Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Addressing the climate crisis necessitates accelerating transitions towards climate-neutral systems of production and consumption, with electrification emerging as a crucial decarbonisation strategy. The acceleration of such net-zero transitions across multiple systems faces significant resistance and contestation. In this paper, we propose an extended list of challenges unique to the acceleration phase of socio-technical transitions: we introduce 'expansion and contestation', 'justice', and 'international dynamics' as additional challenge types to complement the already acknowledged challenge types of 'whole systems change', 'interaction between multiple systems', 'decline and resistance', 'consumers and social practices', and 'governance'. We apply this extended analytical framework to the electrification of private-passenger vehicles and investigate the unfolding transition to e-mobility with evidence from 35 expert interviews in Germany and California. We uncover over 50 real-world challenges associated with these net-zero transitions at the beginning of the acceleration phase. Most challenges fall within the categories of 'expansion and contestation' and 'governance'. While Germany and California share many real-world challenges, we also find significant variation between both jurisdictions, which we attribute to differences in their automotive incumbency, transition governance approaches, and institutional contexts. We discuss implications for future research, arguing for greater attention to the dual politics of acceleration during net-zero transitions: political conflict not only centres around the decline of old industries and future losses, but also around the expansion of the new system and associated future gains.

Addressing the climate crisis necessitates accelerating transitions towards climate-neutral systems of production and consumption, with electrification emerging as a crucial decarbonisation strategy. The acceleration of such net-zero transitions across multiple systems faces significant resistance and contestation. In this paper, we propose an extended list of challenges unique to the acceleration phase of socio-technical transitions: we introduce 'expansion and contestation', 'justice', and 'international dynamics' as additional challenge types to complement the already acknowledged challenge types of 'whole systems change', 'interaction between multiple systems', 'decline and resistance', 'consumers and social practices', and 'governance'. We apply this extended analytical framework to the electrification of private-passenger vehicles and investigate the unfolding transition to e-mobility with evidence from 35 expert interviews in Germany and California. We uncover over 50 real-world challenges associated with these net-zero transitions at the beginning of the acceleration phase. Most challenges fall within the categories of 'expansion and contestation' and 'governance'. While Germany and California share many real-world challenges, we also find significant variation between both jurisdictions, which we attribute to differences in their automotive incumbency, transition governance approaches, and institutional contexts. We discuss implications for future research, arguing for greater attention to the dual politics of acceleration during net-zero transitions: political conflict not only centres around the decline of old industries and future losses, but also around the expansion of the new system and associated future gains.

Addressing the climate crisis necessitates accelerating transitions towards climate-neutral systems of production and consumption, with electrification emerging as a crucial decarbonisation strategy. The acceleration of such net-zero transitions across multiple systems faces significant resistance and contestation. In this paper, we propose an extended list of challenges unique to the acceleration phase of socio-technical transitions: we introduce 'expansion and contestation', 'justice', and 'international dynamics' as additional challenge types to complement the already acknowledged challenge types of 'whole systems change', 'interaction between multiple systems', 'decline and resistance', 'consumers and social practices', and 'governance'. We apply this extended analytical framework to the electrification of private-passenger vehicles and investigate the unfolding transition to e-mobility with evidence from 35 expert interviews in Germany and California. We uncover over 50 real-world challenges associated with these net-zero transitions at the beginning of the acceleration phase. Most challenges fall within the categories of 'expansion and contestation' and 'governance'. While Germany and California share many real-world challenges, we also find significant variation between both jurisdictions, which we attribute to differences in their automotive incumbency, transition governance approaches, and institutional contexts. We discuss implications for future research, arguing for greater attention to the dual politics of acceleration during net-zero transitions: political conflict not only centres around the decline of old industries and future losses, but also around the expansion of the new system and associated future gains.

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IPI in partnership with the Life & Peace Institute and the Permanent Missions of the Republic of Kenya, Norway, and Sweden to the UN, cohosted a policy forum on March 21st assessing lessons learned from Kenya’s Peacebuilding Architecture Review.

The pursuit of peace, a foundational goal at the establishment of the UN in 1945, requires member states to assume primary responsibility for conflict prevention through initiatives that are nationally owned and people-centered, respect human rights, and enhance inclusivity and social cohesion. Its implementation requires a constant refreshing of peacebuilding and conflict prevention and resolution methods. This year, determining a way forward on these issues will be key to the impact hoped for in the Pact for the Future.

