Al-Firdaws camp in Yemen's Aden Governate is hosting families displaced by the recent intensification of fighting. Credit: UNICEF/Mahmoud Alfilastini
By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Nov 20 2026 (IPS)
Over the past two months, the humanitarian situation in Yemen has deteriorated significantly following the eruption of hostilities between Houthi forces and the Yemeni troops backed by the Saudi-led coalition on September 3. Marked by persistent attacks on key infrastructure and densely populated areas—particularly in Taiz and Lahj—civilians continue to struggle amid heightened insecurity and mass displacement, with children bearing the brunt of the crisis.
On November 18, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported that at least 64 children have been killed and 64 others injured since September 3, warning that casualties are projected to soar as fighting escalates in Taiz and Lahj.
At least 7 schools and 28 health facilities, including five supported by UNICEF, have sustained damage since the wake of hostilities. On November 2, an attack on the UNICEF-supported Al-Suqyah Health Center in Lahj—which serves roughly 1,700 civilians—killed five people, including three health personnel.
Ongoing disruptions to essential services and accelerating displacement have prompted UN experts to call for an immediate end to hostilities, unimpeded humanitarian access, and compliance with international humanitarian law. During a press briefing at the UN Headquarters on November 19, Farhan Haq, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, told reporters that conditions are “getting worse by the day.”
“The rising number of children killed and injured in Yemen is devastating. It must stop,” said UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell. “Behind every number is a child whose life has been cut short or changed forever…Children must be protected, including their access to essential services such as healthcare, education, safe water, and food.”
Figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) show that roughly 350,000 individuals have been uprooted from their homes between June 7 and November 16, with UNICEF reporting that this includes approximately 174,000 children. More than 18,000 of those civilians were forced to flee in the last week alone, according to Haq, with nearly two-thirds coming from Taiz.
Many families have been displaced multiple times, often residing in host communities whose resources are already severely strained. The majority of these families currently reside in damaged buildings that serve as makeshift shelters, where they face limited access to food, water, healthcare, and protection services.
UNICEF has expressed particular concern over the humanitarian situation in Taiz City, underscoring persistent access constraints. The main road for humanitarian aid deliveries from Aden is closed, and alternative routes remain unreliable, depriving more than 800,000 civilians of basic services.
Water production has been slashed by nearly 50 percent, while food and fuel prices have nearly doubled. Continued shortages of electricity, fuel, medicines, and oxygen jeopardize lifesaving emergency healthcare interventions, including maternal and newborn care.
Across the most severely impacted regions, UNICEF has recorded over 1,160 school closures or disruptions to learning, affecting more than 500,000 students. Since the escalation, UNICEF and its partners have found that approximately one-third of all children recently screened showed signs of acute malnutrition.
Widespread hunger—compounded by overcrowded and unsanitary displacement shelters, a shortage of latrines, and limited access to safe water- has significantly raised the risk of disease.
Earlier this month, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher informed reporters that he is coordinating with Yemen’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Afrah Abdulaziz Al-Zouba, to restore humanitarian aid access. As of November 2, the UN and its partners had reached nearly 260,000 displaced civilians in Yemen with lifesaving support, though the vast scale of needs continues to outpace available resources.
“We have food and medicine ready to move,” said Fletcher. “Our asks are clear. Open the roads and let them through. Civilians cannot be held hostage by the fighting.”
In response, UNICEF has announced plans to expand its emergency response efforts to reach up to 560,000 people, positioning mobile health and nutrition teams at displacement sites and in vulnerable communities across Aden, Lahj, Taiz, Marib, and Abyan. UNICEF and its partners will also mobilize support for water and sanitation, as well as psychosocial care and case management for children, particularly those who were separated from their families.
IPS UN Bureau Report
Credit: Collection Maykova / Shutterstock
By Taiyi Sun
Nov 20 2026 (IPS)
On November 19, in Shenzhen, the leaders of China, the United States, and Russia gathered for their first-ever face-to-face trilateral summit. The meeting is historic before a single word is exchanged. Whether it becomes consequential, however, depends on what the three leaders choose to accomplish.
A New Yalta—or Something Fundamentally Different?
Comparisons of this trilateral meeting with the 1945 Yalta Conference are inevitable but potentially misleading. At Yalta, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin represented wartime allies negotiating the final stages of a common struggle and the foundations of a postwar order. Washington sought Soviet participation in the war against Japan and support for the emerging United Nations. In return, Moscow secured promises concerning southern Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, Outer Mongolia, and strategic privileges in northeastern China.
Shenzhen presents a fundamentally different configuration. Unlike the wartime allies at Yalta, the three participants in Shenzhen are bound together by a complex mixture of strategic competition and cooperation. Nevertheless, each has interests that could tempt observers to interpret the summit through a Yalta-style lens of spheres of influence.
Russia would welcome recognition of its territorial claims over the four Ukrainian regions it declared annexed in 2022—Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—alongside guarantees against Ukraine’s integration into Western security structures. Washington, meanwhile, has increasingly asserted its primacy in the Western Hemisphere through what has become known as the ‘Donroe Doctrine’, seeking to limit competing powers’ strategic footholds in Latin America. Trump also hopes to enlist Moscow and Beijing in efforts to end the Iran war.
China has its own regional priorities. Beijing would prefer reduced American military pressure in East Asia, greater Russian sensitivity to Chinese interests in Central Asia, and manageable competition over influence in North Korea. The Taiwan question remains central to Beijing’s long-term political objectives, although it is unlikely to be meaningfully resolved through negotiations among the three leaders.
These interests are not necessarily compatible. Competing ambitions for spheres of influence do not imply that a grand bargain is either achievable or desirable. Unlike Yalta, Shenzhen is not expected to produce a formal agreement delineating spheres of influence or granting strategic privileges. Any private discussion of such arrangements would confront substantial political, legal, and practical obstacles, not least the objections of governments and populations whose futures would be affected.
Strategic Stability Without a Grand Bargain
The more realistic purpose of the summit is to promote strategic stability among the world’s three most consequential military powers.
Trump’s preference for personal diplomacy with leaders commanding large territories and formidable nuclear arsenals makes the gathering particularly attractive to him. For Xi and Putin, direct engagement offers opportunities to reinforce their international standing, clarify strategic intentions, and reduce uncertainty.
Even the anticipated photograph of the three leaders has diplomatic value. At a time of prolonged conflicts and intensifying geopolitical competition, visibly demonstrating a willingness to communicate can reassure international audiences that confrontation is not inevitable.
China and the United States have already embraced the concept of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability.” Shenzhen could become an opportunity to extend elements of that approach into a trilateral framework without pretending that the three bilateral relationships are equally cooperative or confrontational.
Nuclear arms control offers an especially revealing test. Since New START expired in February 2026, Washington and Moscow have lacked a functioning bilateral treaty limiting their strategic nuclear arsenals. Trump has expressed interest in a broader arrangement involving China. Yet the asymmetry remains enormous. According to SIPRI, the United States and Russia together possess approximately 86 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads, while China’s arsenal remains substantially smaller. Beijing consequently has little incentive to accept equivalent numerical constraints. Nevertheless, China’s willingness to participate in informal discussions, without accepting immediate reduction commitments, could itself constitute meaningful progress. Strategic dialogue need not begin with identical obligations.
The most substantive agreements may still emerge from bilateral rather than trilateral negotiations. In particular, the China–US relationship requires further clarification of what constructive strategic stability means in practice. Previous presidential meetings have established broad political understandings, but detailed implementation still depends heavily on negotiations among officials between summits.
Trump’s participation in the Quad summit and engagements with ASEAN leaders in Manila also provide a useful comparison. The relative time devoted to these meetings and the Shenzhen gathering, as well as their substance and diplomatic atmosphere, may reveal how his administration balances great-power accommodation with its traditional Indo-Pacific partnerships.
Turning a Historic Photograph into Lasting Stability
For Shenzhen to achieve significance beyond symbolism, several practical steps deserve consideration.
First, the three governments should establish a regular strategic-stability consultation mechanism. Initially informal and without binding obligations, it could facilitate communication on nuclear doctrine, crisis prevention, military incidents, and emerging strategic technologies. The objective should be to prevent unintended escalation rather than demand immediate agreement on fundamental disputes.
Second, nuclear negotiations should proceed on differentiated tracks. Washington and Moscow should take primary responsibility for restoring verifiable limits and transparency mechanisms, while Beijing could participate in discussions on nuclear risk reduction, early-warning communication, and confidence-building measures. This would recognize China’s comparatively smaller arsenal without excluding it from the broader conversation.
Third, conflict resolution must remain inclusive. Discussions concerning Ukraine and Iran could help identify possible areas of convergence, but no durable settlement can be negotiated over the heads of the directly affected parties. The three powers should facilitate broader diplomatic processes rather than attempt to substitute their own understandings for them.
Finally, summit diplomacy should be institutionalized rather than personalized. Working-level follow-up, agreed communication channels, and measurable confidence-building initiatives would help translate presidential understandings into practical arrangements. December’s G20 summit in Florida could provide another opportunity to assess progress, although another three-way encounter remains uncertain.
Shenzhen will not—and should not—be another Yalta. The international system is too interconnected, the principle of sovereignty too important, and other states’ interests too consequential for three leaders to redraw the global order around a negotiating table. Its more constructive historical legacy would be to demonstrate that great powers can manage strategic rivalry without demanding exclusive control over their respective neighborhoods. The success of Shenzhen should therefore be measured not by how much territory or influence the three leaders can divide, but by how much confrontation they can prevent.
Related articles:
Managing Competition: The New Logic of US–China Summitry
Beyond the Trade Truce: AI and the Next Phase of China–US Risk Management
Before Washington: Xi and the Contest Over Global Leadership
Taiyi Sun (Ph.D., Political Science, Boston University) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Christopher Newport University.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.
IPS UN Bureau
Supporters of India's main opposition party shout slogans while women police officers attempt to stop them during a protest in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, India, on 17 October 2026. Credit: Firdous Nazir/NurPhoto via AFP
By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Nov 20 2026 (IPS)
India’s Gen Z cockroach movement has already forced the resignation of the education minister. Now it’s part of a mass mobilisation demanding the Hindu nationalist government reverse and be held accountable for the deletion of some 130 million names from the electoral rolls.
Last year, the Election Commission of India embarked on what it calls a Special Intensive Revision of the electoral rolls, which it says is needed to remove duplicate and ineligible names, including those of people who’ve died. With the task completed in 30 of India’s 36 states and centrally administered territories, around an eighth of the electorate has been struck off. Millions have complained that they’re eligible voters who’ve been disenfranchised.
The purge threatens to turn the universal franchise into a selective privilege, violating a fundamental principle of democracy, that every adult citizen has the same right to vote. Women are disproportionately affected, because many move states when they marry, complicating the paper trail. Muslims, long vilified by the ruling Bharatiya Janata party (BJP), are disproportionately impacted. In Bihar state, around 33 per cent of final-stage deletions were of Muslims, even though they make up roughly 17 per cent of the state’s population.
The suspicion is that the changes will benefit the BJP and Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Deletions could swing elections. In May, the BJP won the election in West Bengal state, previously an opposition stronghold, after 9.1 million names, over 10 per cent of the electorate, were removed from the roll. In some Muslim-majority constituencies, close to half of voters were removed from the roll.
Cockroaches rise
India’s cockroach movement arose in response to an insult. In May, the country’s Chief Justice, Surya Kant, told a courtroom that unemployed young people who protested and spoke out on social media were like cockroaches. Communications strategist Abhijeet Dipke posed a simple question: what if all the cockroaches came together? The answer was a movement of millions, organised around the satirical Cockroach Janta Party.
The movement found its galvanising issue in the leak of the national medical college entrance exam paper, likely the act of corrupt officials in return for bribes. Cockroach movement protesters camped out for weeks in Delhi, until the authorities unleashed violence, beating them with batons and wooden sticks, firing teargas and arresting many. Public revulsion at the violence forced the government to hold talks with the movement, and Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan quit.
On 2 October the cockroach movement took part in nationwide protests, demanding the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar, a criminal investigation, reinstatement of deleted voters, a review of recent state elections and independent selection of election commissioners.
This time, the cockroach movement’s protests have formed part of a broader campaign. Civil society organisations have been raising the issue for some time, and established student movements, emerging leftist student leaders and opposition parties are active and vocal. The Congress party, once India’s dominant political force, has organised protests, including one attended by tens of thousands in Delhi on 1 November.
