Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

On 26 February 2026, SEDE hosts the European Defence Agency (EDA)'s Defence Industry Conference from 9.30 - 16.00hrs in the EP premises, bringing together representatives from industry, EU Member States and EU institutions. The conference will provide a forum for discussion on how Europe’s defence industrial base can respond to an increasingly complex security environment.

Discussions will focus on industrial readiness, cooperation and long-term resilience, with particular attention to production capacity, interoperability and supply chain security.
The programme will include welcome addresses from the Chair of the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) and EDA leadership, followed by briefings on the Agency's engagement with industry, capability development activities and innovation initiatives. Two panel discussions will address cooperation and interoperability, and securing defence supply chains, bringing together perspectives from industry, Member States and EU institutions.
Draft agenda
Background information and overview on ongoing SEDE dossiers
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Cette note est publiée en partenariat avec The Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE) et est disponible dans sa version anglaise sur Khabarhub.

L’Indo-Pacifique est devenue la région la plus dynamique et la plus disputée du XXIe siècle.

Englobant 60 % de la population mondiale et contribuant à plus de 65 % du PIB mondial, c’est un foyer d’innovation, de commerce et de connectivité. S’étendant de la côte orientale de l’Afrique aux rivages occidentaux des États-Unis, l’Indo-Pacifique relie les océans Indien et Pacifique, deux artères du commerce mondial et de la sécurité internationale. Plus de la moitié du commerce maritime mondial, notamment le pétrole, le gaz et les matières premières, transite par ces eaux, ce qui en fait le cœur stratégique de la géopolitique mondiale.

Pour le Népal, bien qu’enclavé, l’Indo-Pacifique n’est pas une réalité lointaine. C’est une réalité interconnectée qui influence l’économie, la diplomatie et la sécurité du pays d’une manière souvent sous-estimée. Alors que de nouvelles rivalités entre grandes puissances se déploient dans la région, notamment entre les États-Unis et la Chine, et que des cadres comme le QUAD et l’AUKUS redéfinissent l’ordre régional, le Népal a besoin d’une vision claire et prospective de l’Indo-Pacifique, ancrée dans ses intérêts nationaux, ses valeurs démocratiques et ses aspirations en matière de développement.

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L’article La vision du Népal sur l’Indo-Pacifique : un paysage stratégique en mutation est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Pascal Boniface · Géopolitique : le choix de l’indépendance. Avec François Ruffin | Entretiens géopo

La politique internationale revient au premier plan du débat public français et occupera une place centrale dans les programmes présidentiels à venir. Face aux reconfigurations géopolitiques majeures engendrées par le second mandat de Donald Trump, parmi lesquelles une remise en cause du système international et de la relation transatlantique, la France et l’Union européenne ne peuvent aujourd’hui plus compter sur leur allié historique. Par ailleurs, les dépendances stratégiques auxquelles elles sont soumises ainsi que les accusations de doubles standards à son encontre viennent éroder leurs influences sur la scène internationale. Si la France souhaite conserver sa souveraineté stratégique, l’heure est donc à l’indépendance géopolitique pour la France et l’Union européenne, tant sur le plan politique à travers la diversification de ses partenaires que sur le plan industriel en relocalisant les industries jugées stratégiques pour le pays.
Quelle posture la France doit-elle adopter sur la scène internationale ? Peut-elle réellement retrouver une marge d’autonomie stratégique sans soutien états-unien ? La France doit-elle négocier avec la Chine ? Comment renouer avec les pays du Sud ?
Dans ce podcast, je reçois François Ruffin, candidat à l’élection présidentielle.

