Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Wie gut kennst du die Finnen in der National League? Beweise es im Quiz.

Planned relocation, the process of moving a community from one area of residence to a new one in response to an environmental risk or threat, is an important option for climate change adaptation. Given the acute climate and environmental risks facing them, small island developing states (SIDS) have taken a leading role in developing policies and processes for planned relocation in response to these risks. This policy brief will look at how planned relocation works as an adaptation strategy in informal urban settlements and will examine the role of social cohesion in planned relocation processes. Fiji has become a regional leader in planned relocation policy, with the Human Mobility in Climate Change Contexts (HMCCC) project serving as a magnifier of Fiji’s existing expertise in planned relocation. Since 2017, the Fijian government and civil society in cooperation with the German and New Zealand governments have developed planned relocation standard operating procedures (SOPs) for helping villages in high-risk areas navigate the physical, cultural, social and economic costs of relocating to higher ground or a safer location. These SOPs have become a “gold standard” for other countries to learn from and emulate in their own planned relocation policies. 
The next step that the government is starting to undertake involves adapting the SOPs to informal urban settle­ments that are facing climate and environ­mental risks. Fiji’s informal urban settlements have faced a number of social, political and eco­nomic challenges over the years. These include serious issues with crime, land insecurity and historical political exclusion. Thus, along with the threats that come with climate change, particularly sea-level rise and flooding, any planned relocation policy for informal urban settlements has to simultaneously address trust in institutions, cooperation for the common good, and inclusive identity. The historical case of the Bainiose being relocated from central Suva to a suburb of Suva in the late 1990s offers guidance on how this can be done. 

Key policy messages

• Planned relocation for communities in urban settings requires long-term planning for services such as new public transportation connections, schools, secure land tenure and health facilities.
• Measures should be taken to build institutional trust with urban com­munities, who may lack the traditional mechanisms of chiefly or customary representa­tion that is present in rural settings.
• Community identity is often strong and can be a starting point for policy-makers and communities to identify sustainable options for relocation.

Dr Anawaite Matadradra is a Lecturer at the University of the South Pacific.
Dr Sevanaia Sakai is a Senior Lecturer at the University of the South Pacific.
Unaisi Raileqe is a Project Officer at the Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding.
Dr Timothy Fadgen is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Auckland.

Planned relocation, the process of moving a community from one area of residence to a new one in response to an environmental risk or threat, is an important option for climate change adaptation. Given the acute climate and environmental risks facing them, small island developing states (SIDS) have taken a leading role in developing policies and processes for planned relocation in response to these risks. This policy brief will look at how planned relocation works as an adaptation strategy in informal urban settlements and will examine the role of social cohesion in planned relocation processes. Fiji has become a regional leader in planned relocation policy, with the Human Mobility in Climate Change Contexts (HMCCC) project serving as a magnifier of Fiji’s existing expertise in planned relocation. Since 2017, the Fijian government and civil society in cooperation with the German and New Zealand governments have developed planned relocation standard operating procedures (SOPs) for helping villages in high-risk areas navigate the physical, cultural, social and economic costs of relocating to higher ground or a safer location. These SOPs have become a “gold standard” for other countries to learn from and emulate in their own planned relocation policies. 
The next step that the government is starting to undertake involves adapting the SOPs to informal urban settle­ments that are facing climate and environ­mental risks. Fiji’s informal urban settlements have faced a number of social, political and eco­nomic challenges over the years. These include serious issues with crime, land insecurity and historical political exclusion. Thus, along with the threats that come with climate change, particularly sea-level rise and flooding, any planned relocation policy for informal urban settlements has to simultaneously address trust in institutions, cooperation for the common good, and inclusive identity. The historical case of the Bainiose being relocated from central Suva to a suburb of Suva in the late 1990s offers guidance on how this can be done. 

Key policy messages

• Planned relocation for communities in urban settings requires long-term planning for services such as new public transportation connections, schools, secure land tenure and health facilities.
• Measures should be taken to build institutional trust with urban com­munities, who may lack the traditional mechanisms of chiefly or customary representa­tion that is present in rural settings.
• Community identity is often strong and can be a starting point for policy-makers and communities to identify sustainable options for relocation.

Dr Anawaite Matadradra is a Lecturer at the University of the South Pacific.
Dr Sevanaia Sakai is a Senior Lecturer at the University of the South Pacific.
Unaisi Raileqe is a Project Officer at the Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding.
Dr Timothy Fadgen is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Auckland.

