Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die internationalen Beziehungen der jüngsten Vergangenheit sind geprägt von weitreichenden geopolitischen Verwerfungen. Die systemische Konfrontation zwischen China und den USA, die russische Invasion der Ukraine, die Machtübernahme 2023 durch putschende Militärs im Niger sowie ähnliche Ereignisse zuvor in Mali und Burkina Faso, die Eskalation der Gewalt im Gazastreifen infolge der Hamas-Terrorangriffe vom 7. Oktober 2023 und nicht zuletzt die vollständige Einnahme Afghanistans  durch die Taliban verdeutlichen, dass das Umfeld für globale Kooperationsanstrengungen deutlich schwieriger geworden ist. In den letzten Monaten und Jahren hat die globale Zusammenarbeit erhebliche Rückschritte gemacht. Populismus und autokratische Trends in allen Weltregionen schädigen zusätzlich gravierend die Bemühungen um globale Kooperation. Die Spielräume zur gemeinsamen Lösungsfindung, insbesondere bei der Bekämpfung des Klimawandels, sind schwierig bis unmöglich geworden und werden selbst zu Teilen internationaler Konfliktlinien. Der Globale Süden ist in erheblichem Maße Schauplatz dieser politischen, ökonomischen und vielfach auch militärischen Auseinandersetzungen (Power 2019; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2023). Allerdings – und dies stellt einen wesentlichen Unterschied zu früheren Zeiten dar – sind Länder des Globalen Südens (Haug et al. 2021), natürlich nicht agierend als durchgängig homogener Monolith, mittlerweile wesentliche Mitgestalter in den internationalen Beziehungen (Ishmael 2022; Klingebiel 2023). Dies gilt insbesondere für China, aber auch für Indien und andere Akteure v. a. aus der Gruppe der BRICS (Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China, Südafrika)-Länder. Die Art und Weise, wie sich Indien, Südafrika, Brasilien, aber auch kleinere Staaten wie Ruanda gegenüber Russland und China verhalten, hat erhebliche internationale Bedeutung, wie die  Abstimmungen in der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen oder die Beteiligung an chinesischen Entwicklungsinitiativen oder am von Russland organisierten Afrikagipfel (Juli 2023) in St. Petersburg zeigen. Die geopolitischen Verwerfungen betreffen letztlich alle Politikbereiche in Europa und der übrigen OECD-Welt. Dies gilt für die klassischen Felder der Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik sowie der Klima- und Energiepolitik, aber zunehmend auch für andere Politikbereiche wie  Landwirtschafts- oder Wissenschaftspolitik. Entwicklungspolitik konzentriert sich auf den Globalen Süden (Klingebiel 2022a) – dies ist ein fundamentales Merkmal des Politikfeldes. Insofern ist die Frage von großer Bedeutung: Was bedeutet all dies für entwicklungspolitische Konzepte und Narrative und ebenso für deren operative Umsetzung?

Die internationalen Beziehungen der jüngsten Vergangenheit sind geprägt von weitreichenden geopolitischen Verwerfungen. Die systemische Konfrontation zwischen China und den USA, die russische Invasion der Ukraine, die Machtübernahme 2023 durch putschende Militärs im Niger sowie ähnliche Ereignisse zuvor in Mali und Burkina Faso, die Eskalation der Gewalt im Gazastreifen infolge der Hamas-Terrorangriffe vom 7. Oktober 2023 und nicht zuletzt die vollständige Einnahme Afghanistans  durch die Taliban verdeutlichen, dass das Umfeld für globale Kooperationsanstrengungen deutlich schwieriger geworden ist. In den letzten Monaten und Jahren hat die globale Zusammenarbeit erhebliche Rückschritte gemacht. Populismus und autokratische Trends in allen Weltregionen schädigen zusätzlich gravierend die Bemühungen um globale Kooperation. Die Spielräume zur gemeinsamen Lösungsfindung, insbesondere bei der Bekämpfung des Klimawandels, sind schwierig bis unmöglich geworden und werden selbst zu Teilen internationaler Konfliktlinien. Der Globale Süden ist in erheblichem Maße Schauplatz dieser politischen, ökonomischen und vielfach auch militärischen Auseinandersetzungen (Power 2019; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2023). Allerdings – und dies stellt einen wesentlichen Unterschied zu früheren Zeiten dar – sind Länder des Globalen Südens (Haug et al. 2021), natürlich nicht agierend als durchgängig homogener Monolith, mittlerweile wesentliche Mitgestalter in den internationalen Beziehungen (Ishmael 2022; Klingebiel 2023). Dies gilt insbesondere für China, aber auch für Indien und andere Akteure v. a. aus der Gruppe der BRICS (Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China, Südafrika)-Länder. Die Art und Weise, wie sich Indien, Südafrika, Brasilien, aber auch kleinere Staaten wie Ruanda gegenüber Russland und China verhalten, hat erhebliche internationale Bedeutung, wie die  Abstimmungen in der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen oder die Beteiligung an chinesischen Entwicklungsinitiativen oder am von Russland organisierten Afrikagipfel (Juli 2023) in St. Petersburg zeigen. Die geopolitischen Verwerfungen betreffen letztlich alle Politikbereiche in Europa und der übrigen OECD-Welt. Dies gilt für die klassischen Felder der Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik sowie der Klima- und Energiepolitik, aber zunehmend auch für andere Politikbereiche wie  Landwirtschafts- oder Wissenschaftspolitik. Entwicklungspolitik konzentriert sich auf den Globalen Süden (Klingebiel 2022a) – dies ist ein fundamentales Merkmal des Politikfeldes. Insofern ist die Frage von großer Bedeutung: Was bedeutet all dies für entwicklungspolitische Konzepte und Narrative und ebenso für deren operative Umsetzung?