L’article Géopolitique : le choix de l’indépendance. Avec François Ruffin est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Vue de loin, en tout cas d’ici, en Europe et en France, parler de l’Iran, c’est mettre l’accent sur les Mollahs, les centrifugeuses, les missiles et les milices. À en oublier parfois les massacres de population, terribles ces dernières semaines, mais qui sont hélas récurrents dans ce régime autoritaire hyper-répressif. La République islamique vient de célébrer son 47e anniversaire et nous commentons, en raison des parades militaires à Téhéran et de l’armada états-unienne qui s’avoisine, les déclarations de l’Ayatollah Ali Khamenei et du président Donald Trump. Le premier aura bientôt 87 ans ; le second 80 ans. De nombreux analystes redoutent le pire, notamment une escalade non souhaitée qui mécaniquement engendrerait une guerre ou des frappes ciblées de grande ampleur, bien plus périlleuses pour la région que celles déjà effectuées sur l’Iran par les bombardiers américains l’an dernier. D’autres mettent en avant le jeu économique qui se trame en coulisses dans les négociations actuelles entre ces deux pays. La République islamique d’Iran se dit prête à discuter de son programme nucléaire, comme l’exige la Maison-Blanche, à condition d’une levée des sanctions commerciales qui pèsent sur le pays depuis des années. Le pays veut se réinsérer sur la scène internationale en raison d’un besoin de développement économique considérable. Les États-Unis savent aussi que ce marché de près de 100 millions d’habitants n’est pas insignifiant en perspective. Le business n’est jamais oublié dans leur action diplomatique, règle d’or que galvanise le transactionnalisme de l’administration Trump.

Pourtant, la bombe la plus dangereuse qui menace l’Iran n’est peut-être ni atomique ni balistique. Elle est hydrique. Et elle est déjà amorcée. Depuis des années, ce pays glisse vers une pénurie structurelle d’eau. Plus de 70 % de ses principaux aquifères sont surexploités. Les nappes phréatiques s’effondrent et les réservoirs atteignent des seuils critiques. Les ressources en eau renouvelables ont chuté d’un tiers en deux décennies. Certaines régions approchent le seuil de pénurie absolue. Dans plusieurs provinces, les sécheresses répétées ne sont plus des accidents climatiques, mais des réalités cruelles, générant des tensions entre usagers, notamment agricoles. 2025 a probablement été l’année la plus sèche depuis le début du siècle. L’Iran a longtemps fait de l’autosuffisance alimentaire un impératif, avec d’ailleurs un ministère de l’Agriculture qui est celui dit du Djihad (« combat ») agricole. Les sanctions internationales ont renforcé cette doctrine : produire chez soi pour ne pas dépendre de l’extérieur.

Blé, riz, betterave à sucre : des cultures exigeantes en eau ont été encouragées dans des territoires arides. L’eau a été massivement subventionnée. L’énergie bon marché a favorisé le pompage intensif. Des centaines de milliers de puits ont été creusés, souvent sans contrôle rigoureux. Le résultat est implacable : l’extraction dépasse largement la capacité de régénération naturelle, des sols s’affaissent et les systèmes traditionnels d’irrigation, comme les qanats, se dégradent. En voulant sécuriser son alimentation, l’Iran a fragilisé sa ressource vitale. Cette contradiction est au cœur d’un dilemme stratégique cependant spécifique : comment concilier sécurité alimentaire, stabilité sociale et durabilité environnementale dans un pays soumis à des sanctions commerciales internationales, à une pression démographique urbaine et à un climat de plus en plus instable ? Dit autrement, les Iraniens sont enfermés : par l’idéologie du régime d’un côté ; par la géographie sous contraintes de l’autre.

Cette insécurité hydrique n’est pas un problème uniquement environnemental. Il s’agit d’un enjeu de stabilité nationale. La crise de l’eau se voit et se ressent. Dans plusieurs provinces, des manifestations ont éclaté sous le slogan « Nous avons soif ». Des agriculteurs voient leurs vergers mourir, leurs troupeaux décliner. Des populations rurales migrent vers des villes déjà saturées, accentuant le chômage et les tensions sociales. Les transferts d’eau interprovinciaux, destinés à alimenter des centres industriels ou des métropoles comme Téhéran, sont perçus comme des injustices territoriales. Et dans la capitale même, le stress hydrique et l’accès à l’eau potable sont devenus des sujets critiques ces derniers mois, à mettre en écho à cette inflation considérable des produits alimentaires, plus de 70 % en 2025… Il faut avoir ces éléments à l’esprit pour comprendre pourquoi des Iraniens descendent aussi dans la rue exprimer leur colère.