In 2023, in line with the push for national governments to take the lead in “identifying, driving and directing priorities, strategies, and activities for peacebuilding and sustaining peace,” the Government of Kenya commissioned a review of its national peacebuilding architecture. The initiative was spearheaded by the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and assisted by an Independent Panel of Advisors (IPA), with support from the United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office and other partners. Resulting from the highly consultative process involving Kenyans from diverse backgrounds, the IPA submitted to Kenya’s political leadership a report with a comprehensive set of observations and recommendations, structured around four pillars: (1) defining a national agenda for peace, (2) promoting political inclusion, (3) enhancing conflict prevention and resolution, and (4) proposing a new institutional architecture for peacebuilding. By pursuing an independent assessment that values the insights and contributions of local peacebuilders and civil society, Kenya demonstrates national ownership and leadership.

The audience heard from the IPA reflecting on its experiences on the review journey and the key findings and recommendations, with a particular emphasis on partnership opportunities in the implementation phase.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Andreas Løvold, Chargé d’affaires and Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the UN
Elizabeth Mary Spehar, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
Shamsa Abubakar, Deputy Chair for the Independent Panel of Advisors for the Peacebuilding Review

Speakers:
Raymond Omollo, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Interior and National Administration, Government of Kenya
Lesley Connolly, Team Leader, Global Policy, Life & Peace Institute
Rana Taha, Peace and Development Advisor, United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office, Kenya
Sheikh Abdullahi Abdi, Independent Panel of Advisors for the Peacebuilding Review

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

Closing remarks:
H.E. Martin Kimani, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kenya to the UN
H.E. Anna Karin Eneström, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN

On 16 September 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – all three states led by military regimes – decided to establish a new regional organisation, the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des Etats du Sahel – AES). This move was prompted by the worsening of the crisis within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2023, a crisis that reached its peak to date with the announcement by the three AES members on 28 January 2024 of their withdrawal from ECOWAS, a regional organisation set up back in 1975. In a socio-political context in which the role and functions of the state, the extent of state powers and the way in which they are exercised are increasingly being called into question, new forms of political and social organisation are developing. These are also influenced by the current geopolitical developments in the changing world order. At the same time, states and societies and the ongoing regional integration processes are facing major new challenges. Within ECOWAS, conventional ideas of state and society, values and structures are coming up against growing tendencies towards a new understanding of statehood and sovereignty. In the West Africa/Sahel region, new processes of nation-building and state-building are under way, underpinned by efforts to renew social cohesion and to integrate the ‘vital forces of the nation’ – a concept cited increasingly frequently in these countries – as comprehensively as possible. These developments call for a realignment of German and European foreign and development policy. The political and social conditions and expectations of the partners in the West Africa/Sahel region are currently undergoing profound transformation. They need to be aligned with the content and interests of the value-based foreign policy advocated by Germany – in line with the principle of a ‘partnership between equals’. Any appraisal of the future developments and integration of the dynamics that determine them must take account of the various integration processes, which are particularly diversified and run in parallel in this region. Adopting a comparative perspective, this paper provides an overview of the various regional organisations in the West Africa/Sahel region. It analyses the potential of each of them in terms of their development prospects and sustainability. In addition to the critical relationship between ECOWAS and the AES, it also examines the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the Integrated Develop-ment Authority of the Liptako-Gourma Region (Autorité de Liptako-Gourma – ALG) and the G5 Sahel, which is currently being dissolved. If the partnership between Germany and Europe on the one hand and the West African and Sahel states on the other is to be continued, it will be vital to adopt a pragmatic approach and maintain a political dialogue with all the partners. The states in this region are extremely important to Europe’s future development. Moreover, it is only through communication based on mutual respect underpinning cooperation in the economic and development sectors that the growing influence of political powers such as Russia and Iran – whose ideas, interests and values are not in line with the Western Atlantic model of democracy governed by the rule of law – can be curbed effectively.

