Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Latest News

The outcome of the Belém climate conference can be compared to a watered-down cocktail, a weak COPirinha, if you will: plenty of crushed ice, little substance to give it strength, and missing sugar in the form of climate finance to sweeten the deal. Hence, while the tumbler of climate diplomacy was well filled, its content hardly lifted spirits of anyone hoping for decisive climate action.

Bonn, 08. Dezember 2025. Vor genau einem Jahr floh der langjährige syrische Gewaltherrscher Baschar al-Assad außer Landes. Die Macht übernahm der umstrittene HTS-Milizenführer Ahmad al-Sharaa. Syriens politische Führung und sein internationales Image haben sich stark gewandelt, doch die Wirtschaft bleibt marode und die humanitäre Lage der Bevölkerung katastrophal. Deutschland und die EU sollten sich trotz aller Unwägbarkeiten stärker für einen gerechten Wiederaufbau und wirtschaftliche Teilhabe aller engagieren.

Mit großen – vielleicht zu großen? – Hoffnungen und Erwartungen hatten Syrer*innen weltweit den Machtwechsel am 8. Dezember 2024 verfolgt und die Freilassung zehntausender politischer Gefangener bejubelt. Ein Jahr später ist die Bilanz der neuen syrischen Regierung allerdings durchwachsen: Zwar wurden wichtige politische Prozesse angepackt – Übergangsverfassung, Übergangsregierung, indirekte Parlamentswahlen – diese jedoch als intransparent und undemokratisch harsch kritisiert. Die syrische Armee wurde kernsaniert und ehemals regimetreue Milizen entwaffnet, doch die Sicherheitslage bleibt angespannt und die Rolle islamistischer Strömungen in der Armee unklar: Übergriffe auf Minderheiten, etwa in der Küstenregion und in Suwayda, gingen durch die Medien; es kommt vermehrt zu Entführungen, die Zahl der zivilen Todesopfer steigt im Vorjahresvergleich sogar an, die Täter blieben meist straffrei.

Gleichzeitig ist die außenpolitische Strahlkraft von Präsident al-Sharaa immens: So wurde er in den Golfstaaten, der Türkei, Frankreich, Russland sowie den USA empfangen und er sprach in der UN-Vollversammlung – als erster syrischer Staatschef seit fast 60 Jahren. Doch regionalpolitisch ist Syrien schwach und im Norden und Süden durch die Türkei bzw. Israel in seiner Souveränität eingeschränkt.

Besonders schwer wiegt die katastrophale Wirtschaftslage, und hier treten die Versäumnisse und falschen Weichenstellungen der al-Sharaa Regierung deutlich zutage: Der einzige Erfolg war die sukzessive Aufhebung der meisten Sanktionen – was sich aber wegen Over-Compliance der Banken und Unsicherheit über gültige Vorschriften noch wenig auswirkt. Es gibt keine umfassenden Wiederaufbaupläne oder wirtschaftspolitische Roadmaps. Entscheidungen werden hinter geschlossenen Türen getroffen, oft vom Übergangspräsidenten selbst oder einem Vertrauten. Kostenreduzierung durch Privatisierung und die Akquise von Großinvestitionen stehen im Vordergrund, doch Herkunft und Modalitäten der bislang meist nur angekündigten Investitionen werfen oft Fragen auf. Darüber hinaus handelt es sich zumeist um Prestigeprojekte in der Hauptstadt – etwa einen neuen Flughafen oder eine Metrolinie – die für weniger wohlhabende Syrer*innen und auf dem flachen Land kaum von Bedeutung sind. Ein wirtschaftlich solider, auf lokalen Wertschöpfungsketten beruhender Wiederaufbau lässt sich so nicht erreichen.

Die notleidende Bevölkerung wartet bislang vergeblich auf eine ‚Friedensdividende‘, also darauf, dass sich der Machtwechsel positiv auf ihre unmittelbaren Lebensverhältnisse auswirkt. Noch immer leben zwei Drittel in Armut, ein Großteil ist auf Hilfen angewiesen. Schlimmer noch, angesichts des angespannten Staatshaushalts sind viele Reformauswirkungen auf die Bevölkerung negativ: Kündigungen und Jobunsicherheit im öffentlichen Dienst, Streichung von Subventionen und deutlich höhere Strompreise trotz hoher Lebenshaltungskosten betreffen große Teile der Bevölkerung. Zudem gibt es Hinweise auf Bodenspekulation und erneute Enteignungen. Proteste mehren sich. Bislang ist es Syrien nicht gelungen, ein menschenwürdiges neues System zu schaffen, das alle Bürger*innen in den gemeinsamen Wiederaufbau einbezieht. 

Syrer*innen benötigen eine echte Perspektive, wann wichtige Basisdienstleistungen wiederhergestellt sind, und syrische Unternehmen brauchen Planungssicherheit. Deutschland und die EU sollten sich für eine bessere Geberkoordination und einen differenzierten Wiederaufbauplan mit verbindlichen Zielmarken einsetzen. Eine transparente Wiederaufbau-Koordinationsplattform zu öffentlichen Investitionen könnte, nach dem Vorbild der ukrainischen DREAM-Plattform, Vertrauen von Investoren und lokale Teilhabe stärken. Zudem würde ein deutsch- oder europäisch-syrischer Wiederaufbaurat, inklusive Vertreter*innen aus Zivilgesellschaft und Kommunen, wichtige Impulse setzen.

