Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Financial constraints are one of the most severe obstacles for the operation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Yet women and women-led enterprises are disproportionally affected, which leads to a gender gap in access to finance. This paper uses panel estimation techniques, namely a correlated random effects model, for 1,655 financial institutions from 109 mostly LMICs for the years 2000 to 2019 to examine empirically whether there are purely economic incentives for financial institutions to scale up their lending activities towards women and women-led enterprises. Going beyond the microfinance sector, this study provides – to the best of my knowledge – the first empirical evidence on this question for banks and bank-like financial institutions that serve higher credit market segments. I find positive and significant effects on the quality of the loan portfolio (lower portfolio at risk), income streams (higher portfolio yield) and the overall financial performance (captured by return on assets or profit margin). Since economic incentives and profitability considerations are crucial in steering the decisions of financial institutions with regard to credit allocations, the banks’ self-interest could lead to management decisions and internal directives to favor female loan applicants, which could contribute to closing the gender gap in access to finance. Furthermore, the findings on the positive effects on banks’ financial performance give policymakers and regulators leeway to push financial institutions through more restrictive policy measures and regulatory requirements to direct more loans to women and women-led firms.

Financial constraints are one of the most severe obstacles for the operation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Yet women and women-led enterprises are disproportionally affected, which leads to a gender gap in access to finance. This paper uses panel estimation techniques, namely a correlated random effects model, for 1,655 financial institutions from 109 mostly LMICs for the years 2000 to 2019 to examine empirically whether there are purely economic incentives for financial institutions to scale up their lending activities towards women and women-led enterprises. Going beyond the microfinance sector, this study provides – to the best of my knowledge – the first empirical evidence on this question for banks and bank-like financial institutions that serve higher credit market segments. I find positive and significant effects on the quality of the loan portfolio (lower portfolio at risk), income streams (higher portfolio yield) and the overall financial performance (captured by return on assets or profit margin). Since economic incentives and profitability considerations are crucial in steering the decisions of financial institutions with regard to credit allocations, the banks’ self-interest could lead to management decisions and internal directives to favor female loan applicants, which could contribute to closing the gender gap in access to finance. Furthermore, the findings on the positive effects on banks’ financial performance give policymakers and regulators leeway to push financial institutions through more restrictive policy measures and regulatory requirements to direct more loans to women and women-led firms.

Demonstration plots (demo plots) are crucial for knowledge dissemination and knowledge production to and with smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, making them important in rural development. Beyond their agricultural extension function considerations, their political and ecological dynamics remain undertheorized. Drawing on qualitative empirical data across Mbeya Region, Tanzania, we analyze the political ecology of different demonstration plots as assemblages deployed by private-sector actors, NGOs/grassroots organizations, and research institutions, to shape agricultural transformation. Our study reveals stark power asymmetries: private sector and research-led demo plots, strategically located and strongly resourced, dominate both physical and discursive landscapes. Their alliance building and branding practices territorialize monocultures, input-dependent farming as aspired futures. Conversely, the more conservation-oriented grassroots demo plots, despite retaining agroforestry socioecological systems, fostering local knowledge and diverse practices, are marginalized by resource constraints and limited institutional support, exposing their territories to constant erasure. Using assemblage theory, we scrutinize demo plots as active sites of socio-technical selection, configuring actors, spaces, and knowledge systems in ways that privilege market integration through intensification, while sidelining alternatives. The analysis challenges prevailing narratives of demo plots as neutral (even apolitical) pedagogical tools, instead arguing to understand them as instruments of power that determine which agricultural futures materialize.

Demonstration plots (demo plots) are crucial for knowledge dissemination and knowledge production to and with smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, making them important in rural development. Beyond their agricultural extension function considerations, their political and ecological dynamics remain undertheorized. Drawing on qualitative empirical data across Mbeya Region, Tanzania, we analyze the political ecology of different demonstration plots as assemblages deployed by private-sector actors, NGOs/grassroots organizations, and research institutions, to shape agricultural transformation. Our study reveals stark power asymmetries: private sector and research-led demo plots, strategically located and strongly resourced, dominate both physical and discursive landscapes. Their alliance building and branding practices territorialize monocultures, input-dependent farming as aspired futures. Conversely, the more conservation-oriented grassroots demo plots, despite retaining agroforestry socioecological systems, fostering local knowledge and diverse practices, are marginalized by resource constraints and limited institutional support, exposing their territories to constant erasure. Using assemblage theory, we scrutinize demo plots as active sites of socio-technical selection, configuring actors, spaces, and knowledge systems in ways that privilege market integration through intensification, while sidelining alternatives. The analysis challenges prevailing narratives of demo plots as neutral (even apolitical) pedagogical tools, instead arguing to understand them as instruments of power that determine which agricultural futures materialize.

