Foreign Policy Blogs

On May 21st, 2025, Tesla dropped its most impressive humanoid robot demo yet—a slick video of its Optimus robot cooking dinner, folding laundry, and taking out the trash. It wasn’t just choreography this time. The robot moved with coordination, handled tools with finesse, and followed natural language instructions—sparking online comparisons to “Rosie” from The Jetsons, the 1960s cartoon housekeeper who could do it all.

But while American audiences were still replaying the demo, across the Pacific, a different robotic future was quietly taking shape. Backed by strategic state funding and a relentless manufacturing machine, Chinese firms have been scaling up their own humanoid robots—less flashy, perhaps, but increasingly functional. And cheaper.

The question looms: Is Tesla about to deliver the first real Rosie? Or will China’s mass-market “Red Rosie” quietly win the race to your living room?

Optimus Evolves: From Viral Gimmick to Domestic Assistant

Tesla’s latest version of Optimus marks a stark evolution from its earlier dance-floor debut. In this newest release, the robot is shown preparing food, loading a dishwasher, and cleaning up—a transition from gimmick to genuine utility.

The leap forward lies in how it learns. Optimus can now observe third-person videos online, interpret them using computer vision and large language models, and reproduce tasks in physical space. Instead of needing line-by-line coding, it learns by watching—much like humans do.

Tesla says this model is being trained for a wide variety of applications, domestic and industrial alike. Elon Musk claims Optimus will enter mass production by 2030, with a target price of around $20,000 per unit, and ambitions for up to 1 million units per year.

It’s still early-stage—there are no retail units, no delivery timelines—but Optimus now looks less like science fiction, and more like a near-future consumer appliance.

Meanwhile, in Shenzhen: China’s Scaled-Down, Scaled-Up Approach

While Tesla’s Optimus captures headlines and likes, Chinese robotics firms are quietly building something more pragmatic: general-purpose service robots optimized for cost, volume, and immediate use.

China is already the world leader in industrial robot deployment, commanding over 50% of global installations. But in the last three years, its domestic firms have moved aggressively into humanoid and service robotics—deploying robots into hospitals, hotels, warehouses, and nursing homes.

Companies like Fourier Intelligence, UBTECH, and Unitree have each rolled out bipedal humanoids that can perform basic chores, support the elderly, or deliver goods in indoor settings. Some of these are already in commercial pilot use and priced below $10,000, made possible by China’s vast electronics supply chain and vertically integrated production ecosystems.

The difference isn’t just corporate—it’s strategic. China’s robot push is state-coordinated, part of national policy under the “Made in China 2025” initiative. Robotics R&D receives heavy subsidies, public-private partnerships accelerate prototyping, and domestic robot firms are given preferential access to procurement contracts.

It’s not about viral moments. It’s about building infrastructure.

Two Philosophies: Innovation vs. Execution

 

The contrast reveals fundamentally different approaches to robotics development:

  United States (Tesla, etc.) China (Various firms) How Robots Learn Robots watch videos and follow spoken instructions Robots follow set rules and also try to imitate behaviors What Robots Do Take on complex, advanced tasks Perform simple, practical tasks for everyday use Building Scale & Cost Small scale, prototype phase Large scale mass production, focuses on low cost Government Support Minimal direct backing, mostly private investment Strong government policies and funding support Typical Use Areas Factories and high-tech industries Hospitals, delivery, elderly care, and logistics Current Deployment Mainly in development, no public use yet Actively testing in real places like hospitals and hotels  

Tesla embodies Silicon Valley’s moonshot culture—bold technical leaps paired with viral marketing moments. Chinese firms follow a more methodical approach rooted in manufacturing pragmatism and coordinated state strategy.

Reality Check: Are We Living in The Jetsons Yet?

Rosie from The Jetsons vacuumed floors, managed schedules, offered life advice, and kept the family sane. Today’s robots—Optimus included—are still bound by brittle generalization and narrow use cases. They can follow a recipe, but can’t yet adapt to a toddler running underfoot or an unexpected spill.

Technically, we’re on the verge of semi-autonomous domestic robots that perform specific household tasks—but only under controlled conditions. And they can’t yet feel, intuit, or comfort, which limits their value in caregiving or companionship.

So yes, Rosie is coming—but she’ll start out as a kitchen intern with limited mobility and zero sarcasm. Full-blown domestic androids with emotional intelligence? That’s still science fiction.

The Bottom Line: Star Power vs. Industrial Engine

Tesla’s Optimus demonstrates what’s possible when cutting-edge AI, robotics engineering, and brand hype converge. But Chinese firms—state-backed, efficiency-optimized, and supply-chain fluent—may reach ordinary consumers faster.

Tesla might be the one to dream up Rosie. But China might just mass-produce her first.

The future of domestic robotics may not arrive with a viral video—but it may come stamped with “Made in China” and priced for mass adoption rather than headlines.

The September 2025 summit between the United States and the United Kingdom marks a watershed moment in the international nuclear energy landscape. The launch of the Atlantic Partnership for Advanced Nuclear Energy—an ambitious framework for regulatory alignment and joint commercial development—signals a peaceful, prosperous transition to what UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has hailed as a “golden age” of nuclear cooperation between two of the world’s most influential nuclear powers.

From Diplomatic Accord to Market Impact

At the heart of the summit’s breakthrough is an unprecedented commitment to streamline regulatory approval processes jointly conducted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). This new arrangement seeks to compress the typically protracted nuclear licensing period—from as much as four years to roughly two—by pooling safety assessments and operational reviews. For the private sector, this promises accelerated deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced modular reactors (AMRs), technologies critical to the strategic energy needs of both nations.

Alongside regulatory reform, the summit produced major commercial commitments. UK energy firm Centrica and US-based X-Energy agreed to develop up to 12 AMRs in Hartlepool, expected to power 1.5 million homes and generate approximately $15 billion(£12 billion) in economic output. Complementing this is a $14 billion( £11 billion) project to establish an advanced data center in Nottinghamshire powered by SMRs, through a partnership between US companies Holtec International and Tritax and France’s EDF—highlighting the deepening intersection of nuclear power and the digital economy across the Atlantic.

Beyond power generation, the partnership highlights nuclear fuel supply chain security, where US technological expertise and strategic capacity are vital to enhancing energy resilience. Collaborative fusion research—particularly the application of artificial intelligence for high-fidelity modeling, which involves creating extremely detailed computer simulations of nuclear systems—further underscores the alliance’s cutting-edge character. Together, these initiatives are projected to attract billions in private investment and create tens of thousands of high-skilled jobs—positioning the US-UK nuclear partnership as a strategic linchpin in the expanding global SMR market while advancing their shared goals of energy security, economic growth, and technological leadership.

Rise of Fourth-Generation SMRs and Maritime Nuclear Power

At the technological frontier of the US-UK nuclear partnership, fourth-generation SMRs epitomize the next leap in nuclear innovation. These reactors—often classified as AMRs—feature advanced cooling systems such as helium or sodium, elevated thermal efficiencies, and modular factory construction that reduces both costs and build times compared with legacy plants. Their design allows for flexible deployment across national grids, remote regions, or integration with high-tech industries. Just as importantly, 4G SMRs and AMRs converge with fast-growing fields like artificial intelligence and big data. Intelligent monitoring enables predictive maintenance and operational optimization, while their reliable electricity supports energy-intensive infrastructure such as hyperscale data centers—now central to both digital economies and broader national energy strategies.

The US-UK partnership’s focus on advanced nuclear technologies, including SMRs and AMRs, reflects these ambitions. With firms such as Rolls-Royce and X-Energy advancing commercial projects, the UK SMR Consortium estimates that by 2050 these efforts could deliver up to 24 gigawatts of new nuclear capacity and create around 40,000 skilled jobs.

Beyond SMRs on land, the US-UK partnership marks a pivotal step toward maritime nuclear power, poised to unlock a multi-trillion-dollar industry by transforming global shipping—a sector that still derives more than 99 percent of its energy from fossil fuels. Companies such as Core Power and Holtec International are developing floating nuclear plants and compact reactors to power ports and vessels. With the International Maritime Organization targeting net-zero emissions by 2050, and alternative fuels like hydrogen and ammonia facing economic and logistical barriers, nuclear emerges as a uniquely viable solution. 

Strategically, integrating nuclear into maritime infrastructure helps to substantially reduce exposure to fossil fuel price volatility—which has historically imposed significant financial risks on the shipping industry by causing unpredictable and often steep fuel cost fluctuations. Nuclear propulsion also offers extended vessel lifespans—with nuclear-powered ships typically operating for 40+ years compared to 20-25 years for conventional ships—reducing lifecycle costs and improving safety through reduced reliance on volatile oil markets. These advances contribute to geopolitical stability by securing vital energy corridors and strengthening supply chains critical to global trade.

By establishing innovative regulatory frameworks, fostering public-private partnerships, and enabling new commercial models, the United States and United Kingdom now stand at the forefront of transforming maritime energy for a secure, prosperous future—essential for sustaining global trade in the 21st century.

The escalation of the War in Ukraine came about in a significant manner recently when several Iranian designed attack drones entered Polish airspace from Belarus and Russia. While Ukraine has been the front lines in defending itself and access points into NATO territory, the border between NATO and the East is the Polish border. Poland has been equipping itself and readying its people to defend the nation from any possible threats to its integrity and sovereignty. Poland has been the strongest ally in NATO against threats from Russia, and has taken a generational approach to its own defense and that of NATO as a whole. Not only did Poland rapidly displace its old Warsaw Pact equipment with more modern NATO tanks and systems, but Poland has taken to establishing South Korean military equipment production in Poland, producing some of the best weapons systems in the world in local facilities. Poland is due to become one of the strongest militaries in the world, and it has now faced its first direct assault from Russia.

While the attack was significant as an act of war, it was not a serious threat to the integrity of Poland, its defenses, or its people. The reasoning behind the drone incursion into Poland is not known, but there are many suspected reasons behind it, none accepting the act as one taken in error. The debate currently going on in Poland and NATO is whether a strong response is required, and what proportional act of force is reasonable, if any at all. Suspected reasons for the incursion could be a show of force by Russia soon after China revealed its new missile force to the world. This might not be the case as Russia has its own significant missile force, and it has not been used against Poland and has been challenged in Ukraine. Drone usage often is accompanied by a swarm tactic using such systems mixed with higher end ballistic missiles, but that did not take place in the attack. Beyond a show of force against Poland, the drones could have been used to reveal the defensive capabilities of Poland against Russian weapons, as Polish defenses and NATO support all scrambled in response from the Netherlands, Italy, France, and local neighbours. What is clear however is that another possible escalation in the future is probable.

