Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Peacekeeping-intelligence (PKI) plays a central role in enhancing the safety and security of UN personnel and in supporting mandate implementation, particularly the protection of civilians. Yet despite growing recognition that gender dynamics shape conflict behavior, threat patterns, and community engagement, gender perspectives remain unevenly integrated across PKI institutions, analytical processes, and training systems. This limits missions’ situational awareness, weakens their early-warning capacity, and constrains their operational effectiveness. 

This issue brief examines how gender can be more systematically integrated into PKI across three interrelated dimensions: the representation of women within PKI institutions, the integration of gender perspectives across the PKI cycle, and the design and delivery of PKI training. Drawing on UN policies and more than 100 interviews with personnel across five peacekeeping missions, the brief highlights persistent structural, analytical, and institutional gaps that undermine gender-responsive intelligence. 

The brief argues that integrating gender into PKI is not merely a normative obligation but a core operational requirement. Advancing this agenda requires sustained investment in workforce diversity, analytical methodologies, data systems, training design, and institutional collaboration to strengthen predictive capacity, enhance civilian protection, and improve mission performance. 

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The post The Operational Imperative of Integrating Gender into Peacekeeping-Intelligence appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Mit dem heute gestarteten Deutschlandfonds will die Bundesregierung mehr Investitionen in private Unternehmen mobilisieren. Die Koordination des Deutschlandfonds übernimmt die KfW. Es folgt dazu ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Der Deutschlandfonds ist eine große Chance, die beabsichtigte Wirkung könnte aber verpuffen. Ähnlich wie beim Investitionsplan für Europa, dem sogenannten Juncker-Plan vor zehn Jahren, könnten die staatlichen Gelder hauptsächlich zu Mitnahmeeffekten führen. Dies wäre der Fall, wenn Unternehmen Projekte realisieren, die sie ohnehin umgesetzt hätten und Investoren lediglich Risiken auf den Staat abwälzen. Daher ist ein kluges, politisch unabhängiges Management der KfW so wichtig. Entscheidungen müssen strikt auf Qualität beruhen, nicht auf politischen Interessen.

Meine Sorge ist, dass der Deutschlandfonds zu unerwünschten Verteilungseffekten führt und primär alte, große (oder große mittelständische) Industrieunternehmen fördert und zu wenig junge, innovative KMU. Ein weiteres Risiko ist, dass Entscheidungen – wer gefördert wird und wer nicht – stark politisch beeinflusst werden und somit zur Klientelpolitik werden. Hier gibt es in den letzten Jahren genug Beispiele, und es besteht die Gefahr, dass die Politik diese Klientelpolitik fortsetzt und das Ziel nicht die wirtschaftliche Transformation und Erneuerung ist.

Der Deutschlandfonds dürfte zudem scheitern, wenn er nicht mit anderen Reformen einhergeht. Ohne große Reformen bei Steuern, Innovation, Regulierung und Sozialsystemen wird der Deutschlandfonds allein seine Ziele verfehlen. Der Deutschlandfonds darf nicht national, sondern muss europäisch gedacht und umgesetzt werden. Wir benötigen schnellen und großen Fortschritt bei der Kapitalmarktunion, der Vollendung des Binnenmarkts für alle Dienstleistungen sowie der Vollendung der Bankenunion.

Der Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) hat in seiner heutigen Sitzung entschieden, den Leitzins unverändert zu belassen. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die EZB ist mit ihrer neuen Prognose wieder etwas optimistischer in Bezug auf die europäische Wirtschaft. Die Preisstabilität ist nach wie vor gewährleistet. Daher ist die Entscheidung, die Zinsen unverändert zu lassen, konsequent und logisch. Nicht nur die Inflationsrate ist stabil bei rund zwei Prozent, sondern auch die Kerninflation hat sich stabilisiert. Die EZB sieht in ihrer neuen Prognose einen leichten wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung für 2026, vor allem in Deutschland. Der Aufschwung ist jedoch schleppend und nach wie vor schwach.

Die wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Risiken für 2026 dürften weiter zunehmen. Die Gefahr einer Eskalation geopolitischer und geoökonomischer Konflikte ist groß und steigt. Die EZB muss besser kommunizieren und signalisieren, dass sie bereit ist, schnell und entschieden zu handeln. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit ist groß, dass der nächste Zinsschritt der EZB eine Zinssenkung sein wird – als Antwort auf erneute negative Schocks für den Euroraum und die Weltwirtschaft.

Sascha dos Santos und seine Co-Autor*innen wurden für ihren Beitrag im European Sociological Review mit dem Titel „Does training beget training over the life course? Cumulative advantage in work-related non-formal training participation in Germany and the UK“ von der interdisziplinären Jury des ...

Lying on the other side of the globe, at first glance the Indo-Pacific seems as remote to European interests as it gets. A more careful consideration beyond the geographical distance reflected on the map, however, paints a rather different picture. The growing interconnectedness of the European and the Indo-Pacific theaters in the security realm, as well as trade dependencies in strategic commodities, such as critical minerals and semiconductors, necessitate the formulation of a more intentional EU Indo-Pacific policy recognizing the region’s centrality in Europe’s defense and economic security. At the same time, acknowledging the structural limitations of the prospective engagement is equally important. The delicate state of affairs in Taiwan and the brinkmanship in the South China Sea should also be factored in. The United States has long called for its European partners to shore up their presence in the Indo-Pacific not least to support Washington in its regional bras-de-fer with China. Besides Washington’s own agenda, a flare-up in the Indo-Pacific will have far-reaching consequences for the EU partners, both financially and strategically. After mapping the European interests linked to the region, this paper will explore the ways in which the EU may tangibly shift some of its attention to the Indo-Pacific demonstrating why this is critical and what constraints it is bound to face in the process.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Vasilis Petropoulos, ELIAMEP Fellow.

