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Ihre Aufgabe ist die Mitwirkung bei der Datenaufbereitung und der Generierung von nutzerfreundlichen Variablen (in R), der Programmierung und Testung von Fragebögen (in limesurvey) sowie der Unterstützung der Forschung im Rahmen der Projekte „Bremer Initiative zur Stärkung der frühkindlichen Entwicklung (BRISE). Dabei lernen Sie neben der Programmierung von Fragebögen, die Arbeit mit komplexen Mehrebenendaten, die Arbeit mit R und das wissenschaftliche Arbeiten in einem interdisziplinär orientierten Team.


Marcel Fratzscher: „Die EZB hat keine andere Wahl, als an ihrem expansiven Kurs festzuhalten“

DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher kommentiert die heutige Sitzung des EZB-Rats wie folgt:

-->Die EZB hat signalisiert, dass sie ihren expansiven Kurs noch für längere Zeit wird fortsetzen müssen. Die Erwartungen derer, die auf ein schnelleres Ende der Anleihenkäufe gehofft hatten, wurden enttäuscht. Die EZB ist noch bei weitem nicht in der Lage, einen Kurswechsel zu vollziehen.

Die europäische Zentralbank muss drei zentrale Herausforderungen bewältigen. Da die gegenwärtigen Inflationserwartungen noch immer nicht ausreichend mit dem Ziel der Preisstabilität vereinbar sind, ist es die größte Herausforderung für die EZB, ihre Glaubwürdigkeit zu stärken und die Erwartungen besser zu verankern. Die zweite zentrale Herausforderung sind die Auswirkungen der expansiven US-Finanz- und Geldpolitik, die weiterhin Druck auf die Zinsen in Europa und den Euro-Wechselkurs ausüben. Auch wenn EZB-Präsidentin Lagarde unterstreicht, dass die Geldpolitik nicht die Finanzpolitik ersetzen kann, so wird der Druck auf die EZB zunehmen, ihre expansive Geldpolitik weiter auszuweiten, da die Finanzpolitik in Europa – im Vergleich zu anderen – nicht ausreichend handelt, um die wirtschaftliche Transformation zu beschleunigen. Als dritte Herausforderung kommt eine Verschlechterung der Finanzierungsbedingungen für einige Unternehmen im Euroraum hinzu.

Alle drei Herausforderungen könnten einem zügigen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung im Weg stehen und lassen der EZB keine andere Wahl, als weiterhin an ihrem expansiven Kurs festzuhalten.

Claudia Kemfert: „Neues EU-Klimaziel ist nicht ausreichend“

Die EU hat heute die Einigung auf ein neues Klimaziel für das Jahr 2030 bekannt gegeben. Dazu ein Statement von Claudia Kemfert, Energieökonomin und Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Grundsätzlich ist es gut, dass sich die EU nach langen zähen Verhandlungen auf ein erhöhtes Klimaziel geeinigt hat. Aus zwei Gründen wird es jedoch nicht ausreichen. Erstens: Das Emissionsminderungsniveau von 55 Prozent ist zu niedrig, um die Pariser Klimabeschlüsse zu erfüllen. Studien zeigen, dass eigentlich eine Emissionssenkung um 60 Prozent hätte beschlossen werden müssen. Dies erfordert erheblich mehr Anstrengungen vor allem mit Blick auf den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien und mehr Energieeinsparungen. Zweitens: Die Einbeziehung negativer Emissionen ist eine Mogelpackung und gefährdet die Erreichung des Ziels. Da sogenannte negative Emissionen gegengerechnet werden, wird das eigentliche Emissionsminderungsziel geschwächt. Da gerade Wälder immer mehr unter dem Klimawandel leiden, wird es ohnehin eine Herausforderung sein, diese in ausreichendem Umfang zu erhalten. Auch durch die Pflanzung neuer Wälder wird es kaum gelingen, die Emissionen zu senken, da diese über lange Zeiträume vorhanden sein müssen, um in nennenswertem Umfang CO2 zu absorbieren. Zudem werden so reale Emissionsminderungen eher verhindert. Daher wäre es besser gewesen, man hätte sich auf absolute und reale Emissionsminderungen von mindestens 55 Prozent geeinigt, ohne negative Emissionen gegenrechnen zu können.

Economic integration into host communities in times of Covid-19: how to ease the impact of Covid-19 on displaced populations in low- and middle-income countries

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and integrate into their host communities. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement have spurred the quest for local integration (UNHCR, 2019). The majority of displaced populations are hosted by neighbouring low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where the Covid-19 pandemic places additional strain on scarce resources.

Economic integration into host communities in times of Covid-19: how to ease the impact of Covid-19 on displaced populations in low- and middle-income countries

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and integrate into their host communities. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement have spurred the quest for local integration (UNHCR, 2019). The majority of displaced populations are hosted by neighbouring low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where the Covid-19 pandemic places additional strain on scarce resources.

Economic integration into host communities in times of Covid-19: how to ease the impact of Covid-19 on displaced populations in low- and middle-income countries

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and integrate into their host communities. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement have spurred the quest for local integration (UNHCR, 2019). The majority of displaced populations are hosted by neighbouring low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where the Covid-19 pandemic places additional strain on scarce resources.

Murky trade waters: regional tariff commitments and non-tariff measures in Africa

In several African regions, economic integration has successfully reduced tariff protection by freezing the opportunity to raise applied tariffs against fellow integration partners above those promised. In this paper, we examine whether the regional tariff commitments on the continent have come at the expense of adverse side-effects on the prevalence of other – non-tariff – trade barriers. More specifically, regional tariff commitments have not only amplified applied tariff overhangs – the difference between Most Favoured Nation (MFN) bound tariffs and effectively applied tariffs – for African members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but have also sharply reduced their tariff policy space within Africa, thus leaving regulatory policies such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT) as two of the few legitimate options to level the playing field with market competitors. Comparing the effects of applied tariff overhangs towards all vis-à-vis African trading partners on SPS and TBT notifications of 35 African WTO members between 2001 and 2017, we find no overall relationship between tariff overhangs and import regulation in our preferred model setting. By contrast, larger tariff overhangs specific to intra-African trade relations have a significant share in increasing the probability of SPS measures and TBT. Our findings have important implications for future Pan-African integration under the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in that success in fostering continental economic integration does not exclusively depend on the realisation of tariff liberalisation, but at the same time on a mindful coordination with non-tariff provisions.

Murky trade waters: regional tariff commitments and non-tariff measures in Africa

In several African regions, economic integration has successfully reduced tariff protection by freezing the opportunity to raise applied tariffs against fellow integration partners above those promised. In this paper, we examine whether the regional tariff commitments on the continent have come at the expense of adverse side-effects on the prevalence of other – non-tariff – trade barriers. More specifically, regional tariff commitments have not only amplified applied tariff overhangs – the difference between Most Favoured Nation (MFN) bound tariffs and effectively applied tariffs – for African members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but have also sharply reduced their tariff policy space within Africa, thus leaving regulatory policies such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT) as two of the few legitimate options to level the playing field with market competitors. Comparing the effects of applied tariff overhangs towards all vis-à-vis African trading partners on SPS and TBT notifications of 35 African WTO members between 2001 and 2017, we find no overall relationship between tariff overhangs and import regulation in our preferred model setting. By contrast, larger tariff overhangs specific to intra-African trade relations have a significant share in increasing the probability of SPS measures and TBT. Our findings have important implications for future Pan-African integration under the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in that success in fostering continental economic integration does not exclusively depend on the realisation of tariff liberalisation, but at the same time on a mindful coordination with non-tariff provisions.

