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Hétfőn közös közlekedésbiztonsági akcióban vettek részt a szakolcai közlekedési rendőrök a Dunaszerdahelyi járásban, összesen 92 szabálysértést regisztráltak.

In early 2025, the new US administration announced a series of tariff increases in violation of its commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO), undermining the very system of trade rules that the US had helped establish after World War II. The US actions led to many retaliatory responses of increased tariffs by trading partners including the European Union (EU). Over the next several months, the US engaged in a series of negotiations leading to so called ‘framework’ agreements with the EU and others.

This paper explores first, the short term implications of these chaotic changes in the world trading regime on the economies of the EU and Greece. Second, it considers how the world trading system will evolve in the medium to longer term and its policy implications for the EU and Greece. The paper concludes that the recent turmoil in international trade should be addressed through the implementation of a basic set of policies to strengthen European integration and institutions as articulated by recent major studies commissioned by the EU, as well as, through trade agreements between the EU and like-minded countries.  These policies should help the European Union rise to the challenges created by the current turmoil and lead to a future strengthening of the WTO.

Read here the policy paper by Constantine Michalopoulos, ELIAMEP Senior Policy Advisor; former senior official World Bank and USAID; Adjunct Professor, American University, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Introduction 

In early 2025, the Greek economy had mostly recovered from the disastrous calamities of a decade earlier and the pandemic’s aftermath. Although income levels had not regained pre debt crisis levels, the economy had been growing steadily for three years. However, continued structural deficiencies, an aging population, as well as technology and climate change, all presented serious challenges to long term economic prospects; and there were two raging wars in the near vicinity. [1]As if these challenges were not enough, the new US administration announced a series of tariff increases in violation of its commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO), undermining the very system of trade rules that the US had helped establish after World War II.

In the US, the administration’s actions prompted numerous challenges to their constitutionality.[2] Internationally, they led to many retaliatory actions by trading partners including the European Union (EU), China and others. Over the next several months, the US backed off a number of the very large early tariff increases and engaged in a series of negotiations leading to so called ‘framework’ agreements with many countries, including the EU. But throughout 2025, the US continued to introduce arbitrary tariff changes, all in violation of the fundamental Most Favored Nation (MFN) non-discrimination principle, enshrined in the WTO, thereby raising significantly the degree of uncertainty in trading transactions.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to explore the short-term implications of these chaotic changes in the world trading regime on the Greek economy; and second, to consider how the world trading system will evolve in the medium to longer term and its implications for the EU and Greece. The analysis, by its very nature, will be tentative, as the policy changes are relatively recent and have not had the time to make a serious impact on trade transactions. Besides, the main new element introduced by the US actions is increased policy uncertainty.

The EU- US Agreement 

The US administration introduced peremptorily and unilaterally a number of tariff changes in early 2025 without offering an authority or justification for them. For example, President Trump announced plans on February 26, 2025, to impose tariffs of 25 percent on imports from the European Union. The major executive action that prompted reaction from the EU occurred on April 2, when the US announced a set of so called “reciprocal” tariffs affecting more than 60 countries, some as high as 50% depending on the countries’ trade balance with the US. According to these, International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs, the US reciprocal rate on imports from the EU would have been set at 20 percent. On May 23, President Trump announced he would be imposing a 50 percent reciprocal tariff on the EU beginning June 1. On May 25, he announced these tariffs would take effect July 9 instead. On July 12, President Trump announced the reciprocal tariffs for the EU would be set at 30 percent by August 1 [4].

In the meantime, the EU retaliated by lifting the suspension of previous tariffs, with rates of up to 50 percent, affecting $8 billion of US exports scheduled for April 1, 2025 and increased tariffs to an additional $20 billion of US exports scheduled for April 13. Finally, on July 15, the EU released a list of $84 billion worth of US goods that would face retaliatory tariffs, if no deal was reached by August 1 [5].

On August 4, 2025, the US and the EU reached a framework agreement on tariffs and other economic issues which governs the tariff rates affecting trade between them to date.

On August 4, 2025, the US and the EU reached a framework agreement on tariffs and other economic issues which governs the tariff rates affecting trade between them to date.

According to the main trade related commitments of the agreement, the US will:

• Apply a maximum, all-inclusive 15% tariff ceiling for EU products, including cars and car parts, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors [6] and [7].
• Apply only MFN tariffs, (which are effectively zero or close to zero) to the following EU products: unavailable natural resources (including cork), all aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals and their ingredients and chemical precursors.
• Impose tariffs of 50% to aluminum and steel products justified by the US under a different exemption, on grounds on national security (US Section 232, of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act).

The EU agreed to:

• Eliminate completely tariffs on a large number of industrial products imported from the US—with an estimated value of €5 billion [8].
• Improve significantly market access to US exports through tariff reductions for certain seafood, nuts, dairy products, fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, processed foods, grains and planting seeds, soybean oilseeds, pork and bison meat and lobster  all implemented via product-specific Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs).

In addition, the two sides agreed to work together to eliminate non-tariff and technical barriers to trade, accept and provide mutual recognition of each other’s standards in automobiles as well co-operate on a number of other important issues affecting trade with China—for example, regarding the latter’s imposition of export controls on rare earths. Finally, the agreement contains a number of EU commitments to ease procedural requirements which the US feels restrain its exports as well as to purchase $40 billion worth of AI chips [9].

There was widespread criticism that the deal was too one-sided favoring the US. But there were also voices suggesting that this was the best the EU could do under the circumstances and that, in any case, there was no logical response to the US requests.

There was widespread criticism that the deal was too one-sided favoring the US. But there were also voices suggesting that this was the best the EU could do under the circumstances and that, in any case, there was no logical response to the US requests [10].

The US actions regarding tariffs were expected to be implemented in some cases as of September 1, 2025 and in others as soon as the EU Commission submitted the needed legislative proposals, which it did in September, 2025. The EU Council took the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including through the establishment of tariff quotas for US products [11].  It is expected that the EU Parliament will complete approval of the relevant legislation by February 2026. At this point it is unclear whether the Parliament will introduce changes in the agreement or what will happen, if such changes are introduced.

Economic Impact on the EU- short term

In the course of 2025 various studies concluded that the US tariffs would result in significant GDP losses both to the US and to the global economy, as well as increased inflationary pressures in the short term. As the year progressed, the estimates of the damage the tariff actions would cause were reduced for several reasons: exporters absorbed some of the increased tariff costs; many importers anticipating the tariffs, had stocked up during the year and the original tariff increases were subsequently reduced.

In the course of 2025 various studies concluded that the US tariffs would result in significant GDP losses both to the US [12] and to the global economy, as well as increased inflationary pressures in the short term [13]. As the year progressed, the estimates of the damage the tariff actions would cause were reduced for several reasons: exporters absorbed some of the increased tariff costs; many importers anticipating the tariffs, had stocked up during the year and the original tariff increases were subsequently reduced [14].

The economic impact of the EU-US trade agreement on individual EU countries will depend on several factors: (a) the amount and composition of each country’s exports to the US; (b) the amount and composition of its imports from the US whose tariffs will be reduced; (c) the specifics of the pass-through in each traded good; (d) any exchange rate changes following the imposition of the tariffs; and (e)  the indirect effects on each country’s future trade of changes in income resulting from the EU-US agreement.

Early studies on the issue [15], suggested that the US tariffs will result in a decline of approximately 0.2-0.3% of EU GDP in 2025. A more recent study [16] confirmed the 0.3 % GDP decline on average and suggested that different countries will have different results depending on the importance of the US in their export market and the composition of their exports. Using a model that took into account the longer term second order effects adversely affecting EU exports as a result of declines in EU and other countries incomes as a consequence of the tariffs, the study suggested a decline of 0.5% on average for 2026. Similar views were expressed by European business in a survey in November 2025 [17]. The most recent IMF World Economic Outlook [14] includes two risk scenarios for 2026: in the worst case, GDP of the euro area would decline by about 1%t below its original baseline in 2026; in the best case, output of the euro area could increase by around 0.7–0.8 percentage points above baseline despite the tariffs. But no studies appear to have included the longer term positive but likely small effects of EU incomes rising as a result of the future reduction of tariff barriers against US imports.

In the first 8 months of 2025, US exports to the EU increased by about 10% and imports, slightly less—around 9.5%. This resulted in an increase in the US trade deficit with the EU in the first eight months of the year from $151.9 billion in 2024 to $165.8 billion in 2025. The results are skewed however, because of very large anticipatory US imports in early 2025. In the months June- August 2025, US imports from the EU declined relative to 2024 [18].

Economic Impact on Greece-short term

Early commentary on the impact of the EU-US agreement on Greece suggested a much higher decline in Greece’s exports and GNP in 2026 than that presented in the above studies. Kathimerini [19] predicted a GDP decline of 0.5%-1.0% in 2025, and smaller effects ranging from 0.2% to 0.4% in 2026 and even smaller declines in 2027.

