La Loterie nationale du Bénin (LNB) a dévoilé les résultats du 4e tirage spécial de la Tranche commune entente (TCE) 2026, organisé le 30 octobre. Dix gagnants se partagent des lots allant de 100 000 à plusieurs centaines de milliers de FCFA, avec un grand gagnant à la clé. Découvrez les numéros gagnants...
Une femme a été retrouvée morte par noyade au bord du fleuve Couffo, dans la commune de Lalo, le vendredi 30 octobre 2026.
Découverte du corps d'une femme âgée d'environ 40 ans dans l'arrondissement de Tohou. Selon les informations rapportées par Libre Express, la victime, mère de trois enfants souffrait d'épilepsie. La maladie se serait déclenchée alors qu'elle faisait sa lessive au bord du fleuve, provoquant sa chute, le visage plongé dans l'eau.
Selon le chef d'arrondissement de Tohou, Périn Djègbé, la victime aurait été retrouvée dans une position qui l'empêchait de respirer normalement. À la suite du constat, le corps de la défunte a été récupéré par ses parents en vue de son inhumation.
Amikor a saját bázistól távol, külföldön kell repülőműszaki munkát végezni, az sok szempontból ugyanolyan, mint az otthoni, hiszen a technológiától eltérni nem lehet, az nem helyszínfüggő. Ugyanakkor mégis más, amiben az idegen környezet és a helyszíni lehetőségek játszanak nem elhanyagolható szerepet. Sorozatunk harmadik részében a magyar repülőműszakiak szemszögéből járjuk körbe a NATO Tiger Meet 2026-ot. A felkészülés és a görög bázison töltött napok főbb mozzanatainak felidézésében Sárai Róbert őrnagy, szolgálat vezetőmérnök volt segítségemre.
Felkészül a „szolgáltató szektor”
A kecskeméti repülőműszakiak is azon az előtervező konferencián találkoztak először a gyakorlat részleteivel, ahol a többi terület képviselői, és megannyi részlet tisztázása után benyújtották igényeiket. Erre egy SOR-nak (Statement of Requirements) nevezett dokumentum szolgál, amelyben minden szerepel, a logisztikától kezdve, az egészségügyi biztosításon, üzemanyagon, ipari gázokon át a gépjárművek beléptetéséig. A SOR benyújtása mellett akárcsak a többi szakterületnek, a repülőműszakiaknak is fontos mozzanat volt a helyszínbejárás, a „site survey”, amikor körbejárták a fogadó repülőteret és megnézték a lehetőségeket. Mindenki a saját szakterületének megfelelően vizsgálta, hogy hova fog települni, és ott milyen feladatokat kell majd végrehajtania. A pilóták, a logisztika, a repülőműszakiak, az őrzés-védelem, a kommunikáció, az informatika, minden kiszolgáló terület olyan szemmel vizsgálta a helyszínt, hogy a végén egy kerek egész képet kapjanak.
Land may be assessed primarily for its potential commercial or residential value, overlooking the food, livelihoods and environmental services it already provides. Credit: Jorge Luis Baños/IPS
By Zhimin Wu
ROME, Oct 30 2026 (IPS)
A field at the edge of a growing city may be worth far more than its market price suggests. It may produce vegetables sold in nearby markets, support local livelihoods and provide green space in an increasingly built-up environment. It can also help cities manage water, adapt to climate shocks and strengthen local food supplies. As municipal authorities decide where new homes and infrastructure should go, understanding what their land already contributes can help them plan for housing and food together.
This question lies at the heart of World Cities Day, which the United Nations will mark on 31 October under the theme “Regenerating the City: Adequate Housing for All.”
This does not mean protecting every agricultural plot from development. Cities urgently need more homes, and housing must remain a priority. The task is to make better-informed decisions about where development should proceed and where maintaining productive agricultural land can offer lasting benefits
According to the United Nations, cities are now home to 45 percent of the world’s population and are projected to account for two-thirds of global population growth between now and 2050.
Accommodating this expansion will require enormous investment in housing, infrastructure and public services. It also presents an opportunity to reconsider how food production and urban development can support one another.
Agriculture is already an integral part of the life and economy of many cities around the world. Within urban areas and along their expanding boundaries, farmers cultivate vegetables, fruits and other crops that supply local markets, generate employment and income, particularly for small-scale producers, and improve access to fresh and nutritious food.
