Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) is currently the fourth largest group in the European Parliament, jockeying for the third position capitalizing on the appeal of the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, whose national party, Fratelli d’Italia, is one of the two main pillars of ECR. In this policy analysis, we examine the political trajectory of ECR, its current level of cohesion as well as its ideological proximity and positioning vis-à-vis the other political groups of the EP. Voting data place the group between the ‘governing majority’ (EPP, S&D, Renew and often the Greens) on one side and the sovereignist cluster (ESN, Patriots for Europe) on the other. When the ‘governing majority’ does not act in unison, the ECR can contribute to the formation of ad hoc and issue-specific alternative coalitions. However, at the same time, its relatively loose internal cohesion highlights its internal fragility, as parties that consistently diverge from the group’s political centre may be lured by other political groups, changing the political balance of the EP.

Read here in pdf the Working paper by Antonis Papakostas, former EU official; Research Associate, ELIAMEP; Spyros Blavoukos, Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business; Senior Research Fellow and Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Program, ELIAMEP and Georgios Matsoukas, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Experiment in Dänemark mit 372 Hausärzt*innen zeigt: KI-Diagnosen werden deutlich weniger berücksichtigt als gleich präzise, übliche Schnelltests – Mehrheit erachtet KI zwar als nützlich, aber ein Drittel ignoriert KI-Informationen fast vollständig – Nutzung der KI kann Zunahme von ...

Amid the increasing urgency to address climate change, the European Union (EU) has assumed a leading role in establishing regulatory measures aimed at decarbonization through the implementation of a series of stringent measures. This policy paper analyzes the implications of the EU’s maritime decarbonization framework, with particular emphasis on the expansion of the EU Emissions Trading System to maritime transport (EU ETS Maritime) and the adoption of the Regulation on the Use of Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuels in Maritime Transport (FuelEU Maritime). While these initiatives are intended to reduce GHG emissions, promote cleaner fuels, and extend the EU’s climate policies to the shipping sector –positioning the EU at the forefront of decarbonization– they also trigger complex economic and geopolitical effects that transcend environmental considerations. Specifically, the paper argues that the extraterritorial scope of these regulations may elevate compliance costs for shipping companies, ports, and exporters, thereby incentivizing route diversion, carbon leakage, and the relocation of transshipment activities to nearby non-EEA ports. To address these challenges, the paper proposes targeted policy measures and concludes that the success of the EU’s maritime climate framework will rely on its ability to harmonize decarbonization objectives with competitiveness, market access, and geopolitical resilience.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by George Dikaios, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow, Leiden University; Dimitris Gavalas, Senior Research Associate, ELIAMEP; Associate Professor, Department of Port Management and Shipping National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and Marianna Terezaki, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

…within Europe, shipping serves as a fundamental pillar of the European economy.

Global shipping accounts for 80% of the world’s trade, underscoring the significance of maritime transport to seaborne commerce and economic development. Similarly, within Europe, shipping serves as a fundamental pillar of the European economy. In recent years, it has experienced robust and steady growth, playing a crucial role in sustaining trade, economic advancement, connectivity, and access, with 74% of EU imports and exports relying on shipping.[1] In particular, the European shipping industry has seen a significant increase since the pandemic, as measured by total turnover, i.e., the direct and indirect impact of the shipping industry, recording an added value of approximately €241.4 billion in 2023, in line with robust demand for maritime transport services. This underscores the pivotal role of shipping in supporting European trade and supply chain activities during the post-pandemic recovery period. Simultaneously, the maritime sector of the EU assumes a crucial function within the broader global fleet, with the scope of the European-controlled fleet surpassing European waters and operating on a global scale, facilitating international trade across various regions and reinforcing Europe’s prominent position in global trade.[2]

Furthermore, in addition to economic growth and ongoing trade activities, the European shipping sector holds a strategically significant position. Notably, European shipowners possess nearly 50% of the world’s container ship capacity, 34% of oil tankers, 32% of LNG carriers, 28% of bulk carriers, and 28% of vehicle carriers, thereby facilitating the movement of the EU’s energy imports, transporting raw materials essential for the energy transition, and lastly linking European exporters to international markets.[3] Nonetheless, as the importance of the maritime sector continues to increase, so does the demand for its services, accompanied by additional environmental impacts.[4]

To mitigate the environmental impact of shipping, the EU has developed one of the most comprehensive climate policy frameworks, including measures targeting the maritime sector.

To mitigate the environmental impact of shipping, particularly greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which account for approximately 3% of global GHG emissions, the EU has developed one of the most comprehensive climate policy frameworks, including measures targeting the maritime sector.[5] Efforts to approach maritime decarbonization more systematically began as early as March 2011, when the European Commission released a white paper on transportation, proposing a 50% reduction in carbon emissions from maritime transport by 2050 compared to 2008 levels.[6] Moreover, four years later, the EU issued the regulation referred to as the “MRV Regulation” for the purpose of monitoring, reporting, and verifying GHG emissions from shipping. This regulation mandated annual reporting for shipping companies and independent verification of CO2 emissions from large ships calling at EEA ports.[7] These efforts reached a peak in 2019 with the European Green Deal and its interim plan, the Fit for 55 package, adopted in 2021 to achieve a 55% reduction in emissions by 2030. Important steps in maritime decarbonization include expanding the EU Emissions Trading System to maritime sector, hereafter referred to as EU ETS Maritime, and implementing Regulation 2023/1805, which promotes the use of renewable and low-carbon fuels, hereafter referred to as FuelEU Maritime.[8]

…shipping is a latecomer sector to be included within the framework of EU climate policy.

This policy paper aims to explore the impact of the newly introduced policy developments for the shipping sector by the EU that are directly connected to the broader European efforts to decarbonize the economy. It has to be noted, as already implied, that these efforts have been in place for over 20 years, and shipping is a latecomer sector to be included within the framework of EU climate policy.[9] The policy paper will focus on how stringent emissions standards and enhanced mitigation requirements are likely to affect the shipping industry and trade activities, with particular emphasis on the geopolitical and economic ripple effects. In the following section, a brief presentation of such standards and requirements will be provided, followed by a discussion of the potential geopolitical ramifications for different aspects of the maritime transport economy. The examples of China and Greece are also discussed, as they can shed light on the implementation of the said policies. Subsequently, several policy proposals for addressing the potential implications of such geopolitical/geoeconomic changes are sketched, while a concluding section summarizes the main points of the paper.

EU ETS, EU ETS Maritime, FuelEU Maritime

The EU ETS, established in 2005, constitutes the world’s first carbon market. This system mandates that polluters compensate for their GHG emissions, thereby reducing overall EU emissions and generating revenue to support the transition to cleaner energy sources. It operates on the principle of “cap and trade”: the “cap” limits the total GHG emissions, which are progressively decreased each year to align with the EU’s climate objectives, ensuring a consistent decline in emissions over time. The cap is structured through emission allowances, each authorizing the emission of one tonne of CO2; these allowances are auctioned and exchangeable, hence the designation “cap and trade”. As the cap is progressively tightened, the supply of allowances within the EU carbon market correspondingly diminishes (European Union, 2026). Since January 2024, the EU ETS has been expanded to encompass the maritime transport sector. This expansion involves the progressive inclusion of emissions from all large ships, i.e., exceeding 5,000 gross tons (GT), entering EEA ports, irrespective of their flag, with full implementation anticipated by 2027. At that point, the EU ETS Maritime will be fully operational, requiring shipping companies to surrender 100% of allowances corresponding to their reported emissions. At the same time, the scope will be extended to incorporate methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions, alongside CO2.[10]

While the EU ETS Maritime aims to limit emissions from the shipping sector and financially support the transition to cleaner energy, the FuelEU Maritime also operates as a complementary measure towards this objective. 

While the EU ETS Maritime aims to limit emissions from the shipping sector and financially support the transition to cleaner energy, the FuelEU Maritime also operates as a complementary measure towards this objective. Specifically, the latter is a pivotal initiative for EU maritime decarbonization, aiming to promote the consistent use of renewable and low-carbon fuels in the maritime sector across the EU. In particular, FuelEU Maritime, fully enforced since 2025, mandates progressively stringent GHG intensity targets for marine fuels, commencing with a 2% reduction by 2025 and escalating to 80% by 2050. These targets encompass not only CO₂ but also CH4 and N2O emissions.[11] In essence, it establishes a maximum allowable GHG content in the energy used by ships that arrive at, stay in, or depart from ports under a Member State’s jurisdiction and it also encourages the adoption of on-shore power supply (OPS) or zero-emission technologies in these ports.[12] Complementarily, to ensure its effective application, the enforcement mechanism outlined in the regulation entails severe consequences for non-compliance, including financial penalties and potential refusal of port entry or detention of the vessel for persistent violators.[13] Thus, the FuelEU Maritime Regulation aims to incentivize the maritime industry to transition gradually from fossil fuels to sustainable alternatives.[14]

Both measures serve the same overarching objective but employ different approaches to accomplish it. Notably, the EU ETS Maritime utilizes financial incentives and disincentives through a “cap and trade” system, whereas FuelEU Maritime establishes a maximum permissible limit on the annual GHG intensity of energy used by ships and promotes the adoption of cleaner fuels and energy sources.[15] Moreover, apart from their shared purpose, both measures are applicable to large vessels, regardless of their flag, and their mandates encompass not only voyages between Member States but also voyages between the EEA and third countries.[16]

…the implementation of the EU’s maritime decarbonization policies includes voyages between the EEA and third countries, thereby exemplifying the expansion of the EU’s influence beyond its borders. 