On 16 September 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – all three states led by military regimes – decided to establish a new regional organisation, the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des Etats du Sahel – AES). This move was prompted by the worsening of the crisis within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2023, a crisis that reached its peak to date with the announcement by the three AES members on 28 January 2024 of their withdrawal from ECOWAS, a regional organisation set up back in 1975. In a socio-political context in which the role and functions of the state, the extent of state powers and the way in which they are exercised are increasingly being called into question, new forms of political and social organisation are developing. These are also influenced by the current geopolitical developments in the changing world order. At the same time, states and societies and the ongoing regional integration processes are facing major new challenges. Within ECOWAS, conventional ideas of state and society, values and structures are coming up against growing tendencies towards a new understanding of statehood and sovereignty. In the West Africa/Sahel region, new processes of nation-building and state-building are under way, underpinned by efforts to renew social cohesion and to integrate the ‘vital forces of the nation’ – a concept cited increasingly frequently in these countries – as comprehensively as possible. These developments call for a realignment of German and European foreign and development policy. The political and social conditions and expectations of the partners in the West Africa/Sahel region are currently undergoing profound transformation. They need to be aligned with the content and interests of the value-based foreign policy advocated by Germany – in line with the principle of a ‘partnership between equals’. Any appraisal of the future developments and integration of the dynamics that determine them must take account of the various integration processes, which are particularly diversified and run in parallel in this region. Adopting a comparative perspective, this paper provides an overview of the various regional organisations in the West Africa/Sahel region. It analyses the potential of each of them in terms of their development prospects and sustainability. In addition to the critical relationship between ECOWAS and the AES, it also examines the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the Integrated Develop-ment Authority of the Liptako-Gourma Region (Autorité de Liptako-Gourma – ALG) and the G5 Sahel, which is currently being dissolved. If the partnership between Germany and Europe on the one hand and the West African and Sahel states on the other is to be continued, it will be vital to adopt a pragmatic approach and maintain a political dialogue with all the partners. The states in this region are extremely important to Europe’s future development. Moreover, it is only through communication based on mutual respect underpinning cooperation in the economic and development sectors that the growing influence of political powers such as Russia and Iran – whose ideas, interests and values are not in line with the Western Atlantic model of democracy governed by the rule of law – can be curbed effectively.

On 16 September 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – all three states led by military regimes – decided to establish a new regional organisation, the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des Etats du Sahel – AES). This move was prompted by the worsening of the crisis within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2023, a crisis that reached its peak to date with the announcement by the three AES members on 28 January 2024 of their withdrawal from ECOWAS, a regional organisation set up back in 1975. In a socio-political context in which the role and functions of the state, the extent of state powers and the way in which they are exercised are increasingly being called into question, new forms of political and social organisation are developing. These are also influenced by the current geopolitical developments in the changing world order. At the same time, states and societies and the ongoing regional integration processes are facing major new challenges. Within ECOWAS, conventional ideas of state and society, values and structures are coming up against growing tendencies towards a new understanding of statehood and sovereignty. In the West Africa/Sahel region, new processes of nation-building and state-building are under way, underpinned by efforts to renew social cohesion and to integrate the ‘vital forces of the nation’ – a concept cited increasingly frequently in these countries – as comprehensively as possible. These developments call for a realignment of German and European foreign and development policy. The political and social conditions and expectations of the partners in the West Africa/Sahel region are currently undergoing profound transformation. They need to be aligned with the content and interests of the value-based foreign policy advocated by Germany – in line with the principle of a ‘partnership between equals’. Any appraisal of the future developments and integration of the dynamics that determine them must take account of the various integration processes, which are particularly diversified and run in parallel in this region. Adopting a comparative perspective, this paper provides an overview of the various regional organisations in the West Africa/Sahel region. It analyses the potential of each of them in terms of their development prospects and sustainability. In addition to the critical relationship between ECOWAS and the AES, it also examines the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the Integrated Develop-ment Authority of the Liptako-Gourma Region (Autorité de Liptako-Gourma – ALG) and the G5 Sahel, which is currently being dissolved. If the partnership between Germany and Europe on the one hand and the West African and Sahel states on the other is to be continued, it will be vital to adopt a pragmatic approach and maintain a political dialogue with all the partners. The states in this region are extremely important to Europe’s future development. Moreover, it is only through communication based on mutual respect underpinning cooperation in the economic and development sectors that the growing influence of political powers such as Russia and Iran – whose ideas, interests and values are not in line with the Western Atlantic model of democracy governed by the rule of law – can be curbed effectively.

