Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

- Agenda / Grèce, France - Régions

Les militants dénoncent le manque de financement et l'absence de délais contraignants

The post Le plan AccelerateEU est jugé indispensable mais insuffisant pour faire face à la crise énergétique appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Ioannis Alexandris, Research Fellow and Alessandro Ieranò, Research Assistant at the Wider Europe Programme of ELIAMEP explore Hungary’s landmark electoral shift and its broader implications for the European Union. It highlights the key drivers behind Peter Magyar’s victory and assesses how a new political era in Budapest could reshape the country’s relationship with Brussels and the trajectory of EU integration.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here.

Event Video 
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IPI, in partnership with the Permanent Missions of Bahrain and Switzerland, and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), cohosted a fireside chat between IPI President Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and Gilles Michaud, UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Safety and Security on April 22nd.

In the conversation, USG Michaud reflected on his seven-year tenure leading the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS), comprising over 50 organizations. The discussion shed light on how the UNSMS is addressing current challenges such as increasing threats from state and non-state actors, the UN funding crisis, and the evolving multilateral landscape. It also focused on how the UNSMS is embracing new opportunities, including emerging technologies, to meet its goal of enabling the UN to stay and deliver while mitigating security risks to its approximately 180,000 personnel.

This discussion took place against the backdrop of the recent Security Council briefing on Resolution 2730 (2024) and annual General Assembly deliberations culminating in the adoption of Resolution 80/112 (2025) on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of UN personnel. USG Michaud shared his lived experience, often behind the scenes, of directing security support to reach people in need or to assist personnel and families affected by traumatic incidents, and his efforts to ensure that the UNSMS remains fit for purpose for years to come.

Welcome and Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute
Oliver Hoehne, Deputy Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations

Featured Speaker:
Gilles Michaud, UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Safety and Security

Closing Remarks:
Suma Sameer Abdulkarim Alalaiwat, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United Nations

The post Fireside Chat between Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and Gilles Michaud appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Le projet stratégique reliant le port de Djen Djen à l’autoroute Est-Ouest revient au cœur des priorités. Le ministre des Travaux publics, Abdelkader Djellaoui, a […]

L’article Pénétrante Djen Djen – El Eulma : le gouvernement accélère la cadence est apparu en premier sur .

For nearly thirty years, beginning with the Razali Initiative in 1997, I’ve been in and out of discussions related to UN Security Council reform. Aside from the work undertaken by the Small Five Group (S-5) and later by the ACT Group on working methods (with which I was fortunate to be involved), much of the discussion at the UN has focused on permanent representation and whether the privilege of exercising the veto should be extended to new permanent members. So much so that it is now almost taken for granted that Security Council reform will only be meaningful if it brings about permanent representation for both the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean and the African Group, with the question of the veto remaining in the balance.

While permanent membership is a matter of utmost significance, just changing the composition of the membership (permanent, elected to two-year terms, or elected to longer terms) would not be enough to deliver a fully functional Security Council. This led me to indulge in some thinking on what else would be needed.

The first thought came to me months ago as I was sharing with my law students some of the techniques a multilateral diplomat chairing a complex legal negotiation would use to arrive at a strong outcome. I pointed out that if a delegation was being obstructive, I would suspend the meeting for a period of time and ask that delegation to come up with a solution that would secure widespread support. No multilateral diplomat worth their salt, or with any sense of professional pride, would refuse me, simply because it would be too embarrassing for them to admit before all their peers that they were lacking the skills to do so. If it was the first time a delegation had ever experienced something like this, they would shuffle out of the conference room looking dumbstruck. They would, however, return at some point, beaming with pride at having found a solution. They would be exhausted, too, and the very next day they would be less enthusiastic about raising an objection.

This reflection coincided with an argument I recalled hearing in private repeatedly from Larry Johnson and Mona Khalil of the UN Office of Legal Affairs when I was a permanent representative (PR). They would tell me time and again that the permanent members of the Council were always quick to seize on their veto privileges expressed in Article 27(3) of the UN Charter but not to honor this article’s twin—the “responsibility” conferred on them in Article 24(1). In other words, they were happy to exercise the privilege of blocking actions without bearing the responsibility of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

Fifteen years ago, I remember casually making remarks in this direction in discussions within the ACT Group. Now, I believe this issue needs to be studied more closely.

