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As part of Geneva Peace Week 2024, IPI in partnership with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), International Gender Champions, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), and the Berghof Foundation cohosted a peace panel on the topic of “A Feminist Peace Built by All: Pathways to Inclusive Visions of Peace” on October 15th.

Despite well-established normative frameworks for gender equality within the UN system, such as the WPS agenda, challenges still exist to achieving the vision of a sustainable and just peace. The theme of the 2024 open debate on WPS in the UN Security Council will focus on inclusive peacemaking by highlighting women’s roles in mediation especially in a changing geopolitical and technological environment.

This event provided a moment to reflect on these issues in advance of the open debate on WPS and the 24th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Panelists analyzed and identified strategies to mitigate these challenges to fully realize an inclusive peace. The event further connected different audiences in discussing how to build an inclusive feminist peace, because these efforts cannot be siloed across different agendas and agencies; they are strongest when they connect feminist actors across different sectors and locations.

Welcoming Remarks:
Thomas Greminger, Executive Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Opening Remarks
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute

Speakers:
Madeleine Rees, Former Secretary-General of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and co-chair of the WPS Impact Group in Geneva
Ingrid Münch, Mediation Support Officer, Gender-Responsive and Inclusive Peacemaking, Co-lead of the Gender and Inclusion Team, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Callum Watson, Gender Coordinator, Small Arms Survey
Victoria Sandino Simanca Herrera, feminist leader, former Senator of the Republic of Colombia, negotiator during the peace process in Colombia, and ex-combatant of the FARC-EP

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace, and Security Program, International Peace Institute

Closing Remarks:
Ambassador OIKE Atsuyuki, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations Office at Geneva

The post A Feminist Peace Built by All: Pathways to Inclusive Visions of Peace appeared first on International Peace Institute.

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On October 14th, IPI President Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein delivered the Peace Message at the Opening Ceremony of the 11th annual Geneva Peace Week at the Maison de la Paix in Geneva, Switzerland. This year’s theme was “What is Peace?” Speakers and participants sought to unravel the essence of peace and discover new pathways towards its attainment.

Speaking to the assembled delegates, President Al Hussein emphasized that peace is imperiled by the world’s current trajectory “toward the savagery of unconfined warfare, where being a civilian offers oneself no protection at all.”

However, he draws inspiration from the remarkable efforts of Israeli and Palestinian lawyers and activists behind the A Land for All initiative: “They are doing something rather remarkable. They seem to have pinned down not just a visionary but also a practical equation for achieving a just and lasting peace to the Middle East conflict.”

Read full remarks here >>

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Zu aktuellen wirtschaftspolitischen Vorschlägen von SPD und CDU mit Blick auf die Bundestagswahl 2025 äußert sich Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die wirtschaftspolitischen Vorschläge von SPD und CDU enthalten zahlreiche gute Maßnahmen, wie die Steuerentlastungen für Unternehmen und Bürger*innen. Auch die steuerlichen Anreize für mehr Investitionen sind klug und richtig. Aber die Maßnahmen greifen zu kurz. Einige davon sind zu sehr Klientelpolitik und zu wenig zukunftsfähig. 

Den Vorschlägen von SPD und CDU fehlt ein klares und ambitioniertes Ziel, wo Deutschland in zehn und in 20 Jahren stehen will. Beide Parteien begehen den Fehler zu glauben, man könne mit kleineren Änderungen die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der deutschen Wirtschaft verbessern und den Wirtschaftsstandort sichern. Wir benötigen ein grundlegendes Umdenken der Politik mit Blick auf die Wirtschaft. Wir brauchen einen Paradigmenwechsel mit einem massiven Investitionsprogramm in Bildung, grüne Transformation, Digitalisierung und Innovation. Die SPD-Forderung nach einem Deutschlandfonds für Investitionen ist gut – auch wenn Details der Umsetzung noch fehlen. Eine Investitionsagenda erfordert nicht nur eine Reform der Schuldenbremse, sondern den Abbau schädlicher Staatsausgaben und Subventionen und ein koordiniertes Programm, um private Investitionen und Innovationen zu mobilisieren. 

Sowohl CDU als auch SPD scheint es zu sehr um Klientelpolitik zu gehen. Beide haben ein veraltetes Verständnis von Industriepolitik, beide versuchen über Subventionen für einzelne Unternehmen und Branchen eine Erneuerung zu schaffen. Dies ist ein Irrweg. Die deutsche Wirtschaft braucht mehr fairen Wettbewerb und alle Unternehmen benötigen bessere Rahmenbedingungen – von steuerlichen Entlastungen über eine bessere Infrastruktur bis hin zu weniger Bürokratie. 

Beide Parteien lassen die große Frage unbeantwortet, wie die zunehmende Arbeitskräftelücke in Deutschland geschlossen werden soll. Beide ignorieren die steigende Bedeutung Europas und die notwendigen wirtschaftspolitischen Reformen des europäischen Binnenmarktes. Ohne ein geeintes, starkes Europa wird die deutsche Wirtschaft gegenüber China und den USA weiter an Einfluss und Marktanteilen verlieren. Die sowohl von der CDU als auch von der SPD geführten Bundesregierungen haben in den letzten 15 Jahren zu wenig zu den Reformen in Europa beigetragen und sich zu häufig gegen notwendige Veränderungen gestellt.

Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomische Panel (SOEP) ist eine der größten und am längsten laufenden multidisziplinären Panelstudien weltweit, für die derzeit jährlich etwa 30.000 Menschen in knapp 15.000 Haushalten befragt werden. Das SOEP hat den Anspruch den gesellschaftlichen Wandel zu erfassen und steht somit immer neuen und vielfältigen Themen- und Aufgabenfelder gegenüber. Seine Datenerhebung und -generierung folgt dem Konzept des Survey bzw. Data Life Cycle.

Wir suchen zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt für das Leibniz-Lab Pandemic Preparedness: One Health, One Future ein*e Wissenschaftler*in (w/m/div) (Vollzeit, Teilzeit möglich).

Das Leibniz-Lab Pandemic Preparedness: One Health, One Future greift die drängendsten Fragen zum Umgang mit zukünftigen Pandemien auf. Dabei wird Expertise aus verschiedenen Disziplinen mit Praxiswissen verknüpft, um evidenzbasierte Strategien zu entwickeln, die die Pandemieresilienz von Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft dauerhaft stärken. Das Teilprojekt des Leibniz-Lab, in dem die ausgeschriebene Stelle angesiedelt ist, hat zum Ziel, statistische Methoden vorzubereiten, die dezentralisierte Gesundheitsdatenbanken datenschutzkonform und effizient zusammenführen.

Das Sozio-oekonomische Panel (SOEP) ist eine der größten und am längsten laufenden multidisziplinären Panelstudien der Welt. Jährlich werden rund 30.000 Personen in fast 15.000 Haushalten befragt. Um gesellschaftliche Veränderungsprozesse zu erfassen, nimmt das SOEP ständig neue Forschungsthemen und -aufgaben auf.

Vorbehaltlich der Finanzierungszusage durch den Zuwendungsgeber suchen wir zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt für das Dateninfrastrukturprojekt Sozio-oekonomisches Panel Linked Employer Employee Vol. 2 (SOEP-LEE2) eine*n Wissenschaftliche*r Mitarbeiter*in (w/m/div) (Vollzeit, Teilzeit möglich).

SOEP-LEE2 wird in Kooperation mit dem Institut für Personal und Arbeit (IPA) der Helmut-Schmidt-Universität/Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg (HSU), der Freien Universität Berlin und dem Hamburgischen WeltWirtschaftsInstitut (HWWI) durchgeführt. Das durch das Zentrum für Digitalisierungs- und Technologieforschung der Bundeswehr (dtec.bw) geförderte Vorhaben zielt darauf ab, Befragungen auf der Individualebene mit der betrieblichen Ebene zusammenzuführen, um Informationen von Arbeitnehmer*innen und Arbeitgebern zu verknüpfen. Dafür werden die abhängig Beschäftigten der SOEP-Stichproben um die Kontaktdaten ihrer Betriebsstätte gebeten und die selbständig Beschäftigten im SOEP in Zusatzbefragungen interviewt.

Wir suchen zwei wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter*innen mit Erfahrung und großem Interesse an der Erhebung und Aufbereitung von Mikrodaten, um mehr über die Beschäftigten und ihr Arbeitsumfeld zu erfahren und Fragen folgender Art zu beantworten: Was sind die Determinanten für gute Employer-Employee-Beziehungen? Welche Unternehmen bieten ein besonders gutes Umfeld für ihre Mitarbeiter*innen? Wie wirkt sich der digitale Wandel auf die Beschäftigten und Unternehmen aus? Wie gut sind Unternehmen auf Cyberangriffe vorbereitet? Was sind Determinanten für erfolgreiche Selbständigen-Karrieren?

Wir erwarten darüber hinaus, dass Sie sich aktiv in die Forschungsaktivitäten in dem Projekt und im Bereich „Angewandte Paneldatenanalysen“ im SOEP einbringen.

Figure 1: Results of the Multilateralism Index 2024

Figure 2: Percentage of indicators that improved and deteriorated, by dimension, 2013–2023

There are growing calls to transform the multilateral system, which is widely seen as being in crisis. Yet solving the crisis of multilateralism requires understanding what that crisis entails. What parts of the multilateral system are in crisis, and what parts are still functioning? Where is commitment to multilateralism flagging, and where does it remain strong? Where is multilateral action failing to translate into concrete results, and where is it delivering? Who is being left out of multilateral engagement, and who is being included? And what are the trends over time?