Planned relocation, the process of moving a community from one area of residence to a new one in response to an environmental risk or threat, is an important option for climate change adaptation. Given the acute climate and environmental risks facing them, small island developing states (SIDS) have taken a leading role in developing policies and processes for planned relocation in response to these risks. This policy brief will look at how planned relocation works as an adaptation strategy in informal urban settlements and will examine the role of social cohesion in planned relocation processes. Fiji has become a regional leader in planned relocation policy, with the Human Mobility in Climate Change Contexts (HMCCC) project serving as a magnifier of Fiji’s existing expertise in planned relocation. Since 2017, the Fijian government and civil society in cooperation with the German and New Zealand governments have developed planned relocation standard operating procedures (SOPs) for helping villages in high-risk areas navigate the physical, cultural, social and economic costs of relocating to higher ground or a safer location. These SOPs have become a “gold standard” for other countries to learn from and emulate in their own planned relocation policies. 
The next step that the government is starting to undertake involves adapting the SOPs to informal urban settle­ments that are facing climate and environ­mental risks. Fiji’s informal urban settlements have faced a number of social, political and eco­nomic challenges over the years. These include serious issues with crime, land insecurity and historical political exclusion. Thus, along with the threats that come with climate change, particularly sea-level rise and flooding, any planned relocation policy for informal urban settlements has to simultaneously address trust in institutions, cooperation for the common good, and inclusive identity. The historical case of the Bainiose being relocated from central Suva to a suburb of Suva in the late 1990s offers guidance on how this can be done. 

Key policy messages

• Planned relocation for communities in urban settings requires long-term planning for services such as new public transportation connections, schools, secure land tenure and health facilities.
• Measures should be taken to build institutional trust with urban com­munities, who may lack the traditional mechanisms of chiefly or customary representa­tion that is present in rural settings.
• Community identity is often strong and can be a starting point for policy-makers and communities to identify sustainable options for relocation.

Dr Anawaite Matadradra is a Lecturer at the University of the South Pacific.
Dr Sevanaia Sakai is a Senior Lecturer at the University of the South Pacific.
Unaisi Raileqe is a Project Officer at the Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding.
Dr Timothy Fadgen is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Auckland.

This paper examines how additional private financial resources can be mobilised through the use of multilateral development bank (MDB) funds. It focuses on identifying the leverage potential of different financing instruments, improving their mobilisation efficiency, and examining how greater leverage can promote development outcomes while safeguarding the financial sustainability of MDBs. Its contribution is a comparative synthesis that brings together mobilisation mechanisms, differences in the public resources and risks underlying leverage ratios, and development impact. The analysis covers six categories: debt instruments, equity instruments, risk-transfer instruments, guarantees, advisory services and policy-based lending. It compares their characteristics, including the level of intervention, mobilisation mechanisms, constraints addressed and time horizons. It also distinguishes transaction-level private direct and indirect mobilisation from broader catalytic effects arising through market development, institutional strengthening and policy reforms.
The comparison shows why instruments cannot be assessed by a single leverage ratio. MDB lending, guarantee exposure and expenditure on advisory services represent different commitments of public resources and risk. Similarly, private finance linked to a transaction cannot be measured in the same way as subsequent investment enabled by policy reform. Available evidence therefore indicates differences in mobilisation potential rather than an established empirical ranking of instruments. The paper argues that leveraging efficiency can be increased by moving to more powerful approaches and by better targeting instruments to binding investment constraints. It examines how this can enhance the development impact and financial viability of MDB/DFI portfolios through two channels: a financial/portfolio efficiency channel and a development/catalytic channel. However, a high leverage ratio does not necessarily indicate superior performance. It may reflect investment in easier markets, weak additionality or an understatement of public risk. Conversely, a lower ratio may be consistent with greater additionality in a fragile market or pioneering sector. These findings highlight the importance of assessing leverage alongside additionality, development impact and financial sustainability. Using concessional funds through blended finance instruments can be costly and can reduce the resources available for other development priorities.
Therefore, the development finance institutions (DFIs) must strictly apply the additionality principle and further operationalise the principle of using minimum concessionality. If interpreted too generously, there is a risk of creating leverage without sufficient development impact. The paper provides specific recommendations for refining the use of financing instruments and integrating transaction-level support into a broader market-shaping approach that draws on the strengths of policy-based lending and technical assistance. Higher leverage should not be pursued as an end in itself; its value depends on its contribution to additional development impact.