Civil society groups have also taken practical steps to help the disenfranchised, setting up helpdesks near places where excluded groups are concentrated so people can file petitions and gather the documents needed to get their vote reinstated. These efforts could make a crucial difference, as without the capacity to appeal, many risk losing their vote by default.
Stare lashes out
The government has made clear it has no intention of walking back the changes by mobilising large-scale force.
Ahead of the protest on 2 October, police barricaded Jantar Mantar, the main protest site, and set up checkpoints around the city. Police invoked section 133 of the Indian Citizen Safety Code, which bans gatherings of over four people, the use of slogans and speeches and other common protest activities, and authorities suspended internet services close to the protest site. When people protested regardless, police detained around 1,000, including student and political leaders. Police also banned a protest in Mumbai that same day.
The crackdown escalated on 10 October, when police detained several thousands, among them Dipke, detained as he arrived at Delhi airport from Mumbai, along with other leading Cockroach Janta Party figures. Authorities deployed around 30,000 officers, sealed Delhi’s borders, shut down public transport routes and stationed anti-riot vehicles with teargas launchers along major roads. Police ordered Delhi hotels to refuse customers, told Uber drivers not to drop people off near protest sites and said they were tracking food delivery services in case they were used to supply protesters. Following the protest, police ended Jantar Mantar’s designation as a protest site.
Police have twice detained Congress party leader Rahul Gandhi and put one of India’s most popular YouTubers, Dhruv Rathee, under house arrest. They’ve detained journalists covering the protests. Police have met subsequent protests with the same responses of barricades, transport restrictions, internet shutdowns and mass arrests. Still, the protests continue.
The state’s hostile response is part of a broader pattern. In recent years it has passed draconian laws that enable it to hold activists in lengthy pretrial detention, restrict civil society funding and force organisations to close, while police routinely use violence against protests. Having made it harder for people to speak out, organise and protest, now the government is taking away their right to vote.
Wider struggles
If the protest movement wins again, the repercussions will be felt beyond India. The story of India’s cockroach movement has travelled the world, inspiring others, as part of a wider wave of Gen Z-led protests that has unfolded in many countries. Young people are rising up against corruption, economies that fail them and out-of-touch politicians, and they’re having an impact. A student movement has just won power in Serbia, while high school protests in France have forced the government to concede several demands.
A Modi climbdown would offer further proof that mass organising and protesting, spearheaded by Gen Z, can make a difference. The Indian government should swallow its pride and offer dialogue instead of violence. The protesters have shown how much they value democracy, and made clear they intend to keep going until the damage the government has caused it is undone.
Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org.
Valepi Banda at a protest at COP31 in Antalya, Turkey. Credit: Farai Shawn Matiashe/IPS
By Farai Shawn Matiashe
ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 20 2026 (IPS)
Valepi Banda still remembers the day she lost dozens of chickens in June last year in Zambia’s capital, Lusaka, after the heating system failed due to power cuts.
The southern African nation was experiencing load-shedding schedules lasting eight hours a day, and the 22-year-old poultry farmer had no backup power.
Zambia, which relies on hydropower plants, was struggling after consecutive droughts caused low water levels in Lake Kariba, its largest, triggering a power crisis.
“We created a timetable for load shedding, but they never followed it. It made me sluggish,” Banda, a student at a university in Zambia, told IPS at the United Nations climate summit in Antalya, Turkey.
“I was raising some chickens in the backyard. And because broilers need heating every time, most of the chickens died.”
Banda has since stopped rearing chickens and is now keeping goats.
“I stopped chicken farming because it was too risky, and I had no buffer,” she said.
Countries like Zambia that generate about 90% of their electricity from renewables are banking on the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), an UNFCCC framework created at COP30 in Belém, Brazil, to support workers, communities, and countries shifting toward low-carbon economies.
For Zambia and Kenya, the challenge involves not only shutting down coal-fired power plants but also expanding renewables and building electricity infrastructure to provide access to affordable electricity for poor communities.
They also want fossil-dependent countries to shift away from dirty fuels because it is their vulnerable communities who suffer from extreme weather events like floods and droughts.
Parties at COP31 in the resort of the Mediterranean country are negotiating about BAM’s operational and governance details.
Activists demand a Just Transition Mechanism at COP31 in Antalya, Turkey. Credit: Farai Shawn Matiashe/IPS
Deadlock
Developing countries want a new institution to coordinate global “just transition” efforts as nations shift away from fossil fuels as agreed at COP30 in Belém.
But developed countries are opposing this proposal, insisting that the UNFCCC coordinate the just transition.
Brandon Wu, director of policy and campaigns at ActionAid USA, said that there is no progress on the just transition.
“This is frustrating because that is what they agreed to last year. Certainly, they are worried that it will require resourcing,” he said.
“They are afraid that a powerful just transition mechanism will require some financing.”
Nona Chai of the Just Transition Alliance, a network of environmental justice groups and local unions tackling polluting extractive industries that harm communities and workers, said the European Union, United Kingdom and Japan are trying to weaken the Just Transition Mechanism and are running away from their responsibility to fund Global South countries.
“That is not acceptable because the whole reason civil society proposed the BAM in the first place is that existing resources are insufficient for a just transition,” she said.
“It is sad. It is shameful. It should not be happening. They are reversing course on all the progress that was made on the Belem-Antalya Mechanism at COP 30 last year. It was a historic win for our movements.”
Global South Demands Finance, Technical Support for Shifting From Fossil Fuels
Wu said they want a Just Transition Mechanism that provides support for developing nations.
“Whether it is technical support or capacity building. It does not all have to be just money. Money is part of it, but a lot of it is technical support and capacity building for how we design just transition plans, how we plan for changes in the economy so that we are not leaving workers behind,” he said.
Chai said that the funding must come as grants to ensure that Global South countries avoid being trapped in debt.
“We need a mechanism that will actually promote grant-based, non-debt-creating funding for Global South countries and affected groups,” she said.
Developing nations have often resorted to debt to fund renewable energy projects, adaptation and other mitigation projects. This has left many countries in debt distress.
In 2022, public debt in Africa reached USD 1.8 trillion, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
For Banda, she wants a Just Transition Mechanism that can help her country expand renewables to complement hydro power plants exposed to droughts.
“We are looking at how best we can supplement our electricity generation because we are a country that depends on hydroelectricity. And because of the repeated effects of climate change and the drought, we have seen a decrease in the amount that we generate,” she said.
Power crisis affects small businesses, and just transition will help them access affordable clean energy, Banda said.
Africa possesses world-class solar, wind, and hydropower potential, alongside critical minerals needed for clean technologies.
It contains 60% of the world’s best solar resources, yet accounts for only about 1% of installed solar PV, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).
But about 600 million people lack electricity access, with half of them living in three countries, namely Nigeria, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, according to the IEA.
Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for roughly 85% of the global population lacking electricity.
Nearly a billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa lack access to modern and clean cooking solutions.
Banda said that on a policy level, the government is trying to diversify its energy mix, but a lack of funding is a setback.
Authorities expect water levels to drop again this year in Lake Kariba, shared between Zimbabwe and Zambia, because of the anticipated El Niño.
“I am already anxious. It is triggering. I do not know how bad it will be,” she said.
IPS UN Bureau Report
By Mohammad Zaman
DHAKA, Bangladesh, Nov 20 2026 (IPS)
The world’s highest court has delivered a historic legal and moral victory. It does not get any more definitive than this. On 19 November 2026, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State. It is the first time the court has held a state responsible for committing genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention. By a 9–6 majority, the judges also found that Myanmar failed to prevent and punish genocide. The ICJ has spoken for the Rohingya. The ruling is final, and there is nowhere left to appeal. However, turning this verdict into a safe journey home will take political muscle that the court itself does not have. The international community must act now.
Dr Mohammad Zaman
A verdict seven years in the makingThe case was brought in November 2019 by The Gambia, a small West African state with no direct connection to the crimes, backed by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The court examined the military’s 2017 “clearance operations” in detail: an estimated 10,000 Rohingya killed, and nearly 400 villages, about 40 per cent of those in three northern townships, partly or wholly destroyed before being bulldozed and built over. It concluded that Myanmar’s security forces intentionally killed members of the group, caused them serious bodily and mental harm, and imposed measures intended to prevent births.
Reading the judgment, ICJ President Yuji Iwasawa said: “The evidence of brutal acts of sexual violence and the targeting of children for violence in Rohingya communities also supports an inference that there was a desire to destroy the foundations of the group. The systematic nature of these actions further indicates a reasonable inference that Myanmar acted with genocidal intent.”
A legal and moral victory
The legal weight of this ruling is hard to overstate. In the 2007 Bosnia case, the court found that Serbia had failed to prevent the Srebrenica genocide but stopped short of holding it responsible for committing genocide. This time there is no such hedge. The court also made clear that genocidal intent can coexist with other aims, including military ones. That undercuts Myanmar’s long-standing claim that it was simply fighting an insurgency.
The moral victory matters just as much. For decades, the Rohingya have been denied citizenship, confined to camps and dismissed by Myanmar’s generals. Now the world’s highest court has put their suffering on the authoritative record. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called the ruling a “powerful recognition of the Rohingya victims of genocide”. That recognition cannot be undone, and it is a form of justice in its own right.
What the court ordered, and what it cannot do
The court’s directives are binding. Myanmar must stop any ongoing violations and pass legislation giving full effect to the Convention. It must investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible, and give guarantees that the atrocities will not happen again. It must also provide restitution, including the “safe, voluntary and dignified return” of displaced Rohingya to their homes and the reunification of families, and compensate the victims. Myanmar has two years to report on what it has done.
In practical terms, little is likely to change in the short run. The ICJ has no police force. Nor does it try individuals: it rules on disputes between states. The fate of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who oversaw the 2017 campaign and now heads the state, lies with the International Criminal Court. The ICC prosecutor’s pending warrant application against him now carries greater weight.
Enforcement and the politics of the veto
If Myanmar ignores the judgment, just as The Gambia says it failed to comply with the court’s 2020 provisional measures, The Gambia can take the matter to the UN Security Council under Article 94 of the UN Charter. This is where justice meets geopolitics. Any one of the five permanent members can veto action, and history offers little comfort. When the court ruled against the United States in the Nicaragua case in 1986, Washington vetoed the resolutions calling for compliance. In 2007, China and Russia vetoed a draft resolution on Myanmar’s human rights record.
China holds the key
No country matters more here than China. Beijing is Myanmar’s most important patron. It has shielded Naypyidaw at the UN, invested heavily in Rakhine and has acted as a broker between the junta and ethnic armed groups. Its priority is stability along its economic corridor to the Bay of Bengal, not accountability.
The situation on the ground complicates matters further. The junta has lost much of Rakhine State to the Arakan Army, and Myanmar has been in turmoil for years. When the ICJ orders a safe return to the Rohingya’s “place of residence”, Naypyidaw can simply say it no longer controls the territory. Any credible repatriation will therefore have to be negotiated with both the junta and the Arakan Army, most likely with Beijing as guarantor. China wants Rakhine stable and its investments secure. If Dhaka and its partners can show that an orderly, rights-based return serves that goal, China’s interests may line up with the court’s orders.
What Bangladesh should do now
Bangladesh has carried the heaviest burden of a crisis it did not create. About 1.4 million Rohingya now live in the camps around Cox’s Bazar. Since 2017, repatriation talks have produced little. The verdict gives Dhaka a kind of leverage it has never had before. It should use the verdict to work with allies to find out a workable solution.
First, make the judgment the baseline. Every repatriation deal should meet the court’s standard: a safe, voluntary and dignified return to the Rohingya’s original homes, not to transit camps, with a clear path to citizenship.
Second, talk to whoever controls the ground. Dhaka should engage the Arakan Army pragmatically, alongside Naypyidaw, so that any agreement can be carried out in Rakhine.
Third, work with China, not around it. Bangladesh should press Beijing to guarantee a deal and present a stable, rights-based return as good for China’s investments.
Fourth, build a coalition for compliance. Bangladesh should work with The Gambia, the OIC, the 11 states that intervened in the case, ASEAN and Japan to keep Myanmar’s compliance before the UN General Assembly and Security Council, and to hold Myanmar to its two-year reporting deadline.
Finally, keep the Rohingya at the centre. Refugees must have a voice in any negotiation. Reparations must reach those living in Bangladesh, and humanitarian funding, education and livelihoods in the camps must be protected while talks continue.
From verdict to homecoming
The ICJ has done its part. It has named the crime, identified the state responsible and set out what justice requires. The verdict will not, by itself, send a single family home. But it changes the terms of every conversation about the Rohingya from this day on. Whether it becomes a turning point or a footnote now depends on what allies and states do next, starting with Bangladesh.