To help answer these questions, the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) developed the Multilateralism Index. This 2024 edition of the Index assesses changes in international cooperation between 2013 and 2023 across five domains: Peace and Security, Human Rights, Climate Action, Public Health, and Trade. Each domain is evaluated across three dimensions: Participation, Performance, and Inclusivity. Looking at each of these dimensions provides several broad takeaways:

• Participation: The Index does not find a major drop-off in participation by states in the multilateral system. In fact, participation increased across all domains except trade. This signals that member states remain engaged in the system, even if the nature of this engagement has shifted from cooperation toward contestation. At the same time, due to limitations in the indicators available, these improvements in participation should not necessarily be interpreted as a broad-based increase in commitment to multilateral action.
• Performance: Performance is the one dimension where the multilateral system saw a clear decline across most of the domains. The biggest decline was in peace and security. Human rights and climate action also saw significant declines. These declines may indicate that some global crises are outstripping the multilateral system’s ability to respond. At the same time, these shortcomings are not solely failures of multilateralism, as performance in many areas also depends domestic action by individual states. Moreover, despite these shortcomings, the gears of the multilateral system are continuing to turn.
• Inclusivity: Broad improvements in the Index’s inclusivity dimension point to two trends: the steady growth in the number of NGOs engaging with various parts of the UN system and the increase in women’s representation across many UN bodies. Limitations in the indicators available make it more difficult to assess progress in other areas, including geographic inclusivity and more substantive inclusivity of women beyond their formal representation at the UN.

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• The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is currently at a crossroads of a changing world environment which impacts demand (food inflation), supply (energy and input costs) and agri-food trade (geostrategic tensions).
• EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions.
• CAP ongoing policy orientation aims at increasing its environmental performance while retaining its economic and social achievements, but excessive targets set by the Farm to Fork Strategy and the impact of changing market conditions brought tensions in the debate between on food security and climate action with respect to priorities on primary agriculture.
• Higher food costs increasing income inequalities put households in the developed world at a risk of changes in consumer behaviour that are driven by forces exogenous to their tastes and preferences.
• Addressing misperceptions about the role of productivity, science and trade will impact on how the EU assesses, in a more balanced way and addresses its strengths and weaknesses in the field of agriculture.
• Despite clear progress of Greek agriculture in recent years three persistent weaknesses of Greek agriculture relate to an uneven and untargeted distribution of direct payments the underestimation of the role of extensive livestock or the absence of a functioning Farm Advisory System.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Tassos Haniotis, Senior Guest Research Scholar, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and Special Advisor for Sustainable Productivity, Forum for the Future of Agriculture.

Introduction

That the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union is currently at a crossroads is probably an understatement. The Farm to Fork Strategy, part of the Green Deal, is essentially in suspension, at least with respect to achieving its overly ambitious targets. A rapidly changing world environment impacts the demand (food inflation), supply (energy and input costs) and trade of agricultural commodities and food products (geostrategic tensions) altered fundamental assumptions underlying the strategy.

Although this reality seems to have changed little in terms of the policy narrative, the results of successive European elections and the new composition of the European Parliament and national governments add a political dimension to the policy uncertainty. Add to the picture the preparation of the EU next budget, a tiny part of total EU public expenditure that, despite its fixity, is expected to address more priority areas, and the prospects for a rational debate about the future of the CAP look rather dim.

This uncertain future is giving the impression that the CAP is a policy fixed in time and space and incapable of reform.

This uncertain future is giving the impression that the CAP is a policy fixed in time and space and incapable of reform. This is further supported by a rather permanent criticism of the CAP by those not benefiting from the EU budget (most sectors, that is). This paper will argue that this impression does not match the facts. It’s not just the space covered by the CAP (initially just six countries of a net importer, now 27 of the largest food exporter and importer in the world) that has fundamentally changed. It is the structure of the policy itself, and its successes and failures, which differ over time.

A clear understanding of what did not work (especially in the period up to the early 90s), what worked (in the two decades following the establishment of WTO), and the mixed picture that has since emerge in the efforts to expand the reach of the policy to address a wide range of environmental and consumer related issues is required.

A clear understanding of what did not work (especially in the period up to the early 90s), what worked (in the two decades following the establishment of WTO), and the mixed picture that has since emerge in the efforts to expand the reach of the policy to address a wide range of environmental and consumer related issues is required.

Greek agriculture has been an integral part of the CAP process for more than forty years. Yet, in sharp contrast to most EU member states, including those with similar structure in their farming sector, Greece has often failed to exploit the benefits of CAP reforms that these other member states did, whether on trade, farm income, competitiveness or structural adjustment.[2]

Greek agriculture seems to have a disproportionate share of problems associated with the CAP, such as penalties related to implementation issues, the uneven and untargeted distribution of support, the lack of a farm advisory system, or its weak and slow structural adjustment.

Instead, Greek agriculture seems to have a disproportionate share of problems associated with the CAP, such as penalties related to implementation issues, the uneven and untargeted distribution of support, the lack of a farm advisory system, or its weak and slow structural adjustment. More importantly, it systematically appears to be a phase behind in its internal debate about the future of the CAP; when other member states already prepare the ground and their positions about what needs to change with the next CAP reform, often the Greek debate focuses not just on what is needed on the basis of the most recent reform but to a large extent on what was not implemented in the previous reform.[3]

How the above play in the current context will be the focus of this paper. Its aim is not to cover exhaustively and descriptively the details of the policy, as the literature is rich in this area. Rather, the aim is to identify the different set of challenges faced by the CAP in the present context of the EU, outline a few possible scenarios for the future as these emerge from the current debate, and examine the serious challenges and untapped opportunities that Greek agriculture has as one of the biggest financial beneficiaries of the CAP in the EU.

The three distinct CAP phases: introvert, extravert, uncertain

That the EU’s agricultural sector, despite its small size, is still of strategic importance becomes evident by referring to four figures – 1% of the economy and 4% of labour manages 50% of land and supplies 99% of food consumed in the EU. Furthermore, the EU food chain is arguably the most demanding globally in terms of food safety and quality, and highly sophisticated in terms of technology, setting standards worldwide. It is also highly competitive as the EU’s agrifood trade balance demonstrates, with a strong surplus based on value-added products despite being the biggest global food importer.

Even when it comes to its environmental performance, an area where results are lagging behind needs and expectations, concrete progress has turned EU’s agriculture as the only major agriculture worldwide that has managed to “produce more with less”. In China, India, Brazil, US and EU, farm production has increased in both volume and value. Yet only EU emissions have declined, by 24% since 1990 (with a clear slowdown in progress lately), while those of the US have slightly increased, and those of China, India and especially Brazil massively increased.[4]

How come then that the policy behind such results rarely receives any credit? The answer lies in the very structure of the EU institutional setting. The CAP still represents roughly a third of the EU budget, still a very significant share, despite its decline by half compared to the past. The focus therefore easily centres on the high part of a small budget, and not on the insignificant share of the EU budget in total EU public spending – on the 35% of the EU budget and not on the fact that this represents roughly 1% of GDP or 2% of total EU public spending, and the CAP 0.7% of total EU public spending.[5]

Within such an environment the CAP generates ‘subsidy envy’ among other EU policies since, being a big part of a small budget, the CAP remains the only policy with a real EU-wide impact. Consequently, it always attracts criticisms whenever the EU raises its ambition to address emerging policy challenges in a rapidly changing global environment. It is true that criticism to the CAP rightly points to the need to assess how this funding, whatever its size, is spent. However, very often this assessment is not done judging the CAP by its successes and failures with respect to its declared objectives, for example on its distributional impact, but with respect to failures in other policy areas (trade or food safety in the past, environment more recently).

In the absence of sufficient budgetary allocations, such policies tend to expect the partial delivery of their objectives via the CAP. The uncomfortable truth is that available policy tools, whether for agriculture or other policy areas, reflect the space that Member States were willing (or not) to give to the Commission – i.e., short in budgetary terms, long in the decision process. In the past, budgetary constraints acted as an incentive to consider the consistency and coherence of the CAP with other EU policies as a prerequisite for its reforms. The increasing gap between expectations from the policy and perceptions about its performance begs the question of how the big picture of its reform path is assessed now.

The CAP has undergone three distinct periods during its long and parallel to the EU history (the CAP was already part of the Treaty of Rome, though its first implementation started in 1962).

During its first period, which lasted almost three decades (until the MacSharry reform of 1992), the CAP was both introvert in design and defensive the CAP did not turn “victim of its success”, as it is often claimed, but of its initial design.

During its first period, which lasted almost three decades (until the MacSharry reform of 1992), the CAP was both introvert in design and defensive in its narrative, running the full cycle of initial design, implementation, success and failure. Succes because the initially impressive increase in farm productivity and structural adjustment turned the food deficits of the post-war Western Europe into surpluses in most major agricultural commodities. Failure because the CAP did not turn “victim of its success”, as it is often claimed, but of its initial design.

High support prices and a trade regime based on high tariffs and export subsidies helped boost productivity, but at a high cost, both budgetary and as well as political. The high budgetary costs were needed to accommodate these surpluses either in the form of intervention stocks or heavily subsidised exports. The high political costs resulted from the internal Member State infighting between those pushing for and those resisting reform and the international isolation of the CAP, which became the culprit of depressed world market prices.[6]

In its second period, extrovert and offensive period, the CAP shifted from a philosophy of supporting products to one of supporting producers. 

The second period of the CAP, which includes the reforms of 1992, 2000, 2003/04 and 2008, was characterised by the gradual but complete transformation of the policy within the span of less than two decades. More and more isolated at the international scene, the CAP faced the paradox that, in the trade policy debate, experts and policy makers alike saw the CAP as an obstacle in integrating agriculture into the global system of Institutions established by the Breton Woods Agreement (having by that time long forgotten that it was US, and not EU farm policies that kept agriculture out of world rules).[7]

In summary, in this extrovert and offensive period, the CAP shifted from a philosophy of supporting products to one of supporting producers. This was achieved by reducing support prices below world market price levels, abolishing export subsidies, massively decoupling direct payments from production decisions and linking them to some degree of environmental conditionality, introducing and significantly strengthening the agri-environmental nature of Rural Development, constraining the remaining (less than 10% of total payments) product-based support by ceilings based on area or animal payments, and abolishing the twin “sacred cows” of sugar and dairy quotas.

No wonder the above process, still grossly underestimated in its difficulty of designing, deciding and implementing it, allowed the EU to assume gradually a less defensive and finally a more offensive position after the abolition of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation. No other proof is needed than a look at the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) of the OECD, an indicator measuring the impact of farm policy support measures at farm gate level. The global gradual farm reform process it depicts, reflected in a downward trend of the most distorting policies, becomes almost a horizontal line when the EU is removed from it.[8]

…by the end of this wave of reforms questions started being asked about the best way to address the emerging challenges of the new century.

Although the above is factually not contested, already by the end of this wave of reforms questions started being asked about the best way to address the emerging challenges of the new century, including those of the new decision- making process, co-decision with the European Parliament. Fischler himself, in his introduction to a book on the CAP after his reform, raised the need for new policy instruments addressing a wide range of areas, from volatility, knowledge, environmental responsibility and climate change, to food chain, social balance among farmers and the wider role of rural areas.[9]

…the third period of the CAP was insecure and uncertain.

Developments in the last decade have confirmed the above concerns, leading to the third period of the CAP, characterised by the impression that the CAP is rather immovable, sort of cast-in-stone policy, reflecting a growing reform fatigue in the farming community and by Member States despite efforts by the European Commission and, until recently, by the European Parliament to adapt it to the new, mainly environmental and climate change challenges global agriculture is facing. Understanding what led to this impression is important in assessing what went wrong with the recent CAP reform and its link to the Farm to Fork strategy of the Green Deal, rendering the CAP prospects seemingly insecure and uncertain.

This period has also not been smooth, with exogenous events influencing the mood and the performance of the policy, with the first attempt to address them under co-decision left its mark by identifying a gap between expectations as expressed in proposals and reality as reflected in decisions.[10] A series of exogenous events explain much. One of them, the COVID crisis, demonstrated the resilience of EU’s food system and boosted confidence in it, against all odds and perceptions of “broken food systems”. Yet three other factors acted in the opposite direction.

First, the Paris Agreement shifted attention on the need to prioritise climate action, with agriculture being one of the most affected sectors in terms of impact, contribution and complexity in finding solutions. Second, twice in the past decade a farm price boom and bust revealed major problems in the price transmission of farm prices at the consumer level; the law of price gravity seems nowadays to apply at farm-gate, but not at the shelf! Inflation has rendered food more expensive due to factors that are exogenous to agriculture and has thus put a big question mark to claims that the path to best internalise food systems’ externalities is by increasing the cost of food.[11] Third, geostrategic tensions have added to uncertainty with their direct impact on natural gas prices, and thus on nitrogen fertilisers, and their more indirect on food security concerns.[12]

Therefore, higher food costs, prospects for higher energy costs driven by the green transition, and increasing income inequalities put households in the developed world at a risk of changes in consumer behaviour that are driven by forces that are exogenous to both their existing and the often-desired tastes and preferences. This introduced a clear affordability challenge for food security that has not been witnessed in the history of the EU, and led to a polarisation of the CAP debate on whether food security (as advocated by farm groups) or climate action (prioritised by environmental stakeholders) should be prioritised – a false dilemma as both are interlinked in problem definition as well as in problem solving.

…co-decision between Council and European Parliament affected the manner by which the CAP is managed at EU level. 

To the above one should add also a major institutional change; co-decision between Council and European Parliament affected the manner by which the CAP is managed at EU level. In previous reforms until 2009, the Commission (which had and continues to have the legislative initiative) proposed and the Council negotiated with the Commission the final outcome; the European Parliament was in all effects an observer.

The result is an outcome which is more complex and less ambitious than the initial proposal.

After 2009, at the “second reading” of a proposal, which determines that final outcome, the Commission the becomes the “facilitator”; in essence, it turns into the observer. This change altered the manner by which all Institutions negotiate; the Commission, willing to avoid the second reading, has the tendency to compromise at earlier stages of the process, the Member States, negotiating with the Presidency (another Member State which is trusted less than the Commission) have the tendency to overload their “red lines” and the European Parliament comes with an endless list of amendments. The result is an outcome which is more complex and less ambitious than the initial proposal.

The suspended step of the Farm to Fork: what went wrong?

It is customary that the discussion about the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) starts before the ink dries on the regulations that set its future framework. In the beginning, this is usually limited to a group of policy experts and stakeholders within the “Brussels bubble” as Member States and farmers are busy first understanding and then implementing what was decided (as a rule, quite different and more complex than what was proposed). But the latest CAP reform brought a novelty; massive demonstrations of farmers before the elections for the European Parliament led to the weakening of exactly the CAP part that was supposed to be strengthened, leading the CAP to renege on the conditionality of best practices introduced two decades ago.

The CAP’s ambitious integration into the Green Deal, approved as the the centre-piece of the von der Leyen Commission in 2020, was expected to come through the Farm to Fork Strategy, which aims at  reducing the environmental and climate footprint of the EU food system, strengthen its resilience, ensure food security in the face of climate change and biodiversity loss and lead a global transition towards competitive sustainability “from farm to fork”.[13]

Already in 2018, under the Junker Commission, the then Commissioner for Agriculture Phil Hogan proposed a CAP reform which, by recognising the need to enhance the environmental performance of the CAP, aimed also to make the policy more result-oriented. Based on an extensive Impact Assessment, the proposal outlined ten specific objectives that the CAP needs to serve (three each on the economic, environmental and social dimension of the CAP, one cross cutting on innovation) but let its more flexible implementation through Strategic Plans of its Member States for the 2023-2027 period.

The Farm to Fork Strategy added a series of initiatives upstream and downstream of the food chain, but with respect to primary agriculture and the CAP it essentially delayed the reform process by two years by adding four main EU quantitative targets to be achieved by 2030 as a measure of success of what was decided by the previous the CAP orientation.  Despite the explicit conclusion of the Impact Assessment that such targets did not make sense at EU level as “one size does not fit all”, and the specific needs of Member States need to be addressed based on evidence, the so called “aspirational” and non-binding targets failed to inspire Member States and farmers. Instead, they demonstrated the huge gap between the exuberance in expectations and the reality on the ground.

All targets set were on areas whose orientation was already desired and prioritised. But their setting undermined from the start the prospects for success. The most promoted target, the doubling of the area for organic farming to 25%, went against the conclusion of any analysis (the EU’s outlook for the sector expected the relative figure to be 14% before reform) and any logic of supporting a sector whose growth was based on value-added and not on area.

The target to reduce the use of pesticides by 50% (a figure that has become sort of fixation not just in the EU but at UN level no matter what the problem or the target is) was proposed to be reached by 2030 while the first data would become available by 2028 and the baseline of what they represent is still unknown. The reduction of nutrient losses in the soil (another 50%) exceeded both in both timing and magnitude what FAO considered feasible for European soils (a 40% reduction by 2040). Even the target of a 50% reduction in the use of animal antibiotics (a theme of one of the Workshops of the Impact Assessment) had already been achieved at EU level, thus reducing any incentive for further progress.

With such a mismatch between expectations and reality, it should come as no surprise that anti-EU populists used the opportunity for a comprehensive attack on whatever “Brussels” is meant to represent during the European elections, and with some success. What should come as surprise is that the Commission did not seem to relax what already was considered as “not legally binding”, its quantitative targets, but chose instead to alter the means meant to achieve broader and absolutely necessary objectives. For example, the relaxation, in the guise of simplification, of certain Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions already in place since the 2003 reform has nothing to do with an impact on the cost of production. On the contrary, it saves production costs.

This asymmetry between initial expectations and reality is not just an EU phenomenon; in the EU it was expressed strongly because the EU policy has been the most ambitious in real terms, with UN such initiatives at limited declaration level. But it reflects the difficulty in delivering policy-relevant outcomes addressing environment challenges and covering the food chain (an “holistic, food systems approach”) and the reality of its available policy instruments. In the EU the latter, adapted over time through a series of reforms, were designed to address clearly set Treaty objectives that mainly address the supply side of agriculture, adapted to make production more demand-driven. Such measures are nonetheless unfit to address growing food demand complexities, often characterised by individuals demanding as citizens what they cannot afford as consumers.

Greek agriculture and the CAP: a cow to milk or a policy to apply?

