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Alle registrierten Datennutzer*innen können die neueste Datenedition v40 (DOI: 10.5684/soep.core.v40eu) ab sofort über unser Online-Bestellformular bestellen.   Auf Deutsch: http://www.diw.de/SOEPbestellungAuf Englisch: http://www.diw.de/SOEPorder Die wichtigsten Neuigkeiten für die v40: Neue ...

Alle registrierten Datennutzer*innen können die neueste Datenedition v40 (DOI: 10.5684/soep.core.v40eu) ab sofort über unser Online-Bestellformular bestellen.   Auf Deutsch: http://www.diw.de/SOEPbestellungAuf Englisch: http://www.diw.de/SOEPorder Die wichtigsten Neuigkeiten für die v40: Neue ...

Zwei Wochen vor der 4. Internationalen Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung (FfD4) vom 30. Juni bis 3. Juli 2025 in Sevilla (Spanien) haben sich alle teilnehmenden Staaten – mit Ausnahme der USA – auf das Abschlussdokument verständigt. Obwohl diese Entscheidung Anlass zur Sorge ist, überwiegt der pragmatische Erfolg, dass gegen den Widerstand Washingtons eine einvernehmliche Lösung gefunden wurde. Da die USA im Verhandlungsverlauf einen zunehmend obstruktiven Kurs verfolgten und die UN-Nachhaltigkeitsziele (SDGs) aufkündigten, blieb der Weg voran – ohne ihr Zutun – die wohl einzige gangbare Möglichkeit, um ein substanzielles Ergebnis zu erzielen. Die Konsequenzen der Nichtbeteiligung der USA sind dabei nicht zu unterschätzen. Es wird schwierig sein, ohne die USA Schlüsselreformen in der Entwicklungsfinanzierung voranzutreiben – besonders in Bereichen, wo der US-amerikanische Einfluss beträchtlich ist, wie etwa als Veto-Macht im Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) und der Weltbank. Ebenso werden die Bemühungen um Fortschritte bei der internationalen Steuerkooperation wahrscheinlich auf große Hindernisse stoßen. Dieses Papier gibt einen Überblick der wichtigsten Streitfragen, die in den einjährigen Vorverhandlungen aufkamen, und untersucht, wie sie im Abschlussdokument behandelt - oder durch Kompromisse gelöst - wurden.

Zwei Wochen vor der 4. Internationalen Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung (FfD4) vom 30. Juni bis 3. Juli 2025 in Sevilla (Spanien) haben sich alle teilnehmenden Staaten – mit Ausnahme der USA – auf das Abschlussdokument verständigt. Obwohl diese Entscheidung Anlass zur Sorge ist, überwiegt der pragmatische Erfolg, dass gegen den Widerstand Washingtons eine einvernehmliche Lösung gefunden wurde. Da die USA im Verhandlungsverlauf einen zunehmend obstruktiven Kurs verfolgten und die UN-Nachhaltigkeitsziele (SDGs) aufkündigten, blieb der Weg voran – ohne ihr Zutun – die wohl einzige gangbare Möglichkeit, um ein substanzielles Ergebnis zu erzielen. Die Konsequenzen der Nichtbeteiligung der USA sind dabei nicht zu unterschätzen. Es wird schwierig sein, ohne die USA Schlüsselreformen in der Entwicklungsfinanzierung voranzutreiben – besonders in Bereichen, wo der US-amerikanische Einfluss beträchtlich ist, wie etwa als Veto-Macht im Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) und der Weltbank. Ebenso werden die Bemühungen um Fortschritte bei der internationalen Steuerkooperation wahrscheinlich auf große Hindernisse stoßen. Dieses Papier gibt einen Überblick der wichtigsten Streitfragen, die in den einjährigen Vorverhandlungen aufkamen, und untersucht, wie sie im Abschlussdokument behandelt - oder durch Kompromisse gelöst - wurden.

