Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Germany and Morocco have a long-standing history of development cooperation, which is now evolving amid a rapidly changing regional and international context. This partnership benefits both countries, and there is significant potential for it to deepen. Morocco has emerged as a key actor in North and West Africa, strengthening its economic, military and geopolitical influence. It benefits from German expertise, investment and strategic support. Germany, as a middle power in Europe, relies on Morocco’s cooperation to advance its economic, technological and diplomatic interests in Africa and the Mediterranean.
Global dynamics are reshaping the nature of German–Moroccan cooperation. Traditional development cooperation models, in which Western countries provide aid to countries in the “Global South”, are becoming less relevant. Increasingly, cooperation is taking the form of transactional relationships aimed at realising mutual economic, commercial and political gains. This pragmatic approach nevertheless needs to remain embedded in cooperation norms that emphasise human rights, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. These principles underpin mutual long-term benefits for the societies of both countries.
Germany needs to position itself as a partner that defines its interests clearly, combining strategic and economic collaboration with support for inclusive and sustainable development. Where trade-offs exist, these must be identified, addressed, or, if necessary, lead to Germany refraining from cooperation in certain areas. Morocco, despite important progress in poverty reduction over the past two decades, continues to face significant socio-economic disparities, and inequalities are rising in the context of climate change, limited access to health and education, and opaque
governance. International partners can support Morocco in addressing these issues.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has articulated a foreign policy that pursues interests and upholds values via strong partnerships with key countries. Development cooperation is a core component of these relationships, both for addressing sustainable development needs and for opening doors for other relationships, in a comprehensive cooperation policy format. Moroccan government officials, researchers and civil society actors interviewed for this paper stressed that this is exactly the kind of relationship that their country is looking to build.
Looking ahead, four key strategic thematic areas are likely to define cooperation over the next decade:
1. geostrategic interests – particularly the status of Western Sahara and African relations;
2. infrastructure and investment – focusing on public and private sector investment in infrastructure, connectivity and energy;
3. migration, labour markets and training – emphasising legal migration, vocational training, and meeting both countries’ labour market needs; and
4. governance for the common good – including climate action and transparent, accountable and inclusive governance both locally and internationally.
Over more than 50 years, Germany and Morocco have built significant trust through development cooperation, providing a strong foundation for a more strategic partnership. Realising this potential, however, requires clarity on each country’s priorities, adaptability and red lines.

Germany and Morocco have a long-standing history of development cooperation, which is now evolving amid a rapidly changing regional and international context. This partnership benefits both countries, and there is significant potential for it to deepen. Morocco has emerged as a key actor in North and West Africa, strengthening its economic, military and geopolitical influence. It benefits from German expertise, investment and strategic support. Germany, as a middle power in Europe, relies on Morocco’s cooperation to advance its economic, technological and diplomatic interests in Africa and the Mediterranean.
Global dynamics are reshaping the nature of German–Moroccan cooperation. Traditional development cooperation models, in which Western countries provide aid to countries in the “Global South”, are becoming less relevant. Increasingly, cooperation is taking the form of transactional relationships aimed at realising mutual economic, commercial and political gains. This pragmatic approach nevertheless needs to remain embedded in cooperation norms that emphasise human rights, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. These principles underpin mutual long-term benefits for the societies of both countries.
Germany needs to position itself as a partner that defines its interests clearly, combining strategic and economic collaboration with support for inclusive and sustainable development. Where trade-offs exist, these must be identified, addressed, or, if necessary, lead to Germany refraining from cooperation in certain areas. Morocco, despite important progress in poverty reduction over the past two decades, continues to face significant socio-economic disparities, and inequalities are rising in the context of climate change, limited access to health and education, and opaque
governance. International partners can support Morocco in addressing these issues.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has articulated a foreign policy that pursues interests and upholds values via strong partnerships with key countries. Development cooperation is a core component of these relationships, both for addressing sustainable development needs and for opening doors for other relationships, in a comprehensive cooperation policy format. Moroccan government officials, researchers and civil society actors interviewed for this paper stressed that this is exactly the kind of relationship that their country is looking to build.
Looking ahead, four key strategic thematic areas are likely to define cooperation over the next decade:
1. geostrategic interests – particularly the status of Western Sahara and African relations;
2. infrastructure and investment – focusing on public and private sector investment in infrastructure, connectivity and energy;
3. migration, labour markets and training – emphasising legal migration, vocational training, and meeting both countries’ labour market needs; and
4. governance for the common good – including climate action and transparent, accountable and inclusive governance both locally and internationally.
Over more than 50 years, Germany and Morocco have built significant trust through development cooperation, providing a strong foundation for a more strategic partnership. Realising this potential, however, requires clarity on each country’s priorities, adaptability and red lines.