The problem with the Council is its chronic state of constipation, with obvious and disastrous effects felt around the world. Changing the composition in any direction won’t affect that underlying state. Instead, we can learn from the techniques used to unlock complex negotiations. Would it not be more sensible to make the exercise of the veto contingent on having a permanent member first provide the Council (in informal consultations) with a credible alternative that could secure nine affirmative votes and no vetoes? This would mean that the PR of a permanent member could only block a draft resolution if they were also willing to do the work of imagining another possible solution—and one that would win widespread support. No work, no veto. The work of the Council might then tip from blocking action to ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

The same principle applies to other multilateral bodies. It is high time we dispense with references to a “consensus rule” in multilateral negotiations and call it what it is: a “veto rule.” I have been saying this for many months now. It is hypocritical for member states to weigh in against the use of the veto in the Security Council when they are only too happy to themselves block agreement in the climate negotiations or the negotiations on a pathogen access and benefit sharing system for the Pandemic Treaty. If we are serious about wanting to do something about the veto in the Council, we must address it in all multilateral bodies and stick to the intent behind Article 18 and its provisions on majoritarian voting in the General Assembly.

If Article 27(3) were to be amended, what might it look like? It might require the concurrence of permanent members “provided those members can first assure the Security Council of there being an accepted alternative.”

There would also have to be an additional subparagraph (4): “The Secretary-General will provide the first draft of every resolution (carrying a decision) to the Security Council but will not subsequently negotiate over it; that will be the prerogative of the Council.” More on this point in my next post.

“From pillar to post” is an English expression denoting frenetic activity—an accurate representation of a functioning multilateral system.

The post From Pillar to Post: No Work, No Veto appeared first on International Peace Institute.

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IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN, in partnership with the UN Department of Peace Operations, cohosted a high-level, closed-door roundtable on “Looking to the Future of Action for Peacekeeping Plus,” on April 16th.

Since it was established in 2021, Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+) has helped mobilize action on critical issues affecting UN peacekeeping operations, including peacekeeper capabilities and mindsets, strategic and operational integration, and cooperation with host countries. To ensure the framework is aligned to the current context, builds on achievements and challenges implementing A4P thus far, and in response to a request from the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), DPO has developed an updated A4P implementation framework. It establishes a strategic, focused, and streamlined set of priorities to improve the impact, effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. This renewed framework will continue to mobilize action across critical priorities in UN peacekeeping operations, taking into account changing political, security, and resource imperatives. This includes recent reform efforts to ensure the UN remains “effective, cost-efficient and responsive,” as part of the UN80 initiative.

Member states participating in this ambassadorial roundtable heard from Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, on the new A4P implementation strategy. Following a briefing by the USG, member states engaged in an interactive dialogue on the future of A4P and A4P+.

The post Looking to the Future of Action for Peacekeeping Plus: A discussion with Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Europe’s dependence on critical raw materials, deriving mainly from the green and digital transition, is best understood as a problem of asymmetric interdependence rather than a simple trade deficit. The principal vulnerabilities are located in specific chokepoints of the supply chain (refining and conversion, intermediates, logistics corridors, finance, and standards). In the context of an intensifying geopolitical competition and a competitive EU-China relationship, such chokepoints can become instruments of leverage, often exercised through selective trade restrictions.

• Demand is rising for structural reasons. Europe’s energy transition and industrial policies increase mineral demand. International Energy Agency underlines that demand for minerals used in clean energy technologies will more than double by 2040.
• Processing is often the weakest link. Europe is often most exposed not at the mine extraction level, but in processing, conversion, and intermediate products needed for manufacturing.
• China’s leverage derives from scale and policy tools. China’s position is strongest in several processing and intermediate segments. China weaponises tools such as export controls to slow or reshape flows.
• The EU has moved from elaboration to implementation. The Critical Raw Materials Act entered into force on 23 May 2024, and the EU has started to implement it through “Strategic Projects”, including 47 projects inside the EU and 13 in third countries. Further initiatives were developed by late 2025 in the context of RESourceEU.
• Rules can improve resilience, but timing matters. Compared with China’s faster, more coordinated model, Europe risks turning regulatory credibility into a liability.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Panagiotis Moumtsakis, DPhil student in Politics, University of Oxford.

8. Oktober 1936 – † 4. April 2026 , Prof. Dr. Richard Hauser ist Anfang April im Alter von 89 Jahren verstorben. Mit ihm verliert die Längsschnittstudie SOEP einen ihrer Gründungsväter, langjährigen Förderer und stets verlässlichen Unterstützer. Richard Hauser hat das SOEP in den frühen 1980er Jahren gemeinsam mit seinen Kolleginnen ...

