Diplomacy & Crisis News

On July 26, 2024, in Vientiane, Laos, the foreign ministers from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India will meet, marking a significant landmark in their relationship. This gathering highlights the increasing significance of their partnership and emphasizes India’s role in enhancing its connections with ASEAN countries while maintaining ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region.

The relationship between India and ASEAN is not new. Both regions have interacted for centuries. These relations have been well established and upgraded in the last few decades. The ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership is setting the course for integration in trade, security, and investment and establishing educational and cultural exchanges.

The year 2024 has seen a major transformation in the Indo-Pacific region’s geopolitics. China’s rise in the region and its assertive behavior in the South China Sea have triggered regional tensions, underlining the imperative for a rule-based order. In light of this, the ASEAN centrality cannot be dismissed since it is the primary driver for regional dialogue and cooperation.

India has varied interests in the Indo-Pacific region. In terms of economics, ASEAN is one of India’s most important trading partners, with bilateral trade between the two reaching over $100 billion. Strategically, the organization is an extremely significant area for India’s Act East Policy (AEP), Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), and Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR).

It should be emphasized that in order to enhance its relationship with ASEAN and support ASEAN centrality, India needs to focus on a number of key areas. India must increase trade and investment among the member states of ASEAN. For instance, it can take part in ASEAN digital transformation efforts and other infrastructure projects like the ASEAN-India Connectivity Plan. 

Considering the Indo-Pacific geographical area, collaboration between India and ASEAN members regarding the protection of their sea lanes is needed. Joint naval exercises, sharing intelligence, and initiatives aimed at capacity building can contribute to regional security and stability. 

Building cultural bridges with others and nurturing people-to-people relations create a sound basis for long-term cooperation. This may involve exchange programs in education, tourism drives, or even cultural festivals to enhance communication as well as build goodwill. 

When it comes to climate change, India’s role is crucial since it can actively and fully participate in addressing issues within the region. A shared commitment to sustainability can be built through joint investments in renewable energy sources, natural disaster prevention projects, and environmental preservation activities done together with neighbors.

With the world moving towards the age of new technology, India also has a chance to form alliances with ASEAN countries to help push innovation and digitalization. Programs of joint research and development, technology transfers, and the organization of capacity-building programs can be used to drive economic growth and development. For instance, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) will enter into collaborative agreements with the central banks of four ASEAN Countries—Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand—to enable the retail purposes of cross-border payments.

Maintaining ASEAN Centrality

ASEAN’s centrality is essential in maintaining a balanced and inclusive regional system in the Indo-Pacific. In order to support this principle, India must interact with ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting with Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States (ADMM+). This would enable India to help build regional norms and address common challenges through its participation in those platforms. India should also advocate for an Indo-Pacific region that is multipolar and dominated by no one power. This means facilitating dialogue and cooperation between every stakeholder in the region, including the United States, China, EU, Japan, and Australia. India has pledged to maintain a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, which accords with the ASEAN vision of centrality.

Economic Integration and Connectivity

India should prioritize deepening economic ties that benefit all stakeholders via open discussions. India’s exit from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2019 owing to trade imbalances and threats to local industries should guide her in striking a more balanced deal. 

Connectivity plays a crucial role in boosting regional trade and links for further cooperation. India’s involvement in projects such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMT) and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) will aid this. In addition, India, being part of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), can link South Asia and Southeast Asia, enhancing wider cooperation beyond the economic sphere.

Defense and Security Cooperation

The South China Sea remains a point of conflict for U.S.-China competition, with ramifications for regional safety. ASEAN’s precepts are echoed in India’s position on freedom of navigation and its allegiance to international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By carrying out joint naval exercises, port visits, and capacity-building programs with ASEAN navies, India can contribute both to maritime security and to a rule-based order.

India’s defense exports, such as BrahMos missiles to the Philippines and possibly other ASEAN countries, show that it has what it takes to support regional defense needs. Expanding defense cooperation agreements and offering technical assistance and training will help strengthen the defense capabilities of these nations in ASEAN, thereby enhancing security within this region.

Soft power and cultural diplomacy

India’s strong basis for soft power diplomacy lies in its historical and cultural relations with South East Asia. Buddhism, Hinduism, and other shared aspects of culture can create deeper people-to-people bonds. Joint efforts like the re-establishment of Nalanda University in India and making ASEAN countries have cultural centers encourage educational exchange and trade.

Additionally, by offering scholarships and academic programs to students from ASEAN, India can instill in them an appreciation of Indian culture and traditions. India is undertaking a number of initiatives to foster closer ties with the ASEAN member countries through the ASEAN-India Youth Summit, ASEAN-India Artists’ Camps, and ASEAN-India Music Festival. Moreover, there is also a significant Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia, which acts as a bridge to link cultural and economic ties between the two regions.

Balancing the Chessboard

The U.S.-China rivalry presents a tightrope walk. India has to deftly handle its relations with both superpowers in line with the neutrality and the regional stability objectives of ASEAN. This is because it stands for an ASEAN where India can gain the confidence and trust of Southeast Asian countries. India’s association with ASEAN is more than a geopolitical move—it is a crucial precondition for peace and prosperity in the region.

Today’s ASEAN-India Foreign Ministers Meeting will provide a useful occasion to reaffirm and expand the partnership between India and ASEAN. As India commemorates a decade of its AEP, it has transformed itself from a mere instrument to engage with East and South East Asia to anchor and linchpin its approach to the Indo-Pacific region. By focusing on cooperation, maritime security, cultural ties, sustainable development, and technological partnership, India can play a vital role in further strengthening its engagement with the organization and its constituent nations. While the region steers through rough waters, India’s proactive and constructive approach toward ASEAN will be the key to instilling peace, stability, and shared prosperity.

Dr. Shristi Pukhrem, currently serving as a Deputy Director (Academics & Research) at India Foundation, holds a Doctorate from the School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She is a JRF (Junior Research Fellow) in Political Science awarded by the University Grants Commission, Government of India. Formerly employed as a Researcher at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi, Dr. Pukhrem’s research areas cover India-ASEAN relations, India’s bilateral relations with the South-East Asian Countries, the Act-East Policy with a larger focus on the Indo-Pacific region.

Image: StockSolution / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The HALO Trust is utilizing artificial intelligence to enhance landmine detection in Ukraine, the world's largest minefield. Supported by a $4 million grant from Amazon Web Services, HALO employs AI to analyze drone-captured imagery, drastically reducing analysis time from days to hours.

-Ukraine’s extensive surface-laid mines make drone detection effective, aiding HALO's mission to clear mines faster and safer.

-With 542 drone flights and 11 terabytes of data already collected, HALO aims to deploy this AI tool by year-end, offering a model for global mine clearance efforts, including in challenging terrains like Colombia.

In the third year of its war of self-defense against an invading Russia, Ukraine has developed a reputation as a laboratory for battlefield innovation, from the way it employs drones and drone countermeasures to how it uses artillery. And close to the fight in eastern Ukraine, a nongovernment organization is employing artificial intelligence in a pilot program that may have life-saving implications for the entire world.

The HALO Trust, which has been working to clear mines from conflict zones for more than three decades, is applying AI to imagery captured by aerial drones to develop reliable identification profiles for landmines hidden within the terrain. Its work is partly enabled by Amazon Web Services (AWS), which gave the organization a $4 million grant in June to support secure storage of the vast amounts of data needed to build the profiles. 

The location of the pilot program is deliberate. As of this year, Ukraine is considered the world’s largest minefield, with as many as two million mines scattered across the land and potentially as much as a third of the country requiring demining for safe habitation. As Vox explains, in a conflict, potentially fatal landmines result in a couple of ways: First, artillery, which has been a land weapon of choice on both sides of the fight, can leave behind active and unstable shells, known as unexploded ordnance, or UXO. Second, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines are placed deliberately to kill combatants on foot or in armored vehicles – and these pressure-triggered devices are just as much a threat to the civilian population as to the military.

“As a very general point with Ukraine quickly becoming one of the most contaminated countries in the world, it’s the place where this technology can have the most impact,” Matthew Abercrombie, research and development officer at The HALO Trust, told Sandboxx News. “Even if we had all the resources in the world, it would still take a huge amount of time and effort to clear what’s being reported as the level of contamination. So anything we can do to narrow that down will have a huge impact on our ability to get the job done,” he added.

