Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Bonn, 18. Mai 2026. Die neuen Märkte gewinnen an Bedeutung. Doch Märkte können nicht schützen, was sie nicht vollständig erfassen.

Biodiversitätszertifikate sind Finanzinstrumente, die privates Kapital in messbare Erfolge bei Naturschutz und Renaturierung lenken sollen. Unternehmen können damit Nachhaltigkeitsversprechen untermauern und naturbezogene Risiken steuern. Die Zertifikate werden auf Grundlage messbarer Verbesserungen der Biodiversität ausgegeben und auf Märkten gehandelt; die Einnahmen fließen an die Projektträger. Die Bedeutung der Zertifikate für die Umsetzung des Globalen Biodiversitätsrahmens wird auf der 17. UN-Biodiversitätskonferenz ein wichtiges Thema sein. Die Idee ist verlockend: eine Maßeinheit für Biodiversität und ihren Wert definieren, und einen Markt schaffen, der Mittel für den Naturschutz mobilisiert. Doch Märkte können nicht schützen, was sie nicht vollständig messen, bewerten oder erfassen können.

Damit Biodiversität handelbar ist, muss sie auf einen zusammengesetzten Wert – eine „Biodiversitätseinheit“ – reduziert werden – doch diese Berechnung ist umstritten. Über 570 verschiedene Kennzahlen spiegeln konkurrierende Vorstellungen darüber wider, welche Aspekte der Natur besonders wichtig sind. Eine Biodiversitätseinheit kombiniert Indikatoren wie Artenreichtum, Einzigartigkeit des Lebensraums, Standortfläche, Ökosystemstruktur, Zustand und Lage. Diese Vereinfachung ist nicht wertneutral: Gewinne bei einem Indikator können Verluste bei einem anderen ausgleichen. So kann die Zunahme weniger, relativ verbreiteter Arten den Rückgang seltenerer und empfindlicherer Arten verdecken und dadurch ökologische Zielkonflikte verschleiern.

Befürworter*innen argumentieren, diese Vielzahl an Bewertungsmethoden sei eine mit den frühen Kohlenstoffmärkten vergleichbare Entwicklungsphase. Doch Kohlenstoff basiert auf einer universellen Kennzahl – einer Tonne CO2-Äquivalent. Bei der Biodiversität spiegelt eine solche Kennzahl nicht den sozioökologischen Wert der Natur wider, denn dieser kann sich je nach Kontext und Ort stark unterscheiden.

Die Vielzahl der Methoden zeigt, dass es keine neutrale Einheit gibt, sondern nur konkurrierende Entscheidungen, was gezählt und was ausgeblendet wird. Das in England angewandte Prinzip „Biodiversity Net Gain“ veranschaulicht dieses Dilemma: Für eine Baugenehmigung müssen Bauträger einen Nettozuwachs der Biodiversität von 10 % über 30 Jahre nachweisen; dafür können Lebensräume an einem Ort geschaffen werden, während irreversible Verluste von Ökosystemen anderswo in Kauf genommen und verschleiert werden.

Märkte erfordern handelbare, ortsungebundene Einheiten, doch biologische Vielfalt hängt vom Standort ab. Ökologische Funktionen wirken in größeren, miteinander verbundenen Systemen, die sich nicht auf abgegrenzte Landflächen reduzieren lassen. Der Amazonas erzeugt fliegende Flüsse aus Wasserdampf, die Niederschläge in entlegene Regionen Südamerikas bringen – Zusammenhänge, die Bewertungsmethoden nicht erfassen.

Indigene Völker und lokale Gemeinschaften verfügen über ortsspezifisches Wissen, das standardisierte Messgrößen nicht vollständig abbilden können: Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Arten, saisonale Dynamiken und die kulturelle Bedeutung bestimmter Lebensräume. Selbst dort, wo die Beteiligung von Interessengruppen an der Messung vorgesehen ist, dominiert die Logik der Zertifikate. In Kolumbien besteht selbst bei gemeinschaftsorientierten Programmen die Gefahr, problematische Dynamiken der Kohlenstoffmärkte zu reproduzieren – etwa durch ungerechte Verträge oder wenn Mittel die betroffenen Gemeinschaften gar nicht erreichen. Und: Indigene Gemeinschaften sind zwar in Governance-Strukturen vertreten, haben aber kaum Einfluss darauf, wie der ‚Wert‘ der Biodiversität definiert wird. Wie ein indigener Vertreter bemerkte, stand das Ziel einer Skalierung dieser Märkte von Anfang an fest, wodurch Beteiligung weitgehend symbolisch bleibt. Gemeinschaften werden zwar befragt, haben aber kein Mitspracherecht darüber, was gemessen oder wertgeschätzt wird – dies macht diese Märkte sozial ungerecht.

Obwohl Biodiversitätszertifikate als naturpositiv gelten, verschwimmt in der Praxis die Grenze zwischen Zertifikaten und Ausgleichsmechanismen. Drei der 15 bestehenden Zertifikatssysteme, darunter die des Vereinigten Königreichs und Indiens, erlauben ausdrücklich, dass Zertifikate auch als Ausgleichsleistung genutzt werden. In Kolumbien zeigen sich die Folgen: sogenannte ‚Habitat Banks‘ werden dort an ökologisch umstrittene extraktive Industrien vermarktet und sind damit faktisch zu einer Erweiterung der seit 2012 bestehenden Pflichtkompensationen geworden, anstatt Biodiversität nachhaltig zu schützen.

Globale Marktdaten zeigen weiterhin eine geringe Nachfrage nach biodiversitätsfördernden Zertifikaten: Von rund 11,6 Millionen ausgegebenen oder geplanten Zertifikaten wurden 124.183 verkauft und 1.285 aus dem Handel genommen. Wie der Kohlenstoffmarkt gezeigt hat, können der fehlende Zusatznutzen, Leakage-Effekte und MenschenrechtsverletzungenHandelssysteme fundamental untergraben; die größere Komplexität der Biodiversität macht diese Probleme noch schwerer zu beherrschen.

Der Verlust biologischer Vielfalt ist kein durch Bepreisung lösbares Marktversagen, sondern Folge des Wachstumszwangs unseres Wirtschaftssystems, welches die ökologischen Grenzen der Erde überschreitet. Antworten darauf liegen in Ansätzen der Postwachstumsökonomie, Maßnahmen wie Schuldenerlassen und Subventionsabbau, sowie rechtsbasierten Ansätzen wie der Anerkennung der Natur als Rechtssubjekt sowie indigener und traditioneller Territorien.

Bonn, 18. Mai 2026. Die neuen Märkte gewinnen an Bedeutung. Doch Märkte können nicht schützen, was sie nicht vollständig erfassen.

Biodiversitätszertifikate sind Finanzinstrumente, die privates Kapital in messbare Erfolge bei Naturschutz und Renaturierung lenken sollen. Unternehmen können damit Nachhaltigkeitsversprechen untermauern und naturbezogene Risiken steuern. Die Zertifikate werden auf Grundlage messbarer Verbesserungen der Biodiversität ausgegeben und auf Märkten gehandelt; die Einnahmen fließen an die Projektträger. Die Bedeutung der Zertifikate für die Umsetzung des Globalen Biodiversitätsrahmens wird auf der 17. UN-Biodiversitätskonferenz ein wichtiges Thema sein. Die Idee ist verlockend: eine Maßeinheit für Biodiversität und ihren Wert definieren, und einen Markt schaffen, der Mittel für den Naturschutz mobilisiert. Doch Märkte können nicht schützen, was sie nicht vollständig messen, bewerten oder erfassen können.

Damit Biodiversität handelbar ist, muss sie auf einen zusammengesetzten Wert – eine „Biodiversitätseinheit“ – reduziert werden – doch diese Berechnung ist umstritten. Über 570 verschiedene Kennzahlen spiegeln konkurrierende Vorstellungen darüber wider, welche Aspekte der Natur besonders wichtig sind. Eine Biodiversitätseinheit kombiniert Indikatoren wie Artenreichtum, Einzigartigkeit des Lebensraums, Standortfläche, Ökosystemstruktur, Zustand und Lage. Diese Vereinfachung ist nicht wertneutral: Gewinne bei einem Indikator können Verluste bei einem anderen ausgleichen. So kann die Zunahme weniger, relativ verbreiteter Arten den Rückgang seltenerer und empfindlicherer Arten verdecken und dadurch ökologische Zielkonflikte verschleiern.