Dr. Mohammad Zaman has written extensively on the Rohingya crisis since 2017. His recent edited (co-editors Robert Anderson and Kawser Ahmed) book is titled Rohingya Stories: History and Geopolitics in a Multipolar World (Springer 2025).
IPS UN Bureau
Two surgeons perform a surgery on their patient, Miracle, in the operating room at the National Cleft Care Center in Kumasi, Ghana. Credit: Smile Train
By Nkeiruka Obi
LAGOS, Nigeria, Nov 20 2026 (IPS)
In too many communities across our continent, a baby born with a cleft lip or palate is met with fear instead of a plan. Some families are told the child is cursed. Some mothers are even forced out of their homes. Yet a cleft is one of the most common and treatable conditions in medicine. A safe operation, done early, lets a child eat, speak and grow up with a bright future.
So when that child goes untreated, the problem is not biology. It is a sign that something is missing: the surgeon, the anesthetist, the nurse, the working operating room, the reliable electricity, the road to the right hospital. In this way, cleft is a bellwether for the strength of health systems overall.
Across sub-Saharan Africa, 93% of people cannot get safe, affordable surgery and anaesthesia when they need it, compared with under 4% in wealthier regions. In Ethiopia alone, roughly five million needed operations go undone each year.
From November 19 to 21, health leaders, surgeons, researchers and partners from across Africa will meet in Addis Ababa for the fourth Pan-African Surgical Healthcare Forum (PASHeF). Its goal is ambitious and overdue: a continental action framework for surgical care.
A doctor measures the nutritional development of a cleft patient at a hospital in Tanzania. Credit: Smile Train
Surgery is health care, not a luxury
For decades, surgery was treated as something that could wait until vaccines, bed nets, and clinics were in place. As a result of that longstanding underinvestment, an estimated 93 million Africans need surgical care every year, yet only about 5% receive it.
The World Health Assembly has recognized emergency and essential surgery and anaesthesia as a core part of universal health coverage. Invest in surgical capability, and you strengthen the whole hospital’s ability to deliver across a wide range of needs: emergency care, safe childbirth, trauma, cancer.
Ethiopia took that commitment seriously. In 2016, it became one of the first countries to write a national surgical plan, Saving Lives Through Safe Surgery (SaLTS).
What we have learned
The challenges were familiar: leadership changes, too little reliable data, and no dedicated budget to reach the whole country. A study of the plan’s rollout found that government ownership was the most important ingredient for success.
Experience from outside government points the same way. Over 25 years, Smile Train’s approach has been to support local teams working inside national systems rather than fly in visiting surgeons. Those teams have now performed nearly 250,000 free cleft surgeries across Africa, more than 46,000 of them in Ethiopia since 2007. Three lessons stand out.
Build with government, not beside it. In Kumasi, Ghana, the Ministry of Health, Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital and the Ghana Cleft Foundation co-created the National Cleft Care Center. Government clinicians staff it, and cleft surgery there has gone from one day a week to every day.
Train together. When Africa’s surgical colleges agreed on a single cleft surgery curriculum, it spread across the continent in English, French and Portuguese.
Fix the basics. A well-equipped theatre is useless in a blackout, yet families are still asked to bring diesel for the generator. Solar systems installed with Kids Operating Room now power more than 85 children’s operating theatres in 28 countries, three of which are public hospitals in Ethiopia.
Together they show what works: government ownership, a local workforce, data that is tracked, and infrastructure that actually runs.
What the framework must do
The Addis Ababa forum should commit African governments to four key things:
A year ago, the African Union and Africa CDC unveiled the Health Security and Sovereignty Agenda, a blueprint for African countries to build stronger health institutions, finance health from their own resources and grow local capacity. Surgery is where that ambition is tested: a country that can staff, equip, power and pay for its own operating theatres can meet its people’s needs on its own terms.
These steps can have a meaningful impact now and for future generations. As long as children are born, some will be born with a cleft. A poor child in a rural district deserves the same chance of a safe operation as an affluent child in a capital city. This week in Addis Ababa, Africa’s leaders can commit to making that happen.
Nkeiruka Obi is Vice President and Regional Director, Africa, Smile Train
IPS UN Bureau
COP31 President Murat Kurum, COP31 President of Negotiations Chris Bowen and UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell address the media after the COP31 Presidency has released the new draft text of the cover decision. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
By Stella Paul
ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 19 2026 (IPS)
Civil society organisations and delegates from climate-vulnerable countries have sharply criticised the latest draft of the Presidency-led cover decision at the UN climate summit. They accuse negotiators of removing commitments on fossil fuels and failing to provide concrete climate finance, as the talks enter their final hours.
Released by the COP31 Presidency on November 19, the second draft of the cover text removes all direct references to fossil fuels and drops proposed roadmaps for moving away from them. Both had appeared in an earlier version released on November 16.
Instead, the new draft proposes a target to increase electricity’s share of final energy consumption to 35 percent by 2035. It also launches the Antalya Compact for Energy Efficient Buildings and retains unresolved, bracketed language supporting carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR).
Although the draft reaffirms the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature goal and sets up new dialogues on oceans and mountains, climate advocates say the removal of key commitments marks a major step backwards on cutting emissions and ensuring fairness for countries most affected by climate change.
Accusations Over Fossil Fuel Omissions
Speaking at a press conference after the draft was released, Andreas Sieber, Head of Political Strategy at 350.org, strongly criticised the removal of fossil fuel language and singled out Chris Bowen, COP31 President of Negotiations and Australia’s Climate Change and Energy Minister.
“The COP President, Bowen, seems to be some kind of spineless fossil fuel bro, after what we’ve seen in the latest cover decision draft,” Sieber said, pointing to the economic ties between the summit’s co-hosts.
“He cut out, and it seems to be quite conveniently, any reference to fossil fuels. We know that Australia is one of the top fossil fuel exporters in the world. They’re currently number two in coal exports, about to become number one. If there’s one thing that connects these two presidencies… it’s the coal trade between Australia and Turkey.”
Sieber said the coal traded between the two countries since the Paris Agreement represents four times Ethiopia’s annual carbon dioxide emissions. Ethiopia is due to host COP32.
He also called for the removal of language promoting carbon capture technologies, specifically demanding that paragraph 36(h) be “killed.” If countries cannot agree on fossil fuel phase-out roadmaps through the formal negotiations, he urged the presidency to continue pushing for them outside the negotiating rooms.
Stalled Negotiations and Distractions
Other climate advocates warned that the Presidency’s cover text is diverting attention from the formal negotiations, particularly discussions on how to protect workers and communities as countries move away from fossil fuels.
Natasha Green, an advisor and specialist in international climate diplomacy and energy transition at E3G Australia, pointed to the absence of a mechanism to coordinate a fair transition away from fossil fuels.
“There will be a fight also to advance the just transition mechanism. It hasn’t been mentioned in the cover decision text, but it was a priority for those who wanted to say, yes, we need to look to ban fossil fuels,” Green said.
She added that progress on the mechanism was “being stalled by negotiating tactics from the European Union, from Australia, and from other countries that don’t want to codify obligations around just transition and internationalise them.”
Carla Daniela Maass Wolfenson of Ecuador’s Sacred Head Waters Alliance also questioned the process behind the cover decision.
“We came here not to discuss this text,” she said, arguing that the cover decision had effectively created a parallel negotiating process. In her view, this was taking attention away from the formal discussions on emissions cuts, just transition and climate finance.
Vulnerable Nations Await Concrete Finance
On adaptation, the November 19 draft launches the Antalya-to-Addis Ababa Roadmap for Adaptation and Resilience Finance. However, it does not set a specific funding target or baseline year for tripling adaptation finance.
For delegates from countries facing conflict and severe climate impacts, the absence of clear financial commitments has serious consequences for people already struggling to cope with multiple crises.
Samer Kalbouneh, head of the Palestinian delegation, stressed the urgent need for financial and technological support to rebuild Gaza’s shattered infrastructure.
“Eighty percent of our productive land is now unproductive because of the war. We are completely dependent for energy on Israel and our water supply systems are broken,” Kalbouneh told IPS.
“What we aim for at this moment is to stress the importance of letting the environmental finance continue, from developed countries to fragile and more affected countries like Palestine, and especially in Gaza,” he added.
Fadumo Abdilahi, gender focal point for the Somali delegation, described how women in her country face overlapping crises, including drought, flooding and violence by the extremist group Al-Shabaab. At the same time, many women continue to support their families and local economies through small businesses and subsistence farming.
“Year after year, we come to the COP, hoping that things will change, that vulnerable communities like us will get finance that will help women become more climate resilient,” Abdilahi told IPS.
Official Defence and Final Push
At a press conference shortly after the draft was released, COP31 officials leading the negotiations defended the process, maintaining that the complex talks were still focused on delivering action.
Minister Chris Bowen described the summit as the “COP of implementation and acceleration”. He emphasised the need for concrete plans to drive an “irreversible global transition towards low greenhouse gas emissions” and keep the 1.5°C goal within reach.
UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell acknowledged that addressing the many issues being negotiated across different rooms was “very complex.” However, he stressed that “these are crucial days ahead for climate cooperation. And we have no time to lose.”
Despite the strong criticism of the latest draft, some observers believe there is still time to secure a stronger outcome before the negotiations end.
Greene of E3G said the language on moving away from fossil fuels could still make it back into the final text in the remaining hours.
“They have the diplomatic skill to pull this through,” she said.
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Rohingya refugees in Jamtoli camp, Bangladesh, watch the live hearing of the International Court of Justice in The Hague convicting the state of Myanmar of genocide. Credit: Mohammed Zonaid/IPS
By Mohammed Zonaid and Sara Perria
COX’S BAZAR, Bangladesh & THE HAGUE, Nov 19 2026 (IPS)
Cheers and celebrations erupted in mass refugee camps across the border from Myanmar on Thursday as a landmark world court ruling found the military regime had committed genocide against its Rohingya minority.
Crowds gathered around screens set up in Jamtoli, one of a complex of camps of bamboo and tarpaulin shelters for over one million refugees in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, to listen to the live reading of the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.
After nearly three hours of reading the court’s final statement, ICJ president Judge Yuji Iwasawa of Japan finally pronounced the first-ever ruling by an international court convicting a state of genocide.
By nine votes to six, he said, the judges of the 80-year-old court established by the UN Charter found that Myanmar had “committed genocide against the Rohingya group in northern Rakhine state”.
Crowds cheered and applauded across Cox’s Bazar as interpreters used loudhailers to convey the message they had waited years for.
“It’s a historic moment for the Rohingya and for the people of Myanmar, for all people who are suffering under different crises around the world. Today the ICJ also recognised the truth and reality, and the world wins today,” declared Mohammed Tofile, a 30-year-old activist.
“It is proof that the world stands against impunity, dictatorship, and brutality. It’s a starting point for accountability,” he told IPS, thanking Gambia for bringing the case to the ICJ, supporters of the Rohingya across the world, and Bangladesh for hosting over one million refugees.
The court’s investigations, hearings and deliberations had taken seven years to complete, focusing mostly on the events of 2017 when the Myanmar military launched what it called “clearance operations” in Rakhine state following attacks by Rohingya militants on police units.
The ICJ’s genocide verdict is sure to trigger widespread debate as the nine judges upholding the conviction found there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer genocidal “intent”, an essential element in a decision under the 1948 Genocide Convention.
Some defenders of Israel, and particularly members of the US administration, had warned the 15 ICJ judges not to “lower the bar” in seeking a genocide conviction, fearing a precedent would be set. Israel is facing a case before the ICJ, brought by South Africa, over Gaza.
In reaching 13 separate rulings, the ICJ also found that Myanmar had violated its obligations to prevent genocide committed by individuals alongside its security forces, that it had covered up evidence of crimes of genocide, and that it had failed to enact legislation to prevent genocide, nor had it punished perpetrators.
Specifically, the court found that the numbers of civilians among the more than 10,000 people killed far outweighed combatants and that civilians were killed as they fled to Bangladesh among a total of 700,000 crossing the border.
Sexual violence committed by armed forces and others was “pervasive and systematic”, gang rapes of women were commonplace, and credible estimates indicated that over 730 children under the age of five had been killed. Boys and men were executed. Nearly 400 villages in northern Rakhine were partially or totally destroyed.
During the 2017 “clearance operations”, hate speech against the Rohingya by Min Aung Hlaing – the then military commander who elevated himself to the presidency this year – was systematically disseminated, while the military whipped up anti-Rohingya diatribes through sympathisers on Facebook.