Germany and Morocco have a long-standing history of development cooperation, which is now evolving amid a rapidly changing regional and international context. This partnership benefits both countries, and there is significant potential for it to deepen. Morocco has emerged as a key actor in North and West Africa, strengthening its economic, military and geopolitical influence. It benefits from German expertise, investment and strategic support. Germany, as a middle power in Europe, relies on Morocco’s cooperation to advance its economic, technological and diplomatic interests in Africa and the Mediterranean.
Global dynamics are reshaping the nature of German–Moroccan cooperation. Traditional development cooperation models, in which Western countries provide aid to countries in the “Global South”, are becoming less relevant. Increasingly, cooperation is taking the form of transactional relationships aimed at realising mutual economic, commercial and political gains. This pragmatic approach nevertheless needs to remain embedded in cooperation norms that emphasise human rights, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. These principles underpin mutual long-term benefits for the societies of both countries.
Germany needs to position itself as a partner that defines its interests clearly, combining strategic and economic collaboration with support for inclusive and sustainable development. Where trade-offs exist, these must be identified, addressed, or, if necessary, lead to Germany refraining from cooperation in certain areas. Morocco, despite important progress in poverty reduction over the past two decades, continues to face significant socio-economic disparities, and inequalities are rising in the context of climate change, limited access to health and education, and opaque
governance. International partners can support Morocco in addressing these issues.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has articulated a foreign policy that pursues interests and upholds values via strong partnerships with key countries. Development cooperation is a core component of these relationships, both for addressing sustainable development needs and for opening doors for other relationships, in a comprehensive cooperation policy format. Moroccan government officials, researchers and civil society actors interviewed for this paper stressed that this is exactly the kind of relationship that their country is looking to build.
Looking ahead, four key strategic thematic areas are likely to define cooperation over the next decade:
1. geostrategic interests – particularly the status of Western Sahara and African relations;
2. infrastructure and investment – focusing on public and private sector investment in infrastructure, connectivity and energy;
3. migration, labour markets and training – emphasising legal migration, vocational training, and meeting both countries’ labour market needs; and
4. governance for the common good – including climate action and transparent, accountable and inclusive governance both locally and internationally.
Over more than 50 years, Germany and Morocco have built significant trust through development cooperation, providing a strong foundation for a more strategic partnership. Realising this potential, however, requires clarity on each country’s priorities, adaptability and red lines.

L’Allemagne et le Maroc sont liés par une coopération au développement de longue date, qui évolue dans un contexte régional et international en mutation. Ce partenariat mutuellement bénéfique pourrait être considérablement approfondi. Devenu un acteur clé en Afrique du Nord et de l’Ouest, le Maroc renforce son influence économique, militaire et géopolitique. Il bénéficie de l’expertise, des investissements et du soutien stratégique de l’Allemagne. L’Allemagne quant à elle s’appuie sur la coopération avec le Maroc pour promouvoir ses intérêts économiques, technologiques et diplomatiques en Afrique et en Méditerranée.
Aujourd’hui, les dynamiques mondiales redéfinissent la nature de la coopération. La coopération au développement traditionnelle en tant qu’aide apportée par les pays occidentaux aux pays du « Sud global » perd de sa pertinence. Elle évolue vers des relations transactionnelles au bénéfice des gains économiques, commerciaux et politiques mutuels. Cette approche pragmatique doit néanmoins rester ancrée dans des normes de coopération privilégiant droits humains, inclusion sociale et durabilité environnementale – des principes essentiels pour des avantages mutuels durables pour les deux sociétés.
L’Allemagne doit s’affirmer comme partenaire défendant clairement ses intérêts, alliant collaboration stratégique et économique à un soutien au développement durable et inclusif. Les compromis éventuels devront être identifiés et adressés ou, si nécessaire, l’Allemagne devra s’abstenir de coopérer dans certains domaines. Malgré un recul notable de la pauvreté, le Maroc fait face à des disparités socioéconomiques significatives et les inégalités se creusent sur fond de changement climatique, d’accès limité à la santé et à l’éducation et d’opacité de la gouvernance. Face à ces
défis, les partenaires internationaux peuvent soutenir le Maroc.
Le chancelier allemand Friedrich Merz a articulé une politique étrangère qui défend les intérêts et poursuit les valeurs du pays par le biais de partenariats solides avec des pays clés. La coopération au développement en est une composante centrale, tant pour soutenir le développement durable que pour faciliter une politique de coopération globale. Comme l’ont souligné nos interlocuteurs marocains du gouvernement, des institutions publiques, de la recherche de la société civile, il s’agit ici précisément du genre de relation que leur pays cherche à construire.
Quatre grands axes stratégiques seront probablement au centre de la coopération au cours de la prochaine décennie :
1. Intérêts géostratégiques – en particulier le statut du Sahara occidental et les relations africaines ;
2. Infrastructure et investissements – surtout infrastructures publiques, connectivité et énergie ;
3. Emploi, compétences et migration – autour de la migration légale, la formation professionnelle et des besoins du marché du travail des deux pays ; et
4. Gouvernance pour le bien commun – y compris l’action pour le climat et une gouvernance transparente, responsable et inclusive au niveau local et international.
En plus de 50 ans, la confiance entre l’Allemagne et le Maroc s’est considérablement renforcée dans le contexte de leur coopération au développement, offrant une base solide en vue d’un partenariat à visée plus stratégique. La réalisation de ce potentiel nécessite cependant de clarifier les priorités, la capacité d’adaptation et les lignes rouges de chaque pays.