But there’s another reason, too, that Ukraine makes sense as a test bed for AI-based mine clearance, Abercrombie said. In the current conflict, a significant amount of placed mines are being laid on the surface of the ground, rather than dug into the ground. That allows the RGB cameras on the large commercial drones flown by The HALO Trust to capture their shape and characteristics. While the organization hopes to build in multispectral imaging eventually, which would help them capture evidence not visible to the naked eye, Ukraine offers a straightforward mine detection challenge.

As of late June, the organization had completed 542 drone flights totaling 11 terabytes of data, according to a published announcement. Flights have already been taking place for more than a year, Abercrombie told Sandboxx News, and the information they yield represents an overwhelming workload to human analysts. The information the organization collects is secure and not shared with other military or civil entities; the mine-clearing that follows identification is conducted largely by HALO’s 1,200 staff in Ukraine.

“It very quickly became apparent that the bottleneck is being able to analyze the imagery in time to make it useful,” he added.

And there is a very clear time element: according to Jennifer Hyman, head of communications for HALO, the greatest number of civilian casualties from landmines typically take place as displaced residents try to return to their homes. The technology the organization is hoping to develop, she said, would also significantly accelerate the ability to spot human activity and signs of damage, providing insights on areas that are safer for human movement and return.

“Drone imagery covering maybe a couple of hectares would take a human analyst maybe two days to trawl through and identify,” Abercrombie said. “Whereas our best estimates for the machine learning models is that it could be [done] on the order of an hour.”

Training the AI to identify mines as well as a human analyst will take time and vast quantities of imagery – thousands of images of a single variant of anti-tank or anti-personnel mine, for example. Complicating matters, human rights observers have said Russia and Ukraine are using at least 13 different kinds of each kind of mine.

However, despite the size of the information collection task, HALO plans to have a first version of an AI mine-detection tool ready for distribution to its staff in Ukraine by the end of the year, according to Abercrombie. They’re also already looking ahead, to employing this technology in other minefields around the globe – places like Colombia, where mountainous terrain makes drone imagery a far more accessible option than human in-person identification.

Troublingly, Russia’s activity in Ukraine may create even more spaces for organizations like HALO to operate in: The Washington Post reported that some neighboring European countries, seeking to harden their own defenses, have been considering a return to using the cheap and deadly devices.

Hope Hodge Seck is an award-winning investigative and enterprise reporter who has been covering military issues since 2009. She is the former managing editor for Military.com.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Summary and Key Points: The Russian Tupolev Tu-95 "Bear" bomber, with its turbo-prop engines, has been a cornerstone of Soviet and Russian air power since its introduction in 1956. Designed for long-range missions, it boasts an operating range exceeding 8,000 miles.

-Despite its age, the Tu-95 remains relevant, capable of carrying nuclear cruise missiles and serving as an electronic surveillance platform. It continues to patrol near American and European borders, including recent activities near Alaska and Ukraine.

-With an expected service life extending to 2040, the Tu-95 is a testament to enduring Soviet engineering, remaining a versatile and strategic asset for Russia.

Russia’s Tupolev Tu-95 “Bear” bomber may not look like much. In fact, its turbo-prop engines are an early Cold War-harkening anachronism. But the aging Tu-95 is commonly understood to be the most capable bomber the Soviet Union ever produced.

While the turbo-prop engines look more like something you’d find on a regional puddle-jumper, rather than a great power’s nuclear bomber, the old-school engines served a very specific purpose. Of course Soviet designers could have installed turbojet engines on their Tu-95 – but the Soviets wanted a jet that could strike deep into enemy territory, with a minimum range of 6,200 miles. The turbo-prop engine enables such a vast operating range. Once installed, the Tu-95’s turbo-prop engines permitted an operating range in excess of 8,000 miles, meaning the Soviet bomber could fly back and forth across the continental U.S. about three times without needing to refuel.

The Tu-95 entered the Soviet air force in 1956, and it continues to serve today, almost 70 years later. This forces comparisons to the long-serving B-52 Stratofortress, an American bomber of similar vintage. The Tu-95, like the B-52, is still relevant. It even saw action in 2015 against ISIS, and it is expected to remain in service until at least 2040, meaning the airframe could hit the 100-year-in-service mark.

Although the Tu-95 was built as a bomber, the airframe has often been used as an electronic surveillance platform, adding value for cash-strapped Soviet/Russian forces hoping to get as much versatility as possible out of their fleet. 

Of course, the Tu-95 is also outfitted as a proper bomber. The K variant can deploy the Russian Kh-20 nuclear cruise missile, meaning the Tu-95 has both the range and ability to deliver nuclear ordnance to American soil, assuming the non-stealth airframe could penetrate American air defenses.

To be clear, the Tu-95 could not penetrate American air defense systems, nor indeed any modern air defense system, and it would not survive against modern interceptor aircraft. The Tu-95 is a 70-year-old platform, after all, and no match for 21st-century systems.

“But that’s where the ability to fire cruise missiles plays such a vital role,” Brandon J. Weichert wrote. “[The Tu-95 is] basically long-range missile trucks that can engage enemies at a distance, negating the efficacy of air defenses and the threat of intercepts.”

The Tu-95 has routinely pestered American and European forces, slinking up to borders and patrolling overlapping areas of interest. The Tu-95 often loiters around the Alaskan coastline, not far from Russia’s easternmost borders. In 2014, a Tu-95 flew to within 50 miles of California’s coastline, forcing the U.S. Air Force to initiate a proper intercept. 

The Tu-95 is also active in Ukraine, fitting in nicely alongside the rest of the Russian equipment – much of which is terribly outdated, yet still capable of performing adequately enough. Expect the 55 still-flying Tu-95s to remain in service for as long as Russian mechanics can keep the bombers airworthy.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Russia is advancing its efforts to counter the American B-2 Spirit stealth bomber by developing the Tupolev PAK DA. This new stealth bomber aims to give Russia a strategic edge similar to that of the B-2, with the capability to carry nuclear payloads.

-The PAK-DA, designed in a flying-wing style to enhance stealth, is nearing prototype completion, with plans for up to six more units.

-While the PAK-DA represents a significant step for Russia in stealth technology, it remains behind the U.S., which continues to lead with its fleet of stealth bombers and fifth-generation fighters.

When the B-2 Spirit was introduced, the flying-wing bomber forced America’s opponents to make defensive adjustments. The B-2 offered an entirely new strategic element. It was the first aircraft that had both stealth technology and the ability to carry a nuclear payload, meaning in essence that the B-2 could end worlds without ever being detected.

The Russians were especially concerned about the B-2, worried that the stealth bomber would be used for deep penetration missions against Moscow or St. Petersburg. Accordingly, Russia was eager to introduce a peer aircraft, something that could help mitigate the advantage the B-2 gave the Americans. 

Decades later, Russia is finally building an answer to the B-2 Spirit: the Tupolev PAK-DA, a stealth bomber capable of carrying a nuclear payload.

Tupolev is understood to be nearly finished with a PAK DA prototype aircraft. The company intends to build up to six more aircraft. If Tupolev can pull off the PAK DA, Russia would become just the second nation, behind the U.S., to introduce a stealth bomber. Even China, whose military capabilities have been improving at a rapid clip, has yet to introduce a stealth bomber, although the Xi’an H-20 is currently under development.

Russia is no stranger to aerospace accomplishments. It is arguably the second most accomplished nation with respect to aerospace (and astrospace) engineering. But in the realm of stealth, the Russians have never come close to matching American capabilities. The U.S. has not only led the way on stealth technology, but has stood head and shoulders above the rest since introducing the F-117 Nighthawk and B-2 Spirit about three decades ago.

Today, the U.S. commands a fleet of stealthy fifth-generation fighters, the F-35 Lightning II and the F-22 Raptor. The B-21 Raider, a new flying-wing stealth bomber slated to replace the B-2 within the next decade, is undergoing flight tests.

All told, the Americans are about a full generation ahead of the Russians (and Chinese) on stealth bombers. Both Russia and China are rushing to catch up, but designing a stealth bomber is much easier than producing or fielding a legitimate, undetectable bomber. Intelligence suggests that Russia is closer to completing the PAK-DA than the Chinese are to completing the H-20, but with the program so obscured from public view, who really knows. 

Very little is known indeed about the PAK DA. What we do know is that the airframe has been crafted in the same flying-wing style as the B-2 and B-21, so we can expect the PAK DA to have a low radar cross section and to cruise at subsonic speeds. Again, easier said than done. The Russians are not known for their stealth accomplishments; their only stealth fighter, the Su-57, is rated as the worst stealth performer of all existing stealth aircraft.