Befürworter*innen argumentieren, diese Vielzahl an Bewertungsmethoden sei eine mit den frühen Kohlenstoffmärkten vergleichbare Entwicklungsphase. Doch Kohlenstoff basiert auf einer universellen Kennzahl – einer Tonne CO2-Äquivalent. Bei der Biodiversität spiegelt eine solche Kennzahl nicht den sozioökologischen Wert der Natur wider, denn dieser kann sich je nach Kontext und Ort stark unterscheiden.

Die Vielzahl der Methoden zeigt, dass es keine neutrale Einheit gibt, sondern nur konkurrierende Entscheidungen, was gezählt und was ausgeblendet wird. Das in England angewandte Prinzip „Biodiversity Net Gain“ veranschaulicht dieses Dilemma: Für eine Baugenehmigung müssen Bauträger einen Nettozuwachs der Biodiversität von 10 % über 30 Jahre nachweisen; dafür können Lebensräume an einem Ort geschaffen werden, während irreversible Verluste von Ökosystemen anderswo in Kauf genommen und verschleiert werden.

Märkte erfordern handelbare, ortsungebundene Einheiten, doch biologische Vielfalt hängt vom Standort ab. Ökologische Funktionen wirken in größeren, miteinander verbundenen Systemen, die sich nicht auf abgegrenzte Landflächen reduzieren lassen. Der Amazonas erzeugt fliegende Flüsse aus Wasserdampf, die Niederschläge in entlegene Regionen Südamerikas bringen – Zusammenhänge, die Bewertungsmethoden nicht erfassen.

Indigene Völker und lokale Gemeinschaften verfügen über ortsspezifisches Wissen, das standardisierte Messgrößen nicht vollständig abbilden können: Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Arten, saisonale Dynamiken und die kulturelle Bedeutung bestimmter Lebensräume. Selbst dort, wo die Beteiligung von Interessengruppen an der Messung vorgesehen ist, dominiert die Logik der Zertifikate. In Kolumbien besteht selbst bei gemeinschaftsorientierten Programmen die Gefahr, problematische Dynamiken der Kohlenstoffmärkte zu reproduzieren – etwa durch ungerechte Verträge oder wenn Mittel die betroffenen Gemeinschaften gar nicht erreichen. Und: Indigene Gemeinschaften sind zwar in Governance-Strukturen vertreten, haben aber kaum Einfluss darauf, wie der ‚Wert‘ der Biodiversität definiert wird. Wie ein indigener Vertreter bemerkte, stand das Ziel einer Skalierung dieser Märkte von Anfang an fest, wodurch Beteiligung weitgehend symbolisch bleibt. Gemeinschaften werden zwar befragt, haben aber kein Mitspracherecht darüber, was gemessen oder wertgeschätzt wird – dies macht diese Märkte sozial ungerecht.

Obwohl Biodiversitätszertifikate als naturpositiv gelten, verschwimmt in der Praxis die Grenze zwischen Zertifikaten und Ausgleichsmechanismen. Drei der 15 bestehenden Zertifikatssysteme, darunter die des Vereinigten Königreichs und Indiens, erlauben ausdrücklich, dass Zertifikate auch als Ausgleichsleistung genutzt werden. In Kolumbien zeigen sich die Folgen: sogenannte ‚Habitat Banks‘ werden dort an ökologisch umstrittene extraktive Industrien vermarktet und sind damit faktisch zu einer Erweiterung der seit 2012 bestehenden Pflichtkompensationen geworden, anstatt Biodiversität nachhaltig zu schützen.

Globale Marktdaten zeigen weiterhin eine geringe Nachfrage nach biodiversitätsfördernden Zertifikaten: Von rund 11,6 Millionen ausgegebenen oder geplanten Zertifikaten wurden 124.183 verkauft und 1.285 aus dem Handel genommen. Wie der Kohlenstoffmarkt gezeigt hat, können der fehlende Zusatznutzen, Leakage-Effekte und MenschenrechtsverletzungenHandelssysteme fundamental untergraben; die größere Komplexität der Biodiversität macht diese Probleme noch schwerer zu beherrschen.

Der Verlust biologischer Vielfalt ist kein durch Bepreisung lösbares Marktversagen, sondern Folge des Wachstumszwangs unseres Wirtschaftssystems, welches die ökologischen Grenzen der Erde überschreitet. Antworten darauf liegen in Ansätzen der Postwachstumsökonomie, Maßnahmen wie Schuldenerlassen und Subventionsabbau, sowie rechtsbasierten Ansätzen wie der Anerkennung der Natur als Rechtssubjekt sowie indigener und traditioneller Territorien.

The policy brief authored by Dr. Ana Krstinovska, Senior Research Fellow, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration & Research Fellow, Wider Europe Programme, ELIAMEP titled: “From Raw Ores to Strategic Autonomy: The Western Balkans in Europe’s Critical Raw Materials Strategy”, is an expansion of the finding of the thematic report “Raw Materials for a Resilient Europe: The EU’s Strategic Partnership with the Western Balkans” (authored by Dr. A. Krstinovska and Dr. A. Wolf) and it examines the strategic importance of the Western Balkans for Europe’s critical raw materials security and industrial resilience. The brief is part of think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, an initiative implemented by the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

Against the backdrop of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and growing geopolitical competition over access to strategic resources, the brief analyses how the Western Balkans have emerged as a significant, yet underutilized, component of Europe’s raw materials ecosystem. It highlights the region’s deposits of copper, lithium, aluminium, nickel, antimony, and rare earth elements, while examining the geopolitical and economic implications of existing extraction and trade patterns.

The analysis demonstrates how current value chains often channel raw ores and concentrates from the Western Balkans towards China, while processed goods flow to EU markets, reinforcing Europe’s strategic vulnerabilities and limiting regional industrial development. The paper also explores the growing role of non-EU actors in the region’s extractive industries, the lack of local refining and processing capacities, and the governance, environmental, and social challenges associated with major mining projects.

Drawing on these findings, the brief argues that the EU should move beyond a narrowly extractive approach and embed raw materials cooperation within the enlargement process itself. It proposes a strategy centred on value-chain upgrading, regional industrial integration, investment in processing and recycling capacities, updated geological mapping, and stronger governance conditionality linked to EU accession chapters.

The paper concludes that the Western Balkans can contribute substantially to Europe’s strategic autonomy if integrated into EU industrial and regulatory frameworks in a credible and sustainable manner. In this sense, the brief presents raw materials cooperation not only as an economic necessity, but also as a geopolitical and enlargement opportunity capable of strengthening both European resilience and the EU accession perspective of the region.

You can read the policy brief here.

Ino Afentouli, Senior Policy Advisor; Head of the Observatory of Geopolitics and Diplomacy, ELIAMEP

The Xi–Trump summit brings together two vastly different personalities who serve as the primary architects of their countries’ strategic policies. The first, a scion of the Party elite, embodies the Chinese perception of the ‘Middle Kingdom’—of China as the realm between heaven and earth. In this view, China does not need to keep pace with time; instead, time is seen as an asset that works in its favour. Trump, by contrast, is operating on a far more constrained timeline, with only two years remaining of his presidency. His penchant for taking decisions on his own often leads to choices detrimental to his country’s interests, as evidenced by the course of the war in Iran. There can be no doubt that the Chinese leadership has taken note of the mistakes the US has made in its handling of the crisis.

Trump’s personality makes it more likely that the US, rather than China, will fall into the so-called Thucydides Trap. As an ascending power, and true to its strategic tradition of defeating an opponent without engaging in battle, China has the luxury of patience. This is something Trump’s America lacks. The US has to preserve the hegemony it has constructed over eight decades, underpinned by its strategic partnerships across Europe and Asia. But Trump is allergic to alliances; under his presidency, the US risks forfeiting the strategic added value that has enabled American primacy in both continents.