L’Iran a appris à vivre sous la menace d’une frappe militaire et a développé une stratégie de dissuasion. Mais face à la dégradation progressive de ses ressources en eau, aucune dissuasion n’est possible. La bombe atomique relève du calcul stratégique. La bombe hydrique relève de la réalité physique. L’eau conditionne la trajectoire d’un pays. Dans le cas iranien, elle est le facteur silencieux qui redessine, en profondeur, l’équilibre intérieur et la posture extérieure. Cette bombe hydrique n’explose pas en un instant. Elle se diffuse lentement, depuis des années, fragilise les territoires iraniens et érode les bases minimums de la sécurité humaine, dans un pays où tout est déjà compliqué, codé et conditionné. La crise déborde des frontières iraniennes, l’eau étant un facteur de divisions et de compétitions dans un Moyen-Orient qui en manque cruellement.

Un pays confronté à une pénurie structurelle d’eau est un pays dont la marge de manœuvre intérieure se réduit. Un pays dont les zones rurales se désertifient est un pays dont la stabilité sociale devient plus précaire. Que se passera-t-il si les pénuries s’aggravent ? Si les migrations internes s’accélèrent ? Si la production agricole chute durablement ? Si la dépendance aux importations alimentaires augmente dans un contexte où l’Iran ne serait pas réinsérée sur la scène géoéconomique internationale ? Quoique fasse Donald Trump, quoiqu’il advienne ces prochaines semaines, pour le régime des Mollahs comme pour la région entière, la rareté de l’eau constituera un invariant géopolitique majeur. Ne pas regarder cette problématique, c’est s’extirper du temps long et du stratégique. La sécurité alimentaire et hydrique fait partie intégrante de la sécurité tout court. Cela vaut pour l’Iran, comme pour le reste du monde. En Europe, nous aurions tort de sous-estimer cette équation.

L’article Iran : la bombe hydrique est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

The next meeting of the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is scheduled to take place on Wednesday, 18 March 2026 from 9.00 - 12.30 and 14.30 - 18.30 and Thursday, 19 March 2026 from 9.00-12.30 in Brussels (room tbc).
Further information about the SEDE meetings can be found here.

_______________________

SEDE missions 2025:

• Djibouti - 27-29 October 2025
  
• Greenland - 15-19 September 2025
  
• Norway - 27-30 May 2025
• Moldova and Ukraine - 14-17 April 2025
  
• Bosnia and Herzegovina - 24-27 February 2025
• Israel and Palestine - 5-8 February 2025

SEDE missions 2024:

• United Kingdom - 28-30 October 2024
• Ukraine - 25-26 October 2024

SEDE Committee meetings' calendar 2026
SEDE Committee meetings' calendar 2025
EP calendar 2026
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The next meeting of the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is scheduled to take place on Wednesday, 18 March 2026 from 9.00 - 12.30 and 14.30 - 18.30 and Thursday, 19 March 2026 from 9.00-12.30 in Brussels (room tbc).
Further information about the SEDE meetings can be found here.

_______________________

SEDE missions 2025:

• Djibouti - 27-29 October 2025
  
• Greenland - 15-19 September 2025
  
• Norway - 27-30 May 2025
• Moldova and Ukraine - 14-17 April 2025
  
• Bosnia and Herzegovina - 24-27 February 2025
• Israel and Palestine - 5-8 February 2025

SEDE missions 2024:

• United Kingdom - 28-30 October 2024
• Ukraine - 25-26 October 2024

SEDE Committee meetings' calendar 2026
SEDE Committee meetings' calendar 2025
EP calendar 2026
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

La crise énergétique de 2022 a brutalement rappelé une réalité stratégique : l’énergie n’est pas seulement une variable économique, mais un pilier de souveraineté. Flambée des prix du gaz, tensions d’approvisionnement, dépendances structurelles aux importations fossiles : en quelques mois, le modèle énergétique européen s’est révélé vulnérable face aux chocs géopolitiques. Dans ce contexte, l’Institut […]

Dauer des Videos : 60'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Length of video : 60'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

SEDE-AFCO Joint Public Hearing on Institutional aspects of the Common European Defence Union - 24 February 2026

The Committee on Security and Defence jointly with the Committee on Constitutional Affairs held a hearing on "Institutional aspects of the Common European Defence Union" on 24 February. The Committees looked into the existing institutional framework supporting the Common European Defence Union. The hearing will help to identify the challenges and opportunities within current institutional arrangements, and it will propose recommendations for closer cooperation among Member States and EU's internal governance mechanisms.

