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Le parquet de Paris a fait appel contre l'éphémère secrétaire d'État, Thomas Thévenoud, condamné le 29 mai à trois mois de prison avec sursis et un an d'inéligibilité pour avoir déclaré ses revenus en...

A pünkösdi hétvégén már megnyitotta kapuit a Liszt Ferenc Nemzetközi Repülőtéren található szabadtéri repülőgép múzeum, a közkedvelt Aeropark. A parkolók bővítése miatt végrehajtott költözés nagy előnyére vált a kiállításnak, egy sor újdonság mellett tisztább és kellemesebb környezet várja a látogatókat.

The European Union and its Member States signed today a strategic blueprint, outlining the future of European development policy. This "New European Consensus on Development" represents a new collective vision and plan of action to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development.

The jointly developed strategy, in the form of a Joint Statement, was signed today during the annual two-day European Development Days by the Prime Minister of Malta, Joseph Muscat, on behalf of the Council and Member States, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, the High Representative/Vice President, Federica Mogherini, and the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani.  

The new European Consensus on Development constitutes a comprehensive common framework for European development cooperation. For the first time, it applies in its entirety to all European Union Institutions and all Member States, which commit to work more closely together.  

The new Consensus strongly reaffirms that poverty eradication remains the primary objective of European development policy. It fully integrates the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. In doing so, it aligns European development action with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which is also a cross-cutting dimension for the EU Global Strategy. 

European leaders committed to three areas: 

1. They recognise the strong interlinkages between the different elements of such action. This includes development and peace and security, humanitarian aid, migration, environment and climate, as well as cross cutting-elements, such as: youth; gender equality; mobility and migration; sustainable energy and climate change; investment and trade; good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights; innovative engagement with more advanced developing countries; and mobilising and using domestic resources.
2. The new Consensus furthermore takes a comprehensive approach to means of implementation, combining traditional development aid with other resources, as well as sound policies and a strengthened approach to policy coherence, recalling that EU development cooperation always has to be seen in the context of Europe's partner countries' own efforts. The Consensus provides the basis for the EU and its Member States to engage in more innovative forms of development financing, leveraging private sector investments and mobilising additional domestic resources for development.
3. The EU and its Member States will create better-tailored partnerships with a broader range of stakeholders, including civil society, and partner countries at all stages of development.  They will further improve their implementation on the ground by working better together and taking into account their respective comparative advantages.

Background 

Europe is a global leader in development, being the world's biggest provider of Official Development Assistance. The new European Consensus on Development was agreed jointly by all European Institutions and all EU Member States in an open and transparent manner, also in consultation with other partners. It is the EU's response to today's global trends and challenges, aligning EU external action to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 

The 2030 Agenda was adopted by the international community in September 2015, and includes at its core the 17 Sustainable Development Goals and associated targets, which run to 2030. Along with the other international summits and conferences held in 2015 in Addis Ababa and in Paris, the international community has an ambitious new frame for all countries to work together on shared challenges. For the first time, the SDGs are universally applicable to all countries and the EU is committed to be a frontrunner in implementing them. 

On 22 November 2016, the European Commission proposed its ideas for a strategic approach for achieving sustainable development in Europe and around the world, including a Commission proposal for a new Consensus. Since then the European Parliament, the Council under the Maltese Presidency, and the Commission have engaged in an intensive series of inter-institutional discussions aimed at agreeing to a new collective vision for development policy which responds to the 2030 Agenda and other global challenges. 

Europe is a frontrunner when it comes to sustainable development and the 2030 Agenda, through external and other policies. 

See also

A Joint Statement by the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, the President of the Council of the European Union, Joseph Muscat, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini.

Joint statement by the President of the Council of the European Union, Joseph Muscat; the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini; the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani and the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker on the adoption of the new European Consensus on Development

With the signature of the new European Consensus on Development, we, the leaders representing the European Union institutions and the Member States, come together to mark a milestone achievement. 

Proud to lead global efforts as the world's largest development actor, we are united in our determination to set ourselves a clear vision and plan of action to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development in its economic, social and environmental dimensions by 2030. 

In 2015, the international community adopted at the United Nations the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This Agenda is a politically transformative, ambitious and universal commitment to end poverty and set the world on a sustainable path to prosperity, peace and social justice. The EU and its Member States are strongly committed to its implementation, within Europe and across the world, and this is why we are now translating this new comprehensive blueprint into our own policies including our development policies. Sustainable development is one of the key elements of our external action, as defined in the Lisbon Treaty and further set out in the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. 

The new European Consensus on Development is the cornerstone of our revamped development policy and constitutes an important part of the EU's overall response to the 2030 Agenda. For the first time a shared framework applies to all EU Institutions and Member States, providing a common approach to development policies in the next decades. It will guide our cooperation with all developing countries, bearing in mind the need to design tailor-made approaches that reflect the growing diversity of our partner countries.   

Ending poverty in all its forms remains our primary objective. We will work to reduce inequalities, address vulnerabilities and combat discrimination ensuring that no one is left behind aiming to reach the furthest behind first. We will promote gender equality and social inclusion across our policies, foster opportunities for young people and improve people's well-being everywhere. In implementing the Consensus, we will be guided by and promote our common principles, including democracy, the rule of law, human rights, equality and solidarity, as well as our commitment to a rules-based global order, with multilateralism and the United Nations at its core. Recognising the linkages between sustainable development and climate action, we also reaffirm our strong commitment to implement the Paris Agreement fully and effectively. 

Our new approach to development is based on the 'five Ps' of the 2030Agenda: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnerships. Recognising the interlinkages between the SDGs, we will pay attention to actions that meet multiple goals in a coherent way. We will work across policies and sectors to boost synergies addressing a range of cross-cutting elements to accelerate transformation. Based on the principle of policy coherence for development, development objectives will be fully taken into account across EU policies that are likely to affect developing countries. Policy coherence will be ensured to contribute to the achievement of the SDGs by partner countries. 

Achieving this ambitious vision for Our World, Our Dignity and Our Future will require  multiplying and unifying our efforts.  We will work better together by improving coordination to maximise the impact of the EU and the Member States' actions, and by applying the development effectiveness principles. We will reinforce innovative partnerships with all countries, involving civil society, the private sector, local authorities, international organisations and all relevant stakeholders. The challenges and opportunities of this era are immense, and none of us alone can successfully address them. Our collective action can make a real difference in addressing our common challenges and advancing mutual benefits. 

In line with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, a full range of means of implementation will be mobilised in the spirit of partnership. Action will focus on establishing conducive policy environments to achieve the SDGs, mobilising and making effective use of domestic and international public finance, combating illicit financial flows and involving the private sector through investment, trade, innovation and technology. We also reaffirm all individual and collective Official Development Assistance commitments and will take realistic, verifiable actions towards meeting them. 

This Consensus is a pledge and a call for all of us to join forces for a prosperous, fair, sustainable, safe world and a life of dignity for all. It represents our vision that now needs to be translated into reality.

Together, we will be true to our aims, consistent in our new approach and united in our action.

