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La réception des ambassadeurs à Dublin (crédit : présidence Irlandaise)

(B2) Dans son discours aux ambassadeurs, le président de la République irlandaise, Michael D. Higgins, a averti aujourd’hui (27 janvier) les Européens du risque que présentait pour l’Europe la crise des réfugiés. Un risque qui n’est pas uniquement celui de Schengen ou du principe de libre circulation, avertit-il. Mais tout simplement nos valeurs (*).

« The risk is not just that this refugee crisis has the potential to undermine Schengen and the principle of free circulation within the European Union. It also has the potential to undermine the values at the basis of that humanistic spirit to which Europeans recommitted themselves after the devastation of WWII. The issue of migration touches upon some of the most divisive and sensitive aspects of European identity: our relationship to the outside world, to the South, and to the Muslim world »

Avec « humilité », le président irlandais se permet d’insister demandant à tous « nos ambassadeurs européens ici de faire tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir de faire que cette crise devienne une opportunité de raviver un ethos européen de dignité humaine, liberté et solidarité, une opportunité peut-être de forger une cohérente politique commune sur l’asile. Je leur demande de donner un sens à ce qui est un concept partagé dans toutes les croyances et les cultures: l’hospitalité. »

« Again I would, with humility, urge all of our European Ambassadors here to do everything that is in their power to ensure that this crisis becomes an opportunity to rekindle a European ethos of human dignity, freedom and solidarity; an opportunity – perhaps – to forge a coherent common policy on asylum. I urge them to give meaning to the most shared concept across all belief systems and cultures – ‘hospitality’; ‘care for the stranger not yet a friend. »

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

traduit par nos soins

(*) NB : Il ne s’agit pas que d’un discours. L’Irlande a montré un certain sens de la solidarité. le gouvernement irlandais (qui ne fait pas partie de l’espace Schengen) a offert de participer volontairement au processus de relocalisation et a aussi envoyé plusieurs navires en Méditerranée, durant six mois, permettant le sauvetage de 8.500 personnes ces derniers mois (selon Dublin), soit quasiment autant que la seule marine allemande….

Security issues in Kenya and the region have had a serious impact on the country's tourism, BBC News looks at attempts to revive the industry.

In the past few years, Saudi Arabia has not managed to make a single foreign policy decision that makes logical sense to anyone outside the Saudi royal family. Things started to go downhill for Saudi Arabia when it decided to inundate the oil market by pumping excess oil to suppress prices and recapture the market share lost to U.S. shale oil and other producers with higher operational costs.

Previously, Saudi troops helped suppress the Shi‘a uprising in Bahrain. Then came along the threat of ISIS. Making things worse, Saudi Arabia started bombing the Shi‘a Houthi rebels in Yemen, dragging the country in a protracted conflict. Government finances have taken a hit and its first sovereign bonds sale in decades occurred a few months ago. And now finally, following years of rhetoric, Saudi Arabia and Iran are now literally at each others necks.

One might be surprised by how the execution of a prominent Saudi Shi‘a cleric has sparked outrage throughout the region. Indeed, Iran also has not been quiet. Iranian proxies have controlled the so-called “Shi‘a crescent”—a crescent-shaped territory comprising of Iraq, Syria and the Shi‘a militia Hezbollah in Lebanon—for a decade now. But within Saudi Arabia, the Shi‘a minority (~25% of the population) have been relatively calm, despite massive government oppression excluding it from the wider Saudi society. Thus, the Saudi Shi‘a have been a time bomb waiting to go off. The execution of the cleric might have marked the point of no return.

The manner in which protesters in Tehran behaved, attacking the Saudi embassy, portrays the long standing animosity. The Syrian conflict has degenerated into a Shi‘a-Sunni sectarian war. Iran is replacing its own troops in Syria with Pakistani Shi‘a volunteers.  The current standoff sparked off on January 4 is sure to define the path the region is going to take in 2016. And it is not going to be a pretty one.

Since protesters in Tehran set fire to the Saudi embassy, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar have downgraded their diplomatic relations with Iran. They have not gone to the extent of cutting diplomatic relations with Iran because of the economic and demographic links they must sustain for their own stability. Iran replied by accusing the Saudi coalition of bombing its embassy in Yemen on purpose.

Some have come to speculate that the Saudi-Iran crisis has been engineered toward preventing Iran from releasing a further 500,000 barrels per day on the market over the next month as the sanctions are lifted. Further, some speculate that an all-out war between oil producing nations will finally cause long anticipated hikes in the oil price. High prices are essential to the proper functioning of the Gulf country finances if they are to maintain autocratic regimes supported by massive social transfers to their population. In that case, some parties do have an incentive to find ways to prevent Iran’s increased oil supply.

