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DT 7/2017 - 8/6/2017
Carmen González Enríquez

A pesar de la crisis económica y de la rápida erosión de la confianza política, en España no ha habido ningún partido populista de derechas que haya obtenido más del 1% del voto en las elecciones generales de los últimos años.

The first major new railway in Kenya for more than a century has some challenging goals to meet if it is justify its high cost.

North Korean has reportedly launched four anti-ship missiles into the sea east of the Korean Peninsula near the eastern port city of Wonsan, Gangwon Province.

The US Navy's George H.W. Bush Carrier Strike Group (GHWBCSG) has commenced strike missions against ISIS from the eastern Mediterranean Sea in support of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).

Canadian company Kraken Sonar Systems has secured a repeat contract for the delivery of its AquaPix miniature interferometric synthetic aperture sonar and real-time SAS signal processor to a major European defence contractor.

A l’occasion des Journées européennes du développement (EDD), personnalités politiques et acteurs du développement du monde entier se sont réunis à Bruxelles, les 7 et 8 juin 2017, afin d’échanger pendant deux jours sur l’avenir de l’aide au développement. L’Union européenne et les pays d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP) devront très prochainement redéfinir les termes de leur nouveau partenariat : l’occasion pour tous de partager expériences et idées pour préparer la période "post-Cotonou", après 2020.

This study examines behavioural patterns of the top echelons of Russia’s elite within four fundamental spheres (law, truth, public welfare and violence) since 2008 and discovers certain continuities. It reveals the elite’s fundamental attitudes in the four areas as evinced by its actions – attitudes which will have a decisive impact on German-Russian and EU-Russia relations in the future. The study shows that Russia’s actions since 2014 – which have surprised many Western observers – are based on attitudes that were already perceptible before then. These attitudes can thus be considered part of the Russian elite’s long-standing political culture. Today, it is the instrumentalisation of law, truth and violence in foreign and domestic politics, and a desire for control derived from mistrust in external and internal actors, that especially characterise Russia’s elite. The common good or well-being of the Russian people is not a priority for the elite, or only in purely instrumental terms. Politicians and policymakers in Germany and the EU need to take these fundamental attitudes into account when developing a medium- to long-term approach to Russia because they will shape the actions of numerous members of the Russian elite for the foreseeable future.

«C’est une question d’opportunité, nous avons eu un délai très court pour préparer la campagne et, sans relais locaux sur place, ce n’est pas facile de trouver une salle», assure un proche de l’humoriste. Candidat...

Trois semaines après sa prise de fonctions, Jean-Michel Blanquer nous a reçus dans son bureau de la rue de Grenelle. Le nouveau ministre de l’Education affiche clairement sa priorité : «Faire en sorte...

„Diplomatische Quellen“ Zeitung: Berlin bereitet „Marshallplan“ für den Balkan vor Thomas Brey/dpa,  06.06.2017 – 16:11 Uhr Die Grenze zwischen Serbien und Kroatien im kroatischen Tovarnik Foto: Str/EPA/dpa Die EU soll in die Staaten investieren und so für Wandel sowie Frieden in der Region sorgen – doch am Sonntag wählen die Kosovaren. Belgrad – Deutschland strebt nach einem Zeitungsbericht für die Länder des westlichen Balkans einen groß angelegten Investitionsplan an, der von der EU und Ländern wie der Schweiz finanziert werden soll. „Marshall 2 als Ersatz für Europa“, titelte die gut informierte serbische Regierungszeitung Novosti am Dienstag in Belgrad unter Berufung auf nicht näher bezeichnete „diplomatische Quellen“. Nach dem Vorbild der US-Aufbauhilfe für […]

