Along the southern coast of India, hard protective infrastructure has become the default response to increasingly frequent cyclones and severe coastal erosion. However, such interventions not only intensify erosion by disrupting sand movement, but also obscure its root causes, which are often contested through diverging narratives and knowledge claims about the sand and the sea. Making use of the burgeoning literature on ‘geosociality’ and ‘situated knowledges’, this paper interrogates how knowledge about coastal dynamics is produced, legitimised and contested in shaping these protective measures. Drawing on multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork, including interviews and participant observation among ocean engineers, policymakers and artisanal fishers, we unravel the diverging and oftentimes contested epistemologies that shape how uncertain coastal futures are navigated. By examining the social entanglements with geomorphic processes such as sand movement and erosion, we show how different forms of knowledge adapt to the unpredictability of the sea, yet with uneven socio-spatial consequences, particularly for artisanal fishers. We argue that coastal protection practices are embedded in epistemic hierarchies that prioritise technical expertise and predictive science, rendering fishers' situated knowledges less legitimate in decision-making. By situating both livelihood practices and scientific modelling within their social and epistemic contexts, we demonstrate how confronting uncertainty can challenge power asymmetries that shape knowledge production. Rather than defaming engineering knowledge, we call for complementary approaches that recognise uncertainty, complexity and the value of co-produced knowledge. Situating fishers' knowledges alongside modelling practices provides openings for re-politicising adaptation and rethinking whose expertise counts in shaping coastal futures.
Am IDOS setzen wir uns für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung unseres Unternehmens ein – ökologisch, sozial und ökonomisch – und tragen durch Forschung, Beratung und Ausbildung zu nachhaltigen Transformationen weltweit bei. Dabei verstehen wir Nachhaltigkeit nicht als einmaliges Ziel, sondern als einen fortlaufenden Prozess, den wir mit Verantwortung und Weitblick gestalten wollen. Nachhaltiges Handeln im betrieblichen Alltag ist für uns eine Selbstverpflichtung, die wir mit Überzeugung und Kontinuität verfolgen. Unser Anspruch ist es, heute so zu handeln, dass auch morgen noch gute Arbeitsbedingungen und ein verantwortungsvoller Umgang mit natürlichen Ressourcen möglich sind. Mit dem vorliegenden Bericht legen wir erstmals eine Bilanz unserer Treibhausgasemissionen für den Zeitraum 2022 bis 2023 vor.
The global development architecture is under the spotlight. This refers to the broad architecture of actors, norms, instruments and institutions that mobilise and coordinate resources, knowledge and political support for development goals. Within this system, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a core financial instrument, primarily provided by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members. It functions alongside other modalities such as South–South cooperation, climate finance, philanthropic aid and private-sector engagement.
We argue that following the rise of new partners such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kenya’s problem is no longer access to finance, but rather the governance of finance. In other words, the question is not simply how much money the country can borrow or from whom, but whether its institutions are capable of turning loans into productive investments rather than patronage networks. As the debt burden mounts, Kenya’s ability to prevent growing options for economic partnerships from undermining domestic accountability will determine whether its infrastructure boom becomes a foundation for long-term development or a monument to short-term political ambition.
This research explores how epistemological dissonance shapes agrarian sustainabilities in Mbeya, Tanzania. Through a case study of smallholder farmers navigating both market-driven and eco-cultural paradigms of sustainability, the research explores how plural epistemologies shape local sensemaking and agricultural decision-making. It demonstrates how farmers reconcile divergent sustainability logics, those rooted in market interpretations of sustainability with those rooted in relational ethics, ecological stewardship, and cultural continuity within agrarian landscapes. Employing hybrid strategies, farmers compartmentalize production, input intensive, market-targeting monocultures co-exist alongside primarily subsistence agroecological systems. These spatial divisions mirror deeper ontological tensions, as farmers articulate pride in market breakthroughs while expressing anxiety about environmental degradation, cultural erosion, and the loss of intergenerational practices. Building on plural sustainabilities literature and epistemologies of the South theories, the paper adds to scholarship reinterpreting sustainability not as a universal, singular paradigm, but a contested, contextually negotiated process. The case of Mbeya illustrates how epistemological dissonance becomes embodied through emotional and cognitive labor, and how hybrid sensemaking enables farmers to navigate conflicting knowledge systems. Rather than viewing hybridity as incoherence, the paper interprets these strategies as acts of situated resilience, adaptation, and resistance. The analysis contributes to political ecology and sustainability studies by foregrounding the ontological multiplicity at play in agrarian transitions and calls for institutional recognition of knowledge pluralism. Ultimately, the paper proposes a shift toward pluriversal sustainability frameworks that integrate both empirical and relational epistemologies, acknowledging that sustainable futures are as much about values and worldviews as they are about technologies and yields.