Greek agriculture is fully integrated into EU policies for more than four decades now, and is one of the largest beneficiaries of CAP funds. EU funds supporting Greek agriculture represent one of the highest percentages of GDP among Member States, lagging behind only Bulgaria’s share; 1.7% for the latter in 2021 vs 1.4% for Greece (for comparison, Spain’s share was 0.6%°. Up until recently, CAP funds have accounted for more than half of all EU funds to Greece, but the exceptional Recovery and Resilience Facility changed this by boosting EU funding to all Member States. Yet, in contrast to the objectives set by the CAP, Greek agriculture seems to have struggled to reap the benefits that other Member States with comparable conditions as those faced by Greece did.[14]

One should not underestimate the progress of Greek agriculture in recent years, as evidenced by the increase in agri-food exports, including in value-added products. 

One should not underestimate the progress of Greek agriculture in recent years, as evidenced by the increase in agri-food exports, including in value-added products. That the reversal of the negative trend of Greece’s agri-food deficit happened during the economic crisis is a sign of resilience of the sector; that this trend continues a promising sign for the future. There are also numerous examples of innovative applications of best practices, stemming the full spectrum from organic farming to precision farming. But there is a paradox when one looks into the details of such progress; it is as if the CAP is absent.

In fact, while the implementation of the CAP in Greece would require a separate analysis, three persistent weaknesses of Greek agriculture point to the administration as the root of problems as all three relate to decisions (not) taken by the Ministry of Agriculture. The first major persistent weakness is the uneven and untargeted distribution of direct payments. Successive reforms of the CAP since 2008 allowed Member States to move away from a level of support based on past data, which was consciously chosen in 2003 by the Commission as a necessary step in order to avoid a negative Impact on land prices and farm asset values. Minimising such changes, Greece has systematically avoided assuming an unavoidable political cost to reap the policy benefits of such a move.

This choice directly impacts the second weakness, the role of extensive livestock as such a redistribution would have required a clear demarcation between permanent grazing land and forest areas. Since the budgetary allocation of direct payments is fixed, increasing the support of the livestock would have reduced the support for crops. It would have also allowed Greece to reduce the average level of area support with the integration of more land into the system (something that was possible already in 2008). Instead, it now leaves Greece vulnerable to a future path of further harmonisation of support, while the poor implementation continues to generate a significant level of penalties.[15]

The third major weakness relates to the absence of a functioning Farm Advisory System. A requirement since the 2003 reform, this continues to be weak. It is not that there is an absence of advisers, or lately even a list of certified advisors. A system requires a commonality in the principles applied, an understanding of the implementation challenges of the policies and suggestions that are well integrated into a Strategic Plan with priorities. While the Greek Strategic Plan generally follows the new orientation of the CAP and the Farm to Fork Strategy, it is unclear to which extent and in which directions the measures chosen will impact the structures of Greek agriculture.

What the future brings

…the recent Draghi Report on the competitiveness of the EU left out one of its most competitive sectors, agri-food, while the “Strategic Dialogue” Report that was meant to address challenges and set the ground for the “vision” of the new Commission about EU agriculture and the CAP left competitiveness out.

As a sign of the parallel universes EU Institutions sometimes work the recent Draghi Report on the competitiveness of the EU left out one of its most competitive sectors, agri-food, while the “Strategic Dialogue” Report that was meant to address challenges and set the ground for the “vision” of the new Commission about EU agriculture and the CAP left competitiveness out (and any numbers whatsoever in a 100-page report of one of the most challenging sectors).  Yet facts are more stubborn than any biases. With a world population that is still increasing at faster rates than production in the two most populated continents and with climate change impacting every aspect of agricultural production, the question of where food covering the additional demand needs will be produced and how and with which footprint this will happen is more pertinent than ever.

EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions.

Thus, the capacity of agricultural supply to respond to increasing food security concerns amidst climate change priorities is at increasing risk. EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions. To do so requires a closer look at how new obstacles and longer-term constraints driven by recent developments impact on the expected path of transition towards sustainability. This not some “treason” of high ambitions; rather it represents the reality check to test how these ambitions could be met.

EU agriculture did well in its purely economic and social dimension, as evidenced by increases in its trade balance and farm income. EU agriculture did comparatively much better than other global players when judged by its performance in emissions. To accept this fact does not imply complacency or ignoring the need to improve significantly the the environmental performance of the CAP. Rather, it implies that in attempting to do so, understanding the role of EU agriculture in the global context is a must if climate action and food security are to be addressed as what they are, global in nature.

Addressing this requires re-opening the debate in three priority areas where the EU has to come clear on its stance and future contribution – productivity, science and trade. 

Addressing this requires re-opening the debate in three priority areas where the EU has to come clear on its stance and future contribution – productivity, science and trade. Though imperfect, all three areas are necessary conditions for moving forward. To become also sufficient in addressing the global need to produce more with less, they require addressing misperceptions about them.

…improving soil helps to improve water, air and biodiversity; the opposite is not always true.

Productivity, in contrast to productivism, does not imply ignoring the need to incorporate the environmental footprint in its measurement. On the contrary, it implies identifying and better integrating the full spectrum of alternative practices that, in different conditions, allow output to grow with lower inputs. In this respect, prioritising soil management offers some clear prospects. This is where better data on the performance of practices at regional, and increasing cases at farm level, are available. Soil is also where the CAP has a leverage since most farmland is covered through the provision of direct payments conditional on better practices, and measurable impacts are possible. Furthermore, improving soil helps to improve water, air and biodiversity; the opposite is not always true.

…unlike human or animal health, EU attitudes on plant health continue to address technological progress as a regression 

Unfortunately, soil is also where resistance to science in the EU is evident. Reduction in nutrient losses implies less and better targeted use of both fertilisers and pesticides, and alternatives in the products that are being phased-out. Yet, unlike human or animal health, EU attitudes on plant health continue to address technological progress as a regression – even in Nobel-winning technologies. But while increasingly scientific evidence provides a more balanced assessment of the role of agriculture, including of livestock (from the recognition of the nutritional value of red meat to the very different role of methane when livestock numbers are in steady state as compared to when they have been increasing), negative public perceptions and prejudice about the role of science in agriculture are well entrenched.

…notions about strategic autonomy and sovereignty which potentially constrain trade are considered priorities in a sector such as food, where both aspects are clearly more advanced than in many other EU sectors.

So are negative perceptions about the role of trade. Partly this has to do with the fact that the benefits from trade are often idealised, ignoring that it comes with winners and losers; and the former need to introduce measures that compensate and accompany in transition the latter. The EU is still, more than anything else, a free-trade area which includes such compensation mechanisms (CAP, regional funds); however, agriculture is a late comer to the global trade system, often pressured to ‘give’ so that other sectors ‘take’. Combined with the absence of global rules on safety and environmental footprint, this renders the debate difficult and prone to isolationist ideas. It is interesting in this respect how notions about strategic autonomy and sovereignty which potentially constrain trade are considered priorities in a sector such as food, where both aspects are clearly more advanced than in many other EU sectors (from energy, metals and minerals to microchips).

In conclusion, addressing misperceptions about the role of productivity, science and trade will impact on how the EU assesses, in a more balanced way and addresses its strengths and weaknesses in the field of agriculture. This, in turn, will to a large extent also determine the EU’s capacity to lead based on evidence in the joint challenge to produce more food with less emissions and pollution and adapt its policies accordingly.

[1] Views expressed here are strictly personal, and do not reflect my current affiliation with the above entities or my previous affiliation with the European Commission. My 33-year career with the latter heavily influenced these opinions, which here reflect only information that is in the public domain.

[2] K. Karantininis, A New Paradigm for Greek Agriculture, Palgrave MacMillan, 2017, or more recently https://www.dianeosis.org/2024/09/o-agrotikos-tomeas-stin-ellada/

[3] See https://www.dianeosis.org/2023/07/i-nea-koini-agrotiki-politiki-tis-periodou-2023-2027/ for the manner by which Greece chose to implement the recent CAP reform. As for the manner by which the debate on the CAP usually evolves, the point raised here is based on my experience from over 100 missions in Greece during my career. While introductory interventions at public conferences and meetings habitually would start with an update of what needed to be done in the future, the discussion very soon would turn into what was not done from previous requirements. That implementation is the problem is evidenced by heavy penalties, which in the decade before the economic crisis exceeded 2 billion euros.

[4] https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/IndicatorsEnvironmental/EmissionsFromAgriculture.html and https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/food-security-climate-change-times-covid-19-tassos-haniotis/

[5] https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DashboardIndicators/Financing.html

[6] At the EU level, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark were leading the reform CAP camp, with France and Ireland strongly resisting change. US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were pushing globally for reform, despite also having significant trade distorting policies in place. See for example McCalla A.F. and Josling, T. E., Agricultural Policies in World Markets, New York, 1985.

[7] T. Haniotis, Agriculture in the WTO: A European Union Perspective, Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 32,2(August 2000): 197-202.

[8] https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2023_b14de474-en

[9] A. Sorrentino, R. Henke and S. Severini (eds), The Common Agricultural Policy after the Fischler Reform, Ashgate, England, 2011.

[10] J; Swinnen (ed), The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: an imperfect storm, CEPS, Brussels, 2015.

[11] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/food-inflation-blues-tassos-haniotis-qhj6e

[12] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/blissful-linearity-ag-market-outlook-nonlinear-nature-tassos-haniotis-iwqpe

[13] https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-05/f2f_action-plan_2020_strategy-info_en.pdf

[14] For a detailed comparison of Greek agriculture with the EU average and those of other Member States see https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DataPortal/analytical_factsheets.html.