Overall, the implementation of the EU’s maritime decarbonization policies seeks to diminish emissions from the maritime sector and encourage the adoption of cleaner energy sources. At the same time, the scope of this framework includes voyages between the EEA and third countries, thereby exemplifying the expansion of the EU’s influence beyond its borders. Considering their extraterritorial scope and the fact that the EU is the largest economy and trading bloc globally,[17] these measures are likely to exert pressure on non-EU shipping companies and third countries to adhere to European climate standards to maintain market access, while also increasing costs for shipping companies and ports in their efforts to achieve decarbonization. Nevertheless, the increasing costs faced by shipping companies and ports in their decarbonization initiatives may prompt a search for ports in third countries not governed by these regulations.[18] This could potentially result in a reconfiguration of trade routes, which might be disadvantageous to European ports or could encourage additional non-EU investments in competing trade hubs, such as Chinese investments in strategic ports.

Geoeconomic ramifications Market Access and Compliance as a Trade Barrier

Given the importance of the EU’s external trade, accounting for approximately 77%, and the introduction of increasingly stringent maritime climate regulations, participation in EU-linked maritime trade has become more closely associated with compliance with European environmental standards.[19] Nonetheless, the linkage between EU market access and environmental compliance can exert asymmetric pressures on third countries and shipping companies.

More specifically, a notable implication stemming from the EU’s climate framework for shipping concerns the financial repercussions of compliance, influencing trading partners and transshipment hubs. In particular, direct trading partners of the EU may face escalating carbon costs embedded in their maritime supply chains, with shipping companies operating between non-EU ports and EU destinations bearing 50% of voyage emissions costs. In turn, these costs are systematically passed through as surcharges; Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, and CMA CGM have announced substantial increases to their environmental surcharges, grouping EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime compliance costs under combined surcharges that will rise by approximately 45% in 2026.[20] Simultaneously, this also effectively raises the cost of trade with the EU, potentially distorting competitive dynamics between exporters and creating inflationary pressures on European consumers.[21]

Transshipment hubs are particularly vulnerable to severe consequences, as well. As Kotzampasakis has argued,[22] the implications extend beyond direct EU traders to countries that rely on EEA ports as transshipment hubs, a category that includes numerous developing economies dependent on European connectivity for global trade integration. Notably, the EU ETS incorporates anti-evasion measures that exclude stops at “neighboring container transshipment ports” located within less than 300 nautical miles of an EU port, provided that these ports have a transshipment share exceeding 65% of total container traffic, and have been in effect since January 2025. Tangier Med in Morocco and East Port Said in Egypt have already been designated under this provision, meaning calls at these ports are not treated as the start or end of a voyage for EU ETS Maritime calculation purposes.[23]

This market access conditionality has been further institutionalized through the adoption of the Global Gateway Green Shipping Corridors (GGGSC) initiative, launched by the European Commission to facilitate the transition towards green shipping. According to the report of the Joint Research Centre (JRC), eight overarching criteria for port inclusion in the GGGSC are identified, including “port interdependencies” and “safeguarding a level playing field for port operators in the EU and partner countries”.[24] Specifically, the report identified 30 ports classified as highly relevant across all three EU industry competitiveness scenarios, forming a “core network” that can ensure critical mass and availability along international shipping networks of interest to the EU. This core network can be complemented by ports important for the development aspect of the GGGSC, balancing competitiveness with sustainable development objectives. Case studies already underway include the Port of Antwerp-Bruges’ support for developing a hydrogen ecosystem in the Port of Walvis Bay (Namibia) through GGGSC funding.[25] Consequently, this creates a tiered system of market access whereby ports and countries aligning with EU standards receive preferential support and connectivity.

The EU’s climate framework has significantly pressured its direct trading partners and key transshipment hubs, strategically enhancing its influence via the GGGSC initiative. Nevertheless, this market-access conditionality, as observed, also introduces cost pressures and market impacts, which may lead to changes in trade routes and competition.

Trade Route Shifts

…increasing costs for shipping companies and ports might drive investments in ports in non-EU countries not subject to these regulations, potentially resulting in what is known as carbon leakage, as well as route diversion.

The compliance costs linked to EU maritime decarbonization initiatives are substantial and experiencing an upward trajectory. In particular, for the EU ETS Maritime alone, the European Community Shipowners’ Associations estimates that this measure generates revenue of approximately €7.65 to €9 billion annually at current carbon pricing levels.[26] Moreover, compliance costs per tonne of fuel have escalated markedly, i.e., from approximately $220 per tonne in 2025 to about $315 per tonne in 2026, representing a 45% increase. These costs are systematically transferred through the global trade network, resulting in notable increases in freight rates on European routes.[27] When considering the comprehensive scope of decarbonization measures, including fuel switching, OPS infrastructure, and alternative fuel adoption, the total cost burden is projected to reach up to €130 billion by 2027, and between €100 billion and €300 billion by 2035.[28]  As a result, increasing costs for shipping companies and ports might drive investments in ports in non-EU countries not subject to these regulations, potentially resulting in what is known as carbon leakage, as well as route diversion.

Carbon Leakage and Route Diversion

The financial costs imposed by the EU ETS are already prompting shipping operators to reconfigure their networks to minimize exposure to carbon expenses, a phenomenon termed carbon leakage. According to the cost-benefit analysis conducted by Lagouvardou and Psaraftis,[29] which examines the risk of container vessels substituting EEA transshipment hubs with nearby non-EEA competitors, their case studies concentrated on the Piraeus-Izmir and Algeciras-Tangier Med scenarios. Specifically for Greece, the Piraeus-Izmir comparison is particularly revealing; with a distance of 210 nautical miles between these ports, their analysis demonstrated that for carbon prices beyond 15-23 EUR/CO₂, there is a clear motive for cargo ships to redesign their networks to evade the EU ETS Maritime. Current carbon prices significantly exceed this threshold, suggesting that route diversion is not merely a theoretical possibility but an emerging reality. The hub switch, while reducing the operator’s EU ETS liability, paradoxically results in a rise in overall carbon emissions attributed to the service, as ships may take longer routes or use less efficient operational patterns.[30]

Evidence from European Commission indicates that the full implementation of the EU ETS in 2026 has transformed environmental surcharges from a marginal cost into a “structural cost of maritime transport.” Shipping lines are now reporting that the combined impact of EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime surcharges will increase “substantially” compared to 2025, with one major carrier noting that the rising cost of biofuels and falling cost of fossil fuels make the transition to lower-emission alternatives only more expensive.[31]

It is important to note that there is no observed evidence of carbon leakage attributable to the adoption of the EU’s maritime climate measures. This lack of evidence can primarily be ascribed to the fact that, until approximately 2030, these maritime climate measures will not be fully implemented. Therefore, the actual impact on carbon leakage across shipping routes is more likely to become fully evident in the coming years, as shipping companies consider multiple factors when designing their logistics chains.[32] Nevertheless, a recent economic study conducted by the European Commission et al.[33] assessing the potential for carbon leakage due to maritime mitigation measures, identified the relocation of transshipment operations to nearby non-EEA hubs as the most significant risk of carbon leakage, underscoring the existence of this risk.

Competitive Dynamics and Chinese Investment

…non-EU ports have increasingly gained transshipment traffic that EU ports have not been able to capture; this change is mainly attributed to the implementation of the EU ETS Maritime.

The potential shift of shipping activities from EU ports to competitors outside the EU is already manifesting, supported by evidence indicating that existing regulations have caused a considerable transition of transshipment operations from EU ports to non-EU ports, e.g., Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan.[34] Of particular note concerning the Eastern Mediterranean region is the loss of direct connectivity by EU ports, as the number of deep-sea services directly linking to their facilities diminishes. Concurrently, non-EU ports have increasingly gained transshipment traffic that EU ports have not been able to capture; this change is mainly attributed to the implementation of the EU ETS Maritime. Namely, 76% of route adjustments can be attributed to the EU ETS Maritime, which significantly influences route reconfigurations.[35] This situation not only results in employment reductions at EU ports but also diminishes the EU’s influence over international supply chains. Moreover, Chinese investments in strategic ports via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further intensify this competitive dynamic.