Location : SPAAK 1A002
Programme
Poster
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

SEDE-AFCO Joint Public Hearing on Institutional aspects of the Common European Defence Union - 24 February 2026

The Committee on Security and Defence jointly with the Committee on Constitutional Affairs held a hearing on "Institutional aspects of the Common European Defence Union" on 24 February. The Committees looked into the existing institutional framework supporting the Common European Defence Union. The hearing will help to identify the challenges and opportunities within current institutional arrangements, and it will propose recommendations for closer cooperation among Member States and EU's internal governance mechanisms.

Location : SPAAK 1A002
Programme
Poster
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

REPORT on flagship European defence projects of common interest
Committee on Security and Defence
Lucia Annunziata

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

REPORT on flagship European defence projects of common interest
Committee on Security and Defence
Lucia Annunziata

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

REPORT on tackling barriers to the single market for defence
Committee on Security and Defence
Tobias Cremer

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

REPORT on tackling barriers to the single market for defence
Committee on Security and Defence
Tobias Cremer

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Result of the General Assembly vote on the draft resolution "Support for lasting peace in Ukraine" adopted during the emergency special session. 24 February 2026 Four years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UN is marked the day with high-level debate and renewed calls to end the war - including in the General Assembly which passed a resolution reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Philippe Leclerc
GENEVA, Feb 25 2026 (IPS)

After surviving the harshest winter in a decade, millions of displaced Ukrainians are confronting a growing crisis marked by hardship and ongoing attacks as peace prospects remain distant.

Inside Ukraine, repeated attacks on housing, energy systems and essential services throughout the winter left millions without heating or electricity for prolonged periods. While temperatures are slowly rising, the damage remains. An estimated 10.8 million people inside the country need humanitarian assistance in 2026, and 3.7 million are internally displaced.

At the same time, 5.9 million Ukrainians remain refugees abroad. Across Europe, host countries have provided protection and opportunities at an unprecedented scale, giving refugees access to education, healthcare and employment. This has helped millions regain stability and contribute to host communities.

As the war continues, however, more is needed to support refugees from a displacement crisis with no clear end. Alongside Temporary Protection, States should explore options for alternative arrangements for longer stay. These can bring stability for the most vulnerable in particular, for whom return may not be immediately possible even after the war.

Evidence shows that meaningful inclusion delivers results and refugees significantly boost host country economies. In Poland, analysis by UNHCR and Deloitte showed that Ukrainian refugees’ net impact amounted to 2.7 per cent of the Polish GDP, in 2024. With increased language training and wider recognition of credentials, access to decent work and self-reliance can improve for refugees across the region.

Inside Ukraine, communities continue to repair homes, restore services and rebuild livelihoods, with the support of UNHCR and NGO partners. But after four years of war, resilience has limits. Sustained humanitarian assistance remains essential, alongside scaled-up recovery and reconstruction support to prevent further displacement and enable safe conditions for return.

When conditions allow, gradual and voluntary returns will be critical for Ukraine’s recovery. UNHCR is working with the Government and partners to restore people’s documents, support rehabilitation of social infrastructure and repair war-damaged homes. UNHCR also works with partners to analyse refugees’ intentions, forecast return movements and support Ukraine’s recovery planning.

Since the start of the full-scale war, UNHCR and partners have supported 10 million people with emergency aid, protection services and psychosocial support. In 2026, UNHCR plans to assist a further 2 million people inside the country, subject to sufficient funding. Across the region, UNHCR and partners are supporting 1.7 million refugees and the States hosting them, with a focus on inclusion and self-reliance.

As winter fades, the humanitarian crisis does not. We must support the people of Ukraine with humanitarian relief and recovery inside the country, and with safety and self-reliance abroad.

Philippe Leclerc is UNHCR’s Regional Director for Europe and Regional Refugee Coordinator for the Ukraine Situation

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) macht im Februar einen Sprung auf 101,6 Punkte. Damit liegt das Barometer fast sieben Punkte über dem Januar-Wert und erstmals seit knapp drei Jahren wieder über der neutralen 100-Punkte-Marke, die ein ...

Emotionale Stabilität hängt positiv mit Bruttostundenlohn zusammen, Verträglichkeit negativ – Zusammenhang ist bei Frauen schwächer als bei Männern – Stereotype und Rollenbilder könnten eine Rolle spielen Bestimmte Persönlichkeitsmerkmale gehen mit Unterschieden im Bruttostundenlohn einher. Hat ...

