You are here

Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Who owns the outcomes of transnational science and technology cooperation: reflections about German-Indonesian cooperation on the tsunami warning system

Transnational cooperation in the science and technology domain has been an integral part of global society. From the times when humans developed artefacts in the prehistoric age to colonialisation practices, the World Wars and beyond, and from  managing global health issues to addressing regional and global natural disasters, science and technology are inherent parts of global change and exchanges. Cooperation in the science and technology domain requires its own forms and frameworks of exchange and circumstances. Entanglements are equally political and complex because they are outcomes of power asymmetries. This paper reflects on a case study on German-Indonesian transnational cooperation in the domain of science and technology, namely the German-Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System Project (GITEWS).

Coping with power asymmetries in transnational mutual learning and dialogue formats

This paper discusses the importance of acknowledging power asymmetries in transnational (knowledge) cooperation and exchange. The authors explore different forms of power and the challenges of tackling power imbalances while working in  cooperation between diverse actors. They argue that new and more reflective approaches to transnational (knowledge) cooperation are necessary. The authors then discuss how power inequalities are addressed in the Managing Global Governance  (MGG) Academy and in the Shaping Futures Academy,24 organised by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Both formats are mutual learning and dialogue programmes for early to mid-career professionals from different partner countries around the globe.

Coping with power asymmetries in transnational mutual learning and dialogue formats

This paper discusses the importance of acknowledging power asymmetries in transnational (knowledge) cooperation and exchange. The authors explore different forms of power and the challenges of tackling power imbalances while working in  cooperation between diverse actors. They argue that new and more reflective approaches to transnational (knowledge) cooperation are necessary. The authors then discuss how power inequalities are addressed in the Managing Global Governance  (MGG) Academy and in the Shaping Futures Academy,24 organised by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Both formats are mutual learning and dialogue programmes for early to mid-career professionals from different partner countries around the globe.

Coping with power asymmetries in transnational mutual learning and dialogue formats

This paper discusses the importance of acknowledging power asymmetries in transnational (knowledge) cooperation and exchange. The authors explore different forms of power and the challenges of tackling power imbalances while working in  cooperation between diverse actors. They argue that new and more reflective approaches to transnational (knowledge) cooperation are necessary. The authors then discuss how power inequalities are addressed in the Managing Global Governance  (MGG) Academy and in the Shaping Futures Academy,24 organised by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Both formats are mutual learning and dialogue programmes for early to mid-career professionals from different partner countries around the globe.

The role of transnational democracy activists during Togo’s constitutional reform episode, 2017-2019

Amidst resurgent autocratisation around the world, digitalisation makes it easier than ever before for civil society activists and opposition politicians to connect with potential allies in other countries. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic  grassroots social movements seem to be increasingly connecting and forming transnational networks and platforms. Against this observation it becomes relevant to study whether transnational alliances can and will play a greater role in fostering democratisation and countering autocratisation. This paper first provides background on the phenomenon of increased transnational networking in sub-Saharan Africa. It then proceeds to present a brief case vignette of the role transnational activist  connections played during Togo’s constitutional reform episode 2017-2019. Findings show that activists purposefully sought transnational allies, but that for the specific case at hand, the links to transnational networks and platforms were still too  nascent. The Togolese regime hence was able to easily obstruct transnational democracy activists from having greater influence.

The role of transnational democracy activists during Togo’s constitutional reform episode, 2017-2019

Amidst resurgent autocratisation around the world, digitalisation makes it easier than ever before for civil society activists and opposition politicians to connect with potential allies in other countries. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic  grassroots social movements seem to be increasingly connecting and forming transnational networks and platforms. Against this observation it becomes relevant to study whether transnational alliances can and will play a greater role in fostering democratisation and countering autocratisation. This paper first provides background on the phenomenon of increased transnational networking in sub-Saharan Africa. It then proceeds to present a brief case vignette of the role transnational activist  connections played during Togo’s constitutional reform episode 2017-2019. Findings show that activists purposefully sought transnational allies, but that for the specific case at hand, the links to transnational networks and platforms were still too  nascent. The Togolese regime hence was able to easily obstruct transnational democracy activists from having greater influence.