Demonstration plots (demo plots) are crucial for knowledge dissemination and knowledge production to and with smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, making them important in rural development. Beyond their agricultural extension function considerations, their political and ecological dynamics remain undertheorized. Drawing on qualitative empirical data across Mbeya Region, Tanzania, we analyze the political ecology of different demonstration plots as assemblages deployed by private-sector actors, NGOs/grassroots organizations, and research institutions, to shape agricultural transformation. Our study reveals stark power asymmetries: private sector and research-led demo plots, strategically located and strongly resourced, dominate both physical and discursive landscapes. Their alliance building and branding practices territorialize monocultures, input-dependent farming as aspired futures. Conversely, the more conservation-oriented grassroots demo plots, despite retaining agroforestry socioecological systems, fostering local knowledge and diverse practices, are marginalized by resource constraints and limited institutional support, exposing their territories to constant erasure. Using assemblage theory, we scrutinize demo plots as active sites of socio-technical selection, configuring actors, spaces, and knowledge systems in ways that privilege market integration through intensification, while sidelining alternatives. The analysis challenges prevailing narratives of demo plots as neutral (even apolitical) pedagogical tools, instead arguing to understand them as instruments of power that determine which agricultural futures materialize.

The European Investment Bank (EIB), the world’s largest multilateral financial institution, has supported projects in over 160 countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states (FCSs). Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EIB adopted its first Strategic Approach to Fragility and Conflict in 2022. While the bank has a history of operating in FCSs, this strategy signals its ambition to strengthen the bank’s focus on state fragility. What is driving this shift and how does it align with the EIB’s traditional emphasis on financial sustainability and risk aversion? This paper examines the drivers of the EIB’s engagement with fragile states through an institutional logics lens, identifying three core logics embedded in the bank’s identity: development, investment and bureaucratic logics. The analysis shows that although development and bureaucratic logics strongly shape the new strategy, the investment logic – anchored in financial prudence – continues to influence lending practices. This finding suggests that the progressive rhetoric on fragility is constrained by institutional caution.

The European Investment Bank (EIB), the world’s largest multilateral financial institution, has supported projects in over 160 countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states (FCSs). Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EIB adopted its first Strategic Approach to Fragility and Conflict in 2022. While the bank has a history of operating in FCSs, this strategy signals its ambition to strengthen the bank’s focus on state fragility. What is driving this shift and how does it align with the EIB’s traditional emphasis on financial sustainability and risk aversion? This paper examines the drivers of the EIB’s engagement with fragile states through an institutional logics lens, identifying three core logics embedded in the bank’s identity: development, investment and bureaucratic logics. The analysis shows that although development and bureaucratic logics strongly shape the new strategy, the investment logic – anchored in financial prudence – continues to influence lending practices. This finding suggests that the progressive rhetoric on fragility is constrained by institutional caution.

The European Investment Bank (EIB), the world’s largest multilateral financial institution, has supported projects in over 160 countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states (FCSs). Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EIB adopted its first Strategic Approach to Fragility and Conflict in 2022. While the bank has a history of operating in FCSs, this strategy signals its ambition to strengthen the bank’s focus on state fragility. What is driving this shift and how does it align with the EIB’s traditional emphasis on financial sustainability and risk aversion? This paper examines the drivers of the EIB’s engagement with fragile states through an institutional logics lens, identifying three core logics embedded in the bank’s identity: development, investment and bureaucratic logics. The analysis shows that although development and bureaucratic logics strongly shape the new strategy, the investment logic – anchored in financial prudence – continues to influence lending practices. This finding suggests that the progressive rhetoric on fragility is constrained by institutional caution.

Wartezeiten, Entfernungen und Kosten erschweren medizinische Versorgung – Vielen Geflüchteten fällt es schwer, sich im Gesundheitssystem zu orientieren – Abbau von Zugangshürden entscheidend Geflüchtete stoßen in Deutschland insbesondere in den ersten Jahren nach ihrer Ankunft auf erhebliche Hürden ...

In Paris delegates convened at the ‘future of development cooperation’ conference organised by the OECD's DCD which supports the work of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the leading traditional donors' aid club.

In Paris delegates convened at the ‘future of development cooperation’ conference organised by the OECD's DCD which supports the work of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the leading traditional donors' aid club.

In Paris delegates convened at the ‘future of development cooperation’ conference organised by the OECD's DCD which supports the work of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the leading traditional donors' aid club.

Im Audit Committee Quarterly, einem Magazin für Corporate Goverance, 1/2026 mit dem Titel "Bürokratie" ist ein neuer Beitrag von Alexander S. Kritikos erschienen: Effizienzgewinne durch Staatsmodernisierung: Warum Verwaltungsqualität der neue Standortfaktor ist: Für Unternehmen ist das Thema ...