Beyond food production, urban and peri-urban agriculture can also strengthen climate resilience, contribute to the restoration of urban ecosystems and support the development of greener, healthier and more sustainable cities.
The proximity of farms to consumers can be especially valuable for perishable produce. Proximity to markets can reduce transport distances and, when supported by adequate handling and storage, help limit losses of perishable produce. Urban and peri-urban agriculture can also diversify food supply chains, giving cities additional sources of food when longer distribution networks face disruptions.³
Yet the contribution of these farms is not always adequately recognized in urban development decisions. Land may be assessed primarily for its potential commercial or residential value, overlooking the food, livelihoods and environmental services it already provides.
As cities expand, these wider benefits deserve greater consideration. Agricultural land can help absorb rainfall, support biodiversity and contribute to urban green infrastructure. With appropriate safeguards, farming can also make use of suitably treated wastewater and safely processed organic resources. Once agricultural land is converted to other uses, such benefits can be difficult to recover.
This does not mean protecting every agricultural plot from development. Cities urgently need more homes, and housing must remain a priority. The task is to make better-informed decisions about where development should proceed and where maintaining productive agricultural land can offer lasting benefits.
Rosario, Argentina, illustrates how municipal policy can bring these objectives together. Following the country’s economic crisis in 2001, the city developed an urban agriculture programme that transformed vacant and underused land into productive spaces. It created opportunities for low-income households, supported fresh-food production and brought agriculture into municipal development planning.
Municipal authorities established arrangements to connect producers with available land, including public and private plots. Rosario subsequently incorporated agriculture into municipal planning and, in 2016, introduced a Green Belt Project to support agroecological production around the city.
Its experience demonstrates how local governments can integrate food production into wider efforts to improve urban livelihoods and the environment.
The lesson extends beyond Rosario. Urban agriculture cannot replace rural farming, which remains indispensable for feeding cities. Its particular contribution lies in complementing rural production, especially through fresh produce, diversified supply chains and stronger connections between urban markets and surrounding agricultural areas.
Realizing these benefits requires sound management. Producers need access to suitable land and safe water, alongside effective food-safety safeguards. Water-efficient irrigation, protected cultivation, improved logistics and the recovery of nutrients from organic waste can help cities use scarce resources more effectively. The most useful innovations are those that local farmers can afford, operate and sustain.
This broader approach is reflected in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ Green Cities Initiative, launched in 2020 with the ambition of improving health and well-being in 1,000 cities by 2030.
The Initiative connects urban and peri-urban agriculture with forestry, green infrastructure and sustainable natural-resource management. Through the Green Cities Network, municipalities can exchange experience, build partnerships and identify practical solutions suited to their circumstances.
World Cities Day offers an occasion for municipal authorities to act. Two measures would make a practical difference.
First, cities can integrate food and agriculture into urban and territorial planning. Mapping agricultural land, identifying its producers and understanding its connections to markets and surrounding rural areas can help governments make more informed decisions about housing, infrastructure and land use.
Second, municipalities can create conditions that encourage sustainable agricultural investment through appropriate zoning, secure access to land, improved market infrastructure and technical support. Rosario demonstrates how municipal policies can help make agriculture a lasting part of urban development.
The cities of tomorrow will need more homes, better infrastructure and thriving economies. They also stand to gain from the agriculture that sustains their populations. Recognizing its full value can help cities make better decisions about what to build, what to preserve and how to grow.
Zhimin Wu is Assistant Director-General and Director of the Forestry Division at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
The legendary lesbian South African runner Caster Semenya successfully contested regulations aimed at policing women’s bodies by World Athletics, ultimately winning her case at the European Court of Human Rights in 2025. Credit: Shutterstock
By External Source
DAKAR, Oct 30 2026 (IPS)
Senegal is welcoming athletes and visitors from across the globe as part of the 4th Summer Youth Olympic Games, the first-ever Olympics in Africa. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) African athletes, including from Senegal, have repeatedly participated in and won competitions–while advocating their rights to compete and speaking out against discrimination.
In 2024, Cindy Ngamba, an openly lesbian boxer born in Cameroon, made history at the Paris 2024 Olympics by winning the first medal for the Refugee Olympic Team.
The legendary lesbian South African runner Caster Semenya successfully contested regulations aimed at policing women’s bodies by World Athletics, ultimately winning her case at the European Court of Human Rights in 2025. Along the way, she won a total of six medals across the Olympics and World Athletics Championships and debunked arbitrary definitions of femininity and racial stereotypes faced by African athletes.