China’s approach to establishing spheres of influence, not only within its own periphery but also on a broader international scale, will be crucial to the emerging balance of power. Chinese strategy over recent decades has prioritized economic penetration as a primary vehicle for exerting political influence. During his 15 years in power, Xi has combined economic power with military might. Huge investments have been made in the armed forces; furthermore, the recent purges—which effectively decapitated virtually the entire military high command—underscore that establishing military primacy remains among his highest strategic priorities. Will this primacy be projected defensively or offensively? The answer to this question will determine the global equilibrium in the years ahead. Xi could exploit the vulnerabilities in Trump’s character, manoeuvring him towards Thucydides’ trap. Possessing strategic patience, Xi is capable of ensnaring Trump in the logic of war through actions that do not jeopardize China’s own security. In this light, the debacle in Iran assumes far greater proportions for the US than a mere military failure. One can only hope the Chinese leader does not pursue such a course while Trump is in office.

Eleni Ekmetsioglou, Non-Resident Fellow, ELIAMEP; Senior Fellow, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

The Xi-Trump meeting happens at a very unfavorable moment for the US. As many analysts have argued, with the US trapped in the Middle East, China seems to have the upper hand on most of the agenda items. Whereas tariffs, technology and probably Taiwan will dominate the discussions, it  might, nevertheless, be the right moment for the US to try and press on other -equally important and highly consequential- issues such as nuclear risk reduction measures. Given that US pundits and official intelligence reports make ominous speculations about the future trajectory of China’s nuclear arsenal, it is in US interests to push for an institutionalized track 1 dialogue for both parties to work towards a better mutual understanding on nuclear issues that might lead to tangible risk reduction measures such as the establishment of a formal missile launch notification regime, for instance. With the quantitative increase in China’s nuclear arsenal, the US has been feeling that its current nuclear modernization might not be fit for purpose in a world with two peer competitors, Russia and China. After the expiration of the New Start treaty last February, the US is not bound by restrictions over the numbers of its deployed warheads. With both countries investing in their nuclear arsenals for quantitative and qualitative improvements, the nuclear component inevitably plays a bigger role in the relationship creating a dangerous dynamic where even a minor crisis between the two powers will have the potential of turning into a nuclear crisis with unprecedented consequences for the region and the whole planet. The Biden administration scored a major success when the two parties agreed to always include a human in the loop for nuclear decision making. AI and nuclear command and control was the low hanging fruit for the Biden administration but it could mark a great starting point towards a more diverse dialogue on precise risk reduction measures in order to  boost crisis stability between the two countries. Hopefully, the Trump administration will be prepared to press Xi on this deeply consequential aspect of the bilateral relationship and continue the positive trend that the Biden administration kicked off in San Francisco back in 2023. 

George Tzogopoulos, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; European Institute of Nice, Centre international de formation européenne (CIFE)

Understanding China remains an extremely complex undertaking in the West. For instance, while US think tanks and media assess that President Trump will not hold the upper hand in his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing does not operate within this Western paradigm. From a Chinese perspective, it matters little where the White House is occupied by Donald Trump, Joe Biden or anyone else. The web of Sino-American relations is so intricate that a single summit—regardless of its gravity—cannot be expected to yield a definitive breakthrough. China predicates its success on its own strategic choices, negotiating only to secure a measure of relative stability in its relations with Washington. While stability serves the interests of both nations, the path forward is arduous—a reality consistent with historical precedent. Although Sino-American competition is set to intensify, it remains within the power of both states to mitigate the risk of catastrophic consequences. The United States will remain the sole superpower, yet China—as the world’s second-largest economy—will command an amplified voice in global economic and geopolitical affairs. It is this very dynamic that is causing tremors in the international system, as the United States is forced to adapt to a reality far removed from the unipolar era it enjoyed for two decades following the Cold War.

Dimitris Tsarouhas, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Professor, Center for European and Transatlantic Studies (CEUTS) at Virginia Tech

Measured tones and muted expectations

In a normal political and economic climate, a meeting between a US President and his Chinese counterpart would be front-page news here in Washington, sparking a deluge of analysis aimed at gauging Beijing’s intentions. However, the current climate is anything but normal—at least for Donald Trump.

With inflation hitting 3.8%, its highest level in nearly three years, the gap between the President’s campaign promises and the economic reality has reignited public frustration with the administration’s fiscal direction. Pledges to shield Americans from an unstable global environment are being belied on the ground. Not only is the US embroiled in yet another conflict in the Middle East at great economic and political cost, the administration’s tariff regime—aimed largely at Chinese imports—is also faltering amidst judicial scrutiny and bureaucratic deadlock.

Against this backdrop, the shift since their last October 2025 summit could not be clearer: it is now President Xi who holds the stronger hand (to echo Trump’s infamous remark to his Ukrainian counterpart). Even as the US is being forced into a de facto capitulation in its undeclared—yet very real—trade war with China, Beijing continues to dictate the terms of the broader geopolitical game. It does so by imposing unilateral export restrictions on its rare earth minerals and by bolstering the Russian war machine on the Ukrainian front. And while the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz undoubtedly burdens the Chinese economy as well, officials in Beijing remain optimistic. They anticipate that their recurring tactic—promising multi-billion-dollar commodity purchases—will appease President Trump and pave the way for ‘constructive’ talks. In practice, this means negotiations that bypass the core of Chinese ambitions: namely, the status of Taiwan and the subjugation of neighbouring states’ rights in the South China Sea, where Beijing continues to assert a unilateral right of intervention. Against this backdrop, Washington harbours few illusions regarding the outcome of this meeting—and rightfully so.

UN peacekeeping transitions are increasingly unfolding under crisis conditions marked by deteriorating host-state consent, imposed timelines, and escalating insecurity. While the UN has developed more sophisticated transition frameworks over the past two decades, recent mission withdrawals have exposed significant gaps between policy guidance and operational realities.

This issue brief examines “transitions in crisis” through the cases of UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNAMID in Sudan, MINUSMA in Mali, and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It explores how operational obstruction, weakened political cooperation, inadequate successor arrangements, and abrupt withdrawals create acute risks for civilians, peacekeepers, and peace processes.

The findings highlight that crisis transitions require different analytical and operational approaches than standard mission drawdowns. Stronger contingency planning, earlier political engagement, more integrated protection mechanisms, and clearer responses to host-state obstruction are essential to mitigating the risks associated with abrupt or noncooperative mission withdrawals.

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The post Peacekeeping Transitions during Crisis appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Strategic communications are critical when a peace operation is preparing to leave a country. Effective communication can help manage expectations, counter misinformation and disinformation, preserve trust, and facilitate handover processes. Failure to communicate effectively can leave civilians feeling abandoned, fuel false narratives, and complicate mission withdrawals and transitions.

This issue brief examines lessons related to strategic communications during recent peacekeeping transitions, including in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It explores how missions have approached external messaging with local populations and host-state governments, internal communication with mission staff, coordination with national and UN actors, and the transition or closure of UN radio stations.

The findings highlight that communications planning must be integrated into transition processes from the outset and supported at the leadership level. Maintaining communications capacity through and beyond mission drawdowns, strengthening joint messaging with UN and national actors, and developing sustainable approaches to UN radio are essential to effective transitions. At the same time, the brief underscores that even well-executed communications cannot compensate for deteriorating security conditions or political realities on the ground.

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The post Strategic Communications and UN Peacekeeping Transitions appeared first on International Peace Institute.

UN peacekeeping missions have played an important role in advancing the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda, including by supporting women’s participation, strengthening gender-responsive institutions, and expanding protection mechanisms. Yet these gains often become vulnerable during mission transitions and withdrawals.

This issue brief examines how peacekeeping transitions have affected WPS gains in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Mali. It explores how missions have incorporated gender-responsive analysis, gender benchmarks, technical expertise, and coordination with civil society into transition planning and implementation.

The findings highlight that sustaining WPS gains requires more systematic gender-responsive planning, stronger coordination with local actors, and continued political and financial support after mission withdrawal. Integrating gender expertise and local women-led organizations into transition processes is essential to preserving progress and reducing protection gaps.

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The post Women, Peace, and Security and UN Peacekeeping Transitions appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Photos

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IPI, in partnership with the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, co-hosted an ambassador-level, off-the-record roundtable continuing the strategic dialogue launched at the May 2025 Berlin Peacekeeping Ministerial, where Germany brought together over 134 countries under the theme “The Future of Peacekeeping” on May 13th.