The court set the violence in the context of decades of discrimination and stigmatisation against the mostly Moslem community in predominantly Buddhist Myanmar, with the intent of reducing their numbers. A 1982 law stripped most Rohingya of their citizenship; restrictions in the main township were placed on marriage and childbirth; access to higher education and freedom of movement were denied or curbed.
In another historic first – one that also exposes the court’s lack of powers of enforcement – the ICJ ordered Myanmar to make reparations by facilitating the safe and voluntary return of refugees to their homes, or failing that, compensation. Myanmar was given two years to report back with the ICJ to determine modalities and amounts.
But the reality is that the Myanmar regime has lost control over most of Rakhine to ethnic Arakan insurgents in the civil war that erupted after Min Aung Hlaing ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government in 2021. Now installed as president, he travels freely these days among neighbouring countries and between his main allies, China and Russia. The US is also engaging with his regime.
The ICJ’s mandate allows it to adjudicate only cases between states, not prosecute individuals, and must rely on the UN Security Council and political pressure to back up its rulings. The UK expressed its support on Thursday and expelled Myanmar’s defence attaché.
The Trump administration had already expressed its displeasure with the ICJ judges before they issued their rulings. The powerful juxtaposition of President Trump joining on Thursday with Russia’s Vladimir Putin in the summit hosted by President Xi Jinping of China did not go unnoticed, with the reform of the UN on the agenda.
Despite all this, the Rohingya know this is their moment of vindication.
“Today the world’s highest court has confirmed what the Rohingya people have said for years: what happened to us was genocide,” said Mohammed Amin, head of the Rohingya Centre of the United Kingdom. He attended the hearing in The Hague with his mother, who carried him out of Rakhine aged three.
“To hear it is very emotional. We were denied for so long, and now the law has recognised the truth, and no one can deny it any more. This judgment belongs to the families in the camps, to those still living in Arakan, and to those we lost,” he told IPS.
Sabekun Naher, founder of Arakan Network for Women’s Rights, was 11 years old when she fled the carnage in Myanmar with her family, her grandfather dying along the way. She told IPS in Cox’s Bazar that she felt goosebumps and cried while listening to the ICJ ruling.
“As a Rohingya woman, I feel incredibly happy. I am sure many other Rohingya women feel the same way, perhaps even more deeply,” she said.
She earnestly thanked The Gambia for its support and the ICJ judges. “Until today, there seemed to be confusion and disagreement over whether the atrocities committed against us constituted genocide and whether we, as Rohingya, truly belong to Myanmar. Today, I feel that this confusion has been clarified and addressed,” she said.
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Investing in virtual networks permanently strengthens local health capacity, which is ultimately our strongest protection against future outbreaks. Credit: WHO
By Caroline Kisia
NAIROBI, Nov 19 2026 (IPS)
Last week, on 11 November, Kenya discharged its last Ebola patient, just 37 days after the country recorded the first-ever case of the virus in its territory. If no new cases emerge over the next six weeks, Kenya will be officially declared Ebola free on 23 December. So far, zero community transmission has been recorded in the country.
That’s an outcome that Kenya can be proud of, and it’s not just a case of good luck. In June – shortly after the Ebola outbreak had been declared in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but months before Kenya saw its first case – Kenya’s National Public Health Institute (KNPHI) invited a Ugandan epidemiologist to teach some 200 Kenyan health workers the importance of investigating every health alert and looking into every unexplained death.
Using simple digital tools to both support and elevate local expertise is a quick, cost effective way to ensure that communities – and nations – stand robust in the face of outbreaks
And when Kenya’s first case was declared on October 6, KNPHI sprang into action, running twice-weekly virtual training sessions for frontline health workers and surveillance officers across the country. The Ugandan experiences, particularly on contact tracing, became essential here, helping Kenyan public health officials break the chain of transmission.
That kind of response – both nimble and far-reaching – is precisely what’s needed to contain an outbreak of a disease like Ebola. KNPHI was able to move fast and reach so many people thanks to virtual networks that were set up before the outbreak reached Kenya. Africa needs more investment in these kinds of networks, which my organization, Project ECHO, supports – not just in the middle of a crisis, but before the next emergency hits.
One reason that virtual networks are so powerful is that they elevate the voices of community members, which are our strongest shields against future outbreaks. Local health workers, officials, faith leaders, civil society groups, and trusted volunteers are often able to spot unusual health events before formal systems do.
Engaging with community leaders also allows us to combine global expertise with essential local context. As we’ve seen with Ebola, a failure to respect local traditions regarding burial practices, for example, has proven to be a serious challenge in containing the disease’s spread.
Embedding medical best practice with established and respected members of the local community – who understand the cultural context, and can work through it – can help us guard against such challenges.
Investing in virtual networks permanently strengthens local health capacity, which is ultimately our strongest protection against future outbreaks. Recent funding cuts to the WHO and other global health programs have undercut health staffing in many communities, making such networks more essential than ever.
Networks that include community health workers can also be used to spread knowledge and information to communities between outbreaks – which is just as essential as emergency response.
In Senegal, for example, the Institut Pasteur runs virtual training sessions on hemorrhagic and viral diseases that are reaching healthcare workers in communities across francophone West Africa and beyond.
And in Zambia, where the government has embraced virtual learning networks for more than a decade, regional and local information hubs are actively connecting frontline health workers with national and international expertise in real time, accelerating the sharing of evolving guidance, supporting mentorship, and creating peer networks that reduce professional isolation.
Even in conflict zones these digital networks have proved remarkably resilient. Since 2023, Sudan has been torn apart by civil war, genocide and gender-based violence. But an international digital network, built in close collaboration with local partners, has enabled global experts to train Sudanese health workers on how to treat victims of rape and other violence.
Some of the sessions have been facilitated through Telegram to accommodate the limited Internet bandwidth. Sometimes, the sessions take place late at night, when the connection is stronger.
The cases of Senegal, Zambia and Sudan show what’s possible when technology is used to serve local leadership. As we respond to the ongoing Ebola outbreak – and as we prepare for future crises – we must apply these lessons at scale.
We will always need high-level expertise and cutting-edge medicine. But we cannot let our investments in those areas distract us from investing in the networks that reach the communities on the frontlines, and that allow for cultural considerations to be taken into account. Using simple digital tools to both support and elevate local expertise is a quick, cost effective way to ensure that communities – and nations – stand robust in the face of outbreaks.
Existing virtual networks gave KNPHI the digital infrastructure it needed to move quickly in response to Kenya’s first Ebola case, broadcasting essential information to frontline health workers and surveillance officers across the country in a matter of days. Africa needs more of these virtual networks to reach communities across the continent – to protect the communities themselves, and to protect us all.
Dr. Caroline Kisia is Africa Director of Project ECHO.
Tuvalu's Minister for Climate Change and Pacific Political Champion of Mitigation, Dr Maina Vakafua Talia, interacts with another delegate at COP31. Credit: Sera Tikotikovatu-Sefeti/IPS
By Sera Sefeti
ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 19 2026 (IPS)
“This is about the survival of people, and we should not sugarcoat anything here at COP31. If you are trying to sugarcoat things, you shouldn’t be coming. We should be frustrated all the time because we are dealing with the very lives of our people.”
Tuvalu’s Minister for Climate Change and Pacific Political Champion of Mitigation, Dr Maina Vakafua Talia, does not believe there is room for complacency in the climate negotiations.
For him, the urgency is measured by whether his people will still have a country they can call home.
Talia has been part of the climate negotiations since COP18 in Doha, Qatar. Fourteen years later, he remains in the same fight, carrying a responsibility he says extends far beyond his position in government.
“I continue to be part of this because it’s important for the survival of our people,” he says.
“I think the survival element is what keeps us all going, not just for me, but for all the Pacific negotiators, our Pacific ministers, and those who have taken the fort way before us.”
At the centre of that commitment is a simple message he says the world must understand: Tuvaluans do not want to leave their islands.
“If you ask some of our elders, the answer is very straightforward. We don’t want to leave. This is our God-given land.”
For Talia, the prospect of displacement cannot be reduced to a conversation about relocation, migration or adapting to a changing environment.
It is a question of what happens to people when they lose the land that holds their history, language, culture and identity.
“Losing an island is literally losing your identity, losing your culture, losing your language, and we’re nothing. We don’t want to end up as second-class citizens in another country. We don’t want to pack and leave.”
He speaks of his mother, who has passed away, and the question he would face if he were forced to leave Tuvalu.
“My mum passed, and if I am asked to move, the biggest question for me is, ‘How are we going to look after those who are resting in the land?'”
He explains that in Pacific belief, those who have gone before are not simply gone.
“Those who went before us, they are not dead; they are just resting.”
It is this connection between land, ancestry and belonging that gives the negotiations a deeply personal meaning for him.
“The issue is not simply whether Tuvalu can adapt to rising seas. It is whether future generations will have the same relationship with their homeland that generations before them knew.”
Talia has four children and is soon to become a grandfather. He says the responsibility to keep fighting is also about the future they deserve.
“I can be in government today, and I can be outside government tomorrow, but we should never lose sight of this. We should continue to fight.”
He describes the climate crisis as an issue of justice, security and sovereignty, particularly for countries whose contribution to global emissions is negligible.
“Our contribution is almost next to nothing. It’s 0.0001. Why do our children have to suffer at the expense of other people? That’s injustice.”
It is also why he rejects the suggestion that Pacific ministers and negotiators should temper their frustration during international climate meetings.
Asked why he and other Pacific representatives appear angry during negotiations, his response is unequivocal.
“We are dealing with the very survival of our people that cannot come to COPs to speak for themselves, to tell their stories. We are here on behalf of 10,000 people. We are here on behalf of millions of people who cannot attend the COP meeting.”
For Talia, the responsibility of representing those communities demands honesty about what is happening and what is not being delivered.
“You cannot live a lie,” he said.
“You cannot romanticise climate change and tell people that you give me the money, and then we will do this. We will tick the box. No, you are playing around with the livelihoods of people.”
He says progress remains too slow, despite years of negotiations and commitments.
“We should have that feeling of being frustrated, being angry, that little changes are coming slowly, too slow.”
He is equally critical of the contradiction between financial commitments to vulnerable Pacific countries and continued investment in fossil fuels by major economies.
“We want some moral guidance, moral clarity, and moral leadership. We cannot continue to say that we will provide financial support to the Pacific, and then on the other hand, we will continue to entertain opening new coal mines or extending the life of other coal mines.”
His analogy is direct: “We cannot continue to mop the floor while not closing the tap.”
For Talia, the transition away from fossil fuels must be accompanied by political decisions that match the urgency of the climate crisis.
That is why Tuvalu is preparing to host the second international meeting on transitioning away from fossil fuels, following the process initiated in Santa Marta, Colombia, co-chaired by Colombia and the Netherlands.
He sees the meeting as an opportunity for the Pacific to take a leading role in shaping the global transition.
“Tuvalu and the Pacific never waited or stood on the sideline – we always lead and so the leadership from the Pacific is important.”
At COP31, that leadership is also reflected in the positions he is pushing through the negotiations as the Pacific’s Political Champion of Mitigation.
The region continues to fight to keep the 1.5°C temperature limit within reach, secure the continuation of the mitigation work programme and accelerate the implementation of decisions already agreed at previous COPs.
Talia says there has been strong resistance to continuing the mitigation work programme, but Pacific negotiators are working to keep it on the table.
“We want to fast-track, and we want to implement some of the decisions that have been made in previous COPs.”
He argues that keeping 1.5°C alive cannot be separated from climate finance, adaptation and implementation on the ground.
For Tuvalu, the stakes are immediate. The country has experienced dry spells in recent months, while the prospect of changing weather patterns and El Niño adds further pressure on communities already exposed to climate impacts.
“We don’t need to convince the world that they need to put money into the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF), we don’t need to convince the world that they need to respond because it is already there,” Talia said. “They need to put money into the Loss and Damage Fund.”
His message is that the Pacific is not asking the world to imagine what climate change might mean. Its people are already living with the consequences.
After 14 years in the negotiations, Talia knows the process can be exhausting. He describes COP as psychologically damaging for those who repeatedly have to return to the negotiating rooms and argue for action on issues that determine whether their communities can remain where they are.
“We should not treat COP as a place where we meet friends or as a place where we see one another. It’s a frustrating process, and we should take advantage of the opportunity of coming and tell the world that we are not happy with how things are progressing.”