Dr Jürgen Karl Zattler is a distinguished non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC and a non-resident research fellow at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn. Until October 2023, he was Director General at the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Prior to that, he served as the Executive Director representing Germany at the World Bank.

This paper examines how additional private financial resources can be mobilised through the use of multilateral development bank (MDB) funds. It focuses on identifying the leverage potential of different financing instruments, improving their mobilisation efficiency, and examining how greater leverage can promote development outcomes while safeguarding the financial sustainability of MDBs. Its contribution is a comparative synthesis that brings together mobilisation mechanisms, differences in the public resources and risks underlying leverage ratios, and development impact. The analysis covers six categories: debt instruments, equity instruments, risk-transfer instruments, guarantees, advisory services and policy-based lending. It compares their characteristics, including the level of intervention, mobilisation mechanisms, constraints addressed and time horizons. It also distinguishes transaction-level private direct and indirect mobilisation from broader catalytic effects arising through market development, institutional strengthening and policy reforms.
The comparison shows why instruments cannot be assessed by a single leverage ratio. MDB lending, guarantee exposure and expenditure on advisory services represent different commitments of public resources and risk. Similarly, private finance linked to a transaction cannot be measured in the same way as subsequent investment enabled by policy reform. Available evidence therefore indicates differences in mobilisation potential rather than an established empirical ranking of instruments. The paper argues that leveraging efficiency can be increased by moving to more powerful approaches and by better targeting instruments to binding investment constraints. It examines how this can enhance the development impact and financial viability of MDB/DFI portfolios through two channels: a financial/portfolio efficiency channel and a development/catalytic channel. However, a high leverage ratio does not necessarily indicate superior performance. It may reflect investment in easier markets, weak additionality or an understatement of public risk. Conversely, a lower ratio may be consistent with greater additionality in a fragile market or pioneering sector. These findings highlight the importance of assessing leverage alongside additionality, development impact and financial sustainability. Using concessional funds through blended finance instruments can be costly and can reduce the resources available for other development priorities.
Therefore, the development finance institutions (DFIs) must strictly apply the additionality principle and further operationalise the principle of using minimum concessionality. If interpreted too generously, there is a risk of creating leverage without sufficient development impact. The paper provides specific recommendations for refining the use of financing instruments and integrating transaction-level support into a broader market-shaping approach that draws on the strengths of policy-based lending and technical assistance. Higher leverage should not be pursued as an end in itself; its value depends on its contribution to additional development impact.

Dr Jürgen Karl Zattler is a distinguished non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC and a non-resident research fellow at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn. Until October 2023, he was Director General at the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Prior to that, he served as the Executive Director representing Germany at the World Bank.

This paper examines how additional private financial resources can be mobilised through the use of multilateral development bank (MDB) funds. It focuses on identifying the leverage potential of different financing instruments, improving their mobilisation efficiency, and examining how greater leverage can promote development outcomes while safeguarding the financial sustainability of MDBs. Its contribution is a comparative synthesis that brings together mobilisation mechanisms, differences in the public resources and risks underlying leverage ratios, and development impact. The analysis covers six categories: debt instruments, equity instruments, risk-transfer instruments, guarantees, advisory services and policy-based lending. It compares their characteristics, including the level of intervention, mobilisation mechanisms, constraints addressed and time horizons. It also distinguishes transaction-level private direct and indirect mobilisation from broader catalytic effects arising through market development, institutional strengthening and policy reforms.
The comparison shows why instruments cannot be assessed by a single leverage ratio. MDB lending, guarantee exposure and expenditure on advisory services represent different commitments of public resources and risk. Similarly, private finance linked to a transaction cannot be measured in the same way as subsequent investment enabled by policy reform. Available evidence therefore indicates differences in mobilisation potential rather than an established empirical ranking of instruments. The paper argues that leveraging efficiency can be increased by moving to more powerful approaches and by better targeting instruments to binding investment constraints. It examines how this can enhance the development impact and financial viability of MDB/DFI portfolios through two channels: a financial/portfolio efficiency channel and a development/catalytic channel. However, a high leverage ratio does not necessarily indicate superior performance. It may reflect investment in easier markets, weak additionality or an understatement of public risk. Conversely, a lower ratio may be consistent with greater additionality in a fragile market or pioneering sector. These findings highlight the importance of assessing leverage alongside additionality, development impact and financial sustainability. Using concessional funds through blended finance instruments can be costly and can reduce the resources available for other development priorities.
Therefore, the development finance institutions (DFIs) must strictly apply the additionality principle and further operationalise the principle of using minimum concessionality. If interpreted too generously, there is a risk of creating leverage without sufficient development impact. The paper provides specific recommendations for refining the use of financing instruments and integrating transaction-level support into a broader market-shaping approach that draws on the strengths of policy-based lending and technical assistance. Higher leverage should not be pursued as an end in itself; its value depends on its contribution to additional development impact.