…the effect of the US tariff increases and the subsequent US-EU trade agreement will result in significantly lower adverse effects on Greek GDP. The main reason for this is that Greece depends much less on the US market for its exports than the EU average.

It is unclear on what analysis these projections were based and no model estimates based on an econometric model of Greece appear to exist. Nevertheless, given the projections for EU as a whole and the size and composition of Greek exports, the analysis below will argue that the effect of the US tariff increases and the subsequent US-EU trade agreement will result in significantly lower adverse effects on Greek GDP. The main reason for this is that Greece depends much less on the US market for its exports than the EU average. Table 1 below shows the evolution of Greek trade with the EU, the US and the rest of the world (ROW) over the 2018-2024, period, i.e. after the Greek economy stabilized from the debt crisis.

Table 1 shows that Greek exports to the US account pretty steadily for about 4% of total Greek exports and about 10% of Greek exports outside the EU. This compares to an average of EU exports to the US of 21% of EU exports to the rest of the world [16]. Roughly speaking, Greece is about half as much exposed to the US market for its exports relative to the average EU member, and much less than countries like Germany or Ireland. The story is similar for Greek imports. Greece has run a small surplus in its trade balance with the US in the last two years while running a persistent huge trade deficit overall. Greece offsets its traditional large trade deficits by running a large surplus in services, especially through earnings from shipping and tourism [21].

The composition of Greek exports to the US does not suggest that Greece would be hit harder than the average EU member by the increased US tariffs. While no detailed estimates are available, the main problem appears to derive from Greece exports of aluminum and steel products which are subject to 50% tariffs (see below Table 2). It should be noted however, that the US tariffs on aluminum (and steel) had been earlier imposed by the US on the grounds of security (Sec. 232) and separately from the IEEPA tariffs that ultimately led to the US- EU agreement.

 

Table 2 shows two dimensions of the importance of aluminum and steel on the Greek economy: first, they are small relative to Greek exports to the US, 7.0% and 2.1% respectively; and second, that the proportion of Greece’s exports of aluminum and steel products to the US are quite small relative to the total Greek exports of these products, 5.1% and 6.5% respectively. The latter would imply that Greek exporters could shift sales of these products elsewhere.[3]

Of the products in which the US is an important market accounting for more than 10%  of total exports, only the agricultural products in the categories of Vegetables and Fruits (20.9%), Essential oils (10.5%) and Edible fruits (16.2%) are likely to be affected by the new US tariffs. And the US has committed that these will not exceed 15%. Greece is not an oil producer and the large exports of oil products  to the US as well as the rest of the world are determined primarily by decisions of the oil companies, some US owned, which import crude oil from the Middle East refine it in Greece and ship out oil products all over the world.  The US importance of the category ‘Aircraft, spacecraft’ probably reflects transactions of air carriers and repairs of aircraft engines and parts as Greece does not produce either aircraft or spacecraft. Greece does produce a variety of crude materials, salt earth etc., for which the US market is significant (21.6%), but as noted earlier, the US will maintain minimal tariffs on these products.

 

Estimates of US trade with Greece for the first eight months of 2025 showed the US to have decreased both its export and its imports to and from Greece- in the case of exports by 10% in the case of imports—i.e. exports from Greece by 3.3% [19].  These data suggest that the pattern of Greece’s trade with the US is somewhat different than that noted earlier for the EU as a whole. It remains to be seen how this pattern will be affected in the longer term by the emerging changes in the world trading system.

Recent reports confirmed the mixed impact of the US tariffs on Greek exports to the US.  Tariffs on edible fruits have been recently removed, but exports of dairy products have been adversely affected. Despite high tariffs, “iron/steel pipes, rose from a zero base in 2023, to €21.8 million in 2024 and to €49.2 million in the April-September 2025 period. Electrical conduits reached €38.4 million in 2024 but during the tariff period they experienced a decrease of 88.1%” [22]. 

On balance, given the relatively small importance of the US market to Greece, compared to other EU countries, it is fair to conclude that the impact of the US-EU agreement on Greek GDP will be significantly smaller than for the EU as a whole. We would guess that the impact could be in the neighborhood of 0.1% to 0.15% reduction of GDP relative to baseline forecasts for 2025 and 2026, much smaller than earlier estimates.

On balance, given the relatively small importance of the US market to Greece, compared to other EU countries, it is fair to conclude that the impact of the US-EU agreement on Greek GDP will be significantly smaller than for the EU as a whole. We would guess that the impact could be in the neighborhood of 0.1% to 0.15% reduction of GDP relative to baseline forecasts for 2025 and 2026, much smaller than earlier estimates. That size of an effect could easily be overwhelmed by other developments in Greece or in the global economy.

The World Trade System

…the US actions on tariffs violated its commitments to the core principle of the WTO of not unilaterally increasing duties that have been capped in previous agreements with its partners (Article II of the GATT) . Similarly, the bilateral deals, such as those with the UK as well as the EU, China, and other countries violate US commitments to the most-favored nation (MFN) non-discrimination clause (Article I of the GATT).

Throughout 2025, the US actions on tariffs violated its commitments to the core principle of the WTO of not unilaterally increasing duties that have been capped in previous agreements with its partners (Article II of the GATT)[4]. Similarly, the bilateral deals, such as those with the UK as well as the EU, China, and other countries violate US commitments to the most-favored nation (MFN) non-discrimination clause (Article I of the GATT). Such preferential deals are permitted only if they are part of an established Free Trade Area or Customs Union. These deals also defy the WTO approach of promoting trade through multilateral negotiations [23] and [24].

For a while, it appeared that the US may wish to leave the WTO. It had withdrawn from other multilateral institutions such as UNESCO and WHO and it had not paid its WTO dues for two years. There were even some voices suggesting that the trading system as a whole would be better off if the US did leave the WTO [25]; or for that matter that it could be expelled [26]. But the US did pay its dues, and others have argued that the US should stay in the WTO as it could provide a useful counterbalance to China which has also been guilty of significant WTO violations.

It is also fair to argue that, in the last twenty years, the WTO based trade system has been undermined by an erosion of global commitments to multilateral rules by many countries including the EU.

It is also fair to argue that, in the last twenty years, the WTO based trade system has been undermined by an erosion of global commitments to multilateral rules by many countries including the EU. It started first, with the failure of completion of the Doha Round of negotiations, which were abandoned after more than a decade of trying—for which, countries like India and China, were as responsible as the EU and the US.  Later, economic and political and developments resulted in reduced emphasis on multilateral approaches to improve firms’ participation in international trade:

• Attempts to facilitate small and medium enterprises foreign trade participation led to “mini-deals” that may be beneficial for a subset of firms in certain sectors but undermine global standards. “The EU has concluded over 2,000 such mini-deals, which cumulatively cover a large share of EU trade participation in global supply chains” [27].
• Countries, and the EU in particular, have established regulatory standards based on concerns about the environment, health and safety, cross border data flows, cyber-security, consumer or worker protection. The national agencies tasked with implementing regulations generally have not wanted, even if they are permitted — to adjust regulatory norms simply to facilitate trade [28].
• The Covid-19 pandemic resulted in a sudden and large contraction in global trade, revealing deep vulnerabilities in international supply chains. This led many countries to introduce policies that promote strategic autonomy, meaning steps that would the ensure availability of critical goods without dependence on foreign suppliers. Governments adopted export restrictions, stockpiling, and incentives for domestic production or near-shoring [27].
• A direct consequence of the strategic autonomy logic was a renewed interest and justification of a wide range of industrial policy measures. Industrial policy became more fashionable and acceptable [29].

Despite, or one would argue, in parallel with these developments, the WTO continued to function. A fisheries agreement came in to force in mid-summer and the EU finalized a WTO compatible agreement with Mercosur that had been under negotiation for more than a decade. And as WTO Director Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala noted in a September 17, 2025 speech, following the US measures there was an 8% decline of trade conducted under MFN rules, but MFN rules continued to apply to 72% of world trade.

In light of these developments, what can be said about the future of rules that would govern world trade? As of November 1, the US average effective tariff rate was 13.1% compared to 2.5% in 2024 [31]. Clearly the most important new element is the introduction of additional uncertainty, for better or worse. On November 14, 2025, the US administration, facing increasingly unfavorable reaction by the US public to the imposition of tariffs on consumer goods, eliminated the   IEEPA tariffs on a whole lot of food and agriculture products. And the constitutionality of all of the IEEPA tariffs is uncertain with the US Supreme Court expected to rule on the issue in the spring of 2026.

Still, given the apparent attraction of tariffs as a foreign policy instrument to President Trump, it is expected that in the event the US Supreme Court rules that the IEEPA tariffs are unconstitutional, the US Administration will seek to justify tariffs under different legislative provisions, such as under section 301 or 202 of the US code or under section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 which gives the President the authority to impose a temporary tariff of up to 15 percent for up to 150 days to address “large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits”. All these measures are likely to be challenged in US courts, resulting in litigation that could easily last another 1-2 years.