The PAK DA is slated to enter mass production before 2027, but that feels like wishful thinking. Russia has a history of slow weapons program rollouts, and the ongoing war of attrition in Ukraine is burning through resources and industrial capacities that might otherwise be used to produce a stealth aircraft. 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Since gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian states have again forged steadily growing ties with China. These ties advanced significantly in 2013 when Xi Jinping formally announced the Silk Road Economic Belt—part of the Belt and Road Initiative—in Kazakhstan. China's expanding presence in the region, however, has raised new concerns among neighboring countries over economic, political, and cultural sovereignty. In light of Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's annual meeting in Astana and an official visit to Tajikistan, three experts will review the evolving dynamics of these relationships.

On July 25, the Center for the National Interest hosted the fifth in a monthly series of expert discussions organized by the Center’s Central Asia Connectivity Project.

—Elizabeth Wishnick is a Senior Research Scientist in the China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and a Senior Research Scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University. She was a tenured professor of Political Science at Montclair State University from 2005-2024. Dr. Wishnick has dual regional expertise on China and Russia and is an expert on Chinese foreign policy, Sino-Russian relations, Northeast Asian and Central Asian security, and Arctic geopolitics. She received a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, an MA in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University, and a BA from Barnard College. She speaks Mandarin, Russian, and French.

—Brian Carlson is Research Professor of Indo-Pacific Security Studies at the China Landpower Studies Center of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Previously, he served as head of the global security team at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich and, prior to that, as a postdoctoral fellow and researcher at RAND Corporation. Dr. Carlson holds a PhD in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His research focuses primarily on China-Russia relations. He speaks Chinese and Russian.

—Temur Umarov is a Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, specializing in Central Asian countries’ domestic and foreign policies, as well as China’s relations with Russia and Central Asian neighbors. A native of Uzbekistan, Umarov holds degrees in China studies and international relations from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). He holds an MA in world economics from the University of International Business and Economics (Beijing). He speaks Chinese, Russian, Tajik, and Uzbek.

Andrew Kuchins, Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, moderated the discussion.

Image: Khikmatilla Ubaydullaev / Shutterstock.com. 

Editor’s Note: The Red Cell series is published in collaboration with the Stimson Center. Drawing upon the legacy of the CIA’s Red Cell—established following the September 11 attacks to avoid similar analytic failures in the future—the project works to challenge assumptions, misperceptions, and groupthink with a view to encouraging alternative approaches to America’s foreign and national security policy challenges. For more information about the Stimson Center’s Red Cell Project, see here.

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Red Cell

Digital trade—the movement of data across borders—is the fastest-growing segment of global trade today. When data moves freely, the capacity to innovate and generate economic value expands, turbocharging growth. Nonetheless, American politicians have become increasingly wary of the digital economy, the vast power of Big Tech, and the free-market orthodoxy enabling its rise. The Biden administration has taken this shift in the zeitgeist to a new level by repudiating the market-oriented model of governance for digital trade—even at the cost of diminishing American leadership and fragmenting the global economy.

The United States has long championed protecting the free flow of data, limiting data localization, and safeguarding source code from forced disclosure. These core principles are enshrined in the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), ratified by Congress, and in the United States-Japan Digital Trade Agreement (USJDTA). They once informed the U.S. position on digital governance at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Not anymore.

President Joe Biden reversed decades of U.S. policy last year when his trade representative, Katherine Tai, stopped supporting these principles in Geneva and paused negotiations on the digital chapter of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). U.S. officials wanted “policy space” for domestic regulation. This approach sounds reasonable, but it is unfounded because “policy space” is built into such agreements. Trade-phobia is a partial explanation at best. Democrats in swing states reportedly feared being branded as job-outsourcing globalists in the general election, even though the Republican administration of former President Donald Trump negotiated the USMCA and the USJDTA and tabled a paper at the WTO echoing the old policy line. The Biden team could have done the same, relying on the legal precedent of a ratified USMCA and decades of policy precedent. They had zero precedent to reverse course. So why did they take such a drastic step, and what are the consequences for the United States and the global economy? 

A Reversal Rooted in Biden’s New Washington Consensus

Biden believes historic levels of corporate concentration and the digital revolution itself are “drivers” of economic inequality, weakening democracies. A “fairer” America and a fairer global economic order thus require state intervention. Biden’s new Washington consensus demands that the United States leave its laissez-faire comfort zone and let the government redirect domestic investment, channel innovation, and fight unchecked corporate power using an expansive interpretation of antitrust law and a whole-of-government competition policy. In the bullseye is “Big Tech,” which Democrats and many Republicans agree is too powerful. Biden hired what the New York Times called the most aggressive antitrust team in decades at the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with a roadmap for rewriting the rules of American capitalism.

The team put digital matters at the center of their efforts, arguing that the digital economy enables unprecedented levels of monopoly power and new ways of abusing it. The worldwide connectivity of digital platforms makes this a global challenge. Cheered by progressives in Congress, they focused on IPEF’s digital trade chapter to further those efforts. In October 2023, prior to the annual gathering of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders Biden was to host in San Francisco, his team paused negotiations, deprioritizing U.S. digital leadership in Asia and undermining part of Washington’s approach to technology rivalry with China. The digital reversal at the WTO followed. A U.S. official cited the right to “regulate in the public interest” and the need to “address anticompetitive behavior in the digital economy.”

“Bigness” Is Bad Again

Biden’s antitrust team is not wrong to consider how competition presents itself in the digital era. For many decades, antitrust laws have protected consumers from economic harm through the application of the consumer welfare standard, which considers alleged monopolistic behavior in terms of the impact on price, innovation, and quality. It is reasonable to consider whether digital platforms have changed the architecture of market power such that antitrust enforcement should address it. The U.S. trade representative is also not wrong to assert that digital trade is about more than just “trade rules.” The digital world engages social and political concerns, as well as concerns over national security, geopolitics, privacy, as well as consumer and labor rights. With the rise of artificial intelligence, it has to wrestle with crucial moral, ethical, and philosophical questions. 

Nonetheless, the administration’s starting point is that “bigness” itself is harmful because it allows companies to exert force over how the market operates and facilitates other social and political harms. The idea is not new or unique to the digital era. It originated during the Industrial Revolution when corporate trusts in oil, sugar, tobacco, steel, and railroads used exclusionary practices to crush competitors. In the 1890s, “bigness” became equated with monopolism and “immoral and injurious” pursuits, according to Senator John Sherman, author of the Sherman Antitrust Act, suggesting a broad definition of harm. That view persisted until the 1970s with the rise of the consumer welfare standard, the intellectual underpinnings for which were laid at the University of Chicago by Judge Robert Bork and adopted by the Supreme Court in 1979. The Biden administration wants to deemphasize reliance on analysis in enforcing antitrust laws. As a former Biden antitrust advisor explained, massive economic power can translate into massive political power, undermining democracy and threatening free speech and privacy. The administration wants to capture all these aspects of harm under an antitrust silver bullet rather than rely on other policy tools. 

This suggests that antitrust laws could be used to break up U.S. technology giants because they have too much political power or to protect small firms, even if they are inefficient. More importantly, the assumption that “bigness” is almost unequivocally harmful is disproven by the fact that it also arises because consumers simply like a firm’s products and services. For instance, they like ordering products from Amazon and receiving them quickly. Some corporate concentration also boosts innovation and employment, according to recent research. “Bigness” might even be a necessary condition for innovation and lower prices, some argue. Research and development are expensive. Moreover, sacrificing the benefits of economies of scale and scope to consumers in order to address harm to other groups creates more problems. After all, everyone is a consumer.

Edging Closer to the EU

The administration is kicking America’s market-oriented model of digital governance to the curb and warming up to the rights-driven model of the European Union (EU). The concept of “bigness” as a potential indicator of current or future economic, social, and political harms, for example, lies at the heart of the EU’s designation of Big Tech as “gatekeepers” of the digital world under the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The act changes antitrust from law enforcement to preemptive regulatory compliance, as the Biden team is also attempting to do. Thus far, Big Tech has not exited the EU market but is adapting to the DMA. 

The perspectives of the administration and the EU have converged. The FTC chair, Lina Khan, reportedly praised the DMA for addressing markets controlled by “digital gatekeepers.” U.S. trade representative Katherine Tai has not only extolled regulation as the EU’s “superpower,” but also, in defending the right to regulate in the public interest, has said that even if foreign governments target U.S. corporate giants, the United States should not object because, from a tax perspective, they may not be “American” after all. This is a shocking statement from a U.S. official, but it reflects the mood among some politicians on both sides of the aisle. 