Introduction

The Indo-Pacific is the geographical space extending roughly from the eastern coast of Africa to the Western coast of the Americas. It encompasses South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania. This region hosts more than half of the world’s population, accounts for 60% of global GDP[1], and is home to the busiest maritime trade routes, such as the Strait of Malacca, the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China seas, featuring contested security flashpoints.

For Europe, the Indo-Pacific is a space where economic interests, strategic dependencies, and global stability converge.

The region is also the site of an intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, whose outcome will largely shape the future of the international order. For Europe, the Indo-Pacific is a space where economic interests, strategic dependencies, and global stability converge. Approximately 40 percent of the EU’s foreign trade passes through the South China Sea[2], and European industries depend heavily on supply chains rooted in East and Southeast Asia. Export controls on rare earths, disruptions in semiconductor production in Taiwan or delays in shipping through the Strait of Malacca would reverberate across Europe’s economy. Beyond economics, a military escalation in the region could fracture the transatlantic alliance and divert U.S. strategic focus away from Europe, leaving the EU more vulnerable on its eastern and southern flanks. But even absent an armed confrontation in Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific is directly tied to Europe’s security through the unprecedented dynamics to which the ongoing war in Ukraine has strikingly given shape. With North Korean troops fighting alongside the Russian invaders and with China implicitly bankrolling the beleaguered Russian economy -thus enabling the perpetuation of the Kremlin’s war effort- the Indo-Pacific theater appears to gradually become embedded into the security architecture of the Old Continent. Hybrid threats originating in the Indo-Pacific, such as organized crime and irregular migration, complete the heap of security-related matters that tie Europe to the region.

Recognizing these interconnections, the EU ought to turn anemic engagement into tangible presence. In doing so, Europe must navigate internal divisions and resource constraints, while treading carefully the geopolitical minefield of the U.S.-China rivalry. The question is not whether Europe should engage in the Indo-Pacific, but how, and to what extent, it can pursue its engagement effectively.

Skin in the game

Economic Security

As already hinted, Europe’s economic prosperity is tightly bound to the Indo-Pacific. The region hosts four of the EU’s top ten trading partners, including China, Japan, South Korea, and India[3]. Further, key European exports (e.g. machinery, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals) flow eastward, while the EU imports a vast array of goods from Indo-Pacific countries. Two sectors epitomize this interdependence most prominently: semiconductors and critical minerals.

Semiconductors

The EU’s economic model is anchored in high-value manufacturing, advanced automotive production, and digital innovation. Maintaining the momentum in these fields hinges on securing an uninterrupted supply of semiconductors. Modern vehicles -particularly electric and hybrid models- integrate hundreds of chips[4] that control everything from engine management and battery systems to safety sensors and infotainment. Increasingly, the move toward autonomous and connected vehicles depends on higher-performance chips fabricated at advanced nodes. Further, advanced chips are the central components of data centers, 5G and forthcoming 6G networks, and industrial automation systems[5]. The defence industry, too, depends on reliable access to semiconductors for advanced military aircrafts, radar systems, satellite communications, and command-and-control platforms[6].

Foundries in Indo-Pacific countries account for the bulk of chip manufacturing worldwide.

Foundries in Indo-Pacific countries account for the bulk of chip manufacturing worldwide. Indicatively, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors with a 71% market share and over 90% of the most advanced chips[7]. It is clear that a disruption to Taiwan’s semiconductor output would cascade directly into Europe’s supply chains resulting in production halts, escalating costs, and loss of competitiveness. It could also impede Europe’s digital transformation, compromise the rollout of critical communications networks, and affect sectors vital to national security. Semiconductors are dual-use technologies underpinning both civilian and military innovation. Therefore, any limitation in access to advanced chips would erode Europe’s technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy, leaving it reliant on the policy choices and geopolitical stability of other, non-Western actors. The graph below offers a visualization of Indo-Pacific’s dominance in global chip manufacturing.

Source: Ali Kamaly

 

Critical Minerals

Many of these minerals are mined or processed in Indo-Pacific countries, and the geographic concentration of production and refining adds a layer of systemic risk for Europe. […] While raw mineral deposits exist in many places, China has deliberately captured the downstream part of the value chain, which includes the refining, processing, separation and manufacturing of the final component.

The transition to a low-carbon, technologically advanced economy has placed critical minerals at the centre of EU’s industrial policy. Elements such as rare earths, nickel, cobalt, lithium, graphite and others form the backbone of batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, and advanced electronics. Many of these minerals are mined or processed in Indo-Pacific countries, and the geographic concentration of production and refining adds a layer of systemic risk for Europe. First, the role of China is pivotal. While raw mineral deposits exist in many places, China has deliberately captured the downstream part of the value chain, which includes the refining, processing, separation and manufacturing of the final component. For example, China accounts for about 65% of the world’s lithium refining capacity, over 70% for cobalt, and an astonishing 90% for rare earth minerals[8]. Second, Southeast Asia and other parts of the Indo-Pacific supply important raw and intermediate materials. For instance, Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of nickel, accounting for more than 50% of global nickel output in 2024 with Australia and New Caledonia also featuring in the list with the top ten global nickel producers[9]. The ASEAN Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply Chains found that Indonesia and the Philippines together account for approximately 72% of global nickel output and 14% of global cobalt output[10]. Crucially, these trends will continue to shape the critical minerals industry in the foreseeable future with Indo-Pacific (especially China) remaining at the epicenter. The tables below show projections about the dominant players in the six main critical minerals in 2030.