This means essentially, that global uncertainty on the rules of international trade is likely to continue at least until the end of the current US administration in 2028.

This means essentially, that global uncertainty on the rules of international trade is likely to continue at least until the end of the current US administration in 2028. A look into the Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU) Index is quite telling in this respect: it shot up in early 2025, came down for a while and shot up again [32]. Other things equal, this factor alone is going to affect adversely the volume of future world trade.

Medium Term Scenarios

The uncertainties surrounding the future of the world trade system have led to the elaboration of many alternative scenarios. In considering these scenarios, one should keep in mind that trade negotiations take a long time to conclude as they involve detailed analysis of data, something that the ‘framework’ agreements concluded by the US did not do. Nevertheless, all scenarios about the future of word trade in the medium term—until 2028, are bleak.

The scenarios discussed below do not include what might happen, if there is a major political or military conflict involving the three major protagonists in world trade, the US, the EU and China. Also, for reasons discussed above, the scenarios do not include a ‘Retreat’ scenario in which the US administration, faced with a recession and declining public support, reverses course and abandons its WTO inconsistent tariff policy.

Scenario 1- Malaise

Under this scenario, WTO members would tolerate higher tariffs and US-dictated deals for as long as they last, while continuing to go about their other WTO business as usual. “The relevance of the WTO will continue to be eroded, though its stabilizing influence may not disappear entirely”[5]. But this scenario contains a lot of complex issues for WTO members. For example, Brazil may file a complaint in the WTO that the US-EU agreement that gives preferential treatment to US exports to the EU damages Brazil’s interests. In this case the EU may not wish to jeopardize its agreement with the US or face counter-measures, in which case it may need to appeal through the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) members [33].

It is unclear how long WTO members would be willing to accept this situation. Perhaps they will wait until the end of the current US administration- while in the meantime they pursue other options. In the case of the EU, it is clear that it would be desirable to explore links with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). A free trade agreement between the EU and CPTPP will account for 30% of world trade. Krueger has argued that the two groups should combine to establish a new organization, the GTO without the US [25].

Scenario 2 –Fragmentation

Under this scenario fragmentation accelerates. The MFN principle and multilateralism are further weakened and give way to a new logic: every country or exporting firm cuts the best deal for itself.[6]

The scenario has many regional variants. If the WTO continues to produce nothing and the EU combines with CPTPP and others to produce a modern agreement, is it necessary to anchor it in the WTO ?

A lot will depend on what role China will want to play. Under one variant, China could take the lead in organizing a large group of countries, for example through an expanded BRICS, to set up their own system. But many countries are worried about unfair Chinese policies that support Chinese firms as it promotes its manufacturing exports because of over capacity at home; and/ or countries may be concerned about China’s willingness to employ trade as a coercive instrument for foreign policy purposes.

Still, such an initiative by China could force Europe to work with Japan, South Korea, and Australia to create their own group and the US with some Latin American and Caribbean to establish yet another. Africa would strengthen its regional trade institutions and possibly ally itself with the BRICS. In all these variants, the WTO is not closed down, but becomes increasingly irrelevant. On the other hand, China has recently indicated that it is willing to abandon its WTO treatment as a ‘developing country’ suggesting a willingness to work within the WTO and thereby dropping a source of a lot of disputes.

The Future of EU Trade Policy

In these uncertain times, it would be natural for the EU to take the lead in strengthening the global multilateral trade system, to the benefit of its members, including Greece but also to the benefit of global trade and the reduction of global poverty.

Co-operation in trade was the essence of what started European integration through the Treaty of Rome more than 70 years ago. In these uncertain times, it would be natural for the EU to take the lead in strengthening the global multilateral trade system, to the benefit of its members, including Greece but also to the benefit of global trade and the reduction of global poverty.

EU should start working hard to strengthen its links with CPTPP. Combined with the EU- Mercosur agreement, this would make a formidable group of countries which could become the basis of attracting other members from Africa and Latin America.

The EU Commission views at this point is that an EU-CPTPP link is a complement and not a substitute to the WTO [34].[7]. In my view, EU should start working hard to strengthen its links with CPTPP. Combined with the EU- Mercosur agreement, this would make a formidable group of countries which could become the basis of attracting other members from Africa and Latin America. It could then work with China and possibly the US to strengthen the multilateral trade system and the WTO.

Such an effort should have two dimensions: first, work with others to establish needed reforms to the WTO; second, adopt internal EU policies that use trade to support equitable and sustainable economic growth for its people.

Regarding WTO reform Mavroidis [24] suggests that it may be useful for the international community to attempt a last-ditch negotiation to bring the US back to the multilateral house, and they should be prepared to amend the WTO’s rules in order to lure the US back to the spirit of the multilateral agenda that would benefit the institution at large. This initial agenda should take care of the US’s concerns such as the introduction of more flexibility in the current Safeguards Agreement or to deal with oversupply in particular sectors as well as amending the Compulsory Third-Party Adjudication (CTPA).

This is certainly worthwhile. The question is at what point it should be done. The current administration has in mind a totally different non- multilateral approach to international trade, feels that the “ancient régime” is obsolete, and should be substituted with a new supposedly more fair and balanced scheme. In any case, putting together an EU- CPTPP understanding will take time, after which a different US administration may be in place which may be more agreeable to global trade agreements. 

There is a need to revise the basis of participation in the WTO by different groups of countries.

It is clear that WTO reforms are needed in several areas in addition to the ones noted above that bother the US. These include the following five areas:

• There is a need to revise the basis of participation in the WTO by different groups of countries. The existing provisions regarding special and differential treatment that permit a group of countries to participate on the basis of more limited commitments to general rules for being ‘developing’ based on ‘self-selection’ proved unworkable during the Doha Round[8]. Yet, there is a need to reduce differences in national regulatory regimes that impact international trade through the mutual adoption of agreed good regulatory practices to which not every WTO member can or may be willing to adhere. Such efforts can be pursued among like-minded states — that is, on a plurilateral and variable-geometry basis. Open Plurilateral Agreements (OPAs) — agreements between groups of countries on specific policies that significantly affect international trade costs and that are open to participation to any country willing to implement a set of agreed rules and disciplines can make a major contribution to facilitating trade. Such agreements can be pursued in several areas such as Digital Trade, Climate and Environment [28], as well as subsidies (see below).[9]

• The WTO subsidies agreement should be revised in order to address several issues: first, is the issue of how to deal with subsidies that provide public goods—including those that address environmental issues. A subsidy that reduces world market prices for products like solar panels or wind turbines has positive consequences for the energy transition, but negative economic repercussions for local producers. Revisiting current WTO rules that center on the adverse effects of foreign subsidies on national firms to recognize that some types of subsidies may be appropriate and desirable to address market failures, in the process benefiting foreign countries, is an important subject for plurilateral negotiations. Still other issues arise from the complexities involving subsidies of trade in global value chains, as well as the desire to pursue ‘industrial’ policies.

• The definition of ‘economic security’ needs to be clarified as the relevant WTO provisions are too vague.

• There is a need to make meaningful progress of liberalizing trade in services. Everybody is infatuated with the desire to protect and restore production of goods, in particular manufacturing, forgetting that services will inexorably rise as a share of incomes and output.

• The link between trade policy and environmental action needs to be clarified especially as the EU is starting to implement its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in January 1, 2026. As noted above, this is an area where an OPA can be especially useful as it is quite clear and it is internationally agreed that poorer countries are not in a position to make the same kind of commitments as more developed economies. A specific proposal for an OPA of such a ‘club’ is contained in [37].

This is a tall order of reforms that need to be undertaken. They will take time to negotiate in part because the political economy of negotiating trade issues resulting from regulatory regimes is more difficult than negotiating a mutual reduction of quotas or tariffs where the costs to some domestic producers can be offset by gains of exporters.  Also, the Doha failure suggests that countries are not likely to want to try to have a ‘Round’ where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed by every participant. A more modest approach using OPAs may be a better avenue for future reform.

These efforts must be accompanied by EU policies that use trade to support a sustainable and equitable growth of incomes. In this connection, measures that raise productivity of EU producers are critical.

These efforts must be accompanied by EU policies that use trade to support a sustainable and equitable growth of incomes. In this connection, measures that raise productivity of EU producers are critical. Since 2019 labor productivity in the EU grew by 2% compared to 10 % in the US [38]. According to a recent study, the main difference between US and EU in labor productivity growth is that EU productivity rose much less than that of the US in the services sector since 2000 [39].