According to the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), China’s influence on global ports has experienced a net reduction in the number of ports it either owns outright or operates in 2024. Notable instances include a Chinese state-owned enterprise divesting its share in the Port of Melbourne to interests from the United States, and Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings failing to secure renewal of the contract for King Abdul Aziz Port in Saudi Arabia. However, this slight decline should not distract from the fact that China’s port network remains largely coordinated from Beijing. Furthermore, the MERICS analysis emphasizes that most identified Chinese companies are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) directly under Beijing’s control, often required to meet non-commercial strategic goals set at the center of the party-state. As one analyst notes, “Chinese container shipper COSCO might be smaller than European giants MSC or Maersk, but it is more usefully viewed as part of a network of SOEs coordinated by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which is itself directly under the supervision of the State Council, China’s cabinet”.[36]

The growing concern about China’s influence in countries with Chinese-run ports appears to be an important factor in Beijing’s changing fortunes. Chinese investments are becoming increasingly controversial amid some Chinese-led projects that have gone awry, efforts to “de-risk” economies from overt dependence on China, and growing fears about national security risks. However, Beijing’s first-mover advantage means its influence on global shipping remains secure for now. In the coming years, Beijing is expected to shift its focus from creating demand in traditional industrial sectors to green and digital projects, as these are expected not only to increase Beijing’s influence but also to create demand for China’s key high-tech companies and technology.[37]

China’s port investments, despite experiencing some recent setbacks and facing growing international resistance, remain strategically important. 

Thus, EU’s climate policy for shipping is observed to contribute in certain instances to a shift of transshipment activities from EU ports to nearby non-EU competitors, thereby undermining EU port connectivity, employment, and influence within supply chains. At the same time, China’s port investments, despite experiencing some recent setbacks and facing growing international resistance, remain strategically important due to their coordination through state-linked enterprises and their increasing alignment with Beijing’s broader ambitions.

Aside from route reconfigurations and investments in competing trade hubs, it is also crucial to examine specific case studies and the following implications of the EU’s maritime climate measures. In particular, the next section will analyze Greece as an EU Member State with substantial maritime reliance, where increased compliance and infrastructure costs could cause economic disruptions and shift competitive dynamics.

Implications for Greece

The Greek government has articulated significant concerns regarding the practicality of certain decarbonization initiatives.

Greece has long held a central position in global shipping industry. A 2024 McKinsey & Company study reports that the Greek merchant fleet comprises more than 5,000 vessels, making Greece the largest ship-owning country, with approximately 20% of global seagoing cargo capacity. Greece also controls the world’s largest tanker and liquefied natural gas fleets by capacity, as well as the second-largest dry bulk and liquefied petroleum gas fleets. In economic terms, the Greek shipping sector contributes approximately $14 billion and supports around 150,000 jibs, reinforcing Greece’s importance to global trade and economic stability.[38] Against this background, Greece as an EU Member State heavily reliant on maritime activities is especially exposed to disproportionately adverse effects from the EU ETS Maritime and its associated measures. The Greek government has articulated significant concerns regarding the practicality of certain decarbonization initiatives, with Minister of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy, Vassilis Kikilias, cautioning that:

Many of these measures are not feasible. Europe is already being tested by rising costs, conflicts, and the energy crisis. Such an additional burden cannot be placed on societies.[39]

What is practically emphasized is the necessity of balancing ambition with realism.

What is practically emphasized is the necessity of balancing ambition with realism; imposing broad-based taxation to attain zero emissions entails substantial risks to the economy, with the resultant costs ultimately transferred to charterers and subsequently to the broader economy, thereby elevating prices and exacerbating inflationary pressures.

Specific vulnerabilities for Greece include:

• Piraeus Port’s particular vulnerability: The analysis by Lagouvardou & Psaraftis[40] demonstrates the potential transshipment diversion to Izmir, threatening the port’s economic activity and development.
• Greek Shipping Cluster’s Strategic Positioning: As a major global shipping nation, Greece must balance the EU’s climate ambition with the commercial interests of its shipowners. This tension has manifested in Greece’s recent abstention at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on the Net-Zero Framework, joining Cyprus in breaking ranks with the EU position. The Union of Greek Shipowners has explicitly called on the EU to scrap the EU ETS Maritime and FuelEU Maritime as soon as a global carbon tax takes effect, arguing that “measures at regional levels undermine shipping’s competitiveness and disrupt global trade”.[41]
• Geopolitical Alignment Concerns: Greece has been accused of aligning with the US and Saudi Arabia to undermine the EU’s climate laws, with Lloyd’s List[42] warning that Greece risks becoming Trump’s Trojan horse in the fight to decarbonize shipping. The Greek Minister for Environment and Energy, Stavros Papastavrou, has defended this position, emphasizing that Greece is “a voice of realism in Europe, when it comes to energy”.[43]
• Regional Disparities: Higher compliance and infrastructure costs may alter competitive dynamics within the Mediterranean, potentially benefiting non-EU ports at the expense of Greek and other European ports. The GGGSC initiative’s focus on ensuring a level playing field for ship and port operators suggests recognition of this risk,[44] but the EU’s ongoing designation of additional transshipment ports under the anti-evasion provisions will be crucial for Greek ports’ competitiveness.[45]

Therefore, the implications of EU’s maritime decarbonization policy framework are particularly significant given the country’s central position in global shipping and its dependence on maritime activity for economic growth and trade. While decarbonization represents a necessary long-term objective, the Greek case illustrates that climate measures ought to be designed with careful attention to competitiveness, port diversion risks, and geopolitical realities. For Greece, the challenge lies not in whether maritime decarbonization should advance, but in how it can be implemented in a manner that sustains the viability of the shipping sector, safeguards strategic ports such as Piraeus, and ensures that the transition toward zero emissions is both environmentally ambitious and economically sustainable. In this context, Greece publicly maintains a particularly cautious stance on the efforts being made, as well as strongly criticizing the EU for its lack of flexibility and promotion of a climate agenda that does not take into account reality.[46] This stance, of course, seems to contradict the European Climate Law and its broader implications, as well as all European climate policies and to contribute to an increasing effort to water down climate targets.

Essential Steps to Address Implications

Although the European Commission works closely with Member States to identify industries at high risk of carbon leakage,[47] further action is needed to ensure effective mitigation.

The extension of EU regulatory authority via the EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime positions the EU as a global standard-setter, compelling third countries and shipping operators to adopt European standards to preserve market access. Nevertheless, this projection of regulatory power engenders asymmetric pressures on other countries and shipping companies, potential carbon leakage through route diversion, while conferring competitive advantages upon ports and shipping operators equipped with advanced infrastructure. Simultaneously, these implications may also be transmitted, significantly impacting Member States heavily engaged in maritime activities, as exemplified by Greece. To address these geoeconomic ramifications, several key initiatives are proposed to be undertaken:

1. Avoiding increased costs and loss of EEA’s ports: As identified above, the primary concern is the potential transfer of increased costs via the global trade network, which may result in EEA’s transshipment hub relocation to nearby non-EEA hubs, posing a risk of carbon leakage and loss of competitiveness of EEA ports. Although the European Commission works closely with Member States to identify industries at high risk of carbon leakage,[47] further action is needed to ensure effective mitigation. In particular, the EU can utilize the revenues from the EU ETS to offset additional costs associated with this transition by formulating transparent allocation strategies that support green technologies and the energy transition for shipping companies, ports, and other stakeholders across the logistics chain.[48]

 

2. Mitigating carbon leakage: Introducing a specific “Carbon Leakage Factor” for deep-sea routes, as suggested in Puertos del Estado’s Report,[49] could be an effective step in reducing the risk of carbon leakage and route diversion. This mechanism would reduce incentives for route splitting by adjusting the volume of emissions subject to the surrender of allowances for each container-vessel voyage. The factor should be calibrated according to voyage distance, ensuring that longer routes are regulated in a way that discourages avoidance strategies while maintaining the environmental integrity of the EU ETS Maritime.