 

Table 1: Mining

Top 3 producers: #1, % #2, % #3, % Copper Chile, 23% DRC, 14% Peru, 10% Lithium Australia, 33% China, 23% Chile, 12% Cobalt DRC, 66% Indonesia, 10% Russia, 3% Rare earths China, 54% Australia,18% Myanmar, 9% Nickel Indonesia, 62% Philippines, 8% New Caledonia, 6% Graphite China, 82% Madagascar, 3% Mozambique, 2%

Source: IEA

 

Table 2: Processing/Refining

Top 3 processors: #1, % #2, % #3, % Copper China, 46% DRC, 7% Chile, 5% Lithium China, 57% Chile, 15% Argentina, 13% Cobalt China, 74% Finland, 6% Japan, 4% Rare earths China, 77% Malaysia, 12% Australia, 3% Nickel Indonesia, 44% China, 21% Japan, 6% Graphite China, 93% Japan, 3% U.S. 1%

Source: IEA

Because the supply chains for these minerals are globally interlinked, a disruption at any point (mining, refining, transport, processing) can severely undercut the EU’s environmental policies enshrined in the “Green Deal”.

Needless to say, the implications for Europe’s green transition are multifold. Europe is seeking to electrify transport, scale-up renewable energy and build digitally interconnected and resilient infrastructure (e.g., smart grids). Electrification means batteries. These in turn require nickel-rich chemistries (for higher energy density), cobalt (for stability in many chemistries), and graphite or other anode materials. Because the supply chains for these minerals are globally interlinked, a disruption at any point (mining, refining, transport, processing) can severely undercut the EU’s environmental policies enshrined in the “Green Deal”. Consider, for example, the battery value chain. The extraction may be in one country, but the ore is shipped to a refining complex in another country (often China) for conversion into battery-grade materials. The high degree of downstream concentration in one geography makes the supply chain vulnerable. Further, the OECD publication “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions” shows that China and Myanmar play dominant roles in processing, separation and downstream production of magnets, alloys and components[11]. From Europe’s perspective, this means that raw-material supply risks are not confined to mining. The biggest risk lies in the “mid‐stream” and “down‐stream” segments, that is, refining, separation, processing and fabrication of value‐added materials.

Because China maintains a tight grip on these segments, Europe and other jurisdictions are exposed to strategic bottlenecks. A mining source thousands of kilometers away becomes vulnerable if the processing plant is in China or if shipments must pass through geopolitical flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific. China’s preeminence in the strategic supply chains of critical minerals affords Beijing the opportunity to weaponize trade to pursue political ends. The placement of export controls on rare earths –a textbook measure taken by China in its bid to afflict the Western economies- has caused manufacturing disruptions, driving up prices and undermining the competitiveness of domestic products.

Similar to semiconductors, critical minerals are also irreplaceable for the European Defense Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB). Critical raw materials, such as graphite, cobalt, beryllium, and germanium are needed for the production of an array of weaponry, including fighter aircrafts, tanks, missiles, torpedoes, artillery, and ammunition, military hardware in which the EU strives to attain self-sufficiency. According to a risk assessment conducted by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies[12], the supply of many of the aforementioned materials is very likely to incur disruptions due to instability or geopolitical bickering.

Military Security

The globalization of markets is what has made the Indo-Pacific indispensable to Europe’s economic security. The intensified great power competition reminiscent of Cold War era-style establishment of opposing blocks is what renders the Indo-Pacific vital to Europe’s hard security as well.

A military escalation in the Indo-Pacific, especially around Taiwan, would have immediate consequences for Europe by drawing U.S. attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic theater.

A military escalation in the Indo-Pacific, especially around Taiwan, would have immediate consequences for Europe by drawing U.S. attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic theater. If Washington were forced to reallocate strategic bandwidth to Asia, the EU would face greater pressure to shoulder the security burden on its eastern and southern flanks, where threats from Russia, instability in the Middle East, and irregular migration already test Europe’s resilience. Even without open conflict, developments in the Indo-Pacific increasingly shape Europe’s security landscape, as seen in the Ukraine war. North Korea’s provision of frontline troops and weapons to Russia, along with China’s economic lifeline that sustains Moscow’s war machine, demonstrates that actors in the Indo-Pacific can directly amplify threats to European stability.

Hybrid Threats 

Equally destabilizing for Europe are hybrid threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific region. The overseas territories of an EU powerhouse are turning into a springboard for irregular migration and organized crime. Criminal groups have established themselves[13] in the French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and the French West Indies engaging in drug trafficking, illegal fishing, gold smuggling, and arms flows as they exploit the vast exclusive economic zones where maritime surveillance is inadequate. These groups wield substantial control of international migration routes using the French territories as transit nodes for migration flows that ultimately reach Europe. Civil strife, climate change, political instability, and economic disparities in the Indo-Pacific exacerbate this trend. Once migrants enter a French territory, they are closer to gaining access to the European Union’s legal space, creating concerns that organized networks could exploit these territories as stepping-stones or “side doors” into Europe. Combined, these pressures increase border insecurity directly impacting Europe’s internal security.

This growing entanglement shows that Europe cannot compartmentalize the two regions. The Indo-Pacific is now woven into the continent’s security architecture, giving the EU undeniable “skin in the game” in preserving stability and building partnerships across the region.

Pinpointing the main hurdles 

To do so, the EU has to step up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific. In formulating its strategy for a more active engagement, Brussels should take into account the limitations it is destined to face.

…the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is not designed for distant power projection.

First, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is not designed for distant power projection. Unlike the U.S., the EU lacks forward bases, logistical capacity, and naval assets suited for sustained Indo-Pacific operations. Any European military contribution would therefore be limited to symbolic deployments, joint exercises, or capacity-building missions.

Consensus-based decision-making and domestic political fragmentation across Europe also constrain the EU’s ability to act swiftly or decisively as a whole. Some member states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, prioritize transatlantic solidarity and view China with suspicion; others, like Germany and Hungary, emphasize economic pragmatism appearing more conciliatory vis-à-vis Beijing due to their tight ties in trade and investments. Furthermore, defense spending disparities among member states hinder the formation of a unified strategic posture. So does the divergence in threat perception: Austria or Ireland might not view the threats stemming from the Indo-Pacific as immediate as they seem to France with its overseas territories or to the Baltic countries with an aggressive Russia on their borders- backed by Indo-Pacific actors.

Compounding to the constraining factors is China’s central role in European trade, which creates strong disincentives for confrontational policies.

Compounding to the constraining factors is China’s central role in European trade, which creates strong disincentives for confrontational policies. While the EU recognizes the risks of overreliance, especially after the pandemic and the Ukraine war, full-scale decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable. Consequently, the EU must pursue a policy of de-risking without disengaging, a pursuit requiring deft balancing that might sound straightforward in theory but can prove a herculean undertaking in practice even for the most experienced European bureaucrats.

Finally, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine consumes Europe’s attention and resources. Other challenges facing Europe, though, have not magically disappeared. The EU’s southern neighborhood grapples with persistent instability. Climate change, energy security, and migration pressures further stretch European capacities. In this context, sustained Indo-Pacific engagement risks being deprioritized unless directly linked to core European interests. Well-constructed and clearly communicated policy messaging on why the Indo-Pacific matters to Europe can serve in achieving the latter.

Rising to the challenge 

Despite these obstacles, Europe, both collectively and at national level, has taken some initial steps toward strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific[14] marked a watershed. It framed the region as “vital for the EU’s interests” and called for cooperation in seven areas: sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital partnerships, connectivity, security, and human security. The strategy’s ambition is evident in its breadth, yet its implementation remains uneven. Unlike the U.S., the EU lacks a hard-power footprint in the Indo-Pacific. The strategy is therefore designed around partnerships leveraging diplomacy, trade, and development tools rather than military presence. The EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defense (2022) sought to fix that. Recognizing the growing assertiveness of China in the Indo-Pacific and the strategic importance of the region to Europe, the strategic compass expanded the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs) to the Indian Ocean while calling for more joint exercises and port calls in the Indo-Pacific with the aim to strengthen the EU regional presence.[15]

Beyond the collective front some EU member states have forged their own Indo-Pacific policies, contributing to a patchwork of European engagement. France maintains territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (La Réunion, New Caledonia, French Polynesia) and a permanent military presence. It views itself as an Indo-Pacific power and a natural anchor for EU engagement. Germany adopted “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”[16] in 2020, emphasizing diversification of partnerships and a rules-based order. The Netherlands followed suit in 2020[17], focusing on trade and security cooperation. Italy and Spain are expanding defense dialogues with India, Japan, and ASEAN.

Given the vitality of the Indo-Pacific to the European economies and to the EU’s strategic autonomy writ large, the moment has come for Brussels to transform its hitherto timid engagement with the region into a vigorous and all-encompassing Indo-Pacific strategy.

Yet, coordination at the EU level remains limited. The EU Naval Mission Atalanta (operating in the western Indian Ocean) and joint exercises or port calls with partners like Japan and India represent embryonic steps toward a coherent European presence. On the other hand, initiatives, such as Global Gateway[18], promising €300 billion in sustainable investment, aim to enhance Europe’s soft power and support resilient infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. However, questions remain about financing, coordination, and visibility compared to China’s extensive network of BRI projects. Given the vitality of the Indo-Pacific to the European economies and to the EU’s strategic autonomy writ large, the moment has come for Brussels to transform its hitherto timid engagement with the region into a vigorous and all-encompassing Indo-Pacific strategy.

The following policy recommendations aim to guide European policymaking in this direction:

• Maritime security

Maritime security represents the most practical entry point for upgraded European involvement; and probably the most instrumental one. Trade routes through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean function as Europe’s economic lifelines. The EU’s dependence on maritime security in these waters ties its prosperity to the stability of these distant sea lanes. Building on operations like Atalanta and AGENOR, the EU could expand naval patrols into the broader Indo-Pacific under a new Maritime Security Compact with ASEAN and regional partners within the framework of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). It could also reinforce the EU Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs) concept in the northwestern Indian Ocean and explore its extension to the western Pacific. Similarly, it can expand joint naval drills with Indo-Pacific partners both in geographical breadth and in scope. In particular, joint exercises may be conducted in more parts of the Indo-Pacific waters, while including training in war scenarios, red teaming, and breaking of potential naval blockades of critical sea lanes. Additionally, the EU could ramp-up investments in information-sharing mechanisms and capacity-building for regional coast guards. Such measures would not only safeguard critical trade routes but also demonstrate Europe’s commitment to free navigation and to a rules-based maritime order.

• Supply chain diversification

To reduce strategic dependencies, the EU should diversify semiconductor supply chains by strengthening partnerships with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, while supporting EU domestic chip production through the European Chips Act.

To reduce strategic dependencies, the EU should diversify semiconductor supply chains by strengthening partnerships with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, while supporting EU domestic chip production through the European Chips Act. Developing critical minerals partnerships with Indonesia, Australia, and India under transparent environmental and labor standards could also go a long way in feeding into Europe’s image as a global leader in sustainable development, while buttressing the diversification of the continent’s supply chains. A credible economic footprint would reinforce Europe’s relevance and complement its security engagement.

• Multilateralism and Diplomacy

Europe’s comparative advantage still lies in norm-setting and diplomacy. The EU should try to act as a mediating voice in U.S.-China tensions, emphasizing international law and open trade, while fostering regional crisis prevention initiatives, including confidence-building measures in the South China Sea. Regarding ASEAN, the EU may institutionalize the EU-ASEAN strategic dialogue with a permanent secretariat-level mechanism and build on the EU-ASEAN strategic partnership to revive sincere talks on a region-to-region free trade agreement, which will enhance integration and mutual economic resilience. Further, the EU would do well to upgrade the current format of talks from a ministerial to heads-of-state level dialogue. Such diplomatic activism would underscore Europe’s role as a stabilizing actor rather than a partisan power.

• Selected Bilateral Partnerships

The EU should deepen cooperation with established partners (Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea) and initiate partnerships with others through joint exercises, technology synergies, and joint research in critical technologies and cybersecurity. Triangular cooperation (e.g., EU-Japan-ASEAN infrastructure projects) could amplify impact while sharing burdens. A more robust presence would also send a message to China and North Korea that Europe is not a passive spectator of the latter’s intercontinental interference on Russia’s side in Ukraine. Rather, it will show that Europe can bring the competition to their own neighborhood, reinforcing its bargaining position. By strengthening the capacities of their own regional rivals while keeping channels of communication open, the EU can plausibly have a shot at persuading China and North Korea to dial down support to Moscow switching to a bold, but calculated, sticks-and-carrots approach.

• Leveraging NATO

While the EU should avoid duplicating NATO’s structures, closer coordination can align transatlantic and Indo-Pacific strategies. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept[19] already recognizes China as a systemic challenge. European contributions to Indo-Pacific security can thus complement, rather than compete with, Alliance objectives. For instance, enhanced interoperability between EU naval deployments and NATO partners in the region, along with coordinated sanctions and export-control regimes, can further reinforce collective deterrence.

Conclusion

The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a key node along the chain of the core European interests. Although pressing issues in its immediate neighborhood would not allow the EU to realize a “pivot to Asia” akin to that professed by the Obama administration back in 2011, the EU leadership would do well to formulate a holistic Indo-Pacific policy in its quest for strategic autonomy. Europe’s economic security largely rests upon intricate supply chains of strategic commodities, such as semiconductors and critical minerals. With upstream and downstream segments of these supply chains concentrated in Southeast Asia and even dominated by China, Europe is vulnerable to trade bottlenecks that can cause unmanageable setbacks in EU’s industrial production, green transition, and defense innovation. From a military perspective, the direct and indirect support of certain Indo-Pacific countries to Russia -namely North Korea and China- has laid bare the interconnectedness of the strategic theaters spanning the Eurasian supercontinent, while the Sino-American rivalry, if not tempered, risks to divert Washington’s resources away from Europe leaving the latter exposed to multiple threats. Expanding on the already existing cooperation mechanisms with Indo-Pacific countries and harnessing its central role in global diplomacy and multilateralism, the EU must prop-up its engagement in the region in its bid to safeguard the aforementioned interests. Coordination with NATO is also essential as the two distinct alliances work closely to achieve common goals in the Indo-Pacific complementing each other rather than going circles in an unproductive overlapping. Structural and systemic limitations may hinder deeper involvement, but the EU has the ability to navigate constraints to the degree that its Indo-Pacific engagement does not raise the risks of accentuating intra-EU divisions or exacerbating geopolitical tensions that might bring the region to the precipice of an armed confrontation.

[1] U.S. Department of State,” Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021–2025)”, 2021–2025, accessed November 2, 2025, https://2021-2025.state.gov/indo-pacific-strategy/.

[2] European External Action Service, “The EU Approach to the Indo-Pacific”, June 3, 2021, European External Action Service, accessed November 2, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-approach-indo-pacific_en.

[3] European Parliament, “EU – Indo-Pacific Trade Relations (Hearing, INTA, 1 September 2022),” European Parliament Think Tank, September 1, 2022, accessed November 2, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/events/details/eu-indo-pacific-trade-relations-/20220715CHE10501.

[4] Glenn Burm, “Semiconductor and beyond: Global Semiconductor Industry Outlook 2026”, PwC, 2025, 11–14, accessed November 10, 2025, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/technology/pwc-semiconductor-and-beyond-2026-full-report.pdf.

[5] Ibid. 16–20

[6] Sujai Shivakumar and Charles W. Wessner, “Semiconductors and National Defense: What Are the Stakes?” CSIS Commentary, June 8, 2022, accessed November 10, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/semiconductors-and-national-defense-what-are-stakes. csis.org.

[7] David Sacks and Seaton Huang, “Onshoring Semiconductor Production: National Security Versus Economic Efficiency.” Council on Foreign Relations, September 27, 2022. Accessed November 10, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/article/onshoring-semiconductor-production-national-security-versus-economic-efficiency. Council on Foreign Relations.

[8] Elvire Fabry, “A looming war for minerals?”, Jacques Delors Institute, April 2023, Accessed 23 November, 2025 https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/la-guerre-des-minerais-aura-t-elle-lieu-2/.

[9] Melissa Pistilli, “Top 9 Nickel-producing Countries”, INN, June 04, 2025, Accessed 23 November, 2025 https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing/base-metals-investing/nickel-investing/top-nickel-producing-countries/

[10]IGF on Mining, Minerals, Metals, and Sustainable Development, “The ASEAN Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply Chains”, ASEAN-IGF Minerals Cooperation, May 2023.

[11] OECD, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, May 14, 2021.

[12] Benedetta Girardi, Irina Patrahau, Giovanni Cisco, and Michel Rademaker. 2023. Strategic Raw Materials for Defence: Mapping European Industry Needs. January, 2023.

[13] Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN), “Revue Nationale Stratégique 2025”, Paris, 2025, p.20.

[14] European Commission & European External Action Service. “Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo‑Pacific” JOIN(2021) 24 final. Brussels, September 16, 2021.

[15] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense”, 21 March, 2022.

[16] Federal Foreign Office (Germany), “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”, Germany–Europe–Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together”, Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 2020.

[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia”, Government of Netherlands, 13 November 2020.

[18] European Commission and European External Action Service, “Global Gateway: European Union Strategy for Sustainable Global Connectivity”, Brussels, 2021.

[19] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29 June 2022

 

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U.S. Department of State. Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021–2025). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2021.

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European Parliament. EU – Indo-Pacific Trade Relations (Hearing, INTA, 1 September 2022). Brussels: European Parliament Think Tank, 2022.

Burm, Glenn. Semiconductor and Beyond: Global Semiconductor Industry Outlook 2026. PwC, 2025.

Shivakumar, Sujai, and Charles W. Wessner. Semiconductors and National Defense: What Are the Stakes? CSIS Commentary. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022.