[15] Although technical in nature, the issue of incorrect integration of grazing land into the payment system brought the expected average per hectare payment in Greece from 380 euros per hectare to 580 euros per hectare already in the 2008 “Health Check” Reform. Total funds were not affected, but their  distribution was, negatively affecting the extensive livestock sector.

Zur Herbstprojektion 2024 der Bundesregierung äußert sich Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die Bundesregierung hat ihre Konjunkturprognose deutlich nach unten korrigiert. Wiederholt verzögert sich nun der wirtschaftliche Aufschwung und die Hoffnung auf eine rasche Kehrtwende wird enttäuscht. Die Prognose der Bundesregierung unterscheidet sich stark und sieht ein um 0,3 Prozentpunkte größeres Wachstum für das Jahr 2025 im Vergleich zu der Prognose der Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute. Die Wachstumsinitiative der Bundesregierung dürfte sich positiv auswirken, aber vermutlich nicht so stark wie von der Bundesregierung erhofft. Und auch die Unsicherheit bleibt weiterhin hoch und dürfte die Erholung von Investitionen und Konsum bremsen. 

Die größte Sorge ist, dass die wirtschaftliche Erholung sich auch in Zukunft weiter verzögern könnte und die deutsche Wirtschaft empfindliche Rückschläge einstecken muss. Die Kriege in der Ukraine und im Mittleren Osten könnten Energiekosten und Rohstoffpreise deutlich erhöhen und somit vor allem die deutsche Industrie weiter schwächen. Das zweite unterschätzte Risiko sind die Konsequenzen einer Wahl Donald Trumps zum US-Präsidenten, was die globalen Handelskonflikte intensivieren und die deutschen Exporte empfindlich treffen dürfte. 

Die größte konjunkturelle Bremse für die deutsche Wirtschaft bleibt der große Pessimismus und die fehlende Zuversicht, sowohl der Unternehmen als auch der Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Vor allem die Industrie leidet unter einer großen Unsicherheit bei der Regulierung, fehlenden Fachkräften und hohen Energiekosten. Und Bürgern fehlt das Vertrauen, so dass viele ihre deutlich gewachsenen realen Einkommen eher auf die hohe Kante legen. 

Die neue Konjunkturprognose macht einen starken wirtschaftlichen Impuls der Finanzpolitik dringender denn je. Unternehmen wie Bürgerinnen und Bürger brauchen finanzielle Entlastungen und der Staat muss deutlich mehr Geld für Investitionen in Infrastruktur, Bildung und Innovation in die Hand nehmen. Die Schuldenbremse wird immer mehr zum größten Hemmnis für eine schnellere und dauerhafte wirtschaftliche Erholung. Die neue Konjunkturprognose vergrößert das Dilemma für die Bundesregierung: Sie muss einerseits eine expansivere Finanzpolitik umsetzen, andererseits entwickeln sich die Steuereinnahmen schwächer als erwartet. Daher könnte die Bundesregierung perverserweise gezwungen sein, noch stärkere Einsparungen im Bundeshaushalt 2025 zu tätigen und somit die Wirtschaft weiter zu schwächen.

Event Video 
Photos

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On October 8th, IPI in partnership with the Permanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the UN, cohosted a special preview screening of THE VETO, a short documentary film, followed by a panel discussion.

For close to eighty years, the UN Security Council’s permanent member veto power has been the subject of constant debate, both within the UN and without.

The veto itself isn’t going away—it’s “veto-proof.” But when vetoes are cast in the face of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, obligations under international law and the UN Charter must be considered. Such uses have led to massive loss of life, displacement of millions, and the multilateral order pushed to a breaking point.

The film, featuring leading global experts, puts aside assertions of the impossibility of change and explores real paths to breaking the Security Council deadlock.

The event video features only the trailer of the documentary. Production of the final film is forthcoming.

Welcoming remarks:
H.E. Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the UN

Conversation following the film:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO of the International Peace Institute
Professor Jennifer Trahan, NYU Center for Global Affairs; author, Existing Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes (CUP 2020)
Tim Slade, Independent Filmmaker, Director and Producer of THE VETO

The post Film Screening of “The Veto” appeared first on International Peace Institute.

This policy paper delves into the volatile relationship between Egypt and Turkey, examining its profound implications for the Eastern Mediterranean. Since 2020, Egyptian-Turkish relations have moved cautiously towards rapprochement following a period of intense tension. Central to this relationship is the Libyan conflict, in which both states hold substantial stakes. This study explores the current political forces driving this tentative reconciliation, as well as the ramifications of these developments for the Eastern Mediterranean.

• The Libyan civil war emerged as a proxy conflict between Egypt and Turkey; however, both states have since aligned their positions on the Gaza crisis, reflecting a major shift in their diplomatic approach.
• The significance of Libya’s oil reserves for both states cannot be overstated, as they have prompted a renewed sense of cooperation after a decade of rivalry.
• Despite their significant ideological differences, Egypt and Turkey have ultimately recognized the necessity of strengthening their ties across nearly all areas, including trade and military cooperation.
• After a decade of intense conflict shaped by competing interests and military interventions in Libya, Egypt and Turkey are now contemplating a rapprochement with a view to addressing common security and economic interests.
• If it signals Turkey’s wish to engage with all the countries in the region based on international norms, a rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey could prove to be a critical factor for the achievement of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.
• An opportunity is emerging for Greece to promote regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University; Senior Research Fellow, Head, Turkey Programme, ELIAMEP and Electra Nisidou, Research Assistant, Turkey Programme, ELIAMEP. 

Introduction

Volatility is not a recent feature of Egyptian-Turkish relations. Following decades of rather lukewarm relations, in the early 2000s, Turkey and Egypt forged cooperative relations characterized by a boost in economic cooperation, trade, and investment. This era was underpinned by Turkey’s AKP administration’s policy of “zero problems with neighbours”[1] and Egypt’s Mubarak-era emphasis on regional stability. The regional landscape underwent a dramatic transformation in 2011 with the onset of the Arab Spring, which led to the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and the fall of other long-standing regimes across the Arab Middle East.[2] The election of Mohamed Morsi, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the Presidency of Egypt in 2012 heralded a new era in Egyptian-Turkish relations. Turkey’s AKP administration, sharing strong ideological affinities with the Muslim Brotherhood, welcomed Morsi’s presidency and sought a strategic relationship with Egypt. However, relations quickly soured following the military coup of 3 July 2013 which ousted Morsi and brought General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to power. Turkey vehemently condemned the coup and refused to recognize El-Sisi’s government; diplomatic relations were suspended.[3] Turkey’s increased support for the Muslim Brotherhood further ratcheted up the tension, which peaked during the Libyan Civil War, in which  Turkey and Egypt found themselves supporting opposing factions: Turkey backed the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, while Egypt supported the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar.

The attempted coup in Turkey of 15 July 2016 marked a new low point in Egyptian-Turkish relations. Initial reactions in Cairo to news of the coup appeared rather positive, reflecting deep-seated animosities linked to the Erdoğan administration’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its refusal to recognize the El-Sisi government.[4] The failure of the coup not only embarrassed Egyptian media, but it also reignited bilateral tensions. The coup attempt ignited internal debates in Egypt about the role of the military in politics in which comparisons were drawn to Egypt’s own experience. Key obstacles to reconciliation remained, notably Turkey’s non-recognition of the El-Sisi regime and the status of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey. Despite Saudi mediation efforts and Turkey’s normalization of relations with other regional powers including Israel and Russia, mutual distrust and differing political stances continued to obstruct the restoration of diplomatic ties.

The Dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean

The instability of the Eastern Mediterranean has been fuelled by several key factors which primarily revolve around the discovery of significant natural gas reserves in the EEZs of Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. The discovery of Israel’s Leviathan field in 2010, followed by Cyprus’s Aphrodite field and Egypt’s Zohr field, sparked high expectations of regional energy exports. However, instead of fostering cooperation, these discoveries intensified maritime boundary disputes and attracted the attention of major powers and energy companies. Initial optimism about leveraging these resources for regional stability and economic benefit was overshadowed by the challenges of monetization, including the need for further discoveries and regional political consensus. Unilateral actions and non-inclusive approaches further impeded progress.[5] Compounding these issues is the unresolved Cyprus problem, which has long strained Greek-Turkish relations and obstructed regional cooperation. Turkey’s opposition to Cyprus’s maritime boundaries and its interference with drilling operations have exacerbated tensions. The emergence of significant natural gas reserves has raised the stakes, leading Greece to strengthen its strategic alliances. Greece’s EEZ delimitation agreements in 2020 with Italy and Egypt, which were aimed at clarifying maritime boundaries and countering Turkey’s claims, marked a significant shift in its approach.

Turkey’s recent foreign policy shift vis-à-vis the Middle East was made in response to both regional dynamics and domestic insecurities. 