Gerade Deutschland sollte angesichts seiner großen syrischen Diaspora eine größere Rolle im Wiederaufbau spielen, und sich nicht in verunsichernden und kurzsichtigen Rückkehr-Debatten verlieren. Es leistet Hilfe in humanitär wichtigen Bereichen wie Gesundheit und Bildung, doch es setzt seinen einmaligen Zugang und strategischen Vorteil bisher nicht in Wert. Mangels gezielter Förderprogramme und Investitionsgarantien überlassen deutsche Unternehmen das Feld risikobereiteren Wettbewerbern. Doch diese Pioniere, meist aus der Türkei und den Golfstaaten, gestalten Syriens neue Wirtschaftsordnung zugunsten eigener Interessen. Es bedarf einer vorausschauenden Syrien-Politik, die auf langfristige Austauschbeziehungen und das Anwerben und Halten von Fachkräften ausgelegt ist – nicht nur für einen inklusiven Wiederaufbau in Syrien, sondern auch für einen besseren sozialen Zusammenhalt zwischen Deutschen und Deutschsyrer*innen hierzulande.

Progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is increasingly hampered by insufficient funding. This Policy Brief, drawing on insights from a roundtable held in the context of the Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) with experts from the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia, examines how sustainable development financing can be safeguarded in an era of economic disruptions, global conflicts, and political shifts. It situates these recommendations within the context of the outcomes of the fourth Financing for Development (FfD4) Conference, with a view to informing the follow-up process.
An estimated USD 4.2 trillion are needed for the implementation of SDG policies. Notwithstanding this, economic insecurity, slow growth, and waning political commitment reduce private and public investments in sustainability. Rising conflicts lead to a redistribution of budgets towards military expenditures and away from environmental and social objectives. This includes reductions in Official Development Aid, further limiting funding for sustainability transformations in low- and middle-income countries.
In order to sustain and increase financing for SDG implementation, taking the challenging framework conditions into account, a series of actions is needed: 
–    Alignment of public spending with the SDGs and planetary boundaries by phasing out harmful subsidies and integrating sustainability into credit ratings and investment strategies.
–    Strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation through improved and efficient tax systems, tax transparency, and reduction of harmful tax expenditures.
–    Building institutional capacity in transitioning sectors, including sustainable finance, digitalised tax systems, and data provision for and engagement with credit-rating agencies.
–    Translating FfD4 outcomes into concrete actions in platforms like the G20, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank meetings, and the HSC, aligning them with social and environmental priorities. But also filling the gaps on issues neglected in FfD4 by supporting future multilateral agreements and voluntary initiatives on tax, SDRs, cost of capital, and debt restructuring.

Tax expenditures (TEs) – i.e. deviations from a benchmark tax system that lower the tax burden of specific groups, economic sectors or activities – can be powerful tools to promote public policies. However, their effectiveness is often in doubt. The present report discusses the determinants and explores the empirical evidence of TE effectiveness.

Background Publicly-funded health insurance (PFHI) schemes are widely employed in low- and middle-income countries to enhance financial protection and advance universal health coverage. India’s Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM-JAY), launched in 2018, provides inpatient coverage to over 500 million socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals. Although positive patient experiences are linked to improved health outcomes, evidence on patient experiences under PM-JAY remains limited. This mixed-methods study investigates patient experiences with PM-JAY healthcare services, while incorporating provider reflections on these experiences. Methods A concurrent triangulation mixed-methods study was conducted across 16 districts in 7 Indian states. Qualitative data were collected via semi-structured interviews (n = 219 doctors, n = 55 beneficiaries) and 28 focus group discussions with beneficiaries. Quantitative data included 508 patient exit surveys, 115 hospital surveys, and 115 infrastructure checklists. Quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, while qualitative data were analyzed using content analysis. Data triangulation occurred during the analysis phase. Results While hospitals had the required physical amenities and patient exit surveys indicated very high satisfaction with PM-JAY services, the qualitative interviews and group discussions with beneficiaries and healthcare providers revealed several areas needing procedural and service improvements. Chief among these were the need for better communication, and enhanced abilities of PM-JAY implementers to provide empathetic and coordinated care. There were also stark differences across states: beneficiaries in Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Kerala, Meghalaya and Tamil Nadu were more appreciative of PM-JAY services, while those in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh reported significant dissatisfaction. Conclusions Beneficiaries and healthcare providers identified key areas for improvement, including patient-provider communication, empathy, emotional support, care coordination, and quality. Barriers included limited awareness of scheme processes among beneficiaries and providers, and deficient communication skills. Addressing organizational and structural challenges, alongside using informal community networks via frontline health workers, offer opportunities to enhance PM-JAY healthcare delivery.