أثمان ليرة سورية جديدة

English summary: Currency is not a national symbol nor a sovereign decision to be made in isolation from reality. Rather, it is a social contract and a measure of trust between citizens and the state. In the absence of this contract—amid division, destruction, and the collapse of institutions—any attempt to replace the currency will only further complicate the situation. What Syria needs today is not to swap one piece of paper for another, but to rebuild the foundations that give that paper its real value: trust, stability, and fulfillment of obligations. These are the true currencies that must be pursued before any new monetary initiative.

أثمان ليرة سورية جديدة

English summary: Currency is not a national symbol nor a sovereign decision to be made in isolation from reality. Rather, it is a social contract and a measure of trust between citizens and the state. In the absence of this contract—amid division, destruction, and the collapse of institutions—any attempt to replace the currency will only further complicate the situation. What Syria needs today is not to swap one piece of paper for another, but to rebuild the foundations that give that paper its real value: trust, stability, and fulfillment of obligations. These are the true currencies that must be pursued before any new monetary initiative.

أثمان ليرة سورية جديدة

English summary: Currency is not a national symbol nor a sovereign decision to be made in isolation from reality. Rather, it is a social contract and a measure of trust between citizens and the state. In the absence of this contract—amid division, destruction, and the collapse of institutions—any attempt to replace the currency will only further complicate the situation. What Syria needs today is not to swap one piece of paper for another, but to rebuild the foundations that give that paper its real value: trust, stability, and fulfillment of obligations. These are the true currencies that must be pursued before any new monetary initiative.

Von Aktivrente würden rund 230 000 erwerbstätige Rentner*innen unmittelbar profitieren – Zunächst jährliche Steuermindereinnahmen von rund 800 Millionen Euro – Bei 75 000 zusätzlichen Beschäftigten könnten Einnahmeverluste mehr als ausgeglichen werden Rund 230 000 abhängig Beschäftigte im ...

Die Abteilung Kriminalität, Arbeit und Ungleichheit des DIW Berlin forscht und analysiert die Auswirkungen von Arbeitsmarkt-, Sozial- und Wirtschaftspolitik auf Entscheidungen und Verhalten von Personen und Haushalten. Sie beschäftigt sich insbesondere mit Aspekten, die mit wirtschaftlichen Ursachen von Kriminalität und deren Auswirkungen in Zusammenhang stehen, und erforscht potenzielle Wechselwirkungen zwischen Kriminalität einerseits und Chancengleichheit und Verteilungsfragen andererseits. Im Mittelpunkt stehen dabei mikroökonomisch fundierte, empirische Forschungsarbeiten, die zu einem evidenz-basierten Diskurs beitragen.

Die Abteilung Kriminalität, Arbeit und Ungleichheit des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 10 Wochenstunden.

Der zwischenstaatliche Umgangston wird rauer, multilaterale Zusammenarbeit wird durch bilaterale Deals ersetzt, die Macht der Stärkeren wird zum neuen Bezugspunkt. Umweltpolitik und internationale Zusammenarbeit stehen unter Druck.Gleichzeitig werden wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse in politischen Entscheidungsprozessen unzureichend herangezogen. Wie lässt sich verhindern, dass das Ziel einer nachhaltigen und sozial gerechten Entwicklung weltweit aus dem Blick gerät? Was  ann getan werden, um Sicherheit und Frieden weltweit zu fördern? Welche Rolle sollten Deutschland und die Europäische Union einnehmen?

Der zwischenstaatliche Umgangston wird rauer, multilaterale Zusammenarbeit wird durch bilaterale Deals ersetzt, die Macht der Stärkeren wird zum neuen Bezugspunkt. Umweltpolitik und internationale Zusammenarbeit stehen unter Druck.Gleichzeitig werden wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse in politischen Entscheidungsprozessen unzureichend herangezogen. Wie lässt sich verhindern, dass das Ziel einer nachhaltigen und sozial gerechten Entwicklung weltweit aus dem Blick gerät? Was  ann getan werden, um Sicherheit und Frieden weltweit zu fördern? Welche Rolle sollten Deutschland und die Europäische Union einnehmen?