Ahogy arról már többször volt szó itt a blogon, a nagy hírportálokon, hírcsatornákon most már a margón sem kerül megemlítésre a szudáni Darfúr régióban közel másfél évtizede zajló erőszakos konfliktus, amely 2003-as kirobbanása óta óvatos becslések szerint legalább 200-300 ezer ember halálát okozta, a konfliktus miatt elmenekültek száma pedig mindenképpen milliósra tehető. És bár 2010-ben a legnagyobb darfúri lázadó csoport, az Igazság és Egyenlőség Mozgalma (JEM) békét kötött a kartúmi kormánnyal, az az erőszakos cselekmények állítólagos folytatódása miatt rövidesen a múlt ködébe veszett és a mai napig kisebb-nagyobb intenzitással zajlik a háborúskodás a szudáni kormány egységei és a kormányhoz hű, főként arab afrikaiakból álló Janjaweed milícia (most már Gyorsreagálású Erők – RSF néven futnak) valamint a JEM és a Szudáni Felszabadítási Mozgalom (SLM) különféle frakciói között.

Jelenleg ismét egy nagyobb intenzitású szakaszba ért a harc, miután helyi tisztviselők és a témával foglalkozó független bloggerek állításai szerint az RSF megtorló akciókat kezdett a darfúri civil lakosság ellen, több tucat embert megöltek, házakat gyújtottak fel, emberek százait üldözték el otthonukból az elmúlt két hétben. A megtorlás az után kezdődött, hogy május 19-én a Szudáni Felszabadítási Mozgalom Minni Minawi-féle frakciója (SLM-MM) illetve a mozgalom Átmeneti Tanács néven ismert egy másik frakciója összecsapott szudáni kormányerőkkel és sokak meglepetésére a lázadók igen komoly ellenállást tudtak kifejteni, sőt igazából (állításuk szerint) ők kerültek ki nyertesként a helyzetből – az összecsapások kirobbanásáért egyébként mindkét fél a másikat tette felelőssé, a harcok alakulása miatt pedig a szudáni elnök, Omar al-Bashir Egyiptomot és Dél-Szudánt vádolta meg, hogy nehézfegyverzettel és logisztikai támogatással segítik a darfúri lázadókat.

A május 19-én történt súlyos összecsapások után következő, civil lakosság elleni akciók nem számítanak újdonságnak errefelé, ezt már többször lehetett látni a régióban különféle milíciáktól, de a legszomorúbb az egészben az, hogy nagyjából a világ teljes csendben fogadta a történteket, a sajtóban a legritkább esetben került bárhol is megemlítésre a dolgok rosszabbra fordulása és az ENSZ Darfúrba nominált, súlyos dollármilliókból fenntartott missziója, az UNAMID semmit nem tudott tenni az állítólagos mészárlások és gyújtogatások megakadályozása érdekében. A támadások helyi segélyszervezetek szerint főként Marla, Muzbad, Um Baru, Adoala és Ain Siro településeket érintik, de igazából a konkrétumokról nincsenek hírek és információk – Darfúrban továbbra is az a helyzet, ami az elmúlt években már megszokottá vált: a sajtó képviselői és a non-profit szervezetek itt nem szívesen látott vendégek és esetenként akár ezek a segíteni akaró emberek az életüket is kockáztatnák, ha a régióba mennének (lásd Daoud Hari és Phil Cox újságírók esetét, akik 2016 végén estek fogságba Darfúrban és bebörtönzést, kínzásokat voltak kénytelenek átélni magánakciójuk következményeként).

Ami azért konkrétumként elhangzott és megerősítést is nyert, az az, hogy a harcok során a kormánykatonák elfogták az SLM-Átmeneti Tanács frakciójának vezetőjét, Nimer Abdel Rahmant és megölték katonai vezetőjüket is – az ennek kapcsán megszólaló Minni Minnawi (az SLA-MM névadó vezetője) szerint egyébként a szudáni kormányzat már hónapok óta készült a mostani akciósorozatra, Kartúm viszont Líbiában megbújó és ott szervezkedő lázadó alakulatokról beszél. És hogy mit jelenthet ez a jövőre nézve? Az biztos, hogy óriási csapás ez a békének, hiszen az SLA-MM és az SLA-TC már több mint egy éve semmilyen komolyabb katonai műveletet nem hajtott végre Darfúrban és Minnawi már a teljeskörű békéről beszélt az elmúlt hónapokban, de a mostani akciókkal egyértelmű, hogy ez rendkívül távoli remény lett ismét.