Iran strikes an uneasy balance between democratic institutions and its theocratic nature. A plethora of different factions are represented in its ruling elite. Rouhani comes from the more moderate faction who manage to take over power since the more hardline faction of Ahmadinejad almost destroyed the country’s economy. One can speculate that Saudi Arabia intends on increasing Sunni-Shi‘a tensions so that public support in Iran reverts back to the hardliners. The Saudi embassy on fire surely made the fundamentalists happy while undermining the moderates’ attempt to portray to the world a progressive Iran.

Iran has a dynamic and vibrant young population which has grown to favor more engagement with the West. The failed 2009 “Green Revolution” was an attempt by these youth to end the rule of the hardliners. If they return to power, they will have a lot of youth dissent to curb. That means a lot of additional human rights violations which will lead to new sanctions being imposed.

Iran badly needs economic growth to avoid being sidelined. For it to retain the title of defender of Shi‘a Muslims, it must have the ability to support Shi‘a governments and factions abroad. Indeed, Hezbollah, Assad and Iraqi Shi‘a militia all depend on Iranian support. Hence, ironically, the fundamentalists have to support the moderates to run the country efficiently in order to achieve their goals of regional hegemony.

Developments in the Middle East will depend heavily on how Iran and Saudi Arabia react to each other’s actions. Rouhani will have to ensure that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps does not carry out overt aggressions. The missile test in October and the recent detaining of two U.S. patrol boats near Qatari waters were risky. A country of Iran’s stature has the right to develop its own ballistic missile system and to detain trespassing naval vessels. Brazil has its nuclear-powered submarines and Pakistan has its nuclear weapons. No one is imposing sanctions on them for that.

The difference is that Iran has lost its reputation as a responsible member of the international community since 1979. It needs to rebuild it and the Rouhani government has taken a lot of positive steps toward that direction. Paraphrasing President Obama, Iran is too large a country to keep isolated from the rest of the world. The world also needs to understand that Rouhani cannot immediately act friendly with the West—Iranians have grown up to loathe the West for decades. To stay in power, Rouhani must be seen as protecting Iranian interests and its self-perceived power. If he is seen as a Western stooge, the fundamentalists will return to power.

The post Saudi Arabia-Iran: Tensions and Intertwined Futures appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Violent extremism has become a dominant problem in the Sahel-Sahara region in the last couple of years. An increasing array of nonstate actors are threatening the state and the safety of populations while at the same time taking on a transnational character and increasing ties and affiliations with actors beyond the francophone space. Despite the urgency of this critical threat, current responses of states in the region seem to be uncoordinated and inadequate.

This meeting note, written in French with an English summary included as an annex, aims to contribute toward better mutual understanding of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara region and its underlying causes. It also outlines a number of potential regional, national, and community responses.

The report stems from a seminar IPI organized in Tunis, Tunisia, from December 7 to 8, 2015, in partnership with the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) and the Centre for Strategies and Security for the Sahel Sahara (Centre 4S, Nouakchott, Mauritania).

The following are among the recommendations that emerged from the seminar’s discussions:

• Analyze, Disseminate, and Communicate: Local actors could benefit from greater access to research, analysis, and lessons learned from other contexts. In addition, local researchers could be supported in developing their own knowledge and narratives, and media could be encouraged to adopt a more positive and analytical approach to covering violent extremism.
• Promote a Culture of Dialogue and a Dialogue of Cultures: A culture of dialogue must be promoted both between and within different cultures and religions, as well as between the state and religious actors. This dialogue should extend to the regional level.
• Rethink State-Society Relations: Increased space for dialogue among different actors in society is needed to help the state engage in more long-term preventive solutions. Such solutions could include reaching out to youth and preventing the manipulation of religious discourse.
• Invest in Prevention: Regional integration could help find common preventive strategies for the francophone space. This integration should not be limited to cooperation among states.

Read more about the seminar>>

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Remember those heady days of the Arab Spring in Egypt in 2011?
Do you recall the pictures of protests in Tahrir Square and the promise of democracy and change made possible with Facebook and Twitter?

Demonstrators on Army Truck in Tahrir Square, Cairo Date: 29 January 2011
Photographed by: Ramy Raoof
Things did not quite turn out the way they were supposed to.

The Muslim Brotherhood was able to co-opt the popular protests and in June 2012, Morsi became president of Egypt.