Zwei Wochen vor der 4. Internationalen Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung (FfD4) vom 30. Juni bis 3. Juli 2025 in Sevilla (Spanien) haben sich alle teilnehmenden Staaten – mit Ausnahme der USA – auf das Abschlussdokument verständigt. Obwohl diese Entscheidung Anlass zur Sorge ist, überwiegt der pragmatische Erfolg, dass gegen den Widerstand Washingtons eine einvernehmliche Lösung gefunden wurde. Da die USA im Verhandlungsverlauf einen zunehmend obstruktiven Kurs verfolgten und die UN-Nachhaltigkeitsziele (SDGs) aufkündigten, blieb der Weg voran – ohne ihr Zutun – die wohl einzige gangbare Möglichkeit, um ein substanzielles Ergebnis zu erzielen. Die Konsequenzen der Nichtbeteiligung der USA sind dabei nicht zu unterschätzen. Es wird schwierig sein, ohne die USA Schlüsselreformen in der Entwicklungsfinanzierung voranzutreiben – besonders in Bereichen, wo der US-amerikanische Einfluss beträchtlich ist, wie etwa als Veto-Macht im Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) und der Weltbank. Ebenso werden die Bemühungen um Fortschritte bei der internationalen Steuerkooperation wahrscheinlich auf große Hindernisse stoßen. Dieses Papier gibt einen Überblick der wichtigsten Streitfragen, die in den einjährigen Vorverhandlungen aufkamen, und untersucht, wie sie im Abschlussdokument behandelt - oder durch Kompromisse gelöst - wurden.

On 17 June, two weeks ahead of the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), to be held from June 30 to July 3, 2025, in Seville, Spain, the conference’s Outcome Document was endorsed by all participating countries—except the United States. While the absence of the U.S. is concerning, reaching consensus despite its opposition can be viewed as a pragmatic success. Given that the U.S. was following an increasingly obstructionist stance throughout the negotiation process and renounced its commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), moving forward without its participation was likely the only path to a worthwhile agreement. However, the implications of U.S. non-participation cannot be overstated. Without U.S. engagement, advancing key reforms in development finance will be challenging—especially in areas where the U.S. holds considerable influence, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, where it retains veto power. Similarly, efforts to achieve progress in international tax cooperation are likely to face major obstacles. This paper reviews the key contentious issues that arose during the year-long negotiation process and examine how they were addressed—or compromised—in the final outcome document.

On 17 June, two weeks ahead of the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), to be held from June 30 to July 3, 2025, in Seville, Spain, the conference’s Outcome Document was endorsed by all participating countries—except the United States. While the absence of the U.S. is concerning, reaching consensus despite its opposition can be viewed as a pragmatic success. Given that the U.S. was following an increasingly obstructionist stance throughout the negotiation process and renounced its commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), moving forward without its participation was likely the only path to a worthwhile agreement. However, the implications of U.S. non-participation cannot be overstated. Without U.S. engagement, advancing key reforms in development finance will be challenging—especially in areas where the U.S. holds considerable influence, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, where it retains veto power. Similarly, efforts to achieve progress in international tax cooperation are likely to face major obstacles. This paper reviews the key contentious issues that arose during the year-long negotiation process and examine how they were addressed—or compromised—in the final outcome document.

On 17 June, two weeks ahead of the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), to be held from June 30 to July 3, 2025, in Seville, Spain, the conference’s Outcome Document was endorsed by all participating countries—except the United States. While the absence of the U.S. is concerning, reaching consensus despite its opposition can be viewed as a pragmatic success. Given that the U.S. was following an increasingly obstructionist stance throughout the negotiation process and renounced its commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), moving forward without its participation was likely the only path to a worthwhile agreement. However, the implications of U.S. non-participation cannot be overstated. Without U.S. engagement, advancing key reforms in development finance will be challenging—especially in areas where the U.S. holds considerable influence, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, where it retains veto power. Similarly, efforts to achieve progress in international tax cooperation are likely to face major obstacles. This paper reviews the key contentious issues that arose during the year-long negotiation process and examine how they were addressed—or compromised—in the final outcome document.

This policy brief situates the crisis of Official Development Assistance (ODA) within a broader transformation of global development cooperation. Today’s challenge goes beyond shrinking aid budgets; it reflects deeper pressures on the post-Cold War development consensus and its institutional architecture. Development cooperation is under strain due to spending cuts by the US and parts of Europe, alongside the rise of nationalist approaches, especially in the United States (US). The longstanding policy norms – framing development as a shared global endeavour, combining moral and strategic redistribution and favouring multilateral coordination – are eroding. Fiscal pressures and domestic priorities have weakened elite and public support for ODA, while populist movements often frame aid as conflicting with national interests. At the same time, development finance has become more geopolitical, increasingly tied to foreign policy, migration deterrence and economic diplomacy. This transactional approach coincides with a retreat from multilateralism, declining support for the UN system, and fragmentation among donors and recipients. The landscape has also diversified, with emerging actors such as China, the Gulf states and new development banks offering alternative financing, governance models and priorities. Many middle-income countries now access international financial markets, reducing dependency on OECD donors. As a result, development cooperation has become a field of strategic contestation. While these trends have evolved gradually over the past decade, the approach of the second administration of US President Donald Trump has accelerated them. Simultaneously, economic progress in parts of the Global South has fostered expectations for reciprocal partnerships rather than traditional donor–recipient hierarchies. The challenge, then, is to reimagine the future of development cooperation in ways that are politically feasible and institutionally resilient. This policy brief argues that this requires rethinking the foundations of development cooperation, rebuilding multilateral credibility and navigating a more pluralistic and geopolitically divided global order.
We propose four plausible options, each reflecting a different configuration of value-based, institutional and political alignment:

• Option 1 assumes a renewed political commitment to development as a global public good, and revitalised leadership from both North and South.
• Option 2 suggests continuity with diminished ambition: multilateralism persists, but its core weakens, with development focused more on stability than transformation.
• Option 3 offers a decentralised, experimental path driven by new actors and coalitions. While less coherent, it avoids the worst effects of fragmentation.
• Option 4 reflects a marked shift towards increased bilateralism, ideological filtering, and instrumentalism.

This policy brief situates the crisis of Official Development Assistance (ODA) within a broader transformation of global development cooperation. Today’s challenge goes beyond shrinking aid budgets; it reflects deeper pressures on the post-Cold War development consensus and its institutional architecture. Development cooperation is under strain due to spending cuts by the US and parts of Europe, alongside the rise of nationalist approaches, especially in the United States (US). The longstanding policy norms – framing development as a shared global endeavour, combining moral and strategic redistribution and favouring multilateral coordination – are eroding. Fiscal pressures and domestic priorities have weakened elite and public support for ODA, while populist movements often frame aid as conflicting with national interests. At the same time, development finance has become more geopolitical, increasingly tied to foreign policy, migration deterrence and economic diplomacy. This transactional approach coincides with a retreat from multilateralism, declining support for the UN system, and fragmentation among donors and recipients. The landscape has also diversified, with emerging actors such as China, the Gulf states and new development banks offering alternative financing, governance models and priorities. Many middle-income countries now access international financial markets, reducing dependency on OECD donors. As a result, development cooperation has become a field of strategic contestation. While these trends have evolved gradually over the past decade, the approach of the second administration of US President Donald Trump has accelerated them. Simultaneously, economic progress in parts of the Global South has fostered expectations for reciprocal partnerships rather than traditional donor–recipient hierarchies. The challenge, then, is to reimagine the future of development cooperation in ways that are politically feasible and institutionally resilient. This policy brief argues that this requires rethinking the foundations of development cooperation, rebuilding multilateral credibility and navigating a more pluralistic and geopolitically divided global order.
We propose four plausible options, each reflecting a different configuration of value-based, institutional and political alignment:

• Option 1 assumes a renewed political commitment to development as a global public good, and revitalised leadership from both North and South.
• Option 2 suggests continuity with diminished ambition: multilateralism persists, but its core weakens, with development focused more on stability than transformation.
• Option 3 offers a decentralised, experimental path driven by new actors and coalitions. While less coherent, it avoids the worst effects of fragmentation.
• Option 4 reflects a marked shift towards increased bilateralism, ideological filtering, and instrumentalism.

This policy brief situates the crisis of Official Development Assistance (ODA) within a broader transformation of global development cooperation. Today’s challenge goes beyond shrinking aid budgets; it reflects deeper pressures on the post-Cold War development consensus and its institutional architecture. Development cooperation is under strain due to spending cuts by the US and parts of Europe, alongside the rise of nationalist approaches, especially in the United States (US). The longstanding policy norms – framing development as a shared global endeavour, combining moral and strategic redistribution and favouring multilateral coordination – are eroding. Fiscal pressures and domestic priorities have weakened elite and public support for ODA, while populist movements often frame aid as conflicting with national interests. At the same time, development finance has become more geopolitical, increasingly tied to foreign policy, migration deterrence and economic diplomacy. This transactional approach coincides with a retreat from multilateralism, declining support for the UN system, and fragmentation among donors and recipients. The landscape has also diversified, with emerging actors such as China, the Gulf states and new development banks offering alternative financing, governance models and priorities. Many middle-income countries now access international financial markets, reducing dependency on OECD donors. As a result, development cooperation has become a field of strategic contestation. While these trends have evolved gradually over the past decade, the approach of the second administration of US President Donald Trump has accelerated them. Simultaneously, economic progress in parts of the Global South has fostered expectations for reciprocal partnerships rather than traditional donor–recipient hierarchies. The challenge, then, is to reimagine the future of development cooperation in ways that are politically feasible and institutionally resilient. This policy brief argues that this requires rethinking the foundations of development cooperation, rebuilding multilateral credibility and navigating a more pluralistic and geopolitically divided global order.
We propose four plausible options, each reflecting a different configuration of value-based, institutional and political alignment:

• Option 1 assumes a renewed political commitment to development as a global public good, and revitalised leadership from both North and South.
• Option 2 suggests continuity with diminished ambition: multilateralism persists, but its core weakens, with development focused more on stability than transformation.
• Option 3 offers a decentralised, experimental path driven by new actors and coalitions. While less coherent, it avoids the worst effects of fragmentation.
• Option 4 reflects a marked shift towards increased bilateralism, ideological filtering, and instrumentalism.

Die Abteilung Klimapolitik des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) untersucht mit empirischen und theoretischen Ansätzen bisherige Wirkungen und zukünftige Gestaltungsoptionen von Politikinstrumenten und regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen für die Transformation zur Klimaneutralität. Schwerpunkte bilden Arbeiten zum Strom- und Gebäudesektor, zur Industrie, zu Sustainable Finance sowie zu internationalen sektorbezogenen Kooperationen im Klimaschutz. Wir suchen für ein Forschungsprojekt zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (w/m/div) für 10-12 Wochenstunden.

Morocco’s reports on tax expenditures (TEs) analyse the derogatory measures adopted as part of the Finance Act. The reports highlight the impact of these measures on public revenue and their socio-economic usefulness. This country report identifies the main limitations and makes recommendations for improving the transparency and effectiveness of tax expenditure policies. It is based on government reports published until December 2023. 
Transparency: Morocco scores 55.7 out of 100 in the Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index (GTETI), ranking 28th out of 105 countries. Despite improvements in the publication of data, the index reveals a number of shortcomings in terms of the clarity of information and the assessment methodology. The government’s TE reports are available to the general public, but they are not always easy to understand, which means that the presentations need to be simplified, and the data made more accessible.
Complexity: The complexity of the Moroccan tax system is based on a multitude of derogatory measures spread across different tax types (value-added tax, corporate tax, income tax). In 2023, 251 derogatory measures were identified, representing a budgetary cost of MAD 35.4 billion (2.4% of GDP). This structure complicates the management and monitoring of tax expenditures. Criticism is levelled at the lack of exhaustive impact studies of these derogatory measures and the absence of clear criteria for creating or removing incentives, which are sometimes influenced by political and economic lobbies.
Fiscal sustainability: This report highlights the continuing decline in tax expenditures as a percentage of GDP, from 2.9% in 2022 to 2.4% in 2023, reflecting a desire to rationalise and reduce tax expenditures. Concerns remain about the system's ability to mobilise sufficient resources to support economic development while maintaining balanced budgets. It should be noted that the latest report on tax expenditures accompanying the Finance Bill (PLF) for 2025 shows that this trend is continuing: as a percentage of GDP, tax expenditures fell to 2.1% in 2024 mainly due to the abolition of 24 measures as part of the VAT reform implemented during the year, resulting in a 28.3% reduction in VAT related tax expenditures. Tax expenditure as a whole has been reduced by 13%, from MAD 37 billion in 2023 to MAD 32.1 billion in 2024. 
Evaluation challenges: There is still room for improvement regarding the evaluation of tax expenditures. The report of the Cour des comptes (Court of Accounts) highlights “the absence of in-depth socio-economic impact studies and a structured evaluation framework. Decisions on tax expenditures are often taken without in-depth studies of their effectiveness, which limits the justification for their contribution to national development”.
This report highlights the challenges and opportunities associated with tax expenditures in Morocco. Although progress has been made, further reforms are desirable to improve the management and effectiveness of tax expenditures.