Autocratisation has become a defining global trend, replacing decades of democratisation and forcing demo­cracy promoters to rethink their approaches. Democracy promoters must adapt to several challenges, including autocratisation in target countries, the rise of powerful autocratic competitors in the global arena, and challenges to democracy in some of the very countries promoting it. Moreover, the crisis in development aid fuelled by the withdrawal of funding by the United States (US) and other countries, and their prioritisation of security, pose further structural challenges. This Policy Brief examines the effects of the global trend of autocratisation on international democracy promotion, summarising findings from a collaborative research project (Grimm et al., 2025).

The findings show that democracy promoters respond to these shifts in four ways: 1) choosing to “carry on and observe” by continuing existing programmes and main­taining cooperation rather than risking confronta­tion; 2) reinforcing rhetorical and diplomatic efforts for demo­cracy, to signal continued commitment; 3) selec­tively adapting policies and strategies, with renewed focus on civil society, education and targeted funding, yet rarely making substantive policy changes; 4) disen­gaging by shifting cooperation toward less politicised fields or withdrawing entirely. So far, however, we lack evidence on the effectiveness of these responses to counter autocratisation.

Given the new challenges to democracy promotion arising from the changed international context, demo­cracy promoters should consider taking the following actions:

Ramping up efforts to counter the rise of autocratic powers: Democracy promoters should proactively deepen their pro-democracy cooperation, reaffirm democratic alliances and maintain a clear normative profile. They should invest in long-term partnerships with governments and civil societies committed to democratic reform.

Revitalising the norm of democracy: Democracy pro­moters must make a case for why democracy matters, highlighting that it delivers rights and freedoms, as well as stability, prosperity, and peace – at least as effectively as autocratic regimes. Em­pha­sising its tangible benefits can help restore faith in its long-term value, and counter the appeal of autocratic alternatives.

Coordinating strategies and combining strengths: Joint frameworks for action among democracy pro­moters are needed that allow for the simultaneous use of different instruments, e.g. political dialogue, develop­ment cooperation, human rights advocacy and eco­nomic incentives. Combining direct and indirect demo­cracy promotion increases adaptability.

Adapting democracy promotion to the context: In contexts where democracy is being eroded, prioritise the defence of current democratic institutions, actors and practices rather than pushing for rapid reforms. Strengthen local actors who uphold democratic values, protect them against repression and maintain spaces for civic participation.

Restoring credibility: Democracy-promoting states and organisations should openly discuss challenges to democracy at home in order to rebuild trust, strengthen legitimacy and facilitate collaboration in defence of democracy. Reinforcing own democratic institutions and upholding the rule of law contributes to restoring the credibility of democracy promoters.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a critical threat to global health, with environmental transmission pathways – pharmaceutical waste, wastewater effluents, agricultural runoff – increasingly recognised as significant yet inadequately governed. Despite international calls for One Health approaches integrating human, animal and environmental sectors, coordination across these domains remains weak, particularly for environmental dimensions. This paper examines why environmental integration lags in Kenya’s AMR governance, despite sophisticated formal architecture that includes national and county coordination platforms (NASIC, CASICs), tech-
nical working groups and the One Health AMR Surveillance System (OHAMRS). We investigate two research questions: (i) What are the enablers and barriers to effective governance of interlinkages among human health, animal health and environmental sectors in mitigating AMR? (ii) What are the options for effectively integrating the environmental dimension into AMR governance?
Drawing on polycentric governance theory, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the concept of Networks of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS), we analyse how authority, information and resources shape interactions among overlapping decision centres across constitutional, collective-choice and operational levels. Through 12 semi-structured interviews with government officials, fisheries officers and environmental regulators, supplemented by policy document analysis, we map six action situations spanning planning, resource allocation, surveillance, stewardship, wastewater treatment and regulation. Findings reveal that constitutional-choice rules create formal overlaps intended to foster coordination, yet systematic asymmetries in authority, information and resources perpetuate the marginalisation of environmental issues. Boundary and position rules concentrate agenda setting in health sectors; information rules exclude AMR parameters from environmental permits and inspections; payoff rules reward clinical outputs while environmental investments compete with higher priorities; and scope rules omit environmental accountability targets. These rule configurations attenuate feedback loops between environmental action situations and upstream planning, maintaining system stability but at sub-optimal performance for One Health objectives. We identify rule-focused interventions – mandating environmental representation with voting authority, embedding AMR parameters in regulatory instruments, institutionalising joint inspection protocols, ring-fencing environmental budgets, and establishing explicit environmental targets – that would realign coordination toward genuine environmental integration. 

Morris Buliva is an independent researcher based in Nairobi, and Governance and Partnerships Consultant for the Fleming Fund Country Grant in Kenya.