The Egyptian Revolution began in January 2011 -- but by the November of that same year when disillusioned protesters reappeared in Tahrir, the effectiveness of social media in general and Facebook and Twitter in particular, was being questioned.

At the time, The Atlantic asked about: What the New Protests in Egypt Mean for the 'Twitter Revolutions'
The past several days have been hard ones for those who cheered the fall of Hosni Mubarak less than a year ago. More than 30 people have been killed protesting the continued rule of the military council, and the Egyptian cabinet has tendered its resignation. Tahrir Square, once a symbol of the possibilities for a new Egypt, has now become a stage for the revolution's unraveling. These developments (and others since last February) have provoked a simple thought: What if the combination of social media and mobile devices does make revolutions more likely, but do not in turn make republican governing any more possible? What then?

Of course, it's not been settled that these new communications technologies do make revolutions any easier. It never will be. Fast-forward to today and it looks like in Egypt they have practically given up on asking the question.

Ih Al Ahram Weekly, Mohamed Abdel-Baky asks why social media appears to have lost its power to mobilise large demonstrations:
Five years after 25 January Revolution, social media may still play a role in political life but its ability to mobilise anti-government supporters has been eroded, particularly in the last two years.

As the fifth anniversary of the uprising that toppled Hosni Mubarak approaches, popular social networks like Facebook and Twitter have seen limited activity, most of it focussed on calling for the release of detainees. Online demands for massive demonstrations to return to Tahrir Square have been few and far between, and the online response muted.

The Twitter hashtag #Ragain lel maidan (“We are back to the square”) attracted a few thousand Egyptian users but interest quickly waned.

“There is a lot of activity on Facebook and Twitter demanding the release of detainees and complaining about the way the revolution’s goals have been abandoned but it is far from turning into a mass movement on the ground,” says Ahmed Ragab, a researcher at the Egyptian Centre for Public Policy Studies.
Back in 2011, social media seemed to give Egyptians the kind of power and voice they lacked at the ballot box. Just five years later, social media just isn't playing as strong a role.

Ahmed Ragab, a researcher at the Egyptian Centre for Public Policy Studies, is quoted giving 2 reasons for this:

• In 2010 a majority of social networkers opposed the Mubarak regime. However today, the Al-Sisi administration has millions of supports on both Facebook and Twitter.
  
  
• Egyptins have lost confidence in the ability of protests to achieve political and social change.

But is that confidence in achieving political and social change any stronger back here in the United States? After all, the US is a real democracy. In the US, we have a real voice through the ballot box.

Right?

The answer may not be so enthusiastic, according to Glenn Reynolds, who writes in USA Today of a Forecast of distrust with a chance of revolution. Noting that Americans have more faith in the military than in the "political class", Glenn writes:
According to a recent Associated Press poll, the public lacks confidence in government. And by “lacks confidence,” I mean “really lacks confidence.” Specifically, “More than 6 in 10 respondents expressed only slight confidence — or none at all — that the federal government can make progress on the problems facing the nation in 2016.”

And this isn’t just Republicans in a sour mood after seven years of Obama. As the AP noted, “Perhaps most vexing for the dozen or so candidates vying to succeed President Barack Obama, the poll indicates widespread skepticism about the government's ability to solve problems, with no significant difference in the outlook between Republicans and Democrats.”Reynolds traces this to a variety of US failures. To name a few:

• Middle East chaos
• Putin's increased influence in in eastern Europe and Syria;
• Saudi Arabia desire for nuclear balance with Iran
• Seven years of economic “recovery” and record deficits.
• The IRS scandal
• The botched ObamaCare rollout

Reynolds adds to the list "a seemingly endless array of similar screwups. When they’re not crooks, our leaders all too often seem to be incompetents."

And if there is no longer any confidence that the Republicans are up to fixing the problems -- if voters are not confident they can vote themselves out of this mess, then, as Reynolds notes, people will look to other solutions. Suddenly, Americans are as disillusioned with the ballot box as Egyptians are with social media. It's tough when the public consensus if being consistently frustrated.

Which may go much further than voting for Donald Trump.

Reynolds points to a YouGov poll from last fall that found that 29% of Americans could imagine supporting a military coup and Newser reported: “Some 71% said military officers put the interests of the country ahead of their own interests, while just 12% thought the same about members of Congress.“

Suddenly, The political situation in the United States doesn't seem so different from from Egypt.


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Technorati Tag: Egypt and United States and Social Media and Elections2016.