 

3. Preventing reconfigurations of transshipment activities outside the EEA: While the current framework seeks to prevent the relocation of transshipment activities outside the EEA, important gaps remain, especially where neighboring container transshipment ports compete directly with European ports without formally meeting the existing anti-evasion measures, introduced by the EU’s maritime climate framework, i.e., FuelEU & EU ETS Maritime. Evidence suggests that European maritime trade may continue to be affected despite these provisions, potentially weakening EEA port competitiveness and increasing the influence of external actors, including China, over global supply chains. Therefore, there is an imperative need to revise the criteria for identifying neighboring container transshipment ports by broadening the scope to include ports that, despite not presently meeting the 65% transshipment threshold or being more than 300 nautical miles from a European port, might serve as direct competitors, e.g. ports in Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, and the United Kingdom.[50]

 

4. Ensuring port competitiveness: To accelerate maritime decarbonization whilst maintaining the competitiveness of EEA ports, the EU is utilizing the GGGSC initiative as a strategic policy tool. In particular, by linking EU ports with key international partners, the GGGSC can improve access to sustainable, renewable, and low-carbon maritime fuels, expand fuel import capacity, and strengthen the resilience of EU maritime transport.[51] However, the EU must ensure that these partnerships remain inclusive and do not create a hierarchy in which only EU-aligned ports benefit from preferential connectivity, investment, and market access. To prevent market distortion and geopolitical fragmentation, particularly for Member States reliant on the maritime partnerships, such as Greece, the GGGSC should be accompanied by transparent participation criteria, targeted support for third-country partners, and safeguards that ensure equitable access to maritime trade.

 

5. Addressing the interconnected ramifications: Οur analysis indicates that compliance costs increase the cost of trade with the EU, and these costs are then transmitted through the global trade network. This contributes to the relocation of transshipment operations, heightens the risk of carbon leakage, and accelerates route reconfigurations. Consistent with Adjei et al.,[52] who identify the structural and institutional barriers of maritime transport governance as interconnected, policy measures should not address these changes in isolation. Instead, targeted action on one barrier can generate positive spillover effects across others. In this context, effective management of carbon leakage could also help reduce incentives for route reconfigurations and support a more coherent transition toward sustainable maritime transport.

Conclusions and the way forward(?)

Overall, the EU’s maritime decarbonization framework represents a transformative regulatory initiative with implications extending beyond the EU’s borders. By linking access to European maritime trade with compliance with European climate standards, it introduces significant geoeconomic implications. Namely, as identified from our research, this entails increased compliance costs for shipping companies, ports, exporters, and consumers, while also incentivizing route diversion, the relocation of transshipment activities from EU ports to nearby non-EEA competitors, and carbon leakage. These are all interconnected barriers which can potentially emerge from the implementation of the EU’s maritime climate framework.

Particular attention is drawn to EU (Eastern) Mediterranean ports, which are especially vulnerable; non-EU hubs such as ports in North Africa, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan could potentially gain a competitive advantage as shipping operators seek to avoid EU carbon costs. Simultaneously, declining competitiveness among EU ports may create opportunities for Chinese investment in strategic port markets. The case of Greece, as an EU Member State highly dependent on shipping, illustrates the broader tension between EU climate ambition and maritime competitiveness.

To address these challenges, this policy paper suggests several measures, i.e., improving the measurement of carbon leakage, strengthening existing anti-investment policies, strategically reallocating revenues from the EU ETS Maritime, and leveraging the GGGSC initiative to promote both decarbonization and competitiveness.

…the European Commission introduced two strategic initiatives in 2026: the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy and the EU Ports Strategy. Together, these signify a shift away from addressing the competitive effects of individual climate measures in isolation.

Looking ahead, the European Commission introduced two strategic initiatives in 2026: the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy and the EU Ports Strategy. Together, these signify a shift away from addressing the competitive effects of individual climate measures in isolation and towards integrating maritime decarbonization within a broader industrial, energy, and infrastructure policy framework.[53] Specifically, the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy, if successfully implemented, may serve as a solution to several challenges, including the energy transition, competitiveness, and Europe’s reliance on non-EU supplies. For instance, it proposes support for the adoption of renewable and low-carbon fuels through the Renewable and Low Carbon Fuel Alliance, which will convene shipowners, sustainable fuel producers, and financial institutions to enhance production capacity and supply chains.[54]

The EU Ports Strategy complements these targets by focusing more directly on port competitiveness and resilience. Its objectives include (a) providing greater regulatory clarity, (b) fostering fairer competition, and (c) ensuring investment certainty across EEA ports, while acknowledging the strategic role of ports as facilitators of energy. To achieve these goals, the Commission has proposed leveraging the opportunities offered by the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation (T-MED) to strengthen sustainable energy connectivity among Mediterranean ports and to promote closer cooperation among ports, energy companies, grid operators, and local authorities. In addition, the Strategy envisions more consistent emissions measurement and reporting protocols within port areas to improve the availability of sustainable fuels. Lastly, the European Commission encourages Member States to allocate a portion of their revenues from the EU ETS to investments in maritime decarbonization across the maritime spectrum of the EEA.[55]

The effectiveness of the EU’s maritime climate framework will depend on its ability to balance decarbonization, competitiveness, market access, and geopolitical resilience without jeopardizing the EU’s trade power.

Although these strategies collectively lay the foundation for addressing several existing gaps and provide a significant framework for aligning decarbonization, infrastructure development, and competitiveness, their practical impact remains uncertain. Currently, both strategies, i.e., the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy and the EU Ports Strategy, function primarily as policy roadmaps rather than instruments that create legally binding obligations, thereby leaving some critical issues unresolved and necessitating further attention. Notably, the anticipated rise in compliance costs may continue to influence the competitiveness of EEA ports, especially those situated near non-EEA alternatives, where shipping operators may seek to mitigate exposure to EU carbon pricing. This could further incentivize the reorganization of transshipment activities outside the EEA, potentially undermining the competitiveness of European ports within regional and global maritime networks. Towards a similar direction acts the 2026 ETS Revision Proposal for maritime transport, with its provisions attempting to alleviate (some of) the criticized aspects of today’s system. For example, it suggests a change to the transshipment threshold from 65% to 50%, it promotes specific requirements for the use of sustainable maritime fuels and incentivizes the use of green shipping corridors. The critique of that, which can also explain the stance of Member States like Greece, is that the above revision favors liner over bulk/tramp trade, leading to an increase of the already existing distributional consequences that would assist the decarbonization of shipping segments that can be decarbonized more easily, instead of developing a policy framework that would cover the entire maritime sector in a (more) equal manner.

The effectiveness of the EU’s maritime climate framework will depend on its ability to balance decarbonization, competitiveness, market access, and geopolitical resilience without jeopardizing the EU’s trade power.

[1] European Environmental Agency-European Maritime Safety Agency Joint Report. (2025). “European Maritime Transport Environmental Report 2025”. https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/publications/maritime-transport-2025 (20/08/2026).

[2] European Community Shipowners’ Association (2026). “The economic value of European shipping”.  https://ecsa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/2026_05_04-ES-ECSA-The-economic-value-of-European-Shipping-FINAL.pdf (3/09/2026).

[3] Ibid.; Fratila, A., Gavril, I. A., Nita, S. C., and Hrebenciuc, A. (2021). “The Importance of Maritime Transport for Economic Growth in the European Union: A Panel Data Analysis”. Sustainability, 13(14), no. 7961.

[4] European Environmental Agency-European Maritime Safety Agency Joint Report. (2025), op. cit.

[5] Dikaios, G., Terezaki, M., and Gavalas, D. (2026). “Geopolitical Upheaval Through Climate Measures: IMO and EU Decisions for International Shipping”. Ocean and Society, 3, no 11894. https://www.cogitatiopress.com/oceanandsociety/article/view/11894/5168 (3/09/2026); UN Trade and Development (2023). “Review of maritime transport 2023”. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4042151?ln=en&v=pdf (20/08/2026).

[6] Dong J., Zeng J., Yang Y. and Wang H. (2022). “A review of law and policy on decarbonization of shipping”. Frontiers Marine Science, 9, no 1076352.

[7] European Maritime Safety Agency (2026). “EU ETS Extension to maritime”. https://www.emsa.europa.eu/reducing-emissions/extension-ets.html (20/08/2026); Wang, S., Zhen, L., Psaraftis, N.H. and Yan, R. (2021). “Implications of the EU’s Inclusion of Maritime Transport in the Emissions Trading System for Shipping Companies”. Engineering, 7(5), 554-557.

[8] Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low‐carbon fuels in maritime transport (2023). Official Journal of the European Union, L 234; European Commission (2026). Questions and answers on the EU Industrial Maritime and Ports Strategies. Brussels, 4 March. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/90cd648d-4a76-4f1e-9123-6bd6fb6d913a_en?filename=Questions_and_answers_on_the_EU_Industrial_Maritime_and_Ports_Strategies.pdf (25/08/2026).

[9] E.g., Dikaios, G. (2024). EU Climate Diplomacy towards the IMO and ICAO (Palgrave Macmillan). https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-51123-3 (3/09/2026).