Dr Jürgen Karl Zattler is a distinguished non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC and a non-resident research fellow at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn. Until October 2023, he was Director General at the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Prior to that, he served as the Executive Director representing Germany at the World Bank.

Die Regierung will das Finanzloch der Pflegeversicherung durch höhere Beiträge stopfen. Dabei gäbe es gerechtere Wege – echte Solidarität und hohe Vermögen ranziehen., Die Reform der gesetzlichen Pflegeversicherung ist dringend notwendig: Die Zahl der Pflegebedürftigen in Deutschland hat sich in den vergangenen 20 Jahren auf inzwischen mehr als sechs Millionen Menschen verdreifacht. Ohne Gegenmaßnahmen droht der Pflegeversicherung bereits 2028 eine ...

Bonn, 12. Oktober 2026. Angesichts rückläufiger öffentlicher Entwicklungshilfe müssen Entwicklungspartner die Finanzierung und den Kapazitätsaufbau nationaler Entwicklungsbanken vorantreiben und gleichzeitig deren Unabhängigkeit stärken.

Heute beginnen in Bangkok die Jahrestagungen des Internationalen Währungsfonds und der Weltbank – zu einer Zeit, in der die Finanzierung nachhaltiger Entwicklung durch geopolitische Spannungen, sich verschärfende Schuldenkrisen und den Rückgang der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe zunehmend unter Druck gerät. Angesichts einer geschätzten jährlichen Finanzierungslücke von 4 Billionen US-Dollar, die Entwicklungsländer zur Erreichung der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung zu schließen haben, ist eine engere Zusammenarbeit zwischen multilateralen und nationalen Entwicklungsbanken wichtiger denn je.

Der Compromiso de Sevilla, der 2025 auf der 4. Internationalen Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung in Sevilla verabschiedet wurde, unterstrich die Bedeutung nationaler Entwicklungsbanken (Banken) für die Förderung einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung, beispielsweise durch die Bereitstellung langfristiger und erschwinglicher Finanzmittel für erneuerbare Energien, oder kleine und mittlere Unternehmen, und forderte die Entwicklungspartner (Partner) auf, ihre Unterstützung für die Banken zu verstärken. Es stellt sich daher die Frage, wie Partner, darunter multilaterale Entwicklungsbanken wie die Weltbank, diesem Aufruf am besten nachkommen können.

Unsere jüngste Studie geht dieser Frage nach und untersucht dabei die Development Bank Ghana (DBG) und die Development Bank of Nigeria (DBN) – zwei relativ neue afrikanische Entwicklungsbanken, die mit erheblicher Unterstützung von Partnern wie der Weltbank, der KfW, der Europäischen Investitionsbank, der Agence Française de Développement und der Afrikanischen Entwicklungsbank gegründet wurden. Wir haben festgestellt, dass Partner die Kapazitäten der Banken stärken können, indem sie Finanzmittel und technische Hilfe bereitstellen und gleichzeitig die institutionelle Unabhängigkeit (die Fähigkeit, ihre Tätigkeit und ihr Mandat frei von politischer Einmischung auszuüben) stärken sowie die nationale Eigenverantwortung (lokal festgelegte Entwicklungsprioritäten) respektieren. Wir möchten drei wesentliche Erkenntnisse hervorheben, die besonders ins Auge fallen.