Ausgelöst durch die kriminellen Nötigungen von Frauen in Köln in der Silvesternacht wird in den Medien über die möglichen Ursachen für dieses Fehlverhalten muslimischer Jugendlicher gerätselt. Seitens unbedarfter deutscher Politiker wird als Allheilmittel zur Verhinderung weiteren Fehlverhaltens eine forcierte Integration dieser Jugendlichen verlangt. Dabei wird übersehen, dass in vielen islamischen Staaten das Verhältnis zwischen Mann und Frau durch archaische Vorschriften, die viel älter sind als der Islam und mit dieser Religion wenig Gemeinsamkeiten aufweisen, geregelt wird. Dazu gehört auch der Stammeskodex der Paschtunen, das Paschtunwali.

In der Zeit von März 1894 bis Mai 1896 wurde die 1287 km lange Ost- und Südgrenze zwischen Afghanistan und dem damaligen Britisch-Indien durch eine afghanisch-britische Grenzkommission entsprechend den Plänen von Sir Mortimer Durand, Sekretär von General F. Roberts, 1880 Sieger über die Afghanen und später Lord of Kandahar, festgelegt.[1] Durch diese sogenannte Durand-Linie wurde das Gebiet der indoeuropäischen Paschtunen, die bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt die ethnische Mehrheit in Afghanistan gebildet und seit 1747, dem Jahr der Gründung von Afghanistan, immer die Herrscher gestellt hatten, in zwei Teile getrennt.

Bei der Teilung von Britisch-Indien wurde im August 1947 Pakistan als unabhängiger Staat gegründet.[2] Trotz den Protesten von Kabul hielt Pakistan an der Durand-Linie als Grenze zu Afghanistan fest. Das Siedlungsgebiet der Paschtunen blieb getrennt. Damit blieben Pakistan bis auf den heutigen Tag auch die halbautonomen Stammesgebiete, die sogenannten Tribal Areas, die durch Paschtunen besiedelt sind, als Unruhegebiet an der Grenze zu Afghanistan erhalten. Diese Stammesgebiete waren während der sowjetischen Besetzung Afghanistans das Durchgangsgebiet für Waffenlieferungen an die Mujaheddin aus Pakistan. Heute haben die pakistanischen Taliban ihre Stützpunkte in diesen Gebieten und auch ihren Rückhalt. Bis anhin ist es der pakistanischen Armee nur bedingt gelungen, diese Gebiete unter die Kontrolle der Regierung von Islamabad zu zwingen.

Das wichtigste, bis heute bestehende Bindeglied zwischen denjenigen Paschtunen, die in Afghanistan leben und jenen, die in Pakistan beheimatet sind, ist der Stammeskodex der Paschtunen, das Paschtunwali. Dieser Kodex beruht auf Richtlinien und Weisungen, wie taboorwali, tor, badal, melmastia und nanawatee.[3] Im Zentrum des Paschtunwali stehen taboorwali und tor. Taboorwali bestimmt über Generationen hinweg die Rivalität innerhalb der väterlichen Verwandtschaft. Taboor ist der Sohn des väterlichen Onkels, der gleichzeitig auch ein Feind sein kann.[4] Die Verletzung der Ehre, nang, eines Paschtunen führt zur Umsetzung von taboorwali. Für die Verletzung von nang genügt nur ein kleiner Anlass.[5] Aus zwei Cousins können Todfeinde werden, die sich gegenseitig töten müssen. Eine solche Todfeindschaft dauert über Generationen hinweg und kann zum Tod vieler Männer führen. Damit regelt taboorwali auch die Überbevölkerung eines Gebietes.

Tor kann als Schwarz übersetzt werden und stellt die Kompromittierung der Keusch- und Reinheit einer Frau dar. Dies ist für einen Mann die schlimmste Verletzung von nang, damit das schwerste Verbrechen und kann nur durch badal geahndet werden.[6] Badal ist Rache und Tod zugleich. In diesem Fall wird badal über Generationen hin ausgeübt, denn zan, zar und zamin – der Besitz von Frauen, Gold (Geld) und Land – dürfen nicht in Frage gestellt werden. Sie sind das Fundament der paschtunischen Gesellschaft.[7] In einem Hinterhalt wird dem Feind aufgelauert und dieser niedergestreckt.