Participants observe a visual montage linking Abu Dhabi’s Zayed Award ceremony, the Sant’Egidio interfaith forum in Rome and the Astana Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions — symbolizing the emerging “rehearsal space” where religion, civil society and state diplomacy converge. (Credit: INPS / Illustrative image)

By Katsuhiro Asagiri
ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates, Feb 24 2026 (IPS)

As wars drag on and the international order grows increasingly unstable, Abu Dhabi has been offering a different kind of narrative. It sought to recognize early efforts at reconciliation, bring religious leaders into the same space, and place former adversaries under the same spotlight. At the heart of the February 4, 2026 Zayed Award for Human Fraternity ceremony was an attempt to make visible, in a public setting, the choice of moving in the direction of easing conflict.

Pope Francis and Ahmed el-Tayeb sign the Document on Human Fraternity。Credit: Vatican News

Timed to coincide with the United Nations–designated International Day of Human Fraternity, the ceremony drew heads of state, religious leaders and civil-society representatives. The award traces its origins to the 2019 Document on Human Fraternity, signed in Abu Dhabi by Pope Francis and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Ahmed Al-Tayeb. The document is widely regarded as a historic declaration that set out a global call for interreligious dialogue and peaceful coexistence.

Seven years on, the international landscape has become even more fragmented. Even so, the organizers have framed the ceremony not merely as an awards event, but as a symbolic platform intended to encourage a minimum measure of restraint when politics turns turbulent.

Shoring Up a Fragile Peace

The moment that drew the most attention this year was the recognition of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for their peace agreement. After decades of confrontation, the award functioned as a form of international endorsement for a still-fragile peace process in the South Caucasus.

Zayed Prize 2026 to Armenia and Azerbaijan Credit: Vatican News

Peace agreements are often most vulnerable immediately after they are reached. Domestic political backlash and deep-seated mistrust can easily undermine implementation. In that sense, bringing the two leaders onto the same stage was not a declaration that the journey was complete; it was an attempt to “reinforce” diplomatic progress. By recognizing leaders who chose dialogue at an early stage, the award appears aimed at widening the political space for compromise—and at making it harder for opponents to overturn the agreement.

The award, however, extended beyond state leadership. The 2026 laureates also included Afghan girls’ education advocate Zarqa Yaftali and the Palestinian nonprofit Taawon, honoring efforts to continue humanitarian and development work under conditions of conflict and political instability. It also underscores the award’s intention to bridge “top-down politics,” such as peace agreements, with “bottom-up peacebuilding” that supports communities on the ground. The underlying message is clear: even with treaties and agreements in place, peace cannot take root if the schools, healthcare, and local support systems needed to sustain society remain fragile.

A Dialogue Circuit Linking Rome and Astana

The closing ceremony held against the backdrop of the ancient Roman ruins, the Colosseum. Credit: Community of Sant’Egidio

Abu Dhabi’s ceremony is not an isolated event. In October 2025, Rome hosted the annual forum “Religions and Cultures in Dialogue for Peace,” organized by the Community of Sant’Egidio. Inheriting the spirit of the 1986 Assisi gathering, the forum serves as a continuing platform that brings together religious leaders, political figures, and representatives of civil society. The Holy See (the Vatican) is a central participant, exercising its moral authority to connect ethical appeals with debates in international politics.

Further east, Kazakhstan has institutionalized interfaith engagement through the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions in Astana. Both the Holy See and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar have consistently participated, helping to sustain the congress as a venue for structured interreligious dialogue.

Seen in this light, Rome, Astana, and Abu Dhabi are not merely separate events; they emerge as nodal points in a broader space of dialogue that links religion and diplomacy. Put differently, they function like a regular service designed to keep the lines of communication open—ensuring that the ability to meet and talk does not fall silent.

Religious Actors Across Borders

On Feb. 4, a Soka Gakkai delegation led by Vice President Hirotsugu Terasaki attended the 2026 Zayed Award for Human Fraternity ceremony in Abu Dhabi, UAE. At the invitation of @ZayedAward, the delegation joined global religious leaders. On Feb. 3, the delegation met with Judge Mohamed Abdelsalam, Secretary-General of the Zayed Award for Human Fraternity and they delivered a letter from Soka Gakkai President Minoru Harada to the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar His Eminence Ahmed Al-Tayeb. Credit: SGI

Not only states sustain this network. Like the Holy See and religious leaders from around the world, Hirotsugu Terasaki, Director-General for Peace Affairs of Soka Gakkai International (SGI) — an organization with some 13 million members worldwide — has taken part in dialogue venues in Abu Dhabi, Rome and Astana.