Der zwischenstaatliche Umgangston wird rauer, multilaterale Zusammenarbeit wird durch bilaterale Deals ersetzt, die Macht der Stärkeren wird zum neuen Bezugspunkt. Umweltpolitik und internationale Zusammenarbeit stehen unter Druck.Gleichzeitig werden wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse in politischen Entscheidungsprozessen unzureichend herangezogen. Wie lässt sich verhindern, dass das Ziel einer nachhaltigen und sozial gerechten Entwicklung weltweit aus dem Blick gerät? Was  ann getan werden, um Sicherheit und Frieden weltweit zu fördern? Welche Rolle sollten Deutschland und die Europäische Union einnehmen?

The tone of interactions between states is becoming harsher; multilateral cooperation is being replaced by bilateral deals; ‘might is right’ is the new watchword. Environmental policy and international cooperation are under pressure. At the same time,  less and less attention is being paid to scientific findings in political decision making. How can we avoid losing sight of the goal of sustainable and socially just development worldwide? What can be done to promote security and peace worldwide? What role should Germany and the European Union play?

The tone of interactions between states is becoming harsher; multilateral cooperation is being replaced by bilateral deals; ‘might is right’ is the new watchword. Environmental policy and international cooperation are under pressure. At the same time,  less and less attention is being paid to scientific findings in political decision making. How can we avoid losing sight of the goal of sustainable and socially just development worldwide? What can be done to promote security and peace worldwide? What role should Germany and the European Union play?

The tone of interactions between states is becoming harsher; multilateral cooperation is being replaced by bilateral deals; ‘might is right’ is the new watchword. Environmental policy and international cooperation are under pressure. At the same time,  less and less attention is being paid to scientific findings in political decision making. How can we avoid losing sight of the goal of sustainable and socially just development worldwide? What can be done to promote security and peace worldwide? What role should Germany and the European Union play?

Was kostet die Migration? Jedes Jahr Hunderte Milliarden? Im Gegenteil: Es drohen Hunderte Milliarden Verluste, wenn nicht mehr Menschen zuwandern., Kaum eine Woche vergeht, ohne dass ein neuer Aspekt der Migration den öffentlichen Diskurs in Deutschland bestimmt. Nach Debatten über Gewalt oder Zurückweisungen an der Grenze steht nun erneut die Frage im Zentrum: Lohnt sich Migration finanziell für Deutschland? Die klare Antwort: Ja. Eine neue ...

Dimitris Kollias, ELIAMEP Junior Research Fellow, gives a brief overview of Israel’s recently launched Operation Rising Lion.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here.

Die Monopolkommission hat heute ihr 10. Sektorgutachten Bahn an Bundesverkehrsminister Patrick Schnieder übergeben. Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin und Vorsitzender der Monopolkommission, äußert sich dazu wie folgt:

Mit dem geplanten Sondervermögen Infrastruktur hat Deutschland eine historische Chance, die Bahn grundlegend zu erneuern. Aber Geld alleine reicht nicht aus. Wir müssen jetzt einen echten Kurswechsel bei der Bahn vollziehen. Es bedarf grundlegender, struktureller Veränderungen, damit das Sondervermögen auch kosteneffizient im Schienennetz ankommt und nicht in intransparenten Finanzflüssen versickert.

Das Sondervermögen muss ausschließlich für zukunftsgerichtete Maßnahmen eingesetzt werden: Für die Modernisierung des Netzes und insbesondere für die Digitalisierung. So lassen sich Abläufe effizienter gestalten und Trassenpreise senken. Am Ende profitieren auch die Kundinnen und Kunden durch günstigere Tickets.

Damit die eingesetzten Mittel den größtmöglichen Nutzen für das Gemeinwohl bringen, benötigt es auch mehr Transparenz und Kontrolle in Form einer unabhängigen, fachkompetent besetzten Steuerungs- und Monitoringstelle. Und klar ist auch: Es ist notwendig, Netz und Betrieb eigentumsrechtlich zu trennen. Die bisherigen Verflechtungen im DB-Konzern behindern den fairen Wettbewerb. Bis dahin gilt: Volle Verantwortung, volle Kontrolle bei der InfraGO AG. Schließlich müssen wir den rasanten Anstieg der Trassenpreise dringend bremsen. Dies kann durch eine Absenkung der Eigenkapitalverzinsung der DB InfraGO AG verbunden mit einem Rückgriff auf die Investitionsfinanzierung über Baukostenzuschüsse erreicht werden. 

Nur wenn das Sondervermögen und die Gestaltung der Trassenpreise wettbewerbsorientiert für die Schiene ausgestaltet werden, profitieren Reisende und der Güterverkehr von günstigeren Preisen, mehr Innovationen und besserer Qualität.