The Draghi study commissioned by the EU in 2024 contains a large number of recommendations on how to raise productivity, some of which are only now slowly being implemented [40]. In particular, there is concern that the EU is lagging far behind the US and China in the application of AI which is critical to future productivity growth. According to Draghi’s report, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), introduced by the EU to protect citizen’s privacy in 2018, is a drag on Europe’s competitiveness. “Europe must move beyond fragmented and overly rigid regulatory structures if it wants to remain competitive in a fast-changing digital landscape. Evidence already shows that GDPR data transfer rules have constrained export potential, and additional regulatory layers introduced through the AI Act risk amplifying these pressures”[41].

Measures to promote diversification of imports of oil and natural gas, by accelerating the green energy transformation are of obvious importance to future trade policy as well as steps to diversify supply of critical minerals away from China. These efforts, however, should not lead to generalized promotion of import substitution through protection incompatible with WTO provisions or commitments with regional trade partners.

“A ‘manufacturing-first’ attitude has taken hold in the European economic policy discussion. New strategies and industrial policies are designed with the ambition of boosting development and output in traditional industrial sectors” [42].[10] There is a clear danger, that disturbances in international trade will encourage the establishment of inefficient EU production —reshoring or home-shoring justified on the vagaries of ensuring adequate supplies of ‘critical’ products from global supply chains—while the future lies in services where growth has been and likely will continue to be greater than in manufacturing; and where the EU is the largest exporter in the world.

Implications for Greek Policy

For Greece, foreign trade policy is determined at the EU level.

For Greece, foreign trade policy is determined at the EU level. This should be helpful in protecting its interests through the large weight that Brussels would bring to bear in any negotiations with China or the US. [11] There are also serious limits to what individual countries can do to promote exports. As Greece has a very small share of exports relative to its GDP, there is a temptation to suggest that export promotion agencies can correct this problem [43]. They obviously can be of some help, but they are not likely to be determinant of overall performance, and in a country like Greece, where there is a tendency of cronyism, there are dangers of trying to pick winners by supporting friends. The best way to promote exports is through general policies that increase productivity and reduce bureaucratic hassles [44].

In this connection, the recommendations of the Draghi report are especially relevant. In many respects, the report sounds as if it was talking specifically about problems facing Greek industry and more generally the Greek economy. The importance of productivity growth to export performance has been well established. In this connection, I argued long ago that the export performance of the ‘Asian Targets’ in the 1960’s was critically dependent on the growth of total factor productivity [45].

Among the Draghi’s report many recommendations are proposals to raise productivity through more training as well as improved technology through increased expenditures on research and development. Implementing these proposals in Greece would require significant increases in both public and private investment from the current levels of roughly 15% of GDP.

Among the Draghi’s report many recommendations are proposals to raise productivity through more training as well as improved technology through increased expenditures on research and development. Implementing these proposals in Greece would require significant increases in both public and private investment from the current levels of roughly 15% of GDP. EU support can be helpful to Greece in this area, but it cannot substitute for stronger and better implemented public sector investments.

Conclusion

In sum, the recent turmoil in international trade should not result in a deviation from the basic set of policies that Greek governments need to pursue in collaboration with their European counterparts to strengthen European integration and institutions. They should do so based on the policy recommendations contained in the several studies referred to above. As it has done in the past, Europe can rise to the challenges created by the current turmoil and restore faith in the prospects of a sustainable and equitable future for its people. This will not happen through retrenchment and protection but through openness to trade. The EU is in the best position to lead a future restoration of a trade system governed by multilateral rules and agreements and a strengthened WTO.

[1]For a discussion see [1] and [2].

[2] Lower US courts judged the IEEPA tariffs to be unconstitutional, but the US Supreme Court permitted them to be retained until it passed a final judgement on them expected in early 2026 [3].

[3] There may be limit to such a shift, as both products, especially aluminum, appear to be in global over supply.

[4] GATT-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade- incorporated in the treaty establishing the WTO.

[5] This scenario is basically the same as what Cernat [30] called ‘Sclerosis”.

[6] This is similar to Cernat’s’[30] third scenario ‘contagion’.

[7] Experience with international organizations over the last century suggests that they are almost as difficult to shut down—even after their usefulness is questionable [35] as to create new ones

[8] For a detailed discussion of the absurdities in the current system see [37]. For example, Turkey and Israel just like China were considered ‘developing countries’ just because they said so.

[9] Such agreements can also be pursued outside the WTO and at some point brought into the system.

[10] As well as in the United States.

[11] But EU membership may not provide cover in the wider US-China conflict: The recently appointed US Ambassador to Greece expressed her concerns to Prime Minister Mitsotakis about the 67% ownership of the Port of Piraeus by the Chinese firm Cosco and suggested that Greece may wish to force a sale of it in the future. To which the Prime Minister responded that agreements have to be respected [46].

 

 

DIW Managerinnen-Barometer: Frauenanteile in Vorständen und Aufsichtsräten stagnieren 2025 vielerorts oder sinken sogar – Nur Finanzsektor bildet Ausnahme – Rückblick auf 20 Jahre Managerinnen-Barometer zeigt Fortschritte, steigende Frauenanteile sind aber kein Selbstläufer – Zusätzliche Studie ...

Heute wurden SPD-Vorschläge zur Reform der Erbschaftsteuer bekannt. DIW-Steuerexperte Stefan Bach kommentiert den Vorschlag wie folgt:

Die Erbschaftsteuer ist reformbedürftig, weil sie in der jetzigen Ausgestaltung durch Steuerprivilegien bei Firmen- und Immobilienübertragungen die Vermögenskonzentration erhöht. Die Vorschläge der SPD gehen in die richtige Richtung. Wenn man die Freibeträge auf eine Million Euro erhöht, halbiert sich die Zahl der Steuerpflichtigen und der Bürokratieaufwand sinkt damit kräftig. Zugleich sollen diese Freibeträge lebenslang gelten und sich nicht alle zehn Jahre erneuern wie bisher, was gerade viele Hochvermögende nutzen, um die Erbschaftsteuer zu umgehen. Kleine und mittlere Unternehmen bis zu fünf Millionen Euro zusätzlich zu entlasten, ist sinnvoll, gegebenenfalls muss man die Steuersätze begrenzen. Auf jeden Fall sollte man die Belastung bei Firmenübertragungen langfristig stunden und verrenten, damit sie aus dem Ertrag abgezahlt werden kann und die Unternehmen nicht in ihrer Existenz gefährdet sind.

The policy brief by Dr. Ioannis Armakolas (Head, South-East Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & Director, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Ioannis Alexandris (Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & Researcher, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration), “Enlargement and the EU Budget: Is the price to pay high? The case against fiscal alarmism”, was prepared in the framework ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans. 

At a time when EU enlargement is increasingly contested by Eurosceptic and radical-right forces, the policy brief examines one of the most politically sensitive aspects of the debate: the budgetary and fiscal implications of enlargement. Building on think nea’s thematic report on radical-right narratives, the authors analyse how fears about costs to taxpayers, agricultural subsidies, and cohesion funds are mobilised to undermine public support for further EU expansion, particularly in net-contributor Member States.

Drawing on recent EU budget proposals for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, as well as economic modelling and lessons from previous enlargements, the brief demonstrates that the actual fiscal cost of enlargement is modest and manageable, especially when phased-in mechanisms and structural reforms are applied. At the same time, it shows that EU transfers are transformational for candidate countries, particularly in the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, supporting convergence, institutional reform and infrastructure development.

The analysis also highlights the opportunity costs of non-enlargement, emphasising how past rounds of enlargement generated significant economic gains for existing Member States through trade, investment, labour mobility and integrated supply chains. In this light, the brief reframes enlargement not as a fiscal burden but as a strategic investment in Europe’s competitiveness, resilience and long-term stability.

The paper concludes with concrete policy recommendations on how to reframe public debate, embed enlargement within the EU’s new competitiveness and strategic autonomy agenda, and counter fiscal alarmism by presenting enlargement as a win-win process that benefits both current and future Member States.

You can read the policy brief here.

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network, led by Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

In Folge #38 des Podcast 'fossilfrei' sprechen Wolf-Peter Schill und Alexander Roth mit Prof. Dr. Tomaso Duso, Vorsitzender der Monopolkommission und Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte am DIW Berlin, über das aktuelle Sektorgutachten Energie der Kommission. Dabei liegt der Fokus auf dem ...

Die CSU will Hunderttausende abschieben. Das wäre ein Wohlstandsrisiko. Flüchtlinge arbeiten oft in systemrelevanten Berufen und stabilisieren die Sozialkassen.  , Die CSU hat eine Abschiebeoffensive vorgeschlagen – mit Linienflügen nach Afghanistan und Syrien. Das wäre für Deutschland ein ökonomisches Eigentor und ein gesellschaftlicher Rückschritt. Der CSU-Vorschlag ist reiner Populismus. Er widerspricht dem Kern des deutschen Asylrechts und ignoriert die ...

