Ideas on Europe Blog

So, here’s the key question: Who actually made the decision for the UK to leave the EU?

It wasn’t the referendum.

The 2016 referendum, as explicitly stated in the Act of Parliament that created it, was advisory only and had no legal authority to decide Brexit. This was confirmed by the UK Supreme Court, which ruled that only Parliament could make the decision to leave the EU.

But Parliament didn’t make the decision either.

Following the referendum, MPs were never given the opportunity to debate and vote on the specific question of whether Brexit should happen. In January 2017, then-Brexit Secretary David Davis incorrectly told Parliament that a vote on the matter was unnecessary because ‘the decision’ had already been made by the referendum.

However, the Supreme Court had ruled that the referendum was not legally capable of making that decision.

In fact, the very reason the court case arose – thanks to Gina Miller’s legal challenge – was because Theresa May’s government had attempted to implement Brexit without any Parliamentary approval whatsoever.

 WAS PARLIAMENT MISLED?

David Davis advised MPs that since ‘the decision’ to leave had already been made, all Parliament needed to do was grant the Prime Minister the authority to notify the EU of an ‘intention’ to leave.

But an intention is not a decision. It’s not even binding.

The European Court of Justice later ruled that the UK could have cancelled Brexit at any time during the Article 50 notice period and remained an EU member on exactly the same terms. In other words, Brexit was fully reversible until 11pm on 31 January 2020, the date the UK formally left the EU.

In early 2017, Parliament was given one of the shortest bills in history – the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill. It simply stated:

(1) The Prime Minister may notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU.

(2) This section has effect despite any provision made by or under the European Communities Act 1972 or any other enactment.

Notably, this bill did not define the content of Theresa May’s Article 50 notification letter, which she unilaterally composed and sent to the EU. When Parliament passed the bill allowing May to notify the EU of an ‘intention’ to leave, the public was led to believe that MPs had voted to leave the EU.

Nothing of the sort had happened.

To reiterate: Parliament never debated or voted on the specific question of whether the UK should leave the EU.

 SO, WHO MADE THE DECISION?

This mystery was unravelled in June 2018 at a High Court hearing on the validity of Article 50. The court established that Theresa May, and Theresa May alone, made the decision to leave the EU.

Lord Justice Gross and Mr Justice Green ruled that the decision to leave was contained in the Prime Minister’s Article 50 notification letter to then-European Council President Donald Tusk on 29 March 2017.

In that letter, May wrote that ‘the people of the United Kingdom’ had made the decision to leave. But the Supreme Court had already ruled that the referendum had no legal authority to make any decision.

She also wrongly claimed that the ‘decision’ had been confirmed by Parliament, even though Parliament had only approved sending a notice of ‘intention’ to withdraw.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 

Article 50 requires a member state to trigger withdrawal from the EU “in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”. But the UK doesn’t have a codified constitution, and the advisory nature of the referendum complicated everything.

Would the written constitutions of other EU states have allowed an exit process based on just 37% of the electorate voting Leave? Unlikely.

Could the EU have rejected the Article 50 notice? Possibly. But it was politically expedient for the EU not to challenge Britain’s flawed decision.

The UK Parliament was denied the opportunity to properly debate and vote on Brexit.

Labour, however, could have legally challenged the process – right through to the Supreme Court or the European Court of Justice.

Instead, they complied with the flawed Brexit process and backed it, making it difficult for them to challenge it later.

WHAT SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED?

After the advisory referendum, Parliament should have been asked the exact same question that was put to the British public:

Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?

Instead, MPs were only asked whether they would allow the Prime Minister to notify the EU of an ‘intention’ to leave – which was a procedural matter, not a substantive decision.

As a result, Parliament debated and voted only on the terms of Brexit, but never on whether Brexit itself should happen.

GETTING BREXIT DONE

Boris Johnson campaigned on the slogan ‘Get Brexit Done’, negotiated the terms of the withdrawal agreement, and Parliament voted to accept them.

But again, MPs were never asked whether the UK should leave the EU – only whether they accepted the deal on offer.

Brexiters argue that the 2019 general election gave Johnson a democratic mandate for Brexit. But the full picture gives a different story:

• In 2019, most voters did not vote Tory.
• Most voters backed parties offering a second referendum.
• The Tories won an 80-seat majority with only a 1% increase in their vote share from 2017, when they lost their majority entirely.
• If the 2019 general election had been a referendum instead, polling suggested Remain would have won.
• The public was never given a vote on the Brexit deal itself.

All this exposed deep flaws in the UK’s electoral system.

A PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO BREXIT

We now urgently need a full public inquiry into Brexit. Such an inquiry should investigate:

1. How Brexit went ahead without the explicit approval of Parliament.
2. How only 37% of the electorate were able to dictate such a momentous constitutional change.
3. How the Leave campaign won through lies, cheating, and illegalities – including unlawful overspending and the misuse of personal data to manipulate voters.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Had the referendum been legally binding, the illegal conduct surrounding it would almost certainly have resulted in the courts annulling the result.

But since the referendum was only advisory, it escaped legal scrutiny – even though the government treated it as if it were binding.

Do you get the feeling that the country has been conned on an enormous scale?

• Join the discussion about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky (to follow)
• Related video: The moment the Theresa May government turned an advisory referendum into a binding vote, announced by Brexit Secretary, David Davis



• Related video: How referendums should be run properly – by former Brexit Secretary, David Davis (note: The EU referendum broke every rule)



• Related video: What Prime Minister, David Cameron, should have done after the referendum

• Why we need a new vote on Brexit



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Not so much a post as a list of links for you this time, as I’ve been working up from a thread on BlueSky to a graphic to a podcast.

The central theme here is how the UK-EU relationship is affected by the chaotic Trump administration in the US, particularly in the wake of his moves on Ukraine, Russia and NATO. Much as the EU had to respond to the UK’s stated willingness to break good faith during the Brexit negotiations, so too do the UK and EU now jointly need to respond here.

Of course, part of the problem with chaotic situations is, well, the chaos; you don’t know what’s coming next. Hence the title of this; circling the wagons to defend against the immediate threat, even as you want to continue on a longer journey.

As well as trying to work out some baseline assumptions, I also suggest what is in effect a holding model for the long-term relationship while the pressing needs around Ukraine can be addressed. I’ll not pretend it’s all that satisfactory, but we seem to be living in a world of less-than-satisfactory situations, so tough luck on that one.

Any way, back to the links.

We start with a first thread on BlueSky:

https://bsky.app/profile/simonusherwood.bsky.social/post/3liel7pudlx2y

This was essentially working through the unsustainability of UK hedging in the new context.

Then we move to a bigger thread:

https://bsky.app/profile/simonusherwood.bsky.social/post/3lijgqhoguf2e

This sets out the basics of my thinking, including discussion of the circling the wagons approach as a manifestation of a de-risking strategy. Particular mention needs to be made here of Nicolai von Ondarza’s work on security arrangements, which is excellent on the specifics of how the UK and EU could move to more institutionalised dealings. If you want more on de-risking, then I’ve worked off the EU’s European Economic Security Strategy.

If that’s all too much, then here’s a graphic form of the key bits:

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic137

And finally, if you just want to listen to me talk it out, then I’ve made an episode of A Diet of Brussels on all of this. Incidentally, I note I’m coming up to the tenth anniversary of the pod and I really didn’t think back then we’d be thinking about these kinds of things: I was right to think that we’d be banging on about Europe though.

Small victories, I guess.

And all of this is very much up in the air: would love to get your feedback on any or all of this as we proceed.

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1) Scholarly Interest in Russian Emigrees 

The immigration politics across Europe receive a greater actuality in the context of Russia’s full-fledged invasion in Ukraine.  The war prompted mass forced emigration not only from Ukraine, where the mass destruction takes place, but also from Russia, where repressions take various forms, as I demonstrated in my recently published books, first, “Diversity of Migrant Entrepreneurship in Varieties of European Capitalism. Post-Soviet Entrepreneurship in Austria, Spain, and Hungary” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), and second, “Global Crises, Resilience, and Future Challenges. Experiences of Post-Yugoslav and Post-Soviet Migrants” (Ibidem Press, 2024). Simultaneously, many of the European Union’s (EU) immediate responses to Russia’s full-fledged invasion in Ukraine were increasing restrictions in issuing visas for Russian citizens across Europe and increased controls at the EU – Russia borders. One of the questions that I address in my research is, how do immigration regimes shape Russians’ immigration in Europe? This question is conceptually situated in the scholarly discussions concerning the EU immigration and integration policies.

2) Recent Immigration of Russians in Serbia 

Building upon these findings, I embarked on an exploration of immigration politics towards Russian anti-war emigrees in the European Union (EU) candidate countries of the Western Balkans. Through my initial research in Serbia, I found that this country, which counts about 6 million population, received between 100000 and 400000 Russian immigrants since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Thanks to UACES’ Microgrant, in January 2025, I made a short field trip to Serbia, where I met and conducted interviews Russian anti-war emigrees, and by using their services and by attending some of their events, I analyzed their motives to immigrate in Serbia and economic activities. Russians’ in-mass exodus to Serbia provides a certain political paradox: while majority of the Russians currently residing in Serbia represent young anti-war emigrants and Putin’s regime opponents, close ties between Russian and Serbian authoritarian political leaders provided them with visa-free access to Serbia.  

3) Are Russian Immigrants in Serbia Short-Term Phenomenon? 

As I noted in “Global Crises, Resilience, and Future Challenges”, “it is essential to distinguish between people and states, especially in non-democratic regimes, as they are very different units and actors.” My initial findings from Serbia confirm this statement: my interlocutors revealed that many of them – relokanty (migrants) as they refer to themselves – in the beginning of the war first moved to visa-free countries territorially closer to Russia, such as Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Turkey. However, for a variety of reasons, they decided to move forward to the EU. Coming to Serbia, many of them found it both culturally close and convenient for living. Most of them are under forty years old, and they initially were employed by Russian companies, which relocated their offices to Serbia, such as the Russian tech giant, Yandex. However, after spending sometime in Serbia, most of Russian immigrants quit their jobs in large Russian companies and founded their small businesses. Most of my interlocutors expressed intension to stay in Serbia for a long-term. Similarly, most of them expressed deep sympathy with the current Serbian students’ mass anti-corruption protests.   

4) Russian Immigrants’ Current Impact on Serbia  

Seemingly endless number of restaurants, cafes, and small shops with Russian titles, and Russian language heard on every corner of Belgrade, making the portrayal of the city vibrant as never before. Relying on the theory built in “Diversity of Migrant Entrepreneurship in Varieties of European Capitalism”, I also found that Serbia resembles dependent market economy of Visegrad Four group of post-socialist countries in the early 2000s, before they joined the EU. Some Serbia’s official sources demonstrated that Serbia’s remarkable economic growth in 2023-2024 is owing to the large number of Russian immigrants in Serbia. At the same time, Serbia’s immigration policy, which particularly resembles the process of Hungary’s immigration regime at the time of its’ emergence in 2010-2012, has not moved further from visa-free regime for these Russian citizens, with largely liberal political views. It remains a question, whether and to what extent will they be enabled to contribute to further economic growth and democratic reforms in Serbia, and the country’s EU integration. 

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Abstract 

This article revisits the productivity paradox in the context of the European Union’s (EU) digital transformation, exploring the intersection of responsible innovation (RI) and productivity growth. The analysis is guided by two pivotal questions: how regulatory frameworks promoting RI influence productivity in the digital economy, and whether traditional productivity metrics effectively capture RI’s broader impacts. By introducing key debates surrounding EU regulations, such as the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA), the article highlights that while these frameworks may initially constrain conventional productivity measures, they also catalyse new forms of innovation and value creation. The exposition highlights the limitations of traditional productivity metrics in capturing RI’s societal benefits, calling for alternative frameworks aligned with the EU’s vision of sustainable, inclusive growth. 