L’Allemagne et le Maroc sont liés par une coopération au développement de longue date, qui évolue dans un contexte régional et international en mutation. Ce partenariat mutuellement bénéfique pourrait être considérablement approfondi. Devenu un acteur clé en Afrique du Nord et de l’Ouest, le Maroc renforce son influence économique, militaire et géopolitique. Il bénéficie de l’expertise, des investissements et du soutien stratégique de l’Allemagne. L’Allemagne quant à elle s’appuie sur la coopération avec le Maroc pour promouvoir ses intérêts économiques, technologiques et diplomatiques en Afrique et en Méditerranée.
Aujourd’hui, les dynamiques mondiales redéfinissent la nature de la coopération. La coopération au développement traditionnelle en tant qu’aide apportée par les pays occidentaux aux pays du « Sud global » perd de sa pertinence. Elle évolue vers des relations transactionnelles au bénéfice des gains économiques, commerciaux et politiques mutuels. Cette approche pragmatique doit néanmoins rester ancrée dans des normes de coopération privilégiant droits humains, inclusion sociale et durabilité environnementale – des principes essentiels pour des avantages mutuels durables pour les deux sociétés.
L’Allemagne doit s’affirmer comme partenaire défendant clairement ses intérêts, alliant collaboration stratégique et économique à un soutien au développement durable et inclusif. Les compromis éventuels devront être identifiés et adressés ou, si nécessaire, l’Allemagne devra s’abstenir de coopérer dans certains domaines. Malgré un recul notable de la pauvreté, le Maroc fait face à des disparités socioéconomiques significatives et les inégalités se creusent sur fond de changement climatique, d’accès limité à la santé et à l’éducation et d’opacité de la gouvernance. Face à ces
défis, les partenaires internationaux peuvent soutenir le Maroc.
Le chancelier allemand Friedrich Merz a articulé une politique étrangère qui défend les intérêts et poursuit les valeurs du pays par le biais de partenariats solides avec des pays clés. La coopération au développement en est une composante centrale, tant pour soutenir le développement durable que pour faciliter une politique de coopération globale. Comme l’ont souligné nos interlocuteurs marocains du gouvernement, des institutions publiques, de la recherche de la société civile, il s’agit ici précisément du genre de relation que leur pays cherche à construire.
Quatre grands axes stratégiques seront probablement au centre de la coopération au cours de la prochaine décennie :
1. Intérêts géostratégiques – en particulier le statut du Sahara occidental et les relations africaines ;
2. Infrastructure et investissements – surtout infrastructures publiques, connectivité et énergie ;
3. Emploi, compétences et migration – autour de la migration légale, la formation professionnelle et des besoins du marché du travail des deux pays ; et
4. Gouvernance pour le bien commun – y compris l’action pour le climat et une gouvernance transparente, responsable et inclusive au niveau local et international.
En plus de 50 ans, la confiance entre l’Allemagne et le Maroc s’est considérablement renforcée dans le contexte de leur coopération au développement, offrant une base solide en vue d’un partenariat à visée plus stratégique. La réalisation de ce potentiel nécessite cependant de clarifier les priorités, la capacité d’adaptation et les lignes rouges de chaque pays.

L’Allemagne et le Maroc sont liés par une coopération au développement de longue date, qui évolue dans un contexte régional et international en mutation. Ce partenariat mutuellement bénéfique pourrait être considérablement approfondi. Devenu un acteur clé en Afrique du Nord et de l’Ouest, le Maroc renforce son influence économique, militaire et géopolitique. Il bénéficie de l’expertise, des investissements et du soutien stratégique de l’Allemagne. L’Allemagne quant à elle s’appuie sur la coopération avec le Maroc pour promouvoir ses intérêts économiques, technologiques et diplomatiques en Afrique et en Méditerranée.
Aujourd’hui, les dynamiques mondiales redéfinissent la nature de la coopération. La coopération au développement traditionnelle en tant qu’aide apportée par les pays occidentaux aux pays du « Sud global » perd de sa pertinence. Elle évolue vers des relations transactionnelles au bénéfice des gains économiques, commerciaux et politiques mutuels. Cette approche pragmatique doit néanmoins rester ancrée dans des normes de coopération privilégiant droits humains, inclusion sociale et durabilité environnementale – des principes essentiels pour des avantages mutuels durables pour les deux sociétés.
L’Allemagne doit s’affirmer comme partenaire défendant clairement ses intérêts, alliant collaboration stratégique et économique à un soutien au développement durable et inclusif. Les compromis éventuels devront être identifiés et adressés ou, si nécessaire, l’Allemagne devra s’abstenir de coopérer dans certains domaines. Malgré un recul notable de la pauvreté, le Maroc fait face à des disparités socioéconomiques significatives et les inégalités se creusent sur fond de changement climatique, d’accès limité à la santé et à l’éducation et d’opacité de la gouvernance. Face à ces
défis, les partenaires internationaux peuvent soutenir le Maroc.
Le chancelier allemand Friedrich Merz a articulé une politique étrangère qui défend les intérêts et poursuit les valeurs du pays par le biais de partenariats solides avec des pays clés. La coopération au développement en est une composante centrale, tant pour soutenir le développement durable que pour faciliter une politique de coopération globale. Comme l’ont souligné nos interlocuteurs marocains du gouvernement, des institutions publiques, de la recherche de la société civile, il s’agit ici précisément du genre de relation que leur pays cherche à construire.
Quatre grands axes stratégiques seront probablement au centre de la coopération au cours de la prochaine décennie :
1. Intérêts géostratégiques – en particulier le statut du Sahara occidental et les relations africaines ;
2. Infrastructure et investissements – surtout infrastructures publiques, connectivité et énergie ;
3. Emploi, compétences et migration – autour de la migration légale, la formation professionnelle et des besoins du marché du travail des deux pays ; et
4. Gouvernance pour le bien commun – y compris l’action pour le climat et une gouvernance transparente, responsable et inclusive au niveau local et international.
En plus de 50 ans, la confiance entre l’Allemagne et le Maroc s’est considérablement renforcée dans le contexte de leur coopération au développement, offrant une base solide en vue d’un partenariat à visée plus stratégique. La réalisation de ce potentiel nécessite cependant de clarifier les priorités, la capacité d’adaptation et les lignes rouges de chaque pays.

The publication “Europe’s Overlooked Allies: Why the Western Balkans Matter for EU Defence Readiness” is a result of ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

The following policy brief and factsheet were prepared in collaboration with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Dialogue Southeast Europe and they present the core findings and strategic recommendations of the full report. It is intended to provide the audience with a concise, accessible overview of the key insights and proposed actions.