A kormány szempontjából is kockázatos a helyzet, hiszen Bashir és kormánya arra vár, hogy közel 20 év után az Egyesült Államok megszüntesse az ország elleni gazdasági szankciókat – ennek pedig feltétele a darfúri béke. Figyeljük tehát a fejleményeket, az biztos, hogy az elkövetkező hónap vízválasztó lesz, egyrészt, hogy milyen akciók jönnek még az RSF-től, illetve hogy Minnawi és a többi SLM frakció miként reagál ezekre. Remélhetőleg a helyzet totális eszkalálódása elkerülhető lesz.

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7 ember kedveli ezt a posztot.Tetszett az írás.Tetszett az írás.

D'après un baromètre Elabe, le ministre de la Transition écologique et solidaire est devenu la personnalité politique préférée des Français, avec 60% d'opinions positives.

The security situation in Mali remains volatile, and violence has spread from the north to the center and south of the country. This persistent instability and spread of violence has undermined the implementation of the peace agreement, which has also suffered from low levels of trust between the signatories and a lack of ownership by the parties. These developments have implications for the political strategy of the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

In light of the expected renewal of MINUSMA’s mandate in June 2017, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report co-organized a workshop on May 2, 2017, to give member states and UN actors the opportunity to develop a shared understanding of the situation faced by the UN in Mali. This workshop was the third in a series analyzing how UN policies and the June 2015 recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) can be applied to country-specific contexts.

Participants suggested that MINUSMA’s renewed mandate should prioritize the restoration of state authority, local-level reconciliation, the security situation in central Mali, a flexible approach to the protection of civilians, and analysis of organized crime. They also suggested that relevant member states and stakeholders address the mismatch between MINUSMA’s mandate and capacity, exercise leverage over the signatories of the peace agreement, and coordinate among various international and national security forces.

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By Fred Johnston

In April, a clandestine meeting took place in New Zealand that included attendees from representatives of the FBI, CIA and National Security Agency plus the United Kingdom’s MI5 and MI6, amongst others. They were brought together to discuss and facilitate intelligence sharing between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, colloquially known as the Five Eyes network.

These nations have been coming together since an alliance was established in 1946 through the UKUSA agreement, with the other three countries joining the collective over the following ten years. The partnership was established on mutual trust and potential advantages for each country, coming at a time when the looming threat of communism from the Soviet Union swept through sections of Asia during the Cold War.

During said period, the alliance paid dividends. In the 1970s, Anglo-American operations were essential in tracking Soviet submarines using a variety of means, while the United States relied heavily for decades on listening posts lying in former British imperial territories. Half the cost of running the Cypriot site was paid for by the US, demonstrating its significance in acquiring intelligence from the Middle East with this post.

The merits of a shared surveillance alliance are plain to see, though one could argue the future of Five Eyes could be jeopardy. In March, former CIA analyst Larry C. Johnson claimed Britain’s intelligence agency, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) had intercepted communications within Trump Tower during the 2016 Presidential election.

His evidence for such sensational claims? GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan had resigned three days after Trump’s inauguration. Hannigan said he was to care for his ill wife and elderly parents, but Johnson declared he “doesn’t believe in coincidences”. The real reason for the resignation, he surmised, was clear: The British government had been gathering intelligence on the Trump administration, and once Trump was made aware of this, Hannigan was forced to step down.

Unfortunately, this unproven claim became tangled in the echo chamber of the media—Johnson’s theory were soon picked up by Andrew Napolitano, a Trump confidant and pundit for Fox News. Two days later, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer cited Napolitano’s comments at a briefing, which evoked a forceful denial from their British allies.

One would think maintaining a positive relationship with like-minded, democratic allies with whom intelligence information has being shared for decades would be seen as a priority for the United States. Yet with the Trump administration demonstrating distrust for the UK in recent months, doubts grow around whether such arrangements will continue in the future.