Turkey’s recent foreign policy shift vis-à-vis the Middle East was made in response to both regional dynamics and domestic insecurities. As regional conflicts intensified, particularly in Syria and Libya, Turkey increasingly turned to military interventions and unilateral actions. This shift was driven by heightened threat perceptions, especially following the collapse of the Kurdish peace process and the failed coup attempt in 2016,[6] which exacerbated concerns over regime security. Moreover, Turkey’s rivalry with the Saudi Arabia–UAE axis has fuelled a zero-sum approach to regional power struggles and further embedded its military presence across the Middle East.[7] This reorientation also underscores Turkey’s efforts to balance its relationships with powers like the United States and Russia, despite the challenges of diverging interests. Overall, Turkey’s evolving strategy highlighted a securitized and risk-prone approach, reflecting its broader ambitions, vulnerabilities and feeding into an increasingly volatile regional landscape.[8]

The deterioration in Turkey’s relations with its immediate Arab neighbours, particularly Egypt, has complicated the strategic landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean significantly. Rooted in divergent strategic interests and historical rivalries, the strain between Turkey and Egypt was exacerbated by Turkey’s alignment with pro-Western states, its NATO membership, and its contentious relationship with Israel. These factors placed Turkey at odds with Egypt, which had aligned itself with the Saudi Arabia-UAE axis against Turkish influence in the region. The aftermath of the Arab uprisings, particularly in Libya, saw the two countries supporting opposing factions, which deepened their rivalry. Moreover, Turkey’s broader regional ambitions, shaped by its security imperatives and strategic alliances, fuelled Egypt’s perception of Turkey as a regional adversary. This animosity was further complicated by Turkey’s assertive military actions in Libya and its support for movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt viewed as a direct threat to its own stability and regional influence. As a result, the relationship between Turkey and Egypt remained tense, with little room for reconciliation as both states pursued competing visions of regional leadership.[9]

The Libyan civil war: From proxy conflict to détente

Libya was the country where Egyptian-Turkish confrontation reached the brink of a proxy war. Following the fall of the Muammar Qaddafi regime in 2011, Libya experienced state failure and prolonged instability due to the rise of various militias. By 2014, Libya was divided between two rival administrations, one in Tripoli and one in Tobruk. Egypt’s involvement in the Libyan conflict was driven by strategic interests and ideological opposition. The geographical proximity of Egypt and Libya, coupled with a history of strained relations with Qaddafi, shaped Egypt’s position in the post-Qaddafi era. Under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt remained resolutely opposed to Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which had ties to the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Instead, Egypt supported the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar with a view to counteracting Islamist influence and securing economic benefits, such as discounted Libyan oil, while also addressing security concerns related to border stability.

However, Turkey’s intervention on behalf of the GNA in early 2020, when the LNA attempted to occupy Tripoli, complicated Egypt’s objectives. Egypt eventually proposed the Cairo Declaration in June 2020, seeking to address the presence of foreign forces—Turkey, in particular–and to avoid direct military confrontation. Egypt’s role in the Libyan conflict was also shaped by its alliance with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, both of which provided Egypt with financial and military aid, aligning Cairo’s policies with their broader regional goals of countering political Islam and containing Turkish influence. Egypt’s strategy involved bolstering Haftar’s military capabilities while simultaneously engaging in diplomatic efforts to limit Turkey’s influence. Despite its assertive stance, Egypt was aware of the potential domestic repercussions and the strain on its economy and was cautious about overextending itself militarily in Libya. This balancing act underscored Egypt’s complex position, as it navigated between immediate security concerns and the broader regional power dynamics involving its Gulf allies.[10]

Turkey’s involvement in Libya also reflected its broader strategy, which sought to expand its influence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya also reflected its broader strategy, which sought to expand its influence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Turkey deepened its engagement in Libya beyond military support for the GNA by leveraging soft power through cultural and economic ties, which included reconstruction efforts and infrastructure projects. This economic involvement not only strengthened Turkey’s political leverage, but it also sought to establish long-term Turkish influence in a post-conflict Libya. Turkey’s actions served to counterbalance those of regional rivals, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which acted across the Arab world to oppose Turkish influence. Turkey’s strategic involvement in Libya, including its efforts to assert its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, underscored the complex interplay between regional powers in the conflict, making Libya a crucial battleground for influence in the MENA region.[11]

The Libyan conflict emerged as a significant arena for rivalry between Turkey and Egypt, reflecting their divergent ideologies and strategic interests.

The Libyan conflict emerged as a significant arena for rivalry between Turkey and Egypt, reflecting their divergent ideologies and strategic interests. The rivalry between Turkey and Egypt in Libya also had broader regional implications. The strategic discord contributed to the formation of alliances and treaties aimed at countering each other’s influence. For instance, the Greece-Egypt maritime boundary agreement of 2019, which aimed to secure maritime rights and limit Turkish expansion, was partially a response to Turkey’s assertive actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. In addition, the United States began increasingly to align with Egypt in recognition of Cairo’s role as a stabilizing force and a counterweight to Turkish influence. Libya’s conflict thus served as a focal point for the broader strategic struggle between Turkey and Egypt.[12] However, while the Libyan conflict has not yet been fully resolved, notable progress has been made toward stabilization. This is thanks to the UN-brokered ceasefire in October 2020 between Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA), which has significantly reduced the violence.

Most of the deposits, as well as the mining and processing facilities, are under the control of the Haftar government, which strengthens his position and may have pushed Turkey to seek a compromise with Egypt.

While military violence has declined, political tensions remain high, however. The Central Bank of Libya, which manages the country’s vast oil revenues, is at the heart of the latest political turmoil. On 26 August 2024, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, the GNA Prime Minister based in Tripoli, fired the governor of the Central Bank, Sadiq al-Kabir. In response to this decision, oil extraction and processing in the eastern part of Libya was frozen.[13] Most of the deposits, as well as the mining and processing facilities, are under the control of the Haftar government, which strengthens his position and may have pushed Turkey to seek a compromise with Egypt. A compromise agreement was brokered by the United Nations, and on 30 September 2024 the Tobruk-based House of Representatives approved the appointment of Naji Mohamed Issa Belqasem as the new head of the Central Bank.

From Conflict to Rapprochement: Current political dynamics

More than a decade after his previous visit, President Erdoğan travelled to Cairo to meet President El-Sisi in February 2024. They discussed enhancing economic cooperation, trade, and investment, while also addressing regional stability, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. Energy cooperation, especially with regard to the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), was a key topic, along with counterterrorism efforts. The meeting aimed to finalize steps toward fully normalizing relations, including restoring ambassadorial exchanges and resuming high-level diplomatic engagements, marking a significant step forward in Egyptian-Turkish relations.

El-Sisi reciprocated with a visit to Ankara in September 2024. Eighteen memoranda of understanding (MoU) were signed covering cooperation in areas including energy, defence, tourism, and finance. During a joint press conference, Erdogan reiterated plans to increase bilateral trade from $5 billion to $15 billion over the next five years. It is worth noting that even after the fall of Morsi and during the Libyan War, trade between Egypt and Turkey was not interrupted; indeed, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries has been crucial for Egypt’s economy, as it has enabled the increased exports critical for generating foreign currency and addressing Egypt’s financing challenges.[14] Despite diplomatic tensions, Egypt has maintained the FTA to preserve access to Turkish markets, support its manufacturing sector, and foster economic recovery. The trade partnership has been more significant than Turkish investment in Egypt, which remains modest compared both to other foreign investments in Egypt and to Turkey’s investment in other countries in the region.[15]

The two leaders also highlighted their shared stance on the Palestinian cause, calling for a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to violence in the West Bank. Turkey has condemned Israel’s actions against Hamas in Gaza, sent aid to Egypt for Palestinians, and praised Cairo’s role in ceasefire negotiations. El-Sisi noted that they also discussed the situation in Libya, where Turkey and Egypt have supported opposing sides, emphasizing that the ongoing conflict cannot be resolved until elections are held, foreign forces and mercenaries withdraw, and the militias disband.[16]

Improved relations between Egypt and Turkey could bring notable benefits to the region, including enhanced stability and opportunities to cooperate in energy development and security. A thaw could enable both states to more effectively address critical issues like maritime disputes and energy monetization, while leveraging their economic and strategic clout to foster regional cohesion. For Turkey, strengthening ties with Egypt might help counterbalance rival influences, particularly from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while Egypt could gain from increased trade and investment opportunities. However, significant ideological differences and historical grievances—exemplified by Turkey’s strained relationship with Israel and divergent views on regional issues—could pose challenges to the sustainability of this rapprochement. Persistent disagreements on key matters, coupled with underlying strategic rivalries, could undermine the potential for a stable and lasting partnership.

The War in Gaza

The Gaza war has posed significant challenges for Egypt, including the risk of a large influx of Palestinians into the Sinai peninsula and severe strains on its fragile economy. The conflict has disrupted Egypt’s revenue streams from natural gas, tourism, and the Suez Canal, exacerbating existing economic issues, despite aid from Gulf states and international creditors. Egypt has actively mediated between Israel and Hamas, seeking a ceasefire and increased humanitarian aid, while preparing for potential refugee inflows and opposing Israeli encroachments. Domestically, Egypt faces the dual threats of rising public discontent over economic hardships and potential instability from a Palestinian influx, underscoring the need for economic and political reforms to ensure long-term stability.[17]

The conflict has also galvanized Egyptian public sentiment, leading to grassroots protests and a boycott of Israeli-linked products, which the government has tightly controlled to prevent broader anti-regime unrest. Despite securing substantial international aid, Egypt’s long-term stability remains uncertain and hinges on essential economic reforms and improved governance. It would be beneficial if the international community supported Egypt’s mediation efforts, opposed forced displacement, and pushed for reforms that could enhance Egypt’s resilience and address internal discontent. The fact that the war in Gaza has cost Egypt financially and that its people are pro-Palestinian, puts it in an extremely difficult position. It seems to be trying to straddle the line between the West and the Islamic world by maintaining a more formal and less bellicose attitude towards the war taking place just over its borders.

