Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Bür

Manchester embodies reinvention like few other places. It built the world’s first industrial economy, watched it rust, and recast itself as the capital of England’s north. When protests turned deadly at the Peterloo massacre, it helped galvanise a tradition of organised labour and democratic reform — one that later produced the suffragettes, founded there by Emmeline Pankhurst. And when the band Joy Division collapsed, the remaining members re-emerged as New Order. That instinct — not to reassemble what broke, but to build something new — was the animating spirit when the University of Manchester’s Global Development Institute convened researchers in mid-April to ask: is the era of Development over? And if so, what replaces it?

Manchester embodies reinvention like few other places. It built the world’s first industrial economy, watched it rust, and recast itself as the capital of England’s north. When protests turned deadly at the Peterloo massacre, it helped galvanise a tradition of organised labour and democratic reform — one that later produced the suffragettes, founded there by Emmeline Pankhurst. And when the band Joy Division collapsed, the remaining members re-emerged as New Order. That instinct — not to reassemble what broke, but to build something new — was the animating spirit when the University of Manchester’s Global Development Institute convened researchers in mid-April to ask: is the era of Development over? And if so, what replaces it?

Manchester embodies reinvention like few other places. It built the world’s first industrial economy, watched it rust, and recast itself as the capital of England’s north. When protests turned deadly at the Peterloo massacre, it helped galvanise a tradition of organised labour and democratic reform — one that later produced the suffragettes, founded there by Emmeline Pankhurst. And when the band Joy Division collapsed, the remaining members re-emerged as New Order. That instinct — not to reassemble what broke, but to build something new — was the animating spirit when the University of Manchester’s Global Development Institute convened researchers in mid-April to ask: is the era of Development over? And if so, what replaces it?

Eine aktuelle SOEP-Studie mit mehr als 42.000 Befragten von einem Forschungsteam um Theresa M. Entringer zeigt, dass jüngere Geburtskohorten in Deutschland stärker davon überzeugt sind, ihr Leben beeinflussen zu können, und dieses Gefühl auch bis ins höhere Alter bewahren. Unterschiede zwischen den ...

Eine neue Analyse von Daniel Graeber, Ulrich Schmidt, Carsten Schröder und Johannes Seebauer auf Basis von SOEP-Daten und unter Berücksichtigung regionaler Unterschiede bei Infektionsraten zeigt: Trotz steigender finanzieller Sorgen und Ängste bleiben individuelle Risikopräferenzen weitgehend stabil ...

Finanzpolitischer Kurswechsel umfasst neben Sondervermögen und gelockerter Schuldenbremse auch steuerliche Entlastungen – Wirkung der Instrumente ist entscheidend, sie sollten gezielt kombiniert werden – Ein zusätzlicher Euro Staatskonsum erhöht das BIP kurzfristig um rund einen Euro – Eine ...

This policy brief argues that Greece should rethink its engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa through selective partnerships, education, religion, diaspora networks and civil society. Instead of competing financially with larger powers, Greece can generate long-term influence by concentrating resources where it has comparative advantages. A policy aligned with EU priorities that will focus on practical, low-cost initiatives can produce significant diplomatic dividends.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Asterios Huliaras, Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of the Peloponnese and member of ELIAMEP’s Advisory Committee.

Introduction

Africa[1] is emerging as one of the most strategically important regions of the twenty-first century. Despite armed conflicts, democratic backsliding, debt crises, and persistent poverty, the continent is characterized by rapid demographic growth, increasing urbanization, expanding markets, and rising geopolitical significance. Global actors such as China, Russia, Turkey, India, the United Arab Emirates, and Brazil have significantly expanded their political and economic engagement with African countries. Greece, by contrast, has traditionally maintained weak and fragmented relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. However, recent European developments, particularly the European Union’s Global Gateway strategy and the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement (AfCFTA), create an opportunity for a strategic rethinking of Greek policy.

The challenge for Greece is not whether it should engage with Africa, but how it can do so with limited diplomatic, financial, and administrative resources. Rather than attempting to imitate larger powers, Greece should adopt a selective strategy emphasizing concentrated partnerships, network diplomacy, educational links, and societal actors.

The Policy Challenge

The starting point of Greek engagement with Africa is structurally weak. Although geographically close to the continent, Greece maintains only eight embassies across forty-nine countries of Sub-Saharan Africa serving a population of approximately 1.2 billion people (in comparison, Turkey maintains thirty-two embassies in the region). Furthermore, only the Greek embassy in South Africa has a commercial attaché, while official high-level political visits have been extremely rare (an exception was Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias official visits to several Sub-Saharan African countries, looking mainly for support for Greece’s candidature for the UN Security Council). No Greek Prime Minister has visited a Sub-Saharan African country during the last three decades. Greek exports to Africa represent only approximately 0.3 percent of total exports, while investment remains minimal.

The weakness of institutional engagement contrasts sharply with the continent’s growing significance. Africa currently hosts some of the fastest-growing economies in the world and the African Continental Free Trade Area aims to create a market of approximately 1.5 billion consumers. In addition, under the European Union’s Global Gateway initiative, €150 billion out of the overall €300 billion package are directed toward Africa.

At the same time, Greece possesses assets that remain largely underutilized.

Existing Greek Assets and Untapped Opportunities

The Orthodox Church represents one of Greece’s most important but often neglected channels of influence in Africa. The Patriarchate of Alexandria maintains bishoprics in twelve African countries with an estimated flock of approximately 1.2 million faithful. Historically, religious diplomacy has often operated as an informal channel for strengthening relations and promoting social initiatives in education, health, and community development.

The Church could therefore function as an instrument of soft power by supporting educational programmes, scholarships, local partnerships, and social services. For example, cooperation between Greek universities and schools connected to the Patriarchate of Alexandria could create educational networks extending from Egypt and Kenya to countries of Central and Southern Africa. Such initiatives would be relatively inexpensive while generating long-term influence. However, the Russian Orthodox Church has increasingly attempted to expand its presence in Africa, potentially weakening the historical position of the Patriarchate of Alexandria (numerous African Greek Orthodox priests have joined the Russian Church in recent years). Consequently, supporting the activities of the Patriarchate also acquires broader geopolitical significance, especially in the current context.

Diaspora communities constitute another important but largely underexploited resource. Although the Greek diaspora in Africa has declined dramatically—from approximately 150,000 individuals in 1960s to only a few tens of thousands today—it still provides networks and contacts across various sectors. At the same time, the African diaspora in Greece, including entrepreneurs, artists, athletes, and community organizations, has become more influential and can function as an important bridge.

Civil society organizations have already demonstrated the potential of such engagement. Organizations including the Greek-African Chamber of Commerce, several consultancies, but also NGOs like Doctors Without Borders–Greece, Lalibella, YouthmakersHub, and ELIX already undertake projects across African countries, often financed through European and private resources. University initiatives such as the AfriquEurope programme of the University of the Peloponnese illustrate that society has often moved ahead of the state and ELIAMEP’s agreement with Pretoria University.

Policy Recommendations

Given its limited resources, Greece should avoid a continent-wide strategy and instead focus on one or two strategic partner countries that can function as anchor states. Kenya, for example, combines strong economic growth, regional influence, and importance in logistics and maritime activities. Ethiopia represents another possible case because of historical links and religious connections. Concentrating resources would allow Greece to build expertise and create visibility at manageable cost.

Second, Greece should strengthen educational and digital partnerships. Universities could expand English-language and French-language programmes specifically targeting African students. Visa procedures should also be simplified. It is inefficient for prospective African students to wait five or six months for visa appointments.

Third, Greece should establish a national volunteer programme inspired by international examples such as the Peace Corps in the US or similar programmes in Europe. Young Greeks could participate in educational, environmental, or healthcare projects in African countries. Such a programme could seek financial support from the Greek Public Employment Service (DYPA) and the EU, create networks and simultaneously improve Greece’s currently limited development profile.

Moreover, Greece should create a digital platform on Greek–African relations that could serve as an innovative mechanism for strengthening coordination, visibility, and interaction among the multiple actors involved in the relationship. The platform could function as a shared digital ecosystem bringing together public institutions, private enterprises, civil society organizations, academic institutions, diaspora networks, and cultural actors from Greece and African countries. It could include databases of ongoing initiatives and partnerships, funding opportunities, business and educational collaborations, cultural exchanges, and development projects, while also providing interactive tools such as discussion forums, thematic working groups, and networking spaces. Beyond its informational role, such a platform could facilitate dialogue and the co-production of ideas, reduce fragmentation among existing initiatives, and create synergies between actors who currently operate in isolation. In this way, it could strengthen relational ties and transform dispersed activities into a more coherent framework of engagement, enhancing Greece’s visibility and influence through networking, participation, and sustained interaction rather than through traditional forms of state power.

Finally, Greece should adopt a broader understanding of migration and mobility by creating more legal pathways for seasonal workers in agriculture, construction, and care services. Bilateral agreements with countries such as Ethiopia could address labour shortages while strengthening long-term partnerships.

Conclusion

Greece cannot compete with larger powers in Africa through financial resources or extensive diplomatic infrastructures. However, it can develop influence through networks, education, religion, and societal links. Rather than perceiving Africa as a distant periphery, Greece should view the continent as an emerging strategic space where modest but carefully designed interventions can generate substantial diplomatic dividends.

 

 

[1] In this paper, the term “Africa” refers specifically to Sub-Saharan Africa, unless otherwise indicated. North Africa is treated separately due to its distinct historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural dynamics.

Als Teil des SOEP-LEE2-Projekts veranstaltet AKempor (Arbeitskreis Empirische Personal- und Organisationsforschung) am 26. und 27. November einen Workshop im DIW Berlin, der Forschungsarbeiten zu den Themen Resilienz, Krisenreaktionen, digitaler Wandel und Cybersicherheit verbinden soll. Der Fokus ...

Als Teil des SOEP-LEE2-Projekts veranstaltet AKempor (Arbeitskreis Empirische Personal- und Organisationsforschung) am 26. und 27. November einen Workshop im DIW Berlin, der Forschungsarbeiten zu den Themen Resilienz, Krisenreaktionen, digitaler Wandel und Cybersicherheit verbinden soll. Der Fokus ...

Das Forum4Mica ist eine Plattform, bei der Datennutzende Fragen zu Daten und Generierung stellen können und zeitnah Antworten der entsprechenden Expert*innen erhalten. Haben Sie Ideen, wie das SOEP noch besser werden kann? Ab sofort steht Ihnen das Forum4MICA auch für Feedback, Anregungen oder ...