More than a year ago US President Donald Trump effectively dissolved the national development agency USAID by executive order on his first day in office. Since then, other Western countries have also implemented significant cuts to their development budgets, albeit less drastically than the US. This includes Germany, whose budget for development cooperation (DC) has been shrinking since 2024. The budget of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) does not cover the entirety of DC, but it does reflect the general trend. It stands at just over 10 billion euros for the current year, 2026 – in 2024, it was still 11.1 billion euros.

More than a year ago US President Donald Trump effectively dissolved the national development agency USAID by executive order on his first day in office. Since then, other Western countries have also implemented significant cuts to their development budgets, albeit less drastically than the US. This includes Germany, whose budget for development cooperation (DC) has been shrinking since 2024. The budget of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) does not cover the entirety of DC, but it does reflect the general trend. It stands at just over 10 billion euros for the current year, 2026 – in 2024, it was still 11.1 billion euros.

More than a year ago US President Donald Trump effectively dissolved the national development agency USAID by executive order on his first day in office. Since then, other Western countries have also implemented significant cuts to their development budgets, albeit less drastically than the US. This includes Germany, whose budget for development cooperation (DC) has been shrinking since 2024. The budget of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) does not cover the entirety of DC, but it does reflect the general trend. It stands at just over 10 billion euros for the current year, 2026 – in 2024, it was still 11.1 billion euros.

Welche Möglichkeiten haben Regierungen in Ländern niedrigen oder mittleren Einkommens, den aktuellen Ausfall von Mittelzuflüssen aus der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu kompensieren? Der Artikel zeigt: Nachhaltig wirksame Steuerreformen sind schwierig, aber nicht unmöglich. Es gibt durchaus Möglichkeiten, Steuersysteme aufkommensstärker und gerechter zu gestalten. Häufig können bereits Investitionen in die Modernisierung der Steuerverwaltungen positive Resultate hervorbringen, etwa bei der Grundsteuer. In anderen Fällen sind steuerpolitische Maßnahmen erforderlich, zum Beispiel bei der Besteuerung digitaler Dienstleistungen (einschließlich von Finanzdienstleistungen). Auch über Steuervergünstigungen wäre zu reden. Sie werden z.B. für Investitionsförderung oder Armutsbekämpfung eingesetzt, verfehlen jedoch häufig ihre Ziele und verringern das Steueraufkommen erheblich. Für die Umsetzung von Reformen gilt: Mehr als Belehrungen von außen wirkt häufig der horizontale Austausch mit Nachbarländern auf regionaler Ebene. International wäre eine gerechtere Verteilung von Besteuerungsrechten wichtig, damit Staaten weltweit die Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Fiskalsysteme weiter erhöhen können. Darauf zu warten, macht aber keinen Sinn. Besser ist es, die Spielräume zu nutzen, die sich bereits heute bieten.

Welche Möglichkeiten haben Regierungen in Ländern niedrigen oder mittleren Einkommens, den aktuellen Ausfall von Mittelzuflüssen aus der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu kompensieren? Der Artikel zeigt: Nachhaltig wirksame Steuerreformen sind schwierig, aber nicht unmöglich. Es gibt durchaus Möglichkeiten, Steuersysteme aufkommensstärker und gerechter zu gestalten. Häufig können bereits Investitionen in die Modernisierung der Steuerverwaltungen positive Resultate hervorbringen, etwa bei der Grundsteuer. In anderen Fällen sind steuerpolitische Maßnahmen erforderlich, zum Beispiel bei der Besteuerung digitaler Dienstleistungen (einschließlich von Finanzdienstleistungen). Auch über Steuervergünstigungen wäre zu reden. Sie werden z.B. für Investitionsförderung oder Armutsbekämpfung eingesetzt, verfehlen jedoch häufig ihre Ziele und verringern das Steueraufkommen erheblich. Für die Umsetzung von Reformen gilt: Mehr als Belehrungen von außen wirkt häufig der horizontale Austausch mit Nachbarländern auf regionaler Ebene. International wäre eine gerechtere Verteilung von Besteuerungsrechten wichtig, damit Staaten weltweit die Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Fiskalsysteme weiter erhöhen können. Darauf zu warten, macht aber keinen Sinn. Besser ist es, die Spielräume zu nutzen, die sich bereits heute bieten.