Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

CDU/CSU haben gestern einen Entschließungsantrag zur Migration auch mit Stimmen der AfD durch den Deutschen Bundestag gebracht. Am morgigen Freitag steht die Abstimmung zum sogenannten Zustrombegrenzungsgesetz an. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Das Zustrombegrenzungsgesetz wird Deutschland schaden. Die von der Union initiierte Gesetzgebung wird keines der erklärten Ziele erreichen, sondern das Gegenteil bewirken: Sie wird die Integration erschweren, die Arbeitskräftelücke vergrößern und die Kosten für den Staat erhöhen. Grenzschließungen und Stigmatisierung werden nicht die Sicherheit verbessern, sondern sie eher verschlechtern. Menschen, die aus Kriegsgebieten fliehen, haben keine andere Wahl, und eine Abschottungspolitik wird qualifizierte Fachkräfte fernhalten, die Deutschland dringend benötigt. Die Wirtschaft sucht händeringend nach Arbeitskräften und leistet hervorragende Arbeit, um junge Geflüchtete zu qualifizieren – die Unionspläne unterlaufen diese Bemühungen. Gleichzeitig wird die Enttäuschung über unerfüllbare Versprechen nur die AfD stärken. Die Konsequenz ist eine Verschlechterung der Integration und höhere Kosten für den Staat. Der Fall der „Brandmauer“ dürfte unumkehrbar sein. Verlierer sind unsere Demokratie, die Menschenrechte und unsere offene Gesellschaft.

Zusammenfassung:

30. Januar 2025 – Die aktuelle Schuldenbremse muss reformiert werden. Dies darf nicht symbolisch und kosmetisch erfolgen, wie es sich in der Debatte bisher andeutet, sondern muss eine signifikante Verbesserung bringen. Die Reform muss insbesondere den blinden Fleck der Generationengerechtigkeit berücksichtigen. Eine generationengerechte Schuldenregel erfordert vier konkrete Änderungen: (1) Eine nominale Ausgabenregel muss eingeführt werden: Staatsschulden dürfen jedes Jahr so stark steigen, wie das nominale Potenzialwachstum ausfällt. Dadurch würde sich die Staatsschuldenquote bei etwa 60 Prozent stabilisieren – und nicht bei 20 Prozent wie die aktuelle Regel implizit fordert. Zudem ermöglicht es dem Staat in wirtschaftlichen Schwächephasen stärker kontrazyklisch zu agieren. (2) Eine Goldenen Regel, die öffentliche Investitionen von Schuldenbegrenzungen ausnimmt, sollte wiedereingeführt werden. Nettoinvestitionen müssen dauerhaft positiv bleiben. Zudem müssen die öffentlichen Konsumausgaben proportional zur Demografie schrumpfen. (3) Implizite Staatsschulden, wie die zukünftigen Kosten für die Sozialsysteme und die Klimakrise, dürfen nicht weiter steigen, sondern müssen proportional mit dem Rückgang des Erwerbstätigenpotenzials abnehmen. (4) Die Verteilungswirkungen staatlicher Ausgaben und Investitionen müssen bei den Staatsausgaben berücksichtigt werden. Der Staat muss Daseinsfürsorge und Chancengleichheit für alle gewährleisten.

The publication “The rise of radical right and Eurosceptic political forces and the impact on the EU’s enlargement policy” is a result of the initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, funded by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

The initiative contributes to reimagining the EU’s engagement with the Western Balkans, as well as the region’s attractiveness for the EU in order to ensure a resilient EU integration strategy and ever-closer integration with a full membership perspective in mind.

The report authored by Ioannis Alexandris, Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP delves into the recent electoral victories of radical right parties and explores how these parties are reshaping the EU’s political landscape, particularly regarding its enlargement agenda. Key themes include public discontent over immigration, economic disparities, and concerns about national sovereignty, all of which fuel opposition to EU expansion.

While the positions of radical right parties vary, their collective influence introduces complexities into EU decision-making. This report provides valuable insights for policymakers, researchers and actors navigating these challenges and shaping the EU’s future trajectory.

Summary:

This think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration report examines the growing influence of radical right and Eurosceptic political forces within the European Union (EU) and their implications for EU enlargement policy. As these parties continue to gain traction across member states, they are altering the political landscape and challenging the long-standing consensus on EU integration.

The analysis takes stock of the recent electoral victories of radical right parties, such as Georgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) in Italy and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) in the Netherlands. These electoral results reflect a broader trend of rising right wing Euroscepticism, potentially posing substantial challenges to the EU’s enlargement agenda. Key drivers behind this significant shift of the political pendulum to the right include public discontent with immigration, economic disparities, and a perceived loss of national sovereignty.