[10] European Maritime Safety Agency (2026). “EU ETS Extension to maritime”. https://www.emsa.europa.eu/reducing-emissions/extension-ets.html (20/08/2026); European Union (2026). “About the EU ETS”. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/areas-action/carbon-markets/about-eu-ets_en (20/08/2026).

[11] European Commission (2025). “Decarbonising maritime transport – FuelEU Maritime”. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/maritime/decarbonising-maritime-transport-fueleu-maritime_en (27/07/2026).

[12] Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low‐carbon fuels in maritime transport (2023). Official Journal of the European Union, L 234, Article 1.

[13] European Maritime Safety Agency (2025). “FuelEU Maritime: full application 1 January 2025”. https://www.emsa.europa.eu/newsroom/latest-news/item/5385-fueleu-maritime-full-application-1-january-2025.html (28/07/2026).

[14] Solakivi, T., Paimander, A., and Ojala, L. (2022). “Cost competitiveness of alternative maritime fuels in the new regulatory framework”. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 113, no 103500.

[15] European Maritime Safety Agency (2026). “FuelEU Maritime Regulation”. https://www.emsa.europa.eu/reducing-emissions/fuel-eu-maritime-regulation.html (20/08/2026).

[16] European Maritime Safety Agency (2026). “EU ETS Extension to maritime”. https://www.emsa.europa.eu/reducing-emissions/extension-ets.html(20/08/2026); Kotzampasakis, M. (2023). “Intercontinental shipping in the European Union Emissions Trading System: A ‘fifty–fifty’ alignment with the law of the sea and international climate law?”. RECIEL, 32(1), 29-43; Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low‐carbon fuels in maritime transport (2023). Official Journal of the European Union, L 234.

[17] European Union (2026). “EU position in world trade”. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/eu-position-world-trade_en (20/08/2026).

[18] Vaca-Cabrero, J., González-Cancelas, N., Camarero-Orive, A., Corral, M. M. E.-I., and Ricci, S. (2024). “Economic Impact of the Application of the ETS to European Ports: Analysis of Different Scenarios”. Sustainability, 16(23), no 10433.

[19] European Commission (2024). “EU trade policy and maritime transport”. https://trade.ec.europa.eu (18/07/2026).

[20] Journal of Commerce (2025). “Ocean carriers unveil hefty increases in Europe emissions surcharges”. https://www.joc.com/article/ocean-carriers-unveil-hefty-increases-in-europe-emissions-surcharges-6126958 (2/08/2026).

[21] Financial Times (2026). “Ships to pay higher EU carbon fees as Brussels seeks to close loophole”. 8 July. https://www.ft.com/content/9f2dafd6-a628-4d8d-9b84-b926f1f152b3?syn-25a6b1a6=1 (29/07/2026).

[22] Kotzampasakis, M. (2025). “Maritime emissions trading in the EU: Systematic literature review and policy assessment”. Transport Policy, 165, 28-41.

[23] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1127 of 6 June 2025 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards of identifying neighbouring container transshipment ports. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32025R1127 (22/07/2026); Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low‐carbon fuels in maritime transport (2023). Official Journal of the European Union, L 234, Article 2.

[24] Christidis, P., Mendoza Villafuerte, P., Oliete Josa, S., Jimenez Espadafor Sardon, E., Hidalgo Gonzalez, I., Dolci, F., Grosso, M., Suarez Bertoa, R., Fontaras, G., Krause, J., Grigoriadis, A., Bellos, A., and Olariaga Guardiola, M. (2024). “Global gateway green shipping corridors: Scoping study for port identification. European Commission”. https://hellenicaid.mfa.gr/wp‐contentuploads/2025/01/Global‐Gateway‐Green‐Shipping‐Corridors.pdf (20/08/2026); European Commission, Joint Research Centre (2024). “Energy and Industry Geography Lab”. https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/scientific-tools-and-databases/energy-and-industry-geography-lab-0_en (16/07/2026).

[25] European Commission (2024). “Global Gateway: building sustainable and trusted connections that work for people and the planet”. https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_en (15/07/2026).

[26] Financial Times (2026), op. cit.

[27] Journal of Commerce (2025), op. cit.

[28] Financial Times (2026), op. cit.

[29] Lagouvardou, S., and Psaraftis, H.N. (2022). Implications of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) on European container routes: A carbon leakage case study. Maritime Transport Research, 3, no 100059.

[30] Ibid.

[31] European Commission (2025). “Commission adopts two new reports on the implementation of EU ETS in maritime transport and the maritime Monitoring, Reporting and Verification review”. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-other-reads/news/commission-adopts-two-new-reports-implementation-eu-ets-maritime-transport-and-maritime-monitoring-2025-03-19_en (25/07/2026).

[32] Vaca-Cabrero, J. et al., op. cit.

[33] European Commission: Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, TISPT, Panteia, Oeko-Institut and Würzburg University (2026). “Economic study for an assessment of potential carbon leakage in the aviation and maritime sectors and mitigating measures: maritime sector: final report”. Publications Office of the European Union. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2832/3480829 (20/08/2026).

[34] Financial Times (2026), op. cit.; Vaca-Cabrero, J. et al., op. cit.

[35] Puertos del Estado’s Report (2026). “ETS Observatory Report 2”. https://www.puertos.es/system/files/2026-07/ETS%20OBSERVATORY%20REPORT%20MAR-2026%20EN.pdf (20/08/2026).

[36] Mercator Institute for China Studies (2024). Mapping China’s global port network: on the backfoot in 2024, but still well entrenched. https://merics.org/en/comment/mapping-chinas-global-port-network-backfoot-2024-still-well-entrenched (12/07/2026).

[37] Ibid.

[38] Koundouri, P., Alamanos, A., Deranian, C., Garcia, J., and Ni, O. (2025). “Too hard to decarbonize: insights from a decision support tool for the Greek maritime operations”. Environmental Research Letters, 20; McKinsey & Company (2024). “Greek shipping: Success factors and opportunities”. 30 July. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/logistics/our-insights/greek-shipping-success-factors-and-opportunities#/ (28/08/2026).

[39] Delphi Economic Forum (2026). Delphi Economic Forum 2026: Minister Vassilis Kikilias speech on maritime decarbonisation. https://www.delphiforum.gr (10/07/2026).

[40] Lagouvardou, S., and Psaraftis, H.N. (2022), op. cit.

[41] Union of Greek Shipowners (2025). “UGS Annual Report 2024-2025”. https://ugs.gr/en/press-releases/2025/press-release-20250801/ (30/07/2026).

[42] Lloyd’s List (2025). “Furious officials consider legal action after Greece and Cyprus break EU unity at IMO”. Lloyd’s List, 23 October. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1155198/Furious-officials-consider-legal-action-after-Greece-and-Cyprus-break-EU-unity-at-IMO (16/07/2026).

[43] Devaux, F. (2026). “Greece risks becoming Trump’s Trojan horse in the fight to decarbonise shipping”. Transport and Environment, 18 February. https://www.transportenvironment.org/articles/greece-risks-becoming-trumps-trojan-horse-in-the-fight-to-decarbonise-shipping (25/08/2026).

[44] Christidis, P. et al., op. cit.

[45] Financial Times (2026), op. cit.

[46] iefimerida (2026). “Kikilias: Concern about the European stance ahead of IMO negotiations on the decarbonization of shipping”. 1 September. https://www.iefimerida.gr/politiki/kikilias-anisyhia-diapragmateyseis-apanthrakopoiisi-naytilias (1/09/2026).

[47] European Union (2026). “Carbon leakage”. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/areas-action/carbon-markets/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/free-allocation/carbon-leakage_en (20/08/2026).

[48] Vaca-Cabrero, J. et al., op. cit.

[49] Puertos del Estado’s Report (2026), op. cit.

[50] Financial Times (2026), op. cit.; Mercator Institute for China Studies (2024), op. cit.; Vaca-Cabrero, J. et al., op. cit.

[51] Christidis, P. et al., op. cit.; European Commission (2024). “Global Gateway: building sustainable and trusted connections that work for people and the planet”. https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_en (15/07/2026).

[52] Adjei, M., Van Leeuwen, J. and Pereira, H. (2026). “Towards decarbonising shipping: Governance challenges and barriers to the implementation of EU emission trading system (ETS)”. Maritime Studies, 25, no 23.

[53] European Commission (2026). Questions and answers on the EU Industrial Maritime and Ports Strategies. Brussels, 4 March. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/90cd648d-4a76-4f1e-9123-6bd6fb6d913a_en?filename=Questions_and_answers_on_the_EU_Industrial_Maritime_and_Ports_Strategies.pdf (25/08/2026).