At the same time, Turkey’s role in the Gaza war has had a significant influence on its evolving relations with Egypt. As a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause and a vocal critic of Israeli military actions, Turkey has positioned itself as a key advocate for Gaza on the international stage[18]. This stance aligns with Turkey’s broader foreign policy, which emphasizes support for Muslim-majority states and opposition to perceived Western and Israeli aggression in the region. Despite their state-level ideological differences, Turkey’s humanitarian aid to Gaza and vocal criticism of Israeli actions have resonated with Egyptian public sentiment, which is deeply sympathetic to the Palestinians’ plight. While this alignment could have been a point of convergence, it has also highlighted the differing approaches, with Turkey’s more confrontational stance contrasting sharply with Egypt’s more diplomatic and mediating role in the conflict.

Turkey and Egypt have found common ground on the Palestinian issue, which offers a significant opportunity for collaboration. 

Despite their divergent political trajectories and regional rivalries, Turkey and Egypt have found common ground on the Palestinian issue, which offers a significant opportunity for collaboration. Under President Erdoğan, Turkey is seeking to position itself as a leading advocate for Muslim-majority states, using its vocal support for Palestine and critique of Israeli policies to enhance its regional influence. Meanwhile, recalling its historic role as the preeminent Arab power during the Nasser era, Egypt continues to claim a pivotal role in mediating the conflict and addressing humanitarian concerns. This shared commitment to the Palestinian cause highlights a potential avenue for cooperation, as both states navigate their historical legacies and contemporary ambitions. By aligning on this issue, they have an opportunity to bridge their differences and explore collaborative paths.

How could the Egypt-Turkey relationship evolve from here?

Given their shared historical grievances and ideological differences, both states will need to strike a delicate balance between cooperation and competition.

The future of relations between Egypt and Turkey appears to hinge on their ability to navigate overlapping regional interests and domestic challenges. Given their shared historical grievances and ideological differences, both states will need to strike a delicate balance between cooperation and competition. Relations with Israel could significantly impact this dynamic, with Turkey’s vocal criticism of Israeli policies, particularly with regard to Palestine, contrasting with Egypt’s more cautious and pragmatic approach. This divergence could either deepen their rivalry or foster a strategic alignment based on their mutual interest in regional stability. Additionally, both countries will need to address the pressing issue of refugee flows, especially given the potential influx of Palestinians into Egypt’s Sinai peninsula. Effective management of this humanitarian challenge could serve as a critical test for their diplomatic efforts, potentially influencing their willingness to collaborate. If they can align their strategies to address these regional and domestic pressures, there is potential for a thaw in relations, leading to greater regional cohesion and a strategic partnership.

On the trade front, both countries have demonstrated a commitment to strengthening economic ties despite past diplomatic tensions. The recent agreements to increase bilateral trade from $5 billion to $15 billion over the next five years underscore the mutual economic interests driving their relationship. Trade could act as a stabilizing factor, fostering deeper economic interdependence and creating incentives for continued cooperation.

In the energy sector, the discovery of significant natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean presents both opportunities and challenges. Alongside its strategic partnership with Egypt, Turkey’s increasing involvement in regional energy dynamics  could facilitate joint ventures and collaborative projects in this field. However, maritime boundary disputes and competing interests may pose obstacles. The alignment of their energy policies and shared interests in regional energy markets could play a vital role in shaping their bilateral relations.

A coordinated approach to resolving the Libyan crisis could significantly impact the overall relationship between Egypt and Turkey, potentially leading to a more collaborative and strategically-aligned partnership in the region.

Libya remains a critical point of contention but also of potential cooperation. The evolving situation in Libya, with its complex web of alliances and ongoing conflict, has highlighted the strategic importance of this North African country. Turkey and Egypt’s support for different rival factions in Libya has been a source of friction. However, their mutual interest in stabilizing Libya and addressing the broader implications of the conflict, including the management of resources and security, could open avenues for dialogue and joint action. A coordinated approach to resolving the Libyan crisis could significantly impact the overall relationship between Egypt and Turkey, potentially leading to a more collaborative and strategically-aligned partnership in the region.

Conclusions

The evolving relationship between Egypt and Turkey marks a significant shift away from their previous antagonism in a direction which is promising for both cooperation and mutual benefit. Recent diplomatic engagements, including high-level meetings and the signing of major agreements, indicate a thaw in relations that could reshape regional dynamics and influence broader strategic landscapes.

One notable implication of this rapprochement is the role Egypt could potentially serve as a conduit for Turkey’s enhanced involvement in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Conversely, Turkey’s improved relations with Egypt could help Egypt achieve its broader strategic goals, including its aspirations for closer cooperation with NATO.

Migration is another critical dimension of their evolving relationship. Both Egypt[19] and Turkey[20] face significant pressures from migration flows and the associated humanitarian and economic challenges. The European Union (EU), which has been grappling with migration and refugee management, would benefit from enhanced coordination between Egypt and Turkey, which could help alleviate pressure on EU borders and contribute to regional stability.

Furthermore, a potential convergence of Egyptian and Turkish maritime policies could have important regional implications. Joint efforts in this area, particularly in terms of maritime boundary delimitation and access to resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, would likely also include Cyprus, Libya and Greece.

The ongoing Libyan conflict remains a critical area of contention, but also an opportunity for collaboration. 

The ongoing Libyan conflict remains a critical area of contention, but also an opportunity for collaboration. The two states have a shared interest in stabilizing Libya, and their joint efforts could further solidify their partnership while influencing regional power dynamics. Similarly, their shared commitment to addressing the Gaza conflict, despite differing approaches, highlights further potential areas for cooperative action.

However, several questions and doubts remain with regard to the future of this collaboration. How will Egypt and Turkey reconcile their differing approaches to the Gaza conflict and their respective relationships with Iran and Russia? Turkey’s closer ties with Iran and Russia, driven by strategic interests and energy partnerships, contrast with Egypt’s cautious engagement with these powers, reflecting a broader strategic divergence. Moreover, how might this rapprochement affect their relations with Western powers and Israel? Both countries must navigate complex relationships with these actors, whose interests and policies could be influenced by the shifting dynamics between Cairo and Ankara. Similarly, Israel’s reaction to this rapprochement, given its own strategic interests and security concerns, could further impact the trajectory of Egyptian-Turkish relations.

…a significant opportunity for Greece to promote a trilateral initiative aimed at fostering dialogue and cooperation among Greece, Egypt and Turkey. 

Last but not least, the détente represents a significant opportunity for Greece to promote a trilateral initiative aimed at fostering dialogue and cooperation among Greece, Egypt and Turkey. By advocating for a collaborative approach to regional issues, Greece could create a platform that encourages Egypt and Turkey to engage more constructively with one another. Such an initiative could start by focusing on shared goals, such as achieving a ceasefire in the Middle East and addressing migration challenges. Through such an initiative, Greece could not only improve its relations with both countries, it could also assert its role as a key player in the Eastern Mediterranean. This could help lay the groundwork for a more cohesive and collaborative regional framework and for enhanced regional stability, shifting the strategic landscape towards peace and mutual understanding while simultaneously giving Greece leverage in its own bilateral relations with Turkey and Egypt. 

 

Bibliography

Adly Amr, How Egypt and Turkey Trade Amid Tensions, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, Oct. 2021: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/11/how-egypt-and-turkey-trade-amid-tensions?lang=en&center=middle-east

Altunışık Meliha Benli, The New Turn in Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Regional and Domestic Insecurities, FFPS-Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2020, ISBN 978-88-9368-137-7

Aoudé Ibrahim G., Turkey and its Immediate Arab Neighbors in the Twenty-first Century, Pluto Journals, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1-2 (Winter/Spring 2020), pp. 91-108.

El-Din Gamal Essam, Ahram Online, August 2023: https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1201/506277/AlAhram-Weekly/Egypt/Egypt-and-Greece-Strategic-relations.aspx

Feuer Sarah, Guzansky Yoel and Lindenstrauss Gallia, A Violent Theater of Regional Rivals, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2019

Free Trade Agreement between Egypt and Turkey: https://www.trade.gov.tr/free-trade-agreements/egypt

Grigoriadis Ioannis N., The Eastern Mediterranean as an Emerging Crisis Zone: Greece and Cyprus in a Volatile Regional Environment, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2021

Gumrukcu Tuvan, Egypt’s Sisi makes first presidential visit to Turkey in 12 years, Reuters, Sep. 2024: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypts-sisi-heads-turkey-first-presidential-visit-12-years-2024-09-04/

Lindenstrauss Gallia & Daniel Rémi, Turkish–Israeli Relations at a Dangerous Turning

Lindenstrauss Gallia, Winter Ofir, A Red Line for the Blue Homeland? The Maritime Border Demarcation Agreement between Greece and Egypt, NSS Insight No. 1373, August 25, 2020

Megerisi Tarek, Libya’s Global Civil War, European Council on Foreign Relations (2019)

Özcan Gencer, Policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours, European Institute of the Mediterranean 2012: https://www.iemed.org/publication/policy-of-zero-problems-with-the-neighbours/

Point, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 1835, May 2024

Sheira Omar, Turkey-Egypt Relations: Incentives to Normalize, Global Political Trends Center (GPoT), September 2014

Sørensen Ninna Nyberg, Kleist Nauja and Lucht Hans, Europe and the refugee situation, Challenges for European Geopolitical Security, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017

Sukkarieh Mona, The East Mediterranean Gas Forum: Regional Cooperation Amid Conflicting Interests, Natural Resource Governance Institute, February 2021

Winter Ofir and Lindenstrauss Gallia, Egypt and Turkey following the Failed Coup: The Interrupted Thaw, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 842, August 2016

Worldometer: https://www.worldometers.info/oil/libya-oil/

Zoubir Yahia H., The Protracted Civil War in Libya: The Role of Outside Powers, Insight Turkey, Vol. 22, No. 4 (FALL 2020), pp. 11-28.