Under pressure from NATO, Bulgaria’s leaders have agreed to restore the country’s defence capacities as fast as possible, but their plans – and how to fund them – have yet to be worked out. 

On 8 June, the Council adopted the decision establishing of the military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) within the EU military staff (EUMS). The terms of reference of the EUMS, which is part of the EEAS, have also been amended and approved.

"The establishment of the MPCC is a very important operational decision to strengthen European defence. It will contribute  to make the non-executive European missions more effective and to improve the training of  soldiers of partner countries, to guarantee peace and security. This is important not just for our partners, but also for the European Union's security", said  the High Representative Federica Mogherini.

The MPCC will assume command of EU non-executive military missions, currently: EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia, EUTM République Centrale Africaine (RCA) and EUTM Mali. The MPCC will be the static, out-of-area command and control structure at the military strategic level, responsible for the operational planning and conduct of non-executive missions, including the building up, launching, sustaining and recovery of European Union forces. This will allow the mission staff in the field to concentrate on the specific activities of their mission, with better support provided from Brussels.

The MPCC improves the crisis management structures of the EU. It will work under the political control and strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed of EU member states' ambassadors and is based in Brussels.

The MPCC will be composed initially of up to 25 staff but will also benefit from the support of other departments of the EUMS.  The Director General of the EU Military Staff will also be the director of the MPCC.  He will exercise command and control over the current three training missions and other possible future non-executive military missions. He will also exercise the responsibilities related to deployment and recovery of the missions as well as overall budgeting, auditing and reporting.

The MPCC will work closely with its existing civilian counterpart, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) through a joint support coordination cell. This cell will be able to share expertise, knowledge and best practices on issues relevant to both military and civilian missions, as well as capabilities when civilian and military missions are simultaneously deployed in the same area, including  medical support or protective measures.

The decision will be published in the Official Journal of 9 June.

BackgroundProcess

On 6 March 2017, the Council adopted conclusions on progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence, endorsing a concept note for the operational planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operation. In its conclusions of 18 May 2017, the Council decided to establish the MPCC, pending a formal legal decision. Today this formal legal decision has been adopted by the Council.

On 14 November 2016, the Council adopted conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence. These conclusions set out the level of ambition in the form of the main goals the EU and its member states will aim to achieve in the area of security and defence, with three strategic priorities: responding to external conflicts and crises, building the capacities of partners, and protecting the European Union and its citizens. On 15 December 2016, the European Council reaffirmed the need to improve EU's capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more seamless manner, as part of an EU comprehensive approach.

About the three EU Training Missions

EUTM Somalia was launched in 2010 and ever since it has contributed to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government and the institutions of Somalia.

EUTM Mali was launched in 2013 to support the rebuilding of the Malian armed forces and to meet their operational needs.

EUTM RCA was launched in 2016 and it supports the Central African Republic government in the implementation of security sector reform in the country.

À la surprise générale, le patron ivoirien a ouvert le capital de son holding familial au réassureur helvète. Objectif : financer la croissance de NSIA, son groupe de bancassurance. L'opération pose plusieurs questions.

Cet article Côte Ivoire : pourquoi Jean Kacou Diagou s’allie à Swiss Re est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.

Date de publication: Mercredi 07 Juin 2017Couverture: Type de publication: NoteRésumé long: La France s’est fixé des objectifs ambitieux de lutte contre le changement climatique. Mais ni les priorités d’action ni les leviers à actionner pour atteindre cet objectif n’ont été clairement définis. Cette étude propose une approche rationnelle du problème et livre une feuille de route opérationnelle pour engager une action efficace pour le climat.

Lundi 5 juin, l’Arabie saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis, le Bahreïn, le Yémen et l’Égypte ont déclaré rompre leurs liens diplomatiques avec le Qatar, l’accusant de soutenir le terrorisme. L’analyse de Didier Billion, directeur adjoint de l’IRIS.

L’accusation portée par les Saoudiens et leurs alliés est-elle justifiée ou cache-t-elle d’autres motifs profonds de rivalité avec Doha ? S’agit-il d’une crise diplomatique inédite ?

On croit assister à l’histoire du pompier pyromane car c’est à la fois le Qatar et l’Arabie saoudite – et probablement davantage de la part de cette dernière – qui ont apporté leur aide à des groupes de rebelles et islamistes, voire djihadistes, sur le terrain syrien. Dénoncer unilatéralement le Qatar d’être à la fois complice des Frères musulmans, de Daech et d’Al-Qaïda est pour le moins simplificateur et, si l’on considère que l’accusation est fondée, elle doit être alors aussi appliquée à l’Arabie saoudite elle-même.

Cette accusation est en réalité l’expression d’une rivalité ancienne entre Riyad et Doha. Sur les trois organisations dont l’Arabie saoudite accuse le Qatar d’être le soutien, seule la relation entre Doha et les Frères musulmans est avérée et d’ailleurs clairement assumée. Depuis 2011 et les débuts de l’onde de choc politique qui a traversé le monde arabe, le Qatar a systématiquement tenté d’élargir son influence dans la région en soutenant la mouvance des Frères musulmans. Or, ces derniers développent depuis longtemps une orientation très critique à l’égard de la monarchie saoudienne. Cela signifie que Riyad et Doha s’opposent donc frontalement et développent des politiques radicalement divergentes à l’égard des Frères musulmans. Pour mémoire, en Égypte, Doha a par exemple apporté un actif soutien au président élu Mohamed Morsi jusqu’au coup d’État fomenté à son encontre en 2013 qui fut approuvé par Riyad.

Quant à Daech et Al-Qaïda – dont l’origine de la création n’est pas étrangère à la politique des Saoudiens, probablement bien plus que celle des Qataris -, la complaisance à leur égard est partagée à la fois par l’Arabie saoudite et par le Qatar. Enfin, mettre dans la même catégorie Frères musulmans, Daech et Al-Qaïda ne résiste guère à l’analyse.

On assiste donc à une instrumentalisation par les Saoudiens des raisons invoquées pour justifier la rupture des relations diplomatiques avec le Qatar et, de facto, la mise en œuvre d’une politique de sanctions économiques extrêmement brutale, puisqu’elle prend la forme de ce qui s’apparente à un embargo.

Cette crise est inédite par son ampleur. Le Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG, comprenant tous les États arabes du Golfe à l’exception du Yémen), fondé en 1981, a connu des divergences et des différences d’appréciation, notamment concernant la relation avec l’Iran. Pour autant jusqu’alors, ces crises étaient sous contrôle et n’ont jamais atteint l’intensité actuelle. Notons au passage que les États membres du CCG sont dans une situation d’asymétrie à l’égard de l’Arabie saoudite qui, de par sa taille et sa puissance économique, les surplombe. Enfin, n’oublions pas qu’il n’existe pas d’homogénéité politique entre ces États puisqu’Oman et le Koweït ne sont pas d’accord avec l’Arabie saoudite, notamment quant à la politique à l’égard de l’Iran et, pour le coup, du Qatar ; alors que Bahreïn est de facto une sorte de protectorat saoudien…

La première crise sérieuse s’est produite en 2014 lorsque les Saoudiens ont fait pression envers Doha – demandant aux États membres de retirer leurs ambassadeurs du Qatar, ce qui fut le cas durant quelques mois -, déjà à propos de la politique de Doha à l’égard des Frères musulmans et de l’Iran, mais plus généralement pour faire « rentrer Doha dans le rang ». Finalement, le Qatar semblait avoir accepté les injonctions de Riyad et la crise avait été close.