The international context is changing profoundly, owing to rising autocratisation and the return of international war. These transformations also impact the long-standing problem of state fragility.
The IDOS Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) provides a differentiated model to measure state fragility along the three dimensions of authority, capacity and legitimacy. Rather than aggregating scores in these dimensions on a one-dimensional scale, the CSF identifies eight constellations of how deficits in these three dimensions occur jointly in reality. The CSF was launched in 2018 and was recently updated for the second time, now covering the period 2005 to 2024.
In this Policy Brief, we pursue three objectives. First, we briefly present the CSF model. Second, we describe the methodological adjustments of the 2025 update. This includes the use of a new measure for “battle-related deaths” – one indicator to assess the state’s monopoly on the use of force (authority). The modification became necessary due to a real-world development: the return of international war and, in particular, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Third, we elaborate on the main empirical trend that emerges from the 2025 update: the global rise of deficits in the legitimacy dimension, reflected in the increase of “illiberal functioning” and “low legitimacy” states. This development is in line with wider autocratisation trends. We derive the following recommendations for policy and policy-related research:
• Use multidimensional models to assess state fragility. Foreign and development policymakers as well as academics should employ multidimensional approaches to conceptualise and measure state fragility. Not only are such models better suited for adequately capturing the complexity of state fragility, but they also provide better starting points for designing tailored policy interventions sensitive to context.
• Acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also rising in Europe. Rather than considering state fragility a phenomenon limited to the Global South, German and European policy-makers would be well advised to acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also growing in Europe, including countries of the European Union (EU). Studying developments in the Global South and mutual learning with Southern policy-makers and civil society actors may contribute to enhanced resilience in Europe as well.
• Explore the relationship between state fragility and international war. Future research should explore how international war and state fragility are related, including investigating the relationship between internal fragility dimensions and vulnerabilities to external shocks, and whether defence capabilities matter in determining whether and to what extent a state is fragile.
• Explore and address the relationship between state fragility and autocratisation. Investigating how state fragility and autocratisation are interrelated is a promising research agenda. This comprises exploring whether and how changes in fragility patterns and autocratisation trends are correlated as well as under what conditions autocratisation acts as a driver of state fragility by prompting violent resistance. Foreign and develop-ment policymakers could build on the findings to design coherent policy interventions.

Dr Sebastian Ziaja is Team Lead for Survey Data Curation at GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) in Cologne.

Bonn, 01. Dezember 2025. Auf der COP30 in Belém haben politische Entscheidungsträger*innen, Wissenschaftler*innen und die Zivilgesellschaft internationale Verpflichtungen und nationale Beiträge diskutiert und aktualisiert, um sie stärker an den Klimazielen des Pariser Abkommens auszurichten. Zum ersten Mal haben mehrere Staaten sowie die EU Klimaschutzmaßnahmen ausdrücklich mit der Bekämpfung von Hunger, dem Zugang zu Nahrungsmitteln und sozialer Sicherheit verknüpft. Doch obwohl dieses Thema zu den Kernpunkten der Konferenz zählte, erkennen Länder mit hohem Einkommen die zentrale Rolle der Ernährungssysteme für globale Transformationsprozesse weiterhin unzureichend an – und ihre Umgestaltung ist weiterhin unterfinanziert.

Ohne nachhaltige Ernährungssysteme gibt es keine nachhaltige Zukunft. Die Landwirtschaft – inklusive Fischerei und Forstwirtschaft – ist Grundlage der Ernährungssysteme und beansprucht 40 % der globalen Landflächen und Ökosysteme. Ernährungssysteme nutzen 70 % der weltweiten Süßwasservorräte, verursachen einen erheblichen Teil der Wasserverschmutzung und bis zu 30 % der Treibhausgasemissionen. Gleichzeitig schaffen sie Jobs für 40 % der Weltbevölkerung und versorgen 8 Milliarden Menschen mit Nahrung. Eine nachhaltige Bioökonomie könnte Treibhausgasemissionen senken und zugleich produktive Flächen und Ökosysteme erhalten.

Eine nachhaltige, bezahlbare und gesunde Ernährung für alle ist das oberste Ziel von Ernährungssystemen. Diese umfassen sämtliche Aktivitäten und Akteure entlang der Wertschöpfungskette und berücksichtigen die wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, kulturellen und ökologischen Rahmenbedingungen, die diese Aktivitäten prägen und beeinflussen. Dazu gehören auch die Auswirkungen von Lebensmittelverarbeitung, -handel, -konsum sowie der Umgang mit Verlusten und Verschwendung auf die Nachhaltigkeit. Ernährungssysteme beziehen zudem weitere Dimensionen ein – von Kaufkraft bis hin zu Inflation und Gesundheit –, insbesondere im Hinblick auf marginalisierte und vulnerable Gruppen.

Dabei unterliegen Ernährungssysteme einem ständigen Wandel und sind aufgrund verschiedener externer Einflüsse und interner Dynamiken besonders anfällig. Zu den externen Faktoren gehören etwa Klimawandel und öffentliche Gesundheit, während die internen Dynamiken auf Effekte wie Produktivitätssteigerungen durch Innovationen, neue Verarbeitungstechnologien, Transportkosten oder sich verändernde Konsumtrends zurückgehen. Auch Machtverhältnisse innerhalb des Systems, die politische Ökonomie verschiedener Teilsysteme und globale politische Veränderungen wirken auf sie ein. Zugleich haben Ernährungssysteme nicht nur für die Versorgung mit Nahrungsmitteln, sondern auch für Gesundheit, Umwelt, Sicherheit und Wirtschaft strategische Bedeutung.