Erstens stellen die Partner den Banken langfristiges, kostengünstiges Kapital zur Verfügung, wodurch diese in die nationale nachhaltige Entwicklung investieren können. Ebenso wichtig ist, dass renommierte internationale Partner den Banken Glaubwürdigkeit verleihen und damit anderen Akteuren das Vertrauen geben, in die Banken zu investieren oder ihnen Kredite zu gewähren. Die Partner können zudem Bemühungen zur Mobilisierung inländischer Ressourcen, wie beispielsweise die Emission von Anleihen, durch Garantien und technische Hilfe unterstützen und so die Abhängigkeit der Banken von externer Finanzierung verringern.

Zweitens kann die Zusammenarbeit mit Partnern auch die institutionelle Unabhängigkeit der Banken verbessern. Im Falle der DBG und der DBN trugen die Partner dazu bei, Mandate für das Wholesale-Modell und Bestimmungen zur institutionellen Unabhängigkeit von Beginn an zu verankern. Die Weiterleitung von Mitteln an die Endbegünstigten über lokale kommerzielle Finanzinstitute schützt Kreditentscheidungen vor politischer Einflussnahme und gewährleistet so die institutionelle Unabhängigkeit der Banken. Die Erfahrungen beider Banken unterstreichen zudem die Bedeutung einer selektiven Ausrichtung, bei der die Zusammenarbeit mit Partnern auf deren Fähigkeit basiert, national festgelegte Entwicklungsprioritäten voranzutreiben. Dieser Ansatz dient als Schutz vor Unterordnung, die in früheren Untersuchungen als Risiko für die Zusammenarbeit zwischen multilateralen und nationalen Entwicklungsbanken identifiziert wurde.

Drittens sind technische Hilfe und Kapazitätsaufbau Kernelemente einer wirkungsvollen Partnerschaft. Beide Banken haben technische Unterstützung in Bereichen wie Risikomanagement, Umwelt-, Sozial- und Governance-Praktiken, grüne Finanzierungen sowie Kreditvergabe zur Förderung der Geschlechtergleichstellung erhalten. Diese Unterstützung ist besonders wertvoll für relativ junge Institutionen, deren Personal aus privatwirtschaftlichen Geschäftsbanken stammt, da sie ihnen hilft, sich an den Auftrag einer Entwicklungsbank anzupassen und die institutionelle Denkweise sowie die Kapazitäten aufzubauen, die erforderlich sind, um finanzielle Nachhaltigkeit und Entwicklungswirkung in Einklang zu bringen.

Diese Erkenntnisse – Investitionen in den Aufbau institutioneller Kapazitäten parallel zur Finanzierung bei gleichzeitiger Ausrichtung der Unterstützung auf nationale Prioritäten – bieten den Partnern praktische Wege, um dem Aufruf nachzukommen, nationale Entwicklungsbanken dabei zu unterstützen, ihr volles Potenzial auszuschöpfen. Unsere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass erfolgreiche Partnerschaften sowohl an der finanziellen als auch an der institutionellen Kapazität der Banken gemessen werden sollten, in großem Maßstab in nachhaltige Entwicklung zu investieren. Auf der diesjährigen Jahrestagung sollten Wege zur Förderung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit erörtert werden, die sicherstellen, dass nationale Entwicklungsbanken besser kapitalisiert sind und in der Lage sind, national festgelegte Entwicklungsprioritäten mit größerer Unabhängigkeit und in größerem Umfang umzusetzen – auch mit zusätzlich mobilisierten Mitteln von Kapitalmärkten (einschließlich inländischer Ersparnisse).

Bonn, 12. Oktober 2026. Angesichts rückläufiger öffentlicher Entwicklungshilfe müssen Entwicklungspartner die Finanzierung und den Kapazitätsaufbau nationaler Entwicklungsbanken vorantreiben und gleichzeitig deren Unabhängigkeit stärken.

Heute beginnen in Bangkok die Jahrestagungen des Internationalen Währungsfonds und der Weltbank – zu einer Zeit, in der die Finanzierung nachhaltiger Entwicklung durch geopolitische Spannungen, sich verschärfende Schuldenkrisen und den Rückgang der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe zunehmend unter Druck gerät. Angesichts einer geschätzten jährlichen Finanzierungslücke von 4 Billionen US-Dollar, die Entwicklungsländer zur Erreichung der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung zu schließen haben, ist eine engere Zusammenarbeit zwischen multilateralen und nationalen Entwicklungsbanken wichtiger denn je.