The original thematic report authored by Dr. Ana Krstinovska (Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP & Senior Researcher, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Dr. Alessandro Marrone (Head of “Defence, Security and Space” Programme, Istituto Affari Internazionali & Non-Resident Research Associate, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) explores the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the context of the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and enhanced defence readiness.It underscores the argument that Western Balkan countries—despite not yet being EU member states—have increasingly proven their value as security contributors and partners. This contribution is both timely and essential as the EU confronts the implications of the war in Ukraine and potential shifts in the transatlantic security relationship. At the EU level, recent initiatives, such as the 2024 European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the 2025 White Paper on European Defence, aim to enhance collective readiness and industrial capability. Yet, the full potential of regional partnerships—particularly with the Western Balkan region—has not been fully realized, undercutting the ability to leverage and further develop their defence capabilities.

You can read the policy brief here.

You can read the factsheet here.

The full report is available here.

Lors d'une réunion du Collège des commissaires, le commissaire chargé de la fiscalité a évoqué l'idée d'une nouvelle ressource propre basée sur les produits trop sucrés ou salés.

The post Budget de l’UE : le commissaire Hoekstra maintient la possibilité de taxer les produits trop sucrés ou salés appeared first on Euractiv FR.

• Venezuela’s crisis has long been narrated through an opposition prism: crowds in the streets demanding democracy, negotiations or contested ballots. In 2025, the spotlight has shifted. The decisive question is not how hard Venezuelans push but what the United States is prepared to do, and why.

• A draft defence review proposes a major redeployment. Led by under‑secretary Elbridge Colby, it calls for concentrating military power on the homeland and the Americas. The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo‑Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean. It revives the logic of the Monroe Doctrine: prevent rival powers from embedding in Latin America.

• For the architects of Washington’s new Venezuela campaign, success will be judged less by what happens in Caracas than by how it plays in Washington DC or Florida. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.

• Washington’s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment. Colby’s “homeland first, hemisphere next” doctrine would pull military assets from the East and surge them into the Americas.

• Latin America’s response reflects both caution and fatigue. They will hedge: criticise the optics of U.S. gunboat diplomacy while quietly ignoring any weakening of the Maduro regime.

• The regime’s only remaining legitimacy is the loyalty of its security apparatus and the fear it can instill.

• The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after María Corina Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize.

• Against that backdrop, four trajectories remain on the table for the crisis itself: 1) Ruling‑party managed transition; 2) Negotiated exit; 3) Forced removal; 4) Regime endurance.

• Venezuela’s impasse is fast becoming a proving ground for Washington’s “America first” doctrine and a primary focus on the Western Hemisphere in their foreign policy in decades.

• The backdrop is a country with its people exhausted, and its institutions hollowed out so internally in Venezuela very little should be expected. A purely theatrical strike may consolidate the status quo rather than topple it. If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle. Whether that is what President Trump actually seeks remains an open question.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Eduardo Massieu Paredes, Executive-in-residence Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

VENEZUELA’S CRISIS HAS LONG BEEN NARRATED THROUGH AN OPPOSITION PRISM: crowds in the streets demanding democracy, negotiations or contested ballots. In 2025, the spotlight has shifted. The decisive question is not how hard Venezuelans push but what the United States is prepared to do, and why. The United States deployed a naval buildup that includes more than 10 ships, including amphibious assault ships, a nuclear‑powered submarine, a special operations ship and an aircraft carrier, unprecedented to the Caribbean. For all that, the Venezuelan portfolio does not solely sit in the Pentagon or the State Department: Stephen Miller, the president’s homeland security adviser, has also taken a leading role in deciding which vessels to target. U.S. forces have so far destroyed sixteen suspected drug‑smuggling boats in international waters. This intervention could underscore a new viewpoint: is this campaign choreographed for a U.S. audience? Furthermore, how far are they willing to go?

A Don-Roe Doctrine?

Two forces shape the Caribbean stand‑off. First is a policy shift. President Donald Trump returned to office on an agenda that places national security, economic strength and sovereignty ahead of traditional diplomacy. Marco Rubio, the new secretary of state and the first Hispanic to hold the job, has been tasked with turning that creed into policy. The State Department’s first hundred‑day report notes that foreign‑aid programs were cut and visa rules tightened to ensure U.S. dollars serve “America First” priorities. It also touts persuading Panama and other Central American countries to reduce cooperation with China’s Belt and Road infrastructure plans. The message is clear: the Western Hemisphere is once again Washington’s sphere of influence.

The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo‑Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean.

Second, a draft defence review proposes a major redeployment. Led by under‑secretary Elbridge Colby, it calls for concentrating military power on the homeland and the Americas. The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo‑Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean. It revives the logic of the Monroe Doctrine: prevent rival powers from embedding in Latin America. In this view, Venezuela is not simply a faltering dictatorship but a potential beachhead for Iranian or Russian influence; deterrence must be visible and follow in line with this administration’s motto of ‘peace through strength’.

Always Victory at Home 

For the architects of Washington’s new Venezuela campaign, success will be judged less by what happens in Caracas than by how it plays in Washington DC or Florida. The White House homeland‑security adviser, Stephen Miller, chairs a reworked council that picks targets and sometimes sidelines the State Department. He has reportedly described the government in Caracas as a cartel—language calibrated for a domestic audience that wants to see criminals punished. War Secretary Pete Hegseth told marines aboard the USS Iwo Jima that their deployment is not a drill but a real‑world mission to “end the poisoning of Americans,” casting it as a crusade that keeps citizens safe. The presence of these two figures, alongside Secretary of State Marco Rubio, underscores how closely the ‘MAGA’ operation aligns with familiar Republican hawkishness: tough on security, unilateral when necessary, and keenly aware of how it plays in the electoral map.