Déjà à l’époque, l’Arabie saoudite ne semblait plus supporter la montée en puissance du Qatar et la prétention de ce dernier à s’imposer sur la scène régionale, voire internationale. Riyad cherchait ainsi à s’affirmer comme le leader incontestable de la région et de la sous-région, obsédé à la fois par les risques de contestation révolutionnaire se développant dans le monde arabe et par la puissance grandissante de l’Iran.

Aujourd’hui, la configuration est différente. Non seulement la rupture est diplomatique mais il y a de plus un jeu de sanctions économiques puisque la frontière terrestre entre l’Arabie saoudite et le Qatar – pourtant vitale pour ce dernier – a notamment été fermée. Les lignes aériennes entre le Qatar et les États arabes qui soutiennent l’Arabie saoudite sont également désormais coupées. La situation est donc préoccupante et il est difficile de savoir comment la crise se dénouera. La tension atteint aujourd’hui un niveau jamais connu par les pays membres du CCG depuis sa création.

Quel impact pour l’émirat qatari cette crise peut-elle avoir sur le plan diplomatique, politique et économique ? A qui profite cette crise ?

Il est encore difficile de mesurer les impacts. Au niveau diplomatique, le Qatar se retrouve relativement isolé. Ceci étant, un certain nombre d’États de la région, parmi lesquels la Turquie – qui considère que ces sanctions ne « sont pas bonnes » selon l’expression utilisée par R. T. Erdogan -, ont exhorté les parties à trouver un terrain de négociation. Aussi, si l’isolement est réel de par l’importance des pays ayant rompu leur relation avec Doha, il ne s’agit ni de la totalité du monde arabe, ni bien sûr de la totalité de la région – loin de là -, qui ont rompu avec Doha.

D’un point de vue niveau économique, le Qatar reste une importante puissance financière de par ses richesses en hydrocarbures et de par l’ampleur de ses investissements à l’étranger. Cependant, les cours du pétrole et du gaz sont à la baisse, ce qui peut causer une difficulté au pays, bien qu’il ait encore de la réserve. La Coupe du monde de football de 2022 nécessitant plus de 200 milliards d’investissements, ces sanctions économiques arrivent au plus mauvais moment car même si le pays est très solvable, il aura besoin de beaucoup de liquidités pour cet évènement.

Au niveau des équilibres politiques intérieurs, il n’y a aucun risque dans le court terme. Le PIB/habitant au Qatar est le plus élevé au monde. La plupart des sujets de l’émir sont largement pourvus en termes de richesse et de couverture sociale donc dans, l’immédiat, ces sanctions ne vont pas susciter un mouvement de contestation. Quant à la partie de la population qatarie immigrée qui est surexploitée et ne dispose d’aucun droit, elle n’est pas en situation de se révolter. La seule difficulté, qu’on ne doit d’ailleurs pas sous-estimer, c’est la faiblesse des stocks alimentaires du Qatar, qui correspondent à environ seulement trois semaines de consommation.

La visite de Donald Trump deux semaines auparavant a-t-elle joué un rôle dans cette crise diplomatique ? Le président états-unien peut-il contribuer à déstabiliser la région ?

Donald Trump a effectivement joué un rôle de déstabilisation indéniable. Toute la politique intelligemment menée par Barack Obama dans la région, consistant à réinsérer l’Iran comme puissance normalisée et potentiellement stabilisatrice, est mise à dure épreuve depuis que Trump est arrivé à la Maison blanche. De façon caricaturale et grossière – mais respectant ses promesses électorales -, le président américain a violemment pris parti contre l’Iran, l’accusant d’être un soutien du terrorisme.

Il a clairement réinstallé l’Arabie saoudite au centre du jeu régional lors de son voyage officiel dans ce pays. Il ne s’agit pas de dire que Trump a demandé aux Saoudiens de rompre avec le Qatar – ce serait manichéen et complotiste – mais il est clair que les Saoudiens se sont sentis confortés par ce soutien actif public de Washington. Cela leur a permis de lancer l’offensive politique actuelle, dont l’arrière fond est évidemment la rivalité avec l’Iran, qui représente le nœud du problème.

Le Qatar ne partage en effet pas les mêmes positions que l’Arabie saoudite à l’égard de la République islamique d’Iran. Tout d’abord parce que le Qatar a des intérêts économiques à ne pas se brouiller avec Téhéran. Notamment, une énorme poche de gaz est exploitée à la fois par les Qataris et par les Iraniens, d’où l’intérêt d’un modus vivendi entre ces deux pays pour une exploitation raisonnable et, si possible, raisonnée. Deuxièmement, les Qataris ont parfaitement conscience de l’asymétrie qui existe avec l’Iran, de par leur différence en termes de superficie, de démographie, de puissance militaire… Les Qataris ont donc eu l’intelligence de comprendre qu’il valait mieux négocier et considérer l’Iran comme partenaire plutôt que comme ennemi.

La décision des Saoudiens, encouragée par la posture binaire de Donald Trump, est donc négative et radicalement contre-productive mais elle doit aussi se comprendre par le fait que Riyad est aussi dans une situation problématique. Son intervention militaire au Yémen est un échec absolu et l’économie du pays est en proie à un relatif affaiblissement. Si l’Arabie saoudite veut affirmer son leadership sur la région pour parer à tout mouvement révolutionnaire et contrer l’Iran, elle n’est en réalité pas capable de le faire et se croit obligée de prendre ce type de sanctions à l’encontre des États qui affirment des divergences.

Április vége óta települ Romániában, és a NATO Southern Air Policing missziójának keretében négy hónapos rotációban, szeptemberig ad készültséget a Fekete-tenger melletti Mihail Kogalniceanu légibázison a brit Királyi Légierő négy Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4-es gépe. 

A négy Typhoon-ból kettő június 6-án, kedden Pápára települt, hogy egy rövid időre bekapcsolódjon a Load Diffuser 2017 gyakorlat utolsó napjaira tervezett feladatokba. Erre leginkább június 7-én kerülhet sor, mert csütörtökön a RAF gépei már visszatelepülnek a román bázisra, hogy folytassák alapfeladatukat, a készültségi szolgálatot és várják a spanyolországi Torrejonból érkező gyakorló vagy éles riasztást.

Az első áthúzást nagy térközt tartva hajtja végre a géppár. A Typhoon-ok nagy felületű sárkányának túlnyomó része kompozitból készült.

A második áthúzás már szorosabb kötelékben történik.

A vezér bal fordulóval bontja a köteléket.

A géppár a 16-os pálya végső egyenesére fordul.

A vezér földet ér. A pilóta a gép szenzorainak és fegyverrendszerének adatait megjelenítő sisakot visel. A RAF Typhoon-pilótái osztrák és német kollégáiktól eltérően nem a folyadékkal töltött Libelle g-ruhában repülnek, hanem a hagyományos levegős öltözékben. 

Gépe orrát magasra tartva, aerodinamikai fékezéssel lassít a Typhoon pilótája. A jobb szárnyvégen a vontatott csalik, a bal szárnyvégen az elektronikai hadviselési rendszer szenzorait tartalmazó áramvonalas konténer van.

Érkezik a kísérő is. A gázsugár alatt a majomfogónak is nevezett ATU-2-es berendezés részei látszanak. 

Centikre a pápai betontól. A törzs oldalán lévő felségjelből kiinduló sávokat és a vezérsíkon lévő századjelvényt egy új rendelkezés alapján lefestették, de az internet korában nem művészet kideríteni, hogy a gépek a Royal Air Force Coningsby bázisához tartoznak. 

A brit vadászgépek két 2000 literes póttartállyal és egy gyakorló ASRAAM rakétával érkeztek Pápára. A Romániában az ASRAAM-ok mellett AMRAAM-okkal és betöltött gépágyúval adnak készültséget. 

A létra csak a vendégek miatt áll a gép mellett, a Typhoon egyébként beépített, teleszkópos létrával rendelkezik. A háttérben a nyugati országrész légi kutató-mentő szolgálatát adó Mi-8-as áll az APA-kocsira csatlakoztatva. A szélvédő mellett a passzív célfelderítést segítő rendszer infravörös szenzora látható.

Tábornoki walk around. Paul Hanson őrnagy vezeti körbe gépe körül Sáfár Albert dandártábornokot, a légi haderőnem főnökét. Korábban mindketten variaszárnyú vadásztípust repültek; Sáfár tábornok MiG-23-ast, Hanson őrnagy Tornado F.3-ast.

A britek a román bázison könnyűszerkezetes lefedést építettek, hogy a gépek a négy hónapos, ideiglenes ott tartózkodás alatt fedél alatt legyenek. A Typhoon-ok Pápán is hangárba kerültek éjszakára.

* * *

Fotó: Szórád Tamás

 

After World War II, Europe had trouble reconstructing its destroyed towns. That is why George C. Marshall made the most of a speech delivered at Harvard to present his ideas about the aid the U.S. could give to its European counterparts.

June 5, 1947, the secretary of State, George C. Marshall, gave a speech at Harvard University to celebrate Commencement Day. Mr. Marshall took the opportunity to present his thoughts about the necessity of helping Europe, a continent ruined by the war. The bill behind it explained that this was “an act to promote world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States through economic, financial and other measures necessary to the maintenance of conditions abroad in which free institutions may survive and consistent with the maintenance of the strength and stability of the United States”. The European states accepted it quickly after its approval by the U.S. Congress. This aid, officially called the “European Recovery Program”, is mostly know as the Marshall Plan. The United Kingdom and France were the two countries that benefited the most from this aid. That is why it is interesting to note that, to date, this anniversary is not even mentioned in most of the main media outlets.

An aid aimed at two main different objectives

The Marshall Plan was, of course, particularly necessary for the reconstruction of Europe. The countries suffered from World War II. Entire cities, towns and villages were destroyed. However, this is the “physical” part of the damages caused by the war. This assessment was accompanied by a ruined economy and a demoralisation of the economic players. The damages were more or less important according to the country or the region but no state was spared. That is why, in his speech, George C. Marshall noticed a less perceptible problem from the U.S. point of view: the trade between the cities and the countryside was more and more difficult. Urban people had to face food shortages while farmers could not obtain manufactured goods to help them producing more food. One of the major goal was then to modernise the European mean of production.

Marshall also took into account the general situation of international relations. In 1947, the Cold War was only at its beginning. The blocs were not totally shaped. Marshall and the U.S. administration feared that communism had spread to European western countries. The goal was to strengthen their ties with the U.S. The Marshall Plan was presented to all the European countries, even the ones who were drawn to communism. Its acceptance certainly rigidified the constitution of blocs. In Eastern Europe, the communist parties strengthened their domination over major parts of the societies and became satellites of the USSR.

An aid laying the foundation of the European unification

The Marshall Plan was original in that that it let Europeans determine their common priorities. This meant that Europeans, fighting in a war 2 years prior, would have to all get together to discuss these common economic priorities. The Marshall Plan also lead to the creation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Its role was to distribute credits among the 18 members who accepted to be part of the European Recovery Program. In 1961, the OEEC became the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), an organization bringing together mostly developed countries.

This first step in co-operation with European countries also  tol the foundation stone for co-operation with other fields. As Clinton said during the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan: “It planted the seeds of institutions that evolved to bind Western Europe together, for the OECD, the European Union and NATO. It paved the way for reconciliation of age-old differences”. The European Coal and Steel Community had not, for instance, been created because of the Marshall Plan. To eventually bring about the European Union that we know today, the will and the leadership of a minority of pro-Europeans were necessary. However, the Marshall Plan allowed Western Europe to keep its ties with the U.S., to remain in the “Free world” and so to enter into an integration in which the sovereignty of each state was respected.

Even if the 70th birthday of the Marshall Plan is not celebrated throughout Western European countries, it is necessary to remember that it was a major plan for our societies that helped us to get back on our feet. It would also be way to remember the ties and relations that unite the two sides of the Atlantic, especially before President Trump, who questioned the necessity of the NATO and the EU.

Pierre Angelloz-Pessey

Sources:

• George C. Marshall’s speech, available at: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/discours_de_george_marshall_harvard_5_juin_1947-fr-dc2f8c43-4269-48c8-ab58-2ef075080e6c.html.
• Postwar Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe marks 70th anniversary, available at: https://fr.usembassy.gov/postwar-marshall-plan-rebuilt-europe-marks-70th-anniversary/.
• Foreign assistance act of 1948, available at: http://marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/06/Foreign_Assistance_Act_of_1948.pdf.
• Jean-Claude Casanova, « Le cinquantième anniversaire du plan Marshall », Commentaire, 1998/2 (Nr. 82), p. 469.
• Charles S. Maier, « Du plan à la pratique. Contexte et conséquences du Plan Marshall », Commentaire, 1998/2 (Nr. 82), pp. 471-474.

Classé dans:Fact of the day

Grèce : malgré la colère populaire, le Parlement vote de nouvelles mesures d'austérité
Grèce : un département d'études islamiques à la fac de Thessalonique
Réfugiés : la Grèce va scolariser les enfants bloqués dans les camps
Grèce : pas d'école pour les enfants en situation de handicap ?

/ Grèce, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Culture et éducation

Monténégro : un député du DPS interdit de séjour en Russie
Monténégro : « Nous et les Russes », l'OTAN, l'amour, la haine...
Monténégro : les mystères du « coup d'Etat » raté du 16 octobre
OTAN : le Monténégro s'apprête à trahir sa « petite-mère » la Russie
Le Monténégro dans la roulette russe : pourquoi Đukanović a-t-il peur de Moscou ?
Monténégro : des imitateurs russes piègent Milo Đukanović et Duško Marković

/ Poutine et les Balkans, Monténégro, Milo Djukanovic, Radio Slobodna Evropa

Monténégro : un député du DPS interdit de séjour en Russie
Monténégro : « Nous et les Russes », l'OTAN, l'amour, la haine...
Monténégro : les mystères du « coup d'Etat » raté du 16 octobre
OTAN : le Monténégro s'apprête à trahir sa « petite-mère » la Russie
Le Monténégro dans la roulette russe : pourquoi Đukanović a-t-il peur de Moscou ?
Monténégro : des imitateurs russes piègent Milo Đukanović et Duško Marković

/ Poutine et les Balkans, Monténégro, Milo Djukanovic, Radio Slobodna Evropa

La France a demandé, mardi, au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU d'appuyer le déploiement d'une force africaine dans la bande sahélienne pour combattre le terrorisme et les trafics. Elle pourrait être opérationnelle dès cet été.

Suite au sondage réalisé sur ce blog, nous avons le plaisir de vous offrir avant la sortie officielle du numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2017), l’article que vous avez choisi d'(é)lire : « La Communauté économique de l’ASEAN : un modèle d’intégration original », par Françoise Nicolas, directeur du Centre Asie de l’Ifri.

À sa création en 1967, la principale préoccupation des cinq membres fondateurs de l’Association des nations d’Asie du Sud-Est (ASEAN) est d’ordre politique : aussi leurs ambitions sont-elles modestes sur le plan économique. Selon la Déclaration de Bangkok, le projet original de l’ASEAN avait pour objectif « de favoriser la croissance économique, le progrès social et le développement culturel dans la région et de promouvoir la paix et la stabilité ». Le développement étant perçu comme le meilleur rempart contre le danger communiste, l’objectif est alors de tout mettre en œuvre pour le faciliter ; mais il n’est aucunement question pour les cinq pays fondateurs de s’engager sur la voie de l’intégration économique sur base institutionnelle. Les initiatives gouvernementales de coopération économique n’interviendront que beaucoup plus tard. Au fil du temps, sous la pression de forces et d’événements extérieurs, les projets se sont pourtant précisés, aboutissant à la mise en place d’une Communauté économique qui constitue aujourd’hui l’un des trois piliers de la Communauté ASEAN.

Ce parcours singulier de l’ASEAN en matière d’intégration économique, qui mêle acteurs étatiques et non étatiques, mais aussi dynamique de marché et logique institutionnelle (voire capitalisme d’État), se démarque des expériences observées dans d’autres régions, et notamment en Europe. Il reflète en outre une constante oscillation entre la poursuite d’objectifs économiques purement nationaux (en premier lieu le développement), et une coopération régionale qui passe par de nécessaires compromis. Cette ambivalence explique aussi le décalage entre les ambitions affichées et les réalisations observées sur le terrain, même si de réels progrès ont été accomplis au cours des 50 dernières années. La question qui se pose aujourd’hui est de savoir si, et comment, les pays de l’ASEAN parviendront à maintenir leur stratégie dans un contexte régional mouvant où l’Association, en tant que groupe, pourrait jouer un rôle stabilisateur.

[…]

La CEA et au-delà

Afin de faire de l’ASEAN une région prospère, stable et hautement compétitive, la CEA est censée créer un marché unique pour la production et la circulation des biens, des services, du capital et du travail qualifié au sein de l’Association, marquant le point d’orgue d’un long processus d’intégration économique s’appuyant sur la réduction progressive des obstacles aux échanges intra-zone. […]

Au-delà de la CEA, l’ASEAN pourrait voir son rôle se modifier profondément dans l’organisation de la région Asie-Pacifique dans les années à venir. Une caractéristique importante de la CEA tient en effet au 4e objectif évoqué plus haut, l’intégration des économies de l’ASEAN dans l’économie mondiale. Dans la logique du régionalisme ouvert qui leur est chère, les pays de l’ASEAN se sont engagés depuis quelques années, à titre individuel, dans la négociation d’accords commerciaux préférentiels. En 2016, Singapour était signataire de plus d’une trentaine d’accords de libre-échange, la Malaisie et la Thaïlande d’une bonne vingtaine, le Vietnam d’une quinzaine. Parallèlement, l’ASEAN a suivi le même chemin, négociant notamment des accords de libre-échange (dits ASEAN + 1) avec ses grands partenaires d’Asie-Pacifique (Chine, Corée du Sud, Japon, Inde, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande). En novembre 201221, l’ASEAN a lancé, à l’initiative de l’Indonésie, un projet de grand partenariat économique régional (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – RCEP), dont l’objectif est de permettre la consolidation des cinq accords ASEAN + 1. […]

Alors qu’avec le TPP, l’ASEAN se trouvait marginalisée comme acteur institutionnel, et divisée en tant que groupe puisque seul quatre pays membres étaient parties à la négociation (Brunei, Singapour, Malaisie, Vietnam), avec le RCEP au contraire l’ASEAN retrouve son rôle central, et reprend en quelque sorte la main sur l’organisation de la région. Il est vrai que le rôle « central » et moteur de l’ASEAN dans le projet RCEP serait grandement facilité si la Communauté économique de l’ASEAN (CEA) était vraiment achevée, ce qui n’est pas encore tout à fait le cas. Il reste que le retrait américain du TPP offre à l’ASEAN une chance inespérée de faire du RCEP la clé de voûte de l’organisation des échanges en Asie de l’Est. […]

Le chemin parcouru par les pays de l’ASEAN ces cinquante dernières années est spectaculaire. La région abrite des économies extraordinairement dynamiques, étroitement insérées dans les réseaux mondiaux de production. Avec un PIB d’environ 2600 milliards de dollars, l’ASEAN en tant que groupe constitue la troisième puissance économique en Asie (derrière la Chine et le Japon, mais devant l’Inde), et la cinquième dans le monde. Et l’ASEAN en tant qu’institution n’est pas étrangère à cette performance : en pacifiant les relations entre les États membres, et en accroissant l’attractivité de la région, elle a incontestablement contribué à la réussite de chacun de ses membres, et facilité leur insertion dans les chaînes de valeur mondiales.

Même si l’Association s’est progressivement transformée pour s’adapter aux défis de son environnement, la construction économique régionale mise en place est marquée par deux grandes constantes. Son régionalisme est ouvert et développemental, ce qui la démarque des entreprises d’intégration économique observées dans d’autres régions, et explique les tensions récurrentes entre agendas nationaux et objectif d’intégration. Il reste que ce groupe, quelle que soit sa malléabilité, peut jouer un rôle moteur dans la structuration économique de la région Asie-Pacifique. Avec les bouleversements observés depuis peu, l’occasion lui est offerte de devenir plus proactif, de prendre son sort en main, et au-delà celui de l’ensemble de la région d’Asie. L’ASEAN saura-t-elle saisir l’occasion ? Tel est l’enjeu des prochaines années.

Pour lire l’article en intégralité, cliquez ici : nicolas_communaute_economique_asean.pdf (21 téléchargements) .

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

After two terrorist attacks in the last two weeks of its general election, the UK heads to the polls this Thursday unsure how the vote will finally turn out. With the polls predicting anything from a hung parliament to a substantial increase in Prime Minister Theresa May’s majority, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn is for now being labelled the political ‘winner’ of the election, with May’s negative ratings increasing as her poll lead has declined.

Will the SNP hold the balance of power at Westminster?

If it is a hung parliament, then attention will turn rather quickly to the third-largest party at Westminster, the Scottish National Party (SNP). The SNP are expected to lose between five and ten of the 56 seats they currently hold (out of a total of 59 in Scotland), though they would still have 46 MPs even if the worst-case likely scenario. The Tories in particular – but Labour and possibly even the LibDems – all look potentially set to increase their seat tally in Scotland from the one MP each they currently have (Labour having been Scotland’s dominant party until 2015).

But the polls still have the SNP on between 40% and 43% of the vote while, just as in England, different polls tell different stories for the Scottish Tory and Labour share of the vote (one suggesting they had levelled at 25% each, another putting the Tories on 30% and Labour on 18%).

“Brexit has been the elephant in the room in the Scottish election debate”

Where is the independence in the EU debate?

Apart from the unpredictability of the results, another curious dimension of Scotland’s election campaign has been the lack of debate over the SNP’s declared aim of independence in the European Union. Two weeks before Theresa May triggered Article 50, Nicola Sturgeon – Scotland’s First Minister and SNP leader – had announced that in the face of Brexit she wanted a second independence referendum once the withdrawal deal was done in autumn 2018.

May responded “no, not now” to this request. The Tory leader in Scotland, Ruth Davidson, then chose to make her Scottish general election campaign all about saying ‘no’ to a second referendum. The stage was set it seemed for a big debate about Brexit with the UK or independence in the EU. But it hasn’t happened.

Nicola Sturgeon has said that having a majority of MPs in Scotland – along with being the largest party in the Scottish parliament and winning the local council elections early last month – would mean she has a ‘triple lock’ on her request for a second independence referendum. But she has also been keen to stress that the election is about electing SNP MPs to provide opposition at Westminster to Conservative austerity policies, benefit cuts and reductions in public service spending. This has been her main line of attack.

Sturgeon has also said that if she wins a majority of MPs (which she is bound to do) she will demand a seat at the Brexit negotiating table, and will again call for Scotland to be allowed to stay in the EU’s single market and the UK (as proposed last December in the Scottish government paper ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’). This is rather curious.

The UK government rejected Sturgeon’s proposal for a differentiated deal for Scotland (on the same day as they triggered Article 50). UK government Brexit Secretary David Davis wrote to his Scottish Government counterpart Mike Russell to say – without a hint of irony – that Scotland could not be in the UK and in the EU’s single market as it would create significant trade barriers between Scotland and England and ‘regulatory confusion’. It is also clear that Nicola Sturgeon would not agree with May’s approach to the Brexit talks (outside the EU single market and customs union) – yet she is putting the emphasis on these two demands: a seat at the table and a differentiated deal.

It appears that, despite taking the bold step of calling a second independence referendum in the face of Brexit, and coming down on the side of an independent Scotland being in the EU not the European Economic Area, Nicola Sturgeon does not want to debate these issues. As a result, with the Scottish Tories and Labour both doing well out of strongly opposing a second referendum, Sturgeon looks on the defensive.

“If it is a hung parliament, the attention will turn rather quickly to the third-largest party at Westminster, the Scottish National Party”

Where is the Brexit challenge?

Ruth Davidson, Scottish Tory leader – and Labour’s leader Kezia Dugdale – have been allowed to argue against independence without being challenged on Scotland being part of the UK’s Brexit, and on all the associated costs and damage that the Brexit decision is already doing and will do even more in the near future. It is understandable that the SNP did not want the general election campaign to be run as if it is a referendum campaign – with arguments over what currency an independent Scotland would use, how it would fund its deficit, and what would happen to the England-Scotland border.

But the SNP had plenty of potential Brexit ammunition to use over the damage to living standards caused by the fall in the pound since 23 June, the slowdown in growth (with eurozone growth in the first quarter of 2017 two-and-a-half times that of the UK), the trade barriers that Brexit will reintroduce, security and more.

To put the focus instead on an anti-Tory, anti-austerity narrative and, when talking about Brexit, to prioritise the demand that Scotland should be in the UK and in the EU’s single market, suggests an SNP that is not on the front foot on independence in the EU.

In the rest of the UK both Labour and the Tories accept Brexit – and so it was pushed to the sidelines of election debates. In Scotland, there is clear blue water over Brexit between the Tories and Labour, on one side, and the SNP (and Scottish Greens) on the other.

Yet Brexit has been the elephant in the room in the Scottish election debate. And whether there will be a second independence referendum before 30 March 2019 is, for now, quite unclear. It is one more Brexit conundrum.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – First Minister of Scotland

The post Neither Brexit nor independence: Scotland’s strange election debate appeared first on Europe’s World.

On 31 May and 3 June 2017, Kabul was the scene of a series of new terrorist bomb attacks that took a heavy toll on the civilian population. While no group has claimed the attacks, the Afghan government has pointed at the Haqqani network, which is part of the Taleban. All this leaves room for various hypotheses and conspiracy theories. In this piece, following up on an earlier AAN summary of events and analysis of the political tensions that followed the bombings, AAN’s Borhan Osman weighs up the few clues available so far and assesses the most plausible explanations as to who could have been behind these attacks, and why. 

For a chronology of events leading up to 4 June 2017, read the first AAN analysis of the ‘black week’ in Kabul here.

Following a series of terrorist attacks and protests in Kabul, starting on 31 May 2017, there has been a prevailing sense of tension in Kabul, although the city has remained calm over the last three days, between 4 and 6 June 2017. Demonstrations have not taken place. Only the protestors who held out in a tent not far from the 31 May bomb site have erected two new tents in town, a sign that they are determined not to give up.

At the opening conference for the Kabul Process  on 6 June – a new attempt by the Afghan government to start a regional peace initiative –, President Ashraf Ghani released new casualty figures for the 31 May attack in Kabul: 150 dead and 350 injured. Injury figures had previously been reported as 450, so it can be assumed that many of those hurt in the blast have since passed away. This makes it the most devastating attack in Kabul since 2001.

ISKP: Celebrations but denial of responsibility

Beyond the official narratives of how the bomb attacks on 31 May and 3 June were carried out, one can only make an informed speculative analysis based on plausibility, in order to ascertain who was behind the attacks. There are two main possible perpetrators, based on other recent attacks in Kabul: the Taleban (all elements, including the Haqqani network, taken as a collective whole), who have been responsible for most of the previous attacks in the city, and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is a relatively minor but growing actor.

Online sources known to reflect ISKP thinking initially celebrated the attack which, they said, must have killed muharibs (people in combat with IS) and their ‘puppets’, based on where the attack took place, which was near western embassies, the offices of international organisations and Afghan government installations. They even condemned the Taleban’s condemnation of the attack.

Several media outlets, both Afghan and non-Afghan (1 TV during a live transmission, Xinhua citing Afghan officials, Iran’s Fars news agency and the BBC’s John Simpson, for example, in a tweet) reported an ISKP claim, but never gave a source. These reports appear to have been wrong.