Morocco’s reports on tax expenditures (TEs) analyse the derogatory measures adopted as part of the Finance Act. The reports highlight the impact of these measures on public revenue and their socio-economic usefulness. This country report identifies the main limitations and makes recommendations for improving the transparency and effectiveness of tax expenditure policies. It is based on government reports published until December 2023. 
Transparency: Morocco scores 55.7 out of 100 in the Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index (GTETI), ranking 28th out of 105 countries. Despite improvements in the publication of data, the index reveals a number of shortcomings in terms of the clarity of information and the assessment methodology. The government’s TE reports are available to the general public, but they are not always easy to understand, which means that the presentations need to be simplified, and the data made more accessible.
Complexity: The complexity of the Moroccan tax system is based on a multitude of derogatory measures spread across different tax types (value-added tax, corporate tax, income tax). In 2023, 251 derogatory measures were identified, representing a budgetary cost of MAD 35.4 billion (2.4% of GDP). This structure complicates the management and monitoring of tax expenditures. Criticism is levelled at the lack of exhaustive impact studies of these derogatory measures and the absence of clear criteria for creating or removing incentives, which are sometimes influenced by political and economic lobbies.
Fiscal sustainability: This report highlights the continuing decline in tax expenditures as a percentage of GDP, from 2.9% in 2022 to 2.4% in 2023, reflecting a desire to rationalise and reduce tax expenditures. Concerns remain about the system's ability to mobilise sufficient resources to support economic development while maintaining balanced budgets. It should be noted that the latest report on tax expenditures accompanying the Finance Bill (PLF) for 2025 shows that this trend is continuing: as a percentage of GDP, tax expenditures fell to 2.1% in 2024 mainly due to the abolition of 24 measures as part of the VAT reform implemented during the year, resulting in a 28.3% reduction in VAT related tax expenditures. Tax expenditure as a whole has been reduced by 13%, from MAD 37 billion in 2023 to MAD 32.1 billion in 2024. 
Evaluation challenges: There is still room for improvement regarding the evaluation of tax expenditures. The report of the Cour des comptes (Court of Accounts) highlights “the absence of in-depth socio-economic impact studies and a structured evaluation framework. Decisions on tax expenditures are often taken without in-depth studies of their effectiveness, which limits the justification for their contribution to national development”.
This report highlights the challenges and opportunities associated with tax expenditures in Morocco. Although progress has been made, further reforms are desirable to improve the management and effectiveness of tax expenditures.

Morocco’s reports on tax expenditures (TEs) analyse the derogatory measures adopted as part of the Finance Act. The reports highlight the impact of these measures on public revenue and their socio-economic usefulness. This country report identifies the main limitations and makes recommendations for improving the transparency and effectiveness of tax expenditure policies. It is based on government reports published until December 2023. 
Transparency: Morocco scores 55.7 out of 100 in the Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index (GTETI), ranking 28th out of 105 countries. Despite improvements in the publication of data, the index reveals a number of shortcomings in terms of the clarity of information and the assessment methodology. The government’s TE reports are available to the general public, but they are not always easy to understand, which means that the presentations need to be simplified, and the data made more accessible.
Complexity: The complexity of the Moroccan tax system is based on a multitude of derogatory measures spread across different tax types (value-added tax, corporate tax, income tax). In 2023, 251 derogatory measures were identified, representing a budgetary cost of MAD 35.4 billion (2.4% of GDP). This structure complicates the management and monitoring of tax expenditures. Criticism is levelled at the lack of exhaustive impact studies of these derogatory measures and the absence of clear criteria for creating or removing incentives, which are sometimes influenced by political and economic lobbies.
Fiscal sustainability: This report highlights the continuing decline in tax expenditures as a percentage of GDP, from 2.9% in 2022 to 2.4% in 2023, reflecting a desire to rationalise and reduce tax expenditures. Concerns remain about the system's ability to mobilise sufficient resources to support economic development while maintaining balanced budgets. It should be noted that the latest report on tax expenditures accompanying the Finance Bill (PLF) for 2025 shows that this trend is continuing: as a percentage of GDP, tax expenditures fell to 2.1% in 2024 mainly due to the abolition of 24 measures as part of the VAT reform implemented during the year, resulting in a 28.3% reduction in VAT related tax expenditures. Tax expenditure as a whole has been reduced by 13%, from MAD 37 billion in 2023 to MAD 32.1 billion in 2024. 
Evaluation challenges: There is still room for improvement regarding the evaluation of tax expenditures. The report of the Cour des comptes (Court of Accounts) highlights “the absence of in-depth socio-economic impact studies and a structured evaluation framework. Decisions on tax expenditures are often taken without in-depth studies of their effectiveness, which limits the justification for their contribution to national development”.
This report highlights the challenges and opportunities associated with tax expenditures in Morocco. Although progress has been made, further reforms are desirable to improve the management and effectiveness of tax expenditures.