The lingering response of NATO and its allies to possible future threats has done nothing but made the conflict more robust and more likely to spiral out of control. The lack of solid coordination in displacing the purchase of Russian oil and gas until 2025, and those funds not only propping up the Rouble, but funding Russian war production does nothing more but extend the war and drain funds. The dedication to the war effort was ever diminishing when public funds in the billions from Ukraine’s allies contradict national energy policies in many of those same nations. It is suspect that since 2022, North American energy policy did not move to assist Europe in their fight, and in 2025 Canada has yet to adjust its energy policy towards assisting its allies currently in conflict in Europe. To add to these policies, the complete avoidance of targeting or eliminating the production of terror weapons, namely the drone production facilities in Iran, allowed those civilian murdering weapons to spring up in Kurdish lands, Poland and Venezuela. To end the war, it is best to start by actively preventing further conflict.

It is not known if the acts against Poland will trigger a wider conflict between NATO and Russia, but the manner the West and NATO treats its natural allies is as much of a challenge in this policy environment as Russian incursions. Rewarding Russian allies and Russian acts does more to turn the tide against NATO and its allies than to end the war with acceptable results. The narrative of a united front will never succeed as simple prose, as actions are needed in this wider war to end a Third World War. Responses in 2025 is the junction point between the end of war in Europe, or the spread of this war globally. It is that significant, and will start in the skies over Poland.

After the collapse of the USSR, Moldova emerged as a fragile state, burdened by weak institutions and deep socio-economic crises. The 1992 armed conflict in Transnistria further exposed these vulnerabilities. Although the conflict was frozen, for over three decades, it has remained an inseparable part of Moldova’s political landscape.

Moldova today is not merely a small post-Soviet republic. Situated between Romania and Ukraine, it lies at the intersection of EU and Russian spheres of influence. For this reason, every election and political decision attracts serious attention, both regionally and internationally.

European leaders — German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen — broke diplomatic protocol by traveling directly to Chișinău to openly endorse President Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS).

Their message was clear: if Moldova embarks on the path of EU accession, it will enjoy economic growth and even find solutions to the Transnistrian conflict.

Yet this approach has sparked controversy. Opposition figures argue that open support from EU leaders disrupts electoral balance and undermines the legitimacy of the ruling party.

During the Biden administration, Moldova received millions of dollars in U.S. assistance, some of which had originally been earmarked for Ukraine. Former USAID Administrator Samantha Power stated bluntly: “We gave Moldova unprecedented support; we expanded USAID programs significantly.”

But the new administration — represented by Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio — has sharply criticized this policy. In their view, if a nation’s democracy depends on foreign money, then it was never strong to begin with.

The United States is now shifting toward a more distant stance, leaving Moldova’s future more in the hands of the European Union. As elections approach, Sandu’s government faces serious accusations:  pressure on opposition figures, closure of independent media outlets, and restrictions on access to polling stations.

Opposition leader Ion Ceban, mayor of Chișinău, stated bluntly: “They are holding the country hostage. They tell us: if you don’t support us, war in Transnistria may flare up again.”

The government denies these charges, insisting all measures comply with Moldovan law. Yet the pre-election climate is far from democratic standards. Former Israeli Communication Minister Ayoob Kara has assessed the Moldovan situation as follows: “Democracy cannot be sustained merely through pressure from Brussels or Washington; it must be strengthened by the free will of Moldova’s citizens. When foreign interventions distort electoral balance, public trust erodes. What we truly need are equal conditions, free media, and every citizen’s ability to express their vote freely.”

His statement underscores three critical points:

1. The risk of foreign intervention — it may undermine democratic legitimacy.
2. The necessity of strong domestic institutions — the only path to long-term stability.
3. Public trust — the true foundation of democracy.

 Kara’s remarks highlight that while international actors shape the playing field, genuine democracy depends on the people themselves. Moldova may be small, but it has become a symbolic battleground in the global struggle for influence.

 For the EU: Moldova is meant to be a success story of European integration. For the U.S, the new administration prefers distance, but for Donald Trump, resolving the Transnistrian issue could represent a major diplomatic achievement — perhaps even strengthening his case for the Nobel Peace Prize.

As Vice President JD Vance put it: “If your democracy can be destroyed by a few hundred thousand dollars in foreign advertising, then it wasn’t very strong to begin with.”

These words echo Kara’s perspective: one from the outside, the other from within the region, but both pointing to the same truth — real democracy can only be built on the will of the people and the strength of domestic institutions.

The Moldovan elections provide three key lessons:

1. For the West: The limits of exporting democracy are becoming clearer.
2. For Moldova: The real issue is preserving internal legitimacy.
3. For the international community: Democracy cannot be imported; it must grow from within.

Moldova’s elections are not just about one small country’s domestic politics — they are also a critical test of whether the West’s model of democracy promotion will succeed or fail.

Image Credits: Energy Industry Review

Strategic Partnership with the Cook Islands as a Small Step to The Blue Energy Revolution

 

On August 4, 2025—marking the 60th anniversary of the Cook Islands’ self-governing status—the United States secured a landmark bilateral agreement that fundamentally reshapes Pacific geopolitics. This strategic partnership grants U.S. companies prioritized access to seabed mineral exploration across the Cook Islands’ expansive 1.9 million square kilometer Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), while ensuring the islands maintain sovereign control over marine stewardship—a crucial balance that demonstrates American respect for partner autonomy.

The timing reveals masterful strategic calculation. Beijing’s 2024 agreement with the Cook Islands for seabed mineral exploration rights had triggered urgent reassessment in Washington. Rather than ceding this critical territory to Chinese influence, the new U.S. partnership represents a swift, decisive competitive response that transforms potential strategic loss into American advantage in the expanding Pacific theater.

The deep ocean floor within the Cook Islands’ EEZ harbors vast deposits of polymetallic nodules rich in nickel, cobalt, and manganese—critical minerals that power what experts recognize as the emerging ‘Blue Energy Revolution.’ This paradigm transcends traditional green technologies anchored to terrestrial renewable energy, instead harnessing the ocean’s vast untapped potential through breakthrough marine applications: offshore renewable energy systems, advanced maritime technologies, and sustainable undersea infrastructure that position America at the forefront of next-generation resource development.

Recent technological advances showcase American innovation leadership through sophisticated remotely operated subsea vehicles and cutting-edge offshore processing vessels. These systems create integrated vertical transport networks connecting seabed operations with surface facilities—an industrial value chain that promises to revolutionize critical mineral extraction while maintaining significantly lower environmental footprints than conventional terrestrial mining. The Cook Islands agreement strategically leverages this technological superiority, emphasizing rigorous scientific research, robust environmental safeguards, and technological cooperation to ensure transparent, responsible resource management that protects marine ecosystems while driving sustainable economic development.

From Green to Blue: A Unifying Western Narrative of Transregional Pacific Governance Framework

 

This bilateral partnership strategically builds upon America’s broader Pacific engagement initiatives, demonstrating sophisticated multilayered diplomacy. In September 2023, the United States joined the Pacific Islands Forum—representing island nations across 41 million square kilometers of ocean—to champion a unified commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” This framework embodies transregional governance excellence, where U.S. allies and partners coordinate seamlessly across vast maritime spaces to ensure lasting peace, enhanced security, climate resilience, and sustainable economic growth that benefits all partners.

The forum’s joint statement directly addressed countering “malign influences”—diplomatic language universally understood as strategic concern over China’s aggressive regional expansion. It called for strengthened maritime governance and ocean conservation cooperation, successfully uniting island nations around shared principles of sovereignty and sustainability. This approach demonstrates American leadership by transcending traditional multilateralism, integrating fisheries management, ocean surveillance, maritime law enforcement, and environmental standards into a comprehensive strategic framework that maximizes collective security and prosperity.

Pacific island communities, whose economies depend fundamentally on ocean health and productivity, had found traditional “green economy” rhetoric—focused primarily on terrestrial ecosystems and carbon reduction—inadequate for their maritime realities. The emerging “blue economy” concept directly addresses these needs by emphasizing sustainable ocean resource utilization: fisheries, marine renewable energy, seabed minerals, and marine biotechnology, while prioritizing ocean health, community resilience, and equitable economic opportunity that resonates with Pacific values and American interests.

This maritime-centered narrative has proven remarkably effective at fostering Western coalition strength and unity. The European Union has committed over €350 million to Pacific blue economy projects by 2030, supporting sustainable fisheries, ocean conservation, and clean marine energy development that complements American initiatives. Australia and Japan have similarly realigned their Pacific strategies around blue economy principles, creating unprecedented Western coordination that strengthens collective bargaining power against Chinese economic coercion.

World Bank projections confidently estimate the global blue economy will reach $3 trillion annually by 2030. The Pacific region, containing the world’s largest combined EEZs, stands positioned to dominate this economic transformation—provided governance and sustainability challenges are successfully addressed through American leadership and technological innovation.

Pacific Ocean Resources: Wealth and Vulnerability

 

The Pacific Ocean’s 63 million square miles contain extraordinary mineral and biological wealth that represents both immense opportunity and strategic vulnerability. The Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), spanning 4.5 million square kilometers between Hawaii and Mexico, holds approximately 21.1 billion dry tonnes of polymetallic nodules containing cobalt, nickel, manganese, and rare earth elements essential for blue technologies powering battery storage and offshore renewables—resources critical to American technological supremacy and energy independence.

Despite the International Seabed Authority administering 17 exploration contracts covering 75,000 square kilometers within the CCZ, commercial mining remains suspended due to regulatory deliberations and environmental concerns that create opportunities for American leadership in establishing responsible extraction standards. Policymakers must skillfully balance immense economic potential against manageable risks including seabed disturbance and biodiversity loss, positioning the United States as the global leader in sustainable deep-sea resource development.

Beyond mineral wealth, the Pacific supports 60 percent of global tuna catch, generating over $10 billion annually in trade value while providing critical protein sources for 12 million Pacific island residents and hundreds of millions worldwide. Pacific coral reefs, covering 25 percent of global reef areas and harboring 30 percent of marine biodiversity, support essential fisheries, tourism, and natural climate resilience infrastructure. These ecosystems face mounting challenges from overfishing, illegal fishing fleets, climate-induced bleaching, and ocean acidification—threats that American technology and environmental leadership can effectively address while strengthening regional partnerships.