There is little separation between the political responsibility he carries and the personal future he is trying to protect.
His children, his future grandchild, the elders who want to remain on their land and the generations resting beneath it are all part of the same argument he takes into the negotiating rooms.
For Talia, the measure of success is not simply what governments agree to at the end of COP31. It is whether those decisions give Tuvaluans a genuine chance to remain on their islands, preserve their identity and determine their own future.
“We are not here to play; we are not here on a holiday trip, but we are here because of the survival of our people.”
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Climate activists protesting, in solidarity with the flood victims in Nepal, at COP31 in Antalya, Türkiye. Credit: Farai Shawn Matiashe/IPS
By Farai Shawn Matiashe
ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 19 2026 (IPS)
The publication timetable for several climate reports has become one of the most contentious issues at this year’s United Nations climate conference, as several fossil-fuel-dependent countries want to delay the next round of scientific assessments.
The scientific reports, released every five to seven years by the UN-backed Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), help governments plan their climate policies.
Limited Resources for Africa’s Scientists
Several African countries, including Kenya, are also among those at COP31 pushing for a delay to the report. But for them, this is not about the fact that they heavily rely on fossil fuels but about a lack of capacity building and limited resources. Kenya generates 90% of its electricity from renewables, according to the International Energy Agency.
Patricia Achieng’ Nying’uro, Kenya’s (IPCC) Focal Point, said that Kenya’s position on the Seventh Assessment Report (AR7) timeline comes down to capacity, not politics.
“We are in favour of a schedule that gives our technical reviewers, negotiators, and authors enough time and support to engage properly with the process,” she told reporters at the Conference of the Parties, or COP31, in Antakya, Turkey.
“We have a history of under-representation across the cycles, and we have an opportunity with AR7 to remedy this to some extent.”
The IPCC Seventh Assessment Report (AR7) cycle began in July 2023. Member governments have not agreed on a final delivery date.
Countries like China, Saudi Arabia, India and Russia are pushing to delay the report from 2028 to 2029, saying they want wider participation from developing nations.
Countries like Chad and some island nations want to align AR7 publication timelines and budget lines with the 2028 Global Stocktake.https://www.ipcc.ch/meeting-doc/ipcc-65/
At the IPCC’s 65th plenary session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in October, Chair Jim Skea suspended the session after delegates did not agree on the dates.
Nying’uro said several of the authors already involved in AR7 have raised concerns about time and workload constraints.
“As an example, many scientists from developing countries, including the focal point teams, are not given dedicated time off their regular jobs for IPCC work, so they are juggling it alongside everything else they do,” she said.
Nying’uro said a compressed timeline only deepens that strain and risks the region being under-represented in the final product.
“Ultimately, what we care about most is that the IPCC’s assessment stays robust and genuinely representative of the regions it covers, and we think that depends as much on giving people the capacity to do the work well as it does on the calendar itself,” she said.
Countries Making Profit From Fossil Fuels Protect Own Interests
Critics say that China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and India, countries that make billions of dollars from fossil fuels, are protecting their own interests under the guise of inclusivity of developing nations.
Mary Robinson, former president of Ireland and founding member of The Elders, an independent group of global leaders, said that developed nations can address the lack of resources and capacity building for scientists from developing countries without delaying the report.
“There are legitimate concerns among African countries about capacity building, and they should be addressed. But that is a separate, important issue on its own. It is not a reason to hold up, try to undermine the IPCC itself,” she said.
She said it is important for the Seventh Assessment Report to be published in time for the next Global Stocktake.
“We know that science is under attack in different parts of the world, and there is a lot of disinformation and misinformation. Actually, those timelines are the timelines that the scientists have agreed on. And they should proceed,” Tubiana said.
She said that countries like Saudi Arabia are blocking the release of the report, but vulnerable countries like Nepal and island nations want its release so they can make informed decisions.
“Because it is vital for them to prepare themselves. And also, the least developed countries and developing countries can benefit much from the assessment reports,” Tubiana said.
“The most vulnerable of the developing countries badly want this report because they do not have the capacity to have separate reports. They rely on the report.”
The AR7 will provide coverage for loss and damage for the first time.
Laurence Tubiana, chief executive officer of the European Climate Foundation, said that the delay is not about scientific position but political.
“Equity is important. The contribution of scientists from the Global South, wherever they are, is very central. The real motive behind this attack is that it is a political enterprise. It is not scientific positioning,” she said.
Tubiana said that there is a need to mobilise resources to capacitate the least developed and developing countries.
“This is true and necessary, but even these small island nations want the report,” she said.
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Young global ambassadors for biodiversity from South Africa performing at the start of a COP17 plenary session on 28 October. Credit: IISD/ENB Mike Muzurakis
By Céline Delacroix
MONTREAL, Canada, Nov 19 2026 (IPS)
The United States isn’t just lagging behind the global effort to protect biodiversity, it’s pulling in the opposite direction. When the 196 nations that are parties to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity concluded their annual 17th Conference of Parties (COP17) in Yerivan, Armenia, last month, the only member state not there (also the only one that hasn’t ratified the CBD) was the United States. It’s an outlier on both biodiversity and the gender issues related to it.
Russia, China, even North Korea are parties to the CBD and sent delegations to COP17. During negotiations Russia objected to language about “human rights-based approaches and inclusive participation,” but in the end all parties, Russia included, agreed to call for “full, equitable, inclusive, effective, and gender-responsive approaches and participation as well as rights,” to consider women’s roles, knowledge, and practices regarding wildlife management, “and apply gender-responsive approaches, in line with the Gender Plan of Action.” The United States alone stands apart from that Plan, in which the CBD formally recognizes gender equity and reproductive agency matter for biodiversity and sustainability.
They matter because converting wild habitat to human needs, especially crops and livestock grazing, drives land degradation and biodiversity loss, and tracks closely with population trends. Greater gender equity correlates with fewer unintended pregnancies, slower population growth, stronger environmental policies, and lasting environmental, social, and economic benefits.
Women and girls are on the front lines. They’re disproportionately affected by land degradation and deforestation, droughts, and floods; they’re more likely to be displaced or die from climate events. They’re usually the ones securing food, water, and firewood for their families, producing up to 80% of food in rural areas, and managing crop and grazing lands. It therefore stands to reason that they should be considered and consulted on protecting land, water, biodiversity, and the climate.
The U.S. didn’t just fail to support this principle. It went out of its way to oppose it.
At a related summit meeting in Mongolia in September on the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), the U.S. delegation alone objected to gender-responsive approaches (for example to drought response) and to including civil society and “synergies” (i.e., coordinating implementation of the CCD with other Rio conventions on biological diversity and climate change). That effectively tabled those issues until the next CCD summit.
Yet gender-responsiveness, inclusivity, and a synergistic approach to the nexus between population trends and sustainability are indispensable for protecting biodiversity and the planet. Until recently this would have been an uncontroversial statement, but now the U.S. has ceded leadership on these fronts and is working to roll them back, protecting biodiversity is up to the rest of the world, and it’s not on track.
The CBD aims to preserve at least 30% of the world’s land, inland waters, and coastal and marine biodiversity by 2030 (“30×30” for short) and mobilize at least $200 billion a year to reverse biodiversity losses. But the CBD’s own review found most national biodiversity targets aren’t within reach, nor is the 30×30 goal. COP17 laid out the “Yerivan Pathway” to accelerate action, but financing is short by $700 billion a year.
To meet CBD goals, we’ll need to focus and invest more, not less, in gender equity and the nexus between population trends, climate change, and biodiversity. We’ll need to insist on implementing the Gender Plan of Action, recognize under-resourced women’s organizations not only as stakeholders but as decisionmakers and implementers, and fund them accordingly. We’ll also need to recognize that since upholding reproductive rights is central to gender equity, it’s also central to sustainable development, as The Guttmacher-Lancet Commission has shown.
Family planning, reproductive health, and gender equity are central to protecting the climate and biodiversity as well as advancing human welfare. Enabling people to choose whether and when to have children reduces unintended pregnancies, improves women’s health, slows population growth, and eases pressure on ecosystems.
Better reproductive health also leads to greater agency, education, economic empowerment, and workforce participation for women. This pays gigantic dividends. If we spent $79 billion on meeting unmet family planning and maternal health needs by 2030, it would yield $660 billion in economic benefits. That could help position countries to fund more biodiversity protection.
Gender equity and reproductive rights are essential to biodiversity, not incidental. It’s not enough to fund protected areas or restoration projects; any lasting conservation also needs robust family planning, maternal and community health, so pressure on nature eases and women can make their contributions to stewardship. It’s part of the transformative change nature needs.
This would be easier to achieve if the United States were funding instead of fighting it. The world can have effective biodiversity action without an American buy-in, but we won’t get it without focusing on the needs, rights, and empowerment of women.
Céline Delacroix is adjunct professor at the University of Ottawa’s School of Health Sciences, a senior fellow with the Population Institute, and director of the FP/Earth Project.
This story was originally published by the The Revelator
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Excerpt:
The recent United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity called for gender-responsive approaches. The United States objected and is the only nation not accepting the plan.By Daniel M. Best
ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 19 2026 (IPS)
In the five years since the UN’s COP26 climate talks called for adaptation finance to double, some 3,610 lives have been lost and another 6.5 million people affected by floods, hurricanes, droughts, and wildfires across the Caribbean.
Daniel M. Best
Behind these statistics are real people, families and communities: a breadwinner whose life has been lost; a family displaced from a home that took decades to build; a child whose education is interrupted when a school becomes an emergency shelter; or a small business that never reopens after a flood or hurricane.Not only is the region disproportionately impacted by climate hazards, but the intensity of climate extremes is growing, resulting in a widening climate finance gap.
The latest warning from the Caribbean Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH) is unequivocal: persistent heat, reduced rainfall, drought, and growing pressure on water resources are becoming more pronounced. Unlike hurricanes, drought and extreme heat do not announce themselves with a single moment of landfall. They intensify gradually, placing sustained pressure on communities, economies, and public services. Climate risk, therefore, is not simply an environmental concern; it is a fundamental development challenge.
Multilateral Development Banks have an important role to play in securing resilient futures, but we must work together to reduce fragmented support while at the same time, pursue financial innovation. To this end, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) is developing a regional country platform with the Green Climate Fund and a multi-guarantor debt-swap facility with the World Bank, Inter American Development Bank (IDB), and Central American Fund for Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.
It is also expanding lending capacity through an Exposure Exchange Agreement with the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI0, a Government of Canada credit guarantee of US$400 million, and a pioneering Contingent Capital Facility to create Tier 2 capital that can support additional lending.
But MDBs cannot deliver climate-resilient futures alone. As I watch COP31 unfold, there are three priorities I would like to see advanced.
First, discussions at this year’s UN COP31 climate talks must move from promises to delivery on adaptation finance.
It is estimated that adaptation funding would have to increase six-fold to meet the needs of Caribbean nations and other Small Island Developing States (SIDs). Last year’s commitment to triple adaptation finance was welcome, but the true measure of success will be whether countries can access the resources needed to build resilience on the ground.
This is particularly important as countries seek to translate climate strategies and commitments into investable projects that support climate-resilient cities, strengthen food security, protect oceans and coastal ecosystems, and build health systems capable of withstanding climate shocks.
Second, negotiators should lobby for the global climate finance architecture to evolve to become more accessible, affordable and responsive to vulnerability.
Roughly half of the Bank’s borrowing members have debt-to-GDP ratios above 60 per cent, placing them at risk of debt distress. The CDB’s US$460 million Special Development Fund programme, our largest concessional lending and grant programme, along with our accreditation to institutions that provide grant and soft loans, support the region but more needs to be made available. Equally important is how eligibility for these concessional resources is determined. Criteria that more explicitly incorporate vulnerability should be adopted as it is more closely aligned, both practically and conceptually, with the real risks facing small states.
Countries need financing arrangements in place before disasters occur. Insurance, contingent credit, and debt-payment pause clauses can play complementary roles. Insurance can transfer specified risks; credit can provide liquidity; and a payment pause can create breathing space. These benefits must be weighed against costs and future repayment obligations.
Lastly, negotiations should focus on keeping the goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C within reach to avoid even worse climate extremes. Every fraction of a degree matters and carries profound implications for our communities, our economies and, in some cases, our very existence.
Achieving that goal will require a faster transition to clean energy, tangible action to reduce methane and other greenhouse gas emissions, and sustained investment in sustainable production and consumption. The world must close the gap between ambition and action.
The test before us is no longer whether we understand the risks. We do. The question is whether we will match the urgency of the challenge with the ambition of our response.