Der Compromiso de Sevilla, der 2025 auf der 4. Internationalen Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung in Sevilla verabschiedet wurde, unterstrich die Bedeutung nationaler Entwicklungsbanken (Banken) für die Förderung einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung, beispielsweise durch die Bereitstellung langfristiger und erschwinglicher Finanzmittel für erneuerbare Energien, oder kleine und mittlere Unternehmen, und forderte die Entwicklungspartner (Partner) auf, ihre Unterstützung für die Banken zu verstärken. Es stellt sich daher die Frage, wie Partner, darunter multilaterale Entwicklungsbanken wie die Weltbank, diesem Aufruf am besten nachkommen können.

Unsere jüngste Studie geht dieser Frage nach und untersucht dabei die Development Bank Ghana (DBG) und die Development Bank of Nigeria (DBN) – zwei relativ neue afrikanische Entwicklungsbanken, die mit erheblicher Unterstützung von Partnern wie der Weltbank, der KfW, der Europäischen Investitionsbank, der Agence Française de Développement und der Afrikanischen Entwicklungsbank gegründet wurden. Wir haben festgestellt, dass Partner die Kapazitäten der Banken stärken können, indem sie Finanzmittel und technische Hilfe bereitstellen und gleichzeitig die institutionelle Unabhängigkeit (die Fähigkeit, ihre Tätigkeit und ihr Mandat frei von politischer Einmischung auszuüben) stärken sowie die nationale Eigenverantwortung (lokal festgelegte Entwicklungsprioritäten) respektieren. Wir möchten drei wesentliche Erkenntnisse hervorheben, die besonders ins Auge fallen.

Erstens stellen die Partner den Banken langfristiges, kostengünstiges Kapital zur Verfügung, wodurch diese in die nationale nachhaltige Entwicklung investieren können. Ebenso wichtig ist, dass renommierte internationale Partner den Banken Glaubwürdigkeit verleihen und damit anderen Akteuren das Vertrauen geben, in die Banken zu investieren oder ihnen Kredite zu gewähren. Die Partner können zudem Bemühungen zur Mobilisierung inländischer Ressourcen, wie beispielsweise die Emission von Anleihen, durch Garantien und technische Hilfe unterstützen und so die Abhängigkeit der Banken von externer Finanzierung verringern.

Zweitens kann die Zusammenarbeit mit Partnern auch die institutionelle Unabhängigkeit der Banken verbessern. Im Falle der DBG und der DBN trugen die Partner dazu bei, Mandate für das Wholesale-Modell und Bestimmungen zur institutionellen Unabhängigkeit von Beginn an zu verankern. Die Weiterleitung von Mitteln an die Endbegünstigten über lokale kommerzielle Finanzinstitute schützt Kreditentscheidungen vor politischer Einflussnahme und gewährleistet so die institutionelle Unabhängigkeit der Banken. Die Erfahrungen beider Banken unterstreichen zudem die Bedeutung einer selektiven Ausrichtung, bei der die Zusammenarbeit mit Partnern auf deren Fähigkeit basiert, national festgelegte Entwicklungsprioritäten voranzutreiben. Dieser Ansatz dient als Schutz vor Unterordnung, die in früheren Untersuchungen als Risiko für die Zusammenarbeit zwischen multilateralen und nationalen Entwicklungsbanken identifiziert wurde.

Drittens sind technische Hilfe und Kapazitätsaufbau Kernelemente einer wirkungsvollen Partnerschaft. Beide Banken haben technische Unterstützung in Bereichen wie Risikomanagement, Umwelt-, Sozial- und Governance-Praktiken, grüne Finanzierungen sowie Kreditvergabe zur Förderung der Geschlechtergleichstellung erhalten. Diese Unterstützung ist besonders wertvoll für relativ junge Institutionen, deren Personal aus privatwirtschaftlichen Geschäftsbanken stammt, da sie ihnen hilft, sich an den Auftrag einer Entwicklungsbank anzupassen und die institutionelle Denkweise sowie die Kapazitäten aufzubauen, die erforderlich sind, um finanzielle Nachhaltigkeit und Entwicklungswirkung in Einklang zu bringen.