Grundsätzlich ist nang das Symbol der Männlichkeit eines Paschtunen, saritob, und bestimmt damit das Weltbild des Paschtunentums.[8] In dieser von Männern dominierte Welt entscheidet allein der Mann. Nur dieser ist erbberechtigt. Zu nang und saritob gehören auch der Besitz und das Führen einer Waffe (topak garzai). Nur wer ein Gewehr besitzt und führt ist ein echter Paschtune. In Pakistan ist der Waffenbesitz nur in den Tribal Areas erlaubt. Nang und saritob sind das Sinnbild des Paschtunentums und damit Zeichen der Männlichkeit. Zu dieser Männlichkeit gehört mindestens auch das Tragen eines Schnurrbarts.[9]

Selbst die Paschtunen betrachten die Einhaltung des Paschtunwali als halben Wahnsinn (Pukhto nim liwantob day). Für die Nichtpaschtunen sind die Paschtunen „Dummköpfe“, weil sie sich untereinander töten würden (kamakal dee yaw bal wajni). Sie verletzen durch die strikte Befolgung des Paschtunwali sogar die Rechtsvorschriften der Scharia und setzen sich damit in Widerspruch zum Islam.[10]

Zum Paschtunwali gehört auch melmastia, das Gesetz der Gastfreundschaft. Melma ist der Gast und dieser darf solange er ihm Haus des Gastgebers lebt, nicht angerührt werden. Ein Gastgeber wird sich für den Gast, wenn es sein muss, auch in erhebliche Unkosten stürzen.

In der Welt der Paschtunen genügt es nicht als Paschtune geboren zu werden. Man muss auch als Paschtune leben. Dies bedeutet die Einhaltung des Kodex des Paschtunwali und damit das Befolgen von nang und die Umsetzung von badal. Das Paschtunwali ist auf Ehre und Würde ausgerichtet, die mit Tapferkeit, Heldenmut, Grossmut und Freigiebigkeit verbunden sind.[11]

Die Einhaltung des Paschtunwali bestimmt zwangsläufig auch das Sicherheitsbedürfnis der Paschtunen. Dieses Sicherheitsbedürfnis hat zum entsprechenden Hausbau der paschtunischen Bauern geführt. Die „Qala“ ist ein grosses Gehöft mit hohen Mauern und Ecktürmen und wirkt wie eine mittelalterliche Burg.[12] In einer Qala leben Grossfamilien. Vielfach sind grosse Qala auch der Sitz eines Khans, eines Stammesführers. Diese Bauweise dient auch dazu, die Frauen vor den Blicken Fremder fernzuhalten oder zu schützen.

Das Paschtunwali ist Wesen und Ausdruck des Paschtunentums und regelt seit Generationen das Leben der Paschtunen in Afghanistan, insbesondere aber auch in den pakistanischen Stammesgebieten. Bereits 1837 charakterisierte das Brockhaus die Paschtunen wie folgt:[13]

„Die Einwohner sind sehr verschiedenen Stammes und treiben starken Karawanenhandel mit Landesprodukten. Herrschend sind unter ihnen die Afghanen, welche sich selbst Puschtaneh nennen. Sie sind kriegerisch, roh und räuberisch, aber gastfrei und bekennen sich zum sunnitischen Mohammedanismus.“

1839 besetzten die Briten Afghanistan. 1841/42 wurde das gesamte Expeditionskorps mit über 13‘000 Männern und Frauen auf dem Rückzug von Kabul nach Jalalabad vernichtet. Die britischen Soldaten hatten durch ihr Verhalten in Kabul gegenüber den Frauen das nang der Paschtunen verletzt. Dies konnte nur durch badal geahndet werden. Das Paschtunwali wird solange ausgeübt werden, solange es freie Paschtunen mit ihrer archaischen Gesellschaftsform geben wird.

 

[1] Brechna, H., Die Geschichte Afghanistans, Das historische Umfeld Afghanistans über 1500 Jahre, Zürich, 2005, S. 178.

[2] Ahmed, A.S., Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, The Search for Saladin, London and New York, 1997, S. 141.

[3] Ahmed, A.S., Pukhtun Economy and Society, Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society, London, Boston and Henley, 1980, P. 367.

[4] Stahel, A.A., Das Frontier Corps, Ein paramilitärischer Verband von Pakistan in den Tribal Areas, in: Buciak, S. und R. von Dehn (Hrsg.), Indien und Pakistan – Atommächte im Spannungsfeld regionaler und globaler Veränderungen, Verlag Dr. Köster, Berlin, 2010, S. 496.

[5] Stahel, A.A., S. 497.

[6] Ahmed, A.S. (1980), P. 367.

[7] Trench, Ch., The Frontier Scouts, With a Foreword by Ph. Mason, London, 1986, P. 3.