The U.S.-Cook Islands partnership thus represents far more than bilateral cooperation—it signals comprehensive Western strategy to secure sustainable ocean resource development while systematically countering Chinese expansion in this strategically vital region. Through technological superiority, environmental stewardship, and genuine partnership, America has positioned itself to lead the blue energy revolution while offering Pacific nations a compelling alternative to Chinese debt-trap diplomacy.

The EAC (East African Community) Global Connect Summit and Expo 2025 will be held August 19-21 in Nairobi, focusing on “Unlocking East Africa Community Markets to Global Business Avenues through Enhanced Trade Collaboration.”

Media narratives about the Global South often center on India and Brazil, portraying them as regional hegemonic powers and key patrons of neighboring economies. While this framing captures part of the story, it overlooks other emerging leaders. Africa—widely seen as a potential future hub of the Global South—is undergoing a dynamic transformation. According to the African Development Bank Group’s 2025 African Economic Outlook, Africa’s economy is projected to accelerate from 3.3 percent growth in 2024 to 3.9 percent in 2025, and to 4.0 percent in 2026, despite global economic uncertainties and geopolitical tensions. East Africa leads this momentum with an estimated 5.9 percent growth rate, driven by resilient economies such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Tanzania. In 2025, 21 African countries are expected to surpass 5 percent growth, with Ethiopia, Niger, Rwanda, and Senegal potentially reaching the critical 7 percent threshold for substantial poverty reduction and inclusive development. This robust performance places Africa ahead of the global average, making it the second-fastest growing region after emerging Asia.

Yet the BRICS-centric framing of the Global South often obscures the role of rising African actors, creating challenges for U.S. leadership. To align the broader Global South with U.S. strategic interests, Washington must intentionally support and nurture these emerging African nations—an approach that reflects shifting multipolar realities and positions the United States as a key partner in building a more inclusive and balanced global order.

Evolving U.S. Engagement in Africa, with East Africa at the Forefront

In recent years, U.S. engagement in Africa has shifted from a primarily aid-focused approach to one emphasizing trade, investment, and private-sector-led growth. The Trump administration’s Bureau of African Affairs Commercial Diplomacy Strategy, launched in 2025, exemplifies this transition by prioritizing commercial diplomacy over traditional aid. Within its first 100 days, the initiative facilitated 33 deals worth more than $6 billion, effectively integrating U.S. business interests with Africa’s expanding economic potential.

East Africa has emerged as a central focus of this strategy, owing to its strategic location along the Indian Ocean—a key maritime route—and its blend of political stability and economic integration. Countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Tanzania are driving regional growth that surpasses the continental average, supported by substantial infrastructure investments, market reforms, and a growing middle class.

Even more, U.S. and East African relations have strengthened in the energy sector. The U.S.-Africa Energy Forum, held on August 7–8, 2025, in Houston, successfully connected U.S. investors with Africa’s rapidly growing energy market. Strategic partnerships with organizations such as the African Energy Chamber and African Energy Week granted American companies direct access to licensing rounds, LNG projects, deepwater exploration, and large-scale renewable energy initiatives. With Africa’s 2025 energy capital expenditures projected between $43 and $47 billion, this forum positioned U.S. firms to capitalize on substantial investment opportunities.

Building on this growing closeness between the U.S. and East Africa, momentum will continue with the EAC (East African Community) Global Connect Summit and Expo 2025, scheduled for August 19–21 in Nairobi. As East Africa’s economic powerhouse, Kenya is playing a leading role in advancing the EAC’s economic integration. This landmark event, themed “Unlocking EAC Markets to Global Business Avenues through Enhanced Trade Collaboration,” is expected to attract over 6,000 visitors, 2,000 delegates, and 400 companies from the region and beyond. The summit aims to expand intra-regional trade, attract foreign investment across agriculture, energy, technology, and tourism sectors, and foster public-private partnerships to further strengthen East Africa’s position as a vibrant economic hub.

Strengthening People-to-People Economic Ties

Beyond official initiatives, deepening people-to-people economic links between the U.S. and East Africa offers a powerful but underappreciated means of engagement. The growing African American middle class has nurtured a financially empowered diaspora increasingly investing in and relocating to East African nations such as Kenya.

Recent reports point to a surge in African American migration to Kenya, motivated not only by cultural and ancestral ties but also by opportunities in entrepreneurship, real estate, and technology. While media coverage often focuses on U.S. political and social controversies, these diaspora communities serve as important economic and cultural bridges—facilitating trade, investment, and exchange.

The U.S. government could integrate these connections into a broader investment-driven strategy. By expanding diaspora-focused funds and incentives, Washington could direct private capital toward sustainable growth projects in East Africa, reinforcing its diplomatic objectives. With remittances to sub-Saharan Africa exceeding $85 billion in recent years—outpacing foreign direct investment and official development assistance—policies that harness these flows could significantly strengthen economic integration and U.S. influence.

East Africa Aligned with U.S. Interests as a Future Linchpin of the Global South

Envision a Global South where East African economies—closely aligned with U.S. strategic interests—take on a central role, moving beyond a narrative historically dominated by India and Brazil. Emerging East African nations possess significant potential to assert their own agency, serving both as reliable partners and strategic counterbalances to other regional powers. By nurturing robust economic and diplomatic partnerships with East Africa, the United States can help shape a Global South where East African countries become pivotal players driving stability, shared prosperity, and a more balanced international order in the decades to come.

China’s licensed produced and updated French Crotale missile system, the HQ-7B took the stage in 2009…a similar system used to protect venues during the Olympics at the time. The last military parade in China was held in 2009 to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. (Vincent Thian / Associated Press)

Early September will bring Beijing to a halt as China’s allies come for one of the most pivotal global military presentations since 2009. With the War in Ukraine likely entering its next phases of capabilities and China, Russia and North Korea now fighting side by side on the fields of Europe’s most deadly conflicts since the Second World War, China has chosen to flex its muscles and demonstrate its military in a grand show of power.

Despite heavy losses of Russian, North Korean and some Chinese independent combat troops in Ukraine, the recent air spat between Pakistan and India had the West take notice. The capabilities of Chinese produced weapons systems were always in question, but when Chinese J-10 Fighters of the PAF were able to destroy and damage some of India’s best Rafale Fighters, Europe and the United States took notice of the jet, and its advanced Chinese missile systems. This pivotal 2025 conflict for China’s weapons industry came after years of Russian export sales decline after systems were seen as too vulnerable in the field and supply was routed back to support Russia’s war effort. Since the end of the Cold War, Russian weapons production focused on export sales of systems, licensing and technology of Russian produced systems, supplying a multitude of nations, including large clients like India. China now has its sales pitch to expand its weapons sales deep into the Global South, displacing Russia where it can with capable low cost platforms.

The September Parade celebrating historical triumphs has a few core purposes besides demonstrating national strength and re-enforcing ties with its allies. Weapons sales may come from new and advanced systems making their debut during the Parade, with the movement of systems being surprisingly uncovered while they make their way through Chinese streets towards the capital. The knowledge that international intelligence agencies as well as prospective buyers will take notice is evident by the openness in exposing new systems to the world. A new tank and weapons platform that looks to be designed for the conditions present in Ukraine is a likely outcome from China’s men on the ground in combat, experience that can often only be gained in a real world scenarios. Knowledge of NATO combat systems was likely possessed by China due to naive Western leader’s ties to the PLA before the start of the 2022 war, but would be re-enforced by knowledge gains from captured NATO Leopard 2s and Bradleys. Even in North Korea during a recent ceremony for fallen soldiers in Ukraine, they claimed that losses have great value as capabilities through combat experience was well noted in speeches by their leadership. What is clear is that this parade is the most significant display of new military equipment since China’s re-introduction to the world in 2008.

The new Generation of China’s post Ukraine War equipment comes as a new phase in global power dynamics shrouds the international security situation. Without a solidified end to the War in Ukraine, chances are that China and Russia will develop closer ties, with China becoming the main power rival of the West as Russia diminishes in its global influence economically. The past phase of the growing China came about in the 2008-2009 era when economic gains and prosperity brought China to the economic level of its financial rivals post joining of the WTO. The famous presentation of new combat systems in the 2009 Military Parade showed the modernity of China’s PLA, with China’s now dated 2009 systems still being some of the more advanced and newest mass produced combat equipment available in large numbers of any major military power.

The past generation of China’s military equipment would alter the balance of power due to capability and number if China chose to sell its older tank and artillery fleets to supply the battlefield in Ukraine. Even if China avoided selling its 2009 era modern ZTZ-99 tanks, the sale of ZTZ-96s and PLZ artillery types would match many modern T-72Bs and older Soviet made 2S1s, 2S3s and 2S5s used by both sides. With the new Generation 2025 tank likely displacing the older unit’s equipments, a lower calibre on the modern tank may show it is meant for the Indian border region or to focus on Taiwan, with anti-drone technology and designs matching the ultra modern Russian T-14 Armata platform. Whatever the intent of China and its allies, it is clear that this demonstration of weapons is one promoting strength in an era where most other large militaries have depleted equipment levels and old technology at the core of their armies. Peace agreements are crucial at this juncture, but it might be the case that it is not wanted in Ukraine at this time by one or either side.

Moscow’s centuries-long ambition to dominate the South Caucasus is collapsing. Armenia’s defiance, Azerbaijan’s sharp responses, and the West’s growing involvement have shattered the Kremlin’s “backyard” myth. The region no longer bows to imperial dictates — a new era is unfolding.   Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus is rapidly shrinking. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s open rejection of Moscow’s “divide and rule” policies became a symbolic turning point. Once considered a loyal ally, Yerevan now openly questions the value of its ties with the Kremlin.   Baku and Tbilisi, for their part, had long voiced frustration with Moscow’s imperialist posture. Russia’s tactic of exploiting ethnic divisions to maintain dominance has lost its previous force. Georgia’s experience with Abkhazia and South Ossetia proves that separatism as an instrument of control is unsustainable.   At the funeral of an Azerbaijani soldier who died in the war in Ukraine, the presence of his Armenian comrade and his words to the grieving mother — “From now on, you are also my mother” — struck a deep emotional chord across the region. This humane gesture stood in stark contrast to the hostility cultivated by Moscow and resonated as a powerful call for peace and reconciliation.    In late 2024, a civilian Azerbaijani plane was shot down by a Russian Pantsir-S1 missile, killing 38 people. The incident marked a watershed moment in Baku-Moscow relations, with President Aliyev openly threatening international legal action against Russia.    The arrest of Russian citizens, including Sputnik staff, in Azerbaijan further eroded the Kremlin’s image. These developments exposed Moscow’s declining status as an “untouchable” power in the region.   The Washington summit created a framework for Armenian-Azerbaijani understanding and effectively sidelined Russia’s role as mediator. The United States’ assertive diplomacy has accelerated the emergence of a new political order in the South Caucasus, underscoring the collapse of Moscow’s last bastions of influence.   Analysts highlight that a generation has grown up in the South Caucasus independent of Russia. The Russian language and cultural presence are steadily declining in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Instead, ties with the West, Turkey, and regional initiatives are taking precedence.   Moscow is losing its grip on a region it long considered its unquestioned “backyard.” — Armenia is openly resisting. — Azerbaijan is holding the Kremlin accountable through legal and political measures. — Georgia is pursuing its sovereign course. — The United States and other Western actors are shaping a new geopolitical reality.   The South Caucasus is no longer Russia’s domain. A new chapter is being written — one that rises from the ashes of imperial illusions, toward independence and freedom.