Diese Erkenntnisse – Investitionen in den Aufbau institutioneller Kapazitäten parallel zur Finanzierung bei gleichzeitiger Ausrichtung der Unterstützung auf nationale Prioritäten – bieten den Partnern praktische Wege, um dem Aufruf nachzukommen, nationale Entwicklungsbanken dabei zu unterstützen, ihr volles Potenzial auszuschöpfen. Unsere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass erfolgreiche Partnerschaften sowohl an der finanziellen als auch an der institutionellen Kapazität der Banken gemessen werden sollten, in großem Maßstab in nachhaltige Entwicklung zu investieren. Auf der diesjährigen Jahrestagung sollten Wege zur Förderung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit erörtert werden, die sicherstellen, dass nationale Entwicklungsbanken besser kapitalisiert sind und in der Lage sind, national festgelegte Entwicklungsprioritäten mit größerer Unabhängigkeit und in größerem Umfang umzusetzen – auch mit zusätzlich mobilisierten Mitteln von Kapitalmärkten (einschließlich inländischer Ersparnisse).

Bonn, 12. Oktober 2026. Angesichts rückläufiger öffentlicher Entwicklungshilfe müssen Entwicklungspartner die Finanzierung und den Kapazitätsaufbau nationaler Entwicklungsbanken vorantreiben und gleichzeitig deren Unabhängigkeit stärken.

Heute beginnen in Bangkok die Jahrestagungen des Internationalen Währungsfonds und der Weltbank – zu einer Zeit, in der die Finanzierung nachhaltiger Entwicklung durch geopolitische Spannungen, sich verschärfende Schuldenkrisen und den Rückgang der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe zunehmend unter Druck gerät. Angesichts einer geschätzten jährlichen Finanzierungslücke von 4 Billionen US-Dollar, die Entwicklungsländer zur Erreichung der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung zu schließen haben, ist eine engere Zusammenarbeit zwischen multilateralen und nationalen Entwicklungsbanken wichtiger denn je.

Der Compromiso de Sevilla, der 2025 auf der 4. Internationalen Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung in Sevilla verabschiedet wurde, unterstrich die Bedeutung nationaler Entwicklungsbanken (Banken) für die Förderung einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung, beispielsweise durch die Bereitstellung langfristiger und erschwinglicher Finanzmittel für erneuerbare Energien, oder kleine und mittlere Unternehmen, und forderte die Entwicklungspartner (Partner) auf, ihre Unterstützung für die Banken zu verstärken. Es stellt sich daher die Frage, wie Partner, darunter multilaterale Entwicklungsbanken wie die Weltbank, diesem Aufruf am besten nachkommen können.

Unsere jüngste Studie geht dieser Frage nach und untersucht dabei die Development Bank Ghana (DBG) und die Development Bank of Nigeria (DBN) – zwei relativ neue afrikanische Entwicklungsbanken, die mit erheblicher Unterstützung von Partnern wie der Weltbank, der KfW, der Europäischen Investitionsbank, der Agence Française de Développement und der Afrikanischen Entwicklungsbank gegründet wurden. Wir haben festgestellt, dass Partner die Kapazitäten der Banken stärken können, indem sie Finanzmittel und technische Hilfe bereitstellen und gleichzeitig die institutionelle Unabhängigkeit (die Fähigkeit, ihre Tätigkeit und ihr Mandat frei von politischer Einmischung auszuüben) stärken sowie die nationale Eigenverantwortung (lokal festgelegte Entwicklungsprioritäten) respektieren. Wir möchten drei wesentliche Erkenntnisse hervorheben, die besonders ins Auge fallen.

Erstens stellen die Partner den Banken langfristiges, kostengünstiges Kapital zur Verfügung, wodurch diese in die nationale nachhaltige Entwicklung investieren können. Ebenso wichtig ist, dass renommierte internationale Partner den Banken Glaubwürdigkeit verleihen und damit anderen Akteuren das Vertrauen geben, in die Banken zu investieren oder ihnen Kredite zu gewähren. Die Partner können zudem Bemühungen zur Mobilisierung inländischer Ressourcen, wie beispielsweise die Emission von Anleihen, durch Garantien und technische Hilfe unterstützen und so die Abhängigkeit der Banken von externer Finanzierung verringern.