Ongoing consultations and exchanges between the EU and Latin-America and the Caribbean offer a unique opportunity to find entry points for effective collaboration and complementarity to achieve climate change objectives and accelerate a just and sustainable energy transition. This chapter analyses and compares the progress made in cooperation in the fields of climate action and energy transition since the last EU-CELAC summit held in 2015, and identifies the opportunities and challenges to make further progress in this area during the remaining seven years of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Ongoing consultations and exchanges between the EU and Latin-America and the Caribbean offer a unique opportunity to find entry points for effective collaboration and complementarity to achieve climate change objectives and accelerate a just and sustainable energy transition. This chapter analyses and compares the progress made in cooperation in the fields of climate action and energy transition since the last EU-CELAC summit held in 2015, and identifies the opportunities and challenges to make further progress in this area during the remaining seven years of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Ongoing consultations and exchanges between the EU and Latin-America and the Caribbean offer a unique opportunity to find entry points for effective collaboration and complementarity to achieve climate change objectives and accelerate a just and sustainable energy transition. This chapter analyses and compares the progress made in cooperation in the fields of climate action and energy transition since the last EU-CELAC summit held in 2015, and identifies the opportunities and challenges to make further progress in this area during the remaining seven years of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The UN’s development work is still driven by earmarked contributions, also referred to as “bilateral resources”, that are tied to specific projects or programs. One explanation for the persistence of earmarked funding might be the lack of a clear benchmark for judging funding modalities. An effective way to evaluate funding modalities is to assess the extent to which they promote best practices in UN development work. These would include the delivery of high-level policy advice based on global frameworks and local evidence; making use of the UN’s rich practical experiences from around the world; working towards systemic and long-term change; acting as a convener for stakeholders within and outside government; and operating in an integrated fashion, delivering as one. The Disability Fund of the UN Partnership on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNPRD) demonstrates how pooled funds can foster best practices in the UN development system.

The UN’s development work is still driven by earmarked contributions, also referred to as “bilateral resources”, that are tied to specific projects or programs. One explanation for the persistence of earmarked funding might be the lack of a clear benchmark for judging funding modalities. An effective way to evaluate funding modalities is to assess the extent to which they promote best practices in UN development work. These would include the delivery of high-level policy advice based on global frameworks and local evidence; making use of the UN’s rich practical experiences from around the world; working towards systemic and long-term change; acting as a convener for stakeholders within and outside government; and operating in an integrated fashion, delivering as one. The Disability Fund of the UN Partnership on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNPRD) demonstrates how pooled funds can foster best practices in the UN development system.

The UN’s development work is still driven by earmarked contributions, also referred to as “bilateral resources”, that are tied to specific projects or programs. One explanation for the persistence of earmarked funding might be the lack of a clear benchmark for judging funding modalities. An effective way to evaluate funding modalities is to assess the extent to which they promote best practices in UN development work. These would include the delivery of high-level policy advice based on global frameworks and local evidence; making use of the UN’s rich practical experiences from around the world; working towards systemic and long-term change; acting as a convener for stakeholders within and outside government; and operating in an integrated fashion, delivering as one. The Disability Fund of the UN Partnership on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNPRD) demonstrates how pooled funds can foster best practices in the UN development system.

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IPI together with the Permanent Missions of Finland and The Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN cohosted a policy forum on March 20th on the topic of “Specialized Police Teams in UN Peace Operations: A Survey of Progress and Challenges.”

United Nations police (UNPOL) efforts to support peace and security around the world have evolved significantly in the past decade. As the roles and responsibilities of UNPOL have become increasingly multifaceted, specialized police teams (SPTs) have emerged as a useful complement to individual police officers (IPOs) and formed police units (FPUs). SPTs provide specific policing expertise and deliver project-based programming in line with their skill sets. For UNPOL, they also allow for more flexible, nimble, and agile responses to specific police development requests under the umbrella of existing field missions and arrangements.

SPTs are still described by many around UN policing as “new,” but more than thirteen years after their formal conceptualization, SPTs are now an established tool of UN policing in peace operations. Given the potential promise related to using SPTs, a more detailed assessment reflecting on these accumulated experiences is warranted. The event examined how SPTs have been used in a range of UN peace operations environments as well as the comparative advantages that SPTs offer in complement to IPOs and FPUs, including some of the challenges that need to be overcome to harness SPTs’ full potential in future deployments.

