Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

This paper examines the renegotiation of social contracts, using the example of Colombia’s phase-out process for fossil fuel subsidies that provides empirical evidence for broad reforms of state–society agreements. While calls for new social contracts increasingly highlight the need to integrate ecological sustainability and address systemic inequalities, few studies explore how such transitions unfold in practice. Drawing on interviews with 43 experts from government, academia, civil society, and the private sector, the paper analyses Colombia’s efforts to remove gasoline and diesel subsidies under President Petro’s reform agenda. The findings reveal four central obstacles: the political cost of reform, structural dependencies in the transport sector, limited state capacity, and the absence of long-term policy continuity. We find that creating a new social contract requires broad support by a range of stakeholders and a clear vision for the new agreement, which is supported across ideological camps. The Colombian government offered an incoherentversion of a green growth social contract, which relied on reforming the existing structures with novel technologies. In contrast to government participants, the interviewees from society, academia and the private sector in Colombia seem to dismiss the plans of the government as unrealistic, as they do not address the deep-rooted challenges within the transport sector and lacks a clear pathway. The Colombian reform process highlights the contested nature of renegotiating social contracts, illustrating the challenges of aligning societal expectations with government visions.

This paper examines the renegotiation of social contracts, using the example of Colombia’s phase-out process for fossil fuel subsidies that provides empirical evidence for broad reforms of state–society agreements. While calls for new social contracts increasingly highlight the need to integrate ecological sustainability and address systemic inequalities, few studies explore how such transitions unfold in practice. Drawing on interviews with 43 experts from government, academia, civil society, and the private sector, the paper analyses Colombia’s efforts to remove gasoline and diesel subsidies under President Petro’s reform agenda. The findings reveal four central obstacles: the political cost of reform, structural dependencies in the transport sector, limited state capacity, and the absence of long-term policy continuity. We find that creating a new social contract requires broad support by a range of stakeholders and a clear vision for the new agreement, which is supported across ideological camps. The Colombian government offered an incoherentversion of a green growth social contract, which relied on reforming the existing structures with novel technologies. In contrast to government participants, the interviewees from society, academia and the private sector in Colombia seem to dismiss the plans of the government as unrealistic, as they do not address the deep-rooted challenges within the transport sector and lacks a clear pathway. The Colombian reform process highlights the contested nature of renegotiating social contracts, illustrating the challenges of aligning societal expectations with government visions.

Am 3. November fand die feierliche Preisübergabe am Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) statt. Die Kohli Foundation for Sociology prämiert Forschende und Strukturen, die das Fachgebiet Soziologie maßgeblich beeinflusst und geprägt haben. Neben herausragenden Leistungen legt die ...

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6. November 2026 – Die Reformdebatte zur gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung dreht sich derzeit vor allem um die Rente für besonders langjährig Versicherte. Statt einer Abschaffung werden strengere Anrechnungsregeln oder eine längere Wartezeit diskutiert. Beide Varianten würden Kosten senken, aber unterschiedliche Gruppen treffen: Ohne Kinderzeiten verlöre knapp jede vierte Person die Möglichkeit, von der abschlagsfreien Frührente zu profitieren – bei den Frauen mehr als die Hälfte. Eine Wartezeit von 47 Jahren träfe mehr als vier von zehn der heute Begünstigten, besonders häufig in Ostdeutschland. Sozial zielgenauer wäre ein Ausbau des Grundrentenzuschlags.

Fünf Wochen nach Einführung des Tankrabatts zeigt der Tankrabatt-Monitor des DIW Berlin weiterhin eine nur teilweise Weitergabe der Steuersenkung an die Verbraucher*innen. Täglich verfolgt der Monitor die Entwicklung der Kraftstoffpreise in Deutschland und Frankreich., „Bei Benzin kommen weiterhin rund 61 bis 64 Prozent des Tankrabatts an den Tankstellen an, wenn man den 30. September, den letzten Tag vor dem Tankrabatt, als Referenzpunkt zugrunde legt. Das entspricht etwa zehn bis elf Cent der Steuersenkung von 16,7 Cent pro Liter. Nimmt man einen früheren ...

Am 2. und 3. November 2026 nahmen Carsten Schröder und Lotte Maaßen online an der Konferenz „Inequality and Tax Policy: A Conference in Honor of Shlomo Yitzhaki“ an der Hebrew University of Jerusalem teil. Die Veranstaltung würdigte das wissenschaftliche Lebenswerk des 2023 verstorbenen Ökonomen ...

Im Oktober 2026 war Alfonso Langastro zu Gast am SOEP. Der Doktorand am European University Institute (EUI) in Florenz forscht an der Schnittstelle von Arbeits- und Berufssoziologie sowie sozialer Mobilität. Im Mittelpunkt seiner Forschung stehen berufliche Erwerbsverläufe, die Qualität von ...

Bei den Midterm-Wahlen zum US-Kongress haben die Demokraten deutlich gesiegt und die Mehrheit im Repräsentantenhaus und im Senat gewonnen. Das Wahlergebnis schätzt Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt ein:  

Der Sieg der Demokraten bei den US-Midterms ist eine positive Botschaft. Das wichtigste Signal ist, dass die Gewaltenteilung in den USA wieder besser greift: Präsident Trump dürfte es künftig schwerer fallen, staatliche Institutionen nach seinem Willen zu beschneiden und umzubauen, wie er dies beispielsweise mit der US-Notenbank in den vergangenen zwei Jahren versucht hat. 

Auch für die Weltwirtschaft ist das Ergebnis eine gute Nachricht, selbst wenn es die US-Wirtschaft kurzfristig bremsen könnte. Die Mehrheit der Demokraten in beiden Kammern des US-Kongresses dürfte es Trump erschweren, seinen Handelskonflikt, vor allem mit Europa, stets neu anzufachen. Zudem kann der Kongress über sein Budgetrecht den Krieg mit dem Iran stärker begrenzen. Das könnte die Energiepreise senken, wovon auch Europa profitieren würde.

Das aggressive Gebaren der US-Techkonzerne könnte nun ein Stück weit eingehegt werden, da sich die Demokraten für eine Regulierung von KI einsetzen und den massiven Boom beim Bau von Rechenzentren wohl deutlich kritischer begleiten werden. Dies dürfte die Wachstumsaussichten vor allem in Europa verbessern, langfristig aber auch in den USA. Es könnte zudem die Überhitzung an den Finanzmärkten bei Techkonzernen etwas abkühlen. Auch in der Finanzpolitik wird Trump weniger freie Hand haben und stärker Rechenschaft ablegen müssen.

Nur wenige Beschäftigte nutzten 2025 am Arbeitsplatz regelmäßig KI – Vor allem junge und hochgebildete Männer in digitalen Berufen kommen häufig mit KI in Kontakt – Digitale Kluft könnte wachsen – Gezielte Förderung nötig, um möglichst viele Beschäftigte am technologischen Wandel teilhaben zu lassen ...

Mit dem „Geolinking Service SoRa“ steht ab sofort eine neue Forschungsdateninfrastruktur zur Verfügung. Der Service macht es möglich, Befragungsdaten aus den Sozialwissenschaften mit raumbezogenen Daten zu verknüpfen und eröffnet damit neue Möglichkeiten für die interdisziplinäre Forschung. ...

Das Thema Vergesellschaftung bleibt weiterhin sehr aktuell für Berlin. In Ergänzung zum DIW aktuell Nr. 126 Vergesellschaftung der Wohnungsunternehmen in Berlin belastet den Haushalt und schafft keine zusätzliche Wohnung gibt es nun auf unserer Webseite die Möglichkeit, selbst einmal die ...