Murky trade waters: regional tariff commitments and non-tariff measures in Africa

In several African regions, economic integration has successfully reduced tariff protection by freezing the opportunity to raise applied tariffs against fellow integration partners above those promised. In this paper, we examine whether the regional tariff commitments on the continent have come at the expense of adverse side-effects on the prevalence of other – non-tariff – trade barriers. More specifically, regional tariff commitments have not only amplified applied tariff overhangs – the difference between Most Favoured Nation (MFN) bound tariffs and effectively applied tariffs – for African members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but have also sharply reduced their tariff policy space within Africa, thus leaving regulatory policies such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT) as two of the few legitimate options to level the playing field with market competitors. Comparing the effects of applied tariff overhangs towards all vis-à-vis African trading partners on SPS and TBT notifications of 35 African WTO members between 2001 and 2017, we find no overall relationship between tariff overhangs and import regulation in our preferred model setting. By contrast, larger tariff overhangs specific to intra-African trade relations have a significant share in increasing the probability of SPS measures and TBT. Our findings have important implications for future Pan-African integration under the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in that success in fostering continental economic integration does not exclusively depend on the realisation of tariff liberalisation, but at the same time on a mindful coordination with non-tariff provisions.

How robust is the evidence on carbon pricing?

Carbon pricing is effective in reducing emissions while having limited negative economic effects. However, researchers and policymakers should be aware of several methodological issues that may reduce the reliability of the evidence on carbon pricing.

How robust is the evidence on carbon pricing?

Carbon pricing is effective in reducing emissions while having limited negative economic effects. However, researchers and policymakers should be aware of several methodological issues that may reduce the reliability of the evidence on carbon pricing.

How robust is the evidence on carbon pricing?

Carbon pricing is effective in reducing emissions while having limited negative economic effects. However, researchers and policymakers should be aware of several methodological issues that may reduce the reliability of the evidence on carbon pricing.

What can the Ethiopian manufacturing sector learn from the past?

According to the ten-year development plan of the Ethiopian government, the country will focus on the manufacturing sector using raw materials by 2017. In the second phase of the plan, from 2018 to 2022, it will turn its attention to "manufacturing sub-sectors that require high capital and skilled manpower". This article examines what the new policy can learn from previous policies adopted by the Ethiopian government.

What can the Ethiopian manufacturing sector learn from the past?

According to the ten-year development plan of the Ethiopian government, the country will focus on the manufacturing sector using raw materials by 2017. In the second phase of the plan, from 2018 to 2022, it will turn its attention to "manufacturing sub-sectors that require high capital and skilled manpower". This article examines what the new policy can learn from previous policies adopted by the Ethiopian government.

What can the Ethiopian manufacturing sector learn from the past?

According to the ten-year development plan of the Ethiopian government, the country will focus on the manufacturing sector using raw materials by 2017. In the second phase of the plan, from 2018 to 2022, it will turn its attention to "manufacturing sub-sectors that require high capital and skilled manpower". This article examines what the new policy can learn from previous policies adopted by the Ethiopian government.

Youth Participation in Global Governance for Sustaining Peace and Climate Action

European Peace Institute / News - Mon, 04/19/2021 - 18:15

Youth movements have played an increasingly prominent role in calling for action to address climate change. Many youth-led organizations are also engaged in initiatives to build peace in their communities. In global policymaking fora, however, youth remain sidelined.

This issue brief outlines the synergies between the youth, peace, and security (YPS) and youth climate action agendas. It also examines the factors that contribute to young people’s exclusion from global governance, including negative misperceptions of youth, outdated policy frameworks, lack of funding, and weak links between youth and global governance fora.

The paper concludes with recommendations for governments and multilateral institutions to better assess the links between youth, peace, and climate change and include young people in decision-making processes. Recommendations include:

  • Bridging the gap between national governments and youth organizations;
  • Bridging the gap between global governance institutions and youth organizations;
  • Systematically putting youth on the agenda of intergovernmental fora and conferences;
  • Prioritizing YPS and youth climate action within the UN Secretariat;
  • Making funding mechanisms more accessible to youth organizations; and
  • Expanding the evidence base on the intersections between youth, climate change, and peace.

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