 

Productivity and RI: Friends or Foes? 

In 1987, Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow famously observed, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics,” coining what became known as the productivity paradox. This paradox emerged during a time of rapid technological advancement, where innovations like personal computers and mainframes were transforming workplaces, yet productivity growth remained stagnant. Brynjolfsson and Hitt’s seminal 1998 research revealed that this apparent paradox stemmed from several factors: measurement challenges, implementation lags, redistribution of benefits, and mismanagement of technology. These insights prove remarkably relevant to today’s digital transformation challenges. Contemporary scholars continue to grapple with the innovation-productivity paradox, particularly in the context of the EU’s digital transformation (Fragkandreas, 2021). 

At the same time, as society faces the complexities of rapidly advancing technologies, the need for a responsible approach to innovation has also become increasingly significant. Awareness of environmental challenges, climate change, social inequality, and the broader impacts of technological advancements has shifted societal expectations of business activities. RI has emerged as an important framework for navigating the complexities of technological advancement, offering a structured approach to ensure that innovation aligns with societal values and sustainable development goals. 

RI, as defined by von Schomberg (2013), represents “a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process.” This definition, however, is just one perspective in a rich academic discourse. Building on this foundational definition, Owen et al. (2013) position RI as a powerful policy discourse that enables innovation processes to address societal challenges while acknowledging inherent uncertainties and ambiguities. Their work emphasizes that innovation must be guided not only by technological capabilities but also by ethical and societal implications, providing a flexible approach for responsible development. 

Expanding this theoretical framework further, Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten (2013) developed four dimensions of RI: anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion, and responsiveness. Anticipation involves systematic thinking about potential impacts, both positive and negative. Reflexivity requires innovators to scrutinize their own assumptions and commitments. Inclusion demands meaningful engagement with stakeholders throughout the innovation process. Responsiveness ensures that innovation systems can adapt to changing societal needs and values. These dimensions of RI, while of great importance for ethical innovation, introduce new complexities into traditional productivity calculations. They require businesses to invest resources in stakeholder engagement, impact assessment, and adaptive management practices that may not yield immediate measurable returns. 

The EU’s regulatory approach to digital transformation exemplifies the complexities of embedding RI principles into governance frameworks, ensuring that technological advancements align with ethical and societal values. Yet, this framework also challenges traditional conceptions of productivity and innovation. This raises two critical questions: First, how do EU digital regulations that promote RI influence productivity growth? Second, can conventional productivity metrics effectively capture the broader value of RI? The next section addresses the first question by discussing the impact of these regulations on productivity, while the following section examines the adequacy of conventional metrics in reflecting the societal contributions of RI. 

 

EU Digital Regulations: Balancing RI and Productivity Growth  

The EU has established a framework of major regulatory initiatives in digital governance through four cornerstone regulations: the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act for comprehensive AI oversight, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) for data privacy standards, and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA) for platform governance and market competition. Recent academic literature highlights critical concerns about how these regulations, while aiming to institutionalize RI principles, affect productivity growth, market dynamics, and business performance, particularly for smaller firms navigating compliance requirements. 

The AI Act stands as the world’s first comprehensive AI regulation, employing a risk-based model to categorize AI systems by their potential societal impact. However, Meyers (2024) brings attention to the tension between implementing robust safeguards, such as transparency, robustness, and human oversight, and maintaining the flexibility businesses need to advance cutting-edge AI technologies. Meyers (2024) also highlights the Act’s singular rulebook approach, designed to ensure regulatory coherence across the EU, which could paradoxically lead to institutional complexity and fragmentation, complicating its implementation. This critique underscores the broader tension between establishing robust safeguards, such as transparency, robustness, and human oversight, and maintaining the flexibility businesses need to promote advancements in AI technologies.  

The GDPR provides a revealing case study of RI’s practical implementation challenges. Research by Chen et al. (2022) demonstrates significant disparities in the regulation’s impact across different business segments. Their findings reveal that enhanced data protection requirements led to measurable reductions in financial performance for companies targeting European consumers, with small technology companies experiencing nearly twice the negative impact on profits compared to industry averages. Also, Chen et al. (2022) point out that larger technology firms remained relatively unaffected, highlighting the regulation’s uneven economic impact. At the same time, despite these challenges, Bachlechner and van Lieshout (2020) note that the GDPR has catalysed innovation in privacy-preserving technologies, spurring the growth of new market segments in data security and encryption, user consent management, and more, thereby advancing the EU’s vision of a digital economy founded on accountability and trust.  

The varying impacts of GDPR implementation across different business segments illustrate a key challenge in measuring the productivity effects of RI-focused regulations. While traditional metrics might show decreased financial performance, especially for smaller firms, these measurements fail to capture the long-term value created through enhanced trust, improved data security, and the emergence of new privacy-preserving technologies 

The DMA and DSA further expand EU’s regulatory framework by addressing digital platform market power and content governance. While these regulations aim to foster a more competitive and ethical digital economy, scholarly analysis reveals potential limitations. Teese and Kahwaty (2021) critique the DMA’s Impact Assessment for applying outdated industrial-era tools to dynamic digital markets. Furthermore, Erixon et. al. (2022) present a nuanced perspective, acknowledging potential benefits from reduced network effects and increased trust in AI-based services while warning about indirect economic consequences. The scholars emphasize that even without direct compliance burdens, these regulations may introduce new costs and affect resource allocation throughout the economy, potentially reinforcing advantages for larger firms and economies. 

The EU’s regulatory approach to digital transformation illustrates both the potential and limitations of implementing RI at scale. While the regulatory frameworks establish important safeguards and foster trust in digital markets, they simultaneously reveal the inherent complexities of balancing innovation, competition, and broader societal benefits. The empirical evidence suggests varying impacts across different market segments, particularly for smaller enterprises, raising fundamental questions about the way in which productivity is measured and evaluated in the context of RI. This measurement challenge requires a deeper examination of traditional productivity metrics and their adequacy in capturing the full spectrum of value created through RI practices. 

 

Measuring Productivity in the Age of RI 

Traditional productivity metrics, focused primarily on labour and capital inputs versus economic outputs, increasingly fall short in capturing the multifaceted impact of RI. This limitation stems in part from significant measurement challenges, as many RI initiatives generate long-term societal benefits that extend well beyond the timeframe of conventional productivity statistics (Cunha, 2018). Moreover, “the variety of the social impact … is substantial and it is difficult to capture all kinds of impacts fairly or objectively,” admits the EU (2014). RI initiatives also create positive externalities that benefit the broader ecosystem rather than individual firms, making their value challenging to quantify through traditional firm-level measurements (Nieminen and Ikonen, 2021). The transformation of business models and organizational processes through RI also generates value that transcends traditional product and service measurements (Yaghmaei and van de Poel, 2021). 

In response to these limitations, new frameworks are emerging that strive to rflect the fuller scope of innovation’s impact. Porter and Kramer’s (2011) Creating Shared Value (CSV) theory offers a particularly compelling approach, demonstrating how businesses can transcend traditional socioeconomic trade-offs. The CVS framework shows how redefining productivity in the value chain through social and environmental innovations can simultaneously improve operations, reduce costs, and contribute to societal well-being without sacrificing corporate competitiveness (Dembek et al., 2016). This methodological innovation emphasizes the importance of considering both direct and indirect value creation, including improvements in supplier capabilities, local cluster development, and workforce development. 

The EU has embraced this broader perspective in its policy evaluation approach, developing impact assessments that integrate social, environmental, and ethical dimensions alongside traditional economic metrics. Such a shift is further exemplified by the growing adoption of Social Impact Measurement and Management (SIMM), which systematically evaluates an organization’s broader societal effects. SIMM enables a more nuanced understanding of long-term impacts and community well-being, fostering greater accountability and transparency while supporting more informed decision-making. 

The integration of CSV and SIMM approaches with traditional productivity metrics presents practical challenges, particularly in standardization and comparability across different contexts. However, these frameworks offer important insights into how regulatory compliance costs might be balanced against broader value creation, especially in the context of RI initiatives. 

Recent scholarly work has also highlighted the importance of considering network effects and innovation ecosystem impacts in productivity measurement. Digital platforms and RI initiatives often create value through network externalities, knowledge spillovers, and ecosystem development that traditional productivity metrics fail to capture. Additionally, the role of intangible assets, such as data, algorithms, and organizational capital, has become increasingly significant in the digital economy, requiring new approaches to value measurement. 

New measurement frameworks must move beyond financial returns to address environmental sustainability, social equity, and long-term resilience. Incorporating more comprehensive assessment dimensions aligns with the EU’s vision of a digital economy that integrates societal well-being with economic competitiveness. This is particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which often lack the resources to implement sophisticated measurement systems yet play a vital role in the digital economy’s transformation. The challenge ahead lies in developing governance frameworks that can effectively balance traditional productivity metrics with these broader value dimensions, while remaining accessible and practical for enterprises of all sizes. 

 

Conclusions  

In the EU’s pursuit of digital transformation, a complex interplay emerges between RI and productivity growth, challenging established paradigms of economic measurement. The implementation of RI frameworks introduces asymmetric productivity constraints across the business landscape, with SMEs bearing a disproportionate burden of compliance costs and operational adjustments. Nevertheless, these regulatory frameworks also catalyse innovation in unexpected ways, fostering new market opportunities and technological solutions. 

The EU’s comprehensive regulatory approach, exemplified by the AI Act, GDPR, DMA, and DSA, illustrates the intricate balance required between advancing RI and maintaining economic dynamism. This balance holds heightened significance for SMEs, which often lack the resources to effectively navigate complex regulatory requirements while maintaining competitive productivity levels. 

This discussion reveals a fundamental need to reconceptualise productivity measurement in ways that acknowledge both immediate economic impacts and broader societal benefits. While conventional metrics inadequately capture the positive externalities generated by RI, emerging frameworks like SIMM and CSV offer promising pathways forward. The challenge lies in developing measurement approaches that are both comprehensive enough to capture the full spectrum of value creation and sufficiently practical for implementation across enterprises of all sizes, ensuring that the transition to responsible digital innovation supports rather than impedes the competitiveness of Europe’s diverse business ecosystem. 

The post The New Solow Paradox? Responsible Innovation and Productivity in the EU Digital Age appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Those paying attention have seen this coming for years.

Britain does not have enough skilled workers to meet Labour’s ambitious target of building 1.5 million homes over the next five years.

This stark reality was highlighted on the front page of The Independent on 17 February 2025, yet Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner insists it’s no excuse. But excuses are irrelevant – facts remain facts.

Post-Brexit and post-Covid, Britain is suffering a chronic shortage of both skills and workers.

The construction sector is no exception.

Without a sufficient workforce, housing plans remain just that – plans. This is precisely why Britain now relies on millions of migrant workers to fill gaps in industries ranging from healthcare to agriculture and, crucially, construction.

The truth is, this crisis was avoidable.

When Britain was part of the EU, workers from our own continent could travel freely to meet labour demand. This fluid workforce ensured industries had the people they needed, when they needed them. But Brexit shattered that dynamic.

Now, in a desperate scramble to plug the gaps, the government – whether Tory or Labour – is handing out work visas to hundreds of thousands of people from countries thousands of miles away, including India, the Philippines, and Nigeria.

Yet, even with these efforts, it’s still not enough.

The result? A nation unable to house its people, spiralling construction costs, and projects stalled due to workforce shortages. This is the tangible cost of Brexit.