Wirtschaft in Deutschland dürfte in diesem Jahr moderat um 0,3 Prozent und im kommenden Jahr deutlich um 1,7 Prozent zulegen, 0,2 beziehungsweise 0,6 Prozentpunkte mehr als im Frühjahr prognostiziert – Investitionspaket und bessere Finanzierungsbedingungen werden Konjunktur wohl merklichen Schub ...

Over the last decade, the European Union has taken major steps to improve its defence industrial base, reflecting a growing strategic ambition and assertiveness. The European Defence Fund (EDF), launched in 2021, and managed by the European Commission, marks a pivotal step in the EU’s efforts to build a more integrated and competitive defence industrial base.

As of June 2025, the EDF has been implemented through annual work programmes from 2021 to 2024, supporting 224 collaborative defence projects involving entities from different EU member states. The aim of the policy paper is to initially evaluate the extent and nature of cross-border industrial cooperation among EU member-states (excluding Malta) and Norway under the European Defence Fund, and to identify emerging patterns, strategic partnerships, and sector-specific dynamics that reflect progress toward the Single Market for Defence.

Our main findings include:

• Success of the EDF: The EDF has successfully built a dense, interconnected network of cooperation among entities from participating countries, promoting shared expertise, EU-wide interdependence, and a more competitive European defence sector.
• Clusters: Intense cooperation is concentrated among countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands and Belgium.
• Specialisation: Entity participation across defence (R&D) categories varies by country, often reflecting national strengths or geostrategic priorities.
• Coordinators: The role of the coordinators becomes more and more important as the dense network of collaboration is expanded.

Our recommendations touch upon three main areas:

• Funding: The EDF’s success justifies increased funding to strengthen the EU’s defence capabilities and support industrial cooperation.
• Inclusivity: To avoid dominance by a small number of large/prime players, the EU should strengthen support for underrepresented countries to ensure broader participation.
• Regarding Greece: Greek entities should be further encouraged to join EDF projects, linking national talent and research initiatives with EU networks to boost innovation and counter brain drain.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Spyros Blavoukos, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Programme; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business; Panos Politis-Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP and Georgios Matsoukas, Research Assistant, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Nearly a decade has passed since the European Commission, under Jean-Claude Juncker, implemented the first EU-wide defence industrial initiatives. During this decade, the European Union’s defence industry has seen significant developments, more recently with the announcement of the ReArm Europe Plan and the SAFE Regulation that prioritises defence industrial readiness. At the same time, the European Defence Fund (EDF) has been a crucial and active instrument since 2021, signaling the EU’s intention and efforts made to close capability gaps, foster innovation and strengthen pan-European defence industrial collaboration.

To what extent have the EU member-states (excluding Malta) and Norway succeeded in building and reinforcing linkages between their defence industries? Which member-states tend to cooperate more intensively with which partners, and do such patterns vary depending on the sector or category of defence capability in which they operate?

These questions become ever more relevant as transnational industrial collaboration constitutes a driver for the development of a real Single Market for Defence, as envisioned by the Draghi Report. Furthermore, understanding the dynamics and structure of defence industrial cooperation among member-states in EU funding programmes is essential for making informed policy advice and decisions aimed at strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities and industrial competitiveness, especially in the context of the negotiations for the next MFF 2028-2034.

Setting the Background: what has changed in the realm of defence

The EU is undergoing a profound transformation regarding security and defence. Long reliant on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the American security umbrella, the EU has increasingly begun to adopt -at least rhetorically- a more assertive and autonomous role in these fields. The broad concept of strategic autonomy, which was once perceived with scepticism, has gradually evolved into a necessity, with the EU realising that the “ability to make its [the EU’s] own choices and shape the world around it through leadership and engagement” is fundamental. After decades of underinvestment, fragmentation and external dependency, the EU is now treating defence industrial policy as a core pillar of its geopolitical awakening. 

In this vein, over the past decade, the European family has taken concrete action to support both the demand and the supply sides of defence, giving more emphasis, though, until very recently, on the latter. In particular, the European Commission, under President Juncker, presented the European Defence Action Plan in 2016, paving the way for the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) (2017-2019) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) (2019-2020). Together, these two initiatives accumulatively channeled approximately 590 million EUR from the EU budget towards defence research and development (R&D). The EDF, which constitutes the successor of the two aforementioned tools, has been the flagship funding instrument for R&D in defence, earmarking almost 7.3 billion EUR for collaborative defence research and capability development for the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). A smaller-scale supply-oriented instrument is the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) with a budget of approximately 500 million EUR (2023-2025).

On the demand side, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) aims to incentivize the common procurement of ammunition, air and missile defence and platforms with a total budget of 310 million EUR until 2025. Furthermore, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), whose negotiations have not yet been concluded, is expected to unlock 1.5 billion EUR from the EU budget for the period 2025-2027 to support both the production and common procurement of defence equipment, building on the experience from both ASAP and EDIRPA. On May 27, 2025, the Council established the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, incentivising the common procurement of specific categories of defence equipment, which will be supported by up to 150 billion EUR in funding borrowed from capital markets or financial institutions by the European Commission until 2030. However, it must be noted that in contrast to the aforementioned instruments, SAFE offers loans, not grants, which will have to be repaid by the member states.

