Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
This paper examines the renegotiation of social contracts, using the example of Colombia’s phase-out process for fossil fuel subsidies that provides empirical evidence for broad reforms of state–society agreements. While calls for new social contracts increasingly highlight the need to integrate ecological sustainability and address systemic inequalities, few studies explore how such transitions unfold in practice. Drawing on interviews with 43 experts from government, academia, civil society, and the private sector, the paper analyses Colombia’s efforts to remove gasoline and diesel subsidies under President Petro’s reform agenda. The findings reveal four central obstacles: the political cost of reform, structural dependencies in the transport sector, limited state capacity, and the absence of long-term policy continuity. We find that creating a new social contract requires broad support by a range of stakeholders and a clear vision for the new agreement, which is supported across ideological camps. The Colombian government offered an incoherentversion of a green growth social contract, which relied on reforming the existing structures with novel technologies. In contrast to government participants, the interviewees from society, academia and the private sector in Colombia seem to dismiss the plans of the government as unrealistic, as they do not address the deep-rooted challenges within the transport sector and lacks a clear pathway. The Colombian reform process highlights the contested nature of renegotiating social contracts, illustrating the challenges of aligning societal expectations with government visions.
Al-Firdaws camp in Yemen's Aden Governate is hosting families displaced by the recent intensification of fighting. Credit: UNICEF/Mahmoud Alfilastini
By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Nov 20 2026 (IPS)
Over the past two months, the humanitarian situation in Yemen has deteriorated significantly following the eruption of hostilities between Houthi forces and the Yemeni troops backed by the Saudi-led coalition on September 3. Marked by persistent attacks on key infrastructure and densely populated areas—particularly in Taiz and Lahj—civilians continue to struggle amid heightened insecurity and mass displacement, with children bearing the brunt of the crisis.
On November 18, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported that at least 64 children have been killed and 64 others injured since September 3, warning that casualties are projected to soar as fighting escalates in Taiz and Lahj.
At least 7 schools and 28 health facilities, including five supported by UNICEF, have sustained damage since the wake of hostilities. On November 2, an attack on the UNICEF-supported Al-Suqyah Health Center in Lahj—which serves roughly 1,700 civilians—killed five people, including three health personnel.
Ongoing disruptions to essential services and accelerating displacement have prompted UN experts to call for an immediate end to hostilities, unimpeded humanitarian access, and compliance with international humanitarian law. During a press briefing at the UN Headquarters on November 19, Farhan Haq, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, told reporters that conditions are “getting worse by the day.”
“The rising number of children killed and injured in Yemen is devastating. It must stop,” said UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell. “Behind every number is a child whose life has been cut short or changed forever…Children must be protected, including their access to essential services such as healthcare, education, safe water, and food.”
Figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) show that roughly 350,000 individuals have been uprooted from their homes between June 7 and November 16, with UNICEF reporting that this includes approximately 174,000 children. More than 18,000 of those civilians were forced to flee in the last week alone, according to Haq, with nearly two-thirds coming from Taiz.
Many families have been displaced multiple times, often residing in host communities whose resources are already severely strained. The majority of these families currently reside in damaged buildings that serve as makeshift shelters, where they face limited access to food, water, healthcare, and protection services.
UNICEF has expressed particular concern over the humanitarian situation in Taiz City, underscoring persistent access constraints. The main road for humanitarian aid deliveries from Aden is closed, and alternative routes remain unreliable, depriving more than 800,000 civilians of basic services.
Water production has been slashed by nearly 50 percent, while food and fuel prices have nearly doubled. Continued shortages of electricity, fuel, medicines, and oxygen jeopardize lifesaving emergency healthcare interventions, including maternal and newborn care.
Across the most severely impacted regions, UNICEF has recorded over 1,160 school closures or disruptions to learning, affecting more than 500,000 students. Since the escalation, UNICEF and its partners have found that approximately one-third of all children recently screened showed signs of acute malnutrition.
