Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Bei der Wahl in Sachsen-Anhalt unterstützen die AfD vor allem viele Männer. Marcel Fratzscher meint, man muss verstehen, warum viele junge Männer die AfD wählen. Erst dann kann man sie zurückgewinnen., Die Sorge über den Rechtsruck unter jungen Männern ist berechtigt: Bei vergangenen Wahlen haben viele von ihnen die AfD gewählt, während junge Frauen deutlich häufiger progressive oder liberale Parteien unterstützen. Viele erklären das mit toxischer Männlichkeit, Anti­feminismus und mangelnder ...

Countries now act in an international cooperation architecture whose rules are disputed from several directions at once. One of those directions is the hegemon itself, the US. The paper argues that the Trump administration’s disruption matters because it moves the largest actor from affirming to contesting across several arenas at once. That reshuffles the calculus for every country. This paper asks how countries can exercise agency when the international order itself is fragmenting. The paper surveys the bewildering array of concepts on state agency and proposes a schema built on two continua. The first is the medium or type of agency, meaning material/institutional versus ideational/discursive. The second is orientation to the prevailing order in a specific arena (not in general) as affirming versus contesting. Countries are not fixed in one position. Whether the same state contests the rules depends on its interests in a particular arena. Each potential position is available only to a country that can pay the arena’s entry fee. The entry fee is the resources, broadly defined, a position demands before a country can take it up. The paper sets out the strategic positions available in a fragmenting system. It names a further position, norm imperialism, where material instruments are turned against an ideational object. The implications for different types of country are discussed.

Countries now act in an international cooperation architecture whose rules are disputed from several directions at once. One of those directions is the hegemon itself, the US. The paper argues that the Trump administration’s disruption matters because it moves the largest actor from affirming to contesting across several arenas at once. That reshuffles the calculus for every country. This paper asks how countries can exercise agency when the international order itself is fragmenting. The paper surveys the bewildering array of concepts on state agency and proposes a schema built on two continua. The first is the medium or type of agency, meaning material/institutional versus ideational/discursive. The second is orientation to the prevailing order in a specific arena (not in general) as affirming versus contesting. Countries are not fixed in one position. Whether the same state contests the rules depends on its interests in a particular arena. Each potential position is available only to a country that can pay the arena’s entry fee. The entry fee is the resources, broadly defined, a position demands before a country can take it up. The paper sets out the strategic positions available in a fragmenting system. It names a further position, norm imperialism, where material instruments are turned against an ideational object. The implications for different types of country are discussed.

Countries now act in an international cooperation architecture whose rules are disputed from several directions at once. One of those directions is the hegemon itself, the US. The paper argues that the Trump administration’s disruption matters because it moves the largest actor from affirming to contesting across several arenas at once. That reshuffles the calculus for every country. This paper asks how countries can exercise agency when the international order itself is fragmenting. The paper surveys the bewildering array of concepts on state agency and proposes a schema built on two continua. The first is the medium or type of agency, meaning material/institutional versus ideational/discursive. The second is orientation to the prevailing order in a specific arena (not in general) as affirming versus contesting. Countries are not fixed in one position. Whether the same state contests the rules depends on its interests in a particular arena. Each potential position is available only to a country that can pay the arena’s entry fee. The entry fee is the resources, broadly defined, a position demands before a country can take it up. The paper sets out the strategic positions available in a fragmenting system. It names a further position, norm imperialism, where material instruments are turned against an ideational object. The implications for different types of country are discussed.

This chapter seeks to explain why development cooperation norms that looked stable in the mid-2010s became contested after 2016. We link this to crisis politics and the post-2030 agenda. Here, the ‘good old days’ means the mid-2010s cooperation moment. In 2015, four agreements were adopted within months: the 2030 Agenda (SDGs), the Paris Agreement, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development. Their adoption set shared expectations about collective action. These agreements did not create a single regime, but they shared a narrative of common problems, shared responsibility, and multilateral problem-solving, backed by monitoring, review, and had a basis in evidence. Only a decade later, that consensus has evaporated. Development cooperation faces intersecting pressures operating through budget contractions, institutional precarity, and public narratives fuelled by the populist right in many DAC donor countries. In this new context, many DAC donors are shifting attention towards direct national interests, including security, migration policing, and geo-politics/geo-economic priorities, amid fiscal squeeze, intensified by the Trump 2.0 administration’s anti-multilateralism. Our chapter argues that the mid-2010s moment was highly contingent on an alignment of interests, institutions, and policy narratives, rather than a settled consensus, and that shifting political ‘mood’ has unravelled that spirit dramatically. We use a policy norm dynamics framework that traces norm contestation through actors and networks, institutions, and context and policy narratives, and introduces ‘epochal moods’ as the over-arching political climate that shape the nature and form of development cooperation. We outline the competing normative regimes of development cooperation and what they imply for positioning on a post-SDG/post-2030 collective framework.