Ahead of the Abu Dhabi ceremony, Terasaki met with Judge Mohamed Abdelsalam, Secretary-General of the award, and delivered a letter from Minoru Harada, President of Soka Gakkai, addressed to Grand Imam Ahmed Al-Tayeb. The two exchanged views on the need to further strengthen “heart-to-heart dialogue” that transcends religious differences.

The stages created by the United Arab Emirates and Kazakhstan—both of which place emphasis on “spiritual diplomacy”—are more than mere events. What gives these settings moral authority and lends them ethical weight as arenas for peacebuilding is a sustained architecture of dialogue, underpinned by relationships that religious and civil-society leaders have cultivated over many years. Put differently, it is a system for meeting regularly and ensuring that lines of communication do not fall silent. Even when interstate relations grow tense, religious and civil-society networks can keep channels of dialogue open, serving as a buffer against rupture.

The fact that Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev engaged with this year’s award ceremony through a video address, and that Director-General Terasaki has moved across dialogue venues such as Abu Dhabi, Rome, and Astana, quietly suggests the presence of such networks where religion and diplomacy intersect. Likewise, the Holy See has also been one of the actors continuously involved in all three of these settings.

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev extended his congratulations to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on being given the Sheikh Zayed Award for Human Fraternity in a video address. Credit: Akorda

Shared Words, Different Realities

The vocabulary repeatedly invoked in these forums is strikingly consistent: fraternity, coexistence, dialogue, and human dignity. At a time when multilateralism is faltering and traditional channels of mediation are weakening, this language also serves a political purpose—allowing states to signal, at home and abroad, a preference for dialogue over force and to project the image that they are not stoking confrontation, but providing a venue in which tensions can be managed.

Yet the distance between ceremony and reality does not disappear. Celebrating a peace agreement does not necessarily guarantee its implementation. Honoring efforts in girls’ education does not automatically reopen classrooms. Proclaiming coexistence does not stop violence overnight. Awards can encourage compromise and bless dialogue, but they are not mechanisms that can compel outcomes.

Even so, governments and religious and civil-society networks continue to engage in these venues—through attendance, public statements, and sustained involvement—because they remain among the few public settings where opposing parties can appear side by side. There are not many spaces where actors in tense relationships can stand in the same room, where restraint is openly affirmed, and where interfaith ties can function as informal diplomatic channels.

A Place to “Rehearse” Peace

A woman crafts a mosaic depicting a peace dove in the Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan. Credit: UN Women/Christopher Herwig

The Zayed Award for Human Fraternity, the peace commemorations in Rome, and the interfaith congress in Astana—taken together—reveal the growing reach of a diplomatic approach that advances not through force or pressure, but through convening, dialogue, and the steady maintenance of relationships. It is a framework that can be symbolic at times, yet capable of exerting a quiet influence.

They also point toward the emergence of a new diplomatic domain where religion, civil society and state interests converge.

In today’s international environment, it is precisely these small points of contact that can carry real significance. Before peace is institutionalized as policy, there are only limited spaces where its shape can be publicly “rehearsed.”

The Abu Dhabi ceremony is one of those rare stages. It did not resolve a conflict, nor did it erase suspicion. Even so, choosing dialogue—and continuing to make that choice visible in the open—constitutes an act in itself: a clear signal, in an age of polarization, of a commitment to restraint over enmity.

This article is brought to you by INPS Japan in collaboration with Soka Gakkai International, in consultative status with the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

INPS Japan

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Credit: Georgios Kostomitsopoulos/NurPhoto via Getty Images

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 24 2026 (IPS)

The Islamic Republic of Iran has put down another uprising, with a ferocity that makes previous crackdowns seem restrained. The theocratic regime has survived, but it has done so by substituting violence for the economic security it cannot provide and the political legitimacy it no longer has. Its show of force is also an admission of weakness.