For vulnerable nations, delay carries a cost measured not in dollars, but in lives, livelihoods and lost development gains. The choices made at COP31 will reverberate far beyond the negotiating halls, shaping the resilience and prosperity of communities for decades to come.
Daniel M. Best is President of the Caribbean Development Bank
IPS UN Bureau
A t-shirt, photographed at the Ministerial High-Level on the Launch of the Second Global Stock Take, captures the dilemmas of the COP31 negotiations. Credit: UN Climate Change/Kiara Worth
By Stella Paul
ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 18 2026 (IPS)
You cannot build a wind turbine, electric vehicle, battery or solar grid without critical minerals. Lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths are as essential to the clean-energy transition as renewable power itself.
Yet at COP31 in Antalya, where governments are negotiating how to deliver a “just transition” away from fossil fuels, critical minerals remain largely absent from the political spotlight. While negotiators debate fairness, jobs and decarbonisation, countries elsewhere are forging mineral alliances, securing supply chains and pursuing strategic resource deals outside the UN climate process.
The disconnect raises a central question: Can the global energy transition be called just if it fails to address where the minerals will come from, who controls them, and who bears the environmental and social costs of extracting them?
That question sits at the heart of an emerging debate at COP31. The transition to clean energy depends on a vast expansion of mineral extraction, yet the governance systems needed to ensure fairness, accountability and community participation remain fragmented and incomplete.
Joan Carling, leader of Indigenous Peoples Rights International (IPRI), warns that the current push for just transition will fail if critical minerals and indigenous peoples are not made central to the issue. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
Whose Minerals, Whose Future?
For Indigenous peoples, the debate is not theoretical.
Joan Carling, a 2024 Right Livelihood Award laureate and executive director of Indigenous Peoples Rights International (IPRI), said the transition to a low-carbon economy must not come at the expense of Indigenous communities.
According to Carling, Indigenous territories hold an estimated 54 percent of critical mineral deposits. That makes Indigenous communities central to the energy transition, whether they are included in decisions or not.
Carling acknowledges an important breakthrough achieved at COP30 in Belém, where negotiators recognised Indigenous peoples’ rights to land, territories, resources, self-determination and free, prior and informed consent. It was a milestone, she says, but recognition alone is not enough.
“It’s our resources; it’s going to be our minerals, and our lands will be used for the transition. We’re not at the table. We’re not the ones taking the decisions,” Carling said.
Her concern extends beyond representation. As demand for transition minerals rises, she fears the world could simply replace one extractive model with another.
“Just moving away from fossil-fuel extractivism to extractivism again for critical minerals,” she said.
The consequences, she argues, are already visible in many Indigenous territories.
“We’ve already seen the legacy of mining, which has completely devastated our territories, destroyed our livelihoods and our food systems, and polluted rivers and water bodies,” she said.
For Carling, the issue is not merely whether mining should occur, but who gets to define the terms under which it takes place. Indigenous peoples, she argues, continue to be treated primarily as stakeholders to consult rather than as rights-holders with decision-making authority.
As global demand for critical minerals accelerates, many Indigenous leaders fear that climate goals could become the latest justification for projects imposed on communities without meaningful participation. In that scenario, the transition may reduce carbon emissions while reproducing long-standing patterns of exclusion and extractivism.
Participants discuss mechanisms of just transition at the Just Transition pavilion at COP31 in Antalya, Türkiye. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
A Fight Over the Meaning of ‘Just’
Inside the COP31 negotiations, advocates are working to ensure that the transition is not discussed solely in technical or economic terms.
While critical minerals are largely absent from the draft political declaration, they have not disappeared entirely from the discussions.
Negotiators at COP31 are currently working to establish a Just Transition Mechanism intended to help countries translate broad commitments into practical action.
The mechanism is expected to be one of the principal outcomes of the COP31 talks, making debates over rights, participation and value addition especially important for mineral-producing communities.
Annabella Rosemberg, senior adviser on just transition at Climate Action Network (CAN), says the evolving Just Transition Mechanism includes references to mineral extraction, Indigenous rights, local participation and value addition.
For Rosemberg, however, the larger challenge is ensuring that social justice receives the same attention as technological deployment.
“There is much more talk about electrification than there is about just transition,” she said. “What needs to be rebalanced is not only talking about targets; it’s also talking about how we centre communities.”
She argues that climate negotiations can still play an important role by legitimising alternative development models that place local communities, Indigenous rights and equitable economic benefits at the center of the transition.
“This decision on minerals is at least giving legitimacy to a different story that needs to be told,” Rosemberg said. “Where rights are important, where community voices are important, and where value addition is important.”
Still, she warns that progress on language does not automatically translate into action.
“We’re getting great language on just transition,” she said. “But we need to have something that has some teeth to make it happen.”
That challenge runs through many of the discussions at COP31. Negotiators increasingly agree on broad principles, but implementation remains uncertain. Without stronger institutions, clearer accountability mechanisms and dedicated financial support, advocates fear that commitments to justice could remain largely aspirational.
The risk, Rosemberg says, is that communities see endless consultations, reports and policy statements while decisions continue to be made elsewhere.
Japan’s Minister of the Environment Hiroyoshi Sasagawa speaks on innovation and knowledge exchange for implementing climate decisions at COP31, while the prime minister of the country attended the QUAD summit, where critical minerals emerged as a leading subject. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
Producer Countries Seek a Bigger Share
The debate extends beyond Indigenous communities to countries expected to supply the minerals needed for the energy transition.
Brazil, for example, possesses significant reserves of graphite, nickel, lithium, niobium and rare earths. In September 2026, the country adopted a National Policy on Critical and Strategic Minerals and established a dedicated council within the Presidency, signalling a growing recognition of the sector’s strategic importance.
“There is no energy transition without mining,” said Gabriella Salazar, a Brazilian mining law specialist.
As demand for minerals grows, countries like Brazil face a familiar dilemma. They possess the resources required by industrialised economies but risk remaining suppliers of raw materials while higher-value manufacturing and processing activities occur elsewhere.
Salazar argues that producer countries should have opportunities to capture more of the economic value generated by the transition.
“My suggestion would be for the COP31 just transition outcomes to formally recognise critical minerals as an integral part of the energy transition supply chain,” she said.
Such recognition, she argues, could help unlock investment, technical cooperation and capacity-building that would allow producing countries to move beyond extraction and into refining, processing and manufacturing.
The question of value addition has become a recurring theme among developing countries. Many governments see the clean-energy transition not only as an environmental necessity but also as a potential development opportunity. Whether that opportunity materialises may depend on how future supply chains are structured and who captures the greatest economic benefits.
COP Talks, ASEAN Acts
The debate has now spread beyond COP31 negotiations.
While negotiators in Antalya debate the principles of a just transition, governments elsewhere are moving to secure access to the minerals needed to power it.
On November 17, leaders gathered for the 46th ASEAN Summit in Manila, where critical minerals were among the issues expected to be discussed, according to Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. Yet unlike artificial intelligence and regional economic cooperation, critical minerals did not emerge as a prominent feature of the summit’s official outcome statement.
That absence reflects a broader trend. Rather than being addressed through a dedicated multilateral framework, questions of mineral security, processing capacity and supply-chain resilience are increasingly being pursued through regional discussions, bilateral agreements and strategic partnerships.
An IISD analysis of more than 200 recent trade and economic agreements found that 139 contained critical-mineral provisions, highlighting how mineral diplomacy is largely advancing outside the UN climate process.
Among them is the France-Malaysia agreement on critical minerals cooperation, signed ahead of COP31, which aims to strengthen collaboration on mineral supply chains, processing and investment. Critical minerals have also featured prominently in discussions among the Quad countries, reflecting mounting concern over access to the resources needed for the energy transition.
The contrast with COP31 is striking. While negotiators in Antalya focus on emissions reductions, climate finance and the principles of a just transition, many of the practical decisions shaping future mineral supply chains are increasingly being made elsewhere.
The result is a widening governance gap. Climate negotiators are debating what a just transition should look like, while the architecture of the critical-minerals economy is taking shape beyond the COP process.
The Missing Global Rulebook
That fragmentation worries Michael Franczak, an economic governance researcher at the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR) and co-author of the recent report, Governing Critical Minerals: Advancing Global Cooperation in a Fragmented Landscape.
“Critical minerals may be absent from the official COP31 agenda, but they are hovering over everything,” Franczak said.
According to Franczak, no single institution currently governs the intersection of mining, energy, trade, investment, industrial strategy and development. Yet all of these sectors increasingly influence the success or failure of the global energy transition.
The absence of an overarching framework leaves countries, communities and companies navigating a rapidly evolving landscape shaped by overlapping institutions and competing priorities.
Rather than calling for a single new treaty, Franczak advocates a more pragmatic approach that is based on stronger coordination among existing organisations. Such a system could improve transparency, strengthen standards, expand participation by producing countries and create mechanisms for addressing cross-border challenges that no single institution can manage alone.
The goal, he argues, is not to slow the energy transition but to ensure that it unfolds in a fair, predictable and accountable manner.
Without that coordination, the world risks repeating mistakes that have long characterised global resource extraction, where wealth accumulates far from the places where resources are extracted.
A Race Against Time
As COP31 enters its final days, the question facing negotiators is no longer whether critical minerals matter to the energy transition.
The question is whether global governance can catch up with a rapidly accelerating mineral race before inequalities become embedded in the foundations of the green economy.
For Indigenous communities, the challenge is ensuring that rights are respected and consent is meaningful. For producer countries, it is securing a fair share of the economic opportunities created by the transition. For policymakers, it is designing institutions capable of connecting climate goals with trade, development and resource governance.
The energy transition may be essential for addressing climate change, but experts warn that its legitimacy will ultimately depend on how its benefits and burdens are distributed.
As governments rush to build the clean-energy economy, Franczak cautions against assuming that cleaner technologies automatically produce fairer outcomes.
“Without better rules and stronger cooperation, we risk repeating an old pattern: resources are extracted in developing countries, while much of the economic value is captured elsewhere and local communities bear the environmental and social costs,” he warns
IPS UN Bureau Report
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By CIVICUS
Nov 18 2026 (IPS)
CIVICUS discusses protests sparked by the mass removal of voters from India’s electoral rolls with Sanjana, a young development professional based in New Delhi who has joined the protests and volunteered at a voter helpdesk.
Sanjana
Since October 2026, people have been taking to the streets of Delhi against the Election Commission’s Special Intensive Revision of the electoral rolls, which has struck an estimated 130 million names off the lists. A broad coalition of student groups, opposition parties and the Cockroach Janta Party, a Gen Z protest movement with mass appeal among young people, is demanding that the exercise be reversed. The government has responded with violence, heavy security and arrests. Meanwhile, volunteers are helping excluded voters in their efforts to get back on the rolls.What’s wrong with the electoral roll revision?
For a start, it has no precedent. The Manual on Electoral Rolls of the Election Commission of India (ECI), published in March 2023, lists four types of revision, and the current ‘Special Intensive Revision’ (SIR) is not one of them. Yet the ECI presents it as routine, claiming it has been conducted eight times since independence.
The core problem is that the SIR is flipping the burden of proof. It used to be the state’s job to enrol every eligible adult. Now people have to prove they belong. The most controversial requirement is that voters prove they, their parents or grandparents appeared on the 2002 rolls. Software then checks these links for ‘logical discrepancies’, such as a parent who appears to have too many children.
The system flagged 13.1 million voters in West Bengal state and 23.5 million in Madhya Pradesh, 17 and 41 per cent of voters in those states. Within weeks, the Bengal figure fell to around 9.5 million because the ECI changed the criteria for what counted as a discrepancy partway through. In Goa, 97 voters were left off the final roll because of software issues, even after officials cleared them. In Uttar Pradesh, the software auto-generated 87,127 forms to delete voters without giving any reason.
There’s dissent even inside the ECI. Two commissioners recorded objections to decisions taken without their knowledge 14 times in 10 months. The ECI has also centralised control over the software, to the point that states have written to the central government to complain they have no access.
Who’s being excluded?
As many as 130 million names have been struck off the rolls across 30 states and territories, with Delhi the hardest hit. Almost 33 per cent of its voters were excluded at the draft stage.
In Bihar, the first state to go through the SIR, the exercise crashed the state’s elector-to-adult population ratio from 97 to 88 per cent, against 99 per cent nationwide. In Bengal, over nine million voters were deleted. In Karnataka, the figure was nearly 10 million, with Bengaluru alone losing over 4.3 million. Overall, at least 120 million eligible adults are likely to be left off the final SIR lists.