Ties with traditional US allies have not only grown fractured with Britain. At the conclusion of bruising meetings with NATO and G7 countries, Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked at an election rally, “The times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over. I’ve experienced that in the last few days. We Europeans truly have to take fate into our own hands.”

A not-so subtle commentary on the degeneration of Germany-US relations, which really began to slide with George W. Bush and Gerhard Schroeder’s split decision on the Iraq war in 2003. It also signals the level of diplomatic success experienced by Trump during these meetings—if the head of state of arguably Europe’s biggest economy is losing faith, it does not bode well for the US.

While Trump’s actions are a cause for concern on the diplomacy front, he has also made strong accusations against the intelligence community—his own, that is. In February, Trump took to Twitter with the following claim, “Information is being illegally given to the failing NY Times and Washington Post by the intelligence community (NSA & FBI). Just like Russia.”

This was in response to the resignation of national security advisor Michael Flynn over potentially illegal contacts with the Russian ambassador during the 2016 Presidential campaign. Whether or not the contact took place is a different matter of debate—Trump’s public comments toward the intelligence community undermines the work this industry has performed for many decades (in a Tweet, no less). If Trump treats his own reconnaissance agencies with such disregard, it would be understandable for other nations to be weary of sharing sensitive information with Donald at the helm.

When examining the US approach towards shared intelligence, one may assume there are doubts on the legitimacy and significance of such agreements. After all, this agreement was sought at the beginning of the Cold War; we no longer exist in a bipolar world of “us and them”, where the threat to Western society lying on the other side of the wall. Does Western society still require joint intelligence and security arrangements, like the Five Eyes network, or are such agreements obsolete?

Firstly, the current manifestations of Five Eyes’ traditional threats, demonstrating their prioritization of military and defense, is a worrying trend. Throughout history, access to the Mediterranean Sea had been crucial to Russia.

Earlier this year, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said the “Mediterranean region was the core of all essential dangers to Russia’s national interest”, which shows a reigniting of interest from Moscow. Along with Russia’s intervention in Syria, Five Eyes member countries must be concerned with Moscow’s military expansion intentions.

Meanwhile, China’s provocative military build-up, its assertive behavior in the South China Sea and its power of persuasion to garner political influence from states within the region should also be under close attention from Five Eyes.

A study by the RAND Corporation, titled “War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable” found that, “improvements in Chinese military capabilities mean that a war would not necessarily go the way US war planners plan it. Whereas a clear U.S. victory once seemed probable, it is increasingly likely that a conflict could involve inconclusive fighting with steep loses on both sides.”

Secondly, the alliance faces an ever-evolving threat from terrorism. Through groups such as al-Qaeda and more recently Islamic State, extremism has become harder to monitor and is increasingly prevalent in the societies of the Five Eyes and their partners. One study has found that ISIS publishes 38 unique pieces of content per day. This, along with the advent of social media to inspire and influence citizens in the West, has shown the pressure to disrupt would-be attackers has never been greater.

Finally, the recent Wannacry attacks shone a light on a growing problem in the technology sector—cyber crime. In the attacks, over 160,000 internet-connected computer systems were infected and forced the user to pay a $300 U.S. “ransom” in order to retrieve information from the affected system. Although reports showed the hackers made less than $100,000, a paltry sum when one considers the hysteria it caused, the cost of cyber crime on society is growing.

One study showed that by 2021, the damage of data, stolen money, theft of personal and financial data, amongst other acts, would cost up to $6 trillion. An eye-watering figure such as this should be the impetus for the majority of world leaders to take action on cyber crime, let alone the Five Eyes collective.

The Five Eyes surveillance network has served a great benefit to its member countries since its inception 70 years ago. With an inexperienced politician as Head of State in the U.S., the status quo of diplomacy and how to approach intelligence gathering have dramatically altered with his presence. His actions prove to undermine the intelligence community, not just in the US but also multilaterally.

In this day and age however, do we really need such integrated surveillance and intelligence operations? In one word—yes.

