Diplomacy & Crisis News

Years of empty promises have not helped Kyiv or fostered peace.

How America and Israel can create the conditions for the toppling of the Islamic Republic.

Trump should support—but not join—Israel’s fight.

In recent years, diplomatic developments have significantly disrupted and reshaped the global trade and logistics systems that had been established over decades. One of the most impactful events in this context was Russia’s — or more precisely, President Vladimir Putin’s — decision to launch a military invasion of Ukraine, effectively sparking the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war that began in March 2022.

In response, the West — namely the United States and Western Europe — sought to impose severe economic penalties on Russia as both a form of punishment for igniting a European war and as a strategy to cripple its military and other critical sectors by cutting off financial lifelines. As part of this effort, Western Europe dap dramatically reduced its purchases of Russian natural gas and began searching for alternatives to both Russian gas and oil (it’s important to note that Russia is the world’s largest gas exporter and the second-largest oil exporter, after Saudi Arabia). Furthermore, Western countries are avoiding any diplomatic or economic engagements that might benefit Russia — including allowing goods to transit through Russian territory, which could generate revenue for Moscow through taxes.

A similar approach has been adopted toward another pariah state — the Islamic Republic of Iran. The recent war between Hamas and Israel, along with Iran’s involvement in supporting jihadist attacks and missile strikes, has led the West to double down on efforts to economically isolate Iran, much like they have with Russia.

It is precisely in this geopolitical context — where Russia and Iran have become largely untouchable for most global actors — that the “Organization of Turkic States” (OTS) has emerged. This alliance, while not radically different from the European Union in structure or vision, resembles the foundational logic behind the United States of America — only this time, among Turkic-speaking nations. Member states include Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Historically, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser attempted to create a unified Arab state, based on the belief that a pan-Arab union — blessed with oil, natural resources, and control over critical chokepoints like the Suez Canal — would be geopolitically unbeatable. That vision failed, primarily because every Arab leader at the time wanted to be the one in charge. Today, the Turkic alliance avoids that trap. It is not about creating a new country, but about forming a unified bloc that empowers each member and increases their collective influence in dealing with the West and the East.

The OTS’s objective is to establish a barrier-free space for international cooperation and joint development, stretching from Western Europe to South and East Asia. Its strategic mission is to reunify the fractured Eurasian continent — which global powers have historically divided — and to restore peace as a central element in the global agenda. Unlike the failed pan-Arab unity project, which was founded on hostility toward Israel, the OTS is not built on conflict but on shared interests for regional stability and prosperity.

So what gives the OTS its strategic strength in this complex global moment? The answer lies in geography and logistics. The Turkic states control the only viable overland route for transporting goods between Europe and parts of Asia. They also serve as critical gateways for Europe to access essential natural resources — both those located within the Turkic states themselves and those that must pass through them en route to Europe. With the West refusing to collaborate with Iran and Russia, the OTS corridor — which stretches from China and Pakistan to the heart of Europe in Hungary — becomes essential.

A successful partnership between the OTS and European states could lead to uniquely accessible transport and communications corridors that connect Western Europe’s economic hubs with those in East Asia, while also linking them to the growing markets and production centers of Central and South Asia. In short, this is a win-win situation for everyone — except, of course, for Russia and Iran.

On May 21, Budapest — the capital of Hungary — hosted the latest OTS summit. Although Hungary is a European country, it holds observer status within the OTS and actively participates in its activities (it’s worth remembering that large parts of Hungary were once under Ottoman rule). There is, in fact, no significant geopolitical gap between Hungary and the Turkic states. As Europe has lost its traditional eastern routes through Russia and Iran and now faces instability along its southern borders — not to mention threats to the Suez Canal — it seems that the OTS corridor may be Europe’s only realistic path to the East. 

Without it, Europe risks becoming a marginal appendage to the United States — a country skilled at rhetoric but lacking meaningful initiatives. European states have begun adjusting their foreign policies accordingly, recognizing the OTS as a key player in the emerging Eurasian order. Even the European Union was forced to accept the observer status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the OTS — despite longstanding opposition from Greece.

The OTS also offers political backing to Hungary against pressure from liberal elites within the EU and presents an alternative to other “pseudo-liberal” projects.