At a time of heightened geopolitical tension in the South Caucasus, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian selected Armenia as his first destination. The visit aimed to preserve regional balance, strengthen economic and transport ties, and respond to Western-backed initiatives threatening to sideline Tehran near its northern frontier.   Iran and Armenia share a border and centuries of intertwined history. During his trip, President Pezeshkian referred to Armenia as a “friend and neighbor,” emphasizing that the goal was not only to sign new agreements but also to accelerate the implementation of earlier commitments in economic, cultural, and social fields.   Tehran’s concerns were sharpened by the U.S.-brokered “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), which proposes linking mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenian territory. Iranian officials viewed this as a plan that could diminish Iran’s regional leverage. Pezeshkian’s visit sent a clear signal that Iran rejects projects undermining its influence in the South Caucasus.   The visit carried a strong economic agenda. Both governments prioritized energy partnerships, trade expansion, and infrastructure development. Multiple agreements were signed covering pipelines, electricity grids, and new transport corridors. The two sides set ambitious trade goals: reaching $1 billion annually in the near term, with plans to expand to $3 billion in the next phase.   The United States has become increasingly active in regional mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. By traveling to Yerevan, Pezeshkian reaffirmed Tehran’s intent to remain a key stakeholder. Consistent with Iran’s long-standing policy, his administration reiterated support for Armenia’s territorial integrity and voiced opposition to projects such as the controversial Zangezur corridor.   Beyond hard politics, the visit also highlighted cultural and humanitarian ties. From historic Persian architecture in Armenia to the Iranian cultural center in Yerevan, symbols of shared heritage remain important pillars of bilateral relations. Pezeshkian stressed that cooperation is not limited to state contracts but is grounded in mutual understanding and centuries of friendship.   By choosing Armenia at this critical juncture, Iran’s president sought to: — defend Tehran’s influence in a rapidly shifting regional landscape, — resist Western-backed projects near its border, and — deepen economic, cultural, and political ties with a trusted neighbor.   The move was both pragmatic and symbolic — a reminder that Armenia remains a vital corridor for Iran’s ambitions in the South Caucasus.

Even a progressive, democratically rooted good twisted into unintended evil is nonetheless evil. Santa Muerte and the Narco Saint emerged from a problematic fusion of Catholic Liberation Theology and local folk beliefs(Photo credit: The New York Post).

By the early twentieth century, the Catholic Church controlled nearly one-third of Mexico’s arable land—a monopoly that stoked fierce power struggles, left thousands dead, and triggered waves of social upheaval. The roots of this imbalance lay in the Church’s relentless accumulation of land and wealth through exploitative practices, its alliances with entrenched political and economic elites, and its instinct to safeguard the institution over the well-being of impoverished peasants. These injustices hardened into what might be called a kind of mauvais sang—a deep, inherited malaise that ran through Mexico’s social fabric. It first erupted during the Cristero War (1926–1929), a bloody confrontation between Catholic establishments and liberal reformers seeking to dismantle the Church’s vast hacienda-based holdings. Later, the same malaise was rearticulated rhetorically through Liberation Theology, a movement forged in the crucible of poverty and inequality. By the 1970s, more than sixty percent of Latin Americans lived below national poverty lines, while regional Gini coefficients remained stubbornly above fifty, reflecting entrenched inequality.

Founded on the just cause of fighting poverty and injustice, Liberation Theology too often succumbed to liberal romanticism and revolutionary nostalgia. It lost faith in rational methods for resolving systemic problems—or in Catholic rationalism itself. Its embrace of Marxist ideas proved especially fraught, prompting Vatican condemnations in 1984 and 1986 for political excesses and theological divisiveness. This blurred the lines between spiritual liberation and criminal-political power struggles, fueling violence, corruption, and institutional instability. The movement notably gained momentum and was formalized through the Medellín Conference in 1968, held in Medellín—an area later infamous for its associations with drug cartels—highlighting the complex and sometimes troubling intersection between liberation theology and local power dynamics.

The Criminal Evolution of Catholic Liberation Theology

In the 1970s and 1980s, liberation theologians lent support to revolutionary movements across Central and South America, at times aligning themselves with guerrilla fighters and even drug traffickers. In Nicaragua, for example, prominent clerics backed the Sandinista revolution and supported guerrilla warfare against the Somoza dictatorship—a testament to how ideals of spiritual liberation could mutate into armed conflict. Although Liberation Theology publicly preached emancipation and equality, such entanglements deepened cycles of violence and institutional collapse. The resulting civil wars that swept Central America displaced millions and claimed over two hundred thousand lives, far from the justice liberation theologians so fervently pursued.

Colombia experienced similar tragic consequences. Between 1980 and 2010, roughly 220,000 people were killed in drug wars, some of which were indirectly legitimized through Church involvement financed by cartel money. Major cartels like Medellín invested millions in Church projects to buy political influence and grassroots legitimacy. This criminal patronage still thrives; a 2017 Colombian government report found that nearly fifteen percent of parishes in cartel-controlled regions maintained financial or logistical ties to illicit groups, eroding the Church’s autonomy and credibility.

Mexico followed a comparable trajectory. In regions where liberation theology had taken deep root, some parishes became enmeshed in local power structures overlapping with cartel networks. In Michoacán and Guerrero, priests faced investigations for allegedly accepting “donations” from traffickers, and cartel leaders often appeared openly at parish events. In 2013, Mexican authorities revealed that at least a dozen churches had been used for laundering crime proceeds, often through conspicuously large offerings.

In Mexico, the criminal legacy linked to liberation theology has uniquely embedded itself within the cultural landscape. The cult of Santa Muerte, or “Saint Death,” which now claims over eight million devotees—including drug traffickers—embodies the unsettling fusion of piety and organized crime. Despite condemnation by the Mexican Bishops Conference in 2013, the devotion endures, further eroding the Church’s traditional authority. Alongside Santa Muerte, narco-saint rituals reinforce cartel cohesion and territorial control, weakening the Church’s historic role as mediator and moral guide. Groups like MS-13, with up to seventy thousand members across the United States and Central America, have incorporated Santa Muerte and narco-saint practices into their own rituals, illustrating the deep cultural legacy of criminal–church entanglements. As a result of this persistent theological distortion, trust in the Catholic Church within cartel-dominated Mexican states such as Guerrero and Tamaulipas has fallen sharply—from 68 percent in 2000 to just 47 percent in 2023.

Catholic Liberation Theology and U.S.–Mexico Immigration

Since 2008, more than five million undocumented migrants have crossed into the United States from Mexico. In 2023 alone, southern border encounters totaled 2.4 million. The Church, through organizations such as Caritas Mexico, has provided humanitarian aid to hundreds of thousands of migrants—more than 300,000 in 2022. Yet Liberation Theology’s politicization, and its shadow of cartel collusion, have weakened ecclesial unity and hampered coordinated advocacy for migrant communities.

Across Latin America, traffickers and guerrillas alike have co-opted the rhetoric of Liberation Theology. By framing their work as “liberation from oppression,” they justify criminal violence as political struggle, muddying the boundary between crime and resistance. The effect is twofold: it grants such groups a veneer of legitimacy and draws popular support from the marginalized. What began as a call for justice becomes a script for lawlessness.

The result has been a deepening fracture in Latino communities and a harder road for U.S.–Mexico immigration reform. Pragmatic cooperation has given way to polarization and rancor.

Can Catholic Rationalism Offer a Way Forward?

Perhaps the most troubling legacy of Liberation Theology’s politicization is its encouragement of a radical Catholicism that resists Catholic rationalism. Catholic rationalism, rooted in the broader tradition of thinkers like Thomas Aquinas and European scholasticism, holds that moral and theological truths arise through the interplay of faith and reason. It demands clarity, logical consistency, and ethical accountability, enabling believers to confront real-world challenges with both doctrinal fidelity and intellectual rigor.

American Catholic rationalism, while grounded in these same foundational principles, is distinctively marked by its emphasis on practical moral reasoning, transparency, and accountability within the public sphere. It prioritizes engagement with democratic institutions, legal frameworks, and pluralistic dialogue, offering a pragmatic approach that bridges spiritual conviction and civic responsibility. This tradition fosters open debate and reform both within the Church and society at large.

The philosopher Jacques Maritain serves as a crucial bridge between Catholic rationalism as a whole and the American Catholic tradition. Born in France but influential for many years in American academic circles, Maritain helped shape modern Catholic thought, notably laying the intellectual groundwork for universal human rights grounded in human dignity, personal responsibility, and the integration of faith and reason. His reinterpretation of Aquinas’ doctrine of the golden mean envisioned Catholic rationalism as a discipline of balance, tempering extremes by placing reason and free will at the core of moral decision-making. Maritain’s focus on ethical accountability and transparency continues to inspire contemporary calls for reform and integrity within the Church.

Importantly, this rationalism acknowledges that human experience is always mediated and subject to distortion, emphasizing careful scrutiny of transcendental claims through reason rather than blind acceptance. Maritain’s perspective resists both unchecked subjectivity and rigid dogmatism, grounding spirituality in a balanced interplay of reason, ethics, and communal life. His modern virtue ethics elevates reason as essential for discerning moral truth, navigating between legalism’s rigidity and relativism’s uncertainty, and recognizing the dynamic, situational nature of virtues amid contemporary complexities.

Joined with today’s demands for accountability and reform, this nuanced rationalism offers a promising path to restore the Church’s credibility and renew its capacity to address political and social crises. Through transparent governance, consistent moral conduct, and pragmatic, faith-informed action, Catholic institutions can embody the golden mean—not merely as an abstract ideal but as lived practice—reclaiming their role as both spiritual leaders and thoughtful contributors to a more just and coherent society.