The progressives pushing for these changes believe the United States should not enter into trade agreements, including on digital issues, that could tie Congress’ hands on possible future legislation. They want to enact legislation resembling what the EU is doing, but they do not have the votes to do so. Although both parties want more regulation and strong antitrust enforcement to rein in Big Tech, the members of each party disagree on methods—one of the reasons the United States has no federal privacy laws. Furthermore, taking free things away from consumers is always a political error. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo made that point in February 2023 when she warned that banning TikTok would “lose every voter under 35 forever.”

That said, a growing cohort of younger Republicans are fans of the Biden approach because they think big business imposes a “woke” political agenda on the country. The Heritage Foundation’s blueprint for the FTC under a second Trump administration channels Biden’s arguments about unchecked corporate concentration undermining democracy. Should Trump win in November, given his past activism on antitrust and belief that Big Tech is biased against conservatives, he may continue the Biden policies and force Republicans to fall in line. 

For now, the administration is content to free-ride on Brussels’ activism while designating the DMA a barrier to trade on paper and claiming that its hands are tied on digital trade until Congress acts on digital policy. In fact, the administration is not only fine with the EU reining in Big Tech but also more comfortable than it should be with letting Europe set global rules. That explains the administration’s complacency toward serious bipartisan accusations that the president has ceded global economic leadership with his reversal on digital trade policy.

The Consequences for the United States and the Global Economy

Even if Washington no longer seeks to foster the conditions conducive to the expansion of American corporations abroad, the U.S. government should not support foreign governments in curbing their ability to do so. The EU is going after the most valuable businesses in the U.S. economy, and its targeting of Big Tech in the short run benefits China. The DMA designated only one of its technology titans, ByteDance. Eventually, more Chinese digital platforms will be subject to EU regulations, but by that time, they will have a foothold in the EU market. As for the EU model of governance, there is a reason Europeans “use an American search engine, shop on an American e-commerce site, thumb American phones, and scroll through American social media feeds.” The EU is apparently unwilling or unable to address the need for both innovation and regulation at the same time. 

The U.S. trade representative implies that the administration’s digital reversal does not put America’s global leadership at risk because China’s model of state control over data flows is unappealing to most. Nonetheless, regional digital economy agreements and trade agreements with digital chapters dot the global landscape, but they do not all conform with each other. If trade is resilient to U.S. withdrawal, so is the business of setting the rules and norms governing it. 

The alternative to a global framework for digital rules is a “Splinternet” and balkanized digital trade. All nations would then make things that could only be sold in limited markets abroad. That is a recipe for shrinking, not growing, the middle class. 

Keeping America’s technological edge sharper than its competitors requires constantly running against the best in the business, no matter what corner of the globe they hail from. Ring-fencing American technology companies into the highly regulated, democracies-only global order the administration prefers will incentivize imitation over innovation.   

Unfortunately, the U.S. path is set—regardless of who wins the White House in November. That is the ultimate irony: an approach aimed in part at changing the political climate at home, growing the middle class, and forcing the political marketplace to reward the center rather than the extremes will do the exact opposite. Washington needs to reconsider its direction of travel before the rest of the world makes other plans.

Ferial Ara Saeed is the Founder of Telegraph Strategies LLC, a consulting firm with deep experience in economic, foreign policy, and national security issues. She is also a former senior U.S. diplomat with extensive experience in Northeast Asia and the Middle East. At the State Department, she has served as Deputy U.S. Coordinator for information and communications technology policy, as an advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs on Asia economic policy, and she has played key roles in negotiating landmark trade agreements with China and Japan. Follow her on X: @TelStratLLC.

Image: Salma Bashir / Shutterstock.com. 

A growing chorus of establishment pundits and policymakers have taken to branding anyone who calls for prioritizing diplomacy over force in U.S. foreign policy as “isolationist.”  

In official Washington, labeling an analyst, advocate, or organization isolationist is essentially an effort to convince the public at large that they are naive, and therefore not to be taken seriously. But recent history suggests that the “military first” (and second and third) approach favored by the Washington establishment is in fact the stance that is the most naive.

The direct U.S. wars of this century, including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, have done more harm than good, consuming vast quantities of blood and treasure in the process— $8 trillion and hundreds of thousands of lives, not to mention millions of displaced people, all  according to estimates by Brown University’s Costs of War project.  America’s slightly less direct wars – those we fund or supply with bombers and bombs – in Yemen, Gaza, and Ukraine are devastating and costly financially, environmentally, and in humanitarian impact. 

Interventionists – and their cheerleaders in the media and think tanks – are never held to account for their failures.   

Moreover, most advocates of greater restraint are not opposed to all uses of force. For example, U.S. support for Ukraine’s effort to fend off Russia’s invasion of their country is essential. But it must be accompanied by a diplomatic track aimed at preventing a long, grinding war that causes more death and destruction and precludes rebuilding, while constantly risking escalation to a direct U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia conflict.  This view appears to be gaining traction with at least some U.S. officials. But when advocates of a diplomatic track raised the idea early in the conflict, many experts and policy advocates within the DC establishment mislabeled it as isolationist.

Given the challenges we face, from thwarting Russian aggression in Ukraine, to taking a balanced approach to the challenges posed by China, to stopping the slaughter in Gaza and heading off a region-wide Middle East war, America desperately needs a serious debate on what policies to pursue in a rapidly changing global security environment.  That means evaluating proposals grounded in a policy of restraint seriously, not dismissing them with misleading labels.  

A critical component of a more effective, more affordable approach to national security should be a more realistic view of the challenges posed by China. Unfortunately, many top U.S. officials are doing more to promote exaggerated views of a hostile Chinese regime bent on global domination than they are to encourage a factual assessment of Beijing’s intentions and capabilities. For example, at the recent Aspen Security Forum, Joint Chiefs chair Gen. Charles Brown warned that if the U.S. lapsed into isolationism – a term he did not define – it “opens the door to Xi Jinping and others who want to do unprovoked aggression . . .We have credibility at stake.”

The tensions between the United States and China are real, but there is little evidence to suggest that Beijing is chomping at the bit to invade its neighbors if the U.S. shifts to a more restrained, realistic strategy.  The most contentious issue –the future status of Taiwan – would be best addressed via diplomacy, in the form of a revival of the “One China” policy that has kept the peace in the Taiwan Straits for the past five decades.  The policy holds that the United States will not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation, and that it will maintain informal relations with Taipei and refrain from treating it as if it were a treaty ally. For its part, China would pledge to pursue unification with Taiwan via peaceful means only.

There are larger problems in the U.S.-China relationship, most notably an action-reaction cycle based on each side’s worst case assessment of the other’s motives and military might.  While neither side is actively seeking conflict, there is a danger that the two sides might stumble into war if they remain on their current paths. In this context, a truly defensive strategy in East Asia that seeks to deter Chinese military action against its neighbors while abandoning the more dangerous and costly goal of being able to “win” a war with that nation is the course most likely to establish stability in the region.

As we elect a new President and Congress, we should debate the future of U.S. foreign policy.  But let’s do it honestly, without throwing around misleading labels intended to shut down debate and to keep us mired in a deadly, expensive and counterproductive approach to world affairs.

William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

Today’s stronger-than-expected GDP numbers make it very unlikely that the Federal Reserve will start an interest rate-cutting cycle at its policy meeting this week. This is a great pity, considering the multiple downside risks to the economic recovery that are now in plain sight. By the time the Fed starts cutting interest rates, it will likely be too late for the Fed to stave off an economic recession.

The distinguishing characteristic of the Jerome Powell Fed is its backward-looking monetary policy approach. In 2021, the Fed was inexcusably slow in raising interest rates at a time when there were clear signs of an acceleration in inflation. Today, the Fed is very slow in cutting interest rates. It is too slow at a time when there are clear signs that inflation is moderating and that downside risks to the economy are building.

A backward-looking Fed will likely say that today’s GDP numbers do not provide it with sufficient reassurance that inflation is coming down to its 2 percent inflation target on a sustainable basis. In defense of its position, the Fed will note that in the second quarter, GDP growth accelerated to a faster-than-expected 2.8 percent. It will also point out that the core personal consumer expenditure deflator, the Fed’s favorite inflation yardstick, ticked up 2.7 percent compared to a year ago.

The basic mistake that the Fed now appears to   shopping habits following the pandemic, commercial property prices are dropping, and property developers are already starting to default on the $900 billion in property loans that fall due this year. This will hit the banks especially hard at a time when high interest rates have wrought serious damage on their loan and bond portfolios. It is estimated that the banks are currently sitting on more than $1 trillion in mark-to-market losses on those portfolios.