At the conclusion of the summit, the OTS issued the “Budapest Declaration,” directed at global leaders and especially those in Europe. The declaration emphasized the OTS’s vital role in securing global peace, security, and sustainable development. It reaffirmed the Turkic states’ commitment to building a reliable transportation and communication corridor linking Europe to Asia, fostering a zone of peace and development along the way. The core message was a call to overcome international divisions and construct a peace-oriented region stretching from Europe to China. However, the declaration did not shy away from defense and security issues — for example, it referenced the expansion of cooperation in the defense industry.

The OTS draws upon Turkic legacies of the past, promotes inclusivity, and is rooted in shared histories across regions such as the South Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. The Budapest Declaration underscores the “Turkic World Vision,” which affirms the value of uniting Turkic nations not only through a shared past, but through a common vision for the present and future. The vision promotes cooperation based on a shared Turkic identity, history, culture, and traditions, explicitly rejecting racist ideologies and embracing multiculturalism. The definition of a “Turkic state” is broadly interpreted — as evidenced by Hungary’s observer status.

It appears that the Turkic era is making a powerful return, echoing the days when three great Turkic empires — the Ottoman, the Mamluk, and the Mongol — dominated the Middle East, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Asia. History, it seems, is repeating itself.

 Among all the member states of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), one country stands out more than the rest—Azerbaijan. First and foremost, there is no doubt that Azerbaijan holds a crucial position in the emerging trade corridor the OTS is striving to establish. Alongside Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan controls a key transit route from Europe to several important regions in Asia, making its role irreplaceable. Without its cooperation, the entire trade initiative would likely collapse.

Secondly, over the past few years, Azerbaijan has gradually become one of the major transportation and logistics hubs in the wider Eurasian region. This status was acknowledged by Kazakhstan’s President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who publicly thanked Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for the logistical support Azerbaijan provided in boosting Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Third, Azerbaijan is the largest investor among all Turkic states, with its total investments in OTS countries exceeding 20 billion US dollars. This financial strength suggests that Azerbaijan may well be the most economically stable member of the organization—and potentially one of the most militarily capable as well.

Aside from Turkey, Azerbaijan is the only OTS member that has engaged in actual warfare in the past decade. Its conflict with Armenia led to increased military funding and the development of a highly trained army. In addition, Azerbaijan maintains exceptionally close ties with Turkey—often referred to as its “brother nation”—and with Kazakhstan, with whom it cooperates across a wide range of sectors. Taken together, these factors position Azerbaijan as arguably the strongest member of the OTS in terms of economy, security, and diplomacy. What is certain, however, is that it is one of the most dominant and influential players within the organization.

Trump can prevent a disastrous escalation.

Arab states may be the key to stopping the Israel-Iran war.

Tehran’s hard-liners squandered decades of strategic capital and undermined deterrence.

The Kremlin will end its war in Ukraine only when it knows that victory is impossible.

The Supreme Allied Commander for Europe should also be from Europe.

The Iron Beam is the next Generation of Air Defense

The idea of the Golden Dome for Air Defense over the United States and some of its allies is not a new concept, but it likely was not possible to be completely effective until the 2020s. In the 1980s, President Reagan’s idea of his Star Wars named SDI space based defense system was an ambitious plan to have missile interceptors and possible laser based weapons in space that would target ICBMs once they entered the upper atmosphere. While ballistic intercontinental missiles entered space or near space when meeting targets on the other side of the globe, the amount of computer processing power and technology needed to hit a very fast moving target was in its infancy. At the time as well, MIRV Missiles, or missiles that launched multiple warheads was at the peak of nuclear missile technology, and would likely ensure that at least some of the warheads would hit, even if the SDI-Star Wars concept was feasible. Such MIRV nuclear missiles are still a threat today, difficult to stop even in the 2020s.

The idea that the United States could defend against a nuclear missile attack did have some utility, as the Soviets were unsure at the time if they would be able to penetrate a US defense shield, putting them in a weak position militarily. The Soviets were aware of the US Nike missile defense systems, one version that worked by setting off a nuke in the sky to destroy many incoming targets, but thought that Star Wars may have been the effective answer to MAD for the US, and would have changed the power dynamic completely. Later in the early 90s during the Gulf War, the first generation of US Patriot Missiles were sent to the region to defend against Soviet made SCUD missiles being launched from Iraq. While they claimed the Patriot could shoot down missiles at the time, the reality is that few SCUDs were shot down by Patriots, being a system geared towards shooting slower flying, larger aircraft.