A combination of external factors and the new geopolitical understanding drives the EU’s defence industrial efforts. Starting with the former, the most obvious and pressing reason has definitely been Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The invasion has exposed Europe’s inability to adequately ramp up its defence production levels. At the same time, the return of conventional and high-intensity warfare to the Old Continent has sparked concern among the European demos, as revealed by the most recent Eurobarometer. Beyond Ukraine, a deeper strategic reorientation is underway. The post-Cold War assumption that Europe could rely indefinitely on the United States (US) for the protection of its territorial integrity no longer applies. Quoting US Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth, “It’s deterrence and peace through strength, but it cannot be reliance”.  In addition, President Trump has repeatedly shaken the transatlantic trust. In the meantime, the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific constitutes a long-term strategic recalibration which has been promoted since the Obama administration. As Washington’s (strategic) interests shift towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC), European security can no longer assume that American help is a given.

The new geopolitical understanding is closely linked to the return of Realpolitik in the international scene. Great power competition and broader security threats have raised the importance of the Union’s broader industrial policy. The development and the resilience of the EU’s defence and technological industrial base are now considered part of its efforts to achieve strategic autonomy. In this environment, the EU’s traditional soft power must be complemented by credible military capabilities, defence innovation capacity and competitiveness.

Data collection and methodology

Why studying the EDF matters

To this end of developing credible military capabilities, the EDF plays a crucial role, being the core tool of defence industrial cooperation within the EU framework. It constitutes the first fully-fledged EU-funding mechanism, marking a shift in the Union’s approach to defence. Studying the patterns of cooperation under the EDF provides valuable insights into both the functional and political evolution of the EU’s defence industrial policy.

Furthermore, the EDF offers temporal depth and continuity. In contrast to shorter-term or ad-hoc funding instruments such as EDIRPA or ASAP, the EDF covers a multi-annual time period, namely the current MFF (2021-2027). This provides a longer and more stable timeline for assessing emerging patterns of collaboration among defence industry actors. As of 6 June 2025, four rounds of EDF project selections have been publicly announced, allowing for a more representative and credible dataset. At the same time, data is not available from either EDIP (still under negotiations) or from SAFE (not yet implemented).

Finally, with a planned envelope of 7.3 billion EUR over seven years, the EDF surpasses other comparable instruments both in scale and ambition. Although the amount may still be considered insufficient relative to Europe’s growing strategic needs (or ambitions), the funding volume makes the EDF one of the most important financial tools for defence capability development at the EU level. This financial magnitude also tends to attract many stakeholders (e.g., companies from the defence sector, research institutes, universities), which allows for a more comprehensive and representative picture of the emerging European defence ecosystem. In particular, approximately 4 billion EUR has been invested between 2021 and 2024, with almost 3,000 entity participations from all EU member states, except Malta, and Norway.

Figure 1: EDF entity participations (2021-2024)

Source: Fiott (2025)

Data mining process

For the needs of our research, the following data gathering process was followed, combining manual research with automated tools to ensure accuracy. First, we reviewed in a systematic way all individual project factsheets released under the EDF for the years 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024. As of 6 June 2025, a total of 224 projects have been publicly selected for EU (co-)funding. These factsheets, available on the European Commission’s (DG DEFIS) official website, list all participating entities, their role in the consortium and their country of origin.

Next, for each project, we identified and recorded every entity listed as a participant (including the coordinator), along with the country from which it originates. This step is critical for making the mapping of defence industrial cooperation possible.

Using the data above, we constructed a 27×27 matrix to capture the frequency of cooperation between entities from different participating countries. Each row and column of the matrix represents one of the 26 EU member-states (excluding Malta) plus Norway. The matrix entries reflect the number of projects in which at least two entities from two given countries jointly participate in an EDF selected project, thereby indicating the intensity of bilateral cooperation.

Beyond the aggregate matrix, we also built additional matrices to reflect cooperation in specific categories of defence capability (e.g., air combat, cyber). For 2021, 2022 and 2024, the project categorisations were available on the Commission’s official website. However, for the 2023 selected projects, no such categorisation was publicly available at the time of writing. To resolve this, we manually reviewed each 2023 project and assigned it to the most relevant/appropriate category, based on the thematic guidelines outlined in the official EDF Work Programme for that year.

In order to minimise the probability of human error, we developed a Visual Basic for Application (VBA)-driven programme, with the support of artificial intelligence (AI), to automate the generation of matrices. Each EDF project was uploaded as a PDF file to Power BI. While the initial stages of project identification and classification required human judgment, especially in 2023, automation ensured consistency in matrix construction and allowed for an efficient verification process.