This chapter seeks to explain why development cooperation norms that looked stable in the mid-2010s became contested after 2016. We link this to crisis politics and the post-2030 agenda. Here, the ‘good old days’ means the mid-2010s cooperation moment. In 2015, four agreements were adopted within months: the 2030 Agenda (SDGs), the Paris Agreement, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development. Their adoption set shared expectations about collective action. These agreements did not create a single regime, but they shared a narrative of common problems, shared responsibility, and multilateral problem-solving, backed by monitoring, review, and had a basis in evidence. Only a decade later, that consensus has evaporated. Development cooperation faces intersecting pressures operating through budget contractions, institutional precarity, and public narratives fuelled by the populist right in many DAC donor countries. In this new context, many DAC donors are shifting attention towards direct national interests, including security, migration policing, and geo-politics/geo-economic priorities, amid fiscal squeeze, intensified by the Trump 2.0 administration’s anti-multilateralism. Our chapter argues that the mid-2010s moment was highly contingent on an alignment of interests, institutions, and policy narratives, rather than a settled consensus, and that shifting political ‘mood’ has unravelled that spirit dramatically. We use a policy norm dynamics framework that traces norm contestation through actors and networks, institutions, and context and policy narratives, and introduces ‘epochal moods’ as the over-arching political climate that shape the nature and form of development cooperation. We outline the competing normative regimes of development cooperation and what they imply for positioning on a post-SDG/post-2030 collective framework.

This chapter seeks to explain why development cooperation norms that looked stable in the mid-2010s became contested after 2016. We link this to crisis politics and the post-2030 agenda. Here, the ‘good old days’ means the mid-2010s cooperation moment. In 2015, four agreements were adopted within months: the 2030 Agenda (SDGs), the Paris Agreement, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development. Their adoption set shared expectations about collective action. These agreements did not create a single regime, but they shared a narrative of common problems, shared responsibility, and multilateral problem-solving, backed by monitoring, review, and had a basis in evidence. Only a decade later, that consensus has evaporated. Development cooperation faces intersecting pressures operating through budget contractions, institutional precarity, and public narratives fuelled by the populist right in many DAC donor countries. In this new context, many DAC donors are shifting attention towards direct national interests, including security, migration policing, and geo-politics/geo-economic priorities, amid fiscal squeeze, intensified by the Trump 2.0 administration’s anti-multilateralism. Our chapter argues that the mid-2010s moment was highly contingent on an alignment of interests, institutions, and policy narratives, rather than a settled consensus, and that shifting political ‘mood’ has unravelled that spirit dramatically. We use a policy norm dynamics framework that traces norm contestation through actors and networks, institutions, and context and policy narratives, and introduces ‘epochal moods’ as the over-arching political climate that shape the nature and form of development cooperation. We outline the competing normative regimes of development cooperation and what they imply for positioning on a post-SDG/post-2030 collective framework.

Data and code that form the basis of the analyses and findings presented in the accompanying publication “African youth and the future of democracy: How social media and cohort size shape political participation” by Godfred Bonnah-Nkansah and Christine Hackenesch, published in Government & Opposition. The dataset comprises individual-level youth data (for persons 15-29 years old), in thirty-nine (39) African countries sampled in the Afrobarometer survey Rounds 6-9, complemented by country-level data on GDP per Capita from the World Bank; youth bulge ratio from the United Nations (UN) Population Bureau; and the V-Dem liberal democracy index.

Data and code that form the basis of the analyses and findings presented in the accompanying publication “African youth and the future of democracy: How social media and cohort size shape political participation” by Godfred Bonnah-Nkansah and Christine Hackenesch, published in Government & Opposition. The dataset comprises individual-level youth data (for persons 15-29 years old), in thirty-nine (39) African countries sampled in the Afrobarometer survey Rounds 6-9, complemented by country-level data on GDP per Capita from the World Bank; youth bulge ratio from the United Nations (UN) Population Bureau; and the V-Dem liberal democracy index.

Data and code that form the basis of the analyses and findings presented in the accompanying publication “African youth and the future of democracy: How social media and cohort size shape political participation” by Godfred Bonnah-Nkansah and Christine Hackenesch, published in Government & Opposition. The dataset comprises individual-level youth data (for persons 15-29 years old), in thirty-nine (39) African countries sampled in the Afrobarometer survey Rounds 6-9, complemented by country-level data on GDP per Capita from the World Bank; youth bulge ratio from the United Nations (UN) Population Bureau; and the V-Dem liberal democracy index.