The role of transnational democracy activists during Togo’s constitutional reform episode, 2017-2019

Amidst resurgent autocratisation around the world, digitalisation makes it easier than ever before for civil society activists and opposition politicians to connect with potential allies in other countries. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic  grassroots social movements seem to be increasingly connecting and forming transnational networks and platforms. Against this observation it becomes relevant to study whether transnational alliances can and will play a greater role in fostering democratisation and countering autocratisation. This paper first provides background on the phenomenon of increased transnational networking in sub-Saharan Africa. It then proceeds to present a brief case vignette of the role transnational activist  connections played during Togo’s constitutional reform episode 2017-2019. Findings show that activists purposefully sought transnational allies, but that for the specific case at hand, the links to transnational networks and platforms were still too  nascent. The Togolese regime hence was able to easily obstruct transnational democracy activists from having greater influence.

When government and civil society organisations join forces in transnational advocacy: lessons from the Strategic Partnership Programme

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

When government and civil society organisations join forces in transnational advocacy: lessons from the Strategic Partnership Programme

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

When government and civil society organisations join forces in transnational advocacy: lessons from the Strategic Partnership Programme

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

Sámi-EU relations as an example of transnational cooperation for sustainable development?

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Sámi-EU relations as an example of transnational cooperation for sustainable development?

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Sámi-EU relations as an example of transnational cooperation for sustainable development?

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Transnationalisation light: non-state inclusion and North/South differentials in global development governance

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

Transnationalisation light: non-state inclusion and North/South differentials in global development governance

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

Transnationalisation light: non-state inclusion and North/South differentials in global development governance

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

A High-Level Panel Discussion on Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan

European Peace Institute / News - Fri, 03/08/2024 - 18:21

IPI together with the Atlantic Council and the Malala Fund cohosted a high-level panel discussion on March 8th, addressing the deteriorating rights of girls, women, and individuals of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities in Afghanistan while also highlighting ongoing efforts to ensure justice and accountability for these abuses—in particular, the momentum around efforts to recognize and codify the crime of gender apartheid. This event was co-sponsored by the Global Justice Center, Rawadari, Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace & Security, Malta, and Mexico.

Since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021, they have implemented a range of laws, policies, and practices that systematically oppress women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons, including 85 decrees focused on curtailing girls’ and women’s rights. Under an increasingly entrenched, institutionalized legal system that curtails freedom, stifles potential, and erodes dignity, victims and survivors have endured and resisted. Reflecting on the lived experiences of Afghan women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons, the event promoted discussion on avenues for accountability for the crimes being perpetrated. One such avenue is the codification of the crime of gender apartheid under international and domestic law.

At the event, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center publicly launched its initiative “Inside Afghanistan’s Gender Apartheid,” an interactive audio timeline that allows listeners to hear directly from Afghan women and girls about the profound and harrowing impacts of the escalating gender apartheid in Afghanistan.

Full coverage of the event is forthcoming.

Opening/Closing Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Peace Institute
H.E. Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Malta to the UN
H.E. Alicia Buenrostro Massieu, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN

Speakers:
Malala Yousafzai, Nobel Peace Laureate
Nayera Kohistani, Afghan Activist and Expert
Penelope Andrews, John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law & Director, Racial Justice Project, New York Law School
Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, Chair, UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls

Moderator:
Jomana Karadsheh, International Correspondent, CNN

Constellations of State Fragility: improving international cooperation through analytical differentiation