Building the Matrix of Cross-border Industrial Defence Cooperation

In this section, we present the results of our research on cross-border industrial cooperation within the framework of the EDF from 2021 to 2024. The findings are visualised through a series of graphs and tables, reflecting the cooperation between entities from the participating countries. In addition to the general matrix, which covers all categories, we also provide 18 separate matrices corresponding to specific capability categories. The National Focal Points (NFPs) category is taken into account only in the general matrix. These thematic categories enable a better understanding of how industrial partnerships vary across different domains, providing deeper insight into the patterns of specialisation and collaboration within the EU’s defence landscape. To ensure clarity and maintain the readability of the main text, the full tables containing all data is provided in the Annex.

General matrix

The general matrix reveals a high level of interconnectedness among the entities of participating countries. Nearly all participating countries have established at least one cooperative link with each other. The thickness of each line connecting two countries represents the frequency of cooperation between entities from those respective countries. Thicker lines indicate a great number of joint participations. As such, it is evident that France, Germany, Italy, Spain, followed by Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands, are involved in a significantly large number of cooperative projects and emerge as central nodes within the broader network. Based on our data, only four country pairs show no collaborative links, namely Croatia-Cyprus, Croatia-Estonia, Slovakia-Hungary and Hungary-Luxembourg. These exceptions highlight rare gaps in the otherwise dense network of partnerships.

Figure 2: General matrix of cross-border industrial cooperation in the framework of EDF (2021-2024)

Created with Flourish.studio. 

Specific categories

While the general matrix offers a comprehensive overview, a closer examination at the category level provides more insights. When the data is disaggregated by capability domain, it becomes evident that fewer countries tend to cooperate within individual categories, particularly in specialised or technically demanding areas (e.g., air and missile defence, underwater warfare). Even in these categories, entities from approximately twenty participating countries have been identified. In broader or more horizontal domains, such as SME calls, digital transformation or cyber, we observe a more diverse range of participating countries.  

Figure 3: EDF industrial cooperation in Air and Missile Defence (2021-2024)

Figure 4: EDF industrial cooperation in Air Combat (2021-2024)

Figure 5: EDF industrial cooperation in Cyber (2021-2024)

Figure 6: EDF industrial cooperation in Digital Transformation (2021-2024)

 

Figure 7: EDF industrial cooperation in Disruptive Technologies (2021-2024)

Figure 8: EDF industrial cooperation in Energy and Environment (2021-2024)

 

Figure 9: EDF industrial cooperation in Ground Combat (2021-2024)

 

Figure 10: EDF industrial cooperation in Information Superiority (2021-2024)

Figure 11: EDF industrial cooperation in Materials & Components (2021-2024)

Figure 12: EDF industrial cooperation in Medical Response and CBRN (2021-2024)

Figure 13: EDF industrial cooperation in Naval Combat (2021-2024)

Figure 14: EDF industrial cooperation in Protection & Mobility (2021-2024)

Figure 15: EDF industrial cooperation in Sensors (2021-2024)

Figure 16: EDF industrial cooperation in Simulation & Training (2021-2024)

Figure 17: EDF industrial cooperation in SMEs calls (2021-2024)

Figure 18: EDF industrial cooperation in Space (2021-2024)

Figure 19: EDF industrial cooperation in Technological Challenges (2021-2024)

Figure 20: EDF industrial cooperation in Underwater Warfare (2021-2024)

All figures were created with Flourish.studio.

Is an EU Industrial Defence Ecosystem Emerging?

The Key Insights

The analysis of data from the EDF for the results of 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 reveals several insights into the evolving landscape of the defence industrial cooperation in the EU. These findings may provide valuable insights for shaping future policy directions at both the national and European levels.

The first and most notable finding is the emergence of a dense and increasingly interconnected network of industrial collaboration across entities from the participating countries. This web of partnerships demonstrates that the EDF has succeeded in one of its central objectives: “to promote cooperation between companies, including SMEs and research actors throughout the Union”. By enabling entities from different member-states and Norway to jointly research, design, develop and/or test defence technologies, the Union provides a platform for building shared expertise, transferring know-how and promoting the involvement of all interested (and eligible) countries in developing a truly European defence technological and industrial base. This, in turn, allows each participant to capitalise on its own comparative advantages, reinforcing strategic EU-wide interdependence rather than duplication or dependency on third countries (to the extent this is possible). Moreover, as cooperation intensifies across borders, the European defence sector may become more efficient and competitive at the international level.

The second major finding highlights the existence of concentrated clusters (or “isles”) of more intense cooperation, particularly among certain countries. These include France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece and the Netherlands. Their enhanced presence is not surprising, as these states have expressed their interest in leveraging the EDF funding since its early stages. Another factor may be that large and promising projects naturally gravitate toward countries with high R&D capacity, experience or enhanced dual-use capabilities. At the same time, entities from smaller states seek to “plug into” projects led by bigger players to gain access to European consortia so that they receive EU funding, build their reputational capital and integrate more fully into the European defence value chains.