One year on, the landscape remains uncertain. A liquidity crisis continues to drive reductions in UN personnel and programming. Security Council dynamics have grown more contested. And the collective security environment increasingly involves regional bodies, ad hoc coalitions, and bilateral arrangements. The discussion focused on how the UN can best operate in this environment of fragmentation — identifying its continued comparative advantages and connecting to the Secretary-General’s forthcoming review on the future of all forms of UN peace operations under the Pact for the Future.

The conversation focused on how the UN can best operate in an environment of fragmentation and alongside multiple actors—including regional bodies, ad hoc coalitions, and bilateral security arrangements—and identified the UN’s continued comparative advantage and added value, and ways to preserve and enhance it. The discussion also connects to the forthcoming secretary-general’s review on the future of all forms of UN peace operations, called for in the Pact for the Future.

Welcome and Opening Remarks
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, International Peace Institute
H.E. Ricklef Beutin, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations

Scene-setting
Elizabeth Spehar, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding and Peace Support, Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations
Daniel Forti, Head of UN Affairs, International Crisis Group

Moderator
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, International Peace Institute

 

The post One Year on from the Berlin Peacekeeping Ministerial: Looking to the Future of Peacekeeping appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Clara Schäper, wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin in der Abteilung Staat sowie der Forschungsgruppe Gender Economics des DIW Berlin und Doktorandin an der Universität Potsdam, hat am 12. Mai 2026 ihre Dissertation mit dem Titel “The Personal is Political: Five Essays in Labor and Family Economics” ...

We are proud to share that our PhD student Gökhan Ider (Freie Universität Berlin) and Hedda Thorell from Stockholm University were awarded the Lamfalussy Research Fellowship 2026 by the European Central Bank. They are among five fellows and will work on their paper "News-driven fluctuations and ...

Turkey–Iran relations are generally characterized as managed rivalry. After the October 2023 Hamas attack and Israel’s war on Gaza, the region had entered a new era of escalating conflicts and Iran’s network of proxies has been significantly weakened. In February 2026, the US and Israel waged war on Iran, which in turn prompted Iran’s attack on the Gulf countries. The new era of conflict had evolved into an era of war. This paper explores the pressures for change emanating from the global and regional levels on this managed rivalry. With that purpose, the paper first maps out the different dimensions of the bilateral relations, noting the resilient and challenging aspects. Then, the paper looks at developments over the last two years at the global and regional level and how they impacted both bilateral relations and the two countries’ positioning within their regions—the Middle East mostly, but also South Caucasus. Finally, the paper assesses the potentials and limits of managed rivalry and Turkey’s statecraft by identifying stress tests that lie ahead under war and post-conflict conditions. Turkey’s economic statecraft toward Iran, as well as increased geopolitical rivalry, reveal the conditions under which middle-power geoeconomic and diplomatic tools hit a ceiling, demonstrating that middle-power economic statecraft operates within, not outside, the structures set by global politics and regional security dynamics.

Read here in pdf the Working paper by Dr Derya Göçer, Associate Professor, Middle East Technical University, Area Studies Programme.

Introduction

The Gaza war 2023 and the fall of the Assad regime in 2024 opened a new era of increased conflict in Middle Eastern regional politics. Israel’s attacks on Iran’s proxies—Hamas and Hezbollah—as well as Iran itself; Houthi attack on maritime trade in the Red Sea; Druze and Kurds fighting Damascus forces in Syria on different occasions, as well as violence against Alawites in the coastal regions; UAE-backed separatist forces rapidly seizing most of southern Yemen, provoking Saudi airstrikes and forcing the UAE to withdraw its military personnel in 2025 are a few episodes from this era of conflict. This momentum, centred around increased Israeli aggression in the region and friction with Iran’s proxies, culminated first in the June 2025 attacks on Iran, which were joined by the US. In February 2026, the US president, together with Israel, declared ‘special combat operations’ on Iran to eliminate any nuclear threat, destroy the country’s ballistic missile programme and bring about regime-change in Iran.

This new era in the region coincides with the weakening of the norms-based international order and the growing resort to armed force at the global level. There is an ongoing debate over whether there is a transition to a new order at both the regional and international levels, or whether they constitute a rupture whose aftermath cannot yet be foreseen. In either case, the depth and scale of the changes are undeniable, and with change on this scale comes stress tests for seemingly resilient relationships in the region. Turkey–Iran relations are generally regarded as just a such resilient relationship—one fraught with tensions which do not escalate into confrontation, and with some degree of cooperation in important domains, such as energy.

Türkiye-Iran relations are generally framed as a managed rivalry: both are pragmatic and cautious, eager to contain each other’s regional activism, yet insistent on avoiding confrontation with each other. Historical episodes are transformed into myths in support of both these rivalry (Ottoman-Safavid wars, WWI attacks) and management (long-standing border agreements) elements. This paper explores whether this relationship can withstand the pressures of change and war emanating from the global and regional levels. Answering this question requires an examination of the existing dimensions of the bilateral relationship, along with both states’ positioning within the new regional and global politics; only then can we identify the actual and potential stress tests those dimensions will need to withstand.

The core argument of this paper is as follows: Turkey–Iran bilateral relations are, in essence, a managed rivalry with increasingly intensifying limitations. In recent years, Turkey has increased the potency of its diplomatic and economic statecraft across the region, achieving a deepening of its relationship with Iraq and normalization with key Arab states. Iran, by contrast, has weakened in terms of both regional influence and domestic stability; as of March 2026, it is also weakened in terms of both military capabilities and civilian infrastructure (logistics, industrial, health and energy sectors). However, Iran is not necessarily defeated and has demonstrated significant strategic leverage over both the Gulf region and the world economy and global connectivity. It is not yet certain when—or how—the 2026 war will end, but if Iran comes out of the war with sanctions lifted and the Strait of Hormuz under its partial control, there might be path ahead for reconstruction. Bilateral relations in the 2020s exhibit a structural ceiling which has constrained Turkey’s statecraft—a ceiling whose principal sources are the international sanctions regime and the stances of the United States and Israel towards Iran. Although both Ankara and Tehran demonstrate a commitment to preserving the bilateral relationship, the “maximum pressures” cascading from the global level, coupled with the fluidity of the regional environment, are testing that commitment in unprecedented ways.

Dimensions of Turkey–Iran Bilateral Relations in the 21st Century

The Border

The Turkey–Iran border is one of the oldest settled boundaries in the Middle East. It is also the first dimension of what scholars have called a managed rivalry. The origins of this stability are conventionally traced to the Kasr-i Shirin Agreement of 1639 between the Ottomans and Safavid Iran. Four centuries of interaction across this frontier, which at times endured conflict, occupation and turmoil in the life of frontier communities, culminated in the finalization of the boundary during the First World War, with the final treaty settling all remaining disputes signed in 1937. As Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs puts it: “Iran is an important neighbour with whom we share a 560 km border that has remained unchanged for nearly 400 years.” This is Turkey’s second longest land border, after the Syrian border. In a region marked by civil wars, external interventions and territorial disintegration, the durability of this border has been a focal point of current bilateral affairs. Despite high volumes of irregular migrant crossings facilitated by smuggling networks, neither side has allowed border disputes to destabilize the relationship. The narrative of an unchanging boundary, though a myth, has itself become a political resource, repeatedly invoked by both states to affirm the mutual recognition on which their modern statehood rests.

Yet the length of this border, with its many potential crossing points, is also a shared vulnerability. Turkey in particular fears mass migration in a prolonged war scenario on its eastern flank. The start of the war prompted the suspension of day trips to Turkey. Even in the absence of armed conflict, irregular migration through this border, especially by Afghan nationals, is deeply intertwined with Turkey’s domestic politics. The issue has become especially salient in the context of rising secular nationalist politics, where an anti-migration agenda has gained significant traction. It is also a topic addressed in bilateral discussions during official visits. As Foreign Minister Fidan acknowledged, the two countries “have fallen somewhat behind on connectivity, transport and logistics,” noting the need to increase the number of border crossings and improve their efficiency, while also addressing joint efforts to combat irregular migration originating from Afghanistan. So, while the border is a point of strength in peaceful times, it may turn out to be a crucial vulnerability during times of war and in a post-conflict economic crisis. It is also a dimension amenable to further improvement via greater control over the border and by increasing border crossings to facilitate the flow of goods and people in times of peace. The depth of the border as a problem will be partially determined by the length of the 2026 war and the destruction it causes. As of April 2026, number of border crossings have not risen to alarming levels.