Ernährungssysteme dürfen in Debatten über nachhaltige gesellschaftliche Transformationen nicht länger ausgeblendet werden. Ernährungssysteme verursachen bereits heute jährliche Kosten von 10 bis 20 Billionen US-Dollar durch Gesundheitsrisiken, Produktivitätsverluste, Umweltzerstörung und Armut – nahezu zehn Prozent des globalen Bruttoinlandsprodukts. Die Folgen des Klimawandels auf Lebensgrundlagen sind schon jetzt sichtbar, vor allem für die ländliche Bevölkerung. Setzt sich die derzeitige Politik fort, werden laut Global Policy Report im Jahr 2050 rund 640 Millionen Menschen unterernährt und 1,5 Milliarden übergewichtig sein.

Eine umfassende Transformation der Ernährungssysteme kann dazu beitragen, diesen Kurs zu verlassen und die externen Effekte deutlich zu reduzieren. Dafür braucht es eine Kombination aus Verhaltensänderungen, politischen Anpassungen, institutionellen Reformen, technologischen Innovationen und sofortigen Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung gefährdeter Gruppen. Eine Ernährungsumstellung hin zu mehr pflanzlichen Nahrungsmitteln kann ernährungsbedingte Ungleichheiten, Mangelernährung und die mit Ernährungssystemen verbundenen ökologischen Folgen verringern. Die Agrarpolitik muss sich von umweltschädlichen Produktionsanreizen und Preiskontrollen, die zu Marktverzerrungen führen, lösen und den Zugang zu nachhaltiger und gesunder Ernährung für alle gewährleisten. Außerdem ist der Ausbau von Sozialsystemen und Transferleistungen unverzichtbar. Zugleich sind steigende Investitionen in Klimaanpassung und -schutz erforderlich, denn derzeit macht die Klimafinanzierung für Ernährungssysteme nur einen kleinen Teil der globalen Klimafinanzierung aus.

Einerseits müssen die externen Effekte der Ernährungssysteme in Marktpreisen sichtbar werden. Damit nachhaltige Veränderungen gelingen, müssen sämtliche Aktivitäten innerhalb der Ernährungssysteme anhand ihrer positiven und negativen externen Effekte neu bewertet werden.

Andererseits erfordert die Transformation der Ernährungssysteme erhebliche zusätzliche Investitionen. Die Politik muss die bestehende Finanzierungslücke schließen, denn trotz ihrer zentralen Bedeutung für die globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele sind Ernährungssysteme weiterhin stark unterfinanziert.

Daher müssen: Ernährungssysteme ins Zentrum der Nachhaltigkeitsagenda rücken. Globale Debatten zur Nachhaltigkeitstransformation müssen ihre Rolle – ebenso wie jene der Bioökonomie – umfassend berücksichtigen. Sofortige Maßnahmen, wie der Ausbau einer klimafreundlichen Landwirtschaft und die Stärkung sozialer Sicherungssysteme, sind unverzichtbar, um notwendige Transformationen auf den Weg zu bringen.

Die gesamte IDOS-Arbeitsgruppe Landwirtschaft hat zu dieser Kolumne beigetragen. Sie ist eine Gruppe von Forscher*innen aller Fachrichtungen am IDOS, die zu allen Themen rund um die Landwirtschaft in Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen arbeiten und darüber diskutieren.

• Clara Brandi
• Katharina Molitor
• Theodore Asimeng
• George Mudimu
• Charlotte Reich
• Srinivasa Srigiri
• Andreas Stamm

Despite the growing demand for gender-disaggregated statistics on poverty, there is hardly any cross-country evidence of gender disparities in poverty. The paper contributes to filling this gap, by using two novel individual-level indices of multidimensional poverty. Relying on data from 78 low- and middle-income countries, it finds that almost everywhere female poverty exceeds male poverty. In the median country, female poverty is 58%–85% higher than male poverty. The highest gender disparities in poverty were detected in the MENA, Latin America and South Asia regions. Finally, the majority of countries experienced an increase in the female/male poverty ratio, thus a feminization of poverty.

Accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and technological developments such as artificial intelligence, digital transformations affect almost all areas of social, economic, and environmental life. Emerging as a tool for addressing challenges – but also as a source of new problems or as an amplifier of existing challenges – digital transformation has increasingly become the focus of initiatives at the European Union (EU) level. Since 2015, the EU has developed a comprehensive digital agenda spanning various policy domains, ranging from bolstering the single market to addressing foreign and security policy concerns. This paper examines the evolving landscape of digitalisation-related EU policies through the lens of strategy documents and policy guidelines, with particular emphasis on developments between 2020 and 2025. It explores the EU’s overarching approach towards digitalisation – its conceptualisation, objectives, and self-defined role in shaping the digital revolution. The analysis reveals that the EU addresses digitalisation through a multitude of policy-specific strategies and guidelines, characterised by four predominant strategic narratives: A geopolitical (“digital sovereignty”), an environmental (“twin transitions”), a socio-political (“fundamental rights”), and an economic (“growth and competitiveness”) narrative.