Les rapports sur les dépenses fiscales (DFs) au Maroc analysent les mesures fiscales dérogatoires adoptées dans le cadre des lois de finances. Ils mettent en lumière leur impact sur les recettes publiques et leur utilité socio-économique. Ce rapport en identifie les principales limites et recommandations pour améliorer la transparence et l’efficacité des politiques fiscales. Il est établi sur la base des rapports publiés jusqu’en décembre 2023. 
Transparence: Le Maroc obtient un score de 55,7/100 dans l’Indice Global de Transparence des Dépenses Fiscales (GTETI), se classant 28e sur 105 pays. Malgré des améliorations dans la publication des données, l’indice laisse apparaître quelques lacunes concernant la clarté des informations et la méthodologie d’évaluation. Les rapports sont disponibles pour le grand public, mais leur compréhension n’est pas toujours aisée, nécessitant une simplification des présentations et une amélioration de l’accessibilité aux données.
Complexité: La complexité du système fiscal marocain repose sur la multitude de mesures dérogatoires réparties entre différents types d’impôts – Taxe à la Valeur Ajoutée (TVA), Impôt sur le Revenu (IR), Impôt sur les Sociétés (IS). En 2023, 251 mesures dérogatoires ont été recensées, représentant un coût budgétaire de 35,4 MMAD (2,4% du PIB). Cette structure complique la gestion et le suivi des DFs. Les critiques portent sur l’absence d’études d’impact exhaustives des mesures dérogatoires ainsi que de critères clairs pour la création ou la suppression des incitations, parfois influencées par des lobbies politiques et économiques.
Soutenabilité Budgétaire: Ce rapport met en évidence la baisse continue des DFs en pourcentage du PIB, passant de 2,9% en 2022 à 2,4 % en 2023. Cette tendance reflète une volonté de rationaliser les DFs et de réduire les niches fiscales. Car des préoccupations persistent quant à la capacité du système à mobiliser des ressources suffisantes pour soutenir le développement économique tout en maintenant des équilibres budgétaires. Notons que le dernier rapport sur la DF accompagnant le Projet de Loi de Finances (PLF) de l’année 2025 montre que cette tendance se confirme : ainsi en pourcentage du PIB, la DF est descendu à 2,1% en 2024, du fait notamment de la suppression de 24 mesures dans le cadre de la réforme de la TVA mise en œuvre au cours de cette année, entrainant une réduction de 28,3% des DFs y afférentes. Au niveau de l'ensemble des DFs, la réduction a été de 13% (elles sont passées de 36,96 MMDH en 2023 à 32,1 MMDH en 2024).
Enjeux de l’Évaluation: L’évaluation des DFs demeure cependant perfectible. Le rapport de la Cour des comptes souligne « l’absence d’études d’impact socio-économique approfondies et d’un cadre d’évaluation structuré. Les décisions sur les incitations fiscales sont souvent prises sans études approfondies sur leur efficacité, ce qui limite la justification de contribution au développement national ». Ce rapport met en lumière les défis et opportunités liés aux DFs au Maroc. Bien que des progrès aient été réalisés en matière de transparence et de rationalisation, des réformes supplémentaires sont souhaitables pour améliorer la gestion et l’efficacité des incitations fiscales.

Fouzi Mourji a été professeur d’économétrie à l’Université Hassan II de Casablanca. En 1997, il a créé le Laboratoire de Statistique Appliquée à l’Analyse et le Recherche en Economie qu’il continue de diriger.