Mr Rubio’s involvement also reflects personal and political ties. As Florida’s former senator he cultivated deep relationships with Venezuela’s opposition; he once called María Corina Machado, the most recent Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, the “Iron Lady” of her country and published an op‑ed praising her courage. He knows that Venezuelan‑American and Cuban‑American voters are pivotal in his home state, and he is not alone in seeing the Caribbean as fertile ground for political capital. For all three men, pressing a regime they see on the ropes may look like a low‑hanging fruit: a way to showcase toughness, score points with a conservative base and, perhaps, advance their own ambitions.

The question is whether this chase for a domestic victory will actually change anything inside Venezuela. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.

In this view, Caracas is both a proxy and an opportunity: neutralise a hostile regime, demonstrate that Washington will police its neighbourhood and send a message to US’ voters that the administration is protecting the homeland. The question is whether this chase for a domestic victory will actually change anything inside Venezuela. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.

What can Europe learn from the Caribbean 

Washington’s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment.

Washington’s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment. Colby’s “homeland first, hemisphere next” doctrine would pull military assets from the East and surge them into the Americas. In practical terms, that would mean fewer ships and aircraft watching the South China Sea or the Baltic Sea, and more watching the Caribbean and the southern border. For instance, the U.S. Navy’s most powerful aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, and its strike group departed from Croatia and are heading to the Caribbean for a new deployment. Latin America becomes the arena where America wants to prove it can still dominate without alliances, while Europe and Asia get pushed down the priority list.

This administration also seems to be resuscitating the Reagan-Bush discourse of the “war on drugs”. Four lethal U.S. strikes against drug boats in the Caribbean are being justified as part of a “non‑international armed conflict” with terrorist cartels. In other words, this administration sees little threats in a geopolitical context of democracy vs. autocracy as well as no need to consult international allies or Congress. Domestic optics—especially playing to voters who want a hard line on drugs and immigration—seem to matter more than European approval or Asian deterrence. The Venezuelan case suggests that, for the foreseeable future, U.S. security decisions may be shaped less by global consensus and more by domestic calculations with a Monroe‑style sphere of influence twist. 

Reaction from the Neighbourhood

Latin America’s response reflects both caution and fatigue. Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva described the U.S. naval buildup as a source of tension and warned it could threaten regional peace. He noted that Washington’s drug‑trafficking accusations lacked evidence and that the lethal strike on a boat was likely illegal. The comment signals the delicate position of governments that distrust Mr Maduro but also remember past US interventions contemptuously. In Mexico City, Mr Rubio faced questions about sovereignty even as he promised deeper cooperation with President Claudia Sheinbaum. Mexico and Brazil may oppose an ‘invasion’ but are unlikely to expend political capital defending Caracas. They will hedge: criticise the optics of U.S. gunboat diplomacy while quietly ignoring any weakening of the Maduro regime.

As Venezuela’s largest neighbour and leading diplomatic power in South America, Brazil is deeply concerned that a forced collapse of the Maduro regime would trigger mass migration to its northern frontier, regional militarisation, and paramilitary spillover.

As Venezuela’s largest neighbour and leading diplomatic power in South America, Brazil is deeply concerned that a forced collapse of the Maduro regime would trigger mass migration to its northern frontier, regional militarisation, and paramilitary spillover. This pushes Brazil to continue favoring a negotiated scenario, yet Brazil’s influence has proven limited in the past. The opposition pointed to how it could not secure safe passage for dissidents under its protection in Caracas, and how little diplomatic pressure any international actor can put on Maduro. Brazil will continue to signal to the US against any form of intervention, will quietly promote talks, and essentially seek stability on its border regardless of the fate of Mr. Maduro.

Legitimacy at a Nadir

All this is happening while Mr Maduro’s own standing is at its lowest. International observers and independent tallies agree that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia won the 2024 presidential vote, only for the regime to rewrite the results. Even some of Mr Maduro’s traditional allies in the region—like Brazil and Colombia—acknowledged doubts about the election’s legitimacy and declined to recognise his new mandate. The regime’s only remaining legitimacy is the loyalty of its security apparatus and the fear it can instill.

Yet that loyalty is brittle. Years of purges and politicisation have left the armed forces fractured. This fragmentation has done two things at once: it has prevented a coup—no faction is strong enough to depose Mr Maduro—yet it also means that if he falls, no coherent military bloc is likely to topple his successor.

As U.S. warships drew closer in September, he ordered the Bolivarian National Militia—a civilian force attached to the armed forces— instead of the Army to prepare to “defend the homeland.” In other words, the state’s coercive power rests as much on politicised volunteers as on the regular army—a sign of weakness rather than strength.

Years of dictatorship have also depoliticised society. Under the weight of hyperinflation and collapsing services, many Venezuelans have turned away from ideological debate; politics is secondary to hunger and survival. This makes Mr Maduro’s appeals to defend the homeland against imperialism ring hollow for large swathes of the population. A militarised mobilisation might energise loyalists who benefit from the status quo, but it does not convince those who are simply trying to feed their families. The contrast is stark: on one side, an ageing elite clinging to power; on the other, a society more concerned with the price of food than with slogans about sovereignty.

The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after María Corina Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize.

The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after María Corina Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize. It is a powerful endorsement at home and abroad, yet the opposition has not been able to translate its moral authority into decisive action. With prominent leaders jailed, exiled or underground, Machado is the only widely recognised voice, operating from the shadows yet carrying a broad popular mandate. Her ally Edmundo González, widely regarded as the true winner of the 2024 election, speaks from abroad; together they embody a legitimacy that the regime lacks, though they cannot convert it into power while the armed forces remain fragmented and society is exhausted by poverty and persecution. That credibility matters in a post‑Maduro scenario: there is a leader to hand the reins to, even if the day‑to‑day structures of the state are in disarray. But the longer the standoff drags on, the more the opposition risks becoming symbolic rather than operational. The stalemate endures partly because everyone is too weak to break it.