Later on, around ten hours after the explosion, social media accounts of known ISKP activists published an announcement denying responsibility and condemning the attack. The announcement came in the form of plain text rather than a formal statement with the group’s logo and usual layout. It noted that there would be no formal statement since, it said, the organisation (including its Afghanistan-Pakistan ‘provincial’ chapter) only issues statements when it carries out or claims an attack, not in the case of denials.

Two days later, on 2 June 2017, two Arabic-language statements bearing the logos and the graphic style of ISKP and the ISIS-affiliated Amaq news agency, spread throughout social media and were even widely circulated by the Taleban, including by their media division. One statement said the bombing had targeted the Germans and had killed a large number of their guards. The other statement contained the name and photograph of the alleged bomber, with his face blurred. ISKP-affiliated websites and online activists, however, rejected the authenticity of the two statements and pointed to flaws in the style of the statements as signs of fabrication. They blamed the Taleban for spreading fake statements in an attempt to cover up their own responsibility. It is not clear who crafted the statements or why, but the fact that the Taleban drew attention to them does suggest that they may have indeed been the source.

For ISKP, a successful truck bomb such as the one that carried out the attack would be a first and would represent a significant scaling up of its operational and logistical capabilities. So far, the organisation has not been able to supply or source such a large amount of explosives in Kabul. Most of the attacks it has claimed have been carried out by single or multiple bombers equipped with explosive belts and automatic guns, as reported in earlier AAN dispatches (for example here). However, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that ISKP’s Kabul cell could have upped its capacity and managed to transport this amount of explosives to one of Kabul’s better-guarded areas. There is always a first time. Moreover, ISKP is not operating within a void. Criminal networks and groups loosely connected with other insurgency actors are able to provide ISKP with one-off help in exchange for financial incentives. But it is too early to say whether that really happened.

The most powerful argument against ISKP’s involvement in the bombing is the fact that it would almost certainly have claimed it had the group carried out the attack. First, the group does not care much about its popularity, especially in the Kabul environment, and would be ready to face a public outcry produced by such an atrocity. The area of the attack could also be well justified in ISKP’s logic, with all its ‘legitimate targets’. This was already evident in early comments on social media by ISKP members before the informal denial came. On the contrary, claiming such an attack would have given ISKP an enormous propagandistic boost, which it certainly needs following recent setbacks, such as the attacks on its strongholds in eastern Afghanistan. (There were even initial speculations that the blast could have been an act of revenge for the ‘MOAB’ strike that was directed at ISKP in Nangrahar province.) This attack, had it been claimed, would have put ISKP at the top of the international news headlines. This is probably no different from IS claims on recent attacks in London and Manila (the latter not even considered a terrorist attack by investigating agencies.)

The fact that the attack has remained unclaimed could also have encouraged ISKP to lay claim to it for the sake of publicity.

The attack would have shown that ISKP had indeed shifted gears, carrying out an attack of this magnitude with such a powerful bomb. It would have boosted its standing vis-à-vis its other major enemy in the Afghan arena, the Taleban.

A close study of ISKP’s media operation, however, indicates that it has started developing more rigorous internal regulations when it comes to its media outreach. Claims of major attacks have to first go through their provincial media branch, which are then given the green light by central media operators in Syria, according to ISKP sources. All in all, ISKP’s involvement in the 31 May terrorist attack remains the less plausible scenario.

Taleban: Condemnation – but…

The Taleban denied responsibility for the attack, and even condemned it. This statement came four hours after the attack. This relatively sluggish response is fairly common for them, however. For a normal attack planned by their central military commission, Taleban spokesmen are immediately briefed when it happens, even sometimes in advance. But for attacks undertaken by special units of the Taleban, or groups that do not always coordinate with the central military commission – such as the Haqqani network –, it usually takes time for the Taleban to establish their own involvement. In some cases, the interval between an attack and a claim or denial is intentional, in order to assess the consequences of the attack and gauge public opinion, before making an official statement (more on this further down.)

In the case of the bomb at the Chahrrahi-ye Zanbaq (Zanbaq junction) on 31 May, however, Taleban social media activists went further than simply condemning it. They blamed it on US and/or foreign intelligence agencies and vowed to avenge the attack, saying that the root cause of the problem was “foreign occupation” and that the only solution to stop such carnage was to end it.

Despite the Taleban’s categorical denial, however, the attack bears all the hallmarks of the movement more than of any other non-state actors. The movement’s operational capacity and logistical access to plan and execute such a bombing is beyond question. It regularly carries out attacks of this magnitude. The main questions are, what was the intended target and why have the Taleban denied it? It could have been a premature detonation, which concurs with the official version that the truck only detonated after the ANP stopped it at the entrance to the city’s well-protected ‘Green Zone’.

The real intended target remains a matter of speculation, as many prominent institutions are present in the area: government institutions (the presidential palace, Ministry of Defence or NDS, for example), international headquarters (including that of Resolute Support and the CIA, in the Ariana Hotel), embassies (many western ones, but also the Indian embassy) etc. The amount of explosives and the magnitude of the explosion, however, were clearly designed to do as much damage as possible.

To understand what may have happened, it is useful to revisit an earlier AAN dispatch on how some semi-autonomous networks under the umbrella of the Taleban operate and why the movement might deny some of the attacks they carry out. These networks tend to have their own sources of funding and a particular chain of command, although nominally and officially under the Taleban’s Rahbari Shura (the Leadership Council.) The Haqqani network is probably the largest and most powerful of these semi-autonomous networks. Another is the former Taleban military chief Qayum Zaker’s network in Helmand, which retains a degree of autonomy despite being partly dependent on resources from the Rahbari Shura. There are also smaller networks that serve as Pakistan’s direct proxies (and are much more loyal to the Taleban than the Haqqanis are) but that also enjoy the freedom to act freely within the insurgency’s sphere. These are thought to be responsible for a series of assassinations (or assassination attempts) against politicians, tribal elders (especially in the south) and ulema, as well as Afghan Taleban members.

For the networks mentioned above, an official policy towards a certain issue does not necessarily always matter. They are bound only by the Taleban’s universal red lines, notably that they cannot engage in sectarian attacks, beheadings or rapes – in order to keep their pledge of allegiance to the movement and benefit from the name. But there is a wide grey area in which these networks can operate with some divergence from official Taleban policies. For the time being, the Taleban leadership seems to heed those networks’ insistence on operational autonomy, in part as a reward for their important military contributions. This also provides the Taleban leadership deniability when it comes to particular ‘operations,’ for example, when the attacks by these networks cause remarkably high numbers of civilian casualties.

Why would the Taleban deny it?