 

[1] Gencer Özcan, Policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours, European Institute of the Mediterranean 2012: https://www.iemed.org/publication/policy-of-zero-problems-with-the-neighbours/

[2] Libya emerged as a major crisis hotspot. The first phase of the Libyan Civil War started in February 2011 and lasted eight months, while the second phase started in May 2014 and ended in October 2020. It resulted in the removal of Muammar Gaddafi and marked a shift in regional power dynamics. Pan-Islamism (Arabic: الوحدة الإسلامية) is a political movement that promotes the unification of Muslims within a single Islamic nation or state, often envisioned as a caliphate, or within an international organization governed by Islamic principles. The ensuing political upheavals saw differing ideological currents emerge, notably between Pan-Islamism, championed by Turkey, and Pan-Arabism, historically aligned with Egypt. Pan-Arabism (Arabic: القومية العربية) is a political movement and belief system which advocates for the nationalist notion of cultural and political unity among Arab countries. Its origins go back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when increased literacy sparked a cultural and literary renaissance known as the Nahda (al-nahḍah al-adabiyyah) among Arabs in the Middle East.

[3] Omar Sheira, Turkey-Egypt Relations: Incentives to Normalize, Global Political Trends Center (GPoT), September 2014

[4] Ofir Winter and Gallia Lindenstrauss, Egypt and Turkey following the Failed Coup: The Interrupted Thaw, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 842, August 2016

[5] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, The Eastern Mediterranean as an Emerging Crisis Zone: Greece and Cyprus in a Volatile Regional Environment, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2021

[6] The Solution Process (Turkish: Çözüm Süreci; Kurdish: Proseya Aştiyê), also known as the Peace Process or the Turkey-PKK Peace Process, aimed to resolve the Kurdish-Turkish conflict which had been ongoing since 1984, resulting in ca. 40,000 casualties and significant economic and social damage to Turkey. Since 1984, there have been more than six peace-making “attempts.”

[7] Military operations in Syria and Iraq against the Kurds; military involvement in Libya supporting the Government of National Accord (GNA) against the forces of Khalifa Haftar; general military preparedness for developments in the region.

[8] Meliha Benli Altunışık, The New Turn in Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Regional and Domestic Insecurities, FFPS – Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2020, ISBN 978-88-9368-137-7

[9] Ibrahim G. Aoudé, Turkey and its Immediate Arab Neighbors in the Twenty-first Century, Pluto Journals, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1-2 (Winter/Spring 2020), pp. 91-108

[10] Yahia H. Zoubir, The Protracted Civil War in Libya: The Role of Outside Powers, Insight Turkey, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Fall 2020), pp. 11-28

[11] Tarek Megerisi, Libya’s Global Civil War, European Council on Foreign Relations (2019)

[12] Sarah Feuer, Yoel Guzansky and Gallia Lindenstrauss, A Violent Theater of Regional Rivals, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2019

[13] Libya is the ninth largest oil producing country in the world and controls 2.9 percent of the world’s oil reserves.

[14] The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Turkey and Egypt was signed on 27 December 2005 and came into effect on 1 March 2007.

[15] Amr Adly, How Egypt and Turkey Trade Amid Tensions, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, Oct. 2021: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/11/how-egypt-and-turkey-trade-amid-tensions?lang=en&center=middle-east

[16] Tuvan Gumrukcu, Egypt’s Sisi makes first presidential visit to Turkey in 12 years, Reuters, Sep. 2024: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypts-sisi-heads-turkey-first-presidential-visit-12-years-2024-09-04/

[17] International Crisis Group, Egypt’s Gaza Dilemmas, Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°91, May 2024

[18] Gallia Lindenstrauss & Rémi Daniel, Turkish-Israeli Relations at a Dangerous Turning

Point, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 1835, May 2024

[19] Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, Nauja Kleist and Hans Lucht, Europe and the refugee situation, Challenges for European Geopolitical Security, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017, p. 45

[20] Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, Nauja Kleist and Hans Lucht, Europe and the refugee situation, Challenges for European Geopolitical Security, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017, pp. 42-43

The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which replaced AMISOM in 2022, is a UN peacekeeping mission with the mandate to support the Somali Security Forces (SSF) in combating al-Shabaab and securing the country. As ATMIS is set to conclude by December 2024, discussions are underway for a follow-on mission, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), to ensure continued support and prevent a security vacuum.

In this context, the International Peace Institute, Stimson Center, and Security Council Report convened a workshop to assess the ATMIS transition and future security arrangements in Somalia. The event aimed to discuss the complex security environment in Somalia, explore lessons learned, and consider strategies to ensure a seamless transition to AUSSOM while maintaining regional stability.

Key takeaways from the workshop included the need to secure predictable and sustainable funding for the new mission, strengthen the Somali security forces, and ensure the transition aligns with on-the-ground realities. Participants also highlighted the importance of preventing a security vacuum, strengthening partnerships between the African Union, United Nations, and Somalia, and focusing on long-term stabilization efforts.

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UN peacekeeping operations have a vital role to play in protecting and promoting civic space. Shrinking civic space undermines human rights, generates instability, and impacts the ability of missions to execute their mandates. Supporting civic space is also connected to core areas of missions’ work, including support to political processes, the protection of civilians, and the promotion of human rights.

This paper identifies how missions are contributing to the protection and promotion of civic space and the obstacles they face in doing so. It identifies how civic space has been reflected in mission mandates and analyzes whether the inclusion of explicit language on civic space has an impact on the work undertaken by missions. It also explores how missions have sought to protect and promote civic space and examines the challenges they face when engaging in these activities.

Despite these challenges, the paper concludes that peacekeeping missions have unique advantages in protecting and promoting civic space, such as their ability to protect civilians and connect civic space initiatives to broader political mandates. Yet their efforts are not always part of a common strategy for promoting and protecting civic space. The paper offers four considerations to help guide future exploration of the topic:

• Policymakers should consider the utility of adding explicit language on civic space to mission mandates and weigh the risks and benefits.
• Missions should consider how to connect the dots between their different efforts related to civic space.
• Missions that have implemented more systematic approaches to monitoring civic space should gather lessons on whether and how this monitoring has impacted their ability to respond to civic space restrictions.
• The UN should improve reporting on the collective impact of activities related to civic space to illustrate the role missions play and their comparative advantages.

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The post The Protection and Promotion of Civic Space in UN Peacekeeping Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.

• Steady but low growth, a relatively high unemployment rate and a steadily shrinking local population highlight the need for a strategic approach through development initiatives.
• The NSRF programmes as well as the overall European cohesion policy constitute an integral part of the national development strategy and in the majority of cases NSRF funding represents the largest share of public development investments.
• The ROP Thessaly 2014-20 aimed to improve parameters in which the region lags behind, such as entrepreneurship and competitiveness, while integrating factors important both at the economic and social level, such as environmental sustainability.
• The delays and obstacles recorded underline the importance of a flexible public administration at the central and regional level that can manage programmes more effectively, as a centralised and highly bureaucratic planning and management system poses significant obstacles to the development of projects.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by by Pery Bazoti, PhD candidate, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

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IPI and G20 Social cohosted a policy forum on September 26th entitled “The G20 and the Reform of Global Economic Governance Structures.”

Speaker interventions centered around the debate on the Reform of Global Economic Governance Structures. The discussion focused on: IMF Governance Reforms; gender and regional balance in international financial institutions; the role of MDBs in global governance and the “G20 Roadmap for Better, Bigger, and More Effective MDBs;” and the Global civil society agenda for new global governance. The event also focused on key points regarding Brazil’s G20 Social Initiative and how it will achieve its goal of increasing nongovernmental stakeholder participation in the work of the G20.

Welcoming Remarks:
Adam Lupel, Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, International Peace Institute

Opening Remarks:
Fernanda Santiago, Special Advisor to the Minister of Finance, Counselor on the Superior Council of the Office of the Attorney General, and Attorney General of the Ministry of Finance of Brazil

Speakers:
Flávio Luís Pazeto, First Secretary of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and responsible for the general coordination of the G20
Bruno Coelho Saraiva, Alternate Executive Director, Brazil IMF Office
Karin Costa Vazquez, General Coordinator for Multilateral Development Banks Reform on the Finance Track, Brazilian Ministry of Finance
Cristina Duarte, Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa, UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
Jeroo Billimoria, Founder of One Family Foundation, Co-founder of Catalyst 2030

Moderator:
Tatiana Berringer, Coordinator of the G20 Social on the Finance Track, Brazilian G20 Presidency, and Senior Lecturer of International Relations at Federal University of ABC, Brazil

The post The G20 and the Reform of Global Economic Governance Structures appeared first on International Peace Institute.