Es besteht die Gefahr einer systemischen Verschuldungskrise in Sub-Sahara Afrika, wo momentan 21 Länder hoch verschuldet sind. Besonders problematisch sind die hohen Zahlungen für den Schuldendienst auf ausländische Schulden. Angesichts der hohen Verschuldung in einigen Ländern ist eine zeitnahe Umstrukturierung der Schulden unerlässlich. Zudem erschweren die geopolitischen Spannungen die Vereinbarung neuer, umfassender Instrumente zur Umstrukturierung von Schulden. Das G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments wurde Ende 2020 eingeführt. Um eine zügige und zeitnahe Schuldenumstrukturierung zu gewährleisten, sind folgende Reformen des G20 Common Frameworks erforderlich: Erstens sollte zu Beginn des Umschuldungsprozesses eine Roadmap mit Zeitpunkten für die Schuldenumstrukturierung erstellt und Gläubigerkomitees gebildet werden. Zweitens sollte die Transparenz über die Schuldenvereinbarungen erhöht werden. Ein weiterer Vorschlag der UN ist die Einführung eines Internationalen Schuldenregisters. Im Abschlussdokument der vierten UN-Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung werden nicht nur einige der oben genannten Vorschläge benannt, sondern es werden auch eine Reihe innovativer Reformen aufgeführt. Zur Umsetzung der in diesem Dokument festgelegten Verpflichtungen wurde die sogenannte „Aktionsplattform von Sevilla” ins Leben gerufen. Beispiele hierfür sind: (i) Die Plattform für Kreditnehmer; (ii) Ein bei der Weltbank angesiedeltes globales Zentrum für Debt Swaps für Entwicklung und (iii) Die „Allianz für Schuldenpausenklauseln“. Einerseits sollten afrikanische Staaten durch Reformen ihrer Steuersysteme und den Ausbau ihrer lokalen Finanzmärkte dazu in Lage versetzt werden, mehr eigene Ressourcen zu generieren. Andererseits sind die hochverschuldeten ärmsten Länder Afrikas auf eine Schuldenerleichterung sowie die Unterstützung der internationalen Gemeinschaft angewiesen. Andernfalls bestünde die Gefahr, dass die in der letzten Dekade erzielten Entwicklungsfortschritte zunichte gehen.

Es besteht die Gefahr einer systemischen Verschuldungskrise in Sub-Sahara Afrika, wo momentan 21 Länder hoch verschuldet sind. Besonders problematisch sind die hohen Zahlungen für den Schuldendienst auf ausländische Schulden. Angesichts der hohen Verschuldung in einigen Ländern ist eine zeitnahe Umstrukturierung der Schulden unerlässlich. Zudem erschweren die geopolitischen Spannungen die Vereinbarung neuer, umfassender Instrumente zur Umstrukturierung von Schulden. Das G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments wurde Ende 2020 eingeführt. Um eine zügige und zeitnahe Schuldenumstrukturierung zu gewährleisten, sind folgende Reformen des G20 Common Frameworks erforderlich: Erstens sollte zu Beginn des Umschuldungsprozesses eine Roadmap mit Zeitpunkten für die Schuldenumstrukturierung erstellt und Gläubigerkomitees gebildet werden. Zweitens sollte die Transparenz über die Schuldenvereinbarungen erhöht werden. Ein weiterer Vorschlag der UN ist die Einführung eines Internationalen Schuldenregisters. Im Abschlussdokument der vierten UN-Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung werden nicht nur einige der oben genannten Vorschläge benannt, sondern es werden auch eine Reihe innovativer Reformen aufgeführt. Zur Umsetzung der in diesem Dokument festgelegten Verpflichtungen wurde die sogenannte „Aktionsplattform von Sevilla” ins Leben gerufen. Beispiele hierfür sind: (i) Die Plattform für Kreditnehmer; (ii) Ein bei der Weltbank angesiedeltes globales Zentrum für Debt Swaps für Entwicklung und (iii) Die „Allianz für Schuldenpausenklauseln“. Einerseits sollten afrikanische Staaten durch Reformen ihrer Steuersysteme und den Ausbau ihrer lokalen Finanzmärkte dazu in Lage versetzt werden, mehr eigene Ressourcen zu generieren. Andererseits sind die hochverschuldeten ärmsten Länder Afrikas auf eine Schuldenerleichterung sowie die Unterstützung der internationalen Gemeinschaft angewiesen. Andernfalls bestünde die Gefahr, dass die in der letzten Dekade erzielten Entwicklungsfortschritte zunichte gehen.

Es besteht die Gefahr einer systemischen Verschuldungskrise in Sub-Sahara Afrika, wo momentan 21 Länder hoch verschuldet sind. Besonders problematisch sind die hohen Zahlungen für den Schuldendienst auf ausländische Schulden. Angesichts der hohen Verschuldung in einigen Ländern ist eine zeitnahe Umstrukturierung der Schulden unerlässlich. Zudem erschweren die geopolitischen Spannungen die Vereinbarung neuer, umfassender Instrumente zur Umstrukturierung von Schulden. Das G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments wurde Ende 2020 eingeführt. Um eine zügige und zeitnahe Schuldenumstrukturierung zu gewährleisten, sind folgende Reformen des G20 Common Frameworks erforderlich: Erstens sollte zu Beginn des Umschuldungsprozesses eine Roadmap mit Zeitpunkten für die Schuldenumstrukturierung erstellt und Gläubigerkomitees gebildet werden. Zweitens sollte die Transparenz über die Schuldenvereinbarungen erhöht werden. Ein weiterer Vorschlag der UN ist die Einführung eines Internationalen Schuldenregisters. Im Abschlussdokument der vierten UN-Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung werden nicht nur einige der oben genannten Vorschläge benannt, sondern es werden auch eine Reihe innovativer Reformen aufgeführt. Zur Umsetzung der in diesem Dokument festgelegten Verpflichtungen wurde die sogenannte „Aktionsplattform von Sevilla” ins Leben gerufen. Beispiele hierfür sind: (i) Die Plattform für Kreditnehmer; (ii) Ein bei der Weltbank angesiedeltes globales Zentrum für Debt Swaps für Entwicklung und (iii) Die „Allianz für Schuldenpausenklauseln“. Einerseits sollten afrikanische Staaten durch Reformen ihrer Steuersysteme und den Ausbau ihrer lokalen Finanzmärkte dazu in Lage versetzt werden, mehr eigene Ressourcen zu generieren. Andererseits sind die hochverschuldeten ärmsten Länder Afrikas auf eine Schuldenerleichterung sowie die Unterstützung der internationalen Gemeinschaft angewiesen. Andernfalls bestünde die Gefahr, dass die in der letzten Dekade erzielten Entwicklungsfortschritte zunichte gehen.

Global public goods (GPGs) are goods that are produced locally but have global effects. GPGs are essential for securing global development. The climate and biodiversity crises, pandemics, as well as fragility, conflict and violence are threatening livelihoods and well-being around the world, and addressing them would have enormous positive economic and social effects. However, the cross-border externalities involved are not being fully taken into account by countries, and hence these GPGs are still underprovided compared with what would be globally optimal. One year ago, the World Bank launched the Framework for Financial Incentives (FFI) to strengthen the support of GPGs in its operations. This novel instrument encourages countries to implement investment projects and policies that have positive spillovers to other countries by offering targeted financial incentives. As a core element of the World Bank’s Evolution reform, the FFI reflects the recognition that relatively modest investments in client countries can generate substantial global benefits – for other developing and emerging economies as well as for the Bank’s shareholder countries. Its challenges lie in incorporating the non-financial aspects of GPGs and the multi-faceted motivations to provide them in bankable operations. This policy brief discusses the relevance of GPGs for development and presents the World Bank’s approach to supporting their provision in client countries through the FFI. The key takeaways are:
• GPGs are not all those that are commonly shared or agreed upon as goals but are defined by the specific problem structure that the involved cross-border externalities entail. 
• Investment in GPGs can generate substantial benefits – not only for developing and emerging economies, but also for high-income countries that make up the World Bank’s largest shareholders. Consequently, both out of enlightened self-interest and as a cost-effective way to advance global sustainable development at a time when international development budgets are undergoing significant reductions, shareholder countries should increase their contributions to the FFI. This applies in particular to those provided to the Livable Planet Fund, which provides the essential grant financing for countries’ GPG-related projects.
• To retain and strengthen confidence among stakeholders, the FFI must deploy its resources efficiently. This implies offering grants only when projects’ overall domestic benefits are insufficient to motivate countries to provide GPGs on their own, and extending loans instead when client countries have sufficient self-interest to ensure repayment. The assessment of costs and benefits is complex, but it should improve with experience and become increasingly standardised. To signal its effectiveness, the FFI should pursue full transparency in its allocation decisions and undertake systematic impact assessments.

Global public goods (GPGs) are goods that are produced locally but have global effects. GPGs are essential for securing global development. The climate and biodiversity crises, pandemics, as well as fragility, conflict and violence are threatening livelihoods and well-being around the world, and addressing them would have enormous positive economic and social effects. However, the cross-border externalities involved are not being fully taken into account by countries, and hence these GPGs are still underprovided compared with what would be globally optimal. One year ago, the World Bank launched the Framework for Financial Incentives (FFI) to strengthen the support of GPGs in its operations. This novel instrument encourages countries to implement investment projects and policies that have positive spillovers to other countries by offering targeted financial incentives. As a core element of the World Bank’s Evolution reform, the FFI reflects the recognition that relatively modest investments in client countries can generate substantial global benefits – for other developing and emerging economies as well as for the Bank’s shareholder countries. Its challenges lie in incorporating the non-financial aspects of GPGs and the multi-faceted motivations to provide them in bankable operations. This policy brief discusses the relevance of GPGs for development and presents the World Bank’s approach to supporting their provision in client countries through the FFI. The key takeaways are:
• GPGs are not all those that are commonly shared or agreed upon as goals but are defined by the specific problem structure that the involved cross-border externalities entail. 
• Investment in GPGs can generate substantial benefits – not only for developing and emerging economies, but also for high-income countries that make up the World Bank’s largest shareholders. Consequently, both out of enlightened self-interest and as a cost-effective way to advance global sustainable development at a time when international development budgets are undergoing significant reductions, shareholder countries should increase their contributions to the FFI. This applies in particular to those provided to the Livable Planet Fund, which provides the essential grant financing for countries’ GPG-related projects.
• To retain and strengthen confidence among stakeholders, the FFI must deploy its resources efficiently. This implies offering grants only when projects’ overall domestic benefits are insufficient to motivate countries to provide GPGs on their own, and extending loans instead when client countries have sufficient self-interest to ensure repayment. The assessment of costs and benefits is complex, but it should improve with experience and become increasingly standardised. To signal its effectiveness, the FFI should pursue full transparency in its allocation decisions and undertake systematic impact assessments.

Global public goods (GPGs) are goods that are produced locally but have global effects. GPGs are essential for securing global development. The climate and biodiversity crises, pandemics, as well as fragility, conflict and violence are threatening livelihoods and well-being around the world, and addressing them would have enormous positive economic and social effects. However, the cross-border externalities involved are not being fully taken into account by countries, and hence these GPGs are still underprovided compared with what would be globally optimal. One year ago, the World Bank launched the Framework for Financial Incentives (FFI) to strengthen the support of GPGs in its operations. This novel instrument encourages countries to implement investment projects and policies that have positive spillovers to other countries by offering targeted financial incentives. As a core element of the World Bank’s Evolution reform, the FFI reflects the recognition that relatively modest investments in client countries can generate substantial global benefits – for other developing and emerging economies as well as for the Bank’s shareholder countries. Its challenges lie in incorporating the non-financial aspects of GPGs and the multi-faceted motivations to provide them in bankable operations. This policy brief discusses the relevance of GPGs for development and presents the World Bank’s approach to supporting their provision in client countries through the FFI. The key takeaways are:
• GPGs are not all those that are commonly shared or agreed upon as goals but are defined by the specific problem structure that the involved cross-border externalities entail. 
• Investment in GPGs can generate substantial benefits – not only for developing and emerging economies, but also for high-income countries that make up the World Bank’s largest shareholders. Consequently, both out of enlightened self-interest and as a cost-effective way to advance global sustainable development at a time when international development budgets are undergoing significant reductions, shareholder countries should increase their contributions to the FFI. This applies in particular to those provided to the Livable Planet Fund, which provides the essential grant financing for countries’ GPG-related projects.
• To retain and strengthen confidence among stakeholders, the FFI must deploy its resources efficiently. This implies offering grants only when projects’ overall domestic benefits are insufficient to motivate countries to provide GPGs on their own, and extending loans instead when client countries have sufficient self-interest to ensure repayment. The assessment of costs and benefits is complex, but it should improve with experience and become increasingly standardised. To signal its effectiveness, the FFI should pursue full transparency in its allocation decisions and undertake systematic impact assessments.

Bonn, 12. Januar 2026. Unverhohlene Machtpolitik lässt die multilaterale Ordnung bröckeln. Europa muss strategische Autonomie ausbauen und die Kooperation mit Mittelmächten stärken.

Das neue Jahr beginnt mit einem Donnerschlag: einem völkerrechtswidrigen Eingriff in die staatliche Souveränität Venezuelas und der Entführung des autokratisch regierenden Präsidenten Maduro. Während die Zukunft Venezuelas offen ist, inszenieren sich die USA geopolitisch: Die auf internationalem Recht und gemeinsamen Prinzipien basierende multilaterale Ordnung bröckelt weiter. Das Denken in Machtsphären wird immer unverhohlener durchgesetzt. Russlands Invasion der Ukraine, Chinas Machtprojektionen im Südchinesischen Meer und nun das Vorgehen der USA in Venezuela zeigen: Machtpolitik verdrängt Recht. Währenddessen ringen Mittelmächte wie Deutschland und die Europäische Union (EU) um eine gemeinsame Haltung.

Schon im vergangenen Jahr waren die multilateralen Systeme so stark unter Druck wie selten zuvor. Die Vereinten Nationen (VN) befinden sich in einem tiefgreifenden Reformprozess. Massive Budgetkürzungen erzwingen institutionelle Veränderungen. Das OECD-Entwicklungssystem steckt in einer tiefen Krise – aufgrund finanzieller Einschnitte vieler Geberländer und asymmetrischer Geber-Nehmer-Attitüden, die den gegenseitigen Abhängigkeiten des 21. Jahrhunderts nicht mehr entsprechen. Während die Folgen des Klimawandels immer deutlicher zutage treten, hat die Klimakonferenz in Brasilien infolge unzureichender Handlungsbereitschaft der wichtigsten Emittenten nicht die erhofften Fortschritte gebracht. Auch das Welthandelssystem steht unter erheblichem Druck: Von den USA ausgelöste Zollkriege treffen auf anhaltenden Reformstau innerhalb der Welthandelsorganisation. Die Liste ließe sich fortsetzen.

Strategische Autonomie braucht verlässliche Partnerschaften

Gleichzeitig sind die Akteure im internationalen System erkennbar, die – neben Europa und Deutschland – weiterhin auf Kooperation und funktionsfähige multilaterale Systeme setzen. Im Rahmen seiner Präsidentschaft der letztjährigen Klimakonferenz setzte sich Brasilien für eine ambitionierte Klimapolitik ein. Südafrika legte während seiner G20-Präsidentschaft den Schwerpunkt auf Lösungsansätze für Schulden, Ernährungssicherheit und Klimafinanzierung. Auch Indonesien und Indien engagierten sich im Rahmen ihrer jeweiligen G20-Präsidentschaften in den vergangenen Jahren für eine entwicklungsorientierte und kooperative internationale Ordnung.

Und Europa? Die verhaltenen Reaktionen auf den US-Angriff auf Venezuela machen deutlich, wie stark Europa weiterhin von den USA abhängig ist. Dies umfasst seine Verteidigungsfähigkeit gegenüber Russland in der Ukraine ebenso wie mögliche künftige Auseinandersetzungen (Beispiel: Grönland).

Das Jahr 2026 wird von Disruption und Reform geprägt sein. Für Europa, die EU und Deutschland bedeutet dies, die eigene strategische Autonomie auszubauen und sich unabhängiger zu machen – von den USA wie auch von China.

Dies setzt voraus, die Kooperation mit den Mittelmächten Lateinamerikas, Afrikas und Asiens gezielt auszubauen. Der Abschluss des Handelsabkommens mit MERCOSUR war längst überfällig. Die Ministerkonferenz der Welthandelsorganisation im März 2026 in Kamerun sollte die EU nutzen, um umfassende Reformen im Welthandelssystem mit auf den Weg zu bringen und hierüber auch die Kritik von Ländern wie Südafrika und Indien zu adressieren.

Mit geeinter Stimme handeln

Ein entscheidender Hebel für die Handlungsfähigkeit Europas ist der neue Mehrjährige Finanzrahmen sowie das darin vorgeschlagene Global Europe Instrument. Die laufenden Verhandlungen sollten genutzt werden, um Europas Wettbewerbsfähigkeit durch Partnerschaften für nachhaltige Entwicklung zu stärken, externe Handlungsfähigkeit kohärent zu unterstützen und langfristige Investitionen in globale öffentliche Güter zu sichern.

Gleichzeitig muss Europa Wege finden, in internationalen Gremien mit geeinter Stimme zu sprechen. Die Mitgliedstaaten der EU – auch in Kooperation mit Großbritannien – sollten ihre institutionellen Rollen in multilateralen Systemen stärker nutzen, z.B. durch die Erhöhung der Kernfinanzierungsbeiträge im VN-System, als Anteilseignerin in multilateralen Entwicklungsbanken und durch gemeinsame europäische Sitze oder Team Europe-Stimmrechtsgruppen. 