This article examines the impact of environmental stringency on firm efficiency, using a large cross-country dataset of 68 developing countries from 2006-2020. We combine the newly published Environmental Performance Index (EPI) as an indicator of the stringency of environmental regulations with firm data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES). Our results indicate that stricter environmental policies significantly increase firm efficiency, and the effect is robust. Moreover, we find that the intensity of environmental stringency matters, and that firm size, firm pollution intensity, and institutional quality also influence the relationship between environmental stringency and efficiency. Thus, our results support the Porter hypothesis in the case of developing countries.

In this chapter we draw on our research with displaced people, conflict, violence, gender, and humanitarian aid between 2006 and 2024 in different African countries, which we conducted separately but were brought together by these shared research interests. We address the nexus between conflict, peace, and forced migration using examples from Africa. We situate the discussion within the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras, which we take not as mere footnotes but as salient periods in the continent’s history that have influenced current conflicts and forced displacement in Africa. We therefore emphasize the role of history in understanding contemporary conflicts and forced migration on the continent. In doing so, we critique Western research perspectives on forms of violence and their ahistorical explanations of contemporary violent conflicts in Africa. We explain the role of colonial borders not only in engendering conflict but also in creating structural obstacles for refugees to contribute to transformation in countries of origin. We also critique the separation of peacebuilding in the countries of origin from refugee protection in host countries and highlight this as a limitation of global (i.e., Western) perspectives on peacebuilding.

Critical minerals (CMs) have become a strategic priority for the European Union (EU) amid the green and digital transitions. These resources – including lithium, cobalt, rare earths and nickel – are essential for clean energy technologies, defence systems and electronics. Yet, their processing and refining are highly concentrated in a few countries, leaving the EU especially vulnerable to supply disruptions and fuelling geopolitical tensions.

Recent shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have further exposed the fragility of supply chains. At the same time, extracting and trading CMs pose severe environmental and social challenges, from high carbon footprints to local community impacts. EU trade policy is therefore confronted with a trilemma: how to safeguard economic competitiveness, ensure en­vironmental sustainability and enhance security of supply.

This policy brief summarises research tracing how the Euro­pean Commission’s trade discourse on CMs has evolved to address the trilemma (Laurens, 2025). Initially, com­muni­cations focused narrowly on free trade and market access for raw materials. Gradually, sustainability and security considerations entered the narrative. Most recently, the EU has embraced a hybrid framing, simultaneously highlighting economic, environ­mental and security objectives in its trade discourse on CMs.

Although this hybrid discursive approach can help build broader support for CM policies and agreements by appealing to diverse stakeholders, it also demands careful policy design to minimise trade-offs and deliver on its promises. Without credible implementation and genuine integration of economic, environmental and security objectives, hybrid framing risks remaining largely rhetorical and failing to steer policy in practice.

Key policy messages:

• The EU should adopt an integrated approach that effectively addresses economic, sustainability and security goals together while anticipating trade-offs to support more robust CM policies. This requires strong coordination across trade, industry, environ­ment and security-related directorates-general to align CM strategies, avoid policy conflicts and maximise synergies. It may also require short-term economic sacrifices for long-term resilience.
• Early and meaningful engagement with research institutions, civil society, local communities and industry should move beyond formal consultation and enable genuine co-creation of solutions. Dialogue should begin before key decisions on CMs are finalised, incorporate stakeholder input trans­parently, and respond to concerns about sustain­ability and security of supply.
• CM policies and agreements should provide for binding obligations and concrete implementation plans to ensure environmental and labour pro­tection, local value addition, skills development and technology transfer in resource-rich but eco­nomically vulnerable regions. Listening to partner governments and local communities as well as investing in the knowledge of local political, social and environ­mental contexts are essential for building trust and long-term partnerships.
• International cooperation on CMs should be strengthened through inclusive arrangements that involve both major consumers and producing countries. Clubs composed primarily of resource-poor but wealthy economies risk being perceived as exclusionary.

The world is moving away from a single, post-2000 consensus around multilateralism and poverty reduction. What replaces it depends on which coalition wins the argument, and then bakes that argument into institutions and finance. So what are the visions for the global development architecture in 2030 that we see? One is ‘Aid Retrenchment with Nationalist Conditionality’. Assistance is folded into foreign, trade, and interior policy. Grants shrink, multilateral agencies are sidelined, and cooperation becomes bilateral deals tied to migration control, geopolitical alignment, or access to minerals. Rights, gender, and climate justice recede. A second world is ‘Strategic Multilateralism’. The multilateral development banks stay central, but their remit narrows to macro-stability, crisis response, and “risk containment”. Concessional finance is rationed to countries seen as fragile or geostrategic. Aid rhetoric turns technocratic and securitised and health framed as biosecurity. A third vision is ‘Pluralist Development Cooperation’. There is no single system, but many partially overlapping regimes: Chinese, Indian, Gulf, regional, and club initiatives. Low and middle income countries gain bargaining space by choosing across offers. The trade-off is fragmentation. Rules on debt workouts, safeguards, and transparency diverge, and global public goods struggle for predictable funding. Finally, a fourth vision is ‘Global Solidarity 2.0’. Development cooperation is rebuilt around shared risks such as climate stability, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and debt contagion. North and South co-lead a pooled Global Public Goods Facility. Contributions reflect income and carbon profile, and access reflects exposure to cross-border risk. The donor-recipient binary fades, even if frictions persist.

Dans de nombreuses régions (semi)arides, les femmes rurales sont au coeur des dynamiques liées à l’eau – et par conséquent très affectées par la pénurie. Celle-ci affecte leur quotidien, leurs activités agricoles, leurs initiatives économiques et leurs réseaux de solidarité qui dépendent directement de la disponibilité de la ressource. Ces femmes sont souvent à la fois plus vulnérables aux changements climatiques à cause d’un accès parfois difficile aux services publics, à la terre, à l’eau et aux institutions. En même temps, ces femmes jouent un rôle central pour le développement rural des oasis, notamment à travers leur savoir-faire, leurs initiatives et leur capacités d’adaptation.
Ce Policy Brief analyse les expériences des femmes dans les oasis du Sud-Est marocain. Il montre que le stress hydrique agit comme un facteur multidimensionnel qui redéfinit les tâches domestiques, les pratiques agricoles, les opportunités économiques et les formes de sociabilité des femmes, ainsi que leur contribution au développement. Il signale trois défis majeurs des femmes en zones rurales vulnérables : (a) un accès limité aux ressources (terre, crédit, infrastructures, éducation) ; (b) des formations inadaptées aux réalités rurales et aux besoins; et (c) des normes sociales freinant leur présence dans les espaces de décision. L’hétérogénéité des femmes rencontrées et de leurs besoins souligne le besoin d’approches ciblées et diverses.
L’exemple marocain montre également l’importance de considérer l’eau dans toutes ses dimensions : domestique, agricole, économique et institutionnelle. Ceci permettrait de mieux comprendre à la fois la vulnérabilité des femmes, et leur contribution au développement durable. Les enseignements tirés des oasis marocaines
offrent ainsi un repère pour d’autres pays (semi-) arides, en soulignant quatre leviers d’action pour les institutions marocaines et les politiques de développement :
1. Produire et diffuser des données genrées
• Collecter des informations désagrégées par sexe, âge, statut socio-économique et autres.
• Cartographier les vulnérabilités, les ressources et les compétences des femmes
• Assurer une meilleure circulation de ces données entre terrain et décideurs pour un soutien adapté.
2. Soutenir l’accès des femmes aux services publics, à la terre et aux crédits
• Promouvoir l’accès aux services de santé et d’éducation suivant les besoins spécifiques ainsi que l’accès aux crédits et à la terre
3. Soutenir les initiatives féminines
• Appuyer les initiatives collectives et individuelles par des formations adaptées, un accès au financement et à la valorisation, et la commercialisation des produits.
4. Accompagner le changement des normes sociales et la représentation institutionnelle
• Intégrer les dimensions culturelles et sociales dans les politiques et programmes de développement.
• Promouvoir une évolution des représentations sociales sur les rôles et capacités des femmes
• Valoriser la diversité des initiatives féminines et faciliter la participation des femmes dans les instances de gouvernance y compris de l’eau par des formations et sensibilisations.

Hind Ftouhi est chercheure senior à l’Institut National d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme (INAU-Rabat).
Lisa Bossenbroek est chercheure senior au Centre de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (CRESC-Rabat).
Amal Belghazi est doctorante à l’Université Hassan II, Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines et sociales Ain Chock, Casablanca.

In many arid and semi-arid regions, rural women are at the heart of water-related dynamics – and therefore greatly affected by its scarcity. This scarcity affects their daily lives, farming activities, economic initiatives and solidarity networks, which are directly dependent on the availability of this resource. These women are often more vulnerable to climate change because of the difficulties they sometimes experience in accessing public services, land, water and institutions. At the same time, they play a central role in the rural development of the oases, in particular through their know-how, initiatives and ability to adapt. This policy brief analyses the experiences of women in the oases of south-eastern Morocco. It shows that water stress acts as a multidimensional factor which redefines women’s domestic tasks, agricultural practices, economic opportunities and forms of sociability, as well as their contribution to development. It highlights three major challenges facing women in vulnerable rural areas: (a) limited access to resources (land, credit, infrastructure and education); (b) training that is often ill-suited to rural realities and their needs; and (c) social norms that restrict their participation in decision-making bodies and spaces. The heterogeneity of the women encountered and of their needs underlines the necessity for targeted and diverse approaches. The example of Moroccan oases also shows the importance of considering water in all its dimensions: domestic, agricultural, economic and institutional. This would provide a better understanding of both women’s vulnerabilities and their contributions to sustainable development. The lessons learnt from the Moroccan oases provide a benchmark for other arid countries, highlighting four action areas for Moroccan institutions and development policies:
1. Produce and disseminate gendered data
• Collect information disaggregated by gender, age, socio-economic status and other factors.
• Map women’s vulnerabilities, resources and skills.
• Ensure better circulation of these data between the field and decision-makers to provide appropriate support.
2. Support women’s access to public services, land and credit
• Promote access to health and education services according to specific needs, as well as access to credit and land.
3. Support women’s initiatives
• Support collective and individual initiatives through appropriate training, access to finance, and product development and marketing.
4. Support changes in social norms and institutional representation
• Integrate the cultural and social dimensions into development policies and programmes.
• Promote changes in the social representations of women’s roles and abilities.
• Promote the diversity of women’s initiatives and facilitate the participation of women in governance institutions, including water governance, through training and awareness-raising.