According to a recent National Bureau of Economic Research study, close to 400 small and medium-sized banks could fail due to high interest rates and the commercial property crisis. Were such failures to materialize, they would be reminiscent of the 1980s Savings and Loan Crisis, which contributed significantly to an economic recession.

Another risk that could derail the recovery is the United States’ drift toward protectionist policies, especially against China. One clear indication of this drift is the emphasis in the current election cycle on the need to protect American jobs from foreign competition. Donald Trump has made clear that if he wins the election, he will impose a 60 percent import tariff on China and a 10 percent across-the-board tariff on all other countries’ exports. That would carry the risk of retaliation by our trade partners and a return to the economically destructive beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s.

Looking abroad, there is no shortage of political and economic risks to which the Fed should be paying attention. Russia is still engaged in its war with Ukraine, while the Israel-Hamas War could spill over to the rest of the Middle East. China, the world’s second-largest economy and, until recently, its main engine of economic growth, is struggling to cope with the fallout from the bursting of its massive housing and equity bubble. Meanwhile, a heavily indebted and ungovernable France raises the specter of another round of Eurozone sovereign debt crises.

In 2021, at a time when the economy was recovering strongly and receiving its largest peacetime stimulus on record, the Powell Fed maintained interest rates at zero to keep a strong recovery going. That allowed the inflation genie out of the bottle. Today, at a time when the Fed’s high interest rates have caused inflation to moderate sharply and at a time when downside risks to the economy are building, the Fed is choosing to stick to its hawkish monetary policy stance. This heightens the chance that the Powell Fed will end up with contributing not only to the inflationary surge to a multi-decade high in 2022 but to an economic recession by early next year.

Desmond Lachman is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and was previously a Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department as well as the Chief Emerging-Market Economic Strategist at Salomon Smith Barney.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

The spectacle of recent electoral shifts in Britain and France, together with looming ones in the United States and elsewhere, raises the question of whether there is any common pattern here. The Left seems to be winning in some cases and losing in others. Clearly, incumbents are unpopular, regardless of ideology. Is there anything more to it than that?

One way to understand all these cases is to refer to the old English idea of a Court Party versus a Country Party. As described by Viscount Bolingbroke in the early eighteenth century, England’s Court Party was led by a Whig elite of the wealthiest aristocrats in alliance with the City of London. This party dominated the king’s ministry and used the resulting patronage to its own benefit. Bolingbroke argued for the legitimacy of an alternate faction, called the Country Party, with its base of support among the lesser nobles, yeomanry, and older faith of rural England. This party, he hoped, could rule in the interest of the whole nation rather than simply in the interest of its metropolitan establishment.

Over the past decade, electoral politics in nearly every Western nation has been upended by a new axis of division closely resembling Bolingbroke’s pairing of Court versus Country. Since this division cuts across the familiar one of Left versus Right, it confuses and frightens observers who misunderstand it. Most working-class, rural, and small-town voters feel that traditional party elites have stopped protecting the people’s interests—or even granting heartland voters a minimal degree of respect. This has encouraged the growth of Country Party insurgencies against besieged Court Party elites among conservatives as well as progressives.

The resulting political dynamic is best understood by picturing four political factions in competition with one another: Court Progressives, Court Conservatives, Country Progressives, and Country Conservatives. This competition is more complex than the simple dichotomy of Left versus Right, allowing for cross-cutting tensions and tactical alliances in different directions. Its exact outcomes vary greatly from one Western nation to the next, depending on local circumstances, including national leaders and the strategies they pursue.

France

Let’s start with the most recent electoral shift involving the case of France. President Emmanuel Macron created Ensemble, a socially progressive, pro-business coalition devoted to liberal technocratic governance. Further left, the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) emerged this year as an anti-establishment coalition featuring the Gallic version of a Country Progressive platform.

Les Republicains, a traditional center-right establishment party, represents Court Conservatives in France. Meanwhile, Country Conservatives have rallied to Marine Le Pen’s National Rally or Rassemblement National (RN), a movement opposed to continued mass migration from the Muslim world. While often described as far-right—including by the supposedly neutral Ministry of Interior—Le Pen has taken pains to distance herself from her father’s noxious anti-Semitism. In fact, she critiques Macron’s economic policies from the Left and supports liberal abortion laws while defending a distinctly French national identity.

In the first round of French parliamentary elections, held on June 30, Marine Le Pen’s coalition won a clear plurality of the vote. This triggered the creation of an alliance between Macronists and the NFP, whereby hundreds of candidates from both coalitions stepped down to allow for the strongest possible competitor versus the RN in each district. The tactic worked. Even though Le Pen’s coalition won an even bigger plurality in the second and final round of voting on July 7, Ensemble and the NFP each won more seats. Meanwhile, Les Republicains ran a distant fourth.

Most striking were the demographics of these results. According to Ipsos France, Le Pen’s RN-led alliance won a whopping 57 percent of blue-collar workers, far outpacing any other coalition. Meanwhile, the NFP found its greatest strength among big cities, younger voters, managers and professionals, those with postgraduate degrees, the non-religious, and those describing themselves as “upper class.” Ensemble dominated the vote only among septuagenarians.

The French case illustrates findings that ring true throughout much of the Western world. Objectively, the RN’s overall policy combination is now center-right. But it’s a version of center-right unacceptable to some traditional establishment conservatives. The RN-led alliance is therefore defined as “far right.” Furthermore, the self-imposed difficulties in getting Court Conservatives and Country Conservatives to cooperate against the Left are immense.

Meanwhile, French progressives have no such qualms. Working on the premise of no enemies to the Left, Court Progressives work tactically with Country Progressives to collectively achieve power. This leaves the Left in control despite overwhelming working-class support for Country Conservatives.

The United Kingdom

The UK’s general election held on July 4 suggests a similar pattern despite all the obvious differences with France. Britain’s Conservative or Tory Party worked under the disadvantage of having governed for too long in a way that alienated voters in nearly every direction. Their leader, Rishi Sunak, was a Court Conservative down to his fingertips. He was also unable to bring mass migration, high taxes, political correctness, a sluggish economy, or regulatory overkill under control. Under such conditions, why vote Tory? Nigel Farage, the cigarette-smoking English populist, therefore led Country Conservatives into his newborn creation, Reform UK. Reform did very well for a novel third party, winning 14 percent of the popular vote. Sunak’s Tories were left with a little less than 24 percent. However, the distribution of seats was such that Reform only won five seats in the House of the Commons, while the Tories won 121.

On the Left, Labour’s Keir Starmer was able to build and maintain a working alliance between Court Progressives and Country Progressives that was more than sufficient to win the election. However, this was not because Labour’s ideology was beloved by most Britons. Polling at less than 34 percent nationwide, it did not do especially well for a governing party in terms of the popular vote. Rather, the key—at least in England—was division among the Conservatives, along with the sheer unpopularity of Sunak’s government. Given the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system, Labor won a colossal 412 seats, while the Tory coalition splintered and collapsed. In truth, this was among the least exciting and most unrepresentative landslides in British history.

Looking ahead, small-c conservatives in Britain face four possible futures in the coming decade. First, the Tories may find a new leader who can win back Country Conservatives and sail to victory, as Boris Johnson did only a few years ago. Second, Reform UK and the Tory Party may continue to split center-right voters, Court versus Country, allowing indefinite rule by Labor. Third, Nigel Farage may succeed in absorbing most Court Conservatives into Reform UK, leaving the Tories as a minor remnant. Fourth, Farage and the Tories may agree to merge into a new party acceptable to all British conservatives. And while this last scenario may seem most unlikely, it has happened in the past. For an example of that, we turn to Canada.

Canada

In Canada—unlike Britain or the United States—the great split between Court and Country Conservatives occurred more than thirty years ago. The leading issues driving that split were not immigration, trade, or foreign policy but regional and constitutional. Canada’s Liberal Party ruled for thirteen years as a result. Once center-right political activists finally reunited in a newly formed Conservative Party, its leader, Stephen Harper, won the federal election of 2006. This helped to set the pattern for subsequent Tory leaders. Ever since Harper, Canada’s Court Conservatives have responded to Country Conservatives not by denouncing them but by staying closely in touch with their concerns. This process—also known as “politics”—has helped to maintain Tory unity through thick and thin.