By Rachel Avraham

At first glance, Libya may appear to be a distant battlefield of fragmented governments and tribal conflict. But as emphasized by analysts at the Dor Moria Think Tank, beneath the surface lies a growing strategic threat to Israel — stemming primarily from Turkey’s expanding military and political presence across the Libyan landscape. Since spring 2025, Turkey has significantly reoriented its Libya policy. Once exclusively aligned with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), Ankara has now opened formal channels with the rival eastern bloc led by General Khalifa Haftar. This strategic pivot includes maintaining military infrastructure in western Libya while forging new economic and security ties with the east.

As the Dor Moria Think Tank explained: “This isn’t just tactical flexibility — it’s strategic encirclement. Turkey is entrenching itself across both shores of the Mediterranean, narrowing Israel’s maneuvering room.” With permanent military bases in Misrata and al-Watiya, and now expanding into Tobruk and Benghazi, Turkey is building a two-coast presence — a silent power play that threatens to redraw regional balance, especially around Israel’s Eastern Mediterranean gas interests.

The 2019 maritime agreement between Turkey and Libya’s GNA remains central to Ankara’s regional ambitions. It grants Turkey expansive maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean — claims that directly threaten the EastMed pipeline project backed by Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. “If Libya’s eastern parliament recognizes the Turkey-Libya maritime pact,” warns the Dor Moria Think Tank, “Israel’s energy fields could become international flashpoints — disputed, blocked, or undermined.” The implications are serious. Israel would be forced to rely more heavily on Egypt’s LNG terminals in Idku and Damietta — more costly, less autonomous, and politically more vulnerable.

In its  latest strategic briefing, the Dor Moria Think Tank outlines Turkey’s broader model of “non-military containment” — a method of expanding influence not through war, but through multi-theater presence: In Syria, 40,000 troops and allied militias across the north; In Libya, dual engagement with both Tripoli and Benghazi; In the Caucasus, logistical and military partnerships with Azerbaijan via the Zangezur Corridor.

“Turkey is operating simultaneously in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus,” writes the Dor Moria Think Tank.  “This is not just projection — it’s pressure. Israel is being boxed in.” For Israel, the threat is multidimensional: Turkish-Russian convergence in Libya could lead to joint control over Eastern Mediterranean maritime access; Weaponized migration from Africa via Libya may be used as leverage against the EU — with indirect impact on Israel; Lack of Israeli influence inside Libya limits its ability to counter emerging threats or gather intelligence.

The Dor Moria Think Tank stressed: “Every base Turkey establishes in Libya becomes a pressure point against Israel. This isn’t war — it’s strategic suffocation.” According to the Dor Moria Think Tank, Israel faces three potential strategic paths:

1. Managed Chaos (60%) – Turkey stays in Libya but faces balancing pressures from the U.S. and EU.
2. Direct Confrontation (25%) – Military escalation in Syria or the Mediterranean involving Turkish and Israeli assets.
3. Authoritarian Stabilization (15%) – Turkey dominates Libya with limited Western resistance.

These scenarios reveal how Libya is directly linked to Israel’s posture in Syria, the Caucasus, and even the Persian Gulf. Long considered distant from Israel’s core security concerns, Libya in 2025 is now central to Tel Aviv’s strategic planning. Energy security, maritime freedom, regional deterrence, and Turkish power projection converge in this evolving theater.

As the Dor Moria Think Tank warns: “The risk isn’t a Turkish tank on Israel’s border. It’s waking up one day to find the entire chessboard flipped — with your access routes, alliances, and energy fields redefined.” For Israel, Libya is no longer a sideshow. It’s a strategic test — and the rules of the game are already changing.

Following the publication of this report by the Dor Moria Think Tank, Saadat Sukurova, the chairwoman of the Dona Gracia Center for Diplomacy and a prominent Azerbaijani journalist who heads Kanal 24, stressed: “The geopolitical landscape of 2025 makes it clear that developments in Libya are no longer merely local or regional confrontations. The analysis presented by the Dor Moria Think Tank illustrates Israel’s strategic dilemma within a broader geostrategic context. Turkey’s simultaneous expansion of influence in Libya, Syria, and the Caucasus signals the emergence of a new power balance across the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.”

According to Sukurova, “Turkey’s engagement with both western and eastern factions in Libya is more than tactical maneuvering — it is a strategy of influence-building. This directly impacts the configuration of regional energy routes, maritime borders, and diplomatic alliances. In this regard, Israel’s concerns are both natural and legitimate, particularly with respect to energy security, freedom of maritime navigation, and the erosion of regional deterrence. However, responding to these threats through direct confrontation alone risks further escalation and instability. Instead, multilateral diplomatic mechanisms, energy cooperation frameworks, and inclusive regional dialogue offer more sustainable paths toward managing the evolving power dynamics.”

She stressed: “Turkey’s increasing military presence and energy diplomacy raise serious strategic questions not only for Israel, but also for Greece, Egypt, and the European Union. Therefore, rather than approaching the issue solely from a single nation’s threat perception, there is an urgent need to rethink the regional security architecture and strengthen diplomatic engagement. In conclusion, Libya is no longer a marginal battlefield — it has become a pivotal point in the future geopolitical architecture of the Mediterranean region. For that reason, all actors, including Israel and Turkey, must balance their national security concerns with a sense of regional responsibility and mutual interdependence.”

Ayoob Kara, who served as Israel’s Communication Minister, concurred: “As a long-time advocate for regional cooperation and stability in the Middle East, I am closely monitoring the shifting dynamics emerging in North Africa — particularly Turkey’s expanding presence in Libya. The recent analysis by the Dor Moria Think Tank correctly highlights a growing strategic complexity. Turkey’s dual engagement with both Tripoli and Benghazi, combined with its military footprint and maritime ambitions, presents significant challenges not only to Israel’s energy independence but to regional balance and security.”

“However, while these developments are deeply concerning, I firmly believe that the solution lies not in confrontation, but in calibrated diplomacy,” Kara stressed. “Israel must act with strength and wisdom — protecting its vital interests in the Eastern Mediterranean while also seeking broader frameworks of cooperation with international and regional actors. It is in the interest of all peace-seeking nations to prevent Libya from becoming a battleground for proxy competition. Instead, we must collectively invest in multilateral diplomacy, energy dialogue, and maritime agreements that ensure shared prosperity and long-term security.”

Kara concluded: “I call on the international community — including our allies in Europe, the United States, Egypt, and the Gulf — to pay close attention to this critical front. A unified stance is necessary to prevent further destabilization and to uphold international maritime law. Libya is no longer a distant arena. It is a strategic test for Israel, for Turkey, and for the future of the Mediterranean as a whole. We must rise to the challenge — not through escalation, but through foresight and responsible engagement.”

 

The official mascot for the 2026 World Cup has not yet been announced. This is just an AI-driven recreation of a publicly released draft concept.

The biggest World Cup in history is about to make a big statement on American soil.

The group draw for the record-setting 2026 FIFA World Cup — featuring an unprecedented 48 national teams — is locked in for December 5, 2025, at noon local time. President Donald Trump announced the news himself, confirming that the event will take place at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D.C.

This isn’t just another soccer tournament. It’s the first World Cup to expand to 48 teams across 12 groups, leading into a knockout stage that starts with the Round of 32. Trump underscored the massive global scale of the competition, estimating a live audience of around 1 billion people and calling the 104-match tournament the equivalent of “104 Super Bowls.”

The action kicks off on June 11, 2026, and runs through July 19, with matches spread across 16 host cities in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. All three host nations are already assigned to groups ahead of the official draw.

The decision to hold the draw in Washington reflects more than logistics — it’s about leadership on the world stage. The tournament will bring together millions of fans and fuel cultural exchange in ways that transcend politics and economics. Sports have always been a unifying force, and in 2026, America will be at the center of it all.

But that’s not all. On July 4, 2026 — America’s 250th birthday — the White House South Lawn will host the first-ever UFC event at a presidential residence. UFC President Dana White confirmed that the card is expected to draw 20,000 to 25,000 fans and will be broadcast live on CBS as part of a groundbreaking media deal.

Two of the world’s biggest spectacles — the FIFA World Cup and UFC — will collide in one summer, creating an unmatched celebration of athletic power, competition, and entertainment. Together, these events signal a new era for sports and cultural diplomacy in North America. They’re not just games — they’re history in the making.

China’s PGZ-95/PGZ-04A is likely the most modern and capable anti-drone system available in quantity worldwide.

Recent videos on air defence over Ukraine detailed the use of one of the original NATO versions of a surface-to-air missile system, the HAWK. It was the case during the Cold War that the Soviet military’s mentality focused around air defence of the realm in response to being invaded by the Germans from the West and suffering casualties in the millions during the Second World War. While the Soviets made air defence systems like the SAM SA-2 famous during its use in the Vietnam war, the United States and its NATO allies lay their focus elsewhere. The United States produced a limited number of air defence systems during the Cold War era, with the HAWK being one of the most well known and well distributed systems compared to the over fifteen Soviet system variants at the time. In 2025, most HAWK systems, including the I-HAWK improved variant, are in storage with Iran having some in use and Ukraine now using refurbished and dusted off systems to ironically target Iranian made drones targeting civilian infrastructure.

While old systems like the HAWK and German made Gepard Anti-Air system are effective against drones, the use of these retired systems are a remarkable achievement reflecting a stilted strategic overall policy against the elimination of civilian terror weapons. Recent policy directives supporting actions by Russian allies do nothing to stop the war, and in many cases extend the conflict. Little to nothing had been done by Ukraine’s NATO allies to target and eliminate drone production facilities, despite billions going into air defence costs to protect civilian targets of these pure terror weapons. The new policy by the US Administration to limit the consumers of Russian Oil and Gas have pushed Russia to the negotiating table faster than any other sanctions platform attempted previously. European indirect purchases of Russian energy products have done more to fund Russia’s military than sanctions have done to prevent further conflict. The lack of effort to displace Russian energy with North American energy in aid of European allies and in the displacement of sources of energy for nations consuming Russian energy products extended the war by months, if not years. Carrots to common allies like India would do more to stabilize the international security situation than making avenues for Russian profit off of Western allies. The reality on the battlefield is that most modern equipment has been spent, to the cost of hundreds of thousands of young lives on both sides.