The report delves deeper into how these political dynamics could shape the bloc’s decision-making processes, particularly those involving candidate countries pursuing EU membership. The radical right’s scepticism over further enlargement raises doubts over the feasibility of integrating countries such as Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in light of ongoing conflicts and political instability. Through a comprehensive examination of party manifestos, official statements, and expert interviews, this study identifies major patterns and trends among these parties with regard to their views on enlargement. It identifies the major enlargement-related concerns that may resonate with the public, hence influencing the EU’s future trajectory.

Even though several of these parties, including VOX in Spain and the Sweden Democrats, have yet to form cohesive views on enlargement or take clearly anti-enlargement positions, the issue is likely to become more politicised in the coming years. This is largely due to its linkages with other areas of political sensitivity for these parties, including migration, fiscal policy, agricultural policy, and national sovereignty, all of which are fundamental to their agendas. Building on its findings, the report concludes that radical right parties share core thematic concerns shaping their views towards EU enlargement. These can be categorised into five main driving forces:

1. Financial concerns: Opposing the financial costs associated with the accession of economically less developed states is a recurring theme among these parties. For example, the PVV in the Netherlands supports a “frugal” economic position, arguing that admitting less developed countries would place undue financial strain on net-contributing member states. Similar concerns are echoed by the Rassemblement National (RN) in France RN, AfD in Germany, SD in Sweden, and FPÖ in Austria, all of which represent net contributor countries concerned over further budgetary burdens.
2. Migration and security: Enlargement is also closely tied to migration and freedom of movement, which are key issues for radical right parties. The RN in its discourse often associates enlargement with increased illegal immigration and organised crime, a stance aligned with its broader domestic agenda. Both the AfD and FPÖ focus on anti-migration narratives targeting Muslim populations, while the PVV places more emphasis on cultural and social risks.
3. Foreign policy: Relations with Russia as well as concerns about geopolitical ramifications can also be a factor influencing the positions of these parties. The AfD’s longstanding tolerant –if not favourable- stance toward Russia drives its opposition to Ukraine and Moldova’s accession. Conversely, Italy’s FdI under Giorgia Meloni has so far adopted a pro-enlargement position, reflecting its broader pro-Western and NATO-aligned foreign policy strategy.
4. Popular support and electoral strategy: Public opinion and domestic political dynamics can also influence these parties’ positions. In Austria and Germany, where public scepticism towards enlargement is significant, the FPÖ and AfD have aimed to capitalise on these sentiments to gain electoral support. Additionally, these two parties have sought to appeal to specific demographics, formulating narratives that resonate with their target voter bases.
5. Concerns over EU functionality and sovereignty: Finally, radical right parties often link enlargement to broader discussions about EU governance. They claim that incorporating new members would necessitate institutional reforms, such as a shift to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in areas such as foreign policy and tax policy, which they perceive as undermining national sovereignty. This could signal a departure from traditional anti-federalist methods that favoured enlargement as a counterbalance to deeper EU integration. Even though a shift to QMV could streamline decision-making, it might also exacerbate tensions among member states, providing fertile ground for radical right parties to amplify their Eurosceptic discourse.

The EU needs to navigate these complexities carefully, balancing the challenges posed by radical right parties with its broader goals of unity and expansion. The growing influence of these parties introduces complexities into the EU’s decision-making processes. On the one hand, their scepticism can slow down or derail enlargement policy, particularly concerning Ukraine and the Western Balkans. On the other hand, their focus on sovereignty and national identity raises questions about the EU’s integration model, potentially leading to alternative frameworks such as “multi-speed Europe” or associate memberships.

It is important, however, to mention that the dividing lines between support and opposition to enlargement among radical right parties are far from uniform. For example, Italy’s FdI has adopted a pragmatic, pro-enlargement stance emphasising economic and strategic benefits, while parties such as the Netherlands’ PVV and Austria’s FPÖ maintain staunch opposition. Hence, a much more nuanced picture emerges from the findings, where radical right parties can be categorised as ‘’supportive’’, like the FdI, ‘’ambiguous’’, like VOX, and ‘’against’’, like the AfD, when it comes to their EU enlargement position.

Overall, this report intends to serve as a resource for understanding the intersection of radical right-wing political forces and the EU’s enlargement policy, offering valuable insights for policymakers involved in shaping the future of the EU in the coming years.

You can read the report here.

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network which is led by led by OSF-WB.

 

 

 

 

You can learn more about think nea by visiting the website of ELIAMEP and OSF-WB.

 

Funded: OSF WB

 

 

 

Mehr als 100 Verbände und Unternehmen wollen am Mittwoch auf dem sogenannten „Wirtschaftswarntag“ einen Zehn-Punkte-Plan vorlegen, wie die deutsche Wirtschaft wieder in Fahrt kommen kann. Dazu eine Einschätzung von DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher:

Der „Wirtschaftswarntag“ ist der Versuch einiger Unternehmenslobbys, ihren eigenen Interessen im Bundestagswahlkampf noch mehr Gewicht zu verleihen. In einer Demokratie ist das legitim. Der Aufruf der Unternehmensverbände enthält zahlreiche richtige Forderungen. Er hat aber auch drei zentrale Schwächen.