Pragmatism

The restraint that Turkey and Iran have shown towards one another, particularly at moments of domestic, regional and global crisis, constitutes the second dimension of the bilateral relationship. Scholars have framed this restraint in different ways: as “compartmentalization”, as “managed rivalry”, or as a product of contending but coexisting “strategic depths” (Şen 2024). What all these framings share is an emphasis on pragmatism. Turkey and Iran’s foreign policy establishments have consistently demonstrated the ability to prevent tensions in one domain, such as opposing positions in the Syrian civil war, from spilling over into another, such as energy relations. The success of the management part of this relationship can be best observed in economic relations. Table 1 shows the bilateral trade over the last four years, with Turkish exports remaining at around the same value while Iranian exports, have been reduced somewhat. That reduction has improved the asymmetry in trade relations, with the trade balance favouring Turkey since 2023.

Table 1: Turkey–Iran Bilateral Trade, 2022–2025 (USD billions)

2022 2023 2024 2025* Turkey’s exports to Iran 3.07 3.31 3.23 2.80 Turkey’s imports from Iran 3.35 2.18 2.45 2.30 Total trade volume 6.42 5.49 5.68 5.10 Trade balance –0.28 +1.13 +0.78 +0.50

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). *2025 figures cover January–November.

Despite a lack of progress in trade volumes, the Turkish business community insisted on keeping its options open regarding investment and trade with Iran. This trend continued even under structural constraints that will be detailed in the next section. Both Turkey’s Ministry of Trade and the Presidential Office supported this push, arguing that two major regional powers should cooperate more closely with regard to investment, trade, construction and tourism—these being the four factors that are always underlined in official speeches during visits and at forums. Erdoğan himself declared in 2024, at the Joint Business Forum convened in Ankara, that, despite the sanctions, both governments intended to proceed with deepening economic relations, since Ankara did not adhere to the principle of unilateral sanctions. This bore some results, including an increase in product diversity (from 700 to 1,383 items), but was not consequential overall. Iran supplies energy, Turkey supplies manufactured goods; there has been little structural deepening, and the main asymmetry remains, whereby exports to Turkey are important for Iran, but Iran ranks low among Turkey’s export destinations.

There is one bilateral factor that impacts economic relations as negatively at both global and regional levels, if not as structurally, and that is the prominence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in the Iranian economy, and how that can sometimes impede economic relations. In the mid-2000s, two major Turkish investment bids in Iran—TAV’s contract to operate Imam Khomeini International Airport (IKA) and Turkcell’s licence to become Iran’s first private mobile operator—were derailed by conservative forces within the Iranian system. Most dramatically, in May 2004, the IRGC physically seized IKA just hours after it opened to air traffic, deploying vehicles on the runways and diverting an incoming passenger jet with a fighter escort on the pretext that TAV’s Turkish partners had links to Israel. Akdevelioğlu argues that the primary driver was not anti-Turkish sentiment but rather the intra-regime struggle between Reformists favouring economic liberalisation and Conservatives—with the IRGC at their core—defending Iran’s state-capitalist model and their own commercial interests, given that an IRGC-affiliated consortium had lost the airport bid to TAV. This episode is an example of national level factors preventing the deepening of economic relations.

Three forthcoming developments will serve as stress tests for the durability of bilateral economic ties and the political will underpinning them. The first is the renewal of the Iran–Turkey gas deal, which is due in 2026. In 2024, Iranian and Russian gas constituted 20 % and 45 % respectively of Turkey’s long-term contract imports. Turkey has already started its pivot to LNG purchases from US companies, with reduced Russian imports. Whether Turkey opts to renew, renegotiate, or allow the Iranian contract to lapse will reveal much about the limits of Ankara’s realignment with Washington, both globally and in the Middle East and South Caucasus. Energy agreements, alongside trade frameworks, remain among the most deliberately managed components of the bilateral rivalry.

The second test concerns the future of proclaimed agreements, most notably the Maku Free Trade Zone on Iran’s northwestern border. First discussed in 2014 at the Turkey–Iran Economic Commission following the signing of the Preferential Trade Agreement, the Maku MoU was only finalized a decade later, in January 2024, during Raisi’s visit to Ankara—one of ten agreements signed on that occasion. In principle, a functioning cross-border free zone would boost bilateral connectivity and position both countries along the China–Europe transit corridor. In practice, progress has been so incremental as to resemble a declaration of intent rather than an actionable programme: Iranian officials themselves have acknowledged the slow pace, urging their own stakeholders to accelerate implementation. The project exemplifies a broader pattern: genuine economic complementarity that cannot be realised under the weight of prevailing global and regional constraints. These constraints have now been intensified immensely by the war, and will remain so during any immediate ceasefire period.

Connectivity corridor competition represents the third stress test for the geoeconomics of the Turkey–Iran rivalry. Whether it will be a zero-sum game will depend on how well the rivalry is managed, and whether there is stability in the Middle East and South Caucasus. Turkey is pursuing multiple routes to position itself as a transit hub: the Development Road Project linking Basra to Europe via Turkey, the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, which is attracting growing but still modest EU investment, and the US-backed TRIPP route through Armenia. Iran, for its part, is anchoring its connectivity ambitions in the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—a 7,200-kilometre route that is approximately 75 % complete and saw freight volumes rise 19 % in 2024. However, the constant postponement of the completion of the Rasht–Astara railway segment has led China to route shipments via the Trans-Caspian instead. Tehran is also pursuing the Shalamcheh–Basra railway link to Iraq. In addition, in the wake of the June 2025 war, an Iranian company has proposed a full share acquisition of the Russian Astrakhan port to secure its northern corridor access. Notably, both countries find themselves excluded from the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was stalled by the Gaza war and the June 2025 Israel–Iran conflict, but has shown signs of revival following the Trump–Modi announcement in February 2025 and the EU–India FTA agreed in January 2026. Iran’s Chamber of Commerce has publicly acknowledged that the country has been “practically ignored” in major connectivity initiatives in recognition of the fact that sanctions and geopolitical isolation are eroding Iran’s transit relevance with regards to new infrastructural investment. Turkey’s corridor portfolio is broader and has attracted more international backing, but its constituent corridors each face significant implementation risks, ranging from Iraqi political fragmentation to unresolved regional conflicts. Crucially, the two countries’ networks are not inherently incompatible: both share an interest in border infrastructure that could complement rather than undercut their respective corridor strategies, provided the political will exists to coordinate rather than compete.

The war on Iran, and Iran using the Strait of Hormoz as leverage in its retaliation against US and Israel attacks, has only increased the importance of the issue of corridors for Turkey, Iran and the regional and global economy. Turkey’s proposed corridors—the Development Road and Middle Corridor—have gained traction. Yet, if the war spills over to Iraq, and even to the Caspian Sea, no regional corridor is totally safe for trade transit. Additionally, the Development Road was going to be financed by Qatar and the UAE, two GCC countries which will need to rebuild their own infrastructure and revitalize their economies, both of which have been severely damaged in the war. So, while in principle all of Turkey’s alternative corridors have gained in prominence, their financing will need to be rethought. Multilateral Development Banks such as AIIB and EBRD constitute a large financial pool of institutions capable of doing so, but hostilities would need to end for them to invest.

Maximum Pressure and an Increasingly Fluid Region

The third dimension of Turkey–Iran relations is the consistent influence of global-level developments on bilateral economic and political relations and on managed rivalry dynamics in the region. Such developments, including the recent Iran war, increase and intensify the rivalry. Some argue that nature of the change at other levels has augmented this influence: what was once a largely compartmentalized rivalry, in which competition in one arena did not necessarily spill over into another, has transformed into a multilayered and interconnected contest spanning the Middle East and the South Caucasus (Azizi 2025). In the 2020s, global- and regional-level developments interacted in such a way as to intensify the rivalry.

Globally

At the global level, as we witnessed with Iran’s recent firing of missiles at Turkey, Turkey’s anchors in NATO and its bilateral relations with the US are the primary frame within which Turkey and Iran managed their relationship. These anchors translate to Turkey complying with the sanctions regime enforced by EU, and most notably US, actors in peace time. Turkey does so with some frictions. The maximum pressure campaigns of the first and second term Trump administrations, and increased military pressure in 2025 and early 2026, highlight this issue further. NATO air defence systems dealt with the missiles that Turkey declared to have come from Iran’s territory but Iran denied firing, arguing that this was provocation by third parties. Turkey and Iran managed this military tension in a manner consistent with the managed rivalry approach, but it was a test that will weigh on the future of their relationship.