The War in Ukraine showed the effectiveness of even older anti-aircraft systems against airplanes, with even old 1980s era systems like the SA-8 keeping both Russian and Ukrainian higher flying aircraft grounded during the war. The start of the war began with Ukraine’s most experienced pilots being shot down soon after take-off in Ukraine by Russian S-300 type missiles based in Belarus. The reality of missile technology at the time effectively grounded both Air Forces. As the war continued on, newer and more expensive NATO missile systems were placed in Ukraine, as Russian bombers would take to launching long range missiles from a safe distance and the new systems were the only ones that had the chance to stop many of these extremely fast missiles.

The Golden Dome Type missile shield desired by the US Administration would likely be composed of different tiers of defense, some of which already exist today in one form or another. Many believe that the Golden Dome would be a copy of the Iron Dome, but even in Israel, the Iron Dome is only used for small munitions, shot in volleys and easily destroyed with small warheads. For ballistic missile defense, the Arrow type missile system is used along with another ranged system. A US version would likely be needed more for long range ballistic missiles, as the threat to the US would be from abroad, not likely from directly over the border Katyusha rocket attacks. The US THAAD system is already deployed in Israel, along with US Navy missile defense systems and radars which are already very effective against incoming missile attacks.

The THAAD system is already deployed by the United States as a missile defense system against threats from North Korea. There is a THAAD system based in South Korea at the moment, and THAAD based in protection of Hawaii in Guam. It could be imagined that the Golden Dome could be easily established with an expanded radar network for THAAD into Central America, Northern Canada(where there was always a radar base in Alert, Canada), and Greenland. Improvements on the THAAD may take place using information in defending against Iran’s ballistic missile attacks and hypersonic missile attacks in Ukraine. The challenge for the THAAD or other systems is that THAAD should be used ideally only for longer ranges, and have enough interceptors to defend against a large swarm attack of enemy missiles. The concept of multi-tiered defense already exists within the US Navy, with SM-6 and other variants of SM missiles being used to target differing levels of threats. The reality is that few planes could likely evade a modern missile defense if targeted by the radar and having a Meteor missile, PL-15 or new US missiles shot at them. The Golden Dome requires a THAAD or similar type missile, ones that can hit hypersonic nuclear threats, can see stealthy and intelligent incoming missiles and will be aided by preventive diplomacy and preemptive strikes as best policy.

Ukraine made history by sneaking truck based shipping containers close to bomber air bases in Russia and launching a drone attack on several bases at once, targeting sensitive parts Russia’s bomber fleet. Russia has a limited bomber capability with many of their ships made during the Soviet era, many being out of production, or difficult and expensive to replace. These bombers were the stand off launchers for Russian missile attacks on Ukraine, and a plan was made over a year ago to execute this highly precise mission. Information has been rolling in about destroyed targets, with slower, older and more numerous TU-95 Bear bombers taking the brunt of the hits. Many supersonic TU-22M3/TU-26 bombers were also hit, planes that are no longer replaceable as they are out of production. Some of the prized TU-160 Blackjack bombers may have also been lost, along with a very valuable A-50 AWACS aircraft and many transport aircraft, all burned on the airfields.

The Golden Dome concept should not assume that their systems are infallible, as Russian territory is blanketed with S-400, Pantsir and S-500 defense systems that have not stopped attacks inside Russia, despite being comparable to the US THAAD system. The Ukrainian intelligence operation to attack Russia’s bomber fleet inside of Russia, along with a possible Submarine base, is a lesson in humility…in that you should not assume there are not internal threats when possessing the best missile defense in the world…and humiliation, where wars can be shifted in direction via narrative as much as via the number of soldiers an army possesses. Internal Guerrilla threats can be as dangerous as external missiles, and the Golden Dome is only as good as safe streets and a responsible Government.

Precision strikes will not destroy Iran’s nuclear program—or its government.

U.S. diplomacy could resolve the conflict between Congo and Rwanda.

How New Delhi’s grand strategy thwarts its grand ambitions.

To avoid a wider war, America should push for a nuclear deal.

American foreign policy in an age of unrestrained executive power.

What it will really take to block Tehran’s path to the bomb.

A conversation with Daniel B. Shapiro.

Tehran’s most dangerous option for responding to Israel.

America should aim for victory but prepare to finish second.

The attack comes after a frenzy of speculation that Israel was planning to take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities.