Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Wegen eines Meningitis-Falls in der Kaserne Emmen bleibt 120 Personen am Wochenende isoliert. Die Rekrutinnen und Rekruten erhalten Antibiotika, um eine mögliche Ausbreitung zu verhindern.

Credit: Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Feb 6 2026 (IPS)

In early January, an emergency UN Security Council meeting on Venezuela followed a familiar path of paralysis. Members clashed over the US government’s abduction of Nicolás Maduro, with many warning it set a dangerous precedent, but no resolution came.

This wasn’t exceptional. In 2024, permanent members cast eight vetoes, the highest since 1986. In 2025, the Council adopted only 44 resolutions, the lowest since 1991. Deep divisions prevented meaningful responses to Gaza and to conflicts in Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine.

Designed in 1945, the Security Council is the UN’s most powerful body, tasked with maintaining international peace and security, but also crucially protecting the privileged position of the most powerful states following the Second World War. Of its 15 members, 10 are elected for two-year terms, but five – China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA – are permanent and have veto powers. A single veto can block any resolution, regardless of global support. The Council’s anachronistic structure reflects and reproduces outdated power dynamics.

Since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has continually used its veto despite breaching the UN Charter. On Gaza, the USA vetoed four ceasefire proposals before the Council passed Resolution 2728 in March 2024, 171 days into Israel’s assault. By then over 10,000 people had been killed.

When the Council is gridlocked, it means more suffering on the ground. Civilian protection fails, peace processes stall and human rights crimes go unpunished.

The case for reform

Since the UN was established, the number of member states has quadrupled and the global population has grown from 2.5 to 8 billion. But former colonial powers that represent a minority of the world’s population still hold permanent seats while entire continents remain unrepresented.

Calls for reform have been made for decades, but they face a formidable challenge: reform requires amendment of the UN Charter, a process that needs a favourable two-thirds General Assembly vote, ratification by two-thirds of member states and approval from all five permanent Council members.

The African Union has advanced the clearest demand. Emphasising historical justice and equal power for the global south, it calls for the Council to be expanded to 26 members, with Africa holding two permanent seats with full veto rights and five non-permanent seats.

India has been particularly vocal in demanding a greater role on a reformed Council. The G4 – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan – has proposed expansion to 25 or 26 members with six new permanent seats: two for Africa, two for Asia and the Pacific, one for Latin America and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe. New permanent members would gain veto powers after a 10-to-15-year review period.

Uniting for Consensus, a group led by Italy that includes Argentina, Mexico, Pakistan and South Korea, opposes the creation of new permanent seats, arguing this would simply expand an existing oligarchy. Instead, they propose longer rotating terms and greater representation for underrepresented regions.

The five permanent members show varying degrees of openness to reform. France and the UK support expansion with veto powers, while the USA supports adding permanent African seats but without a veto. China backs new African seats, but virulently opposes Japan’s permanent membership, while Russia supports reform in principle but warns against making the Council ‘too broad’.

These positions reflect competition and a desire to prevent rivals gaining power. Current permanent members fear diluted influence, while states that see themselves as rising powers want the status and sway that comes with Council membership.

Adding new members could help redress the imbalance against the global south, but wouldn’t necessarily make the Council more effective, accountable and committed to protecting human lives and human rights, particularly if more states get veto powers.

A French-Mexican initiative from 2015 offers a more modest path: voluntary veto restraint in mass atrocity situations. The proposal asks permanent members to refrain from vetoes in cases of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. This complements efforts to increase the political costs of vetoes, including the Code of Conduct signed by 121 states and General Assembly Resolution 76/262, which requires debate whenever a veto is cast.

New challenges

Now a new challenge has emerged from the Trump administration, which recently launched the Board of Peace at the World Economic Forum in Davos. This has mutated from a temporary institution set up by a Security Council resolution to govern over Gaza into a seemingly permanent one that envisages a broader global role under Trump’s personal control. Its membership skews toward authoritarian regimes, and human rights don’t get a mention in its draft charter.

Instead of legitimising the Board of Peace, efforts should focus on Security Council reform to address the two fundamental flaws of representation and veto power. Accountability and transparency must also be enhanced. Civil society must have space to engage with the Council and urge states to prioritise the UN Charter over self-interest.

Some momentum exists. The September 2024 Pact for the Future committed leaders to developing a consolidated reform model. Since 2008, formal intergovernmental negotiations have addressed membership expansion, regional representation, veto reform and working methods. These became more transparent in 2023, with sessions recorded online, allowing civil society to track proceedings and challenge blocking states.

However, reform efforts faced entrenched interests, geopolitical rivalries and institutional inertia even before Trump started causing chaos. The UN faces a demanding 2026, forced to make funding cuts amid a liquidity crisis while choosing the next secretary-general. In such circumstances, it’s tempting to defer difficult decisions.

But the reform case is clear, as is the choice: act to make the Council fit for purpose or accept continuing paralysis and irrelevance, allowing it to be supplanted by Trump’s Board of Peace.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

Credit: United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 6 2026 (IPS)

The current UN financial crisis, described as the worst in the 80-year-old history of the world body, triggers the question: is the US using its financial clout defaulting in its arrears and its assessed contributions to precipitate the collapse of the UN?

If the crisis continues, the UN headquarters will be forced to shut down by August, ahead of the annual meeting of world leaders in September this year, according to a report in the New York Times last week, quoting unnamed senior UN officials.

But apparently there is still hope for survival —judging by a report coming out of the White House.

Asked about the current state of finances, UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric told reporters February 5: “We’ve seen cuts by the United States. We’ve seen cuts by European countries over the last year. And every day, I talk to you about what happens when there’s no money, right?”

“Rations are being reduced, health care not being delivered. So, I mean it’s pretty clear. In terms of the Secretariat, should it come to pass, it will impact our ability to run meetings in this building, to do the political work we do, the peacekeeping work that we do”, he pointed out.

About hopes of a possible resolution, he said “I do also have to say that we saw the reports…earlier this week – of the President of the United States signing a budget bill, which includes funding for the United Nations”.

“We welcome that, and we will stay in contact with the US over the coming days and weeks to monitor the transfers of those monies,” said Dujarric.

Meanwhile, in an interview with IPS last week, Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Founder/CEO, International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN), said the potential financial collapse of the UN is depressing and yet so indicative of these times, when leadership everywhere is devoid of any sense of responsibility and has no care for the future.

They are the antithesis of the UN’s founding fathers and mothers, who, having experienced the hell of war and destitution first hand, committed themselves to creating a global peace and security architecture with the goal of preventing such hell for us – the future generation – their descendants, she argued.

“We all know that the UN system has never been perfect. It has never lived up to its potential. Often this has been due to the shenanigans of the powerful states, who persist in manipulating the institution for their own interests”.

The UN Security Council has long been the insecurity Council, given how the P5 are all implicated in one or other of the worst wars and genocides of the past 25 years, she said.

“But they are not solely to blame. Within the system too, we have seen both leadership and staff with vested interests, benefitting from the inertia, and unwilling to uphold new practices and priorities that would have brought transformative impact”.

“But dysfunction should not lead to abandonment and the dismantling of the system. The UN cannot be stripped and have its key assets and functions sold to the lowest bidder”.

Already, she said, the dystopian (US-created) Board of Peace is akin to the corporate raiders and vulture funds of the finance world – trying to strip the UN of its key functions but with no accountability or guard rails pertaining to its actions.

As it stands, the U.S. currently owes about $2.196 billion to the U.N.’s regular budget, including $767 million for this year and for prior years, according to U.N. sources.

The U.S. also owes $1.8 billion for the separate budget for the U.N.’s peacekeeping operations overseas, and that also will rise.

As of February 5, only 51 countries had paid their dues in full for 2026—that’s 51 out of 193. A breakdown of the last four payments follows: Australia, $65,309,876, Austria, $20,041,168, Croatia, $2,801,889, and Cyprus $1,120,513.

Dr. Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of San Francisco, told IPS on the one hand, the United States has been in arrears in its payments to the United Nations quite a bit in recent years, but the UN has managed to get by.

However, the extent of the Trump administration’s cutbacks and the ways they are being targeted at particularly vulnerable programs has resulted in this unprecedented fiscal crisis.

“The hostility of the Trump administration to the United Nations is extreme. Trump has made clear he believes there should be no legal restraints on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, so it is not surprising he would seek to undermine the world’s primary institution mandated with supporting international law and world order,” declared Dr Zunes.

Addressing the UN’s Administrative and Budgetary Committee last week Chandramouli Ramanathan, Assistant Secretary-General, Controller, Management Strategy, Policy said: “The UN staff is progressively losing confidence in the entire budget process,” referring to cash shortages that have led to severe spending and hiring restrictions. The United Nations needs to find a compromise that allows the Organization to function effectively, he added.

Anderlini, elaborating further, told IPS “now more than ever, the institution must be sustained and enabled to thrive and deliver on the promise of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the body of conventions and policies that have been developed through painstaking work to meet the challenges of today’s world.”

When global military spending is topping $2.6 trillion, she said, the UN’s approved annual budget of $3.45 billion seems like pocket change.

“It is absurd for our governments to be borrowing billions to fund weapons, but nickel and diming the UN, governmental agencies and civil society organizations that work to prevent conflict, build peace and ensure human and environmental security.”

“We live in an era where one man’s assets may soon be valued at over one trillion dollars and the world’s billionaire class wealth increased by $2.5 trillion in just one year 2025. They are lauded and applauded even though their wealth is made on the backs, bodies and lands of “We the people of the United Nations” – whether through tax avoidance or investment in high climate impact sectors such as fossil fuels and mining.”

Perhaps they should be taxed and forced to foot the bill for their complicity in the disasters that the UN is forced to clean up.

Peace and development are good for business, she argued. “They are essential for any society to survive and thrive. The UN and the global ecosystem of institutions and people dedicated to caring for the world give us our humanity – far beyond anything that can be limited to monetary value. But in dollar terms they are a great investment with returns that benefit billions of people worldwide, not just a stockpile of deadly weapons or a handful of billionaires”.

Thanks to member states’ abrogation of responsibility to uphold human rights and prevent the scourge of war, violence cost the world $19.97 trillion in 2024, or 11.6% of global GDP. According the Institute of Economics and peace this represents $2,455 per person, includes military spending, internal security, and lost economic activity, declared Anderlini.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

This chapter analyses the digital divide in Africa by offering both a global perspective and a comparative examination of its various dimensions across and within African states. The main objective is to give an overview of the overall situation and trends in terms of moving African digital access from gaps to goals. In view of this objective, it describes overall trends to provide a continental perspective and does not provide a detailed description as to why individual countries perform differently from others. The chapter was prepared jointly with chapter 5 that analyses key policy dimensions and international cooperation initiatives focused on digital access, with a key focus on the European Union’s Global Gateway and the Italian government’s Mattei Plan.

This chapter analyses the digital divide in Africa by offering both a global perspective and a comparative examination of its various dimensions across and within African states. The main objective is to give an overview of the overall situation and trends in terms of moving African digital access from gaps to goals. In view of this objective, it describes overall trends to provide a continental perspective and does not provide a detailed description as to why individual countries perform differently from others. The chapter was prepared jointly with chapter 5 that analyses key policy dimensions and international cooperation initiatives focused on digital access, with a key focus on the European Union’s Global Gateway and the Italian government’s Mattei Plan.

This chapter analyses the digital divide in Africa by offering both a global perspective and a comparative examination of its various dimensions across and within African states. The main objective is to give an overview of the overall situation and trends in terms of moving African digital access from gaps to goals. In view of this objective, it describes overall trends to provide a continental perspective and does not provide a detailed description as to why individual countries perform differently from others. The chapter was prepared jointly with chapter 5 that analyses key policy dimensions and international cooperation initiatives focused on digital access, with a key focus on the European Union’s Global Gateway and the Italian government’s Mattei Plan.

BERICHT über strategische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspartnerschaften der EU
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Michał Szczerba

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

ELIAMEP held the event “Climate Resilience in Islands Regions and Local Government” on 20 January 2026, at the Hellenic American Union, within the framework of the European project Pathways2Resilience (SMILE). More than 20 speakers from the scientific community, policymaking bodies, municipal authorities, and social partners participated, aiming to strengthen public dialogue on climate change in island areas and the role of Local Government in addressing it.

The discussion focused on the conceptual foundations of climate resilience and their interpretation through the lens of the specific characteristics of insularity. Small scale, geographic isolation, intense tourism pressure, uncontrolled construction, depletion of natural resources, and the lack of critical infrastructure render islands more exposed to climate risks and limit their adaptive capacity.

Particular emphasis was placed on the crucial role of local authorities, which manage key policy areas directly linked to climate resilience, such as flood risk management, infrastructure maintenance, prevention of environmental degradation, and response to extreme events. At the same time, it was highlighted that municipalities’ proximity to local communities and the experiential knowledge they possess can strengthen adaptation planning, risk assessment, and the legitimacy of interventions.

A significant part of the discussion was devoted to whether the existing institutional, administrative, and financial framework enables Local Government to effectively perform this role, particularly in island areas. Despite the transfer of critical competences, the lack of adequate resources, technical support, and administrative capacity-building remains a major obstacle.

The event highlighted as a central conclusion that prevention and the strengthening of resilience in island communities require a holistic approach and cooperation among the scientific community, local authorities, institutions, and citizens. In an environment of an intensifying climate crisis, timely action is a critical factor in limiting impacts and enhancing the resilience of islands.

Many of these issues are also addressed in the ELIAMEP policy paper entitled “Climate Resilience in Island Regions and Local Government”, authored by Othon Kaminiaris, Expert on Environment and Climate Change at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Research Associate, ELIAMEP, and Artemis Androni, International Development Advisor.

The full text of the paper is available here, and its executive summary is available here (in Greek).

 

Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hat in ihrer heutigen Ratssitzung den Leitzins unverändert gelassen. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) steckt derzeit in einem Dilemma: Die schwache Wirtschaft im Euroraum könnte die Inflation zu stark drücken, während geopolitische und geoökonomische Konflikte den gegenteiligen Effekt haben und die Inflation wieder anheizen könnten. Auch wenn die EZB ihre Leitzinsen erneut unverändert lässt, muss sie jetzt signalisieren, dass sie flexibel bleibt.

Momentan liegt die Inflationsrate unter dem EZB-Ziel der Preisstabilität. Die anhaltende wirtschaftliche Schwäche im Euroraum – besonders in Deutschland – könnte in diesem Jahr zu weiter fallenden Inflationsraten und einem klaren Verfehlen des Inflationsziels führen. Eine Aufwertung des Euro würde diesen Trend noch verstärken und vor allem deutschen Exporteuren zusätzlich schaden. Gleichzeitig könnten Strafzölle und steigende Energiepreise infolge geopolitischer Spannungen die Preise wieder deutlich steigen lassen.

Die EZB muss daher sorgfältig zwischen langfristigen strukturellen Problemen und kurzfristigen konjunkturellen Schwankungen unterscheiden. Es zeichnet sich ab, dass die strukturellen Schwächen der europäischen Wirtschaft noch länger bestehen bleiben werden.

Daher sollte die EZB klar kommunizieren, dass sie gewillt und fähig ist, schnell und flexibel zu handeln. Ich gehe davon aus, dass der nächste Zinsschritt noch in diesem Jahr eine weitere Senkung des Leitzinses sein wird.

Investment facilitation is an increasingly important policy tool to promote foreign investment. However, we know very little about its prevalence. This paper introduces a new dataset for measuring the adoption of investment facilitation measures at country level. The Investment Facilitation Index (IFI) covers 101 measures, grouped into six policy areas, and maps adoption across 142 economies. The paper outlines the conceptual and methodological framework of the IFI, analyses the current levels of adoption, and demonstrates the index’s robustness. The data show that economies with lower adoption rates typically belong to the low-income or lower-middle-income groups, often located in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. This dataset serves as a benchmark for assessing the design and impact of international agreements, such as the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA). It can also support the IFDA implementation by guiding domestic assessments of technical assistance needs and capacity development.

Investment facilitation is an increasingly important policy tool to promote foreign investment. However, we know very little about its prevalence. This paper introduces a new dataset for measuring the adoption of investment facilitation measures at country level. The Investment Facilitation Index (IFI) covers 101 measures, grouped into six policy areas, and maps adoption across 142 economies. The paper outlines the conceptual and methodological framework of the IFI, analyses the current levels of adoption, and demonstrates the index’s robustness. The data show that economies with lower adoption rates typically belong to the low-income or lower-middle-income groups, often located in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. This dataset serves as a benchmark for assessing the design and impact of international agreements, such as the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA). It can also support the IFDA implementation by guiding domestic assessments of technical assistance needs and capacity development.

Investment facilitation is an increasingly important policy tool to promote foreign investment. However, we know very little about its prevalence. This paper introduces a new dataset for measuring the adoption of investment facilitation measures at country level. The Investment Facilitation Index (IFI) covers 101 measures, grouped into six policy areas, and maps adoption across 142 economies. The paper outlines the conceptual and methodological framework of the IFI, analyses the current levels of adoption, and demonstrates the index’s robustness. The data show that economies with lower adoption rates typically belong to the low-income or lower-middle-income groups, often located in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. This dataset serves as a benchmark for assessing the design and impact of international agreements, such as the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA). It can also support the IFDA implementation by guiding domestic assessments of technical assistance needs and capacity development.

15 Jahre sind seit Beginn der ägyptischen Revolution vergangen, die am 25. Januar 2011 Präsident Mubarak stürzte. Statt Feierlichkeiten sind die Jahrestage von Trauer geprägt, von erzwungenem Schweigen und stillem Gedenken an jene, die im Streben nach einem verratenen Traum gefallen sind. Die Revolution wurde demontiert, umgeschrieben und ihres Sinns entleert – nicht nur wegen dem, was verloren ging, sondern auch dem, was niemals Wirklichkeit wurde. Revolutionen werden nicht an Parolen oder Momenten kollektiver Euphorie gemessen, sondern daran, ob sie radikale institutionelle Veränderungen bewirken, die über den Moment der Straße hinaus Bestand haben. Gemessen daran ist die ägyptische Januarrevolution politisch, wirtschaftlich und moralisch gescheitert.

15 Jahre sind seit Beginn der ägyptischen Revolution vergangen, die am 25. Januar 2011 Präsident Mubarak stürzte. Statt Feierlichkeiten sind die Jahrestage von Trauer geprägt, von erzwungenem Schweigen und stillem Gedenken an jene, die im Streben nach einem verratenen Traum gefallen sind. Die Revolution wurde demontiert, umgeschrieben und ihres Sinns entleert – nicht nur wegen dem, was verloren ging, sondern auch dem, was niemals Wirklichkeit wurde. Revolutionen werden nicht an Parolen oder Momenten kollektiver Euphorie gemessen, sondern daran, ob sie radikale institutionelle Veränderungen bewirken, die über den Moment der Straße hinaus Bestand haben. Gemessen daran ist die ägyptische Januarrevolution politisch, wirtschaftlich und moralisch gescheitert.

15 Jahre sind seit Beginn der ägyptischen Revolution vergangen, die am 25. Januar 2011 Präsident Mubarak stürzte. Statt Feierlichkeiten sind die Jahrestage von Trauer geprägt, von erzwungenem Schweigen und stillem Gedenken an jene, die im Streben nach einem verratenen Traum gefallen sind. Die Revolution wurde demontiert, umgeschrieben und ihres Sinns entleert – nicht nur wegen dem, was verloren ging, sondern auch dem, was niemals Wirklichkeit wurde. Revolutionen werden nicht an Parolen oder Momenten kollektiver Euphorie gemessen, sondern daran, ob sie radikale institutionelle Veränderungen bewirken, die über den Moment der Straße hinaus Bestand haben. Gemessen daran ist die ägyptische Januarrevolution politisch, wirtschaftlich und moralisch gescheitert.

Nucleus-outgrower schemes (NOSs) are considered particularly effective private-sector mechanisms for supporting smallholder farmers and mitigating problematic aspects of large-scale agricultural investments. Using two rounds of panel household surveys from approximately 780 households in Zambia, this study examines the impact of a NOS associated with one of the largest foreign land-based investments in agriculture in Zambia. We focus on links between NOS interventions and smallholder farmers’ adoption of agricultural technologies, sustainable land management (SLM) practices, and crop productivity. Findings indicate that NOS participation increased adoption of full-suite conservation agriculture (CA) practices. However, impacts on other technologies, specifically improved seed varieties, are less clear and depend on support type and scheme design. Results also show that while overall productivity impacts are modest, the programme contributed to maize productivity improvements during its initial phase, but less so latter when focus shifted towards oilseed crops. In summary, NOSs, despite associated risks, have potential to make substantial contributions to sustainable agricultural practices and improve smallholder productivity.

Nucleus-outgrower schemes (NOSs) are considered particularly effective private-sector mechanisms for supporting smallholder farmers and mitigating problematic aspects of large-scale agricultural investments. Using two rounds of panel household surveys from approximately 780 households in Zambia, this study examines the impact of a NOS associated with one of the largest foreign land-based investments in agriculture in Zambia. We focus on links between NOS interventions and smallholder farmers’ adoption of agricultural technologies, sustainable land management (SLM) practices, and crop productivity. Findings indicate that NOS participation increased adoption of full-suite conservation agriculture (CA) practices. However, impacts on other technologies, specifically improved seed varieties, are less clear and depend on support type and scheme design. Results also show that while overall productivity impacts are modest, the programme contributed to maize productivity improvements during its initial phase, but less so latter when focus shifted towards oilseed crops. In summary, NOSs, despite associated risks, have potential to make substantial contributions to sustainable agricultural practices and improve smallholder productivity.

Nucleus-outgrower schemes (NOSs) are considered particularly effective private-sector mechanisms for supporting smallholder farmers and mitigating problematic aspects of large-scale agricultural investments. Using two rounds of panel household surveys from approximately 780 households in Zambia, this study examines the impact of a NOS associated with one of the largest foreign land-based investments in agriculture in Zambia. We focus on links between NOS interventions and smallholder farmers’ adoption of agricultural technologies, sustainable land management (SLM) practices, and crop productivity. Findings indicate that NOS participation increased adoption of full-suite conservation agriculture (CA) practices. However, impacts on other technologies, specifically improved seed varieties, are less clear and depend on support type and scheme design. Results also show that while overall productivity impacts are modest, the programme contributed to maize productivity improvements during its initial phase, but less so latter when focus shifted towards oilseed crops. In summary, NOSs, despite associated risks, have potential to make substantial contributions to sustainable agricultural practices and improve smallholder productivity.

Neuzulassungen von Elektroautos in Deutschland erholen sich nach Rückgang – Neue Elektro-Pkw überwiegend in oberen Fahrzeugklassen – Ladeinfrastruktur wächst schneller als Elektroautoflotte – Fehlende politische Klarheit bremst Antriebswende – Klare Prioritätensetzung entscheidend Nach einem ...

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States abducting Venezuela’s president,and U.S. President Donald Trump’s public musings about annexing Greenland all point in the same direction. After decades marked by Western dominance, economic globalization and the expansion of multilateral institutions, the ostentatious exercise and threat of raw military power are back at the center of world politics. Overall, we are seeing the return of overt geopolitics: a style of major power politics that does not bother to hide behind international law or multilateral norms. That’s good news for China – and bad news for Taiwan.