Les rapports sur les dépenses fiscales (DFs) au Maroc analysent les mesures fiscales dérogatoires adoptées dans le cadre des lois de finances. Ils mettent en lumière leur impact sur les recettes publiques et leur utilité socio-économique. Ce rapport en identifie les principales limites et recommandations pour améliorer la transparence et l’efficacité des politiques fiscales. Il est établi sur la base des rapports publiés jusqu’en décembre 2023. 
Transparence: Le Maroc obtient un score de 55,7/100 dans l’Indice Global de Transparence des Dépenses Fiscales (GTETI), se classant 28e sur 105 pays. Malgré des améliorations dans la publication des données, l’indice laisse apparaître quelques lacunes concernant la clarté des informations et la méthodologie d’évaluation. Les rapports sont disponibles pour le grand public, mais leur compréhension n’est pas toujours aisée, nécessitant une simplification des présentations et une amélioration de l’accessibilité aux données.
Complexité: La complexité du système fiscal marocain repose sur la multitude de mesures dérogatoires réparties entre différents types d’impôts – Taxe à la Valeur Ajoutée (TVA), Impôt sur le Revenu (IR), Impôt sur les Sociétés (IS). En 2023, 251 mesures dérogatoires ont été recensées, représentant un coût budgétaire de 35,4 MMAD (2,4% du PIB). Cette structure complique la gestion et le suivi des DFs. Les critiques portent sur l’absence d’études d’impact exhaustives des mesures dérogatoires ainsi que de critères clairs pour la création ou la suppression des incitations, parfois influencées par des lobbies politiques et économiques.
Soutenabilité Budgétaire: Ce rapport met en évidence la baisse continue des DFs en pourcentage du PIB, passant de 2,9% en 2022 à 2,4 % en 2023. Cette tendance reflète une volonté de rationaliser les DFs et de réduire les niches fiscales. Car des préoccupations persistent quant à la capacité du système à mobiliser des ressources suffisantes pour soutenir le développement économique tout en maintenant des équilibres budgétaires. Notons que le dernier rapport sur la DF accompagnant le Projet de Loi de Finances (PLF) de l’année 2025 montre que cette tendance se confirme : ainsi en pourcentage du PIB, la DF est descendu à 2,1% en 2024, du fait notamment de la suppression de 24 mesures dans le cadre de la réforme de la TVA mise en œuvre au cours de cette année, entrainant une réduction de 28,3% des DFs y afférentes. Au niveau de l'ensemble des DFs, la réduction a été de 13% (elles sont passées de 36,96 MMDH en 2023 à 32,1 MMDH en 2024).
Enjeux de l’Évaluation: L’évaluation des DFs demeure cependant perfectible. Le rapport de la Cour des comptes souligne « l’absence d’études d’impact socio-économique approfondies et d’un cadre d’évaluation structuré. Les décisions sur les incitations fiscales sont souvent prises sans études approfondies sur leur efficacité, ce qui limite la justification de contribution au développement national ». Ce rapport met en lumière les défis et opportunités liés aux DFs au Maroc. Bien que des progrès aient été réalisés en matière de transparence et de rationalisation, des réformes supplémentaires sont souhaitables pour améliorer la gestion et l’efficacité des incitations fiscales.

Fouzi Mourji a été professeur d’économétrie à l’Université Hassan II de Casablanca. En 1997, il a créé le Laboratoire de Statistique Appliquée à l’Analyse et le Recherche en Economie qu’il continue de diriger.

Les rapports sur les dépenses fiscales (DFs) au Maroc analysent les mesures fiscales dérogatoires adoptées dans le cadre des lois de finances. Ils mettent en lumière leur impact sur les recettes publiques et leur utilité socio-économique. Ce rapport en identifie les principales limites et recommandations pour améliorer la transparence et l’efficacité des politiques fiscales. Il est établi sur la base des rapports publiés jusqu’en décembre 2023. 
Transparence: Le Maroc obtient un score de 55,7/100 dans l’Indice Global de Transparence des Dépenses Fiscales (GTETI), se classant 28e sur 105 pays. Malgré des améliorations dans la publication des données, l’indice laisse apparaître quelques lacunes concernant la clarté des informations et la méthodologie d’évaluation. Les rapports sont disponibles pour le grand public, mais leur compréhension n’est pas toujours aisée, nécessitant une simplification des présentations et une amélioration de l’accessibilité aux données.
Complexité: La complexité du système fiscal marocain repose sur la multitude de mesures dérogatoires réparties entre différents types d’impôts – Taxe à la Valeur Ajoutée (TVA), Impôt sur le Revenu (IR), Impôt sur les Sociétés (IS). En 2023, 251 mesures dérogatoires ont été recensées, représentant un coût budgétaire de 35,4 MMAD (2,4% du PIB). Cette structure complique la gestion et le suivi des DFs. Les critiques portent sur l’absence d’études d’impact exhaustives des mesures dérogatoires ainsi que de critères clairs pour la création ou la suppression des incitations, parfois influencées par des lobbies politiques et économiques.
Soutenabilité Budgétaire: Ce rapport met en évidence la baisse continue des DFs en pourcentage du PIB, passant de 2,9% en 2022 à 2,4 % en 2023. Cette tendance reflète une volonté de rationaliser les DFs et de réduire les niches fiscales. Car des préoccupations persistent quant à la capacité du système à mobiliser des ressources suffisantes pour soutenir le développement économique tout en maintenant des équilibres budgétaires. Notons que le dernier rapport sur la DF accompagnant le Projet de Loi de Finances (PLF) de l’année 2025 montre que cette tendance se confirme : ainsi en pourcentage du PIB, la DF est descendu à 2,1% en 2024, du fait notamment de la suppression de 24 mesures dans le cadre de la réforme de la TVA mise en œuvre au cours de cette année, entrainant une réduction de 28,3% des DFs y afférentes. Au niveau de l'ensemble des DFs, la réduction a été de 13% (elles sont passées de 36,96 MMDH en 2023 à 32,1 MMDH en 2024).
Enjeux de l’Évaluation: L’évaluation des DFs demeure cependant perfectible. Le rapport de la Cour des comptes souligne « l’absence d’études d’impact socio-économique approfondies et d’un cadre d’évaluation structuré. Les décisions sur les incitations fiscales sont souvent prises sans études approfondies sur leur efficacité, ce qui limite la justification de contribution au développement national ». Ce rapport met en lumière les défis et opportunités liés aux DFs au Maroc. Bien que des progrès aient été réalisés en matière de transparence et de rationalisation, des réformes supplémentaires sont souhaitables pour améliorer la gestion et l’efficacité des incitations fiscales.