Sacks, David, and Seaton Huang. Onshoring Semiconductor Production: National Security Versus Economic Efficiency, Council on Foreign Relations, 2022.

Fabry, Elvire. A Looming War for Minerals? Jacques Delors Institute, April 2023.

Pistilli, Melissa. Top 9 Nickel-Producing Countries. INN (Investing News Network), June 4, 2025.

Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF). The ASEAN Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply Chains. ASEAN–IGF Minerals Cooperation. May 2023.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2021.

European Commission and European External Action Service. Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. *JOIN(2021) 24 final. Brussels, September 16, 2021.

Federal Foreign Office (Germany). Germany–Europe–Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together. Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific. Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 2020.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands). Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia. The Hague: Government of the Netherlands, November 13, 2020.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29 June 2022.

Girardi, Benedetta, Patrahau Irina, Ciscon Giovanni, and Rademaker Michel. Strategic Raw Materials for Defence: Mapping European Industry Needs. January 2023.

Council of the European Union.  A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense, 21 March 2022.

Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN). Revue Nationale Stratégique 2025. Paris 2025.

Informelle, plurilaterale Formate fungieren zunehmend als flexible Arenen für Koordination im internationalen System, erzeugen jedoch zugleich konkurrierende Governance-Strukturen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Rolle der Europäischen Union in G7 und G20 untersucht. Anhand der G7-Präsidentschaft Italiens 2024 und des G20-Vorsitzes Brasiliens zeigt der Beitrag, wie unterschiedlich beide Foren mit geopolitischen Konflikten umgehen. Die G7 erzielte substanzielle Ergebnisse zur Ukraine, offenbarte jedoch interne Spannungen etwa im Umgang mit dem Gaza-Krieg. Die G20 fokussierte stärker auf Entwicklungs-, Armuts- und Reformfragen globaler Institutionen, vermied jedoch klare Schuldzuweisungen in aktuellen Konflikten. Der Artikel verdeutlicht, dass die EU ihre multilaterale Strategie anpassen muss: Durch aktive Mitgestaltung informeller Foren, differenzierte Rollenwahrnehmung in G7 und G20 sowie den Ausbau strategischer Partnerschaften mit Schwellenländern. Trotz begrenzter Durchsetzungsmacht leistet die EU so relevante Beiträge zur Weiterentwicklung globaler Governance in einer sich wandelnden Weltordnung.

Informelle, plurilaterale Formate fungieren zunehmend als flexible Arenen für Koordination im internationalen System, erzeugen jedoch zugleich konkurrierende Governance-Strukturen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Rolle der Europäischen Union in G7 und G20 untersucht. Anhand der G7-Präsidentschaft Italiens 2024 und des G20-Vorsitzes Brasiliens zeigt der Beitrag, wie unterschiedlich beide Foren mit geopolitischen Konflikten umgehen. Die G7 erzielte substanzielle Ergebnisse zur Ukraine, offenbarte jedoch interne Spannungen etwa im Umgang mit dem Gaza-Krieg. Die G20 fokussierte stärker auf Entwicklungs-, Armuts- und Reformfragen globaler Institutionen, vermied jedoch klare Schuldzuweisungen in aktuellen Konflikten. Der Artikel verdeutlicht, dass die EU ihre multilaterale Strategie anpassen muss: Durch aktive Mitgestaltung informeller Foren, differenzierte Rollenwahrnehmung in G7 und G20 sowie den Ausbau strategischer Partnerschaften mit Schwellenländern. Trotz begrenzter Durchsetzungsmacht leistet die EU so relevante Beiträge zur Weiterentwicklung globaler Governance in einer sich wandelnden Weltordnung.

Informelle, plurilaterale Formate fungieren zunehmend als flexible Arenen für Koordination im internationalen System, erzeugen jedoch zugleich konkurrierende Governance-Strukturen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Rolle der Europäischen Union in G7 und G20 untersucht. Anhand der G7-Präsidentschaft Italiens 2024 und des G20-Vorsitzes Brasiliens zeigt der Beitrag, wie unterschiedlich beide Foren mit geopolitischen Konflikten umgehen. Die G7 erzielte substanzielle Ergebnisse zur Ukraine, offenbarte jedoch interne Spannungen etwa im Umgang mit dem Gaza-Krieg. Die G20 fokussierte stärker auf Entwicklungs-, Armuts- und Reformfragen globaler Institutionen, vermied jedoch klare Schuldzuweisungen in aktuellen Konflikten. Der Artikel verdeutlicht, dass die EU ihre multilaterale Strategie anpassen muss: Durch aktive Mitgestaltung informeller Foren, differenzierte Rollenwahrnehmung in G7 und G20 sowie den Ausbau strategischer Partnerschaften mit Schwellenländern. Trotz begrenzter Durchsetzungsmacht leistet die EU so relevante Beiträge zur Weiterentwicklung globaler Governance in einer sich wandelnden Weltordnung.

On the occasion of the recent full-day series of discussions on the evolving role of Europe as a space power, organized by ELIAMEP in collaboration with the Bertelsmann Foundation and Bertelsmann Stiftung Niki Karamanli, Defence & Security Researcher, AS Prote Maritime Ltd; Dimitris Kollias, ELIAMEP Research Fellow; Leopold Schmertzing, Non-Resident Fellow on Strategic Foresight, ELIAMEP and Varvara Vasilaki, Head of Technology Transfer Office & Programme Manager, Greek NATO DIANA Accelerator Site, NCSR ‘Demokritos’ assess how great-power competition, the commercialization of space, and European strategic priorities will shape the future of Europe as a space power. 

Niki Karamanli, Defence & Security Researcher, AS Prote Maritime Ltd

In an international system undergoing rapid transformation, with the New World Order once again in flux, the space race is intensifying and re-emerging as a critical instrument of power, influence, and strategic competition. The geopolitical landscape of space is increasingly defined by competition between established actors, such as the USA and Russia, and rising powers including China, India and Japan – states that could potentially function both as partners and as competitors for the European Union in exploration, technological development, and commercial exploitation. Yet within the accelerating contest, Europe risks falling short of securing a leading position.