Fred is a Central Australian who works as a schoolteacher in Bogota, Colombia by day and aspiring social commentator by night. His interests mainly lay in social injustices carried out by those who have misplaced their moral compass—usually politicians and big business. You can follow him on Twitter @FreddyKuma.

The post Is The Five Eyes Network Still Relevant Today? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

By Col. Tomasz K. Kowalik and Dominik P. Jankowski

It all started with a military exercise in 2008. “Today, Georgia. Tomorrow, Ukraine. The day after, the Baltic states—and later perhaps the time will come for my country, Poland!” Those words were uttered 5 August 2008 by Poland’s late president, Lech Kaczyński, in the presence of five European heads of state who had come to Tbilisi in a gesture of solidarity with the just-invaded Georgia. Almost 10 years later, this statement anticipates Europe’s current security dilemma.

These days, pundits are increasingly speculating on what Russia’s next large-scale military exercise—code-named Zapad-2017—may bring. Will it be just another saber-rattling event that will once again lower the security threshold by adding uncertainty and unpredictability—and make us increasingly numb and desensitized to those large-scale exercises?

This time, will a Russian ally have to reluctantly accept the stationing of more foreign troops on its territory? Or will it lead to yet another Russian military incursion into a neighboring country? Which security Rubicon will be crossed this time?

Understanding Russia’s modus operandi in recent years, and what its large-scale military exercises are designed to accomplish, could offer answers and highlight areas that the international community should closely watch. It also indicates a way ahead for the West.

Train with a purpose

In the last decade, Russia has expanded its military capabilities through regular and specific exercises that have often involved offensive, aggressive and anti-Western scenarios. Such maneuvers enhanced troop readiness status and effectiveness, especially since Russian forces train as they fight.

Those drills also served concrete political and strategic communications purposes as a show of force and a narrative for the national leadership. They intimidate and threaten countries against whom the exercises were designed, but also, in some cases, they disguise military movements—helping Russia prepare and subsequently conduct real military operations.

Timing and geographic proximity are useful. In early August 2008, when Russian troops invaded Georgian territory, they surprised the rest of the world, which was following the Summer Olympics in Beijing. Russia’s 58th Army had just finished its Kavkaz-2008 military exercise, coincidentally occurring just ahead of the invasion (15-31 July) and located just north of the Georgian border.

Fast-forward five years to 2013. Russia re-introduced a military training concept known as the snap exercise. These occur with no-notice and often involve large numbers of troops. After putting into motion four such snap alerts in 2013, Russia conducted another such exercise from 26 February to 3 March 2014. That exercise engaged not only large numbers of airborne troops and transport planes but also long-range aircraft. Officially, the exercise also involved 1,200 amphibious combat vehicles, 880 battle tanks and 120 attack helicopters.

Yet there was more. Under the guise of that exercise, Russia deployed a large contingent of troops to Crimea and its vicinity. The next step was Crimea’s effective capture by troops which officially had taken part in a regular military exercise. The result was Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.

Now comes 2017. Another large-scale Russian exercise is scheduled for September. Unlike previous snap exercises, Zapad (West) takes place every four years and is announced well in advance. It also encompasses several preparatory episodes and smaller exercises—some of them usually occur with no advance notice—and all of which culminate in these Russian-led multinational maneuvers.

This year’s exercise—set to take place both in Belarus and in western Russia (including the Kaliningrad oblast)—might be among the largest since 1991.

As a possible indicator of Zapad’s size, Russia has ordered more than 4,000 railcars to transport its troops. Based on this, up to two Russian armored/mechanized divisions (around 30,000 military personnel) could be deployed to Belarusian territory.

Along with troops already moved there, the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) assets brought to Kaliningrad over the last few years, troops traditionally flown into the area during such exercises, and those stationed along Russia’s border with the Baltic states (numbering three new Russian divisions in the Western Military District), it’s clear that Russia can, if it so decides, easily exert significant pressure on its neighbors.