The European Think Tanks Group and the German Institute for Development and Sustainability (IDOS) teamed up with the Istanbul Policy Center to organise a public seminar and a closed-door workshop to explore how three key actors – Turkey, the European Union and China – are responding to the above trends and changes. Comparing their current policies, agendas, and past practices provided a means to explore whether their approaches to international cooperation, particularly in the context of their engagements with the Global South, are converging (or diverging) during today’s turbulent times, and to determine the scope and relevance of further comparative research. This blog post highlights some key points of what was discussed and links them to current academic and policy debates.
Despite the potential of renewable hydrogen to galvanize economies and climate action, governments and development banks often lack a coherent framework to assess and approve hydrogen projects on sustainability grounds. Decision-making processes regarding land allocation, permitting and infrastructure access remain fragmented, increasing the risof extractive investment models that provide limited local benefits while causing environmental harm. Transparent, universally accepted sustainability guidelines can help decision makers select project partners that align with their respective priorities and objectives, including the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, such a framework can enhance investor confidence and public trust by ensuring that hydrogen projects deliver tangible socioeconomic benefits to host communities. Recognizing this need, a broad coalition of stakeholders has collaborate to develop the Guidelines for Sustainable Hydrogen Projects, integrating expertise from multiple disciplines to create a flexible yet comprehensive decision-making tool. The Guidelines serve as a reference for governments, development banks and other stakeholders in evaluating hydrogen project proposals. Rather than prescribing rigid requirements, they provide a non-exhaustive set of criteria that can be adapted to local contexts. The Guidelines emphasize maximizing domestic value creation while safeguarding environmental and social standards. Applicable to large-scale projects with a minimum capacity of 200 megawatts (MW) - including renewable electricity generation, water desalination, electrolysis, and related infrastructure - they help ensure that hydrogen investments contribute to long-term sustainable development. By aligning with the SDGs, they promote inclusive economic growth, responsible resource management and climate action.
Technological change, an overwhelming fact in recent socioeconomic history, involves, as Joseph A. Schumpeter famously put it, “creative destruction” on a large scale: it gives rise to new goods, production methods, firms, organisations, and jobs, while rendering some received ones obsolete. Its impact extends beyond the economy and affects society, culture, politics, and the mind-set of people. While it allows solving certain problems, it causes new ones, inducing further technological change. Against this background, the paper attempts to provide a detailed, yet concise exploration of the historical evolution and measurement of technological change in economics. It touches upon various questions that have been raised since Adam Smith and by economic and social theorists after him until today living through several waves of new technologies. These questions include: (1) Which concepts and theories did the leading authors elaborate to describe and analyse the various forms of technological progress they observed? (2) Did they think that different forms of technological progress requested the elaboration of different concepts and theories – horses for courses, so to speak? (3) How do different forms of technological progress affect and are shaped by various strata and classes of society? Issues such as these have become particularly crucial in the context of the digitisation of the economy and the widespread use of AI. Finally, the paper explores the impact of emerging technologies on the established theoretical frameworks and empirical measurements of technological change, points to new measurements linked to the rise of these technologies, and evaluates their pros and cons vis-à-vis traditional approaches.
Solid waste management is one of the most pressing urban governance issues in low- and middle-income countries. Because waste volumes are increasing, the associated fiscal, environmental and health costs will also rise. The idea of working with informal waste workers to address this problem is often suggested but rarely implemented. Based on the case of Irbid, Jordan’s second-biggest city, we show why it was successful there and draw recommendations for other municipalities.
Irbid used an approach that combined what we call “frontloading trust” and “prioritising integration over training”. First, the mayor and municipal managers invited informal waste worker representatives to a structured dialogue about waste management challenges in the city, about the role of informal workers, and about potential solutions. During this months-long process, they overcame class differences, stigma and distrust and agreed on how to work together in the future. Then, rather than requiring extensive prior training of informal workers, they started to work together, which allowed workers to show what they were able to contribute (“prioritising integration over training”).
Based on this process, the municipality and informal worker representatives signed the first Memorandum of Understanding of its kind in Jordan, legalising the work of informal workers, providing them with official badges and safety equipment and piloting their integration into municipal sorting facilities. After only a few months, data showed that the integration of informal workers had reduced landfill waste, had saved the municipality a lot of money, had improved waste services for residents, and had increased respect, protection and income for informal waste workers.