Space has become a central arena of geopolitical and economic competition, shaping EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy amid an increasingly contested global environment. Looking toward 2050, foresight points to a future in which space is highly probable to evolve as a battlefield marked by militarization and anti-satellite capabilities. Great power competition in space has re-politicised space as a domain of power, deterrence, and influence. For Europe this raises a fundamental challenge as regard to whether it remains a largely civilian and normative space actor, or whether strategic autonomy pushes it toward greater security and defence integration in space. Considering that the future operating environment is likely to be more contested, congested, and competitive, making resilience and protection of space assets central concerns seem to be a one-way road for Europe.

Therefore, it is safe to argue that it is the navigation of these uncertainties by shaping a set of interlinked strategic priorities constitute Europe’s strategic challenge. Specifically, technological sovereignty is essential to reduce structural dependencies on non-European launch systems, components, hardware, data infrastructure, especially as space becomes gradually more security-critical. Closely linked to this is also strategic autonomy, which requires Europe not only to access space independently, but to retain decision-making control over critical space service in dual-use and civilian contexts as well. However, to achieve this demands leaner governance and faster decision-making cycles, as current excessive bureaucracy and fragmented institutional processes continue to delay innovation and weaken Europe’s competitiveness vis-à-vis more agile global actors.

At the same time, increased and more targeted investment is needed to scale European space companies and bridge the gap between research, demonstration, and commercial deployment. It is vital for policies to prioritise strengthening the internal European space market, enabling public procurement of innovation, and cross-border collaboration between industry, startups, and research institutions. Supporting resilient and secure supply chain across space technological ecosystems from launch and manufacturing to data and downstream applications will be critical to mitigating geopolitical and economic risks.

As space re-emerges as a key domain of power, security and technological influence, Europe finds itself at a strategic crossroads. Without greater coherence and long-term commitment, the Union risks remaining a spectator in a contest that will shape the future distribution of power in the international system and as the German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has cautioned, space will indeed be Europe’s Achilles heel.

Dimitris Kollias, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

Great-power competition is turning space into a decisive theatre of hard security. The US, China and Russia are developing military and counterspace capabilities, while the war in Ukraine has shown how cyber-attacks on satellites and dependence on foreign commercial constellations can directly shape outcomes on the ground. For the EU, this means that space capabilities and active participation in the space arena are not a luxury but arguably the last chance to build the foundations of strategic autonomy, in what is the next (and probably, literally, final) frontier.

Space commercialisation sharpens this imperative. NewSpace constellations have provided services that Europe could not rapidly supply itself, but they also lock Europeans into strategic dependence on non-EU operators and launchers. In Ukraine, battlefield connectivity and intelligence were influenced not only by national alliances but also by the inclinations of tech executives in California boardrooms. This illustrates a “technopolar age” in which corporate infrastructures wield quasi-sovereign power. The Union’s emerging answer (Galileo and Copernicus, the secure connectivity constellation IRIS², EU Space Surveillance and Tracking, and ESA’s European Resilience from Space) sketches the core of a defence-relevant, dual-use “system of systems” underpinned by an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence and a prospective EU Space Act.

The real question is integration. Space is geopolitically and geoeconomically bigger than any member state, yet defence remains nationally guarded. Precisely here lies the opportunity: unlike many defence projects, Europe’s space programmes have a history of close cooperation, technical success and very little “bad blood”. If the EU can use this record to move from fragmented assets to an integrated preparedness architecture, space could become the catalyst that finally aligns industrial policy, defence planning and regulation, and with it, Europe’s last realistic window to shape its own strategic destiny.

Leopold Schmertzing, Non-Resident Fellow on Strategic Foresight, ELIAMEP

From my vantage point as a security, defence, and foresight analyst with a keen interest in space, Europe’s role as a space power will be decided by the outcome of two key uncertainties.

The first uncertainty is external. The easiest way to push Europe into becoming a space power would be external attempts to intimidate and isolate it.

If the United States continues to diverge politically and culturally from Europe to a point where Europeans can no longer assume reliable access to U.S. military space assets and launch capabilities, Europe will have little choice but to accelerate its own. Existing “complementary” programmes would need to be transformed into stand-alone systems capable of operating without transatlantic backstopping.

A similar logic applies to Russia and China. While scenarios involving internal collapse or democratic transformation are theoretically possible, they remain highly unlikely. A more plausible trajectory would be continued totalitarian radicalisation. In such a scenario, Europe would face sustained competition in space with actors that possess significant technological capabilities and, in some areas, knowledge advantages.

The second uncertainty is internal. Europe’s ability to act depends on whether it can overcome its deeply fragmented defence and space sectors. Both remain highly nationalised, closely tied to sovereignty, prestige, and domestic industrial bases. As a result, rising demand tends to produce higher prices and duplication rather than scale and output.

Europe does not need to replicate the U.S. model exemplified by SpaceX, nor China’s state-centric approach. In principle, it could build competitive capability through coordinated ecosystems of startups, SMEs, and prime contractors; producing in many places at once while acting strategically as integrated alliances. This path, however, requires politically difficult choices like pooling sovereignty and prioritising collective capability over national visibility.

Varvara Vassilaki, Head of Technology Transfer Office & Programme Manager, Greek NATO DIANA Accelerator Site, NCSR ‘Demokritos’

Europe’s future as a space power will be shaped by its capacity to translate scientific excellence and frontier technologies into deployable, scalable capabilities. Great-power competition is accelerating innovation in sensing, communications, autonomy, cybersecurity, and advanced materials — domains with inherently dual-use potential. In this context, preserving strategic autonomy and ensuring resilient access to critical technologies will strengthen Europe’s position in an increasingly competitive global landscape.