Thanks to this military build-up, all under the pretext of the Zapad exercise, Russia’s options are many. It could, with little or no warning, launch a limited or provocative hybrid operation (to see what happens), test responses on NATO’s eastern flank, or present a security threat to Ukraine where the Russo-Ukraine conflict remains in full swing.

What to watch

Considering this grim view, what are some significant indicators and warnings to watch for? Observers should pay attention to three elements regarding Zapad-2017.

The first is a military deception or maskirovka. Russia has learned to deceive the West by masking and disguising its movements effectively. It continues to hone this technique by mastering novel elements. A recent case in point was last year’s shipment of SS-26 Iskander-M missile launchers—under the guise of a logistics exercise—aboard a civilian cargo ship to Kaliningrad.

Here, Russia’s chronic lack of transparency in continually sending false messages while pretending to be open—essentially offering a mixture of lies and disinformation—aims to encourage the idea that it is actually benign and seeks a true partnership with the West. But the West should be able to distinguish empty gestures from real offers of military transparency.

The second area of concern is Russia’s inclination to train its troops in the use of its nuclear arsenal during these large-scale exercises. According to numerous media reports, during both Zapad-2009 and Zapad-2013, nuclear attacks on NATO member countries were allegedly considered—to the West’s amazement.

Imagine NATO troops training for a nuclear strike on Russian cities. Now consider the many tactical nuclear weapons in Russia’s arsenal and recent developments in doctrine that allow for an easy transition from conventional to nuclear warfare during military operations. Nuclear forces are a factor of consideration for Russia’s neighbors.

Add to that Russia’s obvious violation of the 1987 INF Treaty—which eliminated all short-range and intermediate-range nuclear and conventional missiles, as well as their launchers—and one could conclude that Russia has the potential to be on a collision course with the West.

In that context, Russia’s planned training of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear defense (CBRN) troops should be closely watched. If indeed large CBRN formations engage in such an exercise, it could imply that Russia is getting ready for a potential nuclear development.

The third and final element to monitor is Russia’s long-term military build-up and regional stability. How will Belarus—Russia’s only ally in the region—react and behave during the exercise?

On one hand, it provides a de facto Russian military forward presence, as some Russian units are already permanently stationed there. On the other hand, what if Russia suddenly decides not to leave Belarus with its military build-up after Zapad-2017? This not so improbable scenario might further destabilize the region’s already tense situation. What would NATO and the West do?

What now

In advance of the Zapad exercises, three things should be considered. First, we need to stay the course with the decisions taken at NATO’s Warsaw Summit and make sure the Alliance’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) is fully implemented, along with a Multinational Divisional HQ in Poland to better coordinate multinational efforts. The eFP—defensive in nature—should be properly trained and equipped to fulfill its mission of providing deterrence and defense in allied states.

NATO should also make sure the follow-on forces are more regularly exercised, including in a non-permissive environment. Moreover, NATO should keep working on a comprehensive strategy to counter Russia’s A2/AD systems. This should be closely linked with enhancing the NATO Defense Planning Process and investing in the right kinds of military capabilities that can defend alliance territory.

Second, we need better and more robust intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and situational awareness. NATO requires a proper reporting mechanism at the highest political and military levels to function across the alliance.

In essence, NATO members need a solid multinational tool to provide reliable, accurate, measured and sober analysis of intelligence and capabilities along the alliance’s eastern border from Norway in the north, via the Baltic states and the Suwałki gap, down to Romania and Turkey in the south. In today’s security environment, a well-functioning indicator and warning mechanism that can distinguish true posture and intentions from a maskirovka is crucial.

Third, reciprocal transparency is key in avoiding an uncontrollable military escalation or “spillover” effect. Russia frequently violates the provisions of the OSCE Vienna Document, which was designed to ensure transparency in military exercises. Russia often intentionally lowers the number of troops involved in its exercises or splits them—either by providing a small gap in time between events or holding them in different training areas simultaneously under joint command—with the goal of avoiding notification or observation thresholds. Let’s be blunt: essentially, the Russians are trying to dupe the West.