Had we remained in the EU, Britain wouldn’t be in this predicament.

European builders, engineers, and tradespeople who once came and went with ease are now entangled in red tape – or simply staying away. And with them, the possibility of meeting Britain’s housing targets disappears.

This isn’t an abstract issue.

The housing shortage is worsening the cost-of-living crisis, pushing homeownership further out of reach for millions, and deepening social inequality.

1.5 million homes aren’t just a political talking point – they are a necessity for a functioning, fair society.

There is a solution, but neither major party has the courage to embrace it.

Eventually, a government with foresight will emerge – one that understands the need to reverse the damage and bring Britain back to economic and social sanity.

That means rejoining the EU.

Britain doesn’t have to suffer needlessly when the remedy is clear. It’s only a matter of time before the electorate demands it.

• Join the discussion about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky
• Related video: Why Britain needs migrants

• Migrants are a boon, not a burden: BBC report from 2021 on post-Brexit shortage of construction workers



• • • Post Brexit blues: Video report from 2021 on the shortage of construction workers



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A vote for Brexit was a vote for Putin.

Since the 2016 EU referendum, evidence has mounted that Russian interference helped secure the narrow ‘Leave’ victory.

By weakening the EU and sowing division, Brexit played into Vladimir Putin’s hands while delivering no tangible benefits to Britain.

Putin has long viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as a “major geopolitical disaster” and has consistently sought to weaken the EU while restoring Russian influence over former Soviet states.

Brexit was a significant strategic win for Moscow.

 RUSSIA’S COVERT INFLUENCE

Reports from multiple sources, including The Guardian, The Times, and the UK Parliament, revealed that Russian-backed social media accounts posted tens of thousands of messages in the days leading up to the Brexit vote, overwhelmingly promoting Leave.

Research by Swansea University and the University of California, Berkeley, found that over 150,000 Russian-linked accounts suddenly pivoted to Brexit-related content, influencing millions of voters.

The UK Parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee confirmed that these efforts aimed to increase tensions and undermine Britain’s democratic process. Committee chair Damian Collins MP warned this was likely “just the tip of the iceberg.”

Despite these findings, the British government repeatedly refused to launch a full-scale investigation.

Even after the Russia Report was published in 2020 by Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, confirming systemic Russian interference in UK politics, no meaningful action was taken.

 THE UK’S COMPLICITY

Successive UK governments have ignored the growing threat of Russian influence.

Oligarchs with Kremlin ties poured millions into British politics, particularly the Conservative Party, turning London into a hub for Russian money laundering – earning the nickname ‘Londongrad.’

Cross-party MPs, including Labour’s Chris Bryant and Green Party’s Caroline Lucas, repeatedly warned of the dangers, but their concerns were dismissed.

Even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the UK was slow to freeze Russian assets and sanction oligarchs.

A new Labour government took power in 2024, raising hopes for a fresh approach.

However, despite mounting evidence that Russia played a key role in fueling and funding Brexit, Labour has not committed to investigating alleged interference in the EU referendum or other democratic processes in the UK.

 A WIDER RUSSIAN PLAYBOOK

Russia’s tactics in Britain were not isolated.

While many former Soviet bloc countries remain staunchly pro-EU and wary of Russian influence, some, notably Hungary and Slovakia, have taken a different path.

Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary has repeatedly blocked EU sanctions against Russia, maintained close economic ties with Moscow, and adopted a pro-Kremlin stance on key issues, including energy dependence.

Slovakia, following the election of Robert Fico as Prime Minister, has also signaled a more Russia-friendly position, reducing support for Ukraine and opposing further European intervention.

These shifts pose a challenge for EU unity, as Putin seeks to exploit internal divisions, weakening the bloc’s collective response to Russian aggression.

Moscow has also engaged in cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns, and financial backing for far-right and nationalist parties across Europe to weaken EU cohesion.

By 2017, Russia had amassed 2,500 troops near Latvia and Estonia, heightening fears of aggression.

These concerns escalated further in 2022 when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, despite having repeatedly denied any such plans.

 THE TRUMP FACTOR AND NEED FOR STRONGER EU TIES

The situation has become even more precarious with the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency in 2025.

Trump has made statements appearing to favour Putin over Europe, openly criticised NATO, and questioned US commitment to European security.

His wavering stance on supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression has emboldened Moscow and left Europe more vulnerable.

With the US no longer a reliable ally, the UK’s alliance with the EU is more crucial than ever.

The EU remains the strongest force resisting Putin’s expansionism, coordinating sanctions, military aid, and humanitarian support for Ukraine.

Britain must recognise that its interests align with Europe – not with an increasingly isolationist and unpredictable US administration.

 LEGAL CHALLENGES AND POLITICAL INACTION

Frustrated by the government’s failure to act, in March 2022 cross-party MPs Ben Bradshaw (Labour), Caroline Lucas (Green), and Alyn Smith (SNP) took the case to the  European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

They argued that the UK’s refusal to investigate Russian interference violated democratic rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.

The UK government was given until April 2023 to respond. Predictably, it downplayed the allegations and offered no substantive counter-investigation.

The refusal to engage reflects a deeper unwillingness to acknowledge that Brexit – hailed as a victory for sovereignty – was, in part, manipulated by a hostile foreign power.

The ECHR ruling has yet to be delivered, and there is no indication of when it will be.

However, when it does, it is expected to be major news. The case remains a key moment in determining accountability for foreign interference in UK democracy.

 THE PATH FORWARD

Brexit was a strategic success for Putin but a devastating blow to Britain.

The economic, political, and social consequences are increasingly clear. The UK’s international standing has diminished, businesses have struggled, and trade with Europe has suffered.

But there is a way forward. The UK must:

• Acknowledge and investigate Russian interference in Brexit and UK politics.
• Strengthen ties with the EU, recognising the benefits of European collaboration in trade, security, and global influence – in other words, being back IN the the EU.
• Expose and counter Russian influence, ensuring that UK democracy is not for sale to the highest bidder.

The ultimate repudiation of Putin’s interference would be a national commitment to rebuilding Britain’s European partnerships – including rejoining the EU, at least in the longer term.

The damage caused by Brexit is not irreversible, but time is running out.

The UK must choose: stand with its European allies or remain a pawn in Putin’s geopolitical ambitions.

The clock is ticking.

• Join the discussion about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky 
• Earlier versions of this post were published in February 2024, February 2023, March 2022, February 2022, and November 2017.
• Related article from 2013: Latvia: From Soviet Union to European Union

• Related video – Putin’s interference in UK democracy, as explained by British MPs (will be updated later in 2025)



• Related video: Boris Johnson and the Russian connection



• Related video: Message for Russian people



• Related video: Stanley Johnson (Boris Johnson’s father) and the Russian Connection

The post How Brexit played into Putin’s hands appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Brexiters claim the EU is run by unelected bureaucrats. It’s untrue.

The EU is a democracy, run by elected politicians.

By comparison, the UK seems more like a quasi-democracy, with unelected decision-makers and undemocratic practises that would be considered despotic by EU standards.

The UK Parliament consists of 1,481 members across the Commons and Lords. However, while all 650 MPs in the House of Commons are elected, the remaining 831 members of the House of Lords were appointed and not elected.

Our Parliament has more unelected members than elected.

The number of members of the Lords often fluctuates due to new appointments, leave of absence, and disqualification. Voters have no say in this process.

The House of Lords is the upper chamber of the UK Parliament. It plays a key role in the legislative process, scrutinising government actions, and providing expertise on policy and law.

Although it has limited power compared to the elected House of Commons, for a Bill to become law it must be approved by both the Commons and the Lords except in certain circumstances. Ultimately, however, the elected Commons has the final say over legislation.

The House of Lords is the only upper house of any two-chamber parliament in the world to be larger than its lower house.*

[*Source: Alan Siaroff, Comparing Political Regimes]

By stark contrast, the European Parliament has 720 members, all elected.

Just look at other aspects of so-called British ‘democracy’ that would be considered alien in the EU:

 We have a legislative system whereby most laws are made by Statutory Instruments, drafted by the Civil Service, which cannot be amended by Parliament and most of which become law automatically, without a Parliamentary vote.

We have governments that can bypass Parliament with the use – and abuse – of arcane and ancient Royal Prerogatives and Henry VIII clauses.

We have an old-fashioned voting system of first-past-the-post resulting in governments that most people didn’t vote for. (In European Parliament elections, voting is by proportional representation).

We had a Prime Minister who could (until it was ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court) close down Parliament for an extended period at his will and without Parliamentary approval.

We had a Prime Minister who attempted to initiate Brexit without Parliamentary authority and spent considerable sums of public money in litigation defending her “right” to do so.

We had a government that gave lucrative contracts to their friends, bypassing usual procurement procedures and public accountability.

We had a referendum in which two out of the four nations of the United Kingdom, along with Gibraltar, voted strongly against Brexit, but the UK government went ahead with it anyway.

We have an unelected head of state (although the King has no real power to intervene on important issues).

None of these undemocratic situations would be acceptable in the EU.

But how many people in Britain truly know that the EU is a democracy?

For years, Brexit politicians and papers have been selling us the blatant lie that the EU is undemocratic, even a “dictatorship” and run by unelected bureaucrats.

Let me take this opportunity to explain why that is not the case.

EU MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS

In the EU, democratic governance is the number one requirement of European Union membership.

In 1962, the year after Britain first applied to join the EEC, Spain also applied.

The country was then governed by authoritarian dictator, Francisco Franco. Spain’s membership application was flatly and unanimously rejected by all members of the European Community.

The reason? Because Spain wasn’t a democracy.

Indeed, if the UK was applying to join the EU now, recent events could present questions over the validity of our application and whether our democratic governance is currently robust enough.

Remember, recent Tory governments wanted to scrap our Human Rights Act and also opposed the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Conservative leaders have  also threatened to leave the European Convention on Human Rights. The current Tory leader, Kemi Badenoch, has said she was willing to consider leaving the Convention if she became Prime Minister.

Such a move would bar us from joining the EU, where a commitment to human rights is a strict membership requirement.

Before becoming a member of the EU, an applicant country must demonstrate that it has a stable government guaranteeing:

• Democracy
• The rule of law
• Human rights
• Respect for and protection of minorities
• The existence of a functioning market economy
• The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union

Most countries that applied to join the EU did not meet these strict membership requirements and so they needed many years to prepare for the process before their application could be accepted.

NOTE: The UK’s unelected House of Lords may be a barrier to the UK being accepted as an EU member if we apply to re-join. We may have got away with having an unelected second chamber when we first joined in 1973, but there is a question mark over whether our application would be successful again without deep constitutional reforms in the UK. 

 EU MEMBERS

Contrary to what many people in Britain understand, the EU is a democracy, democratically run by its members.

These comprise the democratically elected governments and Parliaments of EU member states, alongside the directly elected European Parliament.

All the treaties of the EU, upon which all EU laws must be compatible, and any new countries applying to join the EU, must be unanimously and democratically agreed by all the national parliaments of every EU member state, however large or small.

In some EU countries, according to their national constitutions, agreement must also be obtained by regional parliaments and national referendums.

All the EEC/EU treaties since Britain joined the European Community in 1973 were fully debated and democratically passed by our Parliament in Westminster.

Not once were any changes to our EU membership imposed upon us, and neither could they be, as the EU is a democracy.

In addition, every EU country has a veto on any treaty changes or any new country joining.

(Compare that to our referendum of 2016, when a majority of citizens in Scotland and Northern Ireland voted against Brexit, but it made no difference.)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament is the EU’s law-making body, alongside the EU Council, also called the Council of Ministers, which comprises the departmental ministers of democratically elected governments of every EU country.