Russia’s preoccupation with its war against Ukraine and withdrawal from Syria is another global-level development that has affected Turkey–Iran relations. Iran’s Shahed drones were used by Russia in the Ukraine conflict, while Turkey supplied military assistance to Ukraine, creating a proxy military tension. Ukraine’s new military deals with GCC countries to counter Iran’s attacks highlight the regionalization of this global tension.

Turkey’s compliance with the Western sanctions has had a direct and measurable impact on bilateral Iran-Turkey economic relations. Şen provides a detailed account of how successive rounds of sanctions have constrained mutual investment and trade, narrowing the scope of bilateral commerce to a handful of exempted sectors such as food, agricultural products, and medical supplies. The 2018 US withdrawal from the JCPOA triggered a sharp contraction in Turkey–Iran trade, which fell by nearly half within a single year. The Halkbank prosecution further disciplined Turkish actors, with business associations explicitly committing to operating within the boundaries of international sanctions.

Turkey’s sanctions compliance is not a single isolated issue; rather, it is part of the two actors’ global positioning, whereby Turkey is still comfortable following US visions for the regions while simultaneously seeking to increase its strategic autonomy and revise the international order through narratives such as “the world is bigger than five”. The main point of contention between Turkey and the US was the latter’s support in Syria for the SDF, which Turkey viewed as a threat to its national security. This tension has mostly resolved in this new era, especially since the fall of Asad and in parallel with domestic processes including the domestic reset vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue. Turkey is also adamant about finding itself a place in the Gulf-based regional order.

After some very turbulent years in its engagement with the Middle East regions, Turkey has entered a phase of normalization with Arab states in the region, most notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. This normalization period underlines the coming together of geopolitics and geoeconomics in Turkey’s statecraft vis-à-vis the region and the opportunities it creates. In the 2020s, Turkey has also substantially increased its political, security and economic footprint in Iraq through bilateral agreements and regular joint permanent committee meetings. In addition, 2025 saw the signing of a water deal—a crucial component in regional politics in an age of water scarcity. In 2024, the Development Road Project also made headway, with Qatar and UAE also co-signing the project together with Turkey and Iraq. Turkey also seems to be quelling most of its security concerns in Syria. The 29 January 2026 deal between Damascus and the SDF seems to be a step in the right direction for Turkey in terms of post-conflict settlements in Syria. Through these bilateral—and, in the case of the Development Road Project, quadrilateral—agreements, Turkey has developed a distinctive model of middle-power economic statecraft (whose features include the capacity to align state institutions, capital groups, and infrastructure investment toward strategic ends) which is most fully demonstrated in Turkey–Iraq relations. This statecraft facilitated Turkey’s deepening of relations with Saudi Arabia in particular, and also multilateral ventures such as the recent discussions on Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Turkey defence cooperation.

In contrast to Turkey’s realignment with the US and normalization with the Arab states, Iran objects to the US presence in the region and has been a revisionist actor in terms of the international order. At the regional level, Iran had embarked on a diplomatic and economic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the larger Gulf region. If the Gaza war had not brought this rapprochement to a halt, there could perhaps have been a deepening of relations, but any relational depth is now prevented by the larger existential threats confronting Iran. It can thus be seen that Turkey and Iran both attempted normalizations, but with diverging outcomes.

The 28 February US and Israeli attack on Iran and Iran’s retaliatory attacks on GCC countries, of which the heaviest hit was the UAE, changed the normalization dynamics between Iran and the Gulf countries, most notably the UAE and to some extent Saudi Arabia. Qatar and Oman are attempting a more neutral approach in the conflict. Turkey’s normalization path brought it ever closer to Saudi Arabia, as explained above, and the recent Iran war has intensified Iran and Turkey’s divergence vis-à-vis the Gulf countries. Turkey has participated in joint declarations and meetings in Saudi Arabia, with Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan being vocal and active in regional de-escalation efforts. Here de-escalation is a large and ambiguous agenda item, as the post-conflict positions of various Gulf countries and Turkey vis-à-vis Iran will diverge.

Overall, the two countries’ global and regional positioning are divergent and there are structural constraints imposed by the global level. Together, these two trends have served to intensify the managed rivalry, making its management more of a challenge.

Regional intensification of rivalry

The 2003 Iraq war and 2011 Arab Uprisings had the effect of extending Iran’s network in the region, especially in Iraq and Syria. This expansion increased the threat perception of Iran among policy makers in Turkey, and even more so in GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia. It also increased bilateral rivalry, as the two states positioned themselves on opposing sides in the Syrian civil war. The 2020s brought new regional challenges that intensified this rivalry. In that regard, what Şen argues with regard to the 2010s is equally valid for the 2020s: ‘‘The Turkish–Iranian rivalry intensified as states in their vicinity—Syria and Iraq—got weaker and more penetrable with institutional, political, and territorial fragmentation.’’ In that regard, both the fall of Assad in 2024 in Syria, which bolstered Turkey’s influence in Syrian affairs, and the current governmental transition in Iraq, which is to be finalized in 2026, are current developments that will test the delicate management of this rivalry. When Iran had to withdraw from Syria, it rendered its influence over Iraq even more crucial for its survival. Turkey’s own dual-track relations with the KRG and Baghdad, along with Ankara’s realignment with the US over Syria and Iraq, has been simultaneous with Iran weakening in Syria and attempting to retain its influence in Iraq. As a result, issues such as the future of the PMF in Iraq or the new Iraqi president cease to simply be Iraqi domestic issues and become issues of rivalry between Turkey and Iraq. This is especially true given increased US pressure to eliminate Maliki’s presidential candidacy and Iranian elements from Iraq. That Turkey has sought to support the attempts to disarm PMF and establish communications with them are evidence both of that rivalry and of Turkey’s managing of it.

However, Israel’s increased military aggression in the region, including the unprecedented attack on Qatar, a US ally, in 2025 as well as the 2026 attack on Iran, is another regional-level development that has reshaped bilateral and regional affairs, leaving Iran weakened military, but perhaps emboldened strategically. While it has an immediate defence need against Iran, Israel’s posturing in the region creates a need for balancing. Israel has emerged as a shared but asymmetric threat for Iran the most but also Turkey and even less so some Gulf countries such as Oman and Qatar. In that regard, Turkey has attempted to play a role it persistently pursues: that of a mediator between US and Iran in collaboration with Arab counterparts, especially Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Turkey explicitly opposed the US military action against Iran. In January 2026, when the widespread protests in Iran were being suppressed in a bloody military crackdown, Fidan stated: “We are against a military intervention against Iran. Iran needs to solve its authentic internal problems on its own”. Erdoğan was also vocal, calling Iranians their brothers: ‘‘By prioritizing dialogue and diplomacy, we believe our Iranian brothers will overcome this trap-filled period.” Tensions with Israel also surfaced in statements over Turkey’s positioning towards Iran: AKP spokesperson Çelik explicitly named Israel as instrumentalizing protests. Following several bilateral meetings and consultations with the US, Turkey proposed Istanbul as the venue for US-Iran talks; however, the talks shifted to Oman at Iran’s insistence. This insistence underlines the presence of rivalry and mistrust in bilateral relations, and both states’ intolerance towards increased activism on the part of the other. In April 2026, the ceasefire negotiations were mediated by Pakistan; although they were supported by Turkey, it is another instance of the limits of the managed rivalry approach.

The bilateral meetings between Iran and Turkey through January 2026 were presented by Turkey as an attempt to prevent regional destabilization. War on Turkey’s eastern border may trigger refugee flows; the collapse of the Iranian state would create a vacuum with consequences far worse than managed rivalry. By attempting to mediate, Turkey has increased its geopolitical capital as a mediator and is potentially protecting its economic interests (gas contract, trade, exposure to secondary sanctions) in the near future, should the tensions ease. The January 2026 negotiations and March 2026 de-escalation diplomacy were the diplomatic track of Turkey’s revised statecraft towards the Middle East and were in alignment with the managed rivalry approach. Turkey did gain from the normalization with the region achieved by its economic and diplomatic statecraft over the last five years. However, a prolonged and broad US attack on Iran jeopardizes bilateral relations and border security, and affects those achievements in the region negatively. Turkey’s approach to the region hinges on a relative absence of conflict and on the security of larger borders, infrastructure, trade routes and investment platforms. A region that is continuously being intervened in militarily by great powers and having to allocate funds to reconstruction is not conducive to such statecraft. The war rendered the delicate balance that Turkey needs to perform between the US, the Gulf countries and Iran even more difficult, but not impossible.