State fragility has remained a pressing challenge for international security and development policymakers for more than two decades. However, international engagement in fragile states has often failed, in part due to a lack of understanding about what constitutes state fragility. Established quantitative models usually rank fragile states on one-dimensional scales ranging from stable to highly fragile. This puts states characterised by very different problems and dimensions of fragility into the same “box”. Moreover, categorisations such as “fragile”, “weak”, “failed” or “collapsed” are increasingly rejected in the Global South, thereby hampering international development and security cooperation. The “Constellations of State Fragility” model, developed at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), provides a more differentiated model to measure state fragility. It assesses state fragility along three continuous dimensions, assuming that state fragility is a continuous trait that affects all states to some degree: authority, capacity and legitimacy. These dimensions are not aggregated into a one-dimensional index. Instead, the model detects typical constellations across these dimensions. In so doing, it also accounts for the fact that states can perform very differently in different dimensions. Our analysis yields three main insights about what constitutes state fragility and how it can be addressed: first, state fragility, illiberalism, repression and human rights violations are interrelated; second, state fragility is not unique to the Global South, with negative trends also occurring in the Global North; and, third, differentiated, multi-dimensional models offer better starting points for addressing state fragility than one-dimensional ones. We conclude with four policy recommendations:
• Improve analytical capacity by adopting a differentiated view of state fragility: International security and development policymakers would benefit from more fine-grained, differentiated assessments of state fragility. In addition, country-specific assessments of the specific local power constellations in which fragile state institutions are embedded are needed for devising adequate, context-sensitive measures.
• Connect measures to address fragility with democracy protection and the protection of human rights: Illiberalism, human rights violations and repression correlate with state fragility. This also suggests that there is a close relationship between autocracy, autocratisation and fragility. Accordingly, measures to address fragility, democracy support and efforts to protect human rights must be better connected. This also implies doing “no harm to democracy” (Leininger, 2023, p. 2).
• Identify conditions under which state-building can (or cannot) be pursued: It would be fruitful if international security and development policymakers engaged in thorough discussions about the conditions under which state-building can be pursued. Where existing state institutions are legitimate, they should be supported. However, donor coherence and the capacity (and political will) of donors to commit resources to fragile states and to engage long-term are also important preconditions. State-building is both a costly and a long-term endeavour.
• Learning across world regions: Patterns of state fragility can be highly similar, despite geographical distance. In particular, rising illiberalism and increasing attacks on civil liberties are global phenomena. Hence, policy decision-makers and civil society organisations (CSOs) seeking to counter fragility should engage in mutual learning across the North/South divide.

Constellations of State Fragility: improving international cooperation through analytical differentiation

State fragility has remained a pressing challenge for international security and development policymakers for more than two decades. However, international engagement in fragile states has often failed, in part due to a lack of understanding about what constitutes state fragility. Established quantitative models usually rank fragile states on one-dimensional scales ranging from stable to highly fragile. This puts states characterised by very different problems and dimensions of fragility into the same “box”. Moreover, categorisations such as “fragile”, “weak”, “failed” or “collapsed” are increasingly rejected in the Global South, thereby hampering international development and security cooperation. The “Constellations of State Fragility” model, developed at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), provides a more differentiated model to measure state fragility. It assesses state fragility along three continuous dimensions, assuming that state fragility is a continuous trait that affects all states to some degree: authority, capacity and legitimacy. These dimensions are not aggregated into a one-dimensional index. Instead, the model detects typical constellations across these dimensions. In so doing, it also accounts for the fact that states can perform very differently in different dimensions. Our analysis yields three main insights about what constitutes state fragility and how it can be addressed: first, state fragility, illiberalism, repression and human rights violations are interrelated; second, state fragility is not unique to the Global South, with negative trends also occurring in the Global North; and, third, differentiated, multi-dimensional models offer better starting points for addressing state fragility than one-dimensional ones. We conclude with four policy recommendations:
• Improve analytical capacity by adopting a differentiated view of state fragility: International security and development policymakers would benefit from more fine-grained, differentiated assessments of state fragility. In addition, country-specific assessments of the specific local power constellations in which fragile state institutions are embedded are needed for devising adequate, context-sensitive measures.
• Connect measures to address fragility with democracy protection and the protection of human rights: Illiberalism, human rights violations and repression correlate with state fragility. This also suggests that there is a close relationship between autocracy, autocratisation and fragility. Accordingly, measures to address fragility, democracy support and efforts to protect human rights must be better connected. This also implies doing “no harm to democracy” (Leininger, 2023, p. 2).
• Identify conditions under which state-building can (or cannot) be pursued: It would be fruitful if international security and development policymakers engaged in thorough discussions about the conditions under which state-building can be pursued. Where existing state institutions are legitimate, they should be supported. However, donor coherence and the capacity (and political will) of donors to commit resources to fragile states and to engage long-term are also important preconditions. State-building is both a costly and a long-term endeavour.
• Learning across world regions: Patterns of state fragility can be highly similar, despite geographical distance. In particular, rising illiberalism and increasing attacks on civil liberties are global phenomena. Hence, policy decision-makers and civil society organisations (CSOs) seeking to counter fragility should engage in mutual learning across the North/South divide.

Pages

THIS IS THE NEW BETA VERSION OF EUROPA VARIETAS NEWS CENTER - under construction
the old site is here

Copy & Drop - Can`t find your favourite site? Send us the RSS or URL to the following address: info(@)europavarietas(dot)org.