In 2020, Phuti Lekoloane founded the African Pride Games, creating a safe platform for competition regardless of one’s identity and demonstrating that sport “can drive equality, inclusion, and unity.” After coming out publicly in July 2015, he was one of Africa’s first openly gay male footballers.
The climate of hatred and persecution created by the new law puts LGBT people, including athletes, staff, and fans at the Dakar Youth Olympics, at risk of human rights abuses
Senegal’s hosting of the Youth Olympics, however, shows the need to keep fighting for the rights of LGBT people in Africa.
In March 2026, Senegal’s parliament amended its penal code, doubling to 10 years the maximum prison term for consensual same-sex conduct and criminalizing “promotion” of, or support to, LGBT people and organizations. Between February and July, hundreds of people were arrested in connection with the amendment of the penal code, according to the African Forum for the Defense of Human Rights (Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, or RADDHO. Senegalese government officials have frequently used incendiary rhetoric against LGBT people.
The climate of hatred and persecution created by the new law puts LGBT people, including athletes, staff, and fans at the Dakar Youth Olympics, at risk of human rights abuses.
Senegal’s then Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko said in April 2026 that, “any athlete coming solely to practice their sport is welcome and can freely pursue their activity. However, if someone comes for reasons other than sport, the [anti-LGBT] law of the country will apply to them, as it applies to everyone.”
The Senegalese government’s hostility to LGBT rights runs contrary to the Olympic Charter, which prohibits discrimination of any kind, including based on sexual orientation. Olympic hosts are required by their contract with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to prevent, investigate, and remedy human rights abuses related to the Games, including by engaging with affected groups.
Senegalese authorities, through the Youth Olympic Games Organising Committee, have rolled out measures to promote human rights protections, which they described as a key indicator for the success of the competition. But these protections have so far excluded the rights of LGBT people.
Several athletes have already pushed back against Senegal’s draconian law. Jérémy Clamy-Edroux, an openly gay, former professional rugby player, and Brahim Naït-Balk, an openly gay football coach, were among 29 African leaders who signed a May 2026 letter calling for the Senegalese government to open renewed dialogue on the law.
In their letter, they raised concerns about abuses faced by LGBT people and asserted that Pan-Africanism, previously embraced by Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye himself, should advance liberation for all Africans, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity.
The Dakar Youth Olympics ends November 13. Before then, Senegal’s government should repeal its anti-LGBT laws and free anyone still detained under the prior amendments. Senegal should use the Youth Olympics to protect LGBT people and fully embrace Olympic values.
Vincent Sima Olé is a senior program and sport and human rights coordinator and Larissa Kojoué is an LGBT rights researcher, both at Human Rights Watch.
Just Transitions have emerged as a central pillar of global climate policy, particularly following their formal inclusion in the Paris Agreement in 2015. Their rapid adoption at both national and international levels is notable given persistent shortcomings in global climate and sustainable development governance. However, Just Transition initiatives remain fragmented, conceptually contested, and predominantly focused on energy, and their governance has received comparatively little academic attention. At the same time, policy coherence, a governance principle concerned with maximising synergies and minimising trade-offs and extensively studied in the context of the 2030 Agenda, is widely invoked in policy discourse as essential for Just Transitions, yet its role in Just Transition governance has received little systematic attention in the literature. This dissertation therefore asks: to what extent can policy coherence enable the governance of Just Transitions, and under which conditions? Just Transitions here are understood as transitions that advance climate-neutral, sustainable futures in ways that are substantively just, with substantive justice defined as the expansion of opportunity freedoms, the reduction of inequalities across all dimensions, and the fulfilment of the 2030 Agenda’s promise to ‘leave no one behind.’ Part I (Chapters 2–3) examines the relationships between policy coherence, Just Transition, goal attainment, and inequality reduction. Drawing on survey data from 131 COP28 delegates (Chapter 2) and empirical analysis of 40 sustainable development policy processes across multiple countries (Chapter 3), the findings indicate that policy coherence is widely perceived as integral to Just Transitions and is strongly associated with multidimensional, cross-sectoral approaches that extend beyond energy. Empirical analysis further shows that higher coherence is linked to greater policy effectiveness in achieving multiple objectives. However, coherence alone does not reliably reduce inequalities and, in some cases, can exacerbate them. Part II (Chapters 4–6) examines the temporal, discursive, and political conditions under which policy coherence can enable the governance of Just Transitions. Drawing on policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews, these conditions are analysed through an in-depth case study of Germany’s energy transition, the Energiewende, a high-stakes transition context. Findings demonstrate that governing Just Transitions through policy coherence requires balancing short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, as temporal dynamics alter policy interactions and reveal trade-offs and synergies that evolve over time (Chapter 4). Moreover, policy coherence is socially and discursively constructed, with actors’ perceptions and interpretations strongly shaping whether policies and their implementation are experienced as coherent or incoherent (Chapter 5). Political inequalities in decision-making around the German coal phase-out and onshore wind phase-in further constrain coherence and can lead to slower climate mitigation outcomes (Chapter 6). Together, the findings indicate that while policy coherence may appear to be a necessary principle for the governance of Just Transitions, it is not sufficient. While widely endorsed, its ability to enable the governance of Just Transitions is context-dependent and contingent on its implications for social justice. In addition, policy coherence should not be seen as a fixed end-state, but as a dynamic and imperfect governance principle that is deeply shaped by politics and discourse.
