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China’s rise is a matter of concern for US, but not a problem for France

IRIS - Wed, 24/01/2024 - 12:23

How do you evaluate the development of China-France exchanges over the past 60 years? What do you think is the most prominent achievement?

It’s a long way and a historic progress for France and China. There are many changes. Of course, France is not what it used to be in 1964, but we are more or less the same kind of country, while China is totally different from that time.

There are different steps in our cooperation. In the beginning, France was allied with the US, nevertheless, we have decided to be independent, not to rely on the US for our own security. Meanwhile, given the big differences in economic and political systems, China and France have decided to work together to enlarge our room to maneuver.

China is now the second biggest economy in the world, and maybe it could be No.1 in a few years. But the desire to cooperate, though there is a difference in political systems, is still the basis of our relationship. So sometimes we are partners, sometimes we could be rivals, but we have both accepted our differences.

In April last year, French President Emmanuel Macron tweeted about his trip to China on social media, saying that « there is so much for us to do together. » What does he mean by saying « so much for us to do? » Which fields are promising in our future cooperation?

We have many fields that we could cooperate in, for example, both China and France are fighting against climate change. It’s a priority for our two countries. Therefore, we have been working together since the Paris Agreement in 2015. We also called for common interest to contribute to African development. Meanwhile, we are also coming into other peaceful settlements of conflict and working together at the UN Security Council to try to find a solution to the most important conflicts, both in Gaza and between Russia and Ukraine.

France and China have differences, but we have decided to keep in contact and try to find a common solution. And France doesn’t want to follow the American policy against China. France is reluctant to include China in the NATO agenda. As President Macron once said, NATO is an organization that concerns the North Atlantic, China has little to do with the North Atlantic. Both France and Europe have to set freely and independently their own policies toward China and not follow blindly Washington’s policy.

President Macron recently announced France’s decision not to join the US-UK joint strikes on Houthi sites in Yemen. You once said that the alliance with the US makes it difficult for France to back down, as history has proven many times. And that « the time when Europe just obeys the US is over. Europeans must define their own policy by themselves. » How do you see the prospects for French and European strategic autonomy? To what extent can France and even Europe get rid of dependence on the US?

To be frank, it is true that since the beginning of the war between Russia and Ukraine, it has been much more difficult to plead for European strategic autonomy.

European countries want to stick to NATO policy, so for the time being the European society is brain dead but this could change again, notably if Trump is elected in November. But regarding the specific issue of the Houthis and the strikes on Yemen, France considers that it’s not a good solution, and it could only widen the problem, because the Houthis won’t be deterred by the US and the UK’s strikes. They will react even more strongly. So we will agree to provide a protective shelter over the boats that pass through the Red Sea, but not to make strikes on Yemen, otherwise, the situation will deteriorate.

How do you see the possibility of a cease-fire between Russia and Ukraine in 2024? Europe is considered to be the biggest victim of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, how much will it affect Europe if it continues? How can China and France cooperate in promoting a cease-fire?

Honestly, these goals are desirable, but they are just impossible to reach. Maybe in a couple of months, the situation will change. The Western countries can give military help to Ukraine, but they don’t want to send troops.

How will the tension between the US and China affect the development of France itself and China-France cooperation? What does France’s emphasis on strategic autonomy mean for China-France and China-EU relations?

The French position is that there is a worry between China and the US. In fact, the main reason is not the difference of regime, but China’s rise. So it’s a matter of concern for the US, but it’s not a problem for France. When I began to work on strategic issues in the 1980s, France was richer than China, and now it’s the contrary. But this doesn’t hinder the establishment of good relations. We are not fighting for world supremacy. Between the US and China, there is a rivalry for being the No.1 in the world. Therefore, the American perspective and the French perspective are not the same.

You have also mentioned that France should not transform China into a systemic enemy. Why did you say that? Currently, there are various versions of the « China threat » theory in Europe, such as the threat of China’s electric vehicles, the threat of China’s wind power, etc. Which forces are hyping the « China threat » and pushing to turn China into an enemy?

China is a friend, it’s also an economic competitor. We have an unbalance in trade between our two countries. Therefore, its market must be more open. If we have a strong economic exchange with China, many French producers are happy to have access to the Chinese market. China could be a rival, could be a competitor, but  »enemy » is not the correct word to describe China.

Wu Bowei contributed to this interview for Global Times.

« Trotskisme, histoires secrètes. De Lambert à Mélenchon » – 4 questions à Denis Sieffert

IRIS - Wed, 24/01/2024 - 11:32

Denis Sieffert, éditorialiste et ancien directeur de Politis, répond aux questions de Pascal Boniface à l’occasion de la parution de son ouvrage Trotskisme, histoires secrètes. De Lambert à Mélenchon, co-écrit avec Laurent Mauduit, et publié aux éditions Les Petits matins.

Comment expliquer que les Lambertistes ne se soient pas mobilisés contre la guerre du Viêtnam, contrairement à l’ensemble des composantes de la gauche ?