With Ukraine having the ability to source arms from any nation offering it, it may become the case that Russia would look to purchase quick semi-modern equipment from any nation where such options are available without many barriers to these purchases. While North Korean tanks may not be the best option to equip the front line nor be available in sufficient numbers, China would be the best option for such a purchase, especially since Russian Energy would be used as payment in any large transaction.

The main defence initiatives for China really would not focus on heavy military tank forces in the most populated areas of China to maintain a proper defence perimeter. China’s artillery, missile forces, and Navy are the jewels of China’s military in the most populated and active sectors, with heavy main battle tanks serving a secondary role or being too heavy to transport via a sea invasion. The main threats to China that require large tank forces would ironically come from Northern sectors where Russia or North Korea may induce a conflict where modern tanks would be required. China’s most modern Type ZTZ-99 tanks are slowing becoming the mainstay of the PLA and would be the iron wall to stop any tank advancement from their opponent-allies in that region. In the mountain region near India, which could be considered a current hot conflict, smaller tanks like the ZTQ-15 are the main tactical weapons of the PLA as large tanks with engines that may stall in higher mountain air do not function properly in that region.

Russia’s Tank Biathlon competitions often used the T-72B variant tanks from many former Soviet nations and Russian allies as a friendly military competition for many years, with Russia using more modernised versions of the T-72. China is always invited to these competitions, being the only country to use their indigenous tank and more recently produced contemporary of the T-72B, the Type ZTZ-96. With the ZTZ-99 rapidly replacing the ZTZ-96 variants, a large stock of ZTZ-96 are likely available for purchase, equivalent to later modernised versions of the T-72B despite losing to it in competition. With Western allies and Russia and its allies using very old equipment from the 1970s in many cases, China looks to overturn new equipment rapidly, with much of their famed 2008 military parade equipment already being phased out as outdated by newer systems. A surprising example which would make a big difference over the skies of Ukraine and Russia in countering drones, is the 2008 introduced PGZ-95/PGZ-04A, a system with 4 cannons and 4 small anti-air missiles now being considered in a phase out position, being replaced by the newer PGZ-09. With the PGZ-95/PGZ-04A being decades newer than the Gepard and Soviet ZSU-23-4 used to kill drones, a large stock of such weapons would be able to efficiently defend against many drone attacks using modern radar systems.

China has spent many years trying to increase international weapon sales, with Russia being their main competitor and Russia winning the majority of such contracts in the process. The reality is that China’s weapons export receiving nations have not changed much since the 1970s, but that reality may start to change rapidly. China’s J-10 fighter jet’s success when used by Pakistan in the recent conflict with India showed how it’s planes and missiles were able to challenge some of Russia’s and Europe’s best produced fighters. An opportunity to not only sell to its main arms export competitor, Russia, but also show the superiority of its products in the market against its competitor’s products would change the game for China’s weapons export industry. Whether China is willing to accept tariffs in taking Russian oil imports or by selling weapons to Russia will come into question, but the likely reality is that China can manage it diplomatically.

China is currently receiving tariff threats over its use of Russian Energy, and will end up negotiating it in one fashion or another. Demonstrating that Ukraine’s allies were also purchasing Russian oil for years or were denying North American energy on the market would blunt criticism from Ukraine’s allies in the West. China selling equipment to Russia instead of silently donating supplies could be claimed as purely transactional along with other weapons export sales, as these are common actions taken by other nations in hot conflict zones. Selling drone killing systems from the 2008 era of PLA equipment to both sides of the conflict may be tactically wise as in the end as those systems would be killing unmanned vehicles, protecting civilians, and China should be acting to benefit itself over Russia in any scenario. The approach the US Administration has towards purchasers of Russian Energy will be of great interest as Western ally India and their adversary China would not respond well to sticks, when carrots would work brilliantly, yet differently in both cases. At this point, where both sides of the conflict in Ukraine have depleted their weapons stockpiles, China would be wise to take to profiting off their modern stockpiles as opposed to joining in a conflict for little gain to the country and its people. War should always remain as a last resort, especially if you are in the position to benefit your economy and avoiding a hot conflict locally.

The three points of security contention for the West; Russia, Iran and China, seemed to become ever closer until recently when Russia stepped aside during the US attack on Iran’s nuclear program. For years, closer ties came with North Korean soldiers and former PLA Chinese mercenaries contributing to Russia’s front with Ukraine, a relationship previously thought to be only as a parts supplier of China to Russia’s industrial base. China’s links in the Middle East and recent moves in becoming a broker between Saudi interests and Iran’s interests ended with an evacuation of the region as entrenched Russian allies fell and international shipping became targets, affecting Russian, Chinese and international trade interests.

Much of the reversal of the Axis came with assertive moves from the US and their allies against ties between Russia, Iran and China. With the US and Europe now fully united in the re-invigoration of NATO and a full defense of Ukraine, moves by the Axis has galvanised the West militarily on the Ukrainian front, in focusing on Iran, and may quickly collect a united front if China was to attack Taiwan or India. A tactical error that would mirror Sweden and Finland’s ascension into NATO would be for China to pressure both NATO and India’s common security interests as India and NATO would rapidly form defensive alliances if either interests faced military pressure from China or their regional allies in Asia.

The lack of success on the battlefield by the Axis may explain other policy developments that are designed to fracture the Western alliance, mostly by playing the Delay Card and forcing internal upheaval in Western countries. The targeting of Western norms, via the normalization of disproportionately eroding actions in local communities, clearly function by permanently altering Western interests and the internal degradation of Western norms. Most of these orchestrated events come about when there is a Western victory or paradigm shift towards Western interests, often countered by leadership in the West that have low approval ratings or are in power due to outside interest campaigns.

The race to tear down the internal strength of Western powers must be juxtaposed with the deterioration of regimes in Russia and China due to age or political divisions within their Cabinets and ruling party politics. It is hoped that stability can hold so that Western countries would not fracture, nor would countries like Russia or China fracture, as it would likely lead to a more complicated security situation in both countries. A fractured Russia and/or China is bad for the West as it would harm both local allies and adversaries of Western powers. The race to the bottom must not hit the floor, as the end result is bad for everyone.

Since the October 7th massacre, Israeli society has been greatly torn between those who send their children to the army and are suffering the effects of the war, and Haredim who are exempt from sending their children to the army.  Many segments of Israeli society that send their children to the army are growing greatly resentful of the Haredim, who do not send their children to the army, especially as the causalities from the Gaza War continue to rise, with almost every day us hearing about soldiers who were killed in action.

Israeli society is furthermore torn between those who want this war to end as soon as possible and for the hostages to be released by whatever means necessary, and those who would like to see Hamas militarily defeated, even if it means that not all of the hostages will make it back. While Israeli society has always been divided between the secular and the religious, the right and the left, these divisions have only grown stronger since the October 7th massacre.   In the eyes of some, these internal divisions pose a grave threat to Israeli society, as it is hard to focus one’s efforts on fighting external threats if one lacks a united home front. Some argue that these internal divisions have gotten so bad that they threaten the future functioning of the State of Israel.

The Dor Moria Think Tank recently proclaimed, “Israeli society faces a crisis that transcends traditional political or religious divisions. According to groundbreaking research by the Dor Moriah Analytics Center, the nation is trapped within what researchers call an “ontological bubble”—a self-perpetuating system of mutual antagonism that threatens the very fabric of the state.”

According to the Dor Moria Think Tank, “This isn’t merely another analysis of Israel’s well-documented secular-religious divide or left-right political split. The ontological bubble represents something far more insidious: a complete breakdown in shared reality, where opposing worldviews have crystallized into simplified, irreconcilable narratives that feed on conflict itself.”

“The Dor Moriah Center’s extensive research program—encompassing 14 nationwide sociological studies, 5 expert surveys, and collaboration with leading Israeli polling firms Maagar Mochot and Geocartography—has revealed a disturbing pattern,” the Dor Moria Think Tank noted. “Israeli society has bifurcated into two dominant, antagonistic worldviews: the “secular-liberal” and the “religious-conservative.””

“What makes this an ontological bubble rather than a conventional societal split,” one may ponder. According to the researchers, “it’s the self-sustaining nature of these divisions. Traditional information campaigns or dialogue initiatives don’t bridge the gap—they actually intensify it. Any attempt at neutral positioning triggers negative reactions from both sides. The bubble feeds on conflict, growing stronger with each clash.”

Dr. Lola Kolpina, a sociologist at Haifa University and one of the study’s authors, noted that “the high level of radicalization in respondent answers revealed by the study should be considered. On the most significant social issues, most people take extreme positions, reflecting not so much a process of situation analysis as a behavioral strategy oriented toward pushing through their values and interests rather than dialogue and interest coordination.”

The data confirms this grim assessment:

• Only 27.2% hold moderate positions on the state structure question
• Radical positions outnumber moderate ones by 1.5 times on key issues
• The polarization coefficient for critical dichotomies approaches zero, indicating maximum conflict potential

For example, 45% of ultra-Orthodox Jews frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an existential clash between Judaism and Islam.   However, only 30.1% of secular Jews share this view, with 34.1% seeing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as territorial dispute.   While 30.8% of Israelis favor complete annexation of Palestinian territories—the single most popular position—most (52%) doubt it would resolve the conflict. Yet they’re equally pessimistic about alternatives—only 22.6% believe peaceful coexistence is possible without territorial changes.  Nevertheless, 56.9 percent of the ultra-Orthodox support complete annexation of all Palestinian areas, while only 23.3 percent of secular Jews support this extreme position.

This ontological bubble according to the researchers at the Dor Moria Think Tank adversely affect the functioning as Israel as a state, leaving the state strongly divided between those who are religious versus secular, those who favor a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict compared to a two-state solution.  According to the researchers, unless the issue of the ontological bubble is addressed, Israel will not be able to exist in its present form, as the high level of conflict between the sides and the lack of national solidarity will make it difficult for Israel to function in its present format.

We are already beginning to see signs of how the ontological bubble is adversely affecting the functioning of the Israeli government. Elana Sztokman, co-host at Women Ending War Podcast, recently stated on Facebook: “The Knesset has quietly continued with a whole series of terrible actions aimed at breaking democratic processes and enabling the government to do whatever it wants without any criticism. Among other things, they are frantically trying to remove from office anyone who disagrees with their actions, such as the Attorney General Gali Miara Baharav (still in place, thus far, but in peril), Mk Ayman Odeh (saved for now), and the Knesset speaker Yuli Edelstein — out.”