Just Transitions have emerged as a central pillar of global climate policy, particularly following their formal inclusion in the Paris Agreement in 2015. Their rapid adoption at both national and international levels is notable given persistent shortcomings in global climate and sustainable development governance. However, Just Transition initiatives remain fragmented, conceptually contested, and predominantly focused on energy, and their governance has received comparatively little academic attention. At the same time, policy coherence, a governance principle concerned with maximising synergies and minimising trade-offs and extensively studied in the context of the 2030 Agenda, is widely invoked in policy discourse as essential for Just Transitions, yet its role in Just Transition governance has received little systematic attention in the literature. This dissertation therefore asks: to what extent can policy coherence enable the governance of Just Transitions, and under which conditions? Just Transitions here are understood as transitions that advance climate-neutral, sustainable futures in ways that are substantively just, with substantive justice defined as the expansion of opportunity freedoms, the reduction of inequalities across all dimensions, and the fulfilment of the 2030 Agenda’s promise to ‘leave no one behind.’ Part I (Chapters 2–3) examines the relationships between policy coherence, Just Transition, goal attainment, and inequality reduction. Drawing on survey data from 131 COP28 delegates (Chapter 2) and empirical analysis of 40 sustainable development policy processes across multiple countries (Chapter 3), the findings indicate that policy coherence is widely perceived as integral to Just Transitions and is strongly associated with multidimensional, cross-sectoral approaches that extend beyond energy. Empirical analysis further shows that higher coherence is linked to greater policy effectiveness in achieving multiple objectives. However, coherence alone does not reliably reduce inequalities and, in some cases, can exacerbate them. Part II (Chapters 4–6) examines the temporal, discursive, and political conditions under which policy coherence can enable the governance of Just Transitions. Drawing on policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews, these conditions are analysed through an in-depth case study of Germany’s energy transition, the Energiewende, a high-stakes transition context. Findings demonstrate that governing Just Transitions through policy coherence requires balancing short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, as temporal dynamics alter policy interactions and reveal trade-offs and synergies that evolve over time (Chapter 4). Moreover, policy coherence is socially and discursively constructed, with actors’ perceptions and interpretations strongly shaping whether policies and their implementation are experienced as coherent or incoherent (Chapter 5). Political inequalities in decision-making around the German coal phase-out and onshore wind phase-in further constrain coherence and can lead to slower climate mitigation outcomes (Chapter 6). Together, the findings indicate that while policy coherence may appear to be a necessary principle for the governance of Just Transitions, it is not sufficient. While widely endorsed, its ability to enable the governance of Just Transitions is context-dependent and contingent on its implications for social justice. In addition, policy coherence should not be seen as a fixed end-state, but as a dynamic and imperfect governance principle that is deeply shaped by politics and discourse.