[8] Ahmed, A.S. (1980), P. 97.

[9] Snoy, P., Dorfleben – Stadtleben, in Nicod, M.R. (Hrsg.), Afghanistan, Pinguin-Verlag, Innsbruck, 1985, S. 112.

[10] Ahmed, A.S. (1980), P. 98.

[11] Snoy, P., Die Bevölkerung, in: Nicod, M.R. (Hrsg.), S. 80.

[12] Snoy, P., Dorfleben – Stadtleben, S. 110.

[13] Snoy, P., Die Bevölkerung, S. 73.

Az Európai Bizottság új rendelettel kívánja biztosítani azt, hogy a gépjárműgyártók pontosan betartsák valamennyi uniós biztonsági, környezetvédelmi és gyártási követelményt és előírást. Gépjárművenként akár 30 ezer eurós pénzbírsággal is sújthatják a szabályokat kijátszókat.

Nagyszerű felvételek az orosz főváros legújabb és legmodernebb épületeiről. Moszkva, Oroszország.

The European ministers responsible for competitiveness  meet in Amsterdam to discuss the digitisation of industry, strengthening the single markets (digital and services), future-proof legislation and innovation-friendly frameworks. 

The grandness of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy lies in its potential to render the existing conundrum of various EU strategies into a more orderly set of strands with a clear vision regarding their mutually complementary role.

Strategies are in-built in EU’s genome. These policy documents define EU’s aims, approaches in tackling challenges and addressing common issues.  EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter – EUGSFSP) is being designed with an aim to “enable the Union to identify a clear set of objectives and priorities for now and the future. On this basis the European Union can align its tools and instruments to ensure that they have the greatest possible impact”. The EUGSFSP refers to other existing initiatives, which should be streamlined according to the needs of this particular strategy. This short overview of several EU’s strategies is aimed at providing a broader context on how the EU Global Strategy of Foreign and Security Policy fits in the existing conundrum of EU strategies. Consequently, it provides few suggestions for consideration in the context of the EUGSFSP drafting and implementation process.

EU strategies are designed, coordinated and their implementation is overseen by Directorates General of the European Commission, as well as European External Action Service. It is a common practice that prior to the drafting process a public consultation takes place. Then, during the drafting process of a strategy states come together to identify areas of mutual interest, where they see the added value of a joint action. It could be termed as the “business as usual” practice.

Broadly speaking, these policy documents are being discussed on two levels. The European level encompasses inter-service consultations and public consultations, as well as the European Council and its working groups. The national level is characterised by working groups which gather all national (and in certain cases subnational) entities involved in the implementation of the relevant strategy.

Overall, EU strategies vary in structure, level of details in terms of implementation process, approach on measuring achievements, as well as vagueness or concreteness of goals. For example, DG MARE coordinates the EU Maritime Security Strategy (hereafter – EUMSS) which excels in its detailed approach towards actions to be pursued. One of DG REGIO’s facilitated strategies is the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (hereafter – EUSBSR), which, as its name suggests, has a regional focus and is characterised by broad descriptions of policy areas, getting closer to implementation once the flagship projects are explained. The European External Action Service is leading the EU Central Asia Strategy, which since 2007 defines a tailored approach to each of the five countries involved. These are just three examples of a much wider pool of EU strategies dedicated to regional matters or a specific policy area.

The reason why EU strategies are described as a conundrum is that they are far from being unique in terms of issues they are addressing and geographic areas they are aiming at covering. Here are few examples of overlapping responsibilities. Both the EUMSS and the EUSBSR aim at strengthening the cross-sectoral cooperation and synergies between information, capabilities and systems of various authorities in domains of maritime surveillance, preparedness for emergency situations and marine pollution. Moreover, the EUMSS has its own external dimension (called “Workstrand 1”), which defines actions to be undertaken in cooperation with the third parties. Similarly, EUSBSR encompass cooperation with non-EU countries. In addition, the Strategic Review “The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world” covers regions which have already their specific EU strategies in place, such as the previously mentioned EU Central Asia Strategy.

Why it is worth pointing out these commonalities? The success of EU tools and instruments lies in their complementary nature. When it comes to the EUGSFSP, it would be advisable to go beyond the “business as usual” practice outlined above and render the existing EU strategic conundrum in a more orderly jigsaw. Namely, the EUGSFSP would explain the role of other relevant EU strategies and clarify their unique contribution to attaining the EUGSFSP goals. Such an approach would also help to pool the existing expertise for more coordinated actions and streamline initiatives taken under various EU frameworks, as well as avoid duplication of activities.