The third key insight relates to participation in specific categories. The data (Figures 3-20) clearly shows that not all countries are equally represented across all categories of defence R&D. Participation levels often correspond to national comparative advantages, specialisations or geostrategic profiles. For example, in the naval domain, all entities come from participating countries with direct maritime borders. Moreover, the participation of (entities from) Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Baltic states in underwater warfare is noteworthy, given the hybrid attacks and sabotage incidents targeting undersea infrastructure in the Nordic-Baltic region. This finding reinforces the idea that the EDF constitutes a mirror of national industrial strengths and strategic preferences.

Finally, a fourth finding concerns the increasingly pivotal role of project coordinators. As noted before by Fiott (2024), coordinating an EDF project entails more than administrative responsibility. Project coordinators act as network builders and managers. Taking into account this dense network of cooperation, their role becomes extremely important.

Limitations and future research

While the findings presented above offer a valuable overview of defence industrial cooperation through the EDF, five main limitations should be acknowledged, each of which may function as a fruitful ground for future research.

1. The analysis is primarily quantitative. While it captures the presence of cooperation between entities from different countries, it does not measure the quality, depth or strategic significance of those partnerships. To assess these dimensions, qualitative case studies are needed, while interviews with project coordinators and national contact points could shed further light on substantial (internal) issues of collaboration within each consortium.
2. Directly correlated to the first limitation, qualitative research may reveal interesting facts about the ownership of companies (i.e., the country of origin of the parent companies) that benefit from EDF (co)-funding. For instance, Greece’s INTRACOM Defense, which has been awarded at least 15 million EUR through the EDF, was acquired by Israel Aerospace Industries – Israel’s biggest state-owned defence company – in March 2023. Another example would be MILREM AS, whose majority stake was acquired by the Emirate EDGE GROUP in February 2023. Furthermore, the US has also been indirectly involved in EDF projects (e.g., EPIIC 2021), for example, through Germany’s Rockwell Collins Deutschland GmbH, a subsidiary of Rockwell Collins, Inc. More importantly, for Greece, Miilux Oy, a Finnish manufacturing company participating in the EDF 2021 project ECOBALLIFE, had its majority shares acquired by Türkiye’s OYAK Group in 2019. The discussion about the ownership shares and the (indirect) participation of entities from third countries has become more relevant after the SAFE Regulation and the broader discussion it has triggered regarding the role and participation of third countries in EU-funded schemes and initiatives.
3. The current methodology maps cooperation at the country level, but not specific patterns of partner selection within each consortium. It would be interesting to examine whether the big players tend to cooperate with specific entities of equal size from certain countries, indicating a process of cartelisation in the defence sector.
4. The study does not assess the level of EU financial contribution allocated to each project, nor does it analyse the specific distribution of the funding among participating entities. Thus, it does not entirely capture the financial weight or the strategic importance of each entity’s involvement.
5. The political context of cooperation is also not reflected in the dataset. It would be valuable to cross-reference industrial partnerships with indicators of political alignment or joint strategic interests. This could help policymakers understand to what extent defence industrial cooperation reflects broader geopolitical considerations.

Policy Recommendations

Different theoretical approaches offer alternative accounts for the dynamics driving the evolution of the EDF, stressing either its neofunctionalist features or its intergovernmentalist operational logic. To our understanding, it is clear that the EDF evolves into a mechanism for deeper structural integration in the defence sector by creating transnational consortia, fostering interoperability, and promoting European technological development and innovation. The increasing reliance on cross-border defence industrial partnerships and the creation of a dense network of cooperation may be the drivers for deeper political cooperation.

Building on all the above, three key policy recommendations emerge. Firstly, the EDF’s success would justify a significant increase in its funding under the upcoming MFF. This will not only consolidate existing cooperation but also pave the way for more ambitious and strategically relevant projects. The commercialisation of successful EDF projects must also be supported through financial means, as proposed in the White Paper, while the implementation of European defence projects of common interest should take into consideration the lessons learnt, the good practices from the EDF as well as the Union’s strategic needs.

Secondly, to prevent the emergence of cartel dynamics, where a limited number of large players dominate most projects, the EU should further strengthen measures to promote inclusivity and broader participation. Additional tailored incentives for SMEs must be promoted, while incentives for entities from less-represented countries shall also be considered. These actors may often offer significant added value, but they lack the institutional access and means compared to large defence contractors. The European Defence Innovation Scheme’s (EUDIS) matchmaking process could be further expanded.

Last but not least, in the case of Greece, its entities have already demonstrated a capacity to contribute meaningfully to various categories. Greek authorities should encourage greater participation not only from defence firms but also from research institutes and universities. Indeed, involvement in EDF projects would not only provide additional funding streams for their activities, but also facilitate access to cutting-edge European networks, strengthen their visibility and create high-skilled employment opportunities in Greece. This mobilisation of scientific talent and research infrastructure can be closely linked to “Rebrain Greece”, which aims to reverse the brain drain. EU-level funding could serve as a strong incentive for these highly skilled professionals to return and contribute to the development of a competitive Greek defence innovation ecosystem.