Just Transitions have emerged as a central pillar of global climate policy, particularly following their formal inclusion in the Paris Agreement in 2015. Their rapid adoption at both national and international levels is notable given persistent shortcomings in global climate and sustainable development governance. However, Just Transition initiatives remain fragmented, conceptually contested, and predominantly focused on energy, and their governance has received comparatively little academic attention. At the same time, policy coherence, a governance principle concerned with maximising synergies and minimising trade-offs and extensively studied in the context of the 2030 Agenda, is widely invoked in policy discourse as essential for Just Transitions, yet its role in Just Transition governance has received little systematic attention in the literature. This dissertation therefore asks: to what extent can policy coherence enable the governance of Just Transitions, and under which conditions? Just Transitions here are understood as transitions that advance climate-neutral, sustainable futures in ways that are substantively just, with substantive justice defined as the expansion of opportunity freedoms, the reduction of inequalities across all dimensions, and the fulfilment of the 2030 Agenda’s promise to ‘leave no one behind.’ Part I (Chapters 2–3) examines the relationships between policy coherence, Just Transition, goal attainment, and inequality reduction. Drawing on survey data from 131 COP28 delegates (Chapter 2) and empirical analysis of 40 sustainable development policy processes across multiple countries (Chapter 3), the findings indicate that policy coherence is widely perceived as integral to Just Transitions and is strongly associated with multidimensional, cross-sectoral approaches that extend beyond energy. Empirical analysis further shows that higher coherence is linked to greater policy effectiveness in achieving multiple objectives. However, coherence alone does not reliably reduce inequalities and, in some cases, can exacerbate them. Part II (Chapters 4–6) examines the temporal, discursive, and political conditions under which policy coherence can enable the governance of Just Transitions. Drawing on policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews, these conditions are analysed through an in-depth case study of Germany’s energy transition, the Energiewende, a high-stakes transition context. Findings demonstrate that governing Just Transitions through policy coherence requires balancing short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, as temporal dynamics alter policy interactions and reveal trade-offs and synergies that evolve over time (Chapter 4). Moreover, policy coherence is socially and discursively constructed, with actors’ perceptions and interpretations strongly shaping whether policies and their implementation are experienced as coherent or incoherent (Chapter 5). Political inequalities in decision-making around the German coal phase-out and onshore wind phase-in further constrain coherence and can lead to slower climate mitigation outcomes (Chapter 6). Together, the findings indicate that while policy coherence may appear to be a necessary principle for the governance of Just Transitions, it is not sufficient. While widely endorsed, its ability to enable the governance of Just Transitions is context-dependent and contingent on its implications for social justice. In addition, policy coherence should not be seen as a fixed end-state, but as a dynamic and imperfect governance principle that is deeply shaped by politics and discourse.
Diego Mesa, GEF CEO and chairperson, addresses media on the status of finance mobilisation at COP17. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
By Stella Paul
YEREVAN, Armenia, Oct 30 2026 (IPS)
The second week of COP17 was dominated by discussions on biodiversity finance, with new pledges announced and donor outreach intensifying. Yet as the summit approached its close, the financing gap for implementing the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) remains largely unchanged.
Prior to COP17, the first global review of progress toward the KMGBF, often called the global biodiversity review, painted an alarming picture: the commitment to mobilise USD 200 billion annually for biodiversity was still far from being achieved. The conference therefore opened amid growing pressure on governments over missed targets, corporate responsibility and Indigenous rights.
Against that backdrop, finance has become one of the most closely watched issues in the negotiations.
“We started the replenishment cycle number 9, for 2026 to 2030, and the initial contributions were announced in June in the General Assembly of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in Uzbekistan’s Samarkand. And those initial contributions came at USD 3.9 billion for the next four years,” said Diego Mesa, the recently appointed CEO and Chairperson of the Global Environment Facility, at a press conference.
New and Emerging Donors, Including Cities
Since the adoption of the KMGBF, a notable financing trend has emerged: cities and provinces have begun contributing directly to biodiversity finance mechanisms.
The trend started two years ago when Quebec, the Canadian province that hosted COP15 in 2022, independently donated USD 1.4 million to the GBFF.
At COP17, the trend continued. On Oct 26 – observed as Finance Day, the City of Berlin pledged EUR 50,000 (USD 56,000) to the GBFF, while Quebec announced a second contribution of CAD 1.5 million.
Collectively, national and sub-national governments pledged more than USD 60 million to the GBFF. According to GEF sources, this included contributions from Germany (EUR 50 million), Iceland (ISK 160 million) and Monaco (EUR 1.5 million).
While the expanding donor base is an encouraging sign, the world still needs an estimated USD 200 billion annually by 2030 to halt and reverse biodiversity loss under Target 19. The current pace of finance mobilisation, therefore, remains far slower than what is required.
