Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Trotz des Wohlstands in Deutschland sind viele junge Menschen finanziell nicht eigenständig. Die Jugend braucht bessere Chancen, um Vermögen aufzubauen., Die junge Generation in Deutschland steht vor einem Paradoxon: Noch nie war das Land so wohlhabend, doch junge Menschen profitieren davon nur begrenzt. Häufig fehlt ihnen die finanzielle Autonomie, um ihr Leben selbstbestimmt zu gestalten – sei es bei der Familiengründung, der Berufswahl oder dem ...

La capitale algérienne a accueilli, ce jeudi 6 novembre 2025, une réunion ministérielle de haut niveau dans le cadre de l’initiative tripartite des pays voisins […]

L’article Crise en Libye : Alger accueille la réunion du Mécanisme tripartite des pays voisins est apparu en premier sur .

Alors que New York vient de franchir une étape historique en élisant son premier maire musulman, la France, elle, se retrouve une fois de plus […]

L’article En pleine visite scolaire, des élèves voilées déclenchent un tollé politique en France est apparu en premier sur .

Am Montag startet die UN-Klimakonferenz COP30 im brasilianischen Belém. Zuvor kommen bereits viele Staats- und Regierungschefs zu einem zweitägigen Gipfeltreffen zusammen. Energieexpertin Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin, kommentiert den Klimagipfel wie folgt:  

Nach einem halben Jahr schwarz-rote Bundesregierung ist klar: Die deutsche Klimapolitik braucht mehr Mut, Tempo und Weitsicht. Statt entschlossener Investitionen in erneuerbare Energien, Energieeffizienz und Klimaschutz erleben wir Rückschritte und Verzögerungen. Das hat auch der jüngste Stahlgipfel gezeigt, bei dem die Dekarbonisierung fast keine Rolle spielte. Der Fokus liegt zu sehr auf fossilen Übergangslösungen, anstatt die Chancen einer konsequenten Transformation zu nutzen. Dabei ist genau das jetzt entscheidend – für Klimaschutz, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit.  

Die COP30 in Belém ist ein entscheidender Moment: Dort müssen die Länder zeigen, dass sie das Pariser Abkommen, das vor genau zehn Jahren verabschiedet wurde, ernst nehmen. Im Vorfeld hat aber die EU ihr Klimaziel bereits abgeschwächt und Verantwortung durch die Möglichkeit, Emissionsgutschriften von Drittstaaten zu kaufen, ausgelagert. Was wir stattdessen brauchen, sind konkrete Zusagen für den weltweiten Ausstieg aus Kohle, Öl und Gas – und eine deutliche Stärkung der internationalen Klimafinanzierung, damit auch Länder des Globalen Südens ihre Energiewende voranbringen können. Deutschland sollte dabei eine aktive, glaubwürdige Rolle übernehmen und zeigen, dass eigenverantwortlicher Klimaschutz, wirtschaftliche Stärke und globale Solidarität zusammengehören. 

Wir wissen, was zu tun ist – jetzt braucht es politischen Willen und internationale Kooperation. Die Zukunft gehört den Friedensenergien: erneuerbar, gerecht und unabhängig.

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

Über zehn Jahre mussten Apple-Watch-Nutzer warten, jetzt ist der Messenger endlich offiziell fürs Handgelenk da. Die neue App bringt Chatfunktionen direkt auf die Smartwatch.

Über dem Flughafen Göteborg wurden am Donnerstagabend Drohnen gesichtet. Aus diesem Grund ist der Flughafen derzeit gesperrt.

Der F-35-Deal ist zum nächsten Rüstungsskandal geworden. Die USA wollen nichts vom Fixpreis wissen, den sie Viola Amherd angeblich versprochen haben. Das könnte die Schweiz teuer zu stehen kommen. Die SVP fordert Konsequenzen – der Bundesrat schliesst solche nicht aus.

Assad ist im Dezember 2024 in Syrien gestürzt worden und erhielt von Putin Asyl. Seither lebt der Diktator zwar in Luxus, aber offenbar auch in grosser Langeweile. Hinzu kommt die Ungewissheit, ob Putin ihn der neuen syrischen Regierung als Gegengeschäft ausliefert.

Gute Nachrichten für den Einkaufstourismus. In den nächsten Wochen soll eine App erscheinen, die es ermöglicht, sich die Mehrwertsteuer via App zurückerstatten zu lassen. Das soll den Einkauf im Ausland rundum vereinfachen. Unsere Leserschaft hat allerdings Bedenken.

The global development architecture is under the spotlight. This refers to the broad architecture of actors, norms, instruments and institutions that mobilise and coordinate resources, knowledge and political support for development goals. Within this system, ODA is a core financial instrument, primarily provided by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members, and functioning alongside other modalities such as South–South cooperation, climate finance, philanthropic aid and private-sector engagement.

The global development architecture is under the spotlight. This refers to the broad architecture of actors, norms, instruments and institutions that mobilise and coordinate resources, knowledge and political support for development goals. Within this system, ODA is a core financial instrument, primarily provided by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members, and functioning alongside other modalities such as South–South cooperation, climate finance, philanthropic aid and private-sector engagement.