[54] European Commission (2026). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy, COM (2026)111 final.

[55] European Commission (2026). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: EU Ports Strategy, COM (2026)112 final.

European Council President, António Costa, had a meeting with Chancellor of Austria, Christian Stocker, on 15 September 2026, in Vienna, Austria. The meeting is part of President Costa's annual "Tour des Capitales".

Kyriakos Pierrakakis, President of the Eurogroup, is travelling to Berlin for bilateral talks.

Kyriakos Pierrakakis, President of the Eurogroup, is travelling to Berlin for bilateral talks.

This discussion paper examines the development of Syria’s electricity sector before and since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. It also assesses what this implies for the post-war reconstruction of the electricity sector. Drawing on field research conducted in Damascus and Qamishli between August and December 2025, and using a theoretical framework that prioritises environmental sustainability and social inclusion, this paper explores opportunities and challenges for pursuing a transformative reconstruction of the electricity sector that is environmentally sustainable (prioritising renewables) and socially inclusive (participatory and affordable). The paper finds that fragmentation is a key characteristic of the energy regime in post-war Syria,materialising in recent years in three isolated electricity systems: an off-grid, generator-based system in the north-east; a Turkey-linked, semi-private supply system in the north-west; and a national-grid system in the rest of the country. Further findings highlight that the transitional government prioritised the rapid restoration of centralised, fossil fuel-based power plants over renewable energy. It restructured electricity-related public institutions according to market rules and further privatised the electricity market to attract investors, raising electricity tariffs significantly, even as 90 per cent of Syrian households live in poverty. The paper concludes that the ongoing reconstruction pathway is a state-led, market-driven and socially insensitive model. International development cooperation can help local actors bridge this gap at the legal, administrative and technical levels. At the legal and administrative levels, international development cooperation can support local efforts to develop an inclusive electricity-governance framework. To date, electricity-related rules have changed rapidly under the transitional government’s top-down approach, with little transparency or community participation. At the technical level, shifting from standalone, off-grid solar systems to connected hybrid and mini-grid systems requires a targeted programme. This is an area for collaboration between the transitional government and international development cooperation. Nevertheless, closing the information gap in the electricity sector is still a key challenge for policy planning. 

This discussion paper examines the development of Syria’s electricity sector before and since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. It also assesses what this implies for the post-war reconstruction of the electricity sector. Drawing on field research conducted in Damascus and Qamishli between August and December 2025, and using a theoretical framework that prioritises environmental sustainability and social inclusion, this paper explores opportunities and challenges for pursuing a transformative reconstruction of the electricity sector that is environmentally sustainable (prioritising renewables) and socially inclusive (participatory and affordable). The paper finds that fragmentation is a key characteristic of the energy regime in post-war Syria,materialising in recent years in three isolated electricity systems: an off-grid, generator-based system in the north-east; a Turkey-linked, semi-private supply system in the north-west; and a national-grid system in the rest of the country. Further findings highlight that the transitional government prioritised the rapid restoration of centralised, fossil fuel-based power plants over renewable energy. It restructured electricity-related public institutions according to market rules and further privatised the electricity market to attract investors, raising electricity tariffs significantly, even as 90 per cent of Syrian households live in poverty. The paper concludes that the ongoing reconstruction pathway is a state-led, market-driven and socially insensitive model. International development cooperation can help local actors bridge this gap at the legal, administrative and technical levels. At the legal and administrative levels, international development cooperation can support local efforts to develop an inclusive electricity-governance framework. To date, electricity-related rules have changed rapidly under the transitional government’s top-down approach, with little transparency or community participation. At the technical level, shifting from standalone, off-grid solar systems to connected hybrid and mini-grid systems requires a targeted programme. This is an area for collaboration between the transitional government and international development cooperation. Nevertheless, closing the information gap in the electricity sector is still a key challenge for policy planning. 

This discussion paper examines the development of Syria’s electricity sector before and since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. It also assesses what this implies for the post-war reconstruction of the electricity sector. Drawing on field research conducted in Damascus and Qamishli between August and December 2025, and using a theoretical framework that prioritises environmental sustainability and social inclusion, this paper explores opportunities and challenges for pursuing a transformative reconstruction of the electricity sector that is environmentally sustainable (prioritising renewables) and socially inclusive (participatory and affordable). The paper finds that fragmentation is a key characteristic of the energy regime in post-war Syria,materialising in recent years in three isolated electricity systems: an off-grid, generator-based system in the north-east; a Turkey-linked, semi-private supply system in the north-west; and a national-grid system in the rest of the country. Further findings highlight that the transitional government prioritised the rapid restoration of centralised, fossil fuel-based power plants over renewable energy. It restructured electricity-related public institutions according to market rules and further privatised the electricity market to attract investors, raising electricity tariffs significantly, even as 90 per cent of Syrian households live in poverty. The paper concludes that the ongoing reconstruction pathway is a state-led, market-driven and socially insensitive model. International development cooperation can help local actors bridge this gap at the legal, administrative and technical levels. At the legal and administrative levels, international development cooperation can support local efforts to develop an inclusive electricity-governance framework. To date, electricity-related rules have changed rapidly under the transitional government’s top-down approach, with little transparency or community participation. At the technical level, shifting from standalone, off-grid solar systems to connected hybrid and mini-grid systems requires a targeted programme. This is an area for collaboration between the transitional government and international development cooperation. Nevertheless, closing the information gap in the electricity sector is still a key challenge for policy planning. 

President Metsola opened the 14-17 September plenary session in Strasbourg.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The European Parliament will open an antenna office in Ottawa to further strengthen parliamentary relations between the European Union and Canada.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Bonn, 14. September 2026. Morgen ist der Tag der Demokratie, doch Demokratie steht weltweit unter Druck. Auch in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland fordert Rechtspopulismus die freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung heraus wie selten zuvor. 

Bei der Wahl zum sachsen-anhaltinischen Landtag vor einer Woche schnitt der als gesichert rechtsextrem eingestufte Landesverband der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) als stärkste Partei ab. Voraussichtlich wird er eine Regierungsbeteiligung in der Landesregierung haben. Auch in anderen Bundesländern sowie bundesweit kommt die Partei auf hohe Umfragewerte. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Bedrohung der Demokratie in Deutschland lohnt sich die Frage, welche Erkenntnisse man aus der Forschung zu Autokratisierung und internationalem Demokratieschutz für Deutschland ziehen kann. Dabei zeigt sich, dass man, um die Resilienz von Demokratie zu steigern, mit Mut ihre politischen Institutionen schützen und doch, wenn nötig, neugestalten muss. Denn sie bilden die Säulen und Pfeiler einer Demokratie, die diese zusammenhalten. 

Säulen und Pfeiler einer Demokratie: das politische Institutionengefüge

Das demokratische Institutionengefüge Deutschlands lässt sich aus vielerlei Blickwinkeln beschreiben. Im Hinblick auf die Beteiligung der AfD an Landesregierungen ist im öffentlichen Diskurs derzeit allerdings insbesondere der Föderalismus im Fokus. Dieser kann, wenn eine demokratiefeindliche Partei ein Bundesland regiert, treffend als „geflutetes Schott“ eines leckgeschlagenen Schiffs bezeichnet werden: zwar beschränkt der Föderalismus den eintretenden Angriff auf demokratische Strukturen auf ein Bundesland, dennoch kann er auch die Regierungsführung auf der Bundesebene erschweren. Vor allem aber bietet die Forschung keine Indizien, dass Föderalismus an sich Demokratien resilienter gegenüber demokratischer Erosion macht. Während Föderalismus Indiens beispielsweise Demokratieabbau nicht viel entgegensetzen kann, zeigt er sich in den USA als wichtiger Schutzmechanismus. In Indien kann die Regierungspartei die Institutionen derart dominieren, dass sie föderale Strukturen selbst angreift und sogar Bundesstaaten auflöst. In den USA erschwert dagegen die bundesstaatliche Verwaltung von Wahlen deren Vereinnahmung und Manipulation. 

In umgekehrter Richtung kann in Deutschland eine Landesregierung zahlreiche wichtige Institutionen angreifen oder umgestalten, etwa Teile des Bildungssystems, der Landesjustiz, der Medien, der Polizei oder des Verwaltungsapparats. Wie man im Falle des Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) in den USA beobachten konnte, darf man bei derartigen Angriffen auf Institutionen nicht darauf hoffen, dass ihnen aufgrund von gesetzlicher Unrechtmäßigkeit beizeiten Einhalt geboten wird. Dafür ist der Schaden in Institutionen häufig zu schnell und gleichzeitig unwiderruflich angerichtet. Stattdessen ist es wichtig, Angriffe auf Institutionen umgehend zu kontern und möglichst zu blocken.