Canada’s Liberals are the party of that nation’s Court Progressives, based in the downtown districts of Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal. In 2015, the Liberals won back power under Justin Trudeau. Initially hailed as a fresh face, he turned out to be a disaster, presiding over a period of inflation, scandal, dysfunction, and woke revolution. Most Canadians are thoroughly fed up with him. He maintains a working majority in the House of Commons only through the tactical forbearance of Canada’s New Democratic Party (NDP)—a coalition of democratic socialists or Country Progressives. 

Trudeau must hold an election by October 2025 at the latest. The most recent polls have him winning 24 percent of the vote nationwide, reduced to something like 70 seats out of 338 in the Commons. Further to the Left, the NDP holds steady at around 20 percent in these polls, leaving them approximately twenty seats. The Conservatives, meanwhile, polled around 40 percent, winning them over 200 seats under current projections. A Quebec separatist party, the Bloc Quebecois, secured a plurality of seats in La Belle Province under current projections, as they usually have over the past generation.

The current Tory leader, Pierre Poilievre, is a fluently bilingual Albertan skilled at making his party’s case in a plucky, common-sense manner persuasive to ordinary people. He’s also on track to defeat Trudeau’s Liberals in a landslide next year. As a result, the media denounces him as “a conspiracy theorist.” Of course, he is nothing of the sort. Poilievre is a conservative pragmatist with populist, libertarian, and politically incorrect sensibilities. Or, to put it another way—take my word for it—he’s a typical Canadian prairie boy.

In the second part of this series, the author applies the framework of Court versus Country to the United States, with implications for the November election.

Colin Dueck is a professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Frederic Legrand - COMEO / Shutterstock.com. 

Summary and Key Points: Russia is increasing the deployment of its Vikhr air-launched anti-armor missile in Ukraine, utilizing its high precision and destructive power. Produced by Kalashnikov, the Vikhr can be fired from Ka-52 "Alligator" and Mi28N helicopters, effectively targeting armored vehicles, infantry, and fortified positions.

-Developed in the Soviet era, the Vikhr boasts a maximum range of 10 km and employs a tandem shaped-charge/HEAT warhead.

-As both sides rely heavily on advanced anti-tank weapons and drones, Russia's expanded use of the Vikhr missile underscores its strategic shift in the ongoing conflict.

As Russian troops massed on the border of Ukraine in late 2021 and early 2022, there was speculation that Ukrainian militia would have to confront Russian T-90 tanks with more than Molotov cocktails (aka gasoline bombs). When the Kremlin did mount its unprovoked invasion under the guise of a "special military operation," Ukraine was able to stop the Russian tanks with Western-made man-portable rocket launchers like the American FGM-148 Javelin, British NLAW, and Swedish AT4.

Those weapons proved deadly to the Russian tanks, and the Kremlin was forced to regroup.

Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) including loitering munitions and other drones have also been credited with destroying thousands of tanks on both sides. There are now reports that Russia may expand the use of its Vikhr air-launched anti-armor missile.

According to a report from Russian state media outlet Tass, the military conglomerate Rostec has claimed the Vikhr can deliver "phenomenal hit precision," where "one missile is one destroyed target." The ordnance is being produced by the Kalashnikov Company and can be employed from the Ka-52 "Alligator" attack helicopter, while the Mi28N helicopter will soon be armed with the upgraded Vikhr-1.

"The missiles are effective in any time of the day and in bad weather. The engagement of Vikhr is expanding in the special military operation. They are used to destroy armor in shelters or in motion and strike at Ukrainian firing points and camouflaged and protected objects," Rostec stated.

Development of 9K121 Vikhr (NATO reporting name AT-16 Scallion) began in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s but wasn't presented until after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The laser-beam-riding anti-tank missile has a maximum daytime range of 10 km (6 miles) but is most effective at around 800 meters (half a mile). It has a maximum speed of 800 km/h (500 mph), while its tandem shaped-charge/High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warheads can reportedly penetrate up to 750mm of homogeneous armor, behind ERA. 

It is also equipped with a proximity fuse, which enables area-effect that allows it to target non-armored entities, including infantry, forward positions, buildings, and even helicopters – making it a multi-purpose missile.

A laser beam directs the missile to the target, and it employs an automatic sight until equipped with a video monitor for use in the daytime, and infrared for night. Both target tracking and missile control of the Vikhr are automated. According to Army Recognition, the Vikhr has a hit probability of up to 95% against stationary targets and up to 80% against moving targets – but "it is important to note that this missile's accuracy diminishes over long ranges due to the spread of the guiding laser beam."

A dozen Vikhr air-to-ground missiles can be carried on the Ka-52.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: In a significant display of military cooperation, Russian Tupolev Tu-95 and Chinese Xi'an H-6 bombers conducted a joint patrol near the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) this week. Detected and intercepted by NORAD, the bombers remained in international airspace and did not pose a threat to North American security.

-This unprecedented joint patrol highlights the deepening military ties between Russia and China. NORAD's response included fighter jets from both the U.S. and Canada, ensuring robust monitoring of the activity.

-Despite the heightened alert, the patrol adhered to international law, with no violations of U.S. or Canadian sovereign airspace.

It hasn't been uncommon in recent years for Russian Tupolev Tu-95 (NATO reporting name Bear) long-range bombers to be spotted near, and even within, the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The Kremlin has increased what it calls routine patrols over neutral waters, but what made the flight on Wednesday "unique" is that a pair of the Tu-95s was accompanied by two Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force Xi'an H-6 bombers.

The H-6, which is the PLAAF's primary bomber aircraft, is a license-built version of the Soviet-designed Tupolev Tu-16.

According to a statement from the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), it "detected, tracked, and intercepted" the four aircraft – with NORAD fighter jets from both the United States and Canada taking part in Wednesday's intercept.

"The Russian and PRC aircraft remained in international airspace and did not enter American or Canadian sovereign airspace. This Russian and PRC activity in the Alaska ADIZ is not seen as a threat, and NORAD will continue to monitor competitor activity near North America and meet presence with presence," NORAD announced.

It was clear where the U.S. and Canadian aircraft were deployed from, or what kind of fighters took part in the intercept. In the past U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors and F-16 Fighting Falcons have been sortied to intercept the Russian bombers, while Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) – headquartered at the 1 Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg, Manitoba, operates the CF-18 Hornet, a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) variant of the American McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet fighter.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has claimed that the patrol "was carried out as part of the 2024 military cooperation plan and was not directed against third countries," while it claimed the joint flight of the Chinese and Russian bombers lasted more than five hours.

"An air group of the Tu-95MS strategic bombers of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Hong-6K strategic bombers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force conducted a joint air patrol over the Chukchi Sea, the Bering Sea and the northern part of the Pacific Ocean. Russian and Chinese crews practiced cooperation while carrying out an air patrol mission in a new area. The Su-30SM and Su-35S aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces provided fighter cover," read a statement from the ministry to state media outlet TASS.

The ministry further stressed that none of the two sets of bombers violated the airspace of the United States or any other country, but acknowledged the intercept.

 "Foreign fighter jets escorted the air group at certain stages of the route. While performing the mission, both countries' aircraft acted in strict compliance with international law. There were no violations of other countries' airspace," the statement noted.

NORAD also stressed that the Chinese and Russian aircraft never entered U.S. airspace during the patrol flight, but did enter the ADIZ, which "begins where sovereign airspace ends and is a defined stretch of international airspace that requires the ready identification of all aircraft in the interest of national security."

The Russian Aerospace Force continues to operate the Tu-95MS, a highly updated heavy variant of the early Cold War era aircraft that first entered service in 1952. It is now among the oldest aircraft designs still flying anywhere in the world and is the only propeller-powered bomber in operation today.

Yet, it continues to log the miles in the sky. The current models have a reported range that is greater than 9,300 miles (15,000 km) – allowing to make the round-trip flights to the Alaskan ADIZ from bases in the Russian Far East.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Shutterstock or Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: Denmark and the Netherlands continue their strong support for Ukraine by announcing the delivery of an additional fourteen German-made Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks (MBTs).

-These tanks, purchased last year and refurbished by Rheinmetall, are expected to arrive in Ukraine by the end of the summer.

-Despite previous issues with older Leopard 1 MBTs, this new batch aims to bolster Ukraine's defenses against Russian aggression.

-The Leopard 2, renowned for its advanced capabilities, has seen extensive use in conflicts like the War in Afghanistan and the Syrian Civil War, proving its effectiveness in modern combat.

NATO members Denmark and the Netherlands remain staunch supporters of Ukraine. Each has supplied Kyiv with American-made F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole fighter aircraft and previously had pledged to supply Leopard 2 main battle tanks (MBTs) to aid Ukraine's war effort.