Widespread hunger—compounded by overcrowded and unsanitary displacement shelters, a shortage of latrines, and limited access to safe water- has significantly raised the risk of disease.
Earlier this month, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher informed reporters that he is coordinating with Yemen’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Afrah Abdulaziz Al-Zouba, to restore humanitarian aid access. As of November 2, the UN and its partners had reached nearly 260,000 displaced civilians in Yemen with lifesaving support, though the vast scale of needs continues to outpace available resources.
“We have food and medicine ready to move,” said Fletcher. “Our asks are clear. Open the roads and let them through. Civilians cannot be held hostage by the fighting.”
In response, UNICEF has announced plans to expand its emergency response efforts to reach up to 560,000 people, positioning mobile health and nutrition teams at displacement sites and in vulnerable communities across Aden, Lahj, Taiz, Marib, and Abyan. UNICEF and its partners will also mobilize support for water and sanitation, as well as psychosocial care and case management for children, particularly those who were separated from their families.
IPS UN Bureau Report
Animateurs, responsables politiques, plateformes audiovisuelles… Au Cameroun, le réseau GlobUs est cité par VIGINUM dans une enquête sur les stratégies d'influence russes en Afrique. Plusieurs médias, personnalités et émissions sont documentés.
Les plateaux de télévision camerounais représenteraient-ils un nouveau champ d'affrontement pour la diplomatie et l'influence russes ? Dans une enquête parue le 27 octobre 2026, VIGINUM — l'organisme français dédié à la protection contre les ingérences numériques étrangères — met en lumière les opérations de GlobUs. Ce collectif, qui se présente sous la forme d'un cercle d'experts, associe stratégie digitale, diplomatie publique et leviers d'action politique, en ciblant tout particulièrement le Cameroun.D'après les analyses de VIGINUM, la direction de GlobUs est assurée par deux figures russes affiliées à l'écosystème d'Evgueni Prigojine. Youlia Berg et Andreï Gromov. L'organisation s'appuierait sur un ensemble de relais médiatiques du continent africain afin de promouvoir les lignes de communication du Kremlin, en ciblant prioritairement la guerre en Ukraine et les équilibres entre l'Afrique et l'Occident.
Trois médias camerounais cités
Afrique Média TV, For You Média Africa et Panafrican Média TV figurent parmi les plateformes étudiées. Le rapport retrace plusieurs étapes de la présence de GlobUs dans les productions audiovisuelles camerounaises. Entre mars 2022 et novembre 2023, des membres du réseau et d'anciens responsables d'AFRIC interviennent régulièrement sur Afrique Média TV, notamment dans des émissions présentées par Clarisse Wiydorven. Après cette période, les investigations décrivent une présence sur For You Média Africa, avec la diffusion de Global Insights, puis sur Panafrican Média TV à partir de septembre 2025, où sont notamment diffusées les émissions Global Insights et Regard sur le monde. VIGINUM identifie ces programmes comme sponsorisés par GlobUs.
Des collaborations à documenter
Le rapport s'intéresse également à Serge Espoir Matomba, promoteur de For You Média Africa et responsable politique camerounais. Les relations entre médias, partenaires internationaux et acteurs politiques constituent un point central de l'analyse. Les partenariats éditoriaux et les contenus diffusés doivent toutefois être distingués d'une éventuelle adhésion personnelle à une stratégie d'ingérence, laquelle ne peut être déduite d'une simple collaboration. Dans ce dispositif, les émissions de débat, les interventions d'experts et les contenus géopolitiques constituent des espaces de diffusion privilégiés. Le registre souverainiste, la critique des anciennes puissances coloniales et la contestation de l'influence française y occupent une place importante. Ces thèmes, qui relèvent aussi du débat politique africain, peuvent être mobilisés dans des stratégies d'influence étrangères lorsqu'ils sont intégrés à des opérations structurées de communication.