Scenarios Beyond the Headlines

In Washington, the priority is a win that plays at home. The administration shows little interest in adjudicating who governs in Caracas; all signals suggest Mr. Trump’s instinct is to avoid classic “regime change” so much so that the President failed to mention Maduro or Machado by name when he talked about his phone call with the Nobel Peace Prize winner. Is this enough to hypothesize that the US administration could land on a middle course, declare victory over “the cartels” for a domestic audience while steering clear of Venezuela’s internal power struggle. Against that backdrop, four trajectories remain on the table for the crisis itself:

1. Ruling‑party managed transition: The president may be replaced by senior figures within the ruling socialist party (for example Vice President Delcy Rodríguez). This would keep the regime’s structures intact but remove its most toxic symbol. International actors might accept this as progress; the democratic opposition would reject this option and would look to access power through a rebellion.
2. Negotiated exit: Mr. Maduro, under intense international pressure and perhaps fearing arrest or death, could bargain for safe passage abroad, trading his exit for guarantees on his life and property. Such a deal would leave a power vacuum and require a caretaker government with some form of support from the military until fresh elections, which would likely be won by Mrs. Machado.
3. Forced removal – An internal coup, mass uprising or foreign‑backed intervention could topple Mr Maduro. A new leadership, most likely stemming from the current opposition or unexpected military leaders would need rapid international support to prevent chaos and respond to the collapse of public services. Without a plan, local militias could fracture into insurgent groups with a very weak government on the ground.
4. Regime endurance – Mr. Maduro could survive the pressure as he did before, thanks to repression, inertia and a paralyzed opposition. The government would become more repressive and insular; hopes for a negotiated transition would fade, and the world would look away.

Will Optics Trump Outcomes? 

If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle.

Venezuela’s impasse is fast becoming a proving ground for Washington’s “America first” doctrine and a primary focus on the Western Hemisphere in their foreign policy in decades. To some in this administration, reviving Monroe‑era language, sinking a few boats, slap the label of “narco‑terrorism” on an adversary, and declaring a mission accomplished to voters in Florida will be a win. To others, victory is only possible if the US collects Maduro’s bounty, but there we will be entering into unknown territory, territory which could make President Trump uncomfortable. In addition, the backdrop is a country with its people exhausted, and its institutions hollowed out so internally in Venezuela very little should be expected. A purely theatrical strike may consolidate the status quo rather than topple it. If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle. Whether that is what President Trump actually seeks remains an open question.

 

Das DIW Berlin engagiert sich aktiv für die berufliche Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern und kontinuierlich daran, Benachteiligungen zu verhindern. Die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter ist ein fest verankertes institutionelles Ziel, das in internen und externen Dokumenten wie der Satzung, dem Frauenförderplan und Betriebsvereinbarungen verankert ist. Dabei richtet sich das DIW Berlin nach den Rahmenempfehlungen zur Geschlechtergleichstellung der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft sowie der Ausführungsvereinbarung Gleichstellung (AV Glei) der Gemeinsamen Wissenschaftskonferenz (GWK). Die Gewährleistung von Umsetzung, Einhaltung und Aktualisierung gleichstellungsspezifischer Belange obliegt der Gleichstellungsbeauftragten.

Die Gleichstellungsbeauftragten des DIW Berlin suchen zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt  

eine*n Praktikant*in (w/m/d)

(bis zu 19,5 Wochenstunden)

Die Monopolkommission hat heute ihr 10. Sektorgutachten Energie veröffentlicht und zentrale Reformen für Strom-, Ladeinfrastruktur, Fernwärme- und Gassysteme empfohlen. Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin und Vorsitzender der Monopolkommission, äußert sich dazu wie folgt:

Die aktuelle Debatte über hohe Strompreise zeigt einmal mehr, dass die Bekämpfung von Symptomen allein nicht ausreicht. Wir stehen vor grundlegenden Veränderungen im Strommarkt, deren Erfolg maßgeblich von der erzielten Effizienz abhängt. Nur wenn Preis- und Kapazitätssignale richtig gesetzt werden, können Verbraucher*innen und Unternehmen langfristig von niedrigen Systemkosten profitieren. Doch bislang fehlen oft die richtigen Anreize für ein Verhalten, das das Netz entlastet. Derzeit stoßen Netze an ihre Belastungsgrenzen und günstige erneuerbare Energien müssen abgeregelt werden. Abhilfe schaffen würden Preise nach Netzknoten oder Zonen – oder zumindest dynamische Netzentgelte. Solche variablen Preise sowie eine durchgreifende Digitalisierung könnten einen strukturellen Wendepunkt markieren. Die Frage ist, ob Politik und Behörden bereit sind, diesen Weg konsequent zu gehen.

Auch bei der Ladeinfrastruktur für Elektromobilität zeigt sich ein strukturelles Problem. Die Direktvergabe zahlreicher Standorte – vor allem entlang der Autobahnen – birgt das Risiko lokaler Monopole und kann die Preise in die Höhe treiben. Fortschritte bei der Preistransparenz sind ein erster Schritt, sie reichen aber nicht aus, wenn der Wettbewerb um knappe Flächen ausbleibt. Für eine erfolgreiche Verkehrswende dürfen strukturelle Marktverzerrungen nicht toleriert werden.