Angriffe auf Institutionen kontern und blocken

In den Bereich des Konterns fiele zum Beispiel das Einfrieren von Bundes- und EU-Finanzierungen im Falle von Landesverstößen gegen die freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung. Sanktionsmechanismen dieser Art haben sich etwa im Falle des europäischen Rechtsstaatsmechanismus bei demokratischer Erosion in Polen und Ungarn als wirkmächtig erwiesen. Sanktionsmechanismen allein sind jedoch häufig nicht hinreichend und riskieren, politisch-gesellschaftliche Polarisierung zu verstärken. Daher müssen Angriffe auf Institutionen auch durch durchdachte Reformen politischer Regeln geblockt werden. 

Hierzu zählt die sachsen-anhaltinische Parlamentsreform vom April dieses Jahres. Änderungen von Mehrheitsbestimmungen und Sperrminoritäten sind jedoch ein zweischneidiges Schwert. Demokratische wie nicht-demokratische Parteien können sie unter veränderten Mehrheitsverhältnissen für ihre Zwecke nutzen. Statt sich auf Mehrheitsbestimmungen und Sperrminoritäten zu konzentrieren, kann es daher sinnvoller sein, durch institutionelle oder verfassungsrechtliche Regelungen „Verzögerungen“ in politische Prozesse einzubauen. Dies kann geschehen, indem entweder der Prozess der Entscheidungsfindung selbst oder das Inkrafttreten von Entscheidungen zeitlich gestreckt wird. Beispielsweise können Veränderungen an der niederländischen Verfassung nur in Kraft treten, nachdem sie auch von dem nächstgewählten Parlament verabschiedet wurden. In Dänemark wiederum kann ein Drittel der Parlamentsabgeordneten nach der Verabschiedung eines Gesetzes ein Referendum über das neue Gesetz verlangen. Derartige „Verzögerungs“-Regelungen machen demokratische Aushandlungsprozesse zwar langwieriger; sie fügen dem Institutionengefüge eines Landes jedoch weitere Schutzmechanismen hinzu. 

Willy Brandt wird zugeschrieben, gesagt zu haben, dass „unsere Demokratie“ eine „wachsame, eine kämpferische und eine sich stets erneuernde Demokratie sein“ muss. Dies gilt mehr denn je.

Bonn, 14. September 2026. Morgen ist der Tag der Demokratie, doch Demokratie steht weltweit unter Druck. Auch in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland fordert Rechtspopulismus die freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung heraus wie selten zuvor. 

Bei der Wahl zum sachsen-anhaltinischen Landtag vor einer Woche schnitt der als gesichert rechtsextrem eingestufte Landesverband der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) als stärkste Partei ab. Voraussichtlich wird er eine Regierungsbeteiligung in der Landesregierung haben. Auch in anderen Bundesländern sowie bundesweit kommt die Partei auf hohe Umfragewerte. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Bedrohung der Demokratie in Deutschland lohnt sich die Frage, welche Erkenntnisse man aus der Forschung zu Autokratisierung und internationalem Demokratieschutz für Deutschland ziehen kann. Dabei zeigt sich, dass man, um die Resilienz von Demokratie zu steigern, mit Mut ihre politischen Institutionen schützen und doch, wenn nötig, neugestalten muss. Denn sie bilden die Säulen und Pfeiler einer Demokratie, die diese zusammenhalten. 

Säulen und Pfeiler einer Demokratie: das politische Institutionengefüge

Das demokratische Institutionengefüge Deutschlands lässt sich aus vielerlei Blickwinkeln beschreiben. Im Hinblick auf die Beteiligung der AfD an Landesregierungen ist im öffentlichen Diskurs derzeit allerdings insbesondere der Föderalismus im Fokus. Dieser kann, wenn eine demokratiefeindliche Partei ein Bundesland regiert, treffend als „geflutetes Schott“ eines leckgeschlagenen Schiffs bezeichnet werden: zwar beschränkt der Föderalismus den eintretenden Angriff auf demokratische Strukturen auf ein Bundesland, dennoch kann er auch die Regierungsführung auf der Bundesebene erschweren. Vor allem aber bietet die Forschung keine Indizien, dass Föderalismus an sich Demokratien resilienter gegenüber demokratischer Erosion macht. Während Föderalismus Indiens beispielsweise Demokratieabbau nicht viel entgegensetzen kann, zeigt er sich in den USA als wichtiger Schutzmechanismus. In Indien kann die Regierungspartei die Institutionen derart dominieren, dass sie föderale Strukturen selbst angreift und sogar Bundesstaaten auflöst. In den USA erschwert dagegen die bundesstaatliche Verwaltung von Wahlen deren Vereinnahmung und Manipulation. 

In umgekehrter Richtung kann in Deutschland eine Landesregierung zahlreiche wichtige Institutionen angreifen oder umgestalten, etwa Teile des Bildungssystems, der Landesjustiz, der Medien, der Polizei oder des Verwaltungsapparats. Wie man im Falle des Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) in den USA beobachten konnte, darf man bei derartigen Angriffen auf Institutionen nicht darauf hoffen, dass ihnen aufgrund von gesetzlicher Unrechtmäßigkeit beizeiten Einhalt geboten wird. Dafür ist der Schaden in Institutionen häufig zu schnell und gleichzeitig unwiderruflich angerichtet. Stattdessen ist es wichtig, Angriffe auf Institutionen umgehend zu kontern und möglichst zu blocken.

Angriffe auf Institutionen kontern und blocken

In den Bereich des Konterns fiele zum Beispiel das Einfrieren von Bundes- und EU-Finanzierungen im Falle von Landesverstößen gegen die freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung. Sanktionsmechanismen dieser Art haben sich etwa im Falle des europäischen Rechtsstaatsmechanismus bei demokratischer Erosion in Polen und Ungarn als wirkmächtig erwiesen. Sanktionsmechanismen allein sind jedoch häufig nicht hinreichend und riskieren, politisch-gesellschaftliche Polarisierung zu verstärken. Daher müssen Angriffe auf Institutionen auch durch durchdachte Reformen politischer Regeln geblockt werden. 

Hierzu zählt die sachsen-anhaltinische Parlamentsreform vom April dieses Jahres. Änderungen von Mehrheitsbestimmungen und Sperrminoritäten sind jedoch ein zweischneidiges Schwert. Demokratische wie nicht-demokratische Parteien können sie unter veränderten Mehrheitsverhältnissen für ihre Zwecke nutzen. Statt sich auf Mehrheitsbestimmungen und Sperrminoritäten zu konzentrieren, kann es daher sinnvoller sein, durch institutionelle oder verfassungsrechtliche Regelungen „Verzögerungen“ in politische Prozesse einzubauen. Dies kann geschehen, indem entweder der Prozess der Entscheidungsfindung selbst oder das Inkrafttreten von Entscheidungen zeitlich gestreckt wird. Beispielsweise können Veränderungen an der niederländischen Verfassung nur in Kraft treten, nachdem sie auch von dem nächstgewählten Parlament verabschiedet wurden. In Dänemark wiederum kann ein Drittel der Parlamentsabgeordneten nach der Verabschiedung eines Gesetzes ein Referendum über das neue Gesetz verlangen. Derartige „Verzögerungs“-Regelungen machen demokratische Aushandlungsprozesse zwar langwieriger; sie fügen dem Institutionengefüge eines Landes jedoch weitere Schutzmechanismen hinzu. 

Willy Brandt wird zugeschrieben, gesagt zu haben, dass „unsere Demokratie“ eine „wachsame, eine kämpferische und eine sich stets erneuernde Demokratie sein“ muss. Dies gilt mehr denn je.

Bonn, 14. September 2026. Morgen ist der Tag der Demokratie, doch Demokratie steht weltweit unter Druck. Auch in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland fordert Rechtspopulismus die freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung heraus wie selten zuvor. 

Bei der Wahl zum sachsen-anhaltinischen Landtag vor einer Woche schnitt der als gesichert rechtsextrem eingestufte Landesverband der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) als stärkste Partei ab. Voraussichtlich wird er eine Regierungsbeteiligung in der Landesregierung haben. Auch in anderen Bundesländern sowie bundesweit kommt die Partei auf hohe Umfragewerte. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Bedrohung der Demokratie in Deutschland lohnt sich die Frage, welche Erkenntnisse man aus der Forschung zu Autokratisierung und internationalem Demokratieschutz für Deutschland ziehen kann. Dabei zeigt sich, dass man, um die Resilienz von Demokratie zu steigern, mit Mut ihre politischen Institutionen schützen und doch, wenn nötig, neugestalten muss. Denn sie bilden die Säulen und Pfeiler einer Demokratie, die diese zusammenhalten. 