Une influence dont l'impact reste à mesurer
VIGINUM décrit un mécanisme, des relais et des modes opératoires. Mais l'existence d'un dispositif de diffusion ne suffit pas à mesurer son audience réelle, son influence sur les opinions ou le degré d'autonomie des médias concernés. L'enjeu, au Cameroun, est désormais de comprendre comment ces collaborations se nouent, qui finance les productions, quelles sont les conditions des partenariats et quelle marge de décision conserve chaque rédaction.Dans cette bataille des récits, la souveraineté n'est pas seulement un slogan. Elle est aussi devenue un argument de communication, un levier diplomatique et, parfois, un instrument de projection de puissance.
L'homme soupçonné d'avoir tué son épouse à coups de machette a été retrouvé mort, jeudi 19 novembre 2026, dans une zone broussailleuse située non loin du village Tèbo-Gando, commune de Nikki.
Les recherches engagées pour retrouver l'époux d'une femme assassinée à Tèbo-Gando ont connu une issue inattendue. Identifié comme le présumé meurtrier, il a été retrouvé pendu non loin du village.
Dans la journée du mercredi 18 novembre, il est accusé d'avoir tué sa femme à coups de machette. À l'origine du drame, une mésentente conjugale. Selon les informations rapportées par les médias locaux, la victime, troisième épouse de l'homme, avait quitté le domicile conjugal quelques jours après leur mariage pour rejoindre ses parents. Son mari n'aurait pas accepté cette séparation. Après avoir commis son acte présumé, le suspect avait abandonné le corps de son épouse sur place avant de disparaître. Son corps sans vie sera retrouvé pendu à un arbre le lendemain.
Credit: Collection Maykova / Shutterstock
By Taiyi Sun
Nov 20 2026 (IPS)
On November 19, in Shenzhen, the leaders of China, the United States, and Russia gathered for their first-ever face-to-face trilateral summit. The meeting is historic before a single word is exchanged. Whether it becomes consequential, however, depends on what the three leaders choose to accomplish.
A New Yalta—or Something Fundamentally Different?
Comparisons of this trilateral meeting with the 1945 Yalta Conference are inevitable but potentially misleading. At Yalta, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin represented wartime allies negotiating the final stages of a common struggle and the foundations of a postwar order. Washington sought Soviet participation in the war against Japan and support for the emerging United Nations. In return, Moscow secured promises concerning southern Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, Outer Mongolia, and strategic privileges in northeastern China.
Shenzhen presents a fundamentally different configuration. Unlike the wartime allies at Yalta, the three participants in Shenzhen are bound together by a complex mixture of strategic competition and cooperation. Nevertheless, each has interests that could tempt observers to interpret the summit through a Yalta-style lens of spheres of influence.
Russia would welcome recognition of its territorial claims over the four Ukrainian regions it declared annexed in 2022—Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—alongside guarantees against Ukraine’s integration into Western security structures. Washington, meanwhile, has increasingly asserted its primacy in the Western Hemisphere through what has become known as the ‘Donroe Doctrine’, seeking to limit competing powers’ strategic footholds in Latin America. Trump also hopes to enlist Moscow and Beijing in efforts to end the Iran war.
China has its own regional priorities. Beijing would prefer reduced American military pressure in East Asia, greater Russian sensitivity to Chinese interests in Central Asia, and manageable competition over influence in North Korea. The Taiwan question remains central to Beijing’s long-term political objectives, although it is unlikely to be meaningfully resolved through negotiations among the three leaders.
These interests are not necessarily compatible. Competing ambitions for spheres of influence do not imply that a grand bargain is either achievable or desirable. Unlike Yalta, Shenzhen is not expected to produce a formal agreement delineating spheres of influence or granting strategic privileges. Any private discussion of such arrangements would confront substantial political, legal, and practical obstacles, not least the objections of governments and populations whose futures would be affected.
Strategic Stability Without a Grand Bargain
The more realistic purpose of the summit is to promote strategic stability among the world’s three most consequential military powers.