Mesa acknowledged these concerns about the biodiversity finance gap but argued that GEF funding has a catalytic effect, attracting additional public and private investment. He noted that each dollar committed through the facility typically mobilises several more dollars from other sources, and many donor countries also provide biodiversity finance through bilateral programs outside the GEF system.
“We obviously, you know, are concerned. We’ve read the (global) review report. But what we also need to highlight is that, in addition to the funds that come through the GEF, we have to take into account what I mentioned about being able to mobilise additional funds, whether it’s, you know, a multiplier of 8 or 8.2, on average, if we take GEF 8 as a baseline or blended finance, which is about 18.5,” he said.
Astrid Schomaker, Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, stressed that progress remains insufficient despite some gains.
“We all know that a lot of commitments were made four years ago in Montreal (including) mobilising at least USD 200 billion a year for biodiversity from 2030, from all sources. Reduce harmful incentives by at least USD 500 billion a year and align public and private financial flows with a framework. We have seen biodiversity finance increase quite substantially, but also from very, very low levels. Some figures suggest that we would have achieved USD 19 billion in 2024. That would be close to the 2025 milestone of 20 billion. But we also know that aid budgets are a lot under pressure, so that progress is not yet secure, to say the least,” Schomaker said in an address to the delegates on the Finance Day.
“From the side of the Secretariat, we would point to three questions or priorities that we hope you can discuss at this COP and move forward on. First, bring national biodiversity strategies and action plans into national budgets. Second, reform harmful incentives. And third, make public and development finance go further,” Schomaker said.
New Coalition Targets Harmful Subsidies
While much of the discussion centred on mobilising new biodiversity finance, negotiators also stressed the need to curb environmentally harmful spending. In that context, momentum grew around efforts to reform harmful subsidies with the launch of a new coalition of countries committed to Target 18.
Known as the “Friends of Target 18”, the coalition focuses on the KMGBF target to reduce harmful incentives by at least USD 500 billion per year while scaling up positive incentives for biodiversity.
Led by Colombia and Finland, and supported by the CBD, the coalition also has backing from the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Programme’s Biodiversity Finance Initiative (UNDP BIOFIN).
“Our work here in Yerevan can influence how natural resources are used, how goods are produced and consumed, and where public and private financial resources are directed,” said Hambardzum Matevosyan, Minister of Environment of the Republic of Armenia and COP17 President.
So far, only five countries have joined the initiative. However, Marina Von Weissenberg, Senior Ministerial Adviser of Finland and co-chair of the Friends of Target 18, expressed confidence that more countries would follow.
“We don’t need to spend more to close the biodiversity funding gap, we need to spend better. Governments have a real opportunity here to reshape public spending with future generations in mind, but they can’t do it alone. International coordination is key to giving governments the confidence to lead change,” she said.
Meanwhile, GEF continues to focus not only on raising new money but also on broadening the donor base.
“This is exactly what we were doing with this pledging session, with the USD 5 million going to the GEF Trust Fund, and with the 60 million going into the GBFF. But also expanding the donor base. And that’s why we were very pleased to announce that we have a total of nine new contributors to the GEF family of funds,” Mesa said to IPS.
GEF Keeps Pledging Window Open
In an effort to attract additional support, GEF has made a significant change to its replenishment process.
Traditionally, pledging windows close when a replenishment cycle ends. Under that system, pledges for the ninth replenishment cycle would have closed earlier in June, when GEF held its Assembly in Samarkand.
This year, however, the window remains open, allowing countries to make contributions throughout the year.
“This is the first time that we kept the window open for pledging. And this is to respond to requests to be more flexible from the donor side. So, we will have, hopefully, one additional pledging session in the UNFCCC COP (COP31) next month,” Mesa told IPS.
“But we also expect additional contributions to take place in the next calendar year. So, the window will remain open,” he added.
IPS UN Bureau Report
Related Articles
Excerpt:
This first part of a two-part series on biodiversity finance at CBD COP17 examines the status of finance mobilisation and new funding commitments.Following Lula da Silva’s remarkable electoral ‘remontada’, Brazil’s forests may sigh with relief. Lula’s re-election, with 51.8% of votes in the second ballot of Brazil’s presidential elections, averts a second Bolsonaro presidency that seemed to be looming after the first round of elections in early October. It would have threatened to dismantle environmental safeguards, weaken Indigenous territorial rights and accelerate the exploitation of the Amazon. Moreover, Flávio Bolsonaro’s alignment with Donald Trump offered little prospect for a continuation of Brazil’s international leadership for ambitious climate action. The threat was concrete, grounded in both the Bolsonaro family’s track record and Flávio’s personal campaign promises. Yet Brazil’s election was hardly a referendum on forests or climate policy. While forest protection attracts international attention, living costs, corruption and security dominate domestic concerns.