The Parliament is directly elected every five years by citizens in all EU countries. The latest European elections were held in June 2024.

There are 720 MEPs (we used to have 73 MEPs from the UK representing us in Europe; alas, no more).

Each European country is proportionally represented in the Parliament according to their size of population.

EU laws can only be passed by the European Parliament in concert with the Council of Ministers.

The Council shares law making and budgetary powers with the European Parliament. When voting on proposed EU laws, its meetings must be public.

Alongside the Council, the European Parliament has the democratic power to accept, amend or reject proposed laws and regulations.

According to extensive research at the time by VoteWatch Europe, over 97% of adopted EU laws in the 12 years to 2016 were supported by the UK.

There are proposals to give the European Parliament new powers to directly initiate legislation.

 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The European Commission is the servant of the EU, and not its master. Ultimately, the Commission is beholden to the European Parliament, and not the other way around.

The candidates for Commission President are proposed by a qualified majority of the European Council, which comprises the Prime Ministers or Heads of States of EU countries, taking account of the latest European elections.

Similarly, the Commission is composed of one member from each member state “suggested” by the national governments of each member state, but elected by a qualified majority of the European Council.

The Commission President must then be elected by an absolute majority of all MEPs (i.e. over 50% of them).

Indeed, Ursula von der Leyen could only become Commission President – for a second term – with the democratic backing of over half of ALL MEPs.

Each proposed Commissioner must also be democratically approved by the European Parliament in a strict vetting process. The Parliament has the democratic power to reject candidate Commissioners – as two were in in 2019.

After the 2024 European Parliament elections, European Parliament’s hearings, held in November 2024, involved rigorous evaluations of the Commissioners-designate. While no nominees were outright rejected, several faced intense scrutiny and challenges during their hearings.

The Parliament also has the democratic power to sack the entire Commission at any time during its five-year tenure.

The Commission is responsible for implementing the democratic decisions of the EU, upholding and enforcing democratically passed EU laws and treaties, and managing the day-to-day business of the EU.

The Commission also proposes new laws, but they only do this in close collaboration with the European Parliament and Council of Ministers, as only the Parliament and Council can pass laws.

The Commission has zero power to pass any laws.

Before the Commission proposes new laws, it prepares ‘Impact Assessments’ which set out the advantages and disadvantages of possible policy options.

The Commission then consults interested parties such as non-governmental organisations, local authorities and representatives of industry and civil society. Groups of experts also give advice on technical issues.

In this way, the Commission ensures that legislative proposals correspond to the needs of those most concerned and avoids unnecessary red tape.

Citizens, businesses and organisations also participate in the consultation procedure. National parliaments can also formally express their reservations if they feel that it would be better to deal with an issue at national rather than EU level.

 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

The European Council consists of the democratically elected leaders of each EU country – their Prime Ministers and Presidents. It is the EU’s supreme political authority.

The Council does not negotiate or adopt EU laws, but it does democratically set the political goals and priorities of the European Union, including the policy agenda of the Commission.

The Council also democratically chooses candidates for the post of Commission President, which the European Parliament must then elect with an absolute majority of MEPs.

The Council President reports to the European Parliament.

UK MEMBERSHIP OF THE EU

During our membership, Britain democratically helped to run and rule the EU, and not the other way around. Whatever the EU is and has become, Britain helped to create it.

Indeed, the EU can become whatever all its members unanimously agree it can become. But of course, that only applies to EU members, and not to ex-members.

Outside of the EU, Britain can only watch as democratic decisions about our continent are decided without us, even though those decisions affect us just as much, whether we are a member or not.

Leaving the EU has meant a loss of sovereignty. We no longer have a say, votes, and vetoes on the running and future direction of Europe.

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• Related video: The BBC got it wrong, so this video explains how the EU functions as a democracy



• Related video: Why the UK joined the EU – and why we might join again for the same reasons

• Related video: Why Brexit is a colossal mistake, by former Prime Minister Sir John Major



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After 14 years of Conservative rule, many of us longed for real change – a fresh start, a true alternative to austerity, inequality, and broken promises.

But now that Labour is in government, it doesn’t feel like Labour at all. It feels more Tory.

And I’m not the only one saying this. Many Labour voters, supporters, and even Labour MPs are openly questioning the party’s direction.

Just look at Labour’s policies since taking office – many wouldn’t have looked out of place in the Conservative government of just a year ago.

So, let’s examine how a more traditional Labour government might have tackled these issues differently.

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES

– Current Labour Policy: Banning UK citizenship for refugees arriving via ‘dangerous routes’.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: A humane, fair approach – establishing safe and legal routes for asylum seekers, investing in faster processing systems, and working with international partners to manage migration effectively.

Instead of punishing refugees, Labour could crack down on traffickers and exploitative employers.

WINTER FUEL ALLOWANCE CUTS

– Current Labour Policy: Removing the Winter Fuel Allowance from most pensioners to save £1.5 billion.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Instead of cutting support, Labour could increase winter assistance, funded by a windfall tax on energy companies’ record profits.

NHS RECRUITMENT AND MIGRANT DOCTORS

– Current Labour Policy: Criticising NHS reliance on overseas doctors, implying a need for more UK-based recruitment.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Instead of blaming NHS bosses, Labour should invest in training more UK doctors and nurses while improving pay and conditions to retain existing staff.

A Labour government should welcome migrant healthcare workers, ensuring they receive fair pay and working conditions.

BENEFIT CLAIMANTS AND BANK ACCOUNT MONITORING

– Current Labour Policy: Labour plans to monitor bank accounts of benefit claimants to detect fraud.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Instead of targeting the poorest, Labour could focus on corporate tax evasion, which costs the UK billions more than benefit fraud.

A fair benefits system should be supportive, not punitive.

TAXATION AND FISCAL POLICY

– Current Labour Policy: Large National Insurance tax hikes, impacting workers and businesses.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Tax wealth, not work – higher taxes on corporations, high earners, and windfall profits, instead of squeezing working people.

A progressive tax system could fund public services without burdening low- and middle-income earners.

INHERITANCE TAX ON FARMS

– Current Labour Policy: Removing inheritance tax exemptions for farms worth over £1 million.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Instead of a blanket tax increase, Labour could target corporate farms and landowners, while protecting small family farms from financial hardship.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES

– Current Labour Policy: Labour has launched Great British Energy (GBE), a publicly owned clean energy company, and pledged home insulation improvements via the Warm Homes Plan.

However, green investment funding has been cut from £28bn to £14bn, and Labour is expanding nuclear power. Keir Starmer has also indicated he wants to go-ahead with a giant new oilfield, Rosebank off Shetland, continuing Conservative energy policies.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Labour should reverse green investment cuts, expand public ownership of renewable energy, and prioritise fast-deploying renewables over costly and environmentally unfriendly nuclear projects and the Rosebank oilfield.

LAW AND ORDER POLICIES

– Current Labour Policy: More police recruitment and expanded use of facial recognition surveillance.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Tackle the root causes of crime – invest in youth services, education, and job creation.

Instead of increased surveillance, Labour should prioritise community policing and police accountability.

PUBLIC SECTOR PAY AND SERVICES

– Current Labour Policy: Labour has announced above-inflation pay rises for some public sector workers, including 5.5% for NHS staff and a 22% pay rise for junior doctors over two years.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: While better than nothing, true Labour values would ensure all public sector wages rise in line with inflation – funded by progressive taxation, not spending cuts elsewhere.

EDUCATION REFORMS

– Current Labour Policy: Labour plans to recruit 6,500 new teachers, modernise the curriculum, and ensure all new teachers are qualified.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: All well and good, but Labour should also increase school funding, reduce class sizes, and abolish tuition fees for higher education.

Rather than focusing on standardisation, Labour should prioritise investment and support to help all students succeed.

BREXIT – THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

– Current Labour Policy: Labour rules out rejoining the EU, Single Market, or customs union, despite Brexit’s role in low growth, inflation, and workforce shortages – contributing to the £22bn economic “black hole”.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Every Labour Prime Minister since 1957 has supported EU membership – except Keir Starmer.

Labour should face reality. If Starmer started making the case for rejoining, Labour could boost economic growth and help to secure a second term.

A MORE TRADITIONAL LABOUR APPROACH

A Labour government true to its values would:

Increase taxes on wealth and corporations, not on workers.
Invest in public services instead of cutting support.
Ensure a humane, fair approach to refugees and benefits claimants.
Properly fund public sector pay and green investment.
Tackle corporate tax avoidance instead of bank surveillance on the poor.
Support EU membership, just like every Labour Prime Minister before Starmer.

Instead, Starmer’s Labour is adopting fiscally conservative, tougher-on-migrants, tougher-on-welfare policies while avoiding the Brexit debate – mirroring recent Tory approaches.

This isn’t New Labour. This isn’t even true Labour.

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• Related video: Keir Starmer stood for the Labour leadership promoting migration and Free Movement of People – but once he became leader, changed his mind.



• Related article: Labour’s reform-style rhetoric against migration simply won’t work

 

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I support the European Union, believing it has been a force for good. However, it is far from perfect, and transparency issues continue to cast doubt on its leadership.

I want the UK to rejoin the EU because I believe that to be in Britain’s – and Europe’s – best interests.

But that doesn’t mean to say I am starry-eyed about the EU, or more pertinently, the different people who are elected from time to time to run it (yes, contrary to popular mythology, they are elected).

The latest controversy involving European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen raises serious questions about accountability.

Investigative journalist Alexander Fanta reported in The Guardian that von der Leyen has gone to court to prevent the release of personal messages exchanged with Pfizer’s CEO, Albert Bourla, during critical Covid vaccine negotiations in 2021.

These messages could shed light on how the EU secured a €21.5bn (£17.9bn) deal for up to 1.8 billion Pfizer doses – raising concerns over pricing, procurement strategy, and whether millions of doses were wasted.

At the time, the EU was under immense pressure to secure vaccines, lagging behind the UK and Israel.

Amid production issues with Pfizer and AstraZeneca, it’s claimed that von der Leyen took personal charge of negotiations, reportedly leveraging direct text exchanges with Bourla, but this is strongly denied by the European Commission.

However, when Fanta filed an access request under the EU’s freedom of information law, the Commission refused, arguing that texts are “short-lived” and not subject to disclosure rules.

The secrecy surrounding these exchanges has led to a legal battle.

The New York Times and journalist Matina Stevis-Gridneff have also filed lawsuits in the European Court of Justice seeking access.

The EU’s legal team claims the texts are not “substantive” while simultaneously admitting they have never reviewed them – relying instead on von der Leyen’s staff assurances.

One exasperated judge even called the Commission’s testimony “bizarre.”

This lack of transparency extends beyond vaccine procurement.

The EU’s unprecedented €723bn (£600bn) Covid recovery fund, meant to boost digital and climate investments, remains largely unaccounted for.

When Fanta’s colleagues at ‘Follow the Money’ requested details, only the top 100 recipients per country were disclosed, leaving billions in spending unexplained.

Allegations of fraud linked to these funds have since emerged, with Greek authorities investigating €2.5bn in suspected misuse and Italian police probing a €600m fraud case.

Fanta argues that secrecy is embedded in the EU’s administrative culture. It is claimed that under von der Leyen, this has worsened, with key documents withheld for political reasons.

Outgoing European Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly has accused “powerful consiglieri” in von der Leyen’s cabinet of blocking crucial disclosures.

Despite her public stance against authoritarianism, von der Leyen’s resistance to scrutiny undermines democratic accountability.

Fanta warns that limiting transparency only strengthens the arguments of leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, who use secrecy to justify their own undemocratic practices.