This policy forum launched an IPI publication on “Specialized Police Teams in UN Peace Operations: A Survey of Progress and Challenges,” written by Charles T. Hunt. The event and publication were made possible with generous support from the governments of Finland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as part of IPI’s broader workstream on A4P+.

Opening remarks:
H.E. Lauri Voionmaa, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Finland to the UN
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

Speakers:
Charles Hunt, Professor of International Relations, RMIT University and Senior Fellow (Non-Resident) at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research
Dmitri Alechkevitch, Policy Adviser, Strategic Policy and Development, United Nations Police Division
Christine Fossen, Police Commissioner, UNMISS
Jon Christian Møller, Director, KPMG Advisory, Former Specialized Police Team Leader for Haiti

Closing remarks:
Peter Slort, Police Advisor, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

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With growing human insecurity and polarization, policymakers have shifted attention to the resilience of societies. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, emphasizes solidarity as an essential building block for  addressing universal challenges. “Social cohesion” stands out as a buzzword in these discussions and is often suggested as a cure for many development problems and for the unintended consequences of development efforts. As many  governments and international organizations launch or scale up campaigns to promote social cohesion in societies - among groups or between citizens and public institutions - it is time to ask what we know about the relevance of social cohesion for supporting human development and reducing human insecurity. Also, what are the leverage points for policy action, and what is the effectiveness of currently applied measures?

With growing human insecurity and polarization, policymakers have shifted attention to the resilience of societies. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, emphasizes solidarity as an essential building block for  addressing universal challenges. “Social cohesion” stands out as a buzzword in these discussions and is often suggested as a cure for many development problems and for the unintended consequences of development efforts. As many  governments and international organizations launch or scale up campaigns to promote social cohesion in societies - among groups or between citizens and public institutions - it is time to ask what we know about the relevance of social cohesion for supporting human development and reducing human insecurity. Also, what are the leverage points for policy action, and what is the effectiveness of currently applied measures?

With growing human insecurity and polarization, policymakers have shifted attention to the resilience of societies. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, emphasizes solidarity as an essential building block for  addressing universal challenges. “Social cohesion” stands out as a buzzword in these discussions and is often suggested as a cure for many development problems and for the unintended consequences of development efforts. As many  governments and international organizations launch or scale up campaigns to promote social cohesion in societies - among groups or between citizens and public institutions - it is time to ask what we know about the relevance of social cohesion for supporting human development and reducing human insecurity. Also, what are the leverage points for policy action, and what is the effectiveness of currently applied measures?

Bonn, 20. März 2024. Das diesjährige Thema des Weltwassertags der Vereinten Nationen lautet „Wasser für den Frieden“. In einer der wasserärmsten und konfliktreichsten Regionen der Welt setzt die für den Friedensnobelpreis 2024 nominierte Initiative EcoPeace Middle East tatsächlich auf Wasserressourcen, um ein friedliches Zusammenleben zu fördern. Israelis, Jordanier*innen und Palästinenser*innen arbeiteten über Grenzen hinweg zusammen, um ihre gemeinsame wasserabhängige Zukunft zu gestalten.

Wasser als Waffe

Heute ist Wasser im Gazastreifen zu einer Waffe geworden. Als Reaktion auf die Angriffe der Hamas setzt Israel Wasser auf dreierlei Weise als Waffe ein: durch Überflutung, durch Verschmutzung und dadurch, dass es den Zugang zu sauberem Wasser fast unmöglich macht.

Überflutungen wurden auch in der Ukraine und im Irak als Waffe eingesetzt. Im Gazastreifen pumpten die israelischen Streitkräfte Tausende von Kubikmetern Meerwasser in das Tunnelnetz der Hamas, um es zu zerstören. Wie Expert*innen in Nature warnten, könnte dies nicht nur Gebäude destabilisieren, sondern auch das Grundwasser dauerhaft versalzen. Der taktische Nutzen solcher Maßnahmen ist ungewiss.