The appeals system barely works. In Bengal, of 2.22 million appeals seeking reinstatement, only 1,607 voters were restored in time to vote in the 2026 state election. Can the result be considered valid? Some ask whether those voters would have backed the Trinamool Congress, the main rival to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s party in the state. But the real problem is that they could not vote at all, whoever they would have chosen. In a democracy, every citizen’s vote should count.
Those struck off are the people least likely to have the right documents. First of all, women are affected. An analysis in The Hindu found that in the nine Bihar constituencies with the most deletions, 56 per cent of those deleted were women, mostly aged 18 to 39. This points to married women, since marriage is the main reason women move. A woman who moved to her husband’s village is now asked to trace herself back to a 2002 roll. The gender gap on the rolls had narrowed from two million to 700,000 women by early 2025. The SIR pushed it back up to 1.6 million.
Analysis of the Bihar SIR also shows that Muslims made up 24.7 per cent of the 6.5 million voters excluded from the draft rolls and 33 per cent of those deleted from the final list, despite comprising only 16.9 per cent of the state’s population. This matches what I saw at the helpdesk where I volunteered in Nizamuddin, a mostly Muslim neighbourhood of Delhi.
Migrant workers, urban poor people and displaced people have also been disproportionately affected. When your home is bulldozed, your address disappears with it. The problem is so widespread that Delhi’s election office had to hold special camps for people whose neighbourhoods had been demolished. The state demolishes your home and then asks you to prove where you live.
The ECI keeps saying a notice is not a deletion. But for a domestic worker who has to miss a day’s wages, find a lawyer and chase a landlord for a rental agreement, the notice is the punishment. The government is disenfranchising people without saying so.
How are civil society groups helping people get back on the rolls?
Civil society groups such as Voter Adhikar Manch have set up helpdesks close to where excluded groups live, with volunteers who help people file petitions and gather the documents they need to answer their notices.
Many people have been flagged for ‘logical discrepancies’ by software that had not been properly tested. In Nizamuddin, for instance, many cases carried the same flag: ‘You have been linked as son/daughter with someone who is claimed by six others as father, giving suspicion of a likely incorrect match’. That’s absurd in a country with a long history of large families. Many people who had moved house were put on the list of ‘absent, shifted or dead’ voters.
In Nizamuddin, there was a case of a domestic worker who’d received a notice in English, which she didn’t understand. She missed a day’s work to come to us. It turned out she had no document to prove her current address. Her old voter ID card listed Sunder Nagar, a settlement the government demolished in 2023. She’s lived in the same rented home in Nizamuddin since December 2023, but the landlord refuses to give her a rental agreement. The lawyer at the helpdesk offered to speak to the landlord, but she feared retaliation and losing her home. So the lawyer wrote a letter to the ECI asking for police verification of her residence instead.
So much effort, money and distress just to vote in a democracy. Of course this exercise will disenfranchise the poor. It’s an old authoritarian tactic. Helpdesks support people nearby, but India is vast and they cannot reach every neighbourhood. What happens to everyone else?
Who’s leading the protests and what are they demanding?
The protest movement against the SIR is a broad coalition. Alongside opposition leaders, leftist parties and left-wing student organisations such as the All India Students’ Association (AISA) and the Students’ Federation of India, it includes the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP).
CJP has mass appeal among Gen Z and draws a liberal crowd. Its pull was clear in the July protests calling for the education minister to resign over leaked papers in the national medical entrance exam. Because the protests focused on a single issue, the crowd swelled across ideological and party lines. After that success, CJP launched campaigns such as ‘Fix the Schools’, which flags failings in schools across rural India. Through these campaigns and an active social media presence, it has kept a spirit of dissent alive among large numbers of liberal young people.
The protest coalition wants Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar to resign and the SIR rolled back with its deletions declared void. But some groups go further. CJP wants an inquiry and criminal charges against Kumar, a freeze on the 2025 electoral rolls and elections held on those rolls. It also wants an independent body to select election commissioners. AISA wants wrongly deleted voters restored and the 2023 law on appointing election commissioners repealed, since it removed the Chief Justice from the selection panel and gave commissioners sweeping legal immunity. The Congress party and others such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam have also demanded a return to ballot papers.
Everyday people have taken to the streets, asking why the government is protecting Kumar when the ECI is supposed to be autonomous and the public is calling for his impeachment.
How have authorities responded?
The October protests at Jantar Mantar, Delhi’s designated protest site, were met with aggressive repression. Instead of holding Kumar to account, the government deployed 40,000 security personnel in Delhi to confront the people protesting against him, some of them pulled from sensitive security zones. Ahead of the protest, it shut 57 metro stations and cancelled trains to Delhi. It had CJP leaders arrested and several of their allies put under preventive detention or house arrest and made to sign ‘peace bonds’ barring them from future protests.
The state’s strategy of exhaustion also targets leaders beyond CJP. Neha Bora, a young AISA activist, has endured repeated illegal detentions and refuses to sign a peace bond. At a hearing on her case, a mob of 50 to 60 Hindu nationalist supporters chanted slogans such as ‘beat the traitors of the country with shoes’ and made direct threats, right outside a police station. Police have even picked up bystanders in the name of ‘keeping peace’.
How does the struggle for voting rights connect with other struggles?
Beyond Delhi, political momentum is building on many issues. Protests against caste discrimination in universities, against Google data centres and against land grabs share a common message: the people of India have had enough of the Modi regime.
These protests also face harsh repression. In Assam, Indigenous rights activist Pranab Doley, who has led protests against a proposed luxury hotel near Kaziranga National Park, was detained under the National Security Act, a preventive detention law, a day after he was granted bail. The project threatens people’s livelihoods and relationship with the area’s rich biodiversity. In Arunachal Pradesh, authorities have met protests against the Siang Upper Multipurpose Project, a planned mega-dam, with brutal repression. Police used teargas and authorities charged four activists under the state’s anti-terror law.
The movement needs to treat every protest as part of a broader anti-authoritarian wave. Anger over voting rights is intense, and the crowds it has brought onto the streets have opened space to speak out on many issues, including Palestine. But in this charged atmosphere, the movement must not lose sight of high unemployment, inflation, levels of income inequality that are worse than under British rule, women’s safety, land grabs, and caste-based atrocities and discrimination, which hit the most excluded people hardest. The movement in Delhi must connect with these struggles across the country.
What’s needed to protect voting rights?
The SIR must be halted completely and its irregularities examined by the judiciary. Kumar must resign, and the 2023 law that shields the ECI from action must be repealed. Then the Supreme Court must hear the case against those responsible, based on an audit by independent bodies that include civil society. Above all, the state must go back to registering every eligible voter instead of making people prove they have the right to vote.
Even if fewer people had been deleted, there would still be good reason to protest. What we object to is the intention behind the exercise, whatever the numbers. We defend the right of every citizen to vote.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
India is currently on the CIVICUS Monitor watchlist, which identifies countries where a severe deterioration in the quality of civic space is taking place.
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Fruit and vegetable vendors at an everyday market in Rohini, New Delhi, operate makeshift street-vending carts with large umbrellas to shield themselves, their produce, and customers from the summer heat. When temperatures reach 50°C, they leave during peak afternoon hours and return later in the day. Credit: Aishwarya Bajpai/IPS
By Aishwarya Bajpai
ANTALYA, Türkiye & SONIPAT, India, Nov 18 2026 (IPS)
“Climate action has to deliver where people live,” COP31 President Murat Kurum said on Resilient Cities and Built Environment Day, part of the Leaders Summit. Cities, he said, are “where that implementation becomes real – in the homes people live in, the infrastructure they depend on and the energy they use every day.”
Kurum, who is also Türkiye’s environment and urbanisation minister, cited his country’s post-earthquake reconstruction as an example of resilient urban development.
The Presidency announced two initiatives: the Antalya Compact for Energy Efficient Buildings, which sets a voluntary target of reducing building energy intensity by 25% by 2035, and the Sustainable Urban Resilience Financing Facility (SURFF), intended to help cities turn climate plans into investment-ready projects. However, no budget or timeline was announced for the facility.
The question remains: will these commitments translate into funding for cities or remain declarations of intent?
A demonstrator at COP31 asks about the money. Credit: UN Climate Change/Kubilay Ciftci
A Long Climb Up the Agenda
Cities have gradually gained prominence in climate negotiations, largely through voluntary coalitions and initiatives rather than binding commitments.
COP26 Glasgow (2021) emphasised multilevel climate action and launched the Race to Resilience.
COP27 (2022) followed with the first-ever urban ministerial and launched the SURGe initiative.
COP28 (2023) introduced CHAMP, through which 64 countries agreed to involve cities in developing national climate plans. It also launched the Buildings Breakthrough, a 27-country initiative for near-zero-emission and resilient buildings by 2030.
COP29 (2024) in Baku established the Baku Continuity Coalition on Urban Climate Action and the MAP Declaration for resilient and healthy cities.
COP30 (2025) in Belém held the fourth Urbanisation Ministerial and introduced a heat-resilience initiative linked to the Global Cooling Pledge.
This attention is reflected in national climate plans. UN-Habitat found that 80% (2025-2026) of new climate plans have well-developed urban components, compared with 49% (2020-2021) earlier.
Yet only 47 of 128 plans identify a specific urban financing mechanism. Cities are increasingly part of climate commitments, but financial support has not kept pace.
What It Means for India
India illustrates the scale of this challenge. The World Bank estimates India’s cities will need around US$2.4 trillion by 2050, while private finance accounts for only about 5% of urban infrastructure investment.
WRI India estimates annual urban adaptation needs at US$67 billion. India’s 2031–35 climate plan supports resilient urban planning and efficient buildings but sets no specific targets for cities.
Aravind Unni, an urban practitioner and policy researcher, welcomes the attention but cautions against treating declarations as outcomes.
“Declarations are meant to signal the direction in which we may move,” he says. He considers the 25% building energy-intensity target something “that India would have anyways endorsed” and believes the country should “learn and use that in our domestic case”.
Unni is less convinced that the Presidency’s Climate Implementation Bridge, which aims to turn national plans into investment-ready projects, will address the needs of Indian cities.
Much of the work required, he argues, is “not really bankable”. “Adaptation and betterment of people’s lives cannot be dependent on private finance. It can be a part of the programme, but the huge section has to be reinvestment in cities through public finance.”
Private investment, in his assessment, will remain limited. The larger responsibility therefore rests with public finance, raising another question: who controls the money and decides how cities use it?
Civil society members demonstrate at COP31 in support of a liveable planet. Credit: UN Climate Change/Kubilay Ciftci
Money Needs Powers
For Unni, financing alone will not make cities resilient unless local governments have the authority to plan and implement climate action.
“Decentralisation is the key. Actual transfer of powers to the cities,” he says. He argues that the 74th Constitutional Amendment, implemented in 1993, which established the framework for urban local governments, needs to be “revisited and made better”.
Climate action is not explicitly listed among the 18 functions assigned to municipalities. However, urban planning, water supply, public health and urban forestry directly affect how cities prepare for heatwaves and floods.
Without adequate decision-making powers, cities remain dependent on higher levels of government, even when they bear the brunt of climate impacts. Unni argues that decentralisation is essential to ensure funding translates into local action.
Use What Is Already Being Built
India does not necessarily need to wait for new financing mechanisms to begin building climate resilience, Unni argues. Existing public investments in housing and infrastructure could incorporate climate adaptation.
“We are anyway constructing a lot of housing through public investments,” he says. The priority is to identify “what we can do within those schemes and projects.”
He points to Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY), the government’s flagship housing scheme, as an opportunity. Homes could incorporate designs that lower indoor temperatures by three or four degrees at night, allowing residents to recover from daytime heat.
For Unni, the issue is “more of a justice and a comfort issue rather than an efficiency issue”. Housing must protect people from the climate conditions they increasingly face.
“We can’t build our way out of this,” he adds. Existing housing schemes and urban master plans must incorporate climate considerations from the outset.
The housing ministry’s climate adaptation cell is an encouraging development, he says. However, the housing and climate ministries need to work more closely to integrate adaptation into public investment and urban planning.
Heat Shows What Money Can Do
Heat is one area where Unni sees the possibility of translating climate commitments into action. According to the government, heat action plans have been prepared by 23 states, 195 districts and 64 cities.
Another development is the inclusion of heatwaves in India’s list of notified natural disasters. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) says mitigation funds can now support heat action plans.
“Heat action now has money attached to it,” Unni says. The challenge is to ensure this funding leads to sustained action on the ground.