Trump’s preference for personal diplomacy with leaders commanding large territories and formidable nuclear arsenals makes the gathering particularly attractive to him. For Xi and Putin, direct engagement offers opportunities to reinforce their international standing, clarify strategic intentions, and reduce uncertainty.
Even the anticipated photograph of the three leaders has diplomatic value. At a time of prolonged conflicts and intensifying geopolitical competition, visibly demonstrating a willingness to communicate can reassure international audiences that confrontation is not inevitable.
China and the United States have already embraced the concept of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability.” Shenzhen could become an opportunity to extend elements of that approach into a trilateral framework without pretending that the three bilateral relationships are equally cooperative or confrontational.
Nuclear arms control offers an especially revealing test. Since New START expired in February 2026, Washington and Moscow have lacked a functioning bilateral treaty limiting their strategic nuclear arsenals. Trump has expressed interest in a broader arrangement involving China. Yet the asymmetry remains enormous. According to SIPRI, the United States and Russia together possess approximately 86 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads, while China’s arsenal remains substantially smaller. Beijing consequently has little incentive to accept equivalent numerical constraints. Nevertheless, China’s willingness to participate in informal discussions, without accepting immediate reduction commitments, could itself constitute meaningful progress. Strategic dialogue need not begin with identical obligations.
The most substantive agreements may still emerge from bilateral rather than trilateral negotiations. In particular, the China–US relationship requires further clarification of what constructive strategic stability means in practice. Previous presidential meetings have established broad political understandings, but detailed implementation still depends heavily on negotiations among officials between summits.
Trump’s participation in the Quad summit and engagements with ASEAN leaders in Manila also provide a useful comparison. The relative time devoted to these meetings and the Shenzhen gathering, as well as their substance and diplomatic atmosphere, may reveal how his administration balances great-power accommodation with its traditional Indo-Pacific partnerships.
Turning a Historic Photograph into Lasting Stability
For Shenzhen to achieve significance beyond symbolism, several practical steps deserve consideration.
First, the three governments should establish a regular strategic-stability consultation mechanism. Initially informal and without binding obligations, it could facilitate communication on nuclear doctrine, crisis prevention, military incidents, and emerging strategic technologies. The objective should be to prevent unintended escalation rather than demand immediate agreement on fundamental disputes.
Second, nuclear negotiations should proceed on differentiated tracks. Washington and Moscow should take primary responsibility for restoring verifiable limits and transparency mechanisms, while Beijing could participate in discussions on nuclear risk reduction, early-warning communication, and confidence-building measures. This would recognize China’s comparatively smaller arsenal without excluding it from the broader conversation.
Third, conflict resolution must remain inclusive. Discussions concerning Ukraine and Iran could help identify possible areas of convergence, but no durable settlement can be negotiated over the heads of the directly affected parties. The three powers should facilitate broader diplomatic processes rather than attempt to substitute their own understandings for them.
Finally, summit diplomacy should be institutionalized rather than personalized. Working-level follow-up, agreed communication channels, and measurable confidence-building initiatives would help translate presidential understandings into practical arrangements. December’s G20 summit in Florida could provide another opportunity to assess progress, although another three-way encounter remains uncertain.
Shenzhen will not—and should not—be another Yalta. The international system is too interconnected, the principle of sovereignty too important, and other states’ interests too consequential for three leaders to redraw the global order around a negotiating table. Its more constructive historical legacy would be to demonstrate that great powers can manage strategic rivalry without demanding exclusive control over their respective neighborhoods. The success of Shenzhen should therefore be measured not by how much territory or influence the three leaders can divide, but by how much confrontation they can prevent.
Related articles:
Managing Competition: The New Logic of US–China Summitry
Beyond the Trade Truce: AI and the Next Phase of China–US Risk Management
Before Washington: Xi and the Contest Over Global Leadership
Taiyi Sun (Ph.D., Political Science, Boston University) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Christopher Newport University.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.
IPS UN Bureau