Fouzi Mourji a été professeur d’économétrie à l’Université Hassan II de Casablanca. En 1997, il a créé le Laboratoire de Statistique Appliquée à l’Analyse et le Recherche en Economie qu’il continue de diriger.

This research examines the impact of codes of conduct imposed by international lead firms on subcontractors in Morocco’s textile and apparel sector. Based on a qualitative study conducted in the two main industrial hubs (Tangier and Casablanca), it explores the diffusion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards along the supply chain, their role in enhancing subcontractor capabilities, and their influence on inter-level relationships within the chain. The study highlights cross-cutting factors that place subcontractors in conditions that are not conducive to the effective implementation of CSR standards. It also shows that procedural audits associated with the enforcement of codes of conduct promote the spread of coercive isomorphism and foster a culture focused on strict compliance with formal rules. Furthermore, the research identifies two distinct profiles of subcontractors based on how they respond to institutional pressures to adopt these codes: those with minimal compliance, often engaging in rule-bypassing practices, and those adopting a proactive approach to internalising the standards. The study also uncovers factors explaining these divergent attitudes. Among the firms with a proactive stance, initiatives aimed at strengthening the capacities of their subcontractors are emerging. However, relationships with downstream actors in the supply chain remain characterised by a climate of mistrust, which limits the overall impact of these efforts. 

Nadia Benabdeljlil is a Professor of Management Sciences at the Mohammadia School of Engineers, Mohammed V University in Rabat.
Lamia Kerzazi is a Professor of Management Sciences at the Mohammadia School of Engineers, Mohammed V University in Rabat.
 

This research examines the impact of codes of conduct imposed by international lead firms on subcontractors in Morocco’s textile and apparel sector. Based on a qualitative study conducted in the two main industrial hubs (Tangier and Casablanca), it explores the diffusion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards along the supply chain, their role in enhancing subcontractor capabilities, and their influence on inter-level relationships within the chain. The study highlights cross-cutting factors that place subcontractors in conditions that are not conducive to the effective implementation of CSR standards. It also shows that procedural audits associated with the enforcement of codes of conduct promote the spread of coercive isomorphism and foster a culture focused on strict compliance with formal rules. Furthermore, the research identifies two distinct profiles of subcontractors based on how they respond to institutional pressures to adopt these codes: those with minimal compliance, often engaging in rule-bypassing practices, and those adopting a proactive approach to internalising the standards. The study also uncovers factors explaining these divergent attitudes. Among the firms with a proactive stance, initiatives aimed at strengthening the capacities of their subcontractors are emerging. However, relationships with downstream actors in the supply chain remain characterised by a climate of mistrust, which limits the overall impact of these efforts. 

Nadia Benabdeljlil is a Professor of Management Sciences at the Mohammadia School of Engineers, Mohammed V University in Rabat.
Lamia Kerzazi is a Professor of Management Sciences at the Mohammadia School of Engineers, Mohammed V University in Rabat.