Die Verschmutzung von Wasserressourcen ist eine weitere grausame Waffe. Im Gazastreifen sind die Wasser- und Abwasseraufbereitungsanlagen entweder zerstört oder können wegen Treibstoffmangels nicht betrieben werden. Die Grundwasserressourcen wiederum sind durch ungeklärte Abwässer und Krankenhausabfälle sowie Schwermetalle der Raketen verschmutzt. Hochgiftiger weißer Phosphor, der von Israel abgeworfen wurde, sowie menschliche Überreste, Asbest und nicht explodierte Munition vergiften Böden und Wasserökosysteme. Da die Wasserspeicher zerstört und Entsalzungsanlagen entweder beschädigt oder mangels Treibstoff außer Betrieb sind, greift die Bevölkerung zum Überleben auch auf chemisch verseuchtes und stark salzhaltiges Wasser aus landwirtschaftlichen Brunnen zurück. Durch Wasser übertragene Krankheiten wie Cholera, Typhus und antibiotikaresistente Keime verbreiten sich schnell und treffen besonders Kinder. Die Weltgesundheitsorganisation warnt, dass die Wasserverschmutzung möglicherweise mehr Todesopfer fordern wird als die militärischen Interventionen.

Den Zugang zu Wasser zu unterbrechen ist ebenfalls eine altbewährte militärische Taktik. Kurz nach den Angriffen der Hamas hat Israel die Wasserversorgung durch Leitungen vollständig gekappt. Im Osloer Abkommen von 1995 verpflichtete sich Israel, dem Gazastreifen 5 Millionen Kubikmeter Wasser pro Jahr zur Verfügung zu stellen, um den langjährigen Wasserkonflikt zu entschärfen. Laut Human Rights Watch wurde dies zwar teilweise wieder aufgenommen, wegen Stromausfällen und der zerstörten Infrastruktur steht jedoch kaum sauberes Wasser zur Verfügung. Israelische Behörden behindern Berichten zufolge Bemühungen, die beschädigte Wasserinfrastruktur zu reparieren. Zusätzlich zu dem ungeheuren Leid und der Zerstörung im Gazastreifen droht der Mangel an sauberem Trinkwasser ein weiteres Todesurteil für diejenigen zu sein, die die militärischen Angriffe überlebt haben.

Wie der UN-Sonderberichterstatter für das Menschenrecht auf sauberes Trinkwasser und angemessene Sanitärversorgung Pedro Arrojo-Agudo und andere gewarnt haben, verstößt der Einsatz von Wasser als Waffe in Gaza gegen eine Reihe von humanitären und menschenrechtlichen Grundsätzen.

Die Auswirkungen auf Israel

Die Umweltkatastrophe in Gaza wird langfristige Auswirkungen auf Wasserressourcen und Böden haben. Ein gesundes Leben im Gazastreifen ist in Zukunft angesichts der starken Verschmutzung, Versalzung und Wasserknappheit sowie der Zerstörung landwirtschaftlicher Flächen kaum vorstellbar. Da Wasser- und Umweltverschmutzung keine politischen Grenzen kennen, wirkt sich dies auch auf Israel aus. Israelische Expertinnen warnen bereits davor, dass die Umweltzerstörung in Gaza und im Westjordanland negative Auswirkungen auf die Wasser-, Boden- und Luftqualität und damit auf Gesundheit und Ernährungssicherheit in Israel haben wird. Unter anderem fließen die ungeklärten Abwässer aus Gaza ins Mittelmeer, an die israelische Küste und in den Zulauf von Entsalzungsanlagen, und wirken sich negativ auf Böden und Grundwasserqualität in Israel aus. Angesichts der schrecklichen humanitären Lage in Gaza scheinen Umweltbelange zweitrangig zu sein, aber sie sind von Dauer und müssen angegangen werden.

Wasser und Frieden

Wasser für den Frieden erfordert die Mobilisierung von (menschen-)rechtsbasierten Ansätzen, Verhandlungen und Vereinbarungen auf der Grundlage einer angemessenen Vertretung aller Beteiligten, um die unterschiedlichen Interessen an dieser lebenswichtigen Ressource auszugleichen. Allerdings ist der Kontext vor Ort der einer „Wasserhegemonie“, denn schon vor der gegenwärtigen Gewalteskalation erhielten 7 Millionen Israelis 90 Prozent der verfügbaren Wasserressourcen der Region und 3,5 Millionen Palästinenser*innen im Westjordanland und im Gazastreifen die restlichen 10 Prozent; dies wurde von der internationalen Gemeinschaft gemäß den Osloer Vereinbarungen akzeptiert. Unter solch asymmetrischen Bedingungen bleibt „Wasser für Frieden“ wohl Wunschdenken.