Annex I: General matrix

 

 

 

With President Trump’s return to office, United States (US) trade and development policy has undergone a decisive shift – marked by sweeping cuts to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shifting alliances, escalating trade tensions, and a broader retreat from multilateralism. The expiration of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 2020 and the scheduled end of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2025 had already raised concerns among sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Recent shifts under the renewed “America First” agenda – particularly the introduction of new tariffs – have now effectively brought AGOA to an early end.
This policy brief examines the potential effects of the shift from duty-free treatment under the US GSP and AGOA to the new Trump-era tariffs, including a universal 10% tariff applied to all US trading partners and so-called “reciprocal” tariffs announced for 57 countries on “Liberation Day”. Applying a multi-region Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, we find the following:
• Notable adverse effects for specific SSA eco-nomies, such as Lesotho, Madagascar, Chad, Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius, and Malawi.
• Limited aggregate impact on AGOA-eligible countries with overall exports declining by up to 1.1% and real gross domestic product (GDP) largely unchanged.
• Most affected sectors include wearing apparel, leather products, and other manufacturing.
• The US and China would bear the largest losses under the new tariff regime.
Given the relatively weak ties of SSA to the US as well as declining utilisation rates of US preferential trade programmes over time, the limited aggregate effects for all AGOA-eligible countries are not surprising. However, empirical results likely understate the full impact of new Trump-era tariffs and do not capture the indirect effects like reduced foreign investment, weakened supply chains, rising poverty, or the loss of capacity-building linked to AGOA. Moreover, our simulations do not account for potential retaliatory measures, so an intensified global trade war and economic downturn might further harm SSA economies. For these countries, the risks are compounded by limited fiscal space and growing debt vulnerabilities. This underscores the importance for SSA countries of continuing to build more resilient and diversified trade structures, deepening regional integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and pursuing value chain upgrading. At the same time, the European Union (EU) must reaffirm its role as a reliable, development-friendly partner by defending World Trade Organisation (WTO)-based rules, renewing its GSP ahead of 2027, and avoiding retaliatory tariffs that harm vulnerable countries. Strategic engagement with the Global South – through initiatives like Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships (CTIPs) or Sustain-able Investment Facilitation Agreements (SIFAs) – offers a timely opportunity to strengthen trust and promote sustainable, inclusive trade.

PD Dr agr. Wolfgang Britz is a Senior Researcher and lecturer at the Institute for Food and Resource Economics, Bonn University.

With President Trump’s return to office, United States (US) trade and development policy has undergone a decisive shift – marked by sweeping cuts to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shifting alliances, escalating trade tensions, and a broader retreat from multilateralism. The expiration of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 2020 and the scheduled end of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2025 had already raised concerns among sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Recent shifts under the renewed “America First” agenda – particularly the introduction of new tariffs – have now effectively brought AGOA to an early end.
This policy brief examines the potential effects of the shift from duty-free treatment under the US GSP and AGOA to the new Trump-era tariffs, including a universal 10% tariff applied to all US trading partners and so-called “reciprocal” tariffs announced for 57 countries on “Liberation Day”. Applying a multi-region Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, we find the following:
• Notable adverse effects for specific SSA eco-nomies, such as Lesotho, Madagascar, Chad, Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius, and Malawi.
• Limited aggregate impact on AGOA-eligible countries with overall exports declining by up to 1.1% and real gross domestic product (GDP) largely unchanged.
• Most affected sectors include wearing apparel, leather products, and other manufacturing.
• The US and China would bear the largest losses under the new tariff regime.
Given the relatively weak ties of SSA to the US as well as declining utilisation rates of US preferential trade programmes over time, the limited aggregate effects for all AGOA-eligible countries are not surprising. However, empirical results likely understate the full impact of new Trump-era tariffs and do not capture the indirect effects like reduced foreign investment, weakened supply chains, rising poverty, or the loss of capacity-building linked to AGOA. Moreover, our simulations do not account for potential retaliatory measures, so an intensified global trade war and economic downturn might further harm SSA economies. For these countries, the risks are compounded by limited fiscal space and growing debt vulnerabilities. This underscores the importance for SSA countries of continuing to build more resilient and diversified trade structures, deepening regional integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and pursuing value chain upgrading. At the same time, the European Union (EU) must reaffirm its role as a reliable, development-friendly partner by defending World Trade Organisation (WTO)-based rules, renewing its GSP ahead of 2027, and avoiding retaliatory tariffs that harm vulnerable countries. Strategic engagement with the Global South – through initiatives like Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships (CTIPs) or Sustain-able Investment Facilitation Agreements (SIFAs) – offers a timely opportunity to strengthen trust and promote sustainable, inclusive trade.

PD Dr agr. Wolfgang Britz is a Senior Researcher and lecturer at the Institute for Food and Resource Economics, Bonn University.