The ongoing court case may set new limits on von der Leyen’s secrecy, but real change requires sustained pressure from media, civil society, and the European Parliament.

Public trust depends on transparency – leaders must be held accountable, even when it makes governing, or texting, more complicated.

********************

I have now received a response from Stefan de Keersmaecker, Deputy Chief Spokesperson of the European Commission:

Many thanks for your message. This is what we can share with you:

The President had exchanges with the CEO of Pfizer, as she generally had with CEOs of other companies with a view to attracting companies’ interest to engage with the EU for the delivery of vaccines in accordance with the objectives and procedures of the EU’s COVID-19 Vaccine Strategy.

The President was not involved in negotiations of contracts.

There was a clear and transparent process in place for such negotiations. The EU Vaccine Strategy was a joint strategy: all contracts with vaccine developers had been negotiated jointly by the Commission and the Member States, taking into account vaccine needs of all EU countries.

Practically speaking, the negotiations were done by a negotiation team consisting of representatives of the Commission and of several Member States.

This team reported on a regular basis to a Steering Board, consisting of representatives of the Commission and all Member States. The role of this board was to set the mandate for the negotiators, identify the needs and steer the negotiations.

Before each vaccine contract was concluded, it was submitted to the steering board.  Member States were given the opportunity to opt out from the contract.

So all Member States are fully aware of all contractual terms and conditions, including on deliveries, that they negotiated with the companies.

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Kirsty Warner | 21 January 2025 

From the 7th to the 9th of October, I had the opportunity to visit the European House of History in Brussels, a trip that marked a significant step in gathering material for my chapter, Museums and the Evolution of European (Union) Identity Construction (1970–2024), part of the upcoming book Pop Goes the EU: Framing European Identity in Popular Culture. This chapter traces the history of the European Union’s engagement with museums, considering how they have been used as spaces for the construction of citizens European (Union) identity.

Entrance to the European House of History 

The European House of History, opened in 2017, is central to this inquiry as it represents the EU’s attempt to conceptualise its identity beyond political and economic integration. By focusing on pan-European themes, the museum raises questions about the very nature of EU (Union) identity: What stories are told, and whose voices are included? My visit allowed me to explore the narratives presented in its exhibitions, offering a deeper understanding of the museum’s approach to these questions. 

Conflicting Views on the European House of History 

The European House of History is not without controversy. Critics have accused it of serving as EU propaganda, promoting a vision of Europe that centres on integration successes while glossing over its complexities. Whilst others have reported that the museum has been called a “vanity project” and an “offensive waste of money” with an estimated €56m price tag. Supporters, however, argue that the museum provides a unique opportunity to conceptualise a European identity that transcends national borders, creating a thematic narrative that connects shared histories and values. These debates are integral to my research, as they reveal the tension between creating a cohesive European narrative and addressing the diversity of experiences across the continent. Evident is the challenge of balancing a unifying narrative with the complexity of diverse historical experiences, reflecting broader debates about how history is curated and presented in institutional spaces. 

By placing ‘the narrative’ of history at the core of their mission (rather than, say, objects from the past), they attempt to provide a decisive new idea of Western history. Such ‘houses’ become intellectual ‘safe spaces’ for the postwar elites’ idea of history. (Hungary Today 2025.01.11) 

During my visit, I observed how the museum organises its narrative through thematic displays rather than chronological or strictly national ones. This approach attempts to weave together common threads—conflict, cooperation, migration, and innovation—while subtly framing the EU as a central actor in Europe’s contemporary story. For example, exhibits on post-war recovery emphasise the European Coal and Steel Community’s role, while sections on cultural heritage reflect the EU’s efforts to protect and promote shared traditions. This is further evident in the Milestones of European Integration II section of the Shattering Certainties Gallery; the glass cases feature a partial print of the EU flag, underscoring the EU’s role as a central actor in the narrative and highlighting its pivotal place in the continent’s recent history.

 

 

 

 

Pillar of Integration (left): Glass pillar featuring a partial EU flag, symbolising the EU’s central role in Europe’s contemporary story. EU Passports (right): EU passports from member states are displayed within the glass pillar. 

 

 

 

Narratives Beyond the Institution 

What stood out most was the interplay between institutional narratives and public interpretation. The exhibitions invite visitors to engage with the material through interactive displays and multimedia content, creating room for reflection and debate. This aligns with the broader purpose of the book Pop Goes the EU, which examines how the EU is framed in popular culture and how civil society actors contribute to this framing.

My visit to the European House of History was invaluable in shaping the concluding section of my chapter, where I explore how museums like this one attempt to conceptualise European identity. While the EU’s museum involvement has historically focused on supporting cultural heritage without encroaching on member states’ culture, the European House of History represents a shift toward a more deliberate common narrative about European integration and identity. 

 

 

 

 

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As both a researcher and a policymaker, I am often confronted with the challenge of bridging the gap between these two worlds. While academia and policy serve different purposes, they are intricately connected and have much to offer one another. The UACES (University Association for Contemporary European Studies) Doctoral Training Academy (DTA) in Prague gave me a unique opportunity to reflect on this connection, equipping me with the tools, insights, and strategies to navigate both realms better. 

 

The DTA was held at the European Commission in Prague, a city that balances the old with the new, much like academia and policy. From its rich history to its modern influence, Prague served as the perfect backdrop for this experience—reminding me of the delicate balance between tradition and progress that we often face as both practitioners and researchers. Below, I reflect on some of the key lessons I learned and how my experience as a practitioner in the UK Civil Service and an early career researcher at UCL helped shape my perspective throughout the event. 

 

Practical Strategies for Balancing Teaching and Research 

As a practitioner in the Civil Service, I am no stranger to the fast-paced demands of policymaking. However, as a PhD student at UCL, I’m also accustomed to the slower, more deliberate process of academic research. Balancing these two roles can be challenging, but the DTA provided invaluable strategies for managing both without compromising on quality or mental well-being. 

 

Led by Dr. Michal Parízek, Dr. Eliska Tomalová, and Dr. Emilija Tudzarovska, the session on balancing teaching and research focused on time management, integrating research topics into teaching, and ensuring that both areas complement each other. This session resonated deeply with me as it highlighted how, as a practitioner, I often need to draw from theoretical insights to inform policy decisions. Conversely, the DTA reaffirmed how teaching can serve as a dynamic space for refining my own research ideas. This dual advantage can be developed by thoughtfully integrating both roles rather than viewing them as separate entities. 

 

Navigating the Challenges of Teaching Undergraduate and Graduate Students 

Being a practitioner has allowed me to engage in policy discussions and see how theory translates into practice. Yet, as an academic, I often find myself in classrooms with students at various stages of their educational journey. Dr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Dr. Viera Martinková, and Dr. Lucie Tungul’s session on the unique challenges of teaching undergraduate and graduate students provided me with the tools to manage diverse student needs. 

 

What stood out was the importance of engaging students effectively by using social networks and interactive techniques and addressing the varying levels of prior knowledge. As a researcher, it is easy to forget that students may not always be familiar with complex topics. As a practitioner, however, I understand the importance of context and how crucial it is to ensure information is accessible. This session reinforced the value of finding innovative ways to explain complex ideas. 

 

Teaching Sensitive Topics with Respect and Empathy 

As both a policymaker and a researcher, I have dealt with sensitive issues—from political conflicts to social justice issues. Teaching these topics requires a high level of empathy and awareness, which Dr. Irena Kalhousová, Prof. Tomáš Weiss, and Dr. Olga Litvyak skilfully addressed in their session. Teaching sensitive topics requires navigating complexities, ensuring that all voices are heard, and respecting diverse perspectives in the classroom. 

 

The lessons I took away were powerful: sensitivity and respect are key when dealing with controversial or emotionally charged issues. From a policymaker’s perspective, it is essential to be sensitive to the social and cultural dynamics at play when addressing sensitive matters in policy. As a researcher, I now understand that I approach these topics in my work should be equally empathetic and inclusive, aiming to generate thoughtful, well-rounded discussions. 

 

Building Authority and Handling Difficult Questions with Poise 

As a practitioner, I often have to assert my ideas and defend them in public settings. This can be particularly challenging when faced with difficult questions or criticism. Dr. Olga Litvyak and Elena Simanschi’s workshop on building authority and handling difficult questions resonated with me because it focused on how to balance authority with approachability, even under challenging circumstances. 

 

As an academic, it’s essential to present ideas confidently and manage challenging questions with poise, which is equally important in policy debates. The session taught me how to remain composed, assert my authority, and stay focused, no matter the nature of the question. Whether in the classroom or in a policy context, these skills are critical for fostering a respectful and constructive environment for dialogue. 

Networking and Collaboration Opportunities 

As both a researcher and a practitioner, the value of building relationships and networking cannot be overstated. The DTA offered me numerous opportunities to connect with peers and experts, furthering my understanding of the intersection between academic research and policymaking. Engaging with fellow researchers and policymakers from various institutions allowed me to share ideas, learn from different experiences, and explore potential collaborations. 

 

The interdisciplinary nature of these connections also gave me fresh perspectives on approaching my own research and practice. As a researcher, I am constantly looking for ways to make my work relevant to the world of policy, while as a practitioner, I am learning to value the theoretical insights that research brings to the table. The DTA reinforced the idea that collaboration and open dialogue between these communities are essential for creating impactful, evidence-based decisions. 

 

Reflection: The Dual Role of Practitioner and Researcher 

The DTA provided me with practical tools for navigating the academic worlds and deepened my reflection on my dual role as a practitioner and researcher. These two roles can sometimes feel like opposing forces—one focused on practical, immediate solutions and the other dedicated to theoretical, long-term exploration. However, the Academy reinforced that they are not separate worlds but two sides of the same coin. 

 

As a policymaker, I recognise the need for evidence-based decisions that are informed by rigorous research. Yet, as a researcher, I am increasingly aware of how important it is to ensure that my work remains relevant to the challenges faced by policymakers. The DTA helped me see that by balancing these roles effectively, I can make a significant contribution to both the academic and policy communities. 

 

Conclusion: A Balanced Approach for the Future 

The UACES Doctoral Training Academy was a great experience that supported me with the delicate balance between research, teaching, and policymaking. I could integrate theory and practice, build relationships, handle sensitive topics with care, and navigate the complexities of academia and policy. Most importantly, it reinforced the idea that bridging these worlds is not just possible—it is necessary to tackle today’s world’s complex challenges. 

 

I highly recommend engaging in a programme if you’re a PhD student looking to strengthen your impact. The UACES DTA offered the tools to enhance both research and practice and the opportunity to reflect on how these two roles can complement one another. It was a truly invaluable experience that I will carry forward in both my research and policy work. 

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Our political leaders in the UK often point to the 17.4 million people who voted for Leave on a single summer’s day – 23 June 2016 – as the enduring mandate for Brexit.

But is that still a valid justification?

The reality is quite different. Over the years, the number of people who actively support Brexit has dwindled significantly.

Nearly a decade after the referendum, support for staying out of the EU has stagnated, while the desire to rejoin has grown steadily.

In fact, polling data from multiple credible sources shows that those wanting to rejoin the EU now form a clear and sustained majority – a majority far greater than the slim margin by which Leave prevailed in 2016.

This raises an important question: why haven’t successive Conservative governments – or the current Labour government – given us, the people, a new democratic opportunity to revisit Brexit?

Isn’t democracy meant to allow for the evolution of public opinion and offer voters the chance to change their minds?

Brexiters argue that we must wait 40 years before holding another referendum, yet history suggests otherwise.

After the decisive Remain result in the 1975 referendum, the UK revisited its membership in the European Community just eight years later. By that measure, we are already overdue for a fresh vote on Brexit.