On Thursday, both nations announced they will send an additional fourteen of the German-made Leopard 2A4 MBTs in the coming weeks, after buying the tanks last year for 165 million euros ($186 million). The MBTs have been serviced and refurbished by the German-based Rheinmetall for deployment to the frontlines – a process that has been completed.

"Yesterday and today, the last two Leopard 2s are undergoing their verification tests as part of the delivery. All 14 tanks will be delivered simultaneously before the end of the summer," the Dutch Ministry of Defense announced."Ukraine urgently needs more military support, given the heavy fighting on the battlefield. These tanks can play an important role for the Ukrainian army to defend itself against Russian troops. The Netherlands, together with allies and partners, will continue to support Ukraine unabated, for as long as necessary. This is crucial to protect Ukraine and keep Putin's aggression at bay," said Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans.

Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands had also pledged to supply around 100 older Leopard 1 MBTs, but it was reported in May that many of the tanks were found to have significant defects. Significant repairs needed to be made, and that issue served to put a spotlight on NATO's readiness and the reliability of some of its member states' military hardware.

The German-made Leopard 2 is considered among the best MBTs in service today, although it wasn't really "proven" in combat until the War in Afghanistan and the Syrian Civil War – decades after it first entered service. Developed in the 1970s to replace the older Leopard 1, the Leopard 2 was adopted by the West German Bundeswehr in 1979 and has been exported to nations around the world.

The third-generation 55-ton Leopard 2 is armed with a 120mm smoothbore main gun and equipped with a digital fire control system. The MBT has been steadily upgraded and is in active service with numerous NATO members, including those nations that directly border Russia.

Currently, the Polish Armed Forces operates the Leopard 2PL, a modernized version of the older Leopard 2A4. Modernization of the MBT is being carried out in cooperation with Rheinmetall and the Polish Armaments Group. As of the end of last year, the Polish Army has 62 Leopard 2 in the PL/PLM1 version in service out of a planned 142 vehicles.

Despite its capabilities, the Leopard 2 isn't a super weapon – a point noted as more than two dozen have reportedly been seriously damaged or destroyed in Ukraine. However, the frontlines in the ongoing fighting have become a graveyard for tanks, with thousands lost by Russia in the now more than two-and-a-half-year-long war.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Israeli Air Force (IAF) carried out a strategic airstrike on oil facilities in Al Hudaydah, Yemen, following a lethal drone attack by Houthi rebels on Tel Aviv. This unprecedented strike involved a dozen aircraft, including the advanced F-35I Adir, showcasing Israel's aerial capabilities.

-The F-35I, a customized version of the American-made Joint Strike Fighter, is central to Israel's air superiority and defensive strategy.

-This operation highlights the evolving threats Israel faces from regional proxies like the Houthi rebels, who have intensified their attacks on Israeli and international targets, and demonstrates the critical role of the F-35I Adir in Israel's military response.

Over the weekend, the Israeli Air Force carried out strikes targeting oil facilities in a port on Yemen’s west coast. 

This unprecedented attack followed a lethal drone bombing by Houthi rebels on Tel Aviv last Thursday. The IAF published video footage of its retaliatory barrage, showing fighter jets being refueled as part of the “Outstretched Arm” operation. 

Other videos showing the aftermath of the strikes in the Al Hudaydah port city have circulated showing massive fires and explosions at the oil terminal. The raid marks the first time Israel has carried out an airstrike in Yemen and highlights the significant role the F-35I Adir fighter plays in the Jewish state’s security arsenal.

“A short while ago, IDF fighter jets struck military targets of the Houthi terrorist regime in the area of the Al Hudaydah Port in Yemen in response to the hundreds of attacks carried out against the State of Israel in recent months,” the IDF said on Telegram shortly after the strike. “There are no changes in the Home Front Command defensive guidelines. In the case of a change to the guidelines, we will update the public accordingly. Details to follow.” 

On July 19, a long-range Iran-designed UAV struck the center of heavily populated Tel Aviv in the middle of the night, killing one civilian and injuring four others. Tehran’s willingness and capability to use its regional proxies to strike inside Israeli territory has only increased since Hamas’s October 7 massacre. The Houthi rebels are also responsible for dozens of attacks over the last nine months targeting U.S., Israeli, and international shipping and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. According to Israel, Houthi rebels have fired more than 220 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones at Israel since October.  

While details of the strike have yet to be confirmed, the IAF’s long-range strike capabilities should worry Israel’s adversaries. According to an Al Arabiya report, a dozen Israeli aircraft were used in the port city attack, and these included the fifth-generation Adir platform. 

Israel’s air superiority over the Middle East can perhaps be attributed to the Adir, its unique F-35 stealth fighter variant. The IAF is the only military on Earth to possess a custom version of the American-made Joint Strike Fighter. Back in 2010, the Jewish state became the first nation outside the aircraft’s nine-nation co-development group to purchase the jet. Manufacturer Lockheed Martin agreed to allow Israel to incorporate its own domestic technologies into the platform to suit its specific defensive needs.

When the IAF acquired the F-35I Adir “Mighty One” variant, it was granted permission to equip its new fighters with a homegrown Electronic Warfare System. Additionally, homegrown countermeasures, sensors, and helmet-mounted displays were built into the Adir fighters.  The F-35 is widely considered the best fifth-generation fighter in the skies today, and Israel’s specialized variant is arguably the most advanced. 

In 2019, the IAF’s Adir fleet flew in its first combat operation when it carried out strikes in Syria to target Iranian assets on the ground. Prior to this, the Lightning II platform had not been used in combat operations. In 2021, the IAF’s Adir jets also carried out the platform’s first ever aerial engagement, destroying an Iran-launched UAV that was flying close to the Israeli border.

Since October 7, Israel’s Adir fleet has participated in operations against the Gaza-based terror group Hamas. The IAF previously confirmed that one of its Adir jets successfully intercepted a cruise missile and has remained instrumental to the country’s defensive efforts. 

The F-35I is undoubtedly the best aerial weapon in the IAF’s arsenal. However, the Jewish state’s other airframes, including the F-15I and F-16I, should not be discounted. Each of these airframes contributes different capabilities, and together they create the versatile and robust arsenal Israel needs to defend itself.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: In early July, Ukraine executed a successful drone strike on a Russian ammunition depot in Voronezh Oblast, destroying the facility and highlighting the deficiencies in Russia's air defense capabilities.

-The strike exacerbates Russia's already strained logistical chains and material shortages on the frontlines. British Military Intelligence noted the depot's significant size and its role in supplying munitions, emphasizing the detrimental impact on Russia's attritional warfare strategy.

-This attack underscores the ongoing challenges faced by the Russian military, which has resorted to using outdated equipment and seeking support from foreign partners like Iran and North Korea. The Ukrainian military's access to long-range precision munitions, such as HIMARS and MLRS, has been pivotal in targeting high-value assets within Russia.

Ukraine’s forces took out a big ammunition depot inside Russia with a suicide drone, highlighting the shortcomings of the Russian military’s air defense capabilities, while also deepening ongoing materiel shortages in the frontlines.

In early July, the Ukrainian military launched a drone strike against a Russian ammunition storage depot near Sergeerka, Voronezh Oblast in Russia. As a result of the strike, the Russian ammunition storage depot was almost completely destroyed, as well as nearby facilities, according to open-source reporting.

“This is a significant loss at a depot that reportedly covered approximately 9 square kilometres. The depot was highly likely storing a mixture of surface-to-surface munitions as well as small arms to be used by personnel on the frontlines,” British Military Intelligence assessed in its latest estimate of the war.

“This will further stretch Russia’s already struggling logistics chains and force yet more dispersals due to the continued threat of Ukrainian strikes,” British Military Intelligence added.

Almost 900 days of intense fighting have stretched Russia’s military resources thin. The Kremlin has had to take out of storage main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery pieces built in the 1950s. Moreover, Russian troops don’t have enough tactical vehicles to support their offensive operations and they are relying on golf carts to go into battle.

The Ukrainian drone strike also highlights the poor state of Russia’s air defenses: they can’t even protect a high-value target that is located very close to the frontlines.

“Such shortcomings will almost certainly see further losses to other well-planned Ukrainian strikes,” British Military Intelligence assessed.