The Taleban do not always claim the attacks they carry out. Their official position toward attacks varies, ranging from proud claims of responsibility to silence, denial or even condemnation. The type of behaviour is determined mainly by how the attack will affect the Taleban’s image among the wider public, the Taleban support base and the broader political spectrum. For example, the assassination of former President Borhanuddin Rabbani in 2011, then-Chairman of the High Peace Council, obviously resonated well with the Taleban’s support base, but claiming it publicly was seen as too damaging for its political image among the former mujahedin. The Taleban’s response in that instance was silence – although the perpetrator had come as an alleged Taleban peace messenger. Other instances where the Taleban have denied responsibility (but may well have been the perpetrators) include the large truck bomb that seems to have exploded prematurely one night in August 2015 in Kabul’s Shah Shahid neighbourhood, killing dozens, mainly civilians (see here and here.) Denial and occasional condemnation are typical responses when the attack causes a particularly unjustifiable level of damage or number of casualties by the Taleban’s standards, even when they are seen as ‘collateral’ rather than intended.

Examples of Taleban condemnation of attacks that were clearly carried out by their own fighters include two of the deadliest ones, both in Paktika, in 2014 and 2015. In July 2014 – the holy month of Ramadan that year – a truck bomb went off in Urgun killing scores of people, almost all of them civilians, and reduced a large part of the town to rubble. Details provided to AAN at the time by locals left no doubt that the attack was carried out by a well-known local Taleban commander, who had wanted to target a notorious pro-government militia commander, Azizullah Karwan. It was not clear, though, whether the bomb had detonated prematurely or intentionally, given that many local Taleban foot soldiers considered the entire population of the town a legitimate target for its collective hostility toward Azizullah. Another attack targeted a group of people that were considered similarly ‘hostile’ when a suicide bomber blew himself up among a crowd watching or participating in a volleyball tournament in Yahyakhel district in November 2015, that included a number of ALP commanders. The Taleban officially condemned the attack in a statement and promised to hold those responsible to account, while on the other hand a pro-Taleban website provided detailed justifications for the attack.

If the massive truck bomb on 31 May was indeed a premature detonation, the denial by the Taleban would make sense, given their mindfulness of their public image – a contrast to how ISKP handles this. Furthermore, the fact that Taleban media activists went out of their way to promote a fabricated ISKP claim may well have been an attempt to deflect suspicion – although it could also have simply been an attempt to tarnish the image of its jihadist rival.

Conspiracy theories provide ‘easy explanations’

There are two other explanations circulating on social media and among the Afghan public, both falling in the category of conspiracy theories. One is that the government itself was behind the explosion. This, in particular, was hinted at by some of the protestors on 2 June 2017 and in statements by the protest leaders, most of whom are Jamiatis with longstanding grievances against the government. A pro-Taleban writer also pointed to this possibility, arguing that the self-inflicted attack had been aimed at building momentum for the upcoming Kabul Process meeting. The writer argued that the government wanted to magnify the gravity of the threat from terrorist groups, so it could emphasise the need for more international engagement.

A similar theory holds that the explosion was not caused by a tanker-borne bomb, but rather by a huge missile. A well-known and well-respected civil society activist presented metal pieces from the site during a live TV talk show, claiming they did not belong to a vehicle, and adding that the Shah Shahid blast of 2015 mentioned above had been of a similar nature. The implication behind the theory is that the US (or some other western) military dropped the bomb to escalate the conflict. The theory is quite popular on social media, where video clips of the civil society activist has been widely shared and viewed. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that there were anti-US signs and slogans raised during the 2 June 2017 demonstrations. (Another source of anti-US sentiment is the feeling that the bilateral security agreement between Afghanistan and the US has done nothing to address the country’s main security threats.)

The 3 June attacks on the funeral

There are even fewer clues and details surrounding the nature of the explosions that shook the funeral of the son of Muhammad Alam Ezadyar. Three successive explosions took place while a number of high-ranking officials, mostly linked to Jamiat, were attending the ceremony (including Chief Executive Abdullah, Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani, former NDS chief Amrullah Saleh and Minister of Public Health Ferozuddin Feroz.) Officials and participants described how the explosions had been caused by three suicide bombers. They had apparently chosen different locations among the crowd of mourners before blowing themselves up. Afghan media later showed footage indicating the explosive charges were hidden in shoes. This was a well-packed crowd, and if the explosives had been more powerful, the carnage could have been much larger than during the 31 May bombing. However, given that security must have been tight due to the attendance of senior officials, the bombers seem to have arrived with a minimal amount of explosives to avoid being detected and caught.

Nobody claimed responsibility for this series of explosions, either. The Taleban, this time, quickly issued a statement denying their involvement and saying the attack had been the result of “internal enemy feuds”. The NDS, on the other hand, released a video of a man it said was one of the bombers at the funeral (who had failed to detonate his charge), and that he was linked to the Taleban. On the video the man confessed that the funeral attacks had been organised by mullahs based in Chaman, near the Afghan border in Balochistan, without explicitly mentioning the Taleban.

Prominent participants at the funeral, such as Salahuddin Rabbani, hinted that circles within the government (in his words, “terrorists within the system”), had been the culprits. Another prominent member of Jamiat, governor of Balkh province Atta Muhammad Nur, also joined in, describing the attacks as a “cowardly conspiracy and a direct attack on a specific political current [Jamiat] [which] furthers the speculations about the hand of circles within the establishment in orchestrating these attacks.”

Politically charged feuds and claims aside, the two main suspects in this case remain the dominant insurgent groups operating in Kabul. In terms of tactics, the scope of the attack and nature of the target (a funeral ceremony) as well as the limited clues that are available, all point to the involvement of ISKP rather than to the Taleban. Planning such an attack and supplying a small amount of explosives for three bombers would not present a major challenge for ISKP. AAN has reported earlier on a part of ISKP’s Kabul cell operating in the northern parts of the city. An event like this, with the participation of so many senior government officials, would make it not only a ‘legitimate’, but also a highly attractive target for ISKP. However, the fact that the group did not claim the attack, casts doubt on this scenario, which would otherwise be the most plausible.

Afghanistan’s increasingly complex web of violence

Due to the high number of both government and foreign institutions as well as the potential for grabbing media attention far and wide, Kabul has always been an attractive place for insurgent groups to carry out attacks. Over the past decade and a half, a range of militant groups, from the Afghan Taleban to the now reconciled Hezb-e Islami, to Taleban splinter groups such as Fedai Mahaz or Dadullah Mahaz and more recently, ISKP, have focused their attacks on the capital. Kabul remains a favourite launch pad for attacks for any new militant group seeking to gain publicity and introducing itself to potential recruits at the national level.

Lately, it would appear that ISKP and the Taleban have been competing over who could unleash the most violence in the capital. Sometimes, both have claimed responsibility for the same incidents, simultaneously (in the past, similar contesting claims had pitted Hezb-e Islami against the Taleban.) Such a spirit of competition usually makes groups rush to lay claim to the attacks they carry out, providing details of the operation to bolster the credibility of their claims.

What makes the attacks this past week unusual is not only that they caused mass casualties, but also that they came one after the other, as though the first led to the next; both hit soft targets but, importantly, and belying the spirit of competition, nobody claimed responsibility for them. This lends an air of mystery to these attacks. They have succeeded in creating further political tension in the already notoriously divided National Unity Government, feeding an array of conspiracy theories.

Edited by Sari Kouvo, Thomas Ruttig and Emilie Jelinek

 

 

Comentario Elcano 31/2017 - 7/6/2017
Luis Simón

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