So, what’s holding back our post-referendum governments?

Why has there been such resistance to offering a new democratic choice on a matter that so profoundly shapes the future of the UK?

Let’s open the conversation. Watch and share my new video linked below.

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After the Holocaust of the Second World War, during which many millions were systematically, industrially, gruesomely murdered in the worst genocidal crime against humanity, the earnest, global, unison cry was: ‘Never again’

Those two words summed up the sincere, solemn feeling and resolve of a world shocked, numbed and reeling from the discovery that so many had been so callously rounded up and brutally murdered.

Not for anything they had done. But simply for who they were.

Mostly Jews, but also Roma, homosexuals, the disabled…and others, many others.

Millions. Murdered. With the goal to wipe them out. Men, women, children, babies. Mass murdered. Destroyed. Deleted.

Never again. That was the response. Never again. Never again.

The means to achieve this noble intention was set in motion immediately.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations came into existence just 51 days after the World War came to an end – 24 October 1945.

Its goal? To maintain international peace and security and to promote respect for human rights, aided by the jurisdiction of the newly formed International Court of Justice.

One of the United Nation’s first tasks was to create the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ – described as the “international Magna Carta for all mankind.” It came into existence on 10 December 1948.

The Declaration unequivocally proclaimed the inherent rights of all human beings – all of them, all of us; every human; you, me, everyone; universally, and without exception.

The Declaration has been translated into more languages than any other document and has been signed by all 193 member states of the United Nations.

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Alongside this international declaration of principle, Britain’s war time leader, Winston Churchill, passionately promoted the ‘European Charter of Human Rights’ – the world’s first international treaty to legally protect human rights on the continent of Europe.

In May 1948 Churchill said in the opening speech to the Congress of Europe in The Netherlands:

“We aim at the eventual participation of all the peoples throughout the continent whose society and way of life are in accord with the Charter of Human Rights.”

British lawyers drafted what was later to become the ‘European Convention on Human Rights’. The UK was the first country to sign up to it on 4 November 1950, and the Convention came into force on 3 September 1953.

Including Britain, 47 European countries agreed to the Convention, which provides civil and political rights for all citizens, enshrined in law and overseen by the European Court of Human Rights.

A UNITED EUROPE

Europe, in particular, had to change its ways. That’s where the planet’s two world wars originated. Right here, in Europe.

In direct response, the continent needed to be united. Never again should the countries of Europe go to war to resolve their differences. Never again.

Churchill, in his new role as ‘peace monger’ proposed a union of the countries of Europe as the antidote to war on our continent. He said, in the same 1948 speech in which he had also promoted the new Charter of Human Rights:

“We cannot aim at anything less than the Union of Europe as a whole, and we look forward with confidence to the day when that Union will be achieved.”

The European Coal and Steel Community – later to be become the European Economic Community and then later to be called the European Union – was established in 1951 with the express intent of avoiding wars in Europe again.

Trade was to be the means; peace was to be the ends.

NEVER AGAIN. NEVER AGAIN. NEVER AGAIN.

In direct response to the most horrific war and genocide the planet had ever known, the world rallied to find a way forward so that such wicked crimes against humanity could never happen again.

The United Nations. The International Court of Justice. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The European Convention on Human Rights. The European Union.

All established in direct reply to the war, and all to achieve the same aim: peace.

This was the resolve of those who endured and survived the terrible atrocities of the fascist regimes that blighted the planet during the long years of war and madness.

Never again. Those were the words of our parents, our grandparents, our great grandparents. That was the intent of the planet’s leaders following the eventual crushing of the world’s barbarous enemies. Never again.

Fine words. But utterly meaningless unless enforced.

POST-WAR GENOCIDE

Since the end of the Second World War, the words ‘never again’ have been cast in stone and stamped on our memories. But the atrocities that the post-war generation so sincerely wanted to prevent happening again, have happened again. And again.

Churchill described the mass murders in the Nazi death camps as ‘a crime without a name’. But it now has a name. It’s genocide.

And it’s a name that’s in frequent use because it’s a crime that’s frequently committed. Too many to list them all..

The genocide in Brazil of thousands of Brazilian Indians between 1957 and 1968;

The genocide of half-a-million people in Indonesia massacred between 1965 and 1967;

The genocide of up to possibly 3 million mostly Hindu people in Bangladesh in 1971;

The genocide of about 200,000 Mayan people in Guatemala between 1981 and 1983;

The genocide of 2.2 million in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979;

The genocide of millions of non-Arabs in Sudan’s on-off civil wars since 1955;

The genocide in recent years by Islamic State, also known as Daesh, against many thousands of Yazidis, Christians and Shiite Muslims in the Middle East…

And so many other examples…

TREBLINKA

The photo accompanying this article shows the memorial stone at the site of the Nazi extermination camp based in Treblinka, Poland – one of over 40,000 death camps and incarceration centres purposely built to mass-murder or enslave millions of people during Hitler’s regime.

I drove to Treblinka in 1991. It was one of the most desolate, moving experiences of my life. It was dusk and I was there all alone.

I wanted to write ‘not another soul’. But all around me I could feel hanging in the air and deep in the ground the souls of the estimated 900,000 innocent people, who had been methodically and efficiently slaughtered in the camp’s six gas chambers.

There was a sinister silence all around. This was a most evil, awful place, and always will be.

The Nazis, in an attempt to avoid responsibility for their crimes, hastily destroyed much of the camp as they retreated from the advance of the ‘liberating’ Russian Red Army.

Today, the site of the camp, in a bare, bleak, clearing in the middle of a huge, menacing wood, is punctuated with hundreds of shards of rock, carefully placed in memory of the victims.

I prayed for them all before driving away. All the souls, but especially my grandparents, who it had been understood from patchy family history, were murdered there.

As darkness began to fall, I got completely lost trying to navigate the road leading from the camp, in the middle of the never-ending dense woods, through which light could barely penetrate, and it seemed didn’t want to either.

There were no other cars on the road, no street lighting, no signs, no satnav. For a long while I thought I’d never find a way out of there, and if I did, I never, ever wanted to go back.

But at least I can live to say that.

The memorial stone at Treblinka pleads in more than one language, ‘Never again’.

MY GRANDPARENTS

Because of my family history, hearing the name ‘Treblinka’ always created a deep spasm in the pit of my stomach.

In recent years, however, I have learnt that my grandparents – Bertold and Helena Danzig – were not sent to the Treblinka extermination camp.

As a result of meticulous documentation left behind by the Nazi regime, and carefully pieced together by compassionate researchers, I now know they were sent by train to the Sobibór camp, in Nazi-occupied Poland.

Sobibór was an extermination camp, not a concentration camp. Its sole purpose was mass murder, almost exclusively of Jewish people.

Bertold was despatched to Sobibór on Transport Ax, no. 709 from Terezín in Czechoslovakia on 9 May 1942. Helena despatched on Transport Ax, no. 710 on the same day.

The train journey itself would have been unbearable.

Sobibór had only just been made fully operational as a place of mass extermination in the middle of May 1942.

So, my grandparents would have been among the first to perish there.

Soon after they arrived at the camp – separated even before the train journey began – my grandparents would have been told that they were in a transit camp.

Quaint buildings at the front of the camp would have hidden its true, deceitful, notorious purpose.

Assembled with all the other condemned passengers on the railway siding, SS-Oberscharführer Hermann Michel made a speech to them. He wore a white coat to give the impression he was a doctor.

Michel announced that they would be sent to work. But before this they would have to take baths and undergo disinfection, to prevent the spread of diseases.

We know this from the testimony given in the trials that followed the war.

The men and women were all separated. Everyone, including my grandparents, were told to completely undress.

All the women had their hair unceremoniously shaven off with brutal and speedy efficiency.

Then, the train passengers of that day would be led through the “Tube” into chambers, where Bertold and Helena were gruesomely gassed.

In total, some 170,000 to 250,000 innocent people were murdered at the Sobibór death camp.

BOSNIA

One year after my 1991 trip to Treblinka, civil war started in Bosnia, in the former Yugoslavia.

In just one town of Srebrenica during just one month, in July 1995, over 7,000 Muslim men and boys along with 25,000-30,000 refugees were ruthlessly killed. This happened, despite the town being officially declared by the United Nations as a “safe haven” and patrolled by 400 Dutch peacekeepers.

The Srebrenica massacre is considered to be one of the greatest failures of the United Nations. It has been ruled to be genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

GENOCIDE TODAY

And today? Yes, today it’s happening again. Today.

Today, in Myanmar – formerly Burma – Rohingya Muslims are facing the gravest threats since 2017, when the Myanmar military carried out a sweeping campaign of genocidal massacres.

Today, there are genocide mass killings of Christians and Muslims in Central African Republic.

Today, China has locked up in “camps” a million or more Uighur Muslims in what’s been described as the worst human rights crisis in the world.

Today, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine since February 2022 involves the systematic killing of Ukrainian citizens in what former USA President, Joe Biden, described as “genocide”.

Today, there are claims of genocide committed by Israel’s military involving the killing of over 47,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, in the occupied Gaza Strip, following the killing of around 1,200 Israeli citizens, soldiers, and foreign nationals, and the taking of over 250 hostages, by Hamas-led militant groups that attacked Israel on 7 October 2023.

 AND HERE IN BRITAIN?

Today, leading members and recent leaders of the Tory Party say they want the UK to leave the European Convention on Human Rights.

Today, far-right rioters are serving prison sentences for violently attacking hotels in England housing asylum seekers, who were in fear of their lives.

Today, sections of the UK press relentlessly stigmatise refugees and asylum seekers, describing them as “cockroaches” and “illegals”.

Tomorrow, with all good intentions, politicians will no doubt pontificate on today’s horrendous crimes against humanity and declare, ‘Never again’.

Yes, never again. Yes, we must say it. Never again.

But isn’t it time we really meant it?

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• Related video and report: The 8 Steps to Genocide – is Britain on Step 3?



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• Related report: ‘The photo that alerted the world’ – what happened to a German Jewish lawyer when Hitler came to power in 1933

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• Related video and report: The EU was started to create peace between member states



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• Related video and report: The EU was started as the antidote to war



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• Related video and report: The fall of the Berlin Wall



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• Related report: ‘Refugees are innocent’

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• Related report and video: ‘You and human rights’ – how human rights legislation helps Britons

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• Related report from 2022: ‘UK SOS: Human rights under threat’

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• Related video and report: Sir Keir Starmer’s maiden speech as a new Labour MP in the House of Commons in support of human rights

The post Genocide: Never again? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Bogdan Căpraru (Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași; National Institute for Economic Research, Romanian Academy), Anastasios Pappas (Hellenic Fiscal Council; Kapodistrian University of Athens), and Nicu Sprincean (Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași; National Institute for Economic Research, Romanian Academy)

To kick off 2025, the JCMS blog is highlighting some of the great work published in JCMS in 2024. Here we feature the findings of ‘Fiscal Rules in the European Union: Less Is More’.  

A fiscal rule is a legally binding constraint, often enshrined in legislation or the Constitution, which governs the government’s fiscal policy. They can take different forms, limiting the size of the budget deficit, the growth of public spending or the accumulation of public debt, among others (for a fundamental taxonomy of fiscal rules, see Blanco et al., 2020). The main objective of imposing numerical fiscal rules is to put pressure on the government to follow a prudent fiscal path and to enhance fiscal discipline and credibility (Ulloa-Suárez, 2023), with the ultimate goal of improving the sustainability of public finances.