Die Unternehmensverbände weigern sich, Verantwortung für das eigene Handeln und die eigenen Fehler zu übernehmen. An keiner Stelle des Aufrufs wird auf die eigene Verantwortung verwiesen und ein Umdenken angemahnt. Die deutsche Wirtschaft wird die Transformation nicht erfolgreich bewältigen, wenn die Unternehmen lediglich Forderungen an die Politik stellen. So ist beispielsweise die Misere in der Automobilbranche in den letzten 15 Jahren nicht primär durch die Politik, sondern durch das Management der Unternehmen verursacht worden. Viele Unternehmen sind zu langsam bei der Digitalisierung, die Arbeitsproduktivität ist zu niedrig.

Der Ruf der Unternehmenslobbys nach mehr Geld vom Staat ist verständlich. Sie scheinen dies jedoch auf Kosten der Arbeitnehmer zu fordern, da sie von einer Verschiebung der Prioritäten sprechen und die Antwort schuldig bleiben, wie die Hilfe des Staates finanziert werden soll. Dabei brauchen auch viele Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer mit geringen und mittleren Einkommen eine finanzielle Entlastung.

Die Unternehmensverbände liegen falsch, wenn sie mehr nationale Alleingänge fordern. Wir benötigen eine Stärkung europäischer Institutionen und eine Ausweitung europäischer Kompetenzen, die Vollendung der Kapitalmarktunion und in vielen Bereichen ein gemeinsames europäisches Vorgehen. Zur Wahrheit gehört auch, dass kein Staat in Europa in den vergangenen fünf Jahren Unternehmen mehr Hilfe zukommen ließ als Deutschland.

Zusammenfassung:

28. Januar 2025 – Die Ampel-Regierung hat die Energiewende deutlich beschleunigt. Insbesondere der Ausbau der Solarenergie kam gut voran. Die Windenergie liegt derzeit zwar hinter dem Plan, aber die Rahmenbedingungen für einen künftig rascheren Zubau von Windkraftanlagen haben sich stark verbessert. Zudem wurden Fortschritte bei weiteren wichtigen Energiewende-Infrastrukturen wie etwa Strom- und Wasserstoffnetzen erreicht. Einige Bereiche hinken hingegen noch hinterher, insbesondere der Ausbau der Wärmepumpen und der Elektromobilität. Die nächste Bundesregierung muss die Energiewende entschlossen vorantreiben, um das Ziel der Klimaneutralität bis 2045 nicht zu gefährden. Neben einem weiteren Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien sollte sie mehr Tempo machen bei der Sektorenkopplung, also der verstärkten Nutzung erneuerbaren Stroms für Wärme, Verkehr und Wasserstoff. Zunehmend wichtig wird darüber hinaus die effiziente Systemintegration aller Technologien, also die stärkere Ausrichtung von Stromangebot und -nachfrage an Marktpreissignalen.

Zusammenfassung:

23. Januar 2025 – Die deutsche Wirtschaft steht aufgrund des demografischen Wandels und des Ausscheidens der Babyboomer-Generation aus dem Arbeitsmarkt vor einem zunehmenden Arbeits- und Fachkräftemangel. Dieser wird das Produktionspotenzial der deutschen Wirtschaft erheblich einschränken. Das inländische Steigerungspotenzial zur Deckung des Arbeitskräftebedarfs ist nur gering, so dass der Migration eine zentrale Rolle zufällt. Bereits seit 2023 wird der Aufbau der sozialversicherungspflichtigen Beschäftigung lediglich durch ausländische Staatsangehörige getragen. Aktuelle Berechnungen zeigen, dass ohne Migration die Wachstumsrate des Potenzials von derzeit lediglich 0,4 Prozent rasch auf null sinken würde. Um die Potenzialrate bis 2029 wieder zu ihrem langfristigen Mittelwert von 1,1 Prozent (dem Durchschnitt über den Zeitraum von 2004 bis 2023) zu heben, wäre den Berechnungen zufolge eine Zuwanderung von 1,5 Millionen Erwerbspersonen notwendig. Um die Zuwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Drittstaaten attraktiver zu machen, ist das reformierte Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz zwar ein Schritt in die richtige Richtung. Um den positiven Effekt ausländischer Arbeitskräfte auf den Arbeitsmarkt und das Potenzial der deutschen Wirtschaft aber weiter zu stärken, müssen politische Maßnahmen wie der Abbau von bürokratischen Hürden bei der Visaerteilung und der Anerkennung von Qualifikationen vorangetrieben werden. Zudem ist es notwendig, die Sprachkenntnisse und Weiterqualifizierungen von Migrant*innen zu fördern, um ein Missverhältnis zwischen dem Arbeitsangebot und -bedarf zu vermeiden.

This policy brief discusses the role of Greece in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), focusing mainly on those aspects related to infrastructure and ports and the global supply chain. It suggests a series of different actions and highlights different angles that Greece should take into account if it wants to be a major player in the establishment of the Corridor and its gateway to Europe/European Union.