Deutschland muss Impulse setzen

Der G7 unter französischer Präsidentschaft kommt in 2026 eine wichtige Rolle zu, insbesondere angesichts der blockierten Lage in der G20 unter US-Präsidentschaft. Hier sollten die vier europäischen G7-Länder, gemeinsam mit EU, Afrikanischer Union und den Mittelmächten des Südens – auch gegen den Widerstand der USA – Reformimpulse setzen, um weltwirtschaftliche Ungleichgewichte, wie in Finanz- und Digitalisierungssystemen, abzubauen.

Als größte Volkswirtschaft im Zentrum Europas muss sich Deutschland mit eigenen Impulsen – vom Schutz globaler Gemeingüter, über Wirtschaftskooperation im wechselseitigen Interesse bis hin zur Stärkung der EU als globaler Akteur – in die vielfältigen internationalen Reformprozesse einbringen. Mit der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, der Hamburg Sustainability Conference oder der angekündigten Nord-Süd-Kommission hat Deutschland Plattformen, um auf die Mittelmächte dieser Welt zuzugehen.

Auch verfügt Deutschland mit seiner Tradition der kooperativen Politikgestaltung über Glaubwürdigkeit, die in einer zunehmend multipolaren Welt Grundlage einer gestaltenden Kooperationspolitik ist. Die laufenden Reformen der deutschen Entwicklungs- und Außenpolitik sollten an diese Ressource anknüpfen und sie konsequent als strategisches Kooperationsinstrument weiterentwickeln.

Bonn, 12. Januar 2026. Unverhohlene Machtpolitik lässt die multilaterale Ordnung bröckeln. Europa muss strategische Autonomie ausbauen und die Kooperation mit Mittelmächten stärken.

Das neue Jahr beginnt mit einem Donnerschlag: einem völkerrechtswidrigen Eingriff in die staatliche Souveränität Venezuelas und der Entführung des autokratisch regierenden Präsidenten Maduro. Während die Zukunft Venezuelas offen ist, inszenieren sich die USA geopolitisch: Die auf internationalem Recht und gemeinsamen Prinzipien basierende multilaterale Ordnung bröckelt weiter. Das Denken in Machtsphären wird immer unverhohlener durchgesetzt. Russlands Invasion der Ukraine, Chinas Machtprojektionen im Südchinesischen Meer und nun das Vorgehen der USA in Venezuela zeigen: Machtpolitik verdrängt Recht. Währenddessen ringen Mittelmächte wie Deutschland und die Europäische Union (EU) um eine gemeinsame Haltung.

Schon im vergangenen Jahr waren die multilateralen Systeme so stark unter Druck wie selten zuvor. Die Vereinten Nationen (VN) befinden sich in einem tiefgreifenden Reformprozess. Massive Budgetkürzungen erzwingen institutionelle Veränderungen. Das OECD-Entwicklungssystem steckt in einer tiefen Krise – aufgrund finanzieller Einschnitte vieler Geberländer und asymmetrischer Geber-Nehmer-Attitüden, die den gegenseitigen Abhängigkeiten des 21. Jahrhunderts nicht mehr entsprechen. Während die Folgen des Klimawandels immer deutlicher zutage treten, hat die Klimakonferenz in Brasilien infolge unzureichender Handlungsbereitschaft der wichtigsten Emittenten nicht die erhofften Fortschritte gebracht. Auch das Welthandelssystem steht unter erheblichem Druck: Von den USA ausgelöste Zollkriege treffen auf anhaltenden Reformstau innerhalb der Welthandelsorganisation. Die Liste ließe sich fortsetzen.

Strategische Autonomie braucht verlässliche Partnerschaften

Gleichzeitig sind die Akteure im internationalen System erkennbar, die – neben Europa und Deutschland – weiterhin auf Kooperation und funktionsfähige multilaterale Systeme setzen. Im Rahmen seiner Präsidentschaft der letztjährigen Klimakonferenz setzte sich Brasilien für eine ambitionierte Klimapolitik ein. Südafrika legte während seiner G20-Präsidentschaft den Schwerpunkt auf Lösungsansätze für Schulden, Ernährungssicherheit und Klimafinanzierung. Auch Indonesien und Indien engagierten sich im Rahmen ihrer jeweiligen G20-Präsidentschaften in den vergangenen Jahren für eine entwicklungsorientierte und kooperative internationale Ordnung.

Und Europa? Die verhaltenen Reaktionen auf den US-Angriff auf Venezuela machen deutlich, wie stark Europa weiterhin von den USA abhängig ist. Dies umfasst seine Verteidigungsfähigkeit gegenüber Russland in der Ukraine ebenso wie mögliche künftige Auseinandersetzungen (Beispiel: Grönland).

Das Jahr 2026 wird von Disruption und Reform geprägt sein. Für Europa, die EU und Deutschland bedeutet dies, die eigene strategische Autonomie auszubauen und sich unabhängiger zu machen – von den USA wie auch von China.

Dies setzt voraus, die Kooperation mit den Mittelmächten Lateinamerikas, Afrikas und Asiens gezielt auszubauen. Der Abschluss des Handelsabkommens mit MERCOSUR war längst überfällig. Die Ministerkonferenz der Welthandelsorganisation im März 2026 in Kamerun sollte die EU nutzen, um umfassende Reformen im Welthandelssystem mit auf den Weg zu bringen und hierüber auch die Kritik von Ländern wie Südafrika und Indien zu adressieren.

Mit geeinter Stimme handeln

Ein entscheidender Hebel für die Handlungsfähigkeit Europas ist der neue Mehrjährige Finanzrahmen sowie das darin vorgeschlagene Global Europe Instrument. Die laufenden Verhandlungen sollten genutzt werden, um Europas Wettbewerbsfähigkeit durch Partnerschaften für nachhaltige Entwicklung zu stärken, externe Handlungsfähigkeit kohärent zu unterstützen und langfristige Investitionen in globale öffentliche Güter zu sichern.

Gleichzeitig muss Europa Wege finden, in internationalen Gremien mit geeinter Stimme zu sprechen. Die Mitgliedstaaten der EU – auch in Kooperation mit Großbritannien – sollten ihre institutionellen Rollen in multilateralen Systemen stärker nutzen, z.B. durch die Erhöhung der Kernfinanzierungsbeiträge im VN-System, als Anteilseignerin in multilateralen Entwicklungsbanken und durch gemeinsame europäische Sitze oder Team Europe-Stimmrechtsgruppen. 

Deutschland muss Impulse setzen

Der G7 unter französischer Präsidentschaft kommt in 2026 eine wichtige Rolle zu, insbesondere angesichts der blockierten Lage in der G20 unter US-Präsidentschaft. Hier sollten die vier europäischen G7-Länder, gemeinsam mit EU, Afrikanischer Union und den Mittelmächten des Südens – auch gegen den Widerstand der USA – Reformimpulse setzen, um weltwirtschaftliche Ungleichgewichte, wie in Finanz- und Digitalisierungssystemen, abzubauen.

Als größte Volkswirtschaft im Zentrum Europas muss sich Deutschland mit eigenen Impulsen – vom Schutz globaler Gemeingüter, über Wirtschaftskooperation im wechselseitigen Interesse bis hin zur Stärkung der EU als globaler Akteur – in die vielfältigen internationalen Reformprozesse einbringen. Mit der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, der Hamburg Sustainability Conference oder der angekündigten Nord-Süd-Kommission hat Deutschland Plattformen, um auf die Mittelmächte dieser Welt zuzugehen.

Auch verfügt Deutschland mit seiner Tradition der kooperativen Politikgestaltung über Glaubwürdigkeit, die in einer zunehmend multipolaren Welt Grundlage einer gestaltenden Kooperationspolitik ist. Die laufenden Reformen der deutschen Entwicklungs- und Außenpolitik sollten an diese Ressource anknüpfen und sie konsequent als strategisches Kooperationsinstrument weiterentwickeln.

Bonn, 12. Januar 2026. Unverhohlene Machtpolitik lässt die multilaterale Ordnung bröckeln. Europa muss strategische Autonomie ausbauen und die Kooperation mit Mittelmächten stärken.

Das neue Jahr beginnt mit einem Donnerschlag: einem völkerrechtswidrigen Eingriff in die staatliche Souveränität Venezuelas und der Entführung des autokratisch regierenden Präsidenten Maduro. Während die Zukunft Venezuelas offen ist, inszenieren sich die USA geopolitisch: Die auf internationalem Recht und gemeinsamen Prinzipien basierende multilaterale Ordnung bröckelt weiter. Das Denken in Machtsphären wird immer unverhohlener durchgesetzt. Russlands Invasion der Ukraine, Chinas Machtprojektionen im Südchinesischen Meer und nun das Vorgehen der USA in Venezuela zeigen: Machtpolitik verdrängt Recht. Währenddessen ringen Mittelmächte wie Deutschland und die Europäische Union (EU) um eine gemeinsame Haltung.