The fiscal rules of the European Union (EU) have been in place for more than 20 years. The first set of rules was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and focused on public debt and budget deficits. Specifically, Member States were required to keep their budget deficits below 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) and their public debt below 60% of GDP. Since then, the European fiscal framework has evolved, increasing the number and complexity of fiscal rules. In addition to the EU-level rules, many European countries have their own national fiscal rules, which can further complicate the fiscal framework. At the end of April 2024 the European Parliament approved new fiscal rules at the EU level.

Recognizing the complexity of the previous European fiscal framework, the new economic governance framework implies a reduction in the number of rules. The cornerstone of this proposal is the establishment of a single fiscal indicator – the net expenditure path – anchored in debt sustainability, while maintaining the thresholds of 3% of GDP for the budget deficit and 60% of GDP for public debt (European Commission, 2022).

Beginning with this approach, we may encounter several pertinent questions: Does the quantity of fiscal rules influence their efficacy? Moreover, does this relationship hold true when assessing national and supranational rules independently for their effectiveness? Additionally, what other factors have influenced compliance with fiscal rules within EU countries?

Does the number of fiscal rules affect their effectiveness?

Against this background, our new paper argues that there is a non-linear relationship between the number of fiscal rules in place and compliance with the EU’s numerical fiscal targets over the period 2000-2021. Thus, we explore the intricate dynamics between the number of fiscal rules and the adherence to the numerical fiscal targets outlined in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) within the European Union.

We find that fiscal rules contribute significantly to fiscal compliance among EU Member States, but only up to a certain threshold. Beyond this threshold, a higher number of fiscal rules may hinder compliance and thus reduce their effectiveness. This finding holds for both national and supranational fiscal rules.

In particular, our results show that having more than three fiscal rules in total can undermine compliance. When considering only supranational fiscal rules, we document that  more than two supranational numerical fiscal targets is less effective, leading to weaker compliance.

What other factors affect compliance with fiscal rules in EU countries?

Our paper examines a number of factors that influence compliance with fiscal rules in the European Union. These factors can provide valuable insights for the formulation of prudent fiscal policies. We classify these variables into macroeconomic factors, political factors, exogenous shocks (such as financial crises) and variables related to monetary policy.

Our results indicate that among macroeconomic factors, the output gap and public debt are significantly associated with compliance with fiscal rules. Specifically, the output gap is negatively associated with compliance, suggesting that the fiscal framework between 2000 and 2021 fostered procyclicality. Similarly, public debt is negatively correlated with compliance, suggesting that non-compliance is linked with the accumulation of additional public debt.

Political factors also play an important role in fiscal rule compliance. We analyse two variables: election years and the frequency of government changes. Both variables turn out to be significant determinants of fiscal rules compliance within the European Union. The negative coefficients of these variables suggest that compliance decreases in election years and that frequent changes of government undermine compliance. These results provide evidence of the existence of political business cycles in Europe and emphasise the importance of political stability in ensuring fiscal rules’ compliance.

Regarding financial crises, our analysis shows that the global financial crisis (2007-2009) and other systemic crises weakened fiscal rule compliance. Moreover, there is evidence that accommodative monetary policy facilitates compliance, as higher long-term interest rates are associated with lower compliance rates.

Contributions to existing literature

Our paper makes several important contributions to the existing literature. First, we provide evidence that an increased number of fiscal rules negatively affects numerical compliance. This finding contributes to the ongoing debate on the complexity of the former European fiscal framework and highlights the need for potential reforms. Second, we adopt a unique approach by separately assessing the impact of national and supranational fiscal rules on countries’ compliance with EU-level rules. Third, we examine the influence of specific factors that may contribute to fiscal rule compliance, thereby broadening our understanding of the underlying dynamics at play.

Conclusions

In this blog article, we discuss the non-linear relationship between the number of fiscal rules in place and compliance with EU regulations for a set of 27 countries over the period 2000-2021. We find strong evidence of a positive relationship between countries’ compliance with the fiscal rules contained in the Stability and Growth Pact  and the number of fiscal rules in place, both national and supranational. However, once a certain threshold is reached, the relationship becomes negative, suggesting that a higher number of numerical fiscal targets may undermine compliance possible due to complexity, confusion and enforcement difficulties. Thus, a smaller number of fiscal rules, both national and supranational, may be a more effective strategy to ensure compliance.

Our findings have important policy implications in the context of the new European fiscal framework, adopted at the end of April 2024. Before the adoption, in its Communications, the European Commission (2023a, 2023b) presented legislative proposals to implement the European fiscal framework, reiterating the need for “simpler rules” that take into account “different fiscal challenges” and incorporate “lessons learned from policy responses to recent economic shocks, including the interaction between reforms and investments under the Recovery and Resilience Facility”. The simplicity and flexibility of the new governance framework, which includes fewer fiscal rules, is consistent with our empirical findings. According to our results, fewer fiscal rules anchored to an important fiscal target, such as the reduction of the public debt ratio, can lead to greater efficiency in achieving the desired outcomes.

Bogdan Căpraru is a Professor of Finance and Banking at Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Romania. He is also an associate senior researcher at National Institute for Economic Research, Romanian Academy. Since July 2019 he has been a member of the Romanian Fiscal Council, nominated by the Romanian Association of Banks, and since September 2023 he has been elected Vice Chair of the Network of EU Independent Fiscal Institutions.

His research focuses on banking, central banking, financial regulation, independent fiscal institutions and fiscal and monetary policy. He has published in high-ranking academic journals and has various editorial experience as editor-in-chief and editorial board member. He is a columnist for major national media and an invited speaker at prestigious national and international institutions.

Anastasios Pappas is the Head of Research Department of the Hellenic Fiscal Council and Adjunct Professor of Economics at the MBA course of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. He has received a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration from the University of the Aegean (with scholarship), an MSc in International Banking and Financial Studies from the University of Southampton (UK) and a PhD degree in International Macroeconomics from the University of the Aegean. He has taught various courses (Macroeconomics, Microeconomics, Political Economy, Business Economics etc) at the University of Aegean and at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens at both undergraduate and postgraduate level. Furthermore, he has worked as an economist, credit analyst and consultant in various positions in private and public sector in Greece. His research interests cover topics concern, inter alia, Macroeconomic, Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Economic Forecasting, Financial Crises and Capital Mobility.

Nicu Sprincean is a Lecturer in Finance at Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, and a Scientific Researcher at National Institute for Economic Research, Romanian Academy. His research focuses on fiscal and monetary policy, business and financial cycles, banking and central banking, financial intermediation, and empirical finance. More details here.

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Which way is the wind blowing for little Britain?

Little? Yes. We are a tiny, isolated, island in a corner of the North Sea, now quite alone in the world, lost, and lonely.

We’ve turned away from our closest allies, our neighbours on our continent, with whom we used to enjoy a close affinity, and a leading role, as a full member of the European Union.

But our relatively new Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, has made it clear: there is no path back.

For the past five years, Sir Keir, as Labour leader, has repeatedly and emphatically declared, “There is no case for going back into the EU and no case for joining the Single Market or customs union.”

No case! That’s the door closed shut. Not even ajar.

Yet Labour’s promises hinge on one critical factor: economic growth – and lots of it.

Persisting with barriers to trade with our biggest trading partner in the world by far – our own continent – is the antidote to economic growth.

If Sir Keir refuses to look east towards Europe for economic opportunity, will he turn west instead, aligning with Trump’s America? Increasingly, this seems to be the strategy.

Starmer is now pursuing a trade deal with the USA, a long-cherished but elusive goal of Brexiters. He has assembled a ‘mini-Cabinet’ of senior ministers tasked with achieving this objective.

Back in 2019, when Trump was President and Starmer wasn’t yet Labour leader, he opposed Brexit plans to prioritise ties with the USA over the EU.

Such a deal, he warned, would have “obvious consequences for our public services, for businesses, for food and environmental standards and for workers’ rights.”

It was not something, he strongly stated, that Labour “will ever countenance.”

How times change.

Now, despite being desperate for an economic lifeline to reverse Britain’s post-Brexit fortunes, Starmer has dismissed Europe as the solution.

Of course, Trump may well say ‘NO’ or demand huge trade-offs for a trade deal.

But Reform leader, Nigel Farage, has offered the Labour government his help to seal what GB News described as a “mega-Brexit deal” with the US. Mr Farage told The Telegraph:

“The US is our most important relationship in the world. Forget Brussels.”

If Britain looks west rather than east, the dream of Rejoiners – to rejoin the EU – could be extinguished for a generation or longer.

This, despite consistent polling showing that most Britons believe Brexit was a mistake and now support EU membership.

A new poll published on the front page of The Observer shows voters clearly favour prioritising more trade with the EU than the US.

But where is the big campaign to explain why we should join the EU again? It doesn’t exist.

In the nine years since the referendum, there has not been any prominent, powerful, professional campaign to present to the nation the positive benefits of EU membership for Britain and Britons.

If Britain chooses the west, the chance to reorient eastward may slip away – perhaps forever.

This could well be Britain’s last opportunity to chart a course back to Europe.

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On the first day of his new presidency, President Trump signed an executive order ending birthright citizenship for children of ‘illegal’ immigrants.

A Trump official said:

“The federal government will not recognize automatic birthright citizenship for children of illegal aliens born in the United States.” 

The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1868, guarantees birthright citizenship.

Trump’s order seeks to reinterpret this Amendment, which grants citizenship to all individuals born on U.S. soil. Legal experts argue this action is unconstitutional and will likely face immediate legal challenges.

It remains unclear whether the order applies retroactively to children already born to undocumented migrants or only to those born after its implementation.

The irony of this decision is striking. The United States was founded and built by a mix of undocumented migrants, forced migrants, and enslaved people.

European occupation of what is now the United States began in the late 15th and early 16th centuries.

By the 17th and 18th centuries, waves of settlers from England, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and other nations colonised the land – none of them ‘documented’ in the modern sense.

The displacement of Indigenous peoples during this time involved violent conquest, forced removal, cultural suppression, and the introduction of devastating diseases.

Many historians and Indigenous leaders describe this displacement and genocide as foundational to the country’s formation.

The concept of “illegal immigration” did not exist then.

However, the forcible displacement of Indigenous peoples and the imposition of foreign systems of governance raise significant moral and ethical questions about the legitimacy of European claims to the land.

Additionally, between the 17th and 19th centuries, millions of Africans were forcibly brought to the Americas through the transatlantic slave trade.

Enslaved individuals, denied freedom and subjected to brutal exploitation, played a critical role in building the United States’ economy, particularly in agriculture and infrastructure. Their unpaid labour laid much of the nation’s early wealth.

Today, it is undeniable that a significant portion of the U.S. population are the children – i.e. descendants – of both ‘undocumented’ and enslaved migrants.

Many African Americans trace their ancestry to enslaved people brought to America during the transatlantic slave trade.

President Trump’s promise to ‘Make America Great Again’ stands in stark contrast to the historical reality that the nation was built on the labour and sacrifices of marginalised and often undocumented groups.

Indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, and exploited migrants played foundational roles in shaping the country while being denied recognition, rights, and freedom.

In the end, it was ‘illegal migrants’ who made America ‘great’ in the first place.

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• Related video: ‘My question for racists’

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Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk, had a message for our Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer on his visit to Warsaw on Friday 17 January.

He said:

“I am aware this is a dream of mine, that instead of a Brexit we will have a Breturn.”

Mr Tusk, who was previously a President of the EU Council, added:

“Perhaps I’m labouring under an illusion. I’d rather be an optimist and harbour these dreams in my heart – sometimes they come true in politics.”

Sir Keir has consistently ruled out the UK rejoining the EU or its Single Market or customs union.