In der Fernwärme droht derzeit ein Teufelskreis: Sinkende Konkurrenz durch fossile Alternativen und fehlende Preistransparenz eröffnen den Fernwärmeanbietern Spielräume für überhöhte Preise. Verpflichtende Vergleichsplattformen, eine bürokratiearme Preisregulierung und bessere Zugänge zu den Netzen für Dritte könnten die Kosten dämpfen und gleichzeitig dazu beitragen, die Klimaziele bis 2045 zu erreichen. Die Frage ist nicht, ob Regulierung nötig ist, sondern ob sie rechtzeitig kommt.

Beim Gasnetz wiederum stehen wir vor einem schleichenden Strukturwandel. Ohne klare Stilllegungspläne könnten die verbleibenden Kund*innen oder die Netzbetreiber finanziell stark belastet werden. Es ist daher dringend erforderlich, die Verteilnetze aktiv zurückzubauen, bevor die Kosten explodieren. Nichtstun wäre in diesem Fall die teuerste Option.

The Council adopted an implementing decision authorising the fifth regular payment under the Ukraine Plan of the Ukraine Facility.

President Costa will travel to Latin America for COP30 (Brazil) on 6 and 7 November and for the EU-CELAC summit (Colombia) on 9 November.

The thematic report “Raw Materials for a Resilient Europe: The EU’s Strategic Partnership with the Western Balkans” is a result of ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans. 

The initiative contributes to reimagining the EU’s engagement with the Western Balkans, as well as the region’s attractiveness for the EU in order to ensure a resilient EU integration strategy and ever-closer integration with a full membership perspective in mind.

This thematic report authored by Dr. Ana Krstinovska (Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP & Senior Researcher, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Dr. André Wolf (Non-Resident Reseach Associate, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration & Head of Division, CEP Berlin) examines the strategic potential of the Western Balkans in the context of the EU’s efforts to secure critical and strategic raw materials essential for its competitiveness, green transition, and defence readiness. It argues that the region which is geographically proximate, economically interlinked with the EU, and engaged in the accession process, represents a crucial yet underutilized partner in strengthening Europe’s strategic autonomy and industrial resilience.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), adopted in 2024, highlights the strategic importance of securing reliable and diversified access to critical and strategic raw materials

(CRMs/SRMs) essential for Europe’s competitiveness, green transition, and defence capabilities. As global supply chains are increasingly subject to geopolitical pressures, the Western Balkans offer a unique opportunity for the EU. The region is geographically close, economically intertwined with the EU, formally engaged in the accession process, and endowed with significant reserves of copper, aluminium (bauxite), nickel, antimony, lithium, and rare earth elements.

Despite this potential, the Western Balkan’s contribution to European raw materials security remains underdeveloped. A recurring pattern emerges across countries: raw ores and concentrates flow mostly to China, while processed or semi-processed goods are exported to the EU. Serbia exports most of its copper ores to China, while processed copper is split between the EU and Chinese buyers. Montenegro ships bauxite largely to China, but aluminium articles to the EU. Albania exports raw copper to China but processed copper to the EU. In North Macedonia, domestic processing of bauxite has relied heavily on Chinese inputs. This structure secures greater value for China in the global supply chain, while constraining the EU’s strategic autonomy. 

At the same time, the Western Balkans capture limited economic value from their resources. Processing, recycling, and advanced technology investments remain underdeveloped. Outdated geological data, obsolete technologies, weak governance frameworks, and fragile investment climates further constrain efforts to move up the value chain. The lack of regional integration compounds these problems: national strategies often duplicate efforts rather than complement them, leading to inefficiency and missed economies of scale. 

Mining and extraction are politically sensitive and socially contested across the region. The legacy of polluting industries, opaque privatization, and unresolved environmental “hotspots” has fuelled public distrust and citizen mobilization. Serbia’s Jadar lithium project, suspended in 2022 following widespread protests but recently revived, is emblematic of the risks of pursuing extractive partnerships without transparent governance and robust safeguards. 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, local opposition has slowed or blocked several projects in lithium and magnesium. In North Macedonia, civic mobilization successfully halted the Ilovica-Štuka gold-copper project. These cases underscore that raw material development is not only a technical or economic challenge; it also requires political legitimacy and social trust.

Weak rule of law and institutional capacity further aggravates these risks. Geological data often dates back to the 1970s–1980s, permitting processes are fragmented and slow, inspection services lack resources, and corruption remains pervasive. Governance deficiencies drive up costs for investors, fuel social opposition, and undermine the credibility of governments. Without visible guarantees that mining will meet the highest environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, even economically viable projects risk becoming politically toxic and socially unsustainable. 

The Western Balkans’ raw materials potential should not be treated as isolated national resources, but instead as part of Europe’s broader industrial ecosystem. The EU has already launched instruments such as the Single Market Highway and the Reform and Growth Facility, and Western Balkan partners have access to Horizon Europe. These can serve as platforms for joint projects, standards alignment, and technology transfer. Embedding raw materials cooperation into the enlargement framework, including through Chapter 20 (Industrial Policy), Chapter 27 (Environment), and the Fundamentals cluster, can reinforce EU credibility while incentivizing reforms. 

Regional cooperation is equally critical. Restoring value chains that once spanned the former Yugoslavia, covering exploration, smelting, refining, and processing, would generate economies of scale and reduce inefficiencies. EU-led processes such as the Berlin Process can serve as vehicles for fostering such cross-border integration. This report proposes five overarching policy priorities:

1. Value-chain upgrading: Invest in processing, recycling, and innovation capacities so the region exports higher-value goods to the EU instead of raw ores to China. Prioritize aluminium and copper as pilot sectors.