At the same time, the rapid commercialisation of space is transforming how innovation reaches end users. Deep-tech start-ups now play a central role in launch services, satellite systems, advanced components, and in-orbit operations. Test centres and experimentation facilities — including those embedded in research organisations — are becoming essential enablers, providing realistic environments where new technologies can be validated and demonstrated. Europe can further unlock this potential through mission-driven funding instruments and dual-use innovation pipelines such as the European Union Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS) and the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). These initiatives illustrate how structured programmes, combined with access to trusted testing and evaluation facilities, can support the transition of promising technologies from research to deployable capabilities.

Europe’s strategic priorities — secure connectivity, space situational awareness, resilient supply chains, climate monitoring, and defence preparedness — call for continued coordination and sustained investment. By fostering an enabling environment that empowers research centres, innovators, test facilities, and industrial partners to scale deep technologies effectively, Europe can reinforce its leadership and actively shape the evolution of the global space ecosystem. Europe’s commitment to excellence, collaboration, and innovation will be a defining factor in its trajectory as a space power.

A survey of employees in Germany, France and Poland found that while there is political goodwill toward climate efforts, vulnerable groups fear they are going to lose out from the transformation

Sealing the agreement would be a test of the "European Union's ability to act", Merz said ahead of a key EU summit, after France and Italy demanded more time to sign off on the deal

Club governance formats were meant to work around blockages and challenges in the multilateral system. In a system under pressure, these have become more important. Simultaneously, they become embattled themselves in a political climate that has become more ruthless. Just after its presidence, South Africa has declared it would ”pause” its engagement in the G20 for 2026 after intense bullying by the US President. Yet, the existence of the G20 is based on the recognition that (financial) crisis of global scale require close cooperation among countries across the globe, going beyond the G7. That fact remains valid. The G20 is a collection of key countries that have to engage with each other – and that Europe has to engage with – to push for solutions for global challenges. Yet, polarisations are making G20 presidencies increasingly challenging. How did the last four “Southern” presidencies – Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa – navigate the increasingly choppy waters? And which elements can we distil from deliberations as communalities?

Club governance formats were meant to work around blockages and challenges in the multilateral system. In a system under pressure, these have become more important. Simultaneously, they become embattled themselves in a political climate that has become more ruthless. Just after its presidence, South Africa has declared it would ”pause” its engagement in the G20 for 2026 after intense bullying by the US President. Yet, the existence of the G20 is based on the recognition that (financial) crisis of global scale require close cooperation among countries across the globe, going beyond the G7. That fact remains valid. The G20 is a collection of key countries that have to engage with each other – and that Europe has to engage with – to push for solutions for global challenges. Yet, polarisations are making G20 presidencies increasingly challenging. How did the last four “Southern” presidencies – Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa – navigate the increasingly choppy waters? And which elements can we distil from deliberations as communalities?

Club governance formats were meant to work around blockages and challenges in the multilateral system. In a system under pressure, these have become more important. Simultaneously, they become embattled themselves in a political climate that has become more ruthless. Just after its presidence, South Africa has declared it would ”pause” its engagement in the G20 for 2026 after intense bullying by the US President. Yet, the existence of the G20 is based on the recognition that (financial) crisis of global scale require close cooperation among countries across the globe, going beyond the G7. That fact remains valid. The G20 is a collection of key countries that have to engage with each other – and that Europe has to engage with – to push for solutions for global challenges. Yet, polarisations are making G20 presidencies increasingly challenging. How did the last four “Southern” presidencies – Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa – navigate the increasingly choppy waters? And which elements can we distil from deliberations as communalities?

Foreign aid is an important component of international economic exchange and has historically been a central topic in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This phenomenon prompts fundamental questions regarding the motivations behind states’ allocation of resources beyond their national borders and the processes by which donor preferences are shaped at the nexus of power, interests, and ideas. Conventional IR theories concur on the premise that aid is inherently political. Subsequent scholarship has expanded upon this foundation, examining a broad range of systemic and domestic determinants of aid, emphasising how state interests, institutions, and the political economy of donors influence aid allocation. This article provides an overview of the extant literature, including pertinent debates, and presents significant advances in the field of the international political economy of aid. It also highlights how recent geopolitical shifts challenge conventional understandings of aid and concludes by proposing a reversal of the classic question for future research—from why states give aid to why they are increasingly reluctant to do so.

Foreign aid is an important component of international economic exchange and has historically been a central topic in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This phenomenon prompts fundamental questions regarding the motivations behind states’ allocation of resources beyond their national borders and the processes by which donor preferences are shaped at the nexus of power, interests, and ideas. Conventional IR theories concur on the premise that aid is inherently political. Subsequent scholarship has expanded upon this foundation, examining a broad range of systemic and domestic determinants of aid, emphasising how state interests, institutions, and the political economy of donors influence aid allocation. This article provides an overview of the extant literature, including pertinent debates, and presents significant advances in the field of the international political economy of aid. It also highlights how recent geopolitical shifts challenge conventional understandings of aid and concludes by proposing a reversal of the classic question for future research—from why states give aid to why they are increasingly reluctant to do so.

Foreign aid is an important component of international economic exchange and has historically been a central topic in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This phenomenon prompts fundamental questions regarding the motivations behind states’ allocation of resources beyond their national borders and the processes by which donor preferences are shaped at the nexus of power, interests, and ideas. Conventional IR theories concur on the premise that aid is inherently political. Subsequent scholarship has expanded upon this foundation, examining a broad range of systemic and domestic determinants of aid, emphasising how state interests, institutions, and the political economy of donors influence aid allocation. This article provides an overview of the extant literature, including pertinent debates, and presents significant advances in the field of the international political economy of aid. It also highlights how recent geopolitical shifts challenge conventional understandings of aid and concludes by proposing a reversal of the classic question for future research—from why states give aid to why they are increasingly reluctant to do so.