This case shows that challenges like urban waste management require not only technical but social and governance innovations that include rather than exclude informal workers, and that can thereby contribute to improved livelihoods for all concerned.
On 24 and 25 November, African and European heads of state and government will meet in Luanda, Angola, for their seventh joint summit. In addition to issues of economic cooperation and trade relations, migration and multilateralism, peace and security will also be an important topic of discussion. Instead of making general statements about the importance of their partnership in this area, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) should take concrete steps to deepen their cooperation in conflict prevention and peace mediation, the protection of critical infrastructure, and security and defence policy cooperation.
South Africa’s energy transition unfolds within a complex landscape of urgent decarbonization needs, persistent energy insecurity and global competition over renewable value chains. Thus, the central question we ask in this policy brief is: which localization measures could strengthen equity considerations in the energy transition? Based on interviews conducted with stakeholders in South Africa’s energy and industrial policy sectors, and augmented by current academic literature and policy documents, this policy brief finds that policy and incentive gaps undermine domestic manufacturing, job creation and community ownership in the renewable energy sector. Without a stronger localization strategy, the Just Energy Transition Partnership could fail to deliver on its equity promises. Key recommendations include reforming public procurement to reward local content and social impact, leveraging concessional finance to attract private investment in domestic renewable energy industries, establishing bilateral partnerships for technology transfer, facilitating industrial upgrading and promoting community and worker-owned renewable energy initiatives.
Bonn, 10. November 2025. Die heute beginnende COP30 markiert den zehnten Jahrestag des Pariser Abkommens, in dem sich Länder verpflichtet haben, die globale Erwärmung unter 1,5 °C zu begrenzen. Zwei Jahre nach der ersten globalen Bestandsaufnahme – die leider nicht zu wesentlichen Fortschritten der Emissionsreduzierung führte –zeigt sich jedoch: Nur ein Drittel der neuen nationalen Klimabeiträge (NDCs) enthält konkrete Zusagen zum Ausstieg aus fossilen Brennstoffen. Die meisten großen Emittenten – darunter die EU, China, Südafrika, Australien und Indien – haben ihre Zusagen hierzu nicht aktualisiert.
Die Präambel des Pariser Abkommens erkennt an, dass der „gerechte Strukturwandel für die arbeitende Bevölkerung und die Schaffung menschenwürdiger Arbeit und hochwertiger Arbeitsplätze“ unverzichtbar für den Klimaschutz ist. Auf der diesjährigen Weltklimakonferenz (COP30) ist die sozial gerechte Umsetzung dieses Ziels dringender denn je. Zu diesem Zweck wurde im Rahmen der Klimarahmenkonvention UNFCCC das Arbeitsprogramm für eine Just Transition (“gerechter Übergang“) (JTWP) eingerichtet, doch dessen Mandat läuft auf der COP31 aus.
Seit seiner Gründung auf der COP27 und formellen Verabschiedung auf der COP28 soll das JTWP Wege zu einer „Just Transition“ ausloten, etwa durch Dialoge und Runde Tische. Doch bis heute fehlt eine Einigung, wie diese konkret aussehen soll. Länder mit hohem Einkommen setzen vorrangig auf eine Dekarbonisierung des Energiesektors, die Anpassung der Arbeitsplätze und Klimaresilienz. Einkommensschwache Länder dagegen fordern einen umfassenderen, multilateralen Ansatz auf Basis sozialer und Klima-Gerechtigkeit sowie gemeinsamer, aber differenzierter Verantwortlichkeiten. Diese Kluft prägt die politischen Debatten und die Forschung - grundlegende Fragen – Was bedeutet gerecht? Für wen? Und wer entscheidet darüber? – bleiben offen.
Zwar bieten die Leitlinien der IAO für eine „Just Transition“ einen wichtigen Rahmen und betonen menschenwürdige Arbeit und eine ökologische Wirtschaft, doch weltweit bleiben die Bemühungen fragmentiert und unkoordiniert. Dies kann zu Widerstand gegen die Klimapolitik führen. In Europa etwa leugnen Gegner nicht so sehr den Klimawandel, sondern argwöhnen, dass Regierungen die Klimapolitik nicht sozial gerecht gestalten. Ohne eine sinnvolle Beteiligung der lokalen Bevölkerung und spürbare Verbesserungen im Alltag droht die gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz für ehrgeizige Klimaschutzmaßnahmen weiter zu sinken.