Ahmedabad offers an example. Following the 2010 heatwave, associated with 1,344 excess deaths, the city introduced India’s first heat action plan.
A study supported by the NRDC found that the plan contributed to approximately 1,000 fewer deaths annually on hot days in the years following its full implementation in 2013.
However, Unni argues that heat planning must move beyond preventing deaths to addressing the longer-term effects of rising temperatures on people’s lives and livelihoods.
“Heat is not only a threat to life; it also affects how comfortable people are at home, how well they can work, and how much they earn,” he says.
He proposes a dedicated government scheme and legislation focused on thermal comfort and access to shade. The housing ministry could lead efforts to improve indoor comfort, while the labour ministry addresses outdoor workers’ exposure to extreme heat.
Communities as the Cheaper Route
Unni believes that involving communities in climate planning could also reduce the cost of building urban resilience.
“We already have communities which work on this,” he says. People working across India, from NGOs to local groups, to make cities and spaces more climate resilient. Governments should invest in these existing networks and make climate planning more participatory.
Recognising local knowledge and strengthening community-led responses could bring down the often-quoted costs of urban climate action “by a huge number”. Financial constraints, he argues, should not become an excuse for inaction.
What Comes Next
COP31 has given cities greater visibility through the Antalya Compact, the proposed financing facility and renewed political attention to resilient urban development. But these remain largely voluntary commitments, with no clear indication of how much funding cities will receive or when.
Whether cities get money or simply more recognition will become clearer in the negotiated outcomes on adaptation and finance expected at the conference’s close on 20 November.
For India, the test will be whether governments use existing housing investments, disaster mitigation funds and urban planning mechanisms to make cities safer and more liveable as climate risks intensify.
IPS UN Bureau Report
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By Mohammad Zaman
DHAKA, Bangladesh, Nov 18 2026 (IPS)
Assam’s citizenship crisis is not over borders. It is a test of whether citizenship remains a constitutional right or becomes a status that officials may repeatedly place under suspicion. Bengali-speaking Muslims have disproportionately faced reported evictions, electoral-roll deletions, detention and expulsion, while language and faith risk being treated as evidence of doubtful belonging. Recent protests in Delhi against the Election Commission’s leadership have carried that warning to the national stage. The questions are stark: who may vote, who must endlessly prove eligibility, and who pays when the state gets it wrong?
Dr Mohammad Zaman
The official vocabulary—verification, revision, encroachment, expulsion—sounds neutral, but its effects are not. One report estimates that 55,000 people, most of them Bengali Muslims, have been evicted since 2016, including about 6,000 in 2025. Some affected residents were reportedly born in Assam and held voter cards or appeared in the National Register of Citizens. Those records may establish citizenship or electoral status, but they do not, by themselves, establish a right to occupy specific land. Each case requires individual evidence. Even so, a pattern this concentrated cannot be dismissed by labelling everyone affected an “illegal Bengali” from Bangladesh.Assam’s history is difficult and cannot be wished away: colonial and postcolonial migration, conflict over language and land, and the 1985 Assam Accord all matter. India may regulate immigration and protect public land. What it may not do is blur the difference between an undocumented migrant and a citizen with imperfect papers, or between an unlawful occupant and a family that may be entitled to notice, hearing, rehabilitation or appeal. In the process, India may create its own Rohingya crisis in Assam. As a people, the Bengali Muslims in Assam are fighting for decades for recognition of their rights.
That distinction is being crushed by revived executive expulsion powers. A September 2025 Assam procedure reportedly allowed district officials to label people “illegal immigrants” and order expulsion if they could not prove citizenship within ten days. Analysts warn that officials may decide some cases without first referring them to Foreigners Tribunals, although unresolved cases can still be sent to a tribunal. Rights observers have documented cross-border “pushbacks” without formal deportation orders. When statelessness is the possible result, a ten-day ultimatum is not efficiency. It is due process emptied of meaning.
The electoral roll is now the next frontier of exclusion. Assam’s 2025–26 simplified Special Revision formally relied on door-to-door verification and a claims process, unlike the document-heavy Special Intensive Revision used elsewhere. Yet more than 2,000 people in and around Kachutali, a village located in the Sonapur revenue circle of Kamrup Metropolitan district in Assam, including members of families with long voting histories, were reportedly missing from the revised roll. In one family, a son remained enrolled while his father disappeared from the roll. Such contradictions do not merely reveal bureaucratic sloppiness. They make the ballot look like a favour granted by officials rather than a right secured by law.
That is why the ongoing Delhi protests against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar cannot be waved away as partisan theatre. The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), student groups, opposition parties and civil-society activists called a protest for 10 October against alleged voter deletions and irregularities in the Special Intensive Revision. The Election Commission did not create Assam’s citizenship regime, and state authorities—not election officials alone—conduct evictions and expulsions. But the Commission cannot hide behind that distinction when credible evidence points to wrongful deletion. It must disclose its methods, explain its decisions and correct errors before citizens lose the chance to vote.
The remedy is neither radical nor complicated. No one should be pushed across a border without a written order, verified nationality, legal representation and meaningful appeal. Eviction from public land must never serve as proof of foreignness. Electoral deletion must require individual notice, stated reasons and a workable route to restoration before polling. The Election Commission and Assam authorities must publish privacy-protected audit data, while independent legal-aid and civil-society observers monitor hearings and removals. Without these safeguards, administrative power becomes punishment without trial.
These demands do not deny Assam’s history or the state’s authority to enforce law. They reject the poisonous idea that identity can substitute for evidence. Bengali speech is not a border document. Muslim faith is not a land record. Poverty is not a confession of foreignness. Rules that look neutral can discriminate when the state knows who is least able to produce archival papers, hire counsel, receive notice or survive years of appeals. Equality before law requires procedures built to prevent that predictable exclusion.
The Delhi protest matters because Assam’s warning is national. Once citizenship can be unsettled by a hurried notice, a missing paper or a mass objection, no border contains the danger. The franchise becomes conditional on bureaucratic stamina, and citizenship becomes a status people must continually re-earn. The Election Commission will not restore credibility by demanding trust. It must earn trust through reasons, corrections, independent scrutiny and a presumption that no eligible voter should be excluded because the state’s own records are fractured.
The choice is not between indigenous security and minority rights. That is the false binary on which exclusion feeds. Assam can protect land, language and lawful borders without turning Bengali-speaking Muslims into permanent defendants in the court of national belonging. The constitutional question is not whether the state may identify a foreign national, revise a roll or remove an unlawful encroachment. It is whether power is constrained by evidence, hearing, proportionality and effective appeal—and whether officials answer for failure. A republic reveals its character not in slogans but in its treatment of those easiest to dispossess. If administrative suspicion is allowed to do the work that open discrimination cannot, every citizen’s rights are weakened. The state must not be permitted to convert prejudice into procedure and call the result lawful. Citizenship cannot remain meaningful if officials can erase it in practice before the law has proved otherwise.
Dr. Mohammad Zaman has closely followed the plight of Bengali-speaking Muslims since the controversial 2019 citizenship-screening drive and has written several op-eds examining how Assamese media have unfairly portrayed them as Bangladeshis. He can be reached at mqzaman.bc@gmail.com
IPS UN Bureau
By Johan Rockström
ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 17 2026 (IPS)
The world is moving dangerously close to irreversible climate tipping points, making urgent action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions more critical than ever, warns Johan Rockström, Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. He argues that protecting forests and accelerating emissions reductions must go hand in hand to prevent further warming and preserve the planet’s natural capacity to absorb carbon dioxide.
Speaking at COP31 in Antalya, Türkiye, Rockström also raises concerns about efforts to sideline climate science in international negotiations. He warns that undermining the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) could weaken countries’ climate commitments and delay action at a time when scientific evidence should be guiding political decisions.
“This is very worrying and, at the negotiation level, is something we’ve seen creeping in for quite some time. This is a deliberate effort to tone down and sideline the IPCC. Then you have an additional challenge: the next global stocktake is meant to be informed by the latest science, and there is a political effort to try and kind of misalign these so that the IPCC will not be able to have the results finished in order to inform the next global stocktake. This is also political gaming as a way of finding an excuse for not updating the nationally determined contributions properly,” Rockström says.
Johan Rockström | Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research
[VIDEO Interview]
IPS UN Bureau Report
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Denmark, South Korea, Belgium and German announced support for three separately financed funds managed by the GEF at Cop31 in Antalya, Turkey. Credit: IISD/ENB/Mike Muzurakis
By Kizito Makoye
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania & ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 17 2026 (IPS)
Four countries have pledged or proposed a combined $200 million for global environment and climate funds at the COP31 talks in Antalya, as developing nations press for more help to cope with droughts, floods and rising seas.
The offers from Denmark, South Korea, Belgium and Germany will support three separately financed funds managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
Denmark plans to contribute 800 million Danish kroner, about €107 million, to the GEF Trust Fund’s ninth replenishment. South Korea has pledged 4.5 million Special Drawing Rights, an international reserve asset. The GEF says the offers bring pledges to the fund to more than $4.5 billion for 2026–2030.
Belgium has pledged €50 million to the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). Germany has proposed €10 million for the LDCF and €8 million for the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF).
“Both contributions remain subject to parliamentary approval,” Birgit Pickel, a senior official at Germany’s development ministry, said in the GEF announcement.
The LDCF provides grants to the world’s 44 least developed countries. The SCCF supports adaptation in small island developing states outside that group, as well as innovation and private-sector approaches. Both are financed separately from the GEF Trust Fund.
The GEF expects at least 80 per cent of the money in its latest Trust Fund replenishment to generate climate benefits. The funding also supports nature, land and water projects and is not all earmarked for adaptation.
Together, the LDCF and SCCF have provided nearly $3 billion for more than 580 projects since 2001, which are expected to benefit more than 100 million people directly, the GEF says.
A widening gapThe pledges come as developing countries face adaptation costs far beyond the funding available. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that they will need about $305 billion a year by 2035. International public finance for adaptation amounted to between $28 billion and $32 billion in 2024.
The new offers cover several environmental funds and cannot be directly compared with a single year’s adaptation needs. But the gap between available finance and projected costs has become a central issue at the talks.
“Even tripling adaptation finance would meet less than 30 per cent of what is needed,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres told reporters at COP31.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres convenes a Grid Accelerator side event with dignitaries attending COP31. Credit: UN Climate Change/Kiara Worth)
Guterres also met the heads of international climate funds and called for less bureaucracy, according to UN News. Complex application procedures can make it harder for countries with small teams to secure funding.
The conference presidency’s draft cover decision, released on 16 November, expresses concern about the “decline in annual contributions to the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and Global Environment Facility” and calls on developed countries to increase support. The text remains under negotiation and has not been adopted.
The Least Developed Countries Group wants adaptation finance tripled to at least $120 billion a year well before 2035. It is also seeking simpler access and more predictable public grants for national adaptation plans.
“Ambition needs the means to deliver it,” the group’s chair, Ambassador Adão Soares Barbosa of Timor-Leste, said ahead of the talks.
The group also wants more funding for loss and damage: harm that communities cannot avoid through adaptation alone.
From Pledges to ProjectsIn Tanzania, an earlier LDCF-backed project shows what the funding can provide. The Ecosystem-based Adaptation for Rural Resilience project supported water access, landscape restoration and alternative livelihoods in communities facing drier conditions.
UNEP reported in 2024 that the project had drilled 15 boreholes, 12 of them solar-powered, helping to provide water to more than 35,000 people in five districts. It also supported tree planting and training in activities such as beekeeping.
“We used to face many challenges growing vegetables,” Malegesi Makene Chilongo, a resident of a village that received a borehole, told UNEP. The agency said the water source had enabled villagers to establish small farms.
In Bangladesh, a separate LDCF-supported project in preparation aims to restore mangroves and strengthen livelihoods in the Greater Sundarbans. The $8.84 million project is expected to benefit 43,050 people, half of them women, according to a GEF report to the climate convention.
The GEF announcement did not identify which projects would receive the new pledges.
GEF chief executive Diego Mesa Puyo said the institution was seeking to “catalyse greater private finance alongside public investment”. But early-warning systems and rural water supplies may offer little return for investors, while pumps and other infrastructure need money for maintenance.
UN climate chief Simon Stiell welcomed the pledges, saying, “Grant finance remains essential to protecting lives, livelihoods, and development gains.”
For the least developed countries, the test in Antalya will be whether the offers translate into predictable funding that governments and communities can access — and whether more donors follow before COP32 in Addis Ababa.
IPS UN Bureau Report
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