However, such an endeavour demands additional coordination of input and effort both from European and national levels. On the European level, it requires brainstorming regarding the future inter-service coordination of various strategies in order to increase the overall awareness on various EU strategies among different divisions of EU institutions. On the national level, it requires extended consultations. These discussions should not be limited to the so-called “usual suspects”, such as authorities dealing with foreign affairs, defence and military matters. It should incorporate inputs from other governmental bodies involved in national steering of different EU strategies. All in all, if the EUGSFSP really is aimed at being grand, these suggestions might help to render the EUGSFSP impressive and overarching not only in words but also enshrine it in its nature and scope.

 

The post EU’s Conundrum of Strategies: Is There an Orderly Jigsaw on the Horizon? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

DRAFT REPORT on Space capabilities for European security and defence
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

DRAFT REPORT on Space capabilities for European security and defence
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Roberto Savio, founder and president emeritus of the Inter Press Service (IPS) news agency and publisher of Other News

By Roberto Savio
ROME, Jan 27 2016 (IPS)

The rich and the powerful, who meet every year at the World Economic Forum (WEF), were in a gloomy mood this time. Not only because the day they met close to eight trillion dollars has been wiped off global equity markets by a “correction”. But because no leader could be in a buoyant mood.

Roberto Savio

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is losing ground because of the way she handled the refugee crisis. French President Francois Hollande is facing decline in the polls that are favoring Marine Le Pen. Spanish president Mariano Rajoy practically lost the elections. Italian President Matteo Renzi is facing a very serious crisis in the Italian banking system, which could shatter the third economy of Europe. And the leaders from China, Brazil, India, Nigeria and other economies from the emerging countries (as they are called in economic jargon), are all going through a serious economic slowdown, which is affecting also the economies of the North. The absence of the presidents of Brazil and China was a telling sign.

However the last Davos (20-23 January) will remain in the history of the WEF, as the best example of the growing disconnection between the elites and the citizens. The theme of the Forum was “how to master the fourth revolution,” a thesis that Klaus Schwab the founder and CEO of Davos exposed in a book published few weeks before. The theory is that we are now facing a fusion of all technologies, that will completely change the system of production and work.

The First Industrial Revolution was to replace, at beginning of the 19th century, human power with machines. Then at the end of that century came the Second Industrial Revolution, which was to combine science with industry, with a total change of the system of production. Then came the era of computers, at the middle of last century, making the Third Industrial Revolution, the digital one. And now, according Schwab, we are entering the fourth revolution, where workers will be substituted by robots and mechanization.

The Swiss Bank UBS released in the conference a study in which it reports that the Fourth Revolution will “benefit those holding more.” In other words, the rich will become richer…it is important for the uninitiated to know that the money that goes to the superrich, is not printed for them. In other words, it is money that is sucked from the pockets of people.

Davos created two notable reactions: the first came with the creation of the World Social Forum (WSF), in 1991, where 40,000 social activists convened to denounce as illegitimate the gathering of the rich and powerful in Davos. They said it gave the elite a platform for decision making, without anything being mandated by citizens, and directed mainly to interests of the rich.

The WSF declared that “another world is possible,” in opposition to the Washington Consensus, formulated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Treasury of the United States. The consensus declared that since capitalism triumphed over Communism, the path to follow was to dismantle the state as much as possible, privatize, slash social costs which are by definition unproductive, and eliminate any barrier to the free markets. The problem was that, to avoid political contagion, the WSF established rules which reduced the Forums to internal debating and sharing among the participants, without the ability to act on the political institutions. In 2001, Davos did consider Porto Alegre a dangerous alternative; soon it went out of its radar.

At the last Davos, the WSF was not any point of reference. But it was the other actor, the international aid organization Oxfam, which has been presenting at every WEF a report on Global Wealth.

Those reports have been documenting how fast the concentration of wealth at an obscene level is creating a world of inequality not known since the First Industrial Revolution. In 2010, 388 individuals owned the same wealth as 3.6 billion people, half of humankind. In 2014, just 80 people owned as much as 3.8 billion people. And in 2015, the number came down to 62 individuals. And the concentration of wealth is accelerating. In its report of 2015, Oxfam predicted that the wealth of the top 1 per cent would overtake the rest of the population by 2016: in fact, that was reached within ten months. Twenty years ago, the superrich 1 per cent had the equivalent of 62 per cent of the world population.