Wasser als Ausgangspunkt für eine Zusammenarbeit zu nutzen bleibt dennoch auch in Nahost wünschenswert. In der aktuellen Situation in Gaza geht es jedoch eher um „Frieden für Wasser“. Dies erfordert einen Waffenstillstand und eine Aussetzung der Waffenlieferungen an Israel, um humanitäre Hilfe einschließlich der Wasserversorgung zu ermöglichen und kriegsbedingte Umweltverschmutzung zu stoppen. Beide Maßnahmen wurden auch von Josep Borrell, dem Hohen Vertreter der Europäischen Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, sowie von 200 internationalen Parlamentarier*innen gefordert; vier europäische Länder haben ihre Waffenexporte bereits eingestellt. Anschließend sollten die Umweltschäden sowie deren langfristige Auswirkungen gründlich untersucht werden. Dies muss zu einer gerechten Neuverteilung des Wassers und der damit verbundenen Kosten führen. Nur dann kann Wasser zu einer Quelle des Friedens und der Zusammenarbeit im gemeinsamen Interesse beider Bevölkerungen für eine nachhaltige Zukunft werden.

Bonn, 20. März 2024. Das diesjährige Thema des Weltwassertags der Vereinten Nationen lautet „Wasser für den Frieden“. In einer der wasserärmsten und konfliktreichsten Regionen der Welt setzt die für den Friedensnobelpreis 2024 nominierte Initiative EcoPeace Middle East tatsächlich auf Wasserressourcen, um ein friedliches Zusammenleben zu fördern. Israelis, Jordanier*innen und Palästinenser*innen arbeiteten über Grenzen hinweg zusammen, um ihre gemeinsame wasserabhängige Zukunft zu gestalten.

Wasser als Waffe

Heute ist Wasser im Gazastreifen zu einer Waffe geworden. Als Reaktion auf die Angriffe der Hamas setzt Israel Wasser auf dreierlei Weise als Waffe ein: durch Überflutung, durch Verschmutzung und dadurch, dass es den Zugang zu sauberem Wasser fast unmöglich macht.

Überflutungen wurden auch in der Ukraine und im Irak als Waffe eingesetzt. Im Gazastreifen pumpten die israelischen Streitkräfte Tausende von Kubikmetern Meerwasser in das Tunnelnetz der Hamas, um es zu zerstören. Wie Expert*innen in Nature warnten, könnte dies nicht nur Gebäude destabilisieren, sondern auch das Grundwasser dauerhaft versalzen. Der taktische Nutzen solcher Maßnahmen ist ungewiss.

Die Verschmutzung von Wasserressourcen ist eine weitere grausame Waffe. Im Gazastreifen sind die Wasser- und Abwasseraufbereitungsanlagen entweder zerstört oder können wegen Treibstoffmangels nicht betrieben werden. Die Grundwasserressourcen wiederum sind durch ungeklärte Abwässer und Krankenhausabfälle sowie Schwermetalle der Raketen verschmutzt. Hochgiftiger weißer Phosphor, der von Israel abgeworfen wurde, sowie menschliche Überreste, Asbest und nicht explodierte Munition vergiften Böden und Wasserökosysteme. Da die Wasserspeicher zerstört und Entsalzungsanlagen entweder beschädigt oder mangels Treibstoff außer Betrieb sind, greift die Bevölkerung zum Überleben auch auf chemisch verseuchtes und stark salzhaltiges Wasser aus landwirtschaftlichen Brunnen zurück. Durch Wasser übertragene Krankheiten wie Cholera, Typhus und antibiotikaresistente Keime verbreiten sich schnell und treffen besonders Kinder. Die Weltgesundheitsorganisation warnt, dass die Wasserverschmutzung möglicherweise mehr Todesopfer fordern wird als die militärischen Interventionen.