Säulen und Pfeiler einer Demokratie: das politische Institutionengefüge

Das demokratische Institutionengefüge Deutschlands lässt sich aus vielerlei Blickwinkeln beschreiben. Im Hinblick auf die Beteiligung der AfD an Landesregierungen ist im öffentlichen Diskurs derzeit allerdings insbesondere der Föderalismus im Fokus. Dieser kann, wenn eine demokratiefeindliche Partei ein Bundesland regiert, treffend als „geflutetes Schott“ eines leckgeschlagenen Schiffs bezeichnet werden: zwar beschränkt der Föderalismus den eintretenden Angriff auf demokratische Strukturen auf ein Bundesland, dennoch kann er auch die Regierungsführung auf der Bundesebene erschweren. Vor allem aber bietet die Forschung keine Indizien, dass Föderalismus an sich Demokratien resilienter gegenüber demokratischer Erosion macht. Während Föderalismus Indiens beispielsweise Demokratieabbau nicht viel entgegensetzen kann, zeigt er sich in den USA als wichtiger Schutzmechanismus. In Indien kann die Regierungspartei die Institutionen derart dominieren, dass sie föderale Strukturen selbst angreift und sogar Bundesstaaten auflöst. In den USA erschwert dagegen die bundesstaatliche Verwaltung von Wahlen deren Vereinnahmung und Manipulation. 

In umgekehrter Richtung kann in Deutschland eine Landesregierung zahlreiche wichtige Institutionen angreifen oder umgestalten, etwa Teile des Bildungssystems, der Landesjustiz, der Medien, der Polizei oder des Verwaltungsapparats. Wie man im Falle des Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) in den USA beobachten konnte, darf man bei derartigen Angriffen auf Institutionen nicht darauf hoffen, dass ihnen aufgrund von gesetzlicher Unrechtmäßigkeit beizeiten Einhalt geboten wird. Dafür ist der Schaden in Institutionen häufig zu schnell und gleichzeitig unwiderruflich angerichtet. Stattdessen ist es wichtig, Angriffe auf Institutionen umgehend zu kontern und möglichst zu blocken.

Angriffe auf Institutionen kontern und blocken

In den Bereich des Konterns fiele zum Beispiel das Einfrieren von Bundes- und EU-Finanzierungen im Falle von Landesverstößen gegen die freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung. Sanktionsmechanismen dieser Art haben sich etwa im Falle des europäischen Rechtsstaatsmechanismus bei demokratischer Erosion in Polen und Ungarn als wirkmächtig erwiesen. Sanktionsmechanismen allein sind jedoch häufig nicht hinreichend und riskieren, politisch-gesellschaftliche Polarisierung zu verstärken. Daher müssen Angriffe auf Institutionen auch durch durchdachte Reformen politischer Regeln geblockt werden. 

Hierzu zählt die sachsen-anhaltinische Parlamentsreform vom April dieses Jahres. Änderungen von Mehrheitsbestimmungen und Sperrminoritäten sind jedoch ein zweischneidiges Schwert. Demokratische wie nicht-demokratische Parteien können sie unter veränderten Mehrheitsverhältnissen für ihre Zwecke nutzen. Statt sich auf Mehrheitsbestimmungen und Sperrminoritäten zu konzentrieren, kann es daher sinnvoller sein, durch institutionelle oder verfassungsrechtliche Regelungen „Verzögerungen“ in politische Prozesse einzubauen. Dies kann geschehen, indem entweder der Prozess der Entscheidungsfindung selbst oder das Inkrafttreten von Entscheidungen zeitlich gestreckt wird. Beispielsweise können Veränderungen an der niederländischen Verfassung nur in Kraft treten, nachdem sie auch von dem nächstgewählten Parlament verabschiedet wurden. In Dänemark wiederum kann ein Drittel der Parlamentsabgeordneten nach der Verabschiedung eines Gesetzes ein Referendum über das neue Gesetz verlangen. Derartige „Verzögerungs“-Regelungen machen demokratische Aushandlungsprozesse zwar langwieriger; sie fügen dem Institutionengefüge eines Landes jedoch weitere Schutzmechanismen hinzu. 

Willy Brandt wird zugeschrieben, gesagt zu haben, dass „unsere Demokratie“ eine „wachsame, eine kämpferische und eine sich stets erneuernde Demokratie sein“ muss. Dies gilt mehr denn je.

Zusammenfassung:

14. September 2026 – Die Abgeordnetenhauswahl am 20. September 2026 könnte die politische Landschaft Berlins stark verändern. In den jüngsten Umfragen haben vor allem die Linke und die AfD im Vergleich zu 2023 deutlich zugelegt, während CDU und SPD klar verloren haben. Für welche Positionen stehen die politischen Parteien in Berlin? Und wie haben sich ihre Positionen in den letzten 20 Jahren verändert? Eine Auswertung des Wahl-O-Mat der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung zeigt eine bemerkenswerte Entwicklung: Die etablierten Parteien sind in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten deutlich progressiver geworden. Besonders stark gilt dies für die SPD – im Gegensatz vor allem zur FDP, die nun deutlich konservativere Positionen vertritt. Der große Gegenpol ist die AfD. Sie vertritt in fast allen Themenbereichen, vor allem in der Gesellschafts- und Sozialpolitik, extremere Positionen. Zudem zeigen sich deutliche Unterschiede zwischen den Positionierungen der Parteien in Berlin und auf Bundesebene, vor allem bei der CDU.

Der AfD-Sieg in Sachsen-Anhalt könnte zur Katastrophe führen. Oder zu einem Wandel zum Besseren. Doch dafür müssten Kanzler Merz und seine Koalition radikal umsteuern., Der 6. September 2026 könnte für unsere Gesellschaft und Demokratie zu einem ähnlichen Wendepunkte werden wie der 9. November 1989. Der historische Wahlsieg der AfD in Sachsen-Anhalt könnte einen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Schock auslösen. Und dieser könnte die etablierten Parteien zu einem ...

Family poultry farming is widely promoted as a nutrition-sensitive agricultural intervention, yet rigorous causal evidence on its dietary and food security impacts remains limited. Using three rounds of panel data from the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on Agriculture for Ethiopia (2011/12-2015/16), we follow a household fixed-effects strategy to examine the effect of poultry farming on egg consumption, dietary diversity, consumption expenditure, and food security. Despite 53% of households owning poultry in 2015/16, only 9% consumed eggs and 2% consumed chicken meat in the preceding seven days, revealing a stark production-consumption gap. Fixed-effects estimates show that poultry ownership increases the probability of egg consumption by 4 percentage points at the extensive margin, while each additional egg-laying chicken per capita raises it by 8 percentage points. Controlling for household income leaves these estimates unchanged, confirming that nutritional gains operate through direct access to own-produced eggs rather than income effects. Placebo tests find no significant association with milk or non-poultry meat consumption, further supporting this hypothesis. Poultry ownership is associated with higher household dietary diversity scores, but has no significant effect on food security, suggesting improvements in dietary quality without broader food quantity gains. Gender-disaggregated analysis shows that, despite lower ownership rates, female-headed households manage flocks more intensively and channel benefits more effectively into household food consumption. We also find a significant positive association between poultry ownership and diarrhea among children under five, underscoring the need to integrate hygiene and sanitation measures into poultry promotion programs.

Family poultry farming is widely promoted as a nutrition-sensitive agricultural intervention, yet rigorous causal evidence on its dietary and food security impacts remains limited. Using three rounds of panel data from the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on Agriculture for Ethiopia (2011/12-2015/16), we follow a household fixed-effects strategy to examine the effect of poultry farming on egg consumption, dietary diversity, consumption expenditure, and food security. Despite 53% of households owning poultry in 2015/16, only 9% consumed eggs and 2% consumed chicken meat in the preceding seven days, revealing a stark production-consumption gap. Fixed-effects estimates show that poultry ownership increases the probability of egg consumption by 4 percentage points at the extensive margin, while each additional egg-laying chicken per capita raises it by 8 percentage points. Controlling for household income leaves these estimates unchanged, confirming that nutritional gains operate through direct access to own-produced eggs rather than income effects. Placebo tests find no significant association with milk or non-poultry meat consumption, further supporting this hypothesis. Poultry ownership is associated with higher household dietary diversity scores, but has no significant effect on food security, suggesting improvements in dietary quality without broader food quantity gains. Gender-disaggregated analysis shows that, despite lower ownership rates, female-headed households manage flocks more intensively and channel benefits more effectively into household food consumption. We also find a significant positive association between poultry ownership and diarrhea among children under five, underscoring the need to integrate hygiene and sanitation measures into poultry promotion programs.