“Russia can ill afford such losses considering the attritional warfare strategy it has adopted, which shows little regard for the lives of its soldiers. This approach requires huge amounts of ammunition,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

To make up for ammunition and weapon shortages, the Kremlin has been dealing with foreign partners, such as Iran and North Korea, to ensure that its troops on the frontlines have the bare minimum they need to fight. Iranian drones, particularly the Shahed unmanned aerial systems, have proven very capable and deadly. However, the overall quality of the foreign munitions and weapons used by the Russian forces on the frontlines isn’t the best.

In previous months, the Ukrainian military has started targeting and taking out high-value targets inside Russia; the attacks have been occurring with the acquiescence of the West, which provides the vast majority of Ukraine’s arsenal.

The introduction of long-range precision munitions to the Ukrainian arsenal has allowed for accurate strikes against Russian high-value targets inside Ukraine as well. The M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) have been the bane of Russian ammunition depots, command and control centers, and other logistical hubs close to the frontlines.

The Russian military continues to be under serious strain, with its losses exceeding 560,000 men killed, wounded, or captured.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons and or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's Ford-class aircraft carriers, including the USS Gerald R. Ford, are the most advanced and expensive in the world, costing around $13.3 billion each and $726 million annually to maintain. Despite their capabilities, these carriers face significant threats from advanced anti-ship missiles and A2/AD systems, making their survival in combat questionable.

-The high costs and strategic vulnerabilities raise concerns about their viability, especially given America's rising national debt and economic constraints.

-Critics argue that the U.S. cannot afford to continue its reliance on such costly and potentially vulnerable platforms.

The U.S. Navy loves its aircraft carriers. Ever since they proved themselves as the premier naval power projection platform in the fiery cauldron of the Second World War’s Pacific Theater, the Navy has prized these systems. America led the world in innovating this unique platform and retains the world’s dominant fleet of flattops. 

Of 11 U.S. carriers, 10 belong to the Nimitz class, and the newest carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, belongs to the newly minted Ford class of carriers. (USS Enterprise, USS John F. Kennedy, and USS Doris Miller are all coming online as part of this family.) 

Officially, the Navy website describes USS Gerald R. Ford’s as being “the most capable, adaptable, and lethal combat platform in the world, maintaining the Navy’s capacity to project power on a global scale through sustained operations at sea.” 

This flowery description misses the mark, though. In reality, Gerald R. Ford is an unaffordable mess-heap; a hodgepodge of some of the most advanced technologies the Navy had access to, thrown together, and sent forward as the next-generation platform without much thought to price or efficacy. Indeed, the advent of technologies, like advanced anti-ship missiles, as well as the wider threat that anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) poses to the very existence of aircraft carriers, makes the survival of carriers in combat very low. 

Here's a snapshot of what I’m referring to: After the heinous October 7 terrorist attacks conducted by Iran-backed Hamas against neighboring Israel, the U.S. Navy deployed USS Gerald R. Ford to the region. But rumors abounded that the Navy wanted to keep the Ford at a distance from the shores of the region, fearing that Hezbollah’s anti-ship missiles posed a danger to the newly minted carrier. 

It doesn’t really matter whether the Hezbollah anti-ship missile threat posed a significant danger or not. The fact that American naval strategists wanted to stymie the deployment of their newfangled carrier too close to hostile shores shows how vulnerable these systems are. 

So, is the Gerald R. Ford class worth the expenditure of time, finite resources, and money?

Let’s first address the cost of these monstrosities. 

The first unit of this new class of carrier, the aforementioned USS Gerald R. Ford, cost an astonishing $13.3 billion to build. It also took a decade to build. This, in turn, ensured the costs of the program would increase. 

And as for maintaining this massive, highly complex system, that will cost around $726 million per year (this includes the cost of personnel, fuel, maintenance, and the airwing).

Proponents of this costly and complex system argue that USS Gerald R. Ford, being the first of her class, was always going to be an expensive system. Subsequent units, such as John F. Kennedy or Doris Miller will be substantially lower in cost to produce. In fact, these proponents insist that these boats are “now slated to cost about $5 billion per ship less than its predecessor, the Nimitz class, over the life of the ship,” according to Breaking Defense.

Bear in mind that these are all projections and most defense budgeting projections are rarely accurate. 

At $13 billion to produce, and nearly $1 billion to maintain, what do you think might happen if the US were to lose even one of these boats in combat? 

Well, America’s foes are certainly envisioning such a reality. China’s leadership has already stated they plan to sink at least three aircraft carriers with their complex arsenal of A2/AD systems, if war erupted between themselves and the United States. You’ve seen how U.S. carrier operations were complicated by the Houthi as well as Hamas anti-ship threats. 

This doesn’t even scratch the overarching matter of the pending debt bomb that is set to detonate soon in the United States economy. 

Interest repayments on America’s elephantine national debt today outstrip the overall cost of national defense. America simply cannot afford to go on the way that it has when it comes to defense spending.

And anything that can’t last, won’t. What this means for the Gerald R. Ford-class carrier is that they are an impossible dream concocted by Inside-the-Beltway types who just want to engorge themselves at the trough of the people’s tax dollars. That money is soon to evaporate, though, in a whirlwind of debt repayments and devaluation. 

The United States literally cannot afford its love affair with aircraft carriers anymore.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. Main image is from a fire aboard USS John F. Kennedy in 1968.

From the Vault

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Summary and Key Points: Israel's Merkava main battle tanks demonstrated their capabilities when a Hezbollah strike was intercepted by the Trophy active protection system. The Merkava, a critical component of the Israeli Armored Corps, is highly regarded alongside the U.S. Abrams and Britain's Challenger 2.

-Developed post-1973 Yom Kippur War to protect its crew, the tank features thick armor, a unique engine layout, and powerful armaments, including a 120 mm main gun.

-The latest fifth-generation "Barak" variant enhances intelligence and situational awareness with advanced sensors and a 360-degree Elbit helmet. The Merkava remains a cornerstone of Israel's defense strategy.

The Israeli military’s Merkava main battle tanks again proved their worth after a recent Hezbollah strike. 

The Iran-backed terror group claimed one of its Almas missiles struck an Israeli Merkava earlier this month. But analysis of a video shared by Hezbollah suggests the tank was able to employ its Trophy active protection system to detect and intercept the incoming projectile. 

The Merkava is the backbone of the Israeli Armored Corps and is widely considered as capable as more well-known Western MBTs including the U.S. Abrams and Britain’s Challenger 2. The Merkava platform is instrumental to Israel’s defensive strategy.

During Israel’s early days as an independent nation after World War II, it quickly realized its need for protection against hostile neighbors. Until the 1960s, the Jewish state largely relied on joint projects and weapons deliveries from other nations. The IDF collaborated with the British to develop a Chieftain MBT variant, but the UK nixed this program since Chieftain tanks were already being supplied to Arab countries. Former IDF General Israel Tal then kickstarted plans to develop a completely homegrown MBT. 

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel’s armored corps suffered greatly during coordinated attacks launched by Egypt and Syria in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. Their enemies were equipped with some of the latest Soviet-designed tank variants of the time, and Israel’s own arsenal of less advanced MBTs could not keep up. For this reason, the Merkava tank would be built first and foremost to limit casualties.

In order to better protect its crew members, the Merkava was built with thick armor. The layout of the engine transmission was reversed in order to provide an extra level of protection for soldiers. This unique positioning also increased storage capacity and access for the tank’s operators. 

In terms of armaments, the Merkava has always packed a punch. The latest variant sports an IMI 120 mm L44 main gun, a 7.62 mm light machine gun, and an M2 Browning .50-caliber heavy machine gun. The tank’s main gun can also fire armor-piercing and high-explosive shells.

The Trophy active protection system might be the tank’s best attribute. This homegrown system protects the MBT from anti-tank rockets, high-explosive anti-tank rounds, anti-tank guided missiles, and other projectiles. It also increases the crew’s survivability by enhancing the MBT’s capacity to detect enemy tanks.

Last year, the IDF and Israel’s Defense Ministry revealed the fifth-generation “Barak” Merkava MBT after years of development. 

The Ministry detailed that the tanks are equipped with a “wide infrastructure of reliable sensors” that enabled better intelligence information: “The Barak tank will strengthen the capabilities of detecting enemies and will enable fighting against an enemy with a reduced signature and in all combat scenarios, on the current and future battlefield, against the entirety of threats that exist for the maneuvering force,” the Ministry added. The Barak variant will also provide a 360-degree Elbit helmet, which will provide the crew commander with a full view of their surroundings.

Considering the Merkava’s popularity, it is unlikely that the Israeli military will give up on its tried and tested tank series in the near future.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.