Die Zeit für die Umsetzung des JTWP drängt. Bei den UN-Klimaverhandlungen in Bonn im Juni wurden in einem informellen Aktionsplan mehrere Zukunftsoptionen vorgestellt: von einer globalen Plattform über einen Leitrahmen bis hin zu einem neuen Mechanismus oder einer „Toolbox“. Angesichts geringer Fortschritte in den letzten Jahren hat die Zivilgesellschaft nun den Bélem-Aktionsmechanismus für eine globale „Just Transition“ vorgeschlagen – ein neues Instrument, das Ländern endlich Orientierung geben könnte. Dabei sollte es um zwei zentrale Punkte gehen.
Erstens erkennt der informelle Aktionsplan zwar „das Potenzial für Synergien mit den Rio-Konventionen und den SDGs“ an, nimmt aber keine verbindlichen Vorgaben in Bezug auf die Agenda 2030 oder die SDGs auf. Dies ist ein schwerwiegendes Versäumnis. Eine „Just Transition“ kann nur gelingen, wenn sie neben der Dekarbonisierung des Energiesektors oder Emissionssenkungen auch Armut, ein integriertes Ressourcenmanagement, sozialen Schutz und Klimaanpassung berücksichtigt. Da die Umsetzung der SDGs stockt und nur noch fünf Jahre bleiben, droht die fehlende Verknüpfung mit der Agenda 2030 die internationale Politik weiter zu fragmentieren. Jede JTWP-Toolbox muss daher Politikkohärenz als Leitprinzip institutionalisieren, um Synergien zu fördern und Zielkonflikte zu vermeiden. Dies ist unerlässlich, um multidimensionale, sektorübergreifende Übergänge zu erreichen, die nationale soziale und ökologische Ziele mit globalen Rahmenwerken in Einklang bringen.
Zweitens braucht es ein eigenes Forum, um Umsetzungs- und Finanzierungsstrategien zu diskutieren. Zwar ginge das über das bisherige Mandat hinaus, ist aber unverzichtbar für einen glaubwürdigen Finanzierungsrahmen. Die auf der COP26 entstandenen Just Energy Transition Partnerships zeigen die Schwächen klassischer Klimafinanzierung. Diese multilateralen Vereinbarungen zwischen einkommensstarken Ländern und kohleabhängigen Ländern mit mittlerem Einkommen wurden dafür kritisiert, dass sie unterfinanziert und abhängig von Krediten sind und die Verfahrensgerechtigkeit in den Empfängerländern schwächen. Der jüngste Rückzug der USA hat das Vertrauen zusätzlich erschüttert. Das JTWP könnte hier den Boden für eine neue, faire Finanzarchitektur legen und sicherstellen, dass jedes globale Instrumentarium für eine „Just Transition“ letztlich durch eine faire, verlässliche Finanzierung und robuste Rechenschaftsmechanismen untermauert ist.
Dass der Präsident der COP30 das JTWP zur obersten Priorität erklärt hat, schafft neue Chancen. Nun gilt es, die Weichen so zu stellen, dass Klimaschutz, nachhaltige Entwicklung und Gerechtigkeit tatsächlich zusammenfinden. Das JTWP darf keine Fußnote bleiben, sondern muss zu einer Säule der globalen Klimapolitik werden. Die Verhandlungsführer*innen sollten Mut beweisen und dafür sorgen, dass es nicht bei bloßen Versprechen einkommensstarker Länder bleibt, ihrer Verantwortung nachzukommen, und dass alle Sektoren zusammenarbeiten. Wird die „Just Transition“ auf der COP30 zu einem echten globalen Projekt – oder erleben wir eine weitere vertane Gelegenheit in einem Jahrzehnt der Versäumnisse?
A new wave of green industrial policies comes with a set of important economic and social trade-offs for the implementing countries as well as the cross-border impacts for their trading partners.
How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.
The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.
The global development architecture is under the spotlight. This refers to the broad architecture of actors, norms, instruments and institutions that mobilise and coordinate resources, knowledge and political support for development goals. Within this system, ODA is a core financial instrument, primarily provided by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members, and functioning alongside other modalities such as South–South cooperation, climate finance, philanthropic aid and private-sector engagement.
La crisis de desplazamiento venezolana se ha convertido en un momento decisivo en la dinámica migratoria Sur-Sur en toda América Latina. Desde 2015, la grave escasez de alimentos y medicamentos, la creciente inflación y las violaciones generalizadas de los derechos humanos han provocado un éxodo masivo desde Venezuela. En junio de 2024, el agravamiento del colapso humanitario y económico bajo el gobierno autoritario de Nicolás Maduro, en el poder desde 2013, había obligado a al menos 7,7 millones de venezolanos a abandonar el país. De ellos, 6,5 millones permanecen en América Latina y el Caribe, y casi 3 millones residen en Colombia.