Following Lula da Silva’s remarkable electoral ‘remontada’, Brazil’s forests may sigh with relief. Lula’s re-election, with 51.8% of votes in the second ballot of Brazil’s presidential elections, averts a second Bolsonaro presidency that seemed to be looming after the first round of elections in early October. It would have threatened to dismantle environmental safeguards, weaken Indigenous territorial rights and accelerate the exploitation of the Amazon. Moreover, Flávio Bolsonaro’s alignment with Donald Trump offered little prospect for a continuation of Brazil’s international leadership for ambitious climate action. The threat was concrete, grounded in both the Bolsonaro family’s track record and Flávio’s personal campaign promises. Yet Brazil’s election was hardly a referendum on forests or climate policy. While forest protection attracts international attention, living costs, corruption and security dominate domestic concerns.
Following Lula da Silva’s remarkable electoral ‘remontada’, Brazil’s forests may sigh with relief. Lula’s re-election, with 51.8% of votes in the second ballot of Brazil’s presidential elections, averts a second Bolsonaro presidency that seemed to be looming after the first round of elections in early October. It would have threatened to dismantle environmental safeguards, weaken Indigenous territorial rights and accelerate the exploitation of the Amazon. Moreover, Flávio Bolsonaro’s alignment with Donald Trump offered little prospect for a continuation of Brazil’s international leadership for ambitious climate action. The threat was concrete, grounded in both the Bolsonaro family’s track record and Flávio’s personal campaign promises. Yet Brazil’s election was hardly a referendum on forests or climate policy. While forest protection attracts international attention, living costs, corruption and security dominate domestic concerns.
Planstadtprojekte werden den Ansprüchen nachhaltiger Stadtentwicklung häufig nicht gerecht, können allerdings einflussreichen Schatteninteressen dienen.
Bonn, 30. Oktober 2026. Die „Urban October“-Initiative von UN-Habitat steht in diesem Jahr unter dem Motto „Angemessener Wohnraum für alle“ und endet am Weltstädtetag (31. Oktober). Um den dringenden Bedarf an Wohnraum zu decken, erscheint der Bau von Planstädten „auf der grünen Wiese“ als attraktive Lösung. Allerdings tragen solche Projekte häufig nicht zur Bewältigung der Herausforderungen der Urbanisierung bei, dienen stattdessen aber verdeckten politischen Interessen – oft auf Kosten aktueller und zukünftiger Stadtbewohner*innen.
Im Mai 2026 bestätigten Medienberichte das Ende des Stadtvorhabens The Line. Saudi-Arabien stellte bis auf weiteres die Bauarbeiten an der 170 Kilometer langen Bandstadt bis mindestens 2030 ein. Obwohl das Projekt aufgrund seines ungewöhnlichen Ausmaßes und Designs viel internationale Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen hat, ist es nur ein Beispiel für ein umfassenderes Phänomen. Weltweit verfolgen Regierungen und Investoren über 150 Planstadtprojekte, vor allem in Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen. Diese Projekte basieren auf Masterplänen für bisher unbebaute Flächen. Sie beanspruchen häufig, einen Beitrag zur Lösung von Problemen wie Wohnungsnot, Verkehrsüberlastung, Umweltverschmutzung und die Anpassung an die Folgen des Klimawandels leisten zu können. Analysen deuten jedoch darauf hin, dass Planstadtprojekte diesen Versprechungen oft nicht gerecht werden, was zwei wichtige Fragen aufwirft: Warum werden Planstadtvorhaben dennoch in so großer Zahl verfolgt? Und wie sollten Entwicklungsorganisationen reagieren, wenn sie um Unterstützung für solche Projekte gebeten werden?