– IMEC will be a game changer in international trade relationships, regional tensions, and political challenges.

– The main obstacles to IMEC’s establishment are the conflicts in the Middle East and other major national interests of key actors (such as the Chinese monopoly in the region).

– Focus is given to port infrastructure, as ports are pivotal to the global supply chain. India pays significant attention to its ports, while the Port of Piraeus is the largest port in Eastern Europe.

– The critical role and position of Greece are highlighted, underlying its role as a hub that connects India and the Middle East to Europe.

– Greece needs to invest in infrastructure development, build a skilled workforce, and attract foreign investments.

– Suggestions for establishing a successful commercial corridor between India and Greece are given, focusing on mutual interests and growth opportunities.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Dimitris Gavalas, Associate Professor, Department of Ports Management and Shipping, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and George Dikaios, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Lecturer & postdoc researcher, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

Introduction

Greece’s involvement in IMEC is a significant element of their strategic partnership, asserting that Greece serves as India’s gateway to Europe. 

During state visits to India in February 2024, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi engaged in discussions with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. The leaders, among other topics, deliberated on enhancing cooperation under the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which “is a geoeconomic project that propels infrastructure connectivity higher than ever on the geopolitical agenda of global powers” (Sauvignon and Benaglia, 2024). Prime Minister Mitsotakis expressed that Greece’s involvement in IMEC is a significant element of their strategic partnership, asserting that Greece serves as India’s gateway to Europe. He further emphasized the necessity of achieving peace in the Middle East, stating that stability is essential for any initiative aimed at fostering greater prosperity in the broader region, that would benefit all participating nations. Greece’s role is essential to discuss, as it was not in the seven countries (India, France, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States) and the EU, which signed the initial IMEC Memorandum of Understanding in September 2023, during the G-20 Summit in India (Gonultas, 2023). Still, the IMEC is highly possible to go through Greece’s territory.

This policy brief unveils a series of opportunities and challenges that arise from the establishment of IMEC, focusing on Greece’s role and position. It first gives the bigger picture of how the global supply chain works, what role IMEC will play in it, and what infrastructure will be needed. The next section focuses on Greece’s role and opportunities, which might enhance Greece’s position within this particular cooperation, as well as the country’s potential gains. A section on what needs to be done to better prepare for the establishment of the collaboration between India and Greece follows. The final part presents the way forward.

Global supply chains, infrastructure and IMEC’s challenges

A supply chain can be defined as a systematic approach focused on the conversion of materials into finished products or services. It may also be perceived as a comprehensive network encompassing all entities engaged in the production and delivery of goods or services to consumers, including suppliers, manufacturers, transporters, distributors, warehouses, wholesalers, retailers, and customers. The modern supply chain is characterized by complexity, dynamism, competitiveness, and flexibility. Standard metrics utilized to evaluate supply chain performance encompass customer satisfaction, service quality, time efficiency, responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, and overall quality of output (Gavalas, 2024).

Supply chain management fundamentally pertains to the oversight and administration of such a network. In the era of globalization, numerous multinational corporations have established partnerships with entities located across the globe. The global supply chain is primarily driven by economic globalization, as companies endeavor to extend their supply chains into international markets. Such global operations typically increase business complexity due to the involvement of a broader array of stakeholders compared to domestic operations, necessitating the navigation of various political, economic, and cultural influences. Global supply chains function as fully integrated operations, thereby leveraging the distinct advantages offered by diverse geographical locations worldwide (Ma, 2020).

The global value chain can be defined as a complex network of international trade and commerce that involves multiple countries, regions, and industries. It relies on various trade routes, including maritime and road transport networks, to facilitate the movement of goods and services (Vasiliadis et al., 2024). Strategic hub ports like Haifa (Israel), Piraeus (Greece), and Red Sea Gateway Terminal (Saudi Arabia) play a crucial role in connecting different regions and facilitating trade. The global value chain is influenced by global trade relationships between countries, including trade agreements, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers, as well as financial ties between countries, such as investment and trade agreements.

The multimodal transport system of IMEC would enable the efficient and cost-effective transportation of goods. The system would also allow for the flexibility to switch between different modes of transport depending on the specific requirements of each shipment. For example, if there is a high demand for speed, rail transport may be preferred, while if there is a high demand for flexibility, road transport may be preferred.

IMEC aims to connect India, the Middle East and Europe, through a railway network, enhancing regional integration and trade. […] IMEC’s success will depend on navigating the complex web of international trade relationships, regional tensions, and political challenges.

The establishment of IMEC would respond to the global value chain by creating a new ship-to-rail transit network that will supplement existing maritime and road transport routes. IMEC aims to connect India, the Middle East and Europe, through a railway network, enhancing regional integration and trade. By reducing costs and increasing speed, IMEC seeks to challenge Beijing’s influence in the region and offer an alternative to China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI). However, IMEC’s success will depend on navigating the complex web of international trade relationships, regional tensions, and political challenges. China’s existing influence in the region, through its financial ties with Arab Gulf states, may limit IMEC’s ability to challenge Beijing’s dominance, while regional tensions, such as the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, may hinder the progress of IMEC and other regional integration projects (Monroe, 2023).

A major potential obstacle to the IMEC that is to be taken into account is that it does not offer a clear plan to address the Chinese monopoly in the region. The Greek port of Piraeus, a crucial link in the IMEC corridor, is already owned by Cosco, a Chinese shipping company. It is unclear whether India and the United States will attempt to buy stakes in Piraeus and shift the balance of power away from Cosco. Additionally, the deep financial ties between China and the Arab Gulf likely limit the ability of IMEC or any similar development project to challenge Beijing’s influence in the region (Khan et al., 2024).

Additionally, another challenge that needs to be considered is the conflict in the Middle East, as shown in the map below, as the area is an integral part of the Corridor. As it is to be expected, the conflict poses significant barriers to the advancement of IMEC. For example, countries that have not normalized their diplomatic relations, like Israel and Saudi Arabia, would have to work together in order to develop railways, as connectivity between the countries of IMEC has to be undisturbed. The same applies to the relations between Jordan and Israel, as the former would be the corridor-country between Israel and Saudi Arabia (Das, 2024).

(IMEC map, source: Vienna International Institute for Middle East Studies)

 

In terms of infrastructure, the physical aspect of IMEC would include railway lines connecting the United Arab Emirates to Israel via Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as electric cables to enhance digital connectivity, and pipes for clean hydrogen export. The multimodal transport system would likely involve a combination of maritime and rail transport. The Greek port of Piraeus would play a crucial role in this system, serving as a hub for cargo transportation from the port of Haifa in Israel to destinations in Europe and beyond. The port’s locality on the Mediterranean and its existing connections to European markets make it an ideal location for transshipment and distribution of goods (Datta and Misra, 2024).

For Greece, the port of Piraeus is well-positioned to play a key role in the IMEC project, and Greece should focus on leveraging its strategic location to benefit from the project (Pandya and Leal-Arcas, 2024).

India’s Strategic Steps Towards an Enhanced Port Infrastructure

In pursuit of the implementation of the IMEC corridor, India has taken steps from as early as January 2023 to acquire the port of Haifa (Israel). The acquisition was executed by Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited (APSEZ Ltd.), India’s largest private port operator and a comprehensive provider of logistics services. This development came as part of a long-term strategy for India’s blue maritime economy, as introduced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the inauguration of the Global Shipping Summit and International Expo held on October 17, 2023, in Mumbai (Maritime India Summit, 2023). The envisioned horizon of the project is set with a vision towards 2047 (Reuters, 2023).

The plan encompasses several strategic initiatives aimed at enhancing port facilities, promoting sustainable practices, facilitating international collaboration, and executing major projects for the creation of Next Generation Mega Ports, which include the development of international container ports, islands, inland waterways, and multi-modal hubs. The total projected investment for these initiatives is estimated at approximately €900 billion, which is anticipated to generate a substantial number of job opportunities and reduce business operating costs, while mitigating environmental degradation.

Through the plan, India aspires to enhance its cargo handling capacities to 10,000 million metric tons per year by 2047, by addressing the increasing traffic demands and positioning itself among the top five shipbuilding nations of the world, through the establishment of shipbuilding and repair facilities in multiple locations. Over the past decade, the capacity of India’s major ports has doubled, the turnaround time for large vessels has been reduced to under 24 hours from the previous 42 hours, and coastal cargo traffic has similarly doubled, reflecting the ongoing modernization of logistics (Gavalas et al., 2022).

What should Greece’s role be within IMEC? 

As the focus of this brief is to understand the strategic role of Greece in the IMEC’s success, this part focuses on highlighting potential advantages of the process. Given the country’s geographical location between Asia and Europe, Greece could provide a critical and strategic link between India, the Middle East, and mainland Europe. By playing a key role in facilitating trade, infrastructure development, and regional integration, Greece can benefit economically and political, the latter by strengthening its ties with these regions. Below, some potential roles that Greece could seek to play are listed, as a guide:

• Logistics Hub: Greece, particularly the port of Piraeus, can serve as a logistics hub for the IMEC corridor, connecting India and the Middle East to Europe. This could involve the development of new infrastructure, such as warehouses, storage facilities, and transportation networks.

• Gateway to EU: As the largest port in Eastern Europe, Piraeus can serve as a gateway to the EU for goods and services coming from India and the Middle East. This would facilitate trade and investment between these regions and the EU.

• FTA Facilitator: Greece could play a key role in facilitating an FTA (Foreign Trade Agreement) between India and the EU. As a member of the EU, Greece could help negotiate and implement the FTA, which would benefit Greek businesses and industries.