According to Sztokman, “Edelstein, who I don’t have any particular affinity for considering he has spent most of the past two years as an obedient arm of this corrupt government, did exactly one thing that reflects a possibly lingering conscience within him. That is, he refused to automatically allow the continuing of the haredi draft exemption, while the rest of the country is suffering through this war. For that, for still believing in what’s called “sharing the burden” and putting a stop to the free-flowing faucet of budgets and exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox, he was fired from his speaker job and other important Knesset positions.”

“Now, his powerful position as chair of Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee is about to go to a little-known Knesset member named MK Hanoch Milwidsky,” she added. “Aside from being a Netanyahu loyalist who will do whatever Bibi wants, there is another little item worth knowing about this little Milwidsky guy: He is under investigation for rape. Multiple rapes. His victims are still coming forward.”

However, prominent Middle East scholar Dr. Mordechai has a quite different view than Sztokman and the Dor Moria Think Tank: “Polarization is dangerous when both sides are equal in their power. However, the right side is much more powerful than the left side of the spectrum in Israel. This is why the left stick to the judicial system, the arts, academia, the economy, and media in order to hold onto power. The smaller they become, the more perspicuous they are and more extreme in their actions against the majority. Since this risk is unbalanced, they will finish when the left will be finished and it is going in that direction.”

According to Dr. Kedar, “This is what the demography leads to, with the religious population bigger and more numerous and the secular population smaller and therefore, they become more and more violent. A lady was recently arrested for wanting to acquire a weapon and use it against the prime minister. This means they are desperate. The left lacks significant leadership for they are a large array of positions, which vary from ultra-leftists who identify with Hamas to people who are more centric and define themselves as left because they don’t want to define themselves as right.”

Dr. Kedar feels that polarization in American society is a greater issue than it is in Israeli society: “American society is polarized for it is half and half.   They are divided between Democrats and Republicans. Here, the system represents the people much better for we have a multi-party system for people stick to their parties that they supported in the past. This is the way to manage with this.”    

Source: World Bank

At the core of the strategic rivalry between the United States and China lies China’s heavy dependence on maritime trade routes. As of early 2025, about 57.3% of China’s foreign trade transited by sea, with exports reaching nearly $325 billion in June alone. This maritime reliance underscores the economic dominance of China’s eastern coastal regions—Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Shandong—which together generated over $5.1 trillion in GDP in 2024. These provinces thrive on export-oriented manufacturing and port infrastructure, while inland regions such as Wuhan and Chengdu, despite faster population growth and rising consumption, continue to lag economically, with GDP per capita roughly half that of the coastal hubs in 2023. This stark regional disparity creates a national imperative for Beijing to rebalance economic development toward the interior, driving China’s strategic expansion into Central Asia.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Central Asian corridors play a crucial role as an economic equalizer by channeling trade, investment, and infrastructure into inland provinces, thereby reducing coastal dominance and maritime dependency. Through integrating overland logistics networks—like transnational railways and highways—China empowers inland cities with direct access to global markets. This strategy not only lowers transportation costs and diversifies export routes, but also fosters industrial growth in the interior, fundamentally altering China’s economic geography. Consequently, a rising share of China’s foreign trade is shifting from sea-based routes to land-based networks, narrowing regional economic gaps and significantly lessening China’s vulnerability to maritime chokepoints and external disruptions.

The traditional Indo-Pacific Strategy, which has historically emphasized maritime dominance, now faces a critical gap as China diversifies its export and investment pathways toward Eurasia. To effectively counter China’s expanding multi-vector influence, the U.S. must broaden its policy beyond maritime competition, deepening strategic engagement with the Eurasian landmass by integrating economic, political, and security dimensions across the continent. This calls for a shift toward fostering a more resilient and interconnected regional framework.

Fostering Competitive Cooperation to Reflect Realpolitik in Central Asia

Building on this strategic imperative, America should actively promote the development of an open, resilient, and inclusive regional economic ecosystem in Central Asia. The crucial insight is that by enlarging the overall economic “pie,” greater opportunities emerge for meaningful engagement and dynamic interactions among all regional actors—including Russia, China, Turkey, and other ambitious players. By fostering sustainable development and deeper integration, the U.S. can establish itself as a constructive yet strategically savvy partner, cultivating a competitive environment that deliberately harnesses the region’s natural rivalries as a strategic advantage.

This model of competitive cooperation—or “coopetition”—creates space for emerging and increasingly influential actors to contribute to regional development while preventing any single power from achieving dominance. Turkey, for instance, has rapidly expanded its economic footprint, with exports to Central Asia reaching $12 billion in 2022 and bilateral trade with Turkmenistan hitting $2.5 billion in 2023. Ankara’s influence is strengthened not only by trade and defense partnerships—including UAV cooperation with Kazakhstan—but also by deep linguistic and cultural ties to Turkic-speaking populations.

While enlarging the economic pie through engaging diverse actors is crucial, the U.S. must exercise necessary caution in this approach. Critics rightly warn that deepening economic ties with authoritarian-leaning states such as China risks entrenching illiberal governance models across Central Asia. Infrastructure investments and expanded trade may strengthen state capacities for surveillance and repression as much as for development. This tension is particularly evident in the record of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, where investment often advances without governance conditions, effectively decoupling growth from liberal reform and potentially undermining democratic development.

Therefore, as the economic pie grows, U.S. engagement—especially in coordination with the European Union—must move beyond mere commercial diplomacy. Any strategy for economic integration should embed robust mechanisms that promote transparency, accountability, and meaningful participation by civil society. Without addressing these governance dimensions proactively, growing economic interdependence risks solidifying authoritarian resilience, thereby limiting the U.S.’s ability to advance long-term democratic governance and human rights in the region. This governance-conscious approach ensures that economic expansion serves not just growth, but also the development of more open and accountable political systems.

The U.S. Needs to Strategically Leverage Regional Rivalries to Diversify Supply Chains in Central Asia

With this long-term framework in mind, the U.S. should remove Cold War-era constraints on Central Asian countries, most notably by repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. According to a 2025 Atlantic Council report, this outdated provision denies permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to several Central Asian nations that have already met original human rights criteria, resulting in higher tariffs and reduced investment that directly impede U.S. influence and limit economic engagement with the region. The bipartisan efforts led by Senators Marco Rubio, Steve Daines, Chris Murphy, and Todd Young to eliminate this barrier represent a crucial first step toward unlocking trade, infrastructure investment, and cooperation in critical sectors such as rare earth minerals and counterterrorism. Repealing Jackson-Vanik would bring U.S. policy into alignment with current geopolitical realities, enabling more substantial partnerships that promote development grounded in human dignity and democratic accountability.

Building on this policy foundation, the U.S. short-term strategy should adopt a complementary two-pronged approach. First, it must strengthen its institutional toolkit by expanding the role of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to effectively “coopete” with the region’s multipolar actors. This involves promoting private investment and the development of high-quality infrastructure to advance economic diversification and regional connectivity, while enforcing rigorous environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards to support transparent and sustainable growth, along with facilitating the entry and expansion of U.S. companies in competitive markets.

Second, the U.S. should prioritize diversifying trade routes and supply chains by actively engaging both the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) and the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), thereby capitalizing on the ongoing China-Russia rivalry for strategic advantage. This dual-corridor approach helps ensure reliable transportation of natural gas to EU allies while securing access to critical minerals in Siberia, reducing dependence on any single transport pathway or political arrangement.

The strategic logic behind reinforcing these complementary infrastructure corridors lies in fostering a competitive dynamic between China and Russia in Eurasia that ultimately serves U.S. interests. The TITR serves as a vital energy corridor that allows Central Asia to reduce dependence on Russian-dominated supply chains while countering China’s growing influence in regional energy exports. In 2023, freight volumes along the TITR increased by 63.7%, with Kazakh exports surging by 122%, highlighting its rising prominence as an alternative to Russian-controlled transport routes and demonstrating its potential to reshape regional trade patterns. This development systematically diminishes Moscow’s leverage while strengthening regional economic autonomy and diversification.

Simultaneously, the TSR remains crucial for Russia’s mineral exports, underpinning its economic strength despite recent fluctuations in transit volumes due to geopolitical tensions. By ensuring Central Asia maintains access to viable alternatives to both Chinese and Russian transport monopolies, the U.S. empowers the region to enhance its economic sovereignty and alleviate authoritarian pressures from any single dominant power. Together, these competing yet complementary transport corridors promote a balance of economic interdependence and healthy rivalry, bolstering regional bargaining power and allowing U.S. firms to secure strategic resources within politically neutral environments that are not dominated by adversarial powers.

By advancing a pluralistic transport network centered on both the TITR and TSR, the U.S. pursues a sophisticated strategy of competitive cooperation—encouraging diverse connectivity options that simultaneously challenge and engage regional powers constructively. This nuanced approach ultimately supports the development of a stable, multipolar, and rules-based economic order in Central Asia that prevents hegemonic dominance while fostering prosperity and development that aligns with American values and strategic interests.

Azerbaijan is undergoing a significant geopolitical realignment, moving away from Moscow’s traditional dominance and pursuing a more independent, multi-vector foreign policy. This strategic shift has been shaped by historical grievances, the post-war dynamics of the South Caucasus, and the weakening of Russia’s regional influence following the Ukraine war.   For years, Azerbaijan maintained a careful balance with Russia, recognizing Moscow’s power while safeguarding its own sovereignty. However, Russia’s decades-long alliance with Armenia, its reluctance to ensure the implementation of post-war agreements, and its failure to restrain Armenian provocations have eroded trust in Moscow’s role as a “neutral” mediator.   The 2020 Second Karabakh War highlighted a changing reality: Turkey’s military and diplomatic support, rather than Russian involvement, enabled Azerbaijan’s decisive victory. This demonstrated that Moscow was no longer the only power capable of shaping events in the South Caucasus.   Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 weakened its global standing and diminished its ability to project power in the South Caucasus. Preoccupied with the conflict and isolated by Western sanctions, Moscow’s influence in the region has noticeably declined.   This created an opportunity for Azerbaijan to strengthen its role as a reliable energy partner for Europe. The Southern Gas Corridor, supplying gas to European markets, has made Baku a key player in Europe’s energy security strategy, further reducing its reliance on Moscow.   The proposed Zangezur Corridor, which would connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave Nachshivan through southern Armenia, is a strategic priority for Baku. This corridor would not only enhance regional trade and connectivity but also reduce Azerbaijan’s dependence on Russian-controlled routes.   Moscow’s lukewarm stance on this project and its attempts to maintain control over all transit links in the South Caucasus have created additional friction. Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey, seeks to establish the corridor as a sovereign project without Russian oversight.   Moreover, the corridor is viewed by Western and regional partners as a critical route that would integrate the South Caucasus with global trade networks, bypassing both Russia and Iran.   Azerbaijan’s partnership with Turkey has evolved into a robust strategic alliance. Military cooperation, defense industry collaborations, and joint regional initiatives underscore the “one nation, two states” principle.   At the same time, Baku has strengthened its relations with Israel, particularly in defense technology, intelligence sharing, and energy. The European Union and the United States have also deepened their engagement with Azerbaijan, viewing it as a vital partner in energy diversification and regional stability.   Azerbaijan’s growing influence is reshaping the South Caucasus power dynamics. While Russia remains a factor due to geography and trade, its weakened position has allowed Baku to pursue a more independent path. By leveraging its energy resources, modern military capabilities, and strong alliances, Azerbaijan is positioning itself as a leading regional power that is no longer bound by Moscow’s dictates.   Azerbaijan’s strategic pivot is not about severing ties with Moscow but about redefining its role in a multipolar world. The combination of energy diplomacy, the Zangezur Corridor initiative, and strong partnerships with Turkey, Israel, and the West reflects Baku’s determination to act as an autonomous and influential force in the South Caucasus.

