective impact of UN radio and the mechanisms through which strategic communications by peacekeepers may reduce violence. It identifies four main pathways: building trust in the mission and enhancing cooperation with peacekeepers’ protection activities; filling gaps in reliable information that might otherwise be filled by misinformation that incites violence; fostering pro-peace behavioral change among ordinary civilians; and incentivizing rank-and-file combatants to exercise restraint. The brief also argues that messages are more effective when they are perceived as accurate and informative by local audiences.

As the UN seeks to enhance strategic communications in peacekeeping operations, it must carefully manage several trade-offs. These include trade-offs between empowering civilians vs. exposing them to risk; ensuring that messaging is coherent vs. tailoring it to the local context; sustaining independent media vs. promoting national ownership; and expanding access to data vs. maintaining security and host-state consent.

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UN police (UNPOL) have long contributed to protection of civilians (POC) mandates, yet their role remains underexamined and often undervalued. As UN peace operations shift toward more flexible, lighter-footprint mission models and increasingly emphasizes regional partnerships, preventive approaches, and people-centered security, UNPOL could take on an expanded role. This could include greater involvement of UNPOL in addressing emerging protection threats related to urban violence, transnational crime, and cyber-related risks. However, future POC strategies must balance UNPOL’s strengths with other security tools to align expectations with capacity.

This issue brief examines UNPOL’s contributions to POC, focusing on their recent experience, emerging functions during mission transitions, and potential place in future models for peace operations. It highlights how UNPOL have played a vital role in reducing violence, engaging communities, supporting host-state law enforcement, and sustaining protection efforts during mission drawdowns. However, persistent challenges—including coordination gaps, militarization trends, limited data on effectiveness, and political constraints—continue to restrict their impact.

To make UNPOL’s contributions to POC more effective, the UN needs to focus more on police in high-level policy discussions, improve coordination across the rule-of-law sector, and strengthen data collection to assess the impact of UNPOL efforts. As peace operations adapt to evolving challenges, ensuring that UNPOL are properly resourced and embedded within mission planning will be key to realizing their full potential in protecting civilians.

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