Hind Ftouhi is a senior researcher at the Institut National d’Aménagement et d'Urbanisme (INAU-Rabat).
Lisa Bossenbroek is a senior researcher at the Centre de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (CRESC-Rabat).
Amal Belghazi is a doctoral student at l’Université Hassan II, Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines et sociales Ain Chock in Casablanca.

Die Afrikanische Union und die Europäische Union treffen sich in Luanda zu ihrem 7. gemeinsamen Gipfel. Staats- und Regierungschefs, Wirtschaftsvertreter sowie zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure beider Kontinente sind präsent. Deutschland ist durch den Bundeskanzler vertreten. Im Mittelpunkt der Gipfelgespräche stehen Themen wie wirtschaftliche Kooperation, Handel und kritische Rohstoffe, digitale Innovation, Frieden und Sicherheit sowie Migration und Mobilität und Reformen multilateraler Institutionen. Damit der Gipfel ein Erfolg wird, muss er mehr liefern als nur wohlklingende Erklärungen zum gegenseitigen Nutzen der Partnerschaft. Was es braucht, ist ein Fokus auf konkrete Maßnahmen, die von beiden Seiten gemeinsam entwickelt und umgesetzt werden. Nur so kann die Asymmetrie in den Beziehungen schrittweise überwunden und die Partnerschaft an die Anforderungen einer sich rapide ändernden Welt angepasst werden. 

Over the past decade, cooperative climate action has become a central feature of global climate governance. Thousands of businesses, subnational governments, civil society organizations, and international partnerships have mobilized to complement and support multilateral and state-led efforts. Using insights from the CoAct Database (formerly N-CID), and data from a sample of 387 initiatives, this chapter takes stock of developments since 2013 and looks ahead to how cooperative action can contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly addressing priorities arising from the Global Stocktake (GST). Our analysis yields five headline findings. 1. Rapid expansion, but uneven focus. CCIs have multiplied since 2015 and increasingly address adaptation, yet mitigation continues to dominate. While themes such as energy, land use, and industry remain strong, adaptation-related themes, e.g., particularly water, oceans, and resilience, remain underrepresented. 2. Effectiveness is improving, but equity gaps persist. Many CCIs now deliver more tangible outputs and report more systematically, yet overall output effectiveness has plateaued since 2018. Smaller and less-resourced initiatives often lag behind due to capacity constraints, while limited accountability mechanisms—such as monitoring, transparent governance, and membership control—continue to hinder performance. 3. Participation has broadened, but inclusivity remains limited. Participation of actors in CCIs has expanded, but leadership and decision-making remain concentrated among Northern and institutional actors. Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) are largely absent from governance structures, while engagement of businesses, investors, and local civil society has stagnated in recent years. 4. Stronger alignment with global priorities is needed. Future orchestration should strengthen coherence between CCIs and priorities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for instance those emerging from the Global Stocktake (GST). Integrating adaptation, nature, and resilience more effectively—and fostering synergies across thematic axes such as energy–nature, food–energy, and cities–ecosystems—can enhance the systemic impact of cooperative climate action. 5. The next five years are critical. To sustain momentum and credibility, CCIs and orchestrators, such as the High-Level Climate Champions, COP presidencies and the UNFCCC secretariat, must focus on inclusion, capacity, and accountability—especially in underrepresented regions. Expanding implementation and participation in low- and middle-income countries will improve both effectiveness and procedural justice. Deliberate orchestration by COP Presidencies, policymakers, and leading CCIs can ensure that cooperative climate action evolves toward greater balance, legitimacy, and transformative impact. While cooperative climate action has expanded and matured over the past decade, its transformative potential remains only partly realized, calling for deeper structural and systemic change. As the world moves on to implement the Paris Agreement, cooperative initiatives should help accelerate ambition, bridge gaps in implementation, and foster more equitable and effective global climate action.

Climate and biodiversity are inseparable, yet global action to address them remains divided. As countries and non-state actors ramp up pledges, analysis and monitoring often lack one essential ingredient: knowing where implementation actually happens. Without spatial data, we cannot see progress, verify impact, or ensure fair outcomes. This commentary, addressing policymakers at UNFCCC COP30 and beyond, urges that climate and biodiversity tracking be rooted in place.