Conclusion: Turkey’s Statecraft

Turkey–Iran relations, despite several achievements in the 21st century, have exposed the limits of Turkey’s revised statecraft towards, and engagements with, the Middle East. The geoeconomic tools that Turkey deploys effectively in Iraq, but also with Qatar and Saudia Arabia (trade-led investment penetration, construction sector expansion, corridor development, defence sector deals, institutional committee structures) are structurally constrained in the Iranian case. The constraints do not originate primarily at the bilateral level, where more potential for economic complementarity exists and the Turkish side has shown itself willing; rather, the constraints mostly originate from the global and regional levels. At the global level, the limitations stem from a multilayered sanctions architecture including US and EU sanctions, as well as from the military conflict itself. As of January 2026, the already slow trade trend was slowing down due to Trump administration policies. “Trade with Iran has become extremely difficult due to intensifying US pressure and the ongoing protests,” a member of the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TİM) stated during the January protests in 2026.

At the regional level the factors range from corridor competition in the South Caucasus, which is now facing the potential threat of Iranian attacks; proxy conflicts in the Middle East; Israel’s disruptive role in the region; Iraq’s domestic political and military tensions in the wake of national elections in 2025; and Syria’s contested reconstruction. These limitations constrain the ‘management’ of Turkish–Iranian rivalry and stress the rivalry aspect between two actors in the Middle East and South Caucasus.

Turkey’s economic statecraft over the last couple of years vis-à-vis the Middle East underline the benefits of merging economic statecraft with military posturing. However, Turkey’s economic statecraft toward Iran also increased the nations’ geopolitical rivalry, revealing the conditions under which middle-power geoeconomic tools hit a ceiling. Turkey–Iran relations demonstrate that middle-power economic statecraft operates within not outside the structures set by global politics and regional security dynamics. The 2026 war only highlighted this ceiling further. US pressure on Iraq to reduce its dependence on Iran may open space for Turkey, while US pressure on Iran itself threatens Turkey’s interests. The same power, the US, has opposing effect on Turkey’s relations with its neighbours. This structural ceiling on Turkey’s statecraft stemming from the US and Israel’s position on the Middle East also underline Turkey’s reliance on regional stability, which it needs if it is to perform as a trading, connecting, constructing middle power at bilateral and regional levels. Returning to the broader discussion on the changing international order, in which middle powers are expected to play an enlarged role, Turkey–Iran relations illustrate the limits of middle-power statecraft in fostering interdependence and stability. Both the military action launched against Iran by Israel’s Netanyahu government and the Trump administration, and the mobilisation of Turkey and Gulf states to avert and then end it, expose new potentials and constraints in middle-power activism—Turkey’s, but also that of other aspiring regional middle powers, such as Saudi Arabia.

 

 

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres launched the UN80 Initiative in March 2025. Faced with the US government’s increasingly hostile approach to the UN, UN80 was presented as a reform geared towards making the UN system “fit for purpose”. However, this policy brief argues that both the UN bureaucracy and member states have missed key opportunities to turn UN80 into a tool for reconfiguring UN multilateralism and providing space for multilateral cooperation that – despite rising geopolitical tensions – effectively addresses transnational challenges. The UN Secretariat, on the one hand, has pushed for a rushed reform agenda through an avalanche of bureaucratic reshuffling and technocratic ideas that are driven primarily by the logic of efficiency gains. Despite investing considerable efforts, it has failed to develop a coherent organisational and governance vision for the future of the UN that would help the organisation adapt to shifts in global power and policy preferences. Although welcoming reform efforts in principle, member states – on the other hand – have neither provided proactive guidance on desired reform outcomes, nor offered strategic input on the reform proposals put forward by the UN bureaucracy. They have failed to take up their role as political reform governors of a UN system in need of adapting to new geopolitical realities. Although the trajectory of UN80 to date has been far from ideal, the Initiative could still serve as a first step towards more fundamental reform efforts that address member states’ diverging preferences and attempt to tackle multilateral governance deficits. Inorder to highlight what is at stake, the policy brief outlines three scenarios of how post-UN80 dynamics might unfold, helping stakeholders identify what kind of UN system they would like to see and which steps might be necessary to get there.

Scenario 1. Faltering momentum: the phase-out of UN80 contributes to UN fragmentation and decline. Member states and the UN bureaucracy continue working through the UN80 Initiative’s to-do list until everything is either proclaimed done, watered down or silently abandoned. This leaves major challenges unaddressed, contributing to increasing levels of fragmentation and dysfunction across the UN system.

Scenario 2. Bold moves: strategic UN reform ambitions supersede technocratic logics. Member states leave decisions about efficiency gains to UN chief executives while prioritising and spearheading more ambitious reforms. They task the new Secretary-General with designing a high-level debate on the purpose(s) and the future governance of the UN system that reaffirms the UN as the multilateral centre of world politics.

Scenario 3. Muddling through: a combination of technocratic and governance reforms keeps the UN afloat. Cost-cutting reforms continue while a coalition of reform-oriented small and medium-sized member states pushes for a selective reform of multilateral governance. The result is a somewhat smaller UN system that, while not fundamentally transformed, is better equipped to navigate geopolitical tensions.

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres launched the UN80 Initiative in March 2025. Faced with the US government’s increasingly hostile approach to the UN, UN80 was presented as a reform geared towards making the UN system “fit for purpose”. However, this policy brief argues that both the UN bureaucracy and member states have missed key opportunities to turn UN80 into a tool for reconfiguring UN multilateralism and providing space for multilateral cooperation that – despite rising geopolitical tensions – effectively addresses transnational challenges. The UN Secretariat, on the one hand, has pushed for a rushed reform agenda through an avalanche of bureaucratic reshuffling and technocratic ideas that are driven primarily by the logic of efficiency gains. Despite investing considerable efforts, it has failed to develop a coherent organisational and governance vision for the future of the UN that would help the organisation adapt to shifts in global power and policy preferences. Although welcoming reform efforts in principle, member states – on the other hand – have neither provided proactive guidance on desired reform outcomes, nor offered strategic input on the reform proposals put forward by the UN bureaucracy. They have failed to take up their role as political reform governors of a UN system in need of adapting to new geopolitical realities. Although the trajectory of UN80 to date has been far from ideal, the Initiative could still serve as a first step towards more fundamental reform efforts that address member states’ diverging preferences and attempt to tackle multilateral governance deficits. Inorder to highlight what is at stake, the policy brief outlines three scenarios of how post-UN80 dynamics might unfold, helping stakeholders identify what kind of UN system they would like to see and which steps might be necessary to get there.

Scenario 1. Faltering momentum: the phase-out of UN80 contributes to UN fragmentation and decline. Member states and the UN bureaucracy continue working through the UN80 Initiative’s to-do list until everything is either proclaimed done, watered down or silently abandoned. This leaves major challenges unaddressed, contributing to increasing levels of fragmentation and dysfunction across the UN system.

Scenario 2. Bold moves: strategic UN reform ambitions supersede technocratic logics. Member states leave decisions about efficiency gains to UN chief executives while prioritising and spearheading more ambitious reforms. They task the new Secretary-General with designing a high-level debate on the purpose(s) and the future governance of the UN system that reaffirms the UN as the multilateral centre of world politics.

Scenario 3. Muddling through: a combination of technocratic and governance reforms keeps the UN afloat. Cost-cutting reforms continue while a coalition of reform-oriented small and medium-sized member states pushes for a selective reform of multilateral governance. The result is a somewhat smaller UN system that, while not fundamentally transformed, is better equipped to navigate geopolitical tensions.