Zweitens kann die Zusammenarbeit mit Partnern auch die institutionelle Unabhängigkeit der Banken verbessern. Im Falle der DBG und der DBN trugen die Partner dazu bei, Mandate für das Wholesale-Modell und Bestimmungen zur institutionellen Unabhängigkeit von Beginn an zu verankern. Die Weiterleitung von Mitteln an die Endbegünstigten über lokale kommerzielle Finanzinstitute schützt Kreditentscheidungen vor politischer Einflussnahme und gewährleistet so die institutionelle Unabhängigkeit der Banken. Die Erfahrungen beider Banken unterstreichen zudem die Bedeutung einer selektiven Ausrichtung, bei der die Zusammenarbeit mit Partnern auf deren Fähigkeit basiert, national festgelegte Entwicklungsprioritäten voranzutreiben. Dieser Ansatz dient als Schutz vor Unterordnung, die in früheren Untersuchungen als Risiko für die Zusammenarbeit zwischen multilateralen und nationalen Entwicklungsbanken identifiziert wurde.

Drittens sind technische Hilfe und Kapazitätsaufbau Kernelemente einer wirkungsvollen Partnerschaft. Beide Banken haben technische Unterstützung in Bereichen wie Risikomanagement, Umwelt-, Sozial- und Governance-Praktiken, grüne Finanzierungen sowie Kreditvergabe zur Förderung der Geschlechtergleichstellung erhalten. Diese Unterstützung ist besonders wertvoll für relativ junge Institutionen, deren Personal aus privatwirtschaftlichen Geschäftsbanken stammt, da sie ihnen hilft, sich an den Auftrag einer Entwicklungsbank anzupassen und die institutionelle Denkweise sowie die Kapazitäten aufzubauen, die erforderlich sind, um finanzielle Nachhaltigkeit und Entwicklungswirkung in Einklang zu bringen.

Diese Erkenntnisse – Investitionen in den Aufbau institutioneller Kapazitäten parallel zur Finanzierung bei gleichzeitiger Ausrichtung der Unterstützung auf nationale Prioritäten – bieten den Partnern praktische Wege, um dem Aufruf nachzukommen, nationale Entwicklungsbanken dabei zu unterstützen, ihr volles Potenzial auszuschöpfen. Unsere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass erfolgreiche Partnerschaften sowohl an der finanziellen als auch an der institutionellen Kapazität der Banken gemessen werden sollten, in großem Maßstab in nachhaltige Entwicklung zu investieren. Auf der diesjährigen Jahrestagung sollten Wege zur Förderung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit erörtert werden, die sicherstellen, dass nationale Entwicklungsbanken besser kapitalisiert sind und in der Lage sind, national festgelegte Entwicklungsprioritäten mit größerer Unabhängigkeit und in größerem Umfang umzusetzen – auch mit zusätzlich mobilisierten Mitteln von Kapitalmärkten (einschließlich inländischer Ersparnisse).

The 0.7 per cent official development assistance/gross national income (ODA/GNI) target, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, is best understood as a partially successful norm that is now in active retreat. In this paper we discuss the history of the target using Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle framework. We compare the 0.7 to analogous targets in defence, climate, education, health, and biodiversity. We argue that systematic underperformance is a structural feature of politically negotiated international input targets. The rise and retreat of the 0.7 is then not a distinct feature of development finance. The NATO 2 per cent/5 per cent case demonstrates that cascade is achievable under conditions of salience and enforcement. However, these are conditions that the 0.7 has not had. We propose ways forward based on the 0.7 target’s original rationale.

The 0.7 per cent official development assistance/gross national income (ODA/GNI) target, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, is best understood as a partially successful norm that is now in active retreat. In this paper we discuss the history of the target using Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle framework. We compare the 0.7 to analogous targets in defence, climate, education, health, and biodiversity. We argue that systematic underperformance is a structural feature of politically negotiated international input targets. The rise and retreat of the 0.7 is then not a distinct feature of development finance. The NATO 2 per cent/5 per cent case demonstrates that cascade is achievable under conditions of salience and enforcement. However, these are conditions that the 0.7 has not had. We propose ways forward based on the 0.7 target’s original rationale.

The 0.7 per cent official development assistance/gross national income (ODA/GNI) target, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, is best understood as a partially successful norm that is now in active retreat. In this paper we discuss the history of the target using Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle framework. We compare the 0.7 to analogous targets in defence, climate, education, health, and biodiversity. We argue that systematic underperformance is a structural feature of politically negotiated international input targets. The rise and retreat of the 0.7 is then not a distinct feature of development finance. The NATO 2 per cent/5 per cent case demonstrates that cascade is achievable under conditions of salience and enforcement. However, these are conditions that the 0.7 has not had. We propose ways forward based on the 0.7 target’s original rationale.