Die Idee, Planstädte zu errichten, ist eine Reaktion auf eine zentrale globale Herausforderung: Städtische Siedlungen wachsen in beispielloser Geschwindigkeit, insbesondere in Afrika und Asien. Zudem zeigen neue Städte wie Brasilia (Brasilien) und Abuja (Nigeria), dass solche Projekte gelingen können. In den letzten Jahren blieb jedoch eine beträchtliche Anzahl von Planstadtprojekten unvollendet, hatte mit geringer Auslastung zu kämpfen oder wurde ganz aufgegeben. Die Gründe, warum diese milliardenschweren Projekte ihre städtebaulichen Ziele oft verfehlen sind vielfältig. Fehler in der Planung, im Management und bei der Finanzierung spielen hier eine Rolle. Doch wie wir in einem neuen Policy Brief darlegen, sind Planstadtprojekte auch weiterhin attraktiv aufgrund von Schatteninteressen – versteckten politischen Absichten, die von einflussreichen Eliten verfolgt werden. Diese Interessen können zusätzlich zu oder im Gegensatz zu Zielen der Stadtentwicklung bestehen. Sofern Schatteninteressen faktisch Vorrang vor Stadtentwicklungszielen erhalten, dient dies zwar den verborgenen politischen Absichten, erhöht aber die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die offiziellen Stadtentwicklungsziele nicht erreicht werden.
Schatteninteressen umfassen unter anderem Bestrebungen, politische Macht durch die Stärkung klientelistischer Netzwerke zu festigen, etwa durch die Verteilung von Land oder die Vergabe von Aufträgen an gut vernetzte Baufirmen. Ägyptens neue Verwaltungshauptstadt ist ein Beispiel dafür. Die Zeitschrift The Economist beschreibt sie als staatliches Vorhaben, um Unternehmen mit engen Verbindungen zum Militär zu bestechen, was die ohnehin steigende Verschuldung und Inflation weiter in die Höhe treibt. Schatteninteressen können auch Bestrebungen umfassen, geopolitische Kontrolle über strategisch wichtige Gebiete durchzusetzen, wie im Fall von Forest City in Malaysia. Die Stadt war ein Versuch, im Rahmen der chinesischen „Belt and Road“-Initiative eine chinesische neokoloniale Enklave an einem strategisch wichtigen Standort zu errichten. Das Projekt wurde 2014 ins Leben gerufen und ist heute eine verlassene „Geisterstadt“. Darüber hinaus können Schatteninteressen auch dazu dienen, autoritäre Regime durch den Bau von vorgeblichen Ökostädten international zu legitimieren. Masdar City in Abu Dhabi wurde beispielsweise 2006 ins Leben gerufen, um das Emirat als weltweit führend im Bereich grüner Innovationen zu positionieren. Bis heute ist die Stadt kaum ausgelastet. Diese Beispiele zeigen, dass Planstadtprojekte eher nicht die Bedürfnisse von Stadtbewohner*innen erfüllen, wenn Regierungen sich dabei an Schatteninteressen statt an offiziellen Stadtentwicklungszielen orientieren.
Um auf die Herausforderungen der rasanten Urbanisierung zu reagieren, sind verschiedene Ansätze nötig, zu denen auch Planstädte gehören können. Doch die jüngsten Planstadtprojekte versprechen viel, weisen eine schlechte Erfolgsbilanz auf und werden oft durch Schatteninteressen beeinträchtigt. Solche Projekte bergen daher die Gefahr, erhebliche öffentliche und private Ressourcen zu vergeuden – und das in einer Zeit, in der Investitionen in städtische Infrastruktur dringend notwendig sind. Angesichts dieses Risikos sollten Entwicklungsorganisationen sorgfältig abwägen, ob sie Planstadtprojekte unterstützen. Idealerweise sollten solche Entscheidungen auf der Grundlage politökonomischer Analysen stattfinden, die auch mögliche Schatteninteressen berücksichtigen, sowie aufgrund der Analyse alternativer Stadtentwicklungsansätze. Dies ist insbesondere in autoritären Kontexten und in Ländern mit schwachen Institutionen wichtig, in denen Infrastrukturprojekte eher von Schatteninteressen vereinnahmt werden. Maßnahmen wie die schrittweise Modernisierung und Erweiterung bestehender städtischer Siedlungen sind in der Regel kosteneffizienter und kommen einem breiteren Spektrum von Stadtbewohner*innen zugute. Die Verwirklichung des Mottos „Angemessener Wohnraum für alle“ erfordert nicht zuletzt partizipativere Ansätze in Stadtplanung und -entwicklung, die ausdrücklich auch die mehr als eine Milliarde Menschen einbeziehen, die weltweit in informellen städtischen Siedlungen leben.