• Infrastructure Development: Greece could invest in developing its infrastructure, such as ports, roads, and railways, to support the growth of trade and commerce between India and the EU. This would also create new economic opportunities for Greek businesses and citizens.

• Trade Facilitation: Greece could work with Indian and EU authorities to simplify customs procedures, reduce bureaucratic hurdles, and increase trade facilitation measures to make it easier for goods and services to move across borders.

• Investment Attraction: Greece could attract investment from Indian companies by offering competitive incentives, such as tax breaks, subsidies, or other forms of support. This would help create new economic opportunities and jobs in Greece.

At the same time, strengthening bilateral relationships and improving connectivity between ports can facilitate trade and commerce between Greece and India. This could be a potential step towards advancing the IMEC project, especially if India and Greece can work together to improve the efficiency and reliability of their port operations. Additionally, improving Greek-Indian port relations could also have broader benefits for the region. For example, it could help reduce transportation costs and increase trade volumes between Europe and Asia, which could be beneficial for the economies involved.

Balancing Political Priorities

Since 2016, Greece has cultivated a significant partnership with China, notably through Cosco’s investment in the Port of Piraeus. This relationship has significantly helped in the improvement of  Greece’s economic standing. As such, the country – in theory – would not stand to benefit from severing these ties. This parameter is one that the country oughts to consider, as it seeks to assume a central role in IMEC. Balancing these two priorities will require diplomatic finesse and significant, holistic strategic planning. This may involve renegotiating terms with Cosco to maintain control without straining relations with China.

On the other hand, and provided that the former has been dealt with in a productive manner, Greece stands to benefit significantly if it can leverage the IMEC project to foster regional economic cooperation with neighbors like Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Navigating these dynamics, however, demands skillful diplomacy to manage the interests of the two major global actors.

Through careful balancing, Greece could position itself as a pivotal player in both IMEC and the broader regional framework, advancing its strategic and economic goals,

Focus on infrastructure and a skilled workforce

Greece’s port of Piraeus, being the largest port in Eastern Europe, if IMEC proceeds, is to play a crucial role. […] it’s indeed reasonable to suggest that Greece should enhance its domestic skilled workforce in areas such as logistics, transportation, and infrastructure management. 

Greece’s port of Piraeus, being the largest port in Eastern Europe, if IMEC proceeds, is to play a crucial role. Therefore, it’s likely that Greece will be a major actor in the implementation of the project, particularly in terms of logistics and transportation. In light of this, it’s indeed reasonable to suggest that Greece should enhance its domestic skilled workforce in areas such as logistics, transportation, and infrastructure management. This would enable Greece to capitalize on its strategic location, and potentially attract more investment and business opportunities. Moreover, having a skilled workforce would also help Greece to maintain its competitiveness in the region and ensure that it can adapt to any changes or challenges that may arise during the implementation of the IMEC project.

Essential steps to establish a successful commercial corridor between India and Greece

To establish a successful commercial corridor between India and Greece, several essential steps should be undertaken. Firstly, fostering strategic partnerships is crucial; collaboration between Indian and Greek governments, companies, and industries will help identify mutual interests and growth opportunities. Infrastructure development plays a significant role as well, and investment in modernizing and expanding transportation facilities—such as ports, airports, and highways—will facilitate the efficient movement of goods and people.

Negotiating and implementing bilateral trade agreements, particularly FTAs, can serve to reduce tariffs, increase trade volumes, and strengthen economic cooperation. Simplifying customs clearance procedures is also necessary to minimize delays and alleviate bureaucratic obstacles for importers and exporters. Furthermore, efficient logistics and supply chain management systems should be developed to ensure timely and cost-effective delivery of goods.

Encouraging foreign investment in both countries is another critical component, which can be achieved by promoting investment opportunities, providing incentives, and offering support services. As per the data provided by India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the value of goods imported from India to Greece during the fiscal year 2023-24 amounted to $1,055.17 million. This sum includes significant products such as aluminum, organic chemicals, transformers, and various other electrical equipment (Embassy of Greece in India, 2024).

Additionally, capacity-building programs that offer training for businesses, entrepreneurs, and policymakers in areas like international trade, logistics, and entrepreneurship are vital for enhancing skills and knowledge. Marketing campaigns that highlight the benefits, attractions, and opportunities of the Corridor can attract potential investors, exporters, and importers.

Risk management strategies must be developed to identify and mitigate potential trade-related risks, such as regulatory differences, currency fluctuations, and security concerns. Establishing a robust digital connectivity infrastructure, including high-speed internet and data transmission networks, would facilitate seamless communication and data exchange between the two countries.

Identifying competitive advantages in areas like production costs, quality standards, or innovation will further attract businesses and investors. It is essential that both governments provide necessary support and incentives to businesses operating within the corridor, including tax breaks, subsidies, or other forms of assistance. Effective communication channels between Indian and Greek businesses, governments, and regulatory bodies should be established to facilitate dialogue and collaboration. Finally, regular monitoring and evaluation of the Corridor’s progress will be necessary to assess performance and identify areas for improvement, ensuring its continued success.