A few short weeks into the Ceasefire with Iran, Iranian backed Houthis Kill Four, 15 kidnapped/missing after Houthis sink Greek ship in Red Sea.

After much talk and negotiations, the US has finally decided to go full steam ahead and resume its natural state of being as the tip of the spear for NATO in support of Ukraine. With much of the EU pushing for further kinetic involvement and border countries near Ukraine, notably Poland becoming the next major security superpower, the alignment of NATO comes after tough discussions between the Europeans and the United States on financial and supply obligations to the organisation. The new wartime commitment of 5% matches the reality of the current situation in Europe, a conflict that has erupted in other parts of the world despite the haughtiness of European denials on the reality of these situations. While not part of the common discussion in many NATO capitals, Europeans outside of Ukraine are being fired upon as European shipping fleets continue to be targeted and sunk abroad with limited response by the noble Western alliance. These actions during a supposed Ceasefire has resulted in deaths and likely more hostages, with an insufficient response by NATO against one of Russia’s allies. This trend of weak responses does nothing but encourage more conflict it seems, as Russia’s test of NATO’s fortitude continues to fuel more destruction.

In a sincere effort to end the war between Russia and Ukraine, new tariff measures aim to end Russia’s export of oil and gas to its main customers in many BRICS nations. Since the 2022 war began, there has been a concerted efforts to end the dependence on Russian oil and gas, while silently purchasing much of those same products by countries helping Ukraine to the tune of billions in military aid. The prohibition on the sale of North America energy to allies in Europe and Asia likely did more to fund Russia’s war machine than any attempted sanctions, as with high oil prices and the unwillingness to apply workable limits, the Russian military industrial complex would always be able to outproduce NATO with funding being constant. With these half measures, the war could always continue as long as there were men and metal available to put on the field, and Russia seems to be using many allies for these missions.

Effective sanctions on oil and gas must come with the displacement of these resources so other nations dependent on Russian energy have an alternative to conflict themselves. Acknowledging this reality was always a step never truly taken since 2022. A further acknowledgment of the greater war also prohibited and end to the conflict in Ukraine, as NATO sat on intelligence for years on drone production from Iran being sent to Russia. The scourge of these drones have become the essential terror weapon that are now murdering civilians at night in Ukraine. Now that drone facilities are operating in Russia, tank factories are on 24 hour shifts producing new armour and weapons, and former Soviet weapons storage facilities are being emptied out in record time providing refurbished equipment for the front, these targets should be met with the same vigour as the mission to end many of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet on the ground by Ukraine’s intelligence service.

A concerted effort should be taken against Russia’s military supply allies so that all sources of weapons can be limited along with tariffs and sanctions limiting funds towards Russia’s war production. Taking small steps to claim ceasefires only works when the ceasefire is committed to by both sides. In many situations, there is no rational side that can hold to any ceasefire agreement as it is usually just a tactic to delay a conflict until the West tires of the mission, leading to many deaths of innocents until that time comes. The war of delay is one that will always be lost as since the War in Vietnam, all adversaries of the United States have used this tactic with great effectiveness, now mixed with internal conflicts degrading the security situation in many of Europe’s and America’s great cities. Anarchy mixed with the normalisation of disproportionately undemocratic actions is the internal conflict that will likely weaken one side to such a great degree, that they will be unable to counter any conflict. To admit there is a war is the first step, to fight the war is what these new actions hope to achieve before it is no longer an option. Only time will literally tell of the eventual outcomes.

By Rachel Avraham

Donald Trump’s latest geopolitical positioning suggests a dramatic shift in U.S. attitudes toward the South Caucasus. In what critics call a “draining of the Washington swamp,” Trump appears ready to distance himself from the entrenched influence of Armenian lobbyists and place his bets on Azerbaijan—a nation that offers real strategic, economic, and security advantages to the United States.

For decades, the Armenian lobby in Washington, led by groups such as the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and the Armenian Assembly of America, has been among the most vocal diaspora forces in U.S. politics. By leveraging historical grievances and emotional narratives, they lobby against military and energy cooperation with Azerbaijan.

However, the Trump camp sees this lobby as part of an outdated, unproductive political ecosystem. Trump’s strategy focuses on tangible gains: energy security, trade routes, and pragmatic alliances, rather than symbolic gestures. This shift has left Yerevan’s traditional lobbying tactics increasingly ineffective in shaping U.S. foreign policy.

Azerbaijan’s importance has grown significantly in the wake of global energy disruptions caused by the Ukraine war. As a key supplier of natural gas to Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor, Baku is now central to efforts aimed at reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian energy. For a dealmaker like Trump, Azerbaijan represents an opportunity to align U.S. economic and strategic goals with a rising regional power that delivers real results.

Moreover, Azerbaijan’s decisive victories in the 2020 and 2023 operations to restore its sovereignty over Karabakh have boosted its standing on the world stage. By contrast, Armenia has been increasingly seen as a struggling state, overly dependent on Russian protection and unable to adapt to the shifting geopolitical realities of the region.

Trump’s approach to international relations has always been guided by business logic and transactional partnerships. With Azerbaijan’s strategic location—bordering Russia, Iran, and the Caspian Sea—Trump views Baku not just as an ally but as a gateway for trade, energy, and influence in Eurasia. Political analysts suggest that a future Trump administration could dramatically expand U.S.-Azerbaijan cooperation, particularly in energy infrastructure, defense partnerships, and counter-terrorism efforts.

Armenia’s heavy reliance on the U.S. diaspora lobby has left it vulnerable to shifts in Washington’s priorities. As Russia’s grip on the South Caucasus weakens, Yerevan is scrambling to secure allies but has little to offer in terms of strategic value. Trump’s pivot to Azerbaijan highlights this reality: the U.S. is less interested in symbolic narratives and more focused on nations that can contribute to energy diversification and regional stability.

The Trump camp’s emphasis on Baku could redefine U.S. policy in the South Caucasus. By sidelining Armenia’s lobbyists, Washington could foster stronger cooperation with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and other regional players—ultimately reshaping the balance of power in a way that supports Western interests.

Trump’s shift from Yerevan to Baku is not just a diplomatic adjustment—it’s a signal that U.S. politics is moving toward pragmatic, results-oriented partnerships. As Armenian influence in Washington fades, Azerbaijan stands to gain from a renewed American focus on energy security, trade, and stability in the region. If Trump’s strategy continues, Baku could become a key U.S. partner, while Armenia risks sliding into political irrelevance.

A decentralized emirate system based on traditional governance structures could offer
Palestinians sustainable development and peaceful coexistence.

In recent days, the possibility of transforming governance in Judea and Samaria from the
failed Palestinian Authority model to a United Emirates system has been making headlines.
This model, based on traditional clan structures and local governance, represents a fundamental
shift from centralized authoritarian rule to decentralized, community-based administration that
prioritizes economic development and peaceful coexistence.

The emirates model offers what neither Hamas nor the PA can provide: legitimate local
governance rooted in traditional social structures, economic opportunity through industrial
zones and regional cooperation, and a pathway to joining the Abraham Accords framework.
Unlike the current system where over 80% of Palestinians view their government as corrupt
and disconnected from their needs, the emirates model builds on existing social trust within
communities.

Itamar Marcus, head of Palestinian Media Watch, emphasizes the systemic advantages: “There are communal leaders that care about their people. For years, there has been business going on between Jews living in Judea and Samaria and local Palestinians, with the blessing of the clan leaders for these people want the best for the Palestinians. If we are able to transition from the PA to the clan leaders, it will be for the people and for Israel as well.”

The economic dimension is crucial. As the Dor Moria Center research demonstrates,
sustainable peace requires addressing the root causes of conflict – particularly economic
exclusion and underdevelopment. With Human Development Index levels below 0.7 strongly
correlating with conflict, the emirates model’s focus on industrial zones, economic cooperation,
and integration into regional trade networks offers a concrete pathway above this critical
threshold.

The transition mechanism matters as much as the end goal. The current PA survives not
through legitimacy but through international funding – particularly from Europe. A phased
transition would involve redirecting this support from maintaining a failed centralized authority
to empowering local governance structures that can deliver actual services and economic
opportunities to their communities.

A Palestinian journalist, speaking on condition of anonymity, highlighted the systemic
failure: “Before 1988, we had dignity through economic integration. Today, 350,000
Palestinians who once worked in Israel are unemployed. The financial restrictions have
paralyzed our economy. People are so desperate they risk injury jumping the security barrier
just to find work. This isn’t about changing faces at the top – it’s about changing the entire
system.”

The emirates model addresses these structural problems through:
• Decentralized governance that maintains local accountability
• Economic integration through industrial zones and the Abraham Accords
• Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms that have legitimacy
• Direct service delivery without the corruption of centralized bureaucracy

Dr. Mordechai Kedar notes that the primary obstacle isn’t Palestinian opposition but
institutional inertia within certain Israeli administrative structures that have grown comfortable
with the dysfunctional status quo. The success of the emirates model requires Israeli support
for this systematic transformation – not just tolerating it, but actively facilitating the transition
from failed centralization to successful decentralization.

The window for this transformation is now. Each month that passes entrenches the failed
system deeper, while the population’s desperation grows. The United Emirates model offers
not just new leadership but a new system – one built on traditional legitimacy, economic
opportunity, and peaceful coexistence within the Abraham Accords framework.