Den Zugang zu Wasser zu unterbrechen ist ebenfalls eine altbewährte militärische Taktik. Kurz nach den Angriffen der Hamas hat Israel die Wasserversorgung durch Leitungen vollständig gekappt. Im Osloer Abkommen von 1995 verpflichtete sich Israel, dem Gazastreifen 5 Millionen Kubikmeter Wasser pro Jahr zur Verfügung zu stellen, um den langjährigen Wasserkonflikt zu entschärfen. Laut Human Rights Watch wurde dies zwar teilweise wieder aufgenommen, wegen Stromausfällen und der zerstörten Infrastruktur steht jedoch kaum sauberes Wasser zur Verfügung. Israelische Behörden behindern Berichten zufolge Bemühungen, die beschädigte Wasserinfrastruktur zu reparieren. Zusätzlich zu dem ungeheuren Leid und der Zerstörung im Gazastreifen droht der Mangel an sauberem Trinkwasser ein weiteres Todesurteil für diejenigen zu sein, die die militärischen Angriffe überlebt haben.

Wie der UN-Sonderberichterstatter für das Menschenrecht auf sauberes Trinkwasser und angemessene Sanitärversorgung Pedro Arrojo-Agudo und andere gewarnt haben, verstößt der Einsatz von Wasser als Waffe in Gaza gegen eine Reihe von humanitären und menschenrechtlichen Grundsätzen.

Die Auswirkungen auf Israel

Die Umweltkatastrophe in Gaza wird langfristige Auswirkungen auf Wasserressourcen und Böden haben. Ein gesundes Leben im Gazastreifen ist in Zukunft angesichts der starken Verschmutzung, Versalzung und Wasserknappheit sowie der Zerstörung landwirtschaftlicher Flächen kaum vorstellbar. Da Wasser- und Umweltverschmutzung keine politischen Grenzen kennen, wirkt sich dies auch auf Israel aus. Israelische Expertinnen warnen bereits davor, dass die Umweltzerstörung in Gaza und im Westjordanland negative Auswirkungen auf die Wasser-, Boden- und Luftqualität und damit auf Gesundheit und Ernährungssicherheit in Israel haben wird. Unter anderem fließen die ungeklärten Abwässer aus Gaza ins Mittelmeer, an die israelische Küste und in den Zulauf von Entsalzungsanlagen, und wirken sich negativ auf Böden und Grundwasserqualität in Israel aus. Angesichts der schrecklichen humanitären Lage in Gaza scheinen Umweltbelange zweitrangig zu sein, aber sie sind von Dauer und müssen angegangen werden.

Wasser und Frieden

Wasser für den Frieden erfordert die Mobilisierung von (menschen-)rechtsbasierten Ansätzen, Verhandlungen und Vereinbarungen auf der Grundlage einer angemessenen Vertretung aller Beteiligten, um die unterschiedlichen Interessen an dieser lebenswichtigen Ressource auszugleichen. Allerdings ist der Kontext vor Ort der einer „Wasserhegemonie“, denn schon vor der gegenwärtigen Gewalteskalation erhielten 7 Millionen Israelis 90 Prozent der verfügbaren Wasserressourcen der Region und 3,5 Millionen Palästinenser*innen im Westjordanland und im Gazastreifen die restlichen 10 Prozent; dies wurde von der internationalen Gemeinschaft gemäß den Osloer Vereinbarungen akzeptiert. Unter solch asymmetrischen Bedingungen bleibt „Wasser für Frieden“ wohl Wunschdenken.

Wasser als Ausgangspunkt für eine Zusammenarbeit zu nutzen bleibt dennoch auch in Nahost wünschenswert. In der aktuellen Situation in Gaza geht es jedoch eher um „Frieden für Wasser“. Dies erfordert einen Waffenstillstand und eine Aussetzung der Waffenlieferungen an Israel, um humanitäre Hilfe einschließlich der Wasserversorgung zu ermöglichen und kriegsbedingte Umweltverschmutzung zu stoppen. Beide Maßnahmen wurden auch von Josep Borrell, dem Hohen Vertreter der Europäischen Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, sowie von 200 internationalen Parlamentarier*innen gefordert; vier europäische Länder haben ihre Waffenexporte bereits eingestellt. Anschließend sollten die Umweltschäden sowie deren langfristige Auswirkungen gründlich untersucht werden. Dies muss zu einer gerechten Neuverteilung des Wassers und der damit verbundenen Kosten führen. Nur dann kann Wasser zu einer Quelle des Friedens und der Zusammenarbeit im gemeinsamen Interesse beider Bevölkerungen für eine nachhaltige Zukunft werden.