2. Embed partnerships in accession conditionality: Link EU financial support and market access to verifiable implementation of EU environmental, labour, and governance standards, ensuring public trust and the participation of affected communities.

3. Strengthen governance capacity: Modernize geological surveys, streamline permitting systems, consolidate fragmented concessions, and enhance inspection and enforcement to guarantee compliance with ESG safeguards.

4. Promote regional integration: Use the Single Market Highway and the Berlin Process to coordinate standards, infrastructure, and joint investments across the Western Balkans, restoring regional supply chains.

5. Mobilize the European private sector: Deploy EU financial instruments and risk-sharing mechanisms to encourage the greater involvement of European firms, fostering joint ventures that combine EU technology and capital with local resources.

By pursuing this agenda, the EU can simultaneously strengthen its strategic autonomy and support sustainable economic development in the Western Balkans. For the region, the path forward lies not in exporting raw ores but in developing modern, EU-aligned value chains that create jobs, generate revenues, and build public trust. For the EU, engaging early and systematically is the best way to prevent critical assets from reinforcing the influence of rival powers, while accelerating the accession process and securing the raw materials needed for

Europe’s future. By aligning raw materials cooperation with the EU’s enlargement policy, the Union and the Western Balkans can transform shared resources into shared prosperity—building a sustainable, competitive, and strategically autonomous Europe that includes the Western Balkans as equal partners.

You can read the full report here.

In Deutschland entscheidet nicht das Einkommen darüber, wer ein Haus besitzt – sondern die Eltern. So wird Wohnen zu einer Frage der sozialen Herkunft., Wer heute in Deutschland ein Eigenheim besitzt, verdankt das häufig nicht der eigenen Arbeit, sondern den Eltern. Das zeigt eine neue Studie des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin: Kinder von Immobilieneigentümern haben eine höhere Chance, selbst einmal Eigentum zu haben. Wer ...

Although lagging behind green finance, the market for social financial instruments, such as social bonds or social equity funds, has gained traction in recent years. This chapter focuses on the conceptual underpinnings of social finance. It also provides an overview of the heterogeneous definitions of social investments common in financial markets. It distinguishes between a focus on the impact of goods and services produced and one on process-related impacts in social investment criteria. The chapter describes a positive selection of sectors, exclusion of specific sectors, best-in-class procedures, and applying minimum standards as selection procedures commonly used for social financial instruments. The diversity of existing criteria and selection procedures in financial markets increases transaction costs, can facilitate deceptive practices, and might lead to adverse selection. Public governance frameworks are thus necessary to set common standards for social financial instruments.

Although lagging behind green finance, the market for social financial instruments, such as social bonds or social equity funds, has gained traction in recent years. This chapter focuses on the conceptual underpinnings of social finance. It also provides an overview of the heterogeneous definitions of social investments common in financial markets. It distinguishes between a focus on the impact of goods and services produced and one on process-related impacts in social investment criteria. The chapter describes a positive selection of sectors, exclusion of specific sectors, best-in-class procedures, and applying minimum standards as selection procedures commonly used for social financial instruments. The diversity of existing criteria and selection procedures in financial markets increases transaction costs, can facilitate deceptive practices, and might lead to adverse selection. Public governance frameworks are thus necessary to set common standards for social financial instruments.

Although lagging behind green finance, the market for social financial instruments, such as social bonds or social equity funds, has gained traction in recent years. This chapter focuses on the conceptual underpinnings of social finance. It also provides an overview of the heterogeneous definitions of social investments common in financial markets. It distinguishes between a focus on the impact of goods and services produced and one on process-related impacts in social investment criteria. The chapter describes a positive selection of sectors, exclusion of specific sectors, best-in-class procedures, and applying minimum standards as selection procedures commonly used for social financial instruments. The diversity of existing criteria and selection procedures in financial markets increases transaction costs, can facilitate deceptive practices, and might lead to adverse selection. Public governance frameworks are thus necessary to set common standards for social financial instruments.

Our policy brief, authored by Ben Crumpton, Melis Baydag, Niels Keijzer, Camilla Rocca, and Benedikt Erforth, delves into the multifaceted landscape of Africa’s digital transformation. Titled “Digital Transformation in Africa: From Gaps to Goals,” the brief offers a comprehensive analysis of the digital divide across the continent. It provides both a global perspective and a comparative examination of its various dimensions across and within African states. The main objective is to give an overview of the overall situation and trends in terms of moving African digital access from gaps to goals. The analysis primarily draws from three recent reports: the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU, 2024) Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures, the GSMA’s (2024) State of Mobile Internet Connectivity, and data from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG, 2024). In addition to a review of literature and quantitative data, the analysis incorporates insights from discussions held during a side event organized by IDOS, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and the European Think Tanks Group at the Ibrahim Governance Weekend on June 3, 2025, in Marrakesh.

Our policy brief, authored by Ben Crumpton, Melis Baydag, Niels Keijzer, Camilla Rocca, and Benedikt Erforth, delves into the multifaceted landscape of Africa’s digital transformation. Titled “Digital Transformation in Africa: From Gaps to Goals,” the brief offers a comprehensive analysis of the digital divide across the continent. It provides both a global perspective and a comparative examination of its various dimensions across and within African states. The main objective is to give an overview of the overall situation and trends in terms of moving African digital access from gaps to goals. The analysis primarily draws from three recent reports: the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU, 2024) Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures, the GSMA’s (2024) State of Mobile Internet Connectivity, and data from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG, 2024). In addition to a review of literature and quantitative data, the analysis incorporates insights from discussions held during a side event organized by IDOS, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and the European Think Tanks Group at the Ibrahim Governance Weekend on June 3, 2025, in Marrakesh.