Esta situación ha supuesto un reto importante para el Gobierno colombiano durante la última década. Por un lado, las instituciones colombianas no estaban preparadas para gestionar un gran número de refugiados. Por otro lado, las comunidades de acogida han tenido que hacer frente a problemas socioeconómicos estructurales de larga data, como la pobreza y la informalidad laboral. Además, los recientes cambios en la política estadounidense y los enormes recortes en la ayuda han deteriorado aún más la situación en Colombia.
Este informe de políticas se centra en las dinámicas de la cohesión social en el contexto colombiano del desplazamiento de venezolanos y colombianos retornados. Muestra que las narrativas negativas sobre los venezolanos han disminuido en los últimos diez años. Ambas comunidades han aprendido a convivir en relativa armonía a pesar de los continuos retos económicos y sociales a los que se enfrentan. Este informe de políticas ofrece recomendaciones para mejorar la cohesión social en las comunidades de
acogida que reciben a los venezolanos desplazados en Colombia.
Mensajes políticos clave:
• Continuar con los programas de regularización, garantizar la igualdad de acceso a los servicios básicos y apoyar los esfuerzos de inclusión socioeconómica y cultural de los gobiernos a nivel local para la población venezolana y las comunidades de acogida, especialmente en lo que respecta al acceso al mercado laboral.
• Colaborar con los actores locales que trabajan en la construcción de la paz, tanto estatales como no estatales, para desarrollar una comprensión común de la violencia en Colombia y de las rutas de asistencia del Estado para los venezolanos afectados y sus comunidades de acogida. Muchos venezolanos tienen dificultades para comprender el prolongado conflicto colombiano y cómo la violencia impregna la sociedad y sus comunidades de acogida.
• Aprovechar los esfuerzos locales para frenar la xenofobia y la discriminación por parte de las mujeres líderes comunitarias que han ayudado a abordar estas cuestiones conjuntamente con venezolanas y colombianas. Las cuestiones de xenofobia y discriminación, en particular hacia las mujeres y las personas LGBTQ+, perjudican la cohesión social.
• Abordar las narrativas negativas que se difunden principalmente a través de los medios de comunicación convencionales y, en algunos casos, por parte de los políticos locales, con verificación de datos y mensajes positivos sobre la migración.
The Venezuelan displacement crisis has become a defining moment in South-South migration dynamics across Latin America. Since 2015, severe food shortages, medicine scarcity, soaring inflation and widespread human rights violations have driven a massive exodus from Venezuela. By June 2024, the deepening humanitarian and economic collapse under Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian government – in power since 2013 – had forced at least 7.7 million Venezuelans to leave the country. Of these, 6.5 million remain in Latin America and the Caribbean, with nearly 3 million residing in Colombia.
This situation has posed a significant challenge for the Colombian government over the past decade. On the one hand, Colombian institutions were not equipped to manage large numbers of refugees. On the other hand, host communities have had to deal with long-standing structural socioeconomic issues such as poverty and job informality. Additionally, recent US policy shifts and immense aid cuts have further deteriorated the situation in Colombia.
This policy brief focuses on social cohesion dynamics in the Colombian context of the displacement of Venezuelans and Colombian returnees. It shows that negative narratives about Venezuelans have declined over the past ten years. Both communities have learned to live jointly in relative harmony despite the ongoing economic and social challenges they face. This policy brief offers recommendations
for improving social cohesion in host communities that receive displaced Venezuelans in Colombia.
Key policy messages:
• Continue regularisation programmes, ensure equal access to basic services and support socioeconomic and cultural inclusion efforts from governments at the local level for Venezuelans and host communities, especially regarding access to the labour market.
• Engage with local peacebuilding actors, both non-state and state, to develop a shared understanding of violence in Colombia and the State’s assistance pathways for affected Venezuelans and their host communities. Many Venezuelans struggle to understand the long-standing Colombian conflict and how the violence permeates society and their host communities.
• Build on the local efforts to tamp down xenophobia and discrimination by women community leaders who have helped address these jointly with Venezuelans and Colombians. Issues of xenophobia and discrimination, particularly towards women and LGBTQ+ persons, harm social cohesion.
• Address negative narratives that are spread mostly through mainstream media, and, in some cases, by local politicians, with fact-checking and positive messages around migration.