Finally, a growing lack of transparency on the Russian side, combined with an increase in Russian snap exercises (four in 2013, eight in 2014; 20 in 2015 and 11 in 2016) limits room to maneuver with a genuine dialogue and puts political pressure on Western decision-makers.

Since 2016, Poland, along with numerous allies, has strived to avoid situations in which a military incident or a snap exercise might unexpectedly spark armed conflict. Three Polish proposals are now on the table: modernization of the Vienna Document (Chapter III on risk reduction); reciprocal, advanced briefings in the NATO-Russia Council on one Allied and one Russian exercise (preferably Zapad-2017) this year; and voluntary briefings on national exercises in 2017 in the OSCE (Forum for Security Co-operation). Not surprisingly, we are still waiting for Russia to engage on a basis of reciprocity regarding any of these proposals.

Conclusion

Russian military exercises have become a dangerous tool, politically and militarily. The “train as you fight” approach—especially when nuclear attacks are an option—poses a serious threat to the West. It’s not enough that we be prepared to respond militarily. We must also be able to send clear unambiguous messages of unity, cohesion and readiness. As long as Zapad-2017 style exercises are a tool of coercion, no one can take regional stability for granted.

All in all, the West needs to send Russia an unequivocal message that it is ready to engage in confidence-building measures. At the same time we must verify Russia’s actions. We should undoubtedly make efforts to build reciprocal trust, but that will not come immediately.

Finally, Russia needs to understand that if it messes with the alliance, it will pay dearly.

All opinions are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent. Col. Tomasz K. Kowalik, PhD, is director of the Military Foreign Affairs Department at the Polish Ministry of National Defense. Dominik P. Jankowski is head of the OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This article was originally published by Center for European Policy Analysis.

The post The Dangerous Tool of Russian Military Exercises appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Les élections législatives françaises se tiendront les 11 et 18 juin prochains. De nombreux partis et mouvements citoyens sont en lice. Parmi eux, France 24 vous en présente quatre.

On June 12th, IPI together with the United Nations Development Programme are cohosting a policy forum discussion and reception on how the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is promoting accountability, tackling impunity, and contributing to sustaining peace around the world.

Remarks will begin at 5:30pm EST.

Strengthening the capacity of rule of law institutions to promote political accountability and tackle impunity is essential to achieving lasting, positive peace and sustainable, nationally-owned development. In recent years, national authorities—with assistance from the international community—have put forward considerable efforts toward embedding the rule of law throughout the world. These efforts have resulted in improvements such as strengthened national prosecutorial capacities to fight impunity, promoting political accountability and democratic governance through inclusive and consultative processes to open space for airing and addressing grievances, and expanding the provision of support and free legal aid to victims and other marginalized populations. These measures are also critical components of development efforts to achieve peaceful, just and inclusive societies as put forward by the aspiration of Sustainable Development Goal 16.

This event, which will open the UNDP 2017 Annual Meeting on Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights for Sustainable Peace and Fostering Development, aims to explore how the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development can promote accountability, tackle impunity, and contribute to sustaining peace. This discussion will be grounded in the personal experience of the featured panelists, all of whom play critical roles in championing the rule of law in the respective countries. The event will feature select excerpts from the film “The Burden of Peace”, which tells the story of Ms. Claudia Paz y Paz, the first woman to lead the Public Prosecutors Office of Guatemala.

Speakers:
Mr. Patrick Keuleers, Director, Governance and Peacebuilding Cluster, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, UNDP
Mr. Adama Dieng, Under Secretary-General and Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide
Ms. Claudia Paz y Paz, Secretary for Multidimensional Security for the Organization of American States and former Attorney General for Guatemala
Mr. Toussaint Muntazini Mukimapa, Special Prosecutor for the Special Criminal Court, Central African Republic
Ms. Gordana Tadić, Acting State Prosecutor, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mr. Alejandro Alvarez, Director of the Rule of Law Unit, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Moderator:
Ms. Jimena Leiva-Roesch, Research Fellow, IPI