The way forward

The discussions between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis during their state visits highlight the profound potential for collaboration under the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. The proposed commercial Corridor serves as a critical link that can enhance trade, connectivity, and regional integration among diverse economies, positioning Greece as a pivotal gateway for India into Europe.

Key actions such as developing strategic partnerships, investing in infrastructure, and negotiating favorable trade agreements are paramount for establishing a robust commercial corridor.

To realize the ambitious goals of IMEC, a multifaceted approach is essential. Key actions such as developing strategic partnerships, investing in infrastructure, and negotiating favorable trade agreements are paramount for establishing a robust commercial corridor. By simplifying customs procedures and improving logistics and supply chain systems, both countries can foster a conducive environment for trade, thereby driving economic growth.

Successful IMEC implementation hinges on achieving regional cooperation, brokering peace initiatives, and creating a balance of power that favors equitable economic engagement among participating nations.

Moreover, the challenges posed by existing geopolitical dynamics, notably China’s significant influence in the region and the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, must be addressed strategically. Successful IMEC implementation hinges on achieving regional cooperation, brokering peace initiatives, and creating a balance of power that favors equitable economic engagement among participating nations.

Greece’s role as a logistical hub and trade facilitator is indispensable. The port of Piraeus not only complements the IMEC’s shipping routes but also positions Greece favorably to attract investments, foster regional integration, and promote sustainable development practices. Navigating the complexities of international trade relationships while maintaining a focus on green initiatives can enhance IMEC’s viability and public acceptance.

The IMEC presents a unique opportunity for India and Greece to strengthen their bilateral ties while playing a significant role in reshaping regional trade dynamics. 

The IMEC presents a unique opportunity for India and Greece to strengthen their bilateral ties while playing a significant role in reshaping regional trade dynamics. With concerted efforts in infrastructure development, strategic collaboration, and diplomatic negotiations, the IMEC could become a transformative framework benefiting not just the participating nations but also the broader global economy.

As a final comment, it is likely that the project would require significant investment from governments and private companies in terms of who will pay for the implementation of IMEC. The endorsement of IMEC by several countries, including India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (and France, Germany, Italy, and the United States), suggests that they may be willing to contribute financially or otherwise to its development. The project’s potential economic benefits, such as cutting costs and increasing speed of cargo shipment, could attract private investment and funding from companies and institutions interested in the region’s growth and development.

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Zusammenfassung:

Studie auf Basis von SOEP-Daten – Generation der 68er bleibt häufiger auch nach dem Renteneintritt ehrenamtlich aktiv – Anstieg des Engagements geht aber auch auf junge Menschen zurück – Pflicht zum Engagement für bestimmte Altersgruppen wäre nicht zielführend, stattdessen sollten flexible und niedrigschwellige Angebote für alle geschaffen werden, die ehrenamtlich aktiv sein wollen

Fast jede dritte in Deutschland lebende Person ab 17 Jahren – insgesamt also rund 22 Millionen – engagiert sich ehrenamtlich. Der Anteil der ehrenamtlich Aktiven lag im Jahr 2017 bei rund 32 Prozent und damit um fünf Prozentpunkte höher als im Jahr 1990. Sowohl junge Erwachsene als auch Rentnerinnen und Rentner sind zunehmend bereit, beispielsweise in Vereinen, Initiativen oder der Flüchtlingshilfe freiwillig mit anzupacken. Das sind zentrale Ergebnisse einer Studie des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), die auf repräsentativen Daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP) basiert.

Nach der Amtseinführung von US-Präsident Donald Trump äußert sich DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher zu den erwarteten Auswirkungen der künftigen US-Politik auf die deutsche Wirtschaft wie folgt:

Die Wirtschaftspolitik des nun wieder amtierenden US-Präsidenten Donald Trump wird Deutschland hart treffen. Vor allem ein Handelskonflikt mit den USA in Form von Strafzöllen dürfte sich gleich dreifach negativ auf die deutsche Wirtschaft auswirken. Die Exporte werden sinken und die deutsche Industrie wird in ohnehin schon schwierigen Zeiten weiter geschwächt. Damit dürfte sich die Deindustrialisierung und der Verlust guter Arbeitsplätze in der Industrie in Deutschland beschleunigen. Eine erneute Rezession der deutschen Wirtschaft in diesem Jahr wird dadurch immer wahrscheinlicher.  

Höhere Preise und eine steigende Inflation werden das unweigerliche Resultat des Handelskonflikts sein. Vor allem Menschen mit mittleren und geringen Einkommen werden dafür einen hohen Preis zahlen, da ihre Kaufkraft und ihr Lebensstandard sinken werden. Sollten die Zinsen infolge der Inflation wieder steigen, wird das die deutsche Wirtschaft zusätzlich belasten. 