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IPI and the Stimson Center, in partnership with the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN and the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN, co-organized a workshop on “UNMISS in the Context of Changing Security and Regional Dynamics” on May 26th. This event is part of a series of workshops, “Missions and Mandates: Toward Adaptable, Nimble, and Effective Responses,” that aim to support the sustained engagement of UN member states on how to make peace operations mandates more adaptable.

The workshop reflected on the mandate of UNMISS, which is set for renewal on April 30, in the context of heightened political and security tensions in South Sudan, while also assessing how broader regional insecurities are shaping dynamics within the country, including the ramifications of the war in Sudan. The situation in South Sudan requires urgent action: escalating violence across multiple states, political detentions in breach of the peace agreement, and a humanitarian crisis worsened by the war in Sudan. More than 1.3 million people have crossed into South Sudan from Sudan since 2023. Over half the country’s population faces food insecurity.

Under the Chatham House Rule, today’s conversation brought together UN and AU representatives as well as, Member States, and independent experts to address critical questions concerning the practical implications of the renewed mandate and the ways in which regional dynamics shape the prospects for stability in South Sudan.

The post United Nations Mission in South Sudan in the Context of Changing Security and Regional Dynamics appeared first on International Peace Institute.

This policy brief analyses how the EU may strengthen its role and advance its legitimacy in the Arctic when redesigning its priorities and partnerships, and how, in the process, it may contribute to the redesigning of established institutions and policies to fill the vacuum left by the Arctic Council. We will first provide a brief overview of the tensions inherent in different
types of cooperation approaches, the role that the EU wishes to play in the Arctic and external expectations that concern the EU’s priorities in the Arctic. Second, we discuss how these tensions affect the EU’s legitimacy as a cooperation partner and assess factors that strengthen and weaken the EU’s perception as an actor that needs to engage in the Arctic to avoid being excluded from policy negotiations of great relevance for the EU’s short-term, mid-term and long-term priorities. Third, we conclude with how EU ambitions have
changed and how it can strengthen its legitimacy as a cooperation partner by emphasizing the human dimension of security in the Arctic.

This policy brief analyses how the EU may strengthen its role and advance its legitimacy in the Arctic when redesigning its priorities and partnerships, and how, in the process, it may contribute to the redesigning of established institutions and policies to fill the vacuum left by the Arctic Council. We will first provide a brief overview of the tensions inherent in different
types of cooperation approaches, the role that the EU wishes to play in the Arctic and external expectations that concern the EU’s priorities in the Arctic. Second, we discuss how these tensions affect the EU’s legitimacy as a cooperation partner and assess factors that strengthen and weaken the EU’s perception as an actor that needs to engage in the Arctic to avoid being excluded from policy negotiations of great relevance for the EU’s short-term, mid-term and long-term priorities. Third, we conclude with how EU ambitions have
changed and how it can strengthen its legitimacy as a cooperation partner by emphasizing the human dimension of security in the Arctic.

This policy brief analyses how the EU may strengthen its role and advance its legitimacy in the Arctic when redesigning its priorities and partnerships, and how, in the process, it may contribute to the redesigning of established institutions and policies to fill the vacuum left by the Arctic Council. We will first provide a brief overview of the tensions inherent in different
types of cooperation approaches, the role that the EU wishes to play in the Arctic and external expectations that concern the EU’s priorities in the Arctic. Second, we discuss how these tensions affect the EU’s legitimacy as a cooperation partner and assess factors that strengthen and weaken the EU’s perception as an actor that needs to engage in the Arctic to avoid being excluded from policy negotiations of great relevance for the EU’s short-term, mid-term and long-term priorities. Third, we conclude with how EU ambitions have
changed and how it can strengthen its legitimacy as a cooperation partner by emphasizing the human dimension of security in the Arctic.

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) fällt im Mai deutlich: Mit 94,8 Punkten liegt es nach zwischenzeitlich deutlich höheren Werten nun wieder auf dem Stand von Januar. Die neutrale 100-Punkte-Marke, die ein durchschnittliches Wachstum der deutschen ...

KI wird Arbeitsplätze kosten, aber auch neue schaffen. Das Problem: die Verteilung. Es profitieren die Jungen, die Frauen, die Geringverdiener – oder eben genau nicht., Was wird künstliche Intelligenz mit unseren Arbeitsplätzen machen? Die Ängste sind groß. Doch wer genau hinschaut, kommt zu einem differenzierteren Bild: KI wird unseren Arbeitsmarkt zwar grundlegend verändern, aber wir werden wohl viele Entscheidungen noch immer selbst in der Hand haben. Die ...

Unrest between crowds trying to reclaim the bodies of suspected Ebola cases and authorities have continued.