Schon im vergangenen Jahr waren die multilateralen Systeme so stark unter Druck wie selten zuvor. Die Vereinten Nationen (VN) befinden sich in einem tiefgreifenden Reformprozess. Massive Budgetkürzungen erzwingen institutionelle Veränderungen. Das OECD-Entwicklungssystem steckt in einer tiefen Krise – aufgrund finanzieller Einschnitte vieler Geberländer und asymmetrischer Geber-Nehmer-Attitüden, die den gegenseitigen Abhängigkeiten des 21. Jahrhunderts nicht mehr entsprechen. Während die Folgen des Klimawandels immer deutlicher zutage treten, hat die Klimakonferenz in Brasilien infolge unzureichender Handlungsbereitschaft der wichtigsten Emittenten nicht die erhofften Fortschritte gebracht. Auch das Welthandelssystem steht unter erheblichem Druck: Von den USA ausgelöste Zollkriege treffen auf anhaltenden Reformstau innerhalb der Welthandelsorganisation. Die Liste ließe sich fortsetzen.

Strategische Autonomie braucht verlässliche Partnerschaften

Gleichzeitig sind die Akteure im internationalen System erkennbar, die – neben Europa und Deutschland – weiterhin auf Kooperation und funktionsfähige multilaterale Systeme setzen. Im Rahmen seiner Präsidentschaft der letztjährigen Klimakonferenz setzte sich Brasilien für eine ambitionierte Klimapolitik ein. Südafrika legte während seiner G20-Präsidentschaft den Schwerpunkt auf Lösungsansätze für Schulden, Ernährungssicherheit und Klimafinanzierung. Auch Indonesien und Indien engagierten sich im Rahmen ihrer jeweiligen G20-Präsidentschaften in den vergangenen Jahren für eine entwicklungsorientierte und kooperative internationale Ordnung.

Und Europa? Die verhaltenen Reaktionen auf den US-Angriff auf Venezuela machen deutlich, wie stark Europa weiterhin von den USA abhängig ist. Dies umfasst seine Verteidigungsfähigkeit gegenüber Russland in der Ukraine ebenso wie mögliche künftige Auseinandersetzungen (Beispiel: Grönland).

Das Jahr 2026 wird von Disruption und Reform geprägt sein. Für Europa, die EU und Deutschland bedeutet dies, die eigene strategische Autonomie auszubauen und sich unabhängiger zu machen – von den USA wie auch von China.

Dies setzt voraus, die Kooperation mit den Mittelmächten Lateinamerikas, Afrikas und Asiens gezielt auszubauen. Der Abschluss des Handelsabkommens mit MERCOSUR war längst überfällig. Die Ministerkonferenz der Welthandelsorganisation im März 2026 in Kamerun sollte die EU nutzen, um umfassende Reformen im Welthandelssystem mit auf den Weg zu bringen und hierüber auch die Kritik von Ländern wie Südafrika und Indien zu adressieren.

Mit geeinter Stimme handeln

Ein entscheidender Hebel für die Handlungsfähigkeit Europas ist der neue Mehrjährige Finanzrahmen sowie das darin vorgeschlagene Global Europe Instrument. Die laufenden Verhandlungen sollten genutzt werden, um Europas Wettbewerbsfähigkeit durch Partnerschaften für nachhaltige Entwicklung zu stärken, externe Handlungsfähigkeit kohärent zu unterstützen und langfristige Investitionen in globale öffentliche Güter zu sichern.

Gleichzeitig muss Europa Wege finden, in internationalen Gremien mit geeinter Stimme zu sprechen. Die Mitgliedstaaten der EU – auch in Kooperation mit Großbritannien – sollten ihre institutionellen Rollen in multilateralen Systemen stärker nutzen, z.B. durch die Erhöhung der Kernfinanzierungsbeiträge im VN-System, als Anteilseignerin in multilateralen Entwicklungsbanken und durch gemeinsame europäische Sitze oder Team Europe-Stimmrechtsgruppen. 

Deutschland muss Impulse setzen

Der G7 unter französischer Präsidentschaft kommt in 2026 eine wichtige Rolle zu, insbesondere angesichts der blockierten Lage in der G20 unter US-Präsidentschaft. Hier sollten die vier europäischen G7-Länder, gemeinsam mit EU, Afrikanischer Union und den Mittelmächten des Südens – auch gegen den Widerstand der USA – Reformimpulse setzen, um weltwirtschaftliche Ungleichgewichte, wie in Finanz- und Digitalisierungssystemen, abzubauen.

Als größte Volkswirtschaft im Zentrum Europas muss sich Deutschland mit eigenen Impulsen – vom Schutz globaler Gemeingüter, über Wirtschaftskooperation im wechselseitigen Interesse bis hin zur Stärkung der EU als globaler Akteur – in die vielfältigen internationalen Reformprozesse einbringen. Mit der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, der Hamburg Sustainability Conference oder der angekündigten Nord-Süd-Kommission hat Deutschland Plattformen, um auf die Mittelmächte dieser Welt zuzugehen.

Auch verfügt Deutschland mit seiner Tradition der kooperativen Politikgestaltung über Glaubwürdigkeit, die in einer zunehmend multipolaren Welt Grundlage einer gestaltenden Kooperationspolitik ist. Die laufenden Reformen der deutschen Entwicklungs- und Außenpolitik sollten an diese Ressource anknüpfen und sie konsequent als strategisches Kooperationsinstrument weiterentwickeln.

Alessandro Ieranò, Project Research Assistant at the South-East Europe Programme (ELIAMEP), explores the interplay between EU enlargement disputes and minority rights in his new article for Contemporary Southeast Europe.

Drawing from the Beleri case and Hungary’s ongoing veto on Ukraine, he observes how, in the context of bilateral disputes between a member (kin) state and a candidate (home) state, enlargement paralysis is a ‘lose-lose’ outcome for all parties involved. Above all, for national minorities, which risk to find themselves caught in the crossfire of politicisation and securitisation.

As he argues, this stems from the of lack of safeguards and alternative-dispute resolution mechanisms in the current enlargement framework, which has turned veto powers from an atomic option into a default practice. This not only enables the politicisation of kin-minorities in candidate countries—adding further straining bilateral relations—but also jeopardises enlargement at the moment when it is most needed. To address this challenge, he proposes a set of policy recommendations aiming at restoring the credibility of the enlargement promise through mutual guarantees to both ‘gatekeeping’ kin-member states and ‘obstructed’ candidate-home states, while preventing the securitisation of national minorities.

You may read the essay here.

Global cooperation is under stress. Finance, climate, security, and technology shocks overlap, while major powers contest rules and public budgets shrink. Yet these shifts potentially widen agency for parts of the Global South. This paper asks how the current moment should be viewed: does it represent a crisis or opportunity, and what does workable cooperation look like in a polycentric world? We use the 2025 Financing for Development conference in Seville as a point of reference for our reflections. Against this backdrop, we argue that a managed, issue-based new multilateralism is emerging, organized around ‘pockets of effectiveness’, or bounded, likeminded coalitions that work on concrete tasks. While universal multilateralism is likely to remain challenging, practical cooperation is feasible on some issues. If ‘the who’ is likeminded coalitions of countries, then ‘the how’ of new multilateralism is found in these ‘pockets’.

Global cooperation is under stress. Finance, climate, security, and technology shocks overlap, while major powers contest rules and public budgets shrink. Yet these shifts potentially widen agency for parts of the Global South. This paper asks how the current moment should be viewed: does it represent a crisis or opportunity, and what does workable cooperation look like in a polycentric world? We use the 2025 Financing for Development conference in Seville as a point of reference for our reflections. Against this backdrop, we argue that a managed, issue-based new multilateralism is emerging, organized around ‘pockets of effectiveness’, or bounded, likeminded coalitions that work on concrete tasks. While universal multilateralism is likely to remain challenging, practical cooperation is feasible on some issues. If ‘the who’ is likeminded coalitions of countries, then ‘the how’ of new multilateralism is found in these ‘pockets’.

Global cooperation is under stress. Finance, climate, security, and technology shocks overlap, while major powers contest rules and public budgets shrink. Yet these shifts potentially widen agency for parts of the Global South. This paper asks how the current moment should be viewed: does it represent a crisis or opportunity, and what does workable cooperation look like in a polycentric world? We use the 2025 Financing for Development conference in Seville as a point of reference for our reflections. Against this backdrop, we argue that a managed, issue-based new multilateralism is emerging, organized around ‘pockets of effectiveness’, or bounded, likeminded coalitions that work on concrete tasks. While universal multilateralism is likely to remain challenging, practical cooperation is feasible on some issues. If ‘the who’ is likeminded coalitions of countries, then ‘the how’ of new multilateralism is found in these ‘pockets’.