The protests that began on 28 December were triggered by a specific event — the collapse of the rial to a record low — but rooted in years of accumulated grievances. The second half of 2025 alone saw at least 471 labour protests across 69 Iranian cities. Inflation stood at 49.4 per cent. The 12-day war with Israel in June sent the Tehran Stock Exchange down around 40 per cent and cost many people their jobs. The United Nations Security Council reimposed sanctions in September. The government cut fuel subsidies in November and slashed exchange-rate subsidies in December. Over 40 per cent of Iranian households now live below the poverty line and around half the population consume fewer than the recommended 2,100 calories per day.

It was this collapse that brought typically conservative bazaar merchants onto the streets. Within two weeks, the protests had spread to all of Iran’s 31 provinces, drawing in the urban middle class, working-class communities and people from rural provinces who had historically been among the regime’s most reliable supporters. What began as an economic stoppage rapidly became political defiance. For the millions who joined the striking merchants, the plummeting currency and rising cost of food were not market failures; they were proof of the regime’s corruption and ineptitude. Generation Z played a central role, demanding not reform but profound change. Lethal repression provided further confirmation the system was beyond reform.

The state’s response evolved. Initially it offered token economic concessions alongside its usual crowd control violence such as batons and teargas. When it became clear that a widespread movement with political demands had taken hold, it shifted to total attrition. On 8 January, authorities imposed a near-total internet shutdown and authorised security forces to use military-grade weapons against crowds. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a parallel military structure, major political force and economic empire with a direct stake in the regime’s survival – spearheaded the crackdown, with its affiliated Basij paramilitary networks playing a central role in street-level violence.

The casualty figures were deliberately obscured by the internet blackout, but all evidence points in the same direction. Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights reported that at least 3,000 civilians — including 44 children — were killed in the first 17 days. Iran Human Rights, citing Ministry of Health sources, documented a minimum of 3,379 deaths across 15 provinces. The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency reported around 7,000 verified fatalities by mid-February, with 12,000 further cases under review. Time magazine cited hospital records suggesting the toll may have reached 30,000. Even the lowest of these figures vastly eclipses the 537 deaths recorded during the 2022-2023 Woman, Life, Freedom protests. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s concession that ‘several thousand’ had been killed confirmed the order of magnitude.

By 16 January the streets had been cleared, but a quieter repressive campaign continued, with nighttime raids, enforced disappearances and mass detentions in unofficial holding sites outside the legal system, targeting not only protesters but also doctors who treated the wounded, lawyers who provided legal assistance, bystanders who helped and people who posted supportive statements online. Authorities have detained over 50,000 people. Revolutionary Courts have fast-tracked mass indictments through summary trials, often conducted online and lasting mere minutes, with defendants denied independent legal counsel and confessions extracted under torture. Eighteen-year-old Saleh Mohammadi, whose retracted confession was obtained after interrogators broke bones in his hand, has been sentenced to be publicly hanged at the site of his alleged crime. Dozens more face imminent execution.

The regime has, for now, held: its security forces have not fractured, there have been no significant elite defections, and the IRGC has maintained its capacity for suppression. But it rules over a country with a wrecked economy, a battered nuclear programme, weakened regional proxies and a population that has run out of reasons to comply. Each protest cycle has required a higher threshold of state violence to suppress, a sign the regime has no other tool left.

What prevents weakness from becoming collapse is the absence of any alternative. The international response briefly suggested external pressure might tell – but did not. Donald Trump told Iranian protesters that ‘help is on its way’. The European Union listed the IRGC as a terrorist organisation. The UK imposed fresh sanctions. The Iranian diaspora held at least 168 protests across 30 countries. But the international noise simply enabled the regime to spread the narrative that the uprising was foreign-directed.

The exiled opposition is fragmented along ethnic, ideological and generational lines, seemingly more consumed by internal rivalries than the task of converting widespread discontent into sustained political pressure. Inside Iran, the most credible opposition voices — Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi, reformist politician Mostafa Tajzadeh and veteran leader Mir Hossein Mousavi — are imprisoned or cut off from public life.

A weakened regime facing a leaderless opposition can endure, but what it cannot do is reverse its decay. Violence may clear the streets, but it cannot rebuild the economy, restore trust or give Iran’s young people a reason to stay. The regime has bought time, at an ever-rising price, but the crisis it’s suppressed isn’t going away.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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