Die AfD beißt sich in das eigene Parteiprogramm: Sie verspricht etwas, das sie nie wird einhalten können. Ihre Politik würde Probleme sogar verschärfen., Bei den Landtagswahlen am 6. September in Sachsen-Anhalt droht ein politischer Einschnitt. Die AfD könnte erstmals eine Regierung bilden und den Ministerpräsidenten stellen. Für welche politischen Positionen steht die AfD in Sachsen-Anhalt? Mit welchen Parteien hat sie Überschneidungen? Und wo ...

Dr. Thomas Meissner, Associate Professor am Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics der School of Business and Economics der Maastricht University, war vom 11. Juni bis 19. Juli 2026 als Visiting Researcher am SOEP im DIW Berlin zu Gast. Während seines Aufenthalts nahm der ...

Zusammenfassung:

2. September 2026 – Nach den Landtagswahlen am 6. September könnte Sachsen-Anhalt dramatische politische Veränderungen erfahren: Die AfD könnte zum ersten Mal Regierungsverantwortung übernehmen und den Ministerpräsidenten stellen. Für welche politischen Positionen steht die AfD in Sachsen-Anhalt? Wie fällt ein Vergleich zu den demokratischen Parteien aus, wo gibt es Überschneidungen? Und wie extrem ist die AfD in ihren Positionen, wo bestehen Widersprüche? Eine Auswertung des Wahl-O-Mats der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung sowie ein Vergleich mit den Landtagswahlen 2016 und 2021 und der Bundestagswahl 2025 zeigen ein grundlegend verändertes Parteiensystem. Trotz wachsender Unterschiede in den Positionen der Parteien verliert die AfD vermehrt ihre inhaltliche Alleinstellung. Gerade in der Sozialpolitik zeigt sich in Sachsen-Anhalt das AfD-Paradox: Menschen und Wirtschaft sind auf eine gute öffentliche Daseinsvorsorge, Fachkräfte, kommunale Infrastruktur, Bildung, bezahlbares Wohnen und eine verlässliche Gesundheitsversorgung angewiesen. Die AfD unterstützt zwar einzelne populäre Maßnahmen wie kostenfreie Schüler-Mobilität, geringere Kita-Kosten oder öffentliche Krankenhäuser. Aber sie lehnt zentrale Voraussetzungen einer zukunftsfähigen sozialen Infrastruktur ab, etwa die Anwerbung ausländischer Fachkräfte, Projekte gegen Rechtsextremismus, Demokratiebildung, Klimaneutralität, Vermögensteuer und teils Instrumente des sozialen Wohnungsbaus oder der Ausbildungsfinanzierung.

DIW Berlin setzt Konjunkturprognose nach oben – Deutsche Wirtschaft entwickelt sich besser als im Sommer erwartet, vor allem dank zuletzt starker Exporte – Voraussichtlich mehr als ein Prozent Wirtschaftswachstum in diesem Jahr – Hohe Gaspreise, Niedrigwasser und strukturelle Schwächen bremsen im ...

Wir freuen uns mitzuteilen, dass seit heute die Ausschreibung der W3-Professur für Angewandte Sozialforschung und Surveymethodologie online ist. Die Professur ist mit der Leitung des Bereichs Surveymethodik und -management am Sozio-oekonomischen Panel (SOEP) des Deutschen Instituts für ...

Seit der Teillegalisierung diskutieren wir über Cannabis. Doch dessen Konsum ist gar nicht gestiegen. Ein Blick ins Abwasser zeigt: Die wahren Drogenprobleme sind andere., Die Teillegalisierung von Cannabis vor zwei Jahren hat die Gesellschaft gespalten. Innenminister Alexander Dobrindt etwa spricht von einem richtigen »Scheißgesetz«, auch andere sparen nicht an harscher Kritik. Dabei deutet eine ausgewogene, wenn auch bislang vorläufige Betrachtung der Zahlen darauf ...

Etwa die Hälfte der einkommensschwachen Länder ist derzeit zahlungsunfähig oder hat ein großes Risiko, zahlungsunfähig zu werden. Was die Weltgemeinschaft dagegen tun muss, erläutert eine IDOS-Wissenschaftlerin.

Etwa die Hälfte der einkommensschwachen Länder ist derzeit zahlungsunfähig oder hat ein großes Risiko, zahlungsunfähig zu werden. Was die Weltgemeinschaft dagegen tun muss, erläutert eine IDOS-Wissenschaftlerin.

Etwa die Hälfte der einkommensschwachen Länder ist derzeit zahlungsunfähig oder hat ein großes Risiko, zahlungsunfähig zu werden. Was die Weltgemeinschaft dagegen tun muss, erläutert eine IDOS-Wissenschaftlerin.

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) setzt sein Auf und Ab fort. Nach dem deutlichen Rückgang im Juli steigt es im August um gut fünf auf nun 96,4 Punkte und kommt damit der neutralen 100-Punkte-Marke, die ein durchschnittliches Wachstum der deutschen ...