It would have been logical to expect that those who run the world, looking at the unprecedented phenomena of a fast growing inequality, would have connected Oxfam report with that of UBS, and consider the new and immense challenge that the present economic and political system is facing. Also because the Fourth Revolution foresees the phasing out of workers from whatever function can be taken by machines. According to Schwab, the use of robots in production will go from the present 12 per cent to 55 per cent in 2050. This will cause obviously a dramatic unemployment, in a society where the social safety net is already in a steep decline.

Instead, the WEF largely ignored the issue of inequality, echoing the present level of lack of interest in the political institutions. We are well ahead in the American presidential campaign, and if it were not for one candidate, Bernie Sanders, the issue would have been ignored or sidestepped by the other 14 candidates. There is no reference to inequality in the European political debate either, apart from ritual declarations: refugees are now a much more pressing issue. It is a sign of the times that the financial institutions, like IMF and the World Bank, are way ahead of political institutions, releasing a number of studies on how inequality is a drag on economic development, and how its social impact has a very negative impact on the central issue of democracy and participation. The United Nations has done of inequality a central issue. Alicia Barcena, the Executive secretary of CEPAL, the Regional Center for Latin America, has also published in time for Davos a very worrying report on the stagnation in which the region is entering, and indicating the issue of inequality as an urgent problem.

But beside inequality, also the very central issue of climate change was largely ignored. All this despite the participants in the Paris Conference on Climate, recognized that the engagements taken by all countries will bring down the temperature of no more than 3.7 degrees, when a safe target would be 1.5 degrees. In spite of this very dangerous failure, the leaders in Paris gave lot of hopeful declarations, stating that the solution will come from the technological development, driven by the markets. It would have been logical to think, that in a large gathering of technological titans, with political leaders, the issue of climate change would have been a clear priority.

So, let us agree on the lesson from Davos. The rich and powerful had all the necessary data for focusing on existential issues for the planet and its inhabitants. Yet they failed to do so. This is a powerful example of the disconnection between the concern of citizens and their elite. The political and financial system is more and more self reverent: but is also fast losing legitimacy in the eyes of many people. Alternative candidates like Donald Trump or Matteo Salvini in Italy, or governments like those of Hungary and Poland, would have never been possible without a massive discontent. What is increasingly at stage is democracy itself? Are we entering in a Weimar stage of the world?

(End)

Romániát hozta ki jobban teljesítőnek az Európai Bizottság éves jelentése a bolgár és a román igazságügyi rendszer működéséről. Az Együttműködési és Ellenőrzési Mechanizmus (CVM) keretében készült értékelés mindként ország esetében gondnak érzi, hogy még ha a kormány reformálna is, a parlament sokszor akadályokat támaszt.

Legalább ötvenezer háztartásnak kell részesülnie a lakóépületek felújítására szánt uniós támogatásból. Ha a kormány nem szállítja az eredményeket, a Bizottság visszatarthatja a kifizetést.

Az Egyesült Államok azért akarja meggyengíteni Oroszországot, hogy hozzáférjen természeti kincseihez - jelentette ki a Moszkovszkij Komszomolec napilap híroldalán kedden megjelent interjújában Nyikolaj Patrusev, az orosz biztonsági tanács titkára. "Nem kizárt, hogy ezt a célt az Oroszországi Föderáció széthullásának útján kívánják elérni. Ez lehetővé tenné, hogy az Egyesült Államok hozzáférjen a gazdag erőforrásokhoz, amelyekkel véleményük szerint Oroszország érdemtelenül rendelkezik - mondta Patrusev, aki azután vette a testület operatív irányítását, hogy 1998 és 2008 között az orosz Szövetségi Biztonsági Szolgálat (FSZB) vezetője volt.

Görögországnak most már papírja van arról, hogy nem képes a minimálisan elvárható módon őrizni a külső schengeni határokat. Brüsszel egy-két héten belül konkrét ajánlásokkal fordulhat Athénhoz, amelynek három hónapja lesz a hibák kijavítására. Ha ez nem sikerül, amit sokan már előre készpénznek vesznek, Németország, Svédország és mások jogszerűen akár további két évre is fenntarthatják majd a belső határellenőrzést.

Rencontre avec Affiong Williams, fondatrice et présidente de Reelfruit au Nigeria, dans le cadre de la série Femmes d’Afrique. "Le prochain Starbucks de l’Afrique" Sourde, aveugle et diplômée de Harvard

Ces 14 Martiniquais et 14 Martiniquaises font partie de la première promotion de gendarmes adjoints volontaires recrutés et formés localement dans leur île.Ils