And yet, it’s not only Mr Tusk who has a dream of Britain’s Breturn. Millions of Britons also share this dream, and every UK poll now shows a majority want to rejoin the EU.

But what exactly is the case AGAINST continuing with Brexit and INSTEAD doing a Breturn?

DEBUNKING BREXIT MYTHS

Sovereignty? Far from gaining sovereignty, Brexit means Britain now has no say in EU decisions, despite being affected by them.

Migration? Britain faces a labour shortage, with almost a million chronic job vacancies. Migrants have always been essential, contributing positively to the economy and public services.

Housing, Schools, and Hospitals? Reduced EU migration has worsened shortages of skilled workers, from builders to healthcare professionals.

“Taking Back Control”? EU membership never meant losing national identity; other EU nations maintain sovereignty and strong support for the union.

Laws and Bureaucracy? EU laws are collaboratively agreed upon, bringing collective benefits like fair mobile charges, flight compensation, and accountability for tech giants. The EU operates democratically, with decisions shaped by elected representatives.

THE CASE FOR BRETURN

Economic Gains: EU membership boosted Britain’s economy, yielding a tenfold return on membership fees. The Confederation of British Industry estimated it added £3,000 per year to each family’s income. [Source: CBI Report: Our Global Future, page 11]

Peace and Freedom: The EU has been instrumental in maintaining peace and democracy, winning the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. Membership also granted Britons freedom to live, work, and trade seamlessly across Europe.

Global Strength: The EU’s economic might enables its members to secure favourable trade deals and exert influence on the global stage. Outside the EU, Britain struggles to achieve comparable agreements.

Rights and Protections: EU laws safeguard workers, consumers, and travellers, offering paid holidays, anti-discrimination measures, and fair work conditions. Such protections are difficult to replicate nationally.

Trade: The EU remains Britain’s largest trading partner, with nearly half of exports and over half of imports linked to the bloc. Erecting trade barriers with this critical market has been economically damaging.

LOOKING AHEAD

Brexit means we are poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power.

The case for Breturn – Britain returning to the EU as a full member – is overwhelming. It may take years to achieve a democratic reversal of Brexit, but it’s a worthwhile fight.

In a democracy, losing doesn’t mean having to give up. Ask Brexiters, they know. (See graphic below)

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When Theresa May became Prime Minister in July 2016, she famously declared, “Brexit means Brexit”.

It was pure gobbledygook.

Brexit at that time didn’t mean anything – there was no consensus on what Brexit should entail, not among the electorate, politicians, or even Brexit campaigners themselves.

But on 17 January 2017, Mrs May unilaterally defined her version of Brexit in her speech at Lancaster House, London.

Paradoxically, she claimed that the referendum was, “not the moment Britain chose to step back from the world” but “the moment we chose to build a truly global Britain”.

The Prime Minister outlined her unequivocal red lines – closing doors on most possibilities before any negotiations with the EU had even taken place.

• No partial membership of the European Union, associate membership, or anything that “leaves us half-in, half-out”.
  

No model already enjoyed by other countries.

No holding on to “bits of membership as we leave”.

No membership of the EU Single Market.

No free movement of people.

No to being part of the EU Common Commercial Policy (CCP) or the EU Common External Tariff (CET).

Michel Barnier, the EU’s Chief Brexit Negotiator, was ‘astounded by the sheer numbers of doors she is closing here, one after the other.’

In his diary entry for 17 January 2017, published in his book, ‘My Secret Brexit Diary’, he asked:

Have the consequences of each of these decisions been fully thought through, assessed and discussed?

Does she realise that, in doing this, she is excluding almost all models of cooperation we have managed to construct up to now with our partners, even the closest among them?

Can we be sure that the referendum vote gave the British government carte blanche for such a total break?

He concluded:

‘In fact, for her to say all this, amounts to writing off not only membership of the European Economic Area – of which Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are members – but also the kind of partnership we have with Turkey, which has a customs union agreement with the EU.’

MY VIEW TODAY

No version of Brexit – be it Theresa May’s, Boris Johnson’s, Liz Truss’s, Rishi Sunak’s, or the as-yet-defined Brexit of Keir Starmer – has ever enjoyed the consensus support of the electorate.

Even Kemi Badenoch, new Tory leader and a staunch Brexiter, has admitted that the “no plan” Brexit approach was “a mistake.”

We’ve been had.

Successive Prime Ministers hijacked the simple word “Leave” and shaped it into THEIR visions of Brexit, none of which align with the public’s expectations or interests.

• A Brexit nobody voted for – watch 4-minute video



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by Sarah Wolff (Leiden University), Helena Carrapico (Northumbria University), and Agathe Piquet (UC Louvain)

To kick off 2025, the JCMS blog is highlighting some of the great work published in JCMS during autumn 2024. Here we feature the findings of ‘Out of Sight, Out of Mind? UK-EU Member States Bilateralism as an Enabler of Europeanisation’, which was published as part of the Symposium on ‘Selective Reconstruction: Re-engagement in the Post-Brexit UK-EU Security Relationship’.

Extensive scholarship has examined the UK’s role in multilateral (e.g. United Nations, World Trade Organisation) and mini-lateral venues (e.g. E3 with France and Germany on Iran; G7 and G20 on economic issues) since Brexit, but less attention has been given to the 24 bilateral declarations signed between the UK and EU Member States from 2021 to 2023. Bilateralism has been one of the UK’s preferred strategies for achieving foreign policy coordination with EU Member States post-Brexit. This article finds that, despite clear efforts to de-EUise UK foreign policy, there is no evidence of purposeful de-Europeanisation.

Purposeful de-Europeanisation would imply a repudiation of shared European values, a divergence from common priorities, and an end to social encounters between UK and EU member state officials. Instead, through a frame analysis of these declarations and interviews, the article highlights that bilateralism has enabled continued Europeanisation, albeit to a lesser extent compared to the pre-Brexit situation. Closer relations with European capitals have thus allowed Europeanisation of UK foreign policy to persist. In other words, while the UK has distanced itself from the EU as a political entity, it has not rejected the common European values and priorities that remain shared with EU Member States.

De-EUisation and Europeanisation in foreign policy: conceptual and methodological reflections

Renewed bilateralism, initiated by the UK through the 24 joint statements it agreed upon with EU Member States, raises questions about the UK government’s intentions regarding EUisation and Europeanisation of its foreign policy. The recent strengthening of these bilateral ties (e.g. with the war in Ukraine), during a time of troubled relations with the EU, could suggest the UK’s intention to pursue ideational transfers.

To understand the UK’s intentions in its post-Brexit bilateralism, it is crucial to distinguish between EUisation and Europeanisation. EUisation refers to the more top-down transfer of institutional and organisational practices and policies between the EU and its Member States. In contrast, Europeanisation is a broader process of social learning and diffusion of ideas and values through multiple interactions, including those outside formal EU structures.

In the context of foreign policy, we argue that de-EUisation is characterised by three dynamics that reflect the institutional, political and organisational aspects of policy change:

1. the disengagement from EU structures, ranging from a reduced rhetoric or substantive support and commitment to a complete withdrawal;
2. the rescaling of foreign policy discourse namely, where non-EU geographical spaces are given preference; and
3. the reorganisation of foreign policy bureaucracy through a reinforced control over the national officials seconded to Brussels, including a redeployment of staff away from EU institutions.

De-Europeanisation, on the other hand, is made of three cognitive and social processes:

1. the rejection of shared European values;
2. the divergence from ‘previously established common European […] priorities that have emerged through Europeanisation’, resulting from ideational transfers and discussions; and
3. the end of social encounters with European national officials, including outside formal EU venues.

Using this framework, this article examines the 24 bilateral declarations signed between the UK and EU member states to assess whether they reflect intentions of de-EUisation, de-Europeanisation, or a continuation of Europeanisation in the UK’s foreign policy.

De-EUising but still Europeanising: away from Brussels but closer to European capitals

The analysis of bilateral declarations underscores the de-EUisation of UK foreign policy, marked by disengagement from EU structures, a re-scaling of foreign policy discourse to the global level discourse, and counter-Brusselisation via bureaucratic reorganisation.

The UK’s foreign policy has increasingly shifted away from the EU, especially under the leadership of Boris Johnson. The Global Britain strategy emphasised the UK’s autonomy and global ambitions, with less emphasis on EU cooperation. This shift was evident in the UK’s decision to have a reduced involvement in EU foreign policy structures and its focus on bilateral relations with individual EU member states. The signing of bilateral declarations with EU countries was part of this broader strategy.

These declarations reveal limited references to the EU, with most emphasising the desire to go beyond current UK-EU cooperation frameworks. Comparatively, there are more references to cooperation through NATO, highlighting the UK’s preference for alternative multilateral venues over EU structures. This re-scaling of foreign policy discourse to a global level and the bureaucratic reorganisation of UK institutions, including the transformation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office into the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), further illustrate the UK’s de-EUisation efforts. The reduction of UK staff in Brussels and the redeployment of personnel to bilateral embassies in Europe also signalled a shift away from an EU-centric foreign policy.

Secondly, the article finds that despite the clear trends of de-EUisation, the bilateral declarations also suggest a desire for continued Europeanisation of UK foreign policy. This is evidenced by three dynamics:

1. Persistent Shared Values: The bilateral declarations consistently align with EU foreign policy values, including human rights, democracy, international law, and multilateralism. These shared values and the many references to a specific European like-minded community reflect a continued Europeanisation of UK foreign policy, even as the UK seeks to redefine its global role.
2. Convergence Towards Shared Security Priorities: The UK’s bilateral declarations with EU member states also demonstrate a strong alignment with EU security priorities, ranging from international conflicts, cybersecurity and disinformation, to migration, organised crime and terrorism. This common understanding of priorities suggests that the UK remains committed to addressing shared security challenges with its European partners, even outside formal EU structures.
3. Continuation of Social Encounters: The bilateral agreements emphasise the importance of regular consultations and meetings between UK and EU officials, ensuring the exchange of ideas and practices, including through new fora (e.g. joint trainings, joint defence capabilities). While the level of institutionalisation achieved through these bilateral agreements may not match that of the EU framework, they still provide a mechanism for social learning and ideational transfers, contributing therefore to continued Europeanisation.

Conclusion

Could the recent intensification in UK foreign policy bilateralism be seen as an instance of de-EUisation and/or de-Europeanisation of its foreign policy? Despite the UK’s exit from EU structures, shift towards global ambitions, and reorganisation of its administration to reduce EU focus, Europeanisation persists through extensive bilateral diplomatic ties. The UK continues to promote values and priorities fundamental to European countries and maintains social interactions with European capitals. This ongoing Europeanisation is not solely a product of the UK’s former EU membership but is also rooted in broader historical ties and shared values across Europe.

The article contributes to understanding the evolution of bilateralism in times of crisis, with UK and EU partners seeking closer cooperation in response to challenges such as the war in the Ukraine. We call for further research on how polycrisis, including the Eurozone debt crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, has intensified bilateralism both within the EU and between the EU and third countries, questioning whether this trend strengthens or undermines European integration.

Sarah Wolff is Professor in International Studies and Global Politics at the University of Leiden. She is an expert on EU-UK relations, EU migration policy as well as the gender and religious dimension of EU foreign policy. She can be followed on Linkedin.

 

 

Helena Farrand Carrapico is Professor in International Relations and European Politics at Northumbria University, UK. Her research focuses on European internal security governance, in particular on the UK-EU relationship post-Brexit. She can be followed on LinkedIn.

 

 

Agathe Piquet is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at UCLouvain Saint-Louis Bruxelles. Her primary research interest lies in EU internal security policies, with a particular focus on the processes of Europeanisation. She can be followed on Linkedin.

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