Größe und Macht der US-Wirtschaft werden dazu beitragen, dass US-Handelszölle den Konflikt auch zwischen China und Europa weiter eskalieren lassen. Denn China hat schon jetzt begonnen, eigene Überkapazitäten auf dem europäischen Markt zu verkaufen und somit einen zum Teil unfairen Wettbewerb anzuzetteln. Die EU wird darauf reagieren müssen, um fairen Wettbewerb zu gewährleisten. 

Die alte wie die neue Bundesregierung müssen zuallererst Europa stärken und ihre Fehler der Vergangenheit korrigieren. Ohne ein starkes Europa hat auch Deutschland keine Chance, sich im Konflikt mit den USA zu behaupten. Die Schwierigkeit ist es, die angemessene Reaktion auf die Zölle der USA zu finden, um eine weitere Eskalation zu verhindern.

Die Internationale Energieagentur (IEA) hat eine Studie veröffentlicht, derzufolge sie weltweit ein Comeback der Atomkraft erwartet. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Claudia Kemfert, Energieökonomin und Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die Internationale Energieagentur irrt. Die angeblichen „Comeback-Indikatoren“ der IEA sind nicht durch Fakten gedeckt. Weltweit ist der Ausbau von Atomkraftwerken weitgehend zum Erliegen gekommen. Die Produktion von Strom aus Atomkraftwerken liegt erstmal seit Jahrzehnten unter zehn Prozent und sinkt weiter. Der Anteil erneuerbarer Energien steigt dagegen stetig an.  

Und der Anteil der Atomenergie an der Stromerzeugung wird weltweit weiter sinken. Bis zum Jahr 2040 gehen rund 200 Atomkraftwerke vom Netz, diesen umfangreichen Abschaltungen stehen aktuell lediglich etwa 53 laufende Neubauprojekte gegenüber. Nur in China gibt es laufende Neubauprojekte, alle anderen zeichnen sich durch Verzögerung in der Planung, Genehmigung und Fertigstellung aus, teilweise mit erheblichem Ausmaß von mehr als zehn Jahren. Zudem sind die Kosten exorbitant hoch und übersteigen oftmals die der Planungen. Atomenergie ist enorm teuer, risikoreich und löst den Bedarf an zusätzlichen Strom nicht. Auch sogenannte Small Modular Reactor (SMR) sind keine Lösung, da sie ebenfalls hohe Kosten, Risiken und Bauzeiten aufweisen würden. Die bisherigen Erfahrungen zeigen, dass sie kaum zu realisieren sind, es gibt keine technologischen Durchbrüche, die dies erwarten ließen. Es müssten tausende SMR gebaut werden, um die notwendigen Bedarfe zu decken, das ist im höchsten Maße unrealistisch, teuer und risikoreich. Die Betrachtung aktuell geplanter, im Bau oder in Betrieb befindlicher Anlagen bestätigen, dass Planungs-, Entwicklungs- und Bauzeiten die ursprünglichen Zeithorizonte in der Regel um ein Vielfaches übersteigen. Historische Erfahrungen mit nichtwassergekühlten SMR deuten zudem auf einen langfristigen Rückbau hin. 

Der Anteil der erneuerbaren Energien steigt stetig an, dieser ist zur Abdeckung von zusätzlichem Strombedarf aufgrund der Energiewende oder auch beispielsweise von Rechenzentren ausreichend. Atomenergie kann dazu keinen nennenswerten Beitrag leisten, da sie zu teuer ist, hohe Ausfallzeiten hat und nicht wettbewerbsfähig gegenüber anderen Energien ist, insbesondere der erneuerbaren Energien.  

Die IEA hat sich auch schon in der Vergangenheit oft geirrt. So hat sie beispielsweise den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien aufgrund völlig überhöhter Kostenannahmen unterschätzt und die Atomenergie aufgrund fehlerhafter und zu niedrig angesetzter Kosten überschätzt. Die IEA geht von viel zu niedrigen Kostenannahmen für die Atomkraft aus, ignoriert Risiken und lange Bauzeiten. In Zeiten geopolitischer Risiken ist Atomenergie als Hochrisikotechnologie keine Option.

Analyzing data from the European Social Survey (ESS), we explore macro-level effects of the 2015 refugee crisis on public attitudes toward immigration in Greece. Contrary to the belief that the crisis hardened Greeks’ attitudes toward immigration, we find no evidence of a significant negative effect that persists over time. Indeed, we observe a slight improvement in immigration attitudes since a low point that occurred during Greece’s foreign debt crisis. More broadly, the commonly held belief that European publics are becoming more hostile toward immigrants over time is a misperception of reality. We instead observe a slight improvement in attitudes since the refugee crisis of 2015.

Read here in pdf the Working Paper by Nicholas Sambanis, Kalsi Family Professor of Political Science, and Director, Identity and Conflict Lab, Yale University, ELIAMEP Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow and Carlos di Bonifacio, Research Affiliate, Identity & Conflict Lab, Yale University.