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres launched the UN80 Initiative in March 2025. Faced with the US government’s increasingly hostile approach to the UN, UN80 was presented as a reform geared towards making the UN system “fit for purpose”. However, this policy brief argues that both the UN bureaucracy and member states have missed key opportunities to turn UN80 into a tool for reconfiguring UN multilateralism and providing space for multilateral cooperation that – despite rising geopolitical tensions – effectively addresses transnational challenges. The UN Secretariat, on the one hand, has pushed for a rushed reform agenda through an avalanche of bureaucratic reshuffling and technocratic ideas that are driven primarily by the logic of efficiency gains. Despite investing considerable efforts, it has failed to develop a coherent organisational and governance vision for the future of the UN that would help the organisation adapt to shifts in global power and policy preferences. Although welcoming reform efforts in principle, member states – on the other hand – have neither provided proactive guidance on desired reform outcomes, nor offered strategic input on the reform proposals put forward by the UN bureaucracy. They have failed to take up their role as political reform governors of a UN system in need of adapting to new geopolitical realities. Although the trajectory of UN80 to date has been far from ideal, the Initiative could still serve as a first step towards more fundamental reform efforts that address member states’ diverging preferences and attempt to tackle multilateral governance deficits. Inorder to highlight what is at stake, the policy brief outlines three scenarios of how post-UN80 dynamics might unfold, helping stakeholders identify what kind of UN system they would like to see and which steps might be necessary to get there.

Scenario 1. Faltering momentum: the phase-out of UN80 contributes to UN fragmentation and decline. Member states and the UN bureaucracy continue working through the UN80 Initiative’s to-do list until everything is either proclaimed done, watered down or silently abandoned. This leaves major challenges unaddressed, contributing to increasing levels of fragmentation and dysfunction across the UN system.

Scenario 2. Bold moves: strategic UN reform ambitions supersede technocratic logics. Member states leave decisions about efficiency gains to UN chief executives while prioritising and spearheading more ambitious reforms. They task the new Secretary-General with designing a high-level debate on the purpose(s) and the future governance of the UN system that reaffirms the UN as the multilateral centre of world politics.

Scenario 3. Muddling through: a combination of technocratic and governance reforms keeps the UN afloat. Cost-cutting reforms continue while a coalition of reform-oriented small and medium-sized member states pushes for a selective reform of multilateral governance. The result is a somewhat smaller UN system that, while not fundamentally transformed, is better equipped to navigate geopolitical tensions.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, the “post–Cold War” international order as we know it is coming to an end. Amid increasing volatility and conflict, the shape and character of the order that will replace it are dangerously unclear. There are ambitions by so-called middle powers – including some member states of the EU – to provide an effective response, but questions remain as to their potential impact. Three scenarios can be envisaged: (1) an Orwellian dystopia dominated by three global powers – the United States, China and Russia – each with its own sphere of influence; (2) a “new Cold War” between two rival capitalist models: “Western” liberal democracy versus “Eastern” oligarchy and (3) the survival of the rules-based international order, possibly as a counterweight to oligarchic spheres of influence. For this scenario to materialise, middle powers must address the liberal order’s inherent weaknesses so that it delivers for all of its members. This discussion paper brings together 14 contributions drawing on the German Institute of Development and Sustainability’s (IDOS) broad regional and thematic expertise to examine these questions. The contributions analyse key actors, cooperation themes and regions. Each contribution analyses the implications of the changing global order for its specific area of focus and explores how international cooperation in general – and development cooperation in particular – can contribute to a more just and sustainable international system. The paper aims to provide readers with a range of perspectives on the state of international development cooperation and its possible evolution. Taken together, the contributions provide insights into the roles that international development cooperation may play in an emerging global order and identify priorities for reforms.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, the “post–Cold War” international order as we know it is coming to an end. Amid increasing volatility and conflict, the shape and character of the order that will replace it are dangerously unclear. There are ambitions by so-called middle powers – including some member states of the EU – to provide an effective response, but questions remain as to their potential impact. Three scenarios can be envisaged: (1) an Orwellian dystopia dominated by three global powers – the United States, China and Russia – each with its own sphere of influence; (2) a “new Cold War” between two rival capitalist models: “Western” liberal democracy versus “Eastern” oligarchy and (3) the survival of the rules-based international order, possibly as a counterweight to oligarchic spheres of influence. For this scenario to materialise, middle powers must address the liberal order’s inherent weaknesses so that it delivers for all of its members. This discussion paper brings together 14 contributions drawing on the German Institute of Development and Sustainability’s (IDOS) broad regional and thematic expertise to examine these questions. The contributions analyse key actors, cooperation themes and regions. Each contribution analyses the implications of the changing global order for its specific area of focus and explores how international cooperation in general – and development cooperation in particular – can contribute to a more just and sustainable international system. The paper aims to provide readers with a range of perspectives on the state of international development cooperation and its possible evolution. Taken together, the contributions provide insights into the roles that international development cooperation may play in an emerging global order and identify priorities for reforms.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, the “post–Cold War” international order as we know it is coming to an end. Amid increasing volatility and conflict, the shape and character of the order that will replace it are dangerously unclear. There are ambitions by so-called middle powers – including some member states of the EU – to provide an effective response, but questions remain as to their potential impact. Three scenarios can be envisaged: (1) an Orwellian dystopia dominated by three global powers – the United States, China and Russia – each with its own sphere of influence; (2) a “new Cold War” between two rival capitalist models: “Western” liberal democracy versus “Eastern” oligarchy and (3) the survival of the rules-based international order, possibly as a counterweight to oligarchic spheres of influence. For this scenario to materialise, middle powers must address the liberal order’s inherent weaknesses so that it delivers for all of its members. This discussion paper brings together 14 contributions drawing on the German Institute of Development and Sustainability’s (IDOS) broad regional and thematic expertise to examine these questions. The contributions analyse key actors, cooperation themes and regions. Each contribution analyses the implications of the changing global order for its specific area of focus and explores how international cooperation in general – and development cooperation in particular – can contribute to a more just and sustainable international system. The paper aims to provide readers with a range of perspectives on the state of international development cooperation and its possible evolution. Taken together, the contributions provide insights into the roles that international development cooperation may play in an emerging global order and identify priorities for reforms.

Krankheitsbedingte Fehltage von Beschäftigten in Deutschland sind 2022 stark gestiegen – Grund ist aber nicht primär die elektronische Krankschreibung – Atemwegserkrankungen und verändertes Verhalten nach der Pandemie sorgen für mehr Fehlzeiten am Arbeitsplatz – Teilkrankschreibung und mehr ...

The policy brief by Frauke Seebass (Research Fellow, Wider Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & Researcher, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration), “Europe at a Crossroads: Setting the Course for a Resilient Continent”, was prepared in the framework of ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

This policy brief explores how the European Union can reconcile internal reform with geopolitical enlargement in an increasingly unstable global environment. It argues that the EU must adopt a more strategic and integrated approach to enlargement, security, competitiveness, and democratic resilience in order to strengthen its strategic autonomy and global relevance.

The brief highlights the untapped potential of enlargement countries—particularly the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova—in areas such as defense, infrastructure, critical raw materials, and supply chains. At the same time, it stresses the importance of safeguarding democratic values, improving institutional effectiveness, and involving citizens more directly in shaping Europe’s future. Ultimately, it argues that closer cooperation with candidate countries and like-minded partners is essential for building a more resilient, united, and future-proof Europe.

You can read the policy brief here.

This policy brief was profoundly informed by Europe at a Crossroads, a two-day high-level dialogue to explore forward-looking strategies for Europe’s future held by ELIAMEP on 19 and 20 February 2026, with the kind support of Konrad Adenauer Foundation Greece & Cyprus and Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies.

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Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge of weak job creation and persistent informality. Drawing on survey evidence on business behaviour and labour market dynamics, this column explains why job creation is limited and informal work remains such an integral part of how firms organise production. The generation of more formal jobs requires a comprehensive policy approach, one that goes beyond enforcement of labour regulations to reshape the economic environment in which firms and workers make decisions.

In a nutshell

Informality in the labour market reflects incentives on both sides: firms benefit from lower costs and flexibility, while workers may prefer higher take-home pay or they may perceive limited benefits from formal employment.

Policies to create formal jobs that are focused solely on enforcement may backfire by raising hiring costs; effective reform requires reducing the cost of formality -including through simpler tax procedures and more proportionate labour costs - while increasing its benefits.

Addressing informality requires targeting informal employment within formal firms, aligning labour market and industrial policies, and adapting social protection and contribution systems to non-standard work arrangements.