On ne peut pas dire que l’Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI), le mouvement lambertiste de l’époque, ne se soit pas mobilisée. Mais l’OCI n’a pas été en tête des manifestations, c’est le moins que l’on puisse dire. Il y avait comme un embarras sur la question. La résistance vietnamienne était dirigée par le Vietminh, le parti communiste fondé par Hô Chi Minh. Un parti stalinien, selon l’OCI, et qui avait assassiné le leader des trotskistes vietnamiens Ta Thu Thau, en 1945. Les slogans à la gloire de Hô Chi Minh heurtaient profondément les lambertistes. On retrouvait la même quête de « pureté » idéologique qui avait déjà conduit Lambert à s’opposer au FLN algérien, jusqu’à nier son rôle dirigeant dans la guerre d’indépendance. Comme si l’anticolonialisme ne suffisait pas, il fallait en plus que le mouvement de libération nationale, qu’il soit algérien ou vietnamien, soit trotskiste ou « trotskisant ».  Ce qui a conduit l’OCI à un isolement à gauche, alors que la mobilisation contre la guerre du Viêtnam a structuré toute une génération. De même, l’OCI n’a pas donné la priorité à l’Amérique latine à une époque où les États-Unis de Nixon et de Kissinger promouvaient les dictatures militaires dans le cadre de l’opération Condor. Là encore l’OCI n’a pas été en première ligne, sans être totalement absente non plus. C’était une faute politique et morale qui résultait de l’idée que l’anti-stalinisme était la priorité absolue. De plus, les lambertistes critiquaient fortement la fascination que la Ligue communiste révolutionnaire (LCR), la grande rivale trotskiste, pouvait avoir pour la guérilla. Les lambertistes étaient favorables aux mobilisations ouvrières de masse, et étaient hostile à la guérilla. En Amérique latine, l’OCI soutenait les mouvements sociaux. Elle s’est beaucoup mobilisée notamment pour les mineurs en grève en Bolivie et au Pérou.

Y-a-t-il eu des combats géopolitiques spécifiques du trotskisme ?

Les lambertistes privilégiaient l’anti-stalinisme. D’où de fortes mobilisations pour la libération des prisonniers politiques en URSS, et contre la répression des révolutions politiques à Budapest, Prague, puis en Pologne aux côtés de Solidarnosc. Elles ont été ponctuées par de grandes victoires, comme la libération du mathématicien Léonid Pliouchtch emprisonné dans un hôpital psychiatrique spécial. Cela a minoré la mobilisation de l’OCI contre l’impérialisme américain. Mais il y avait une certaine cohérence dans son analyse puisque, pour l’OCI, les Partis communistes, aux ordres de Moscou, étaient devenus les obstacles principaux à la révolution. On aperçoit l’ambiguïté d’une telle position, entre antistalinisme et anticommunisme. Ce qui plaide en faveur de l’OCI, c’est que cette organisation a toujours fait la différence entre la bureaucratie stalinienne et l’URSS en tant que telle, héritière de ce que les lambertistes appelaient « les acquis de la révolution d’Octobre ». C’était en fait une illusion, car on a bien vu que le Mur de Berlin a emporté dans sa chute les acquis d’Octobre et recyclé la bureaucratie en oligarchie et en mafia.

 Sur le plan stratégique, les néoconservateurs reprochent à Jean-Luc Mélenchon son anti-américanisme… Vous aussi ? 

C’est le caractère systématique de l’antiaméricanisme que l’on peut critiquer chez Mélenchon. Surtout quand cela le conduit à manifester une indulgence coupable pour Vladimir Poutine. Mélenchon est ce qu’on appelait autrefois un « campiste ». Il est toujours antiaméricain. C’est pavlovien, et cela l’entraine parfois du mauvais côté de l’histoire, de Poutine à Maduro, au nom de l’adage « les ennemis de mes ennemis sont mes amis ». Il a ainsi tendance à apprécier les régimes autoritaires issus du camp communiste. On le trouve plutôt du côté de Xi Jinping que des Ouïghours ou des Tibétains.

Comment expliquer que Jean-Luc Mélenchon, qui a longtemps été réticent à s’exprimer sur le conflit israélo-palestinien, ait pris un tournant radical ? 

C’est, pour partie, l’héritage du lambertisme. Le conflit et la guerre civile au Liban faisaient l’objet d’articles très dogmatiques, mais le désintérêt était tel que l’OCI n’a pas hésité à liquider l’organisation trotskiste israélienne. Le leadership palestinien était aux yeux des lambertistes trop lié à Nasser, puis à Moscou et à Pékin. Toujours cette exigence de pureté idéologique. Il y avait aussi une erreur d’analyse en ce qui concerne le syndicat israélien Histadrout. L’OCI le considérait comme un syndicat ouvrier, ce qui résultait d’un lien étroit avec la gauche travailliste israélienne, alors que les trotskistes israéliens le voyaient comme un instrument du colonialisme. C’est eux qui avaient raison. Mélenchon était éloigné de ces débats, ou inconsciemment sous l’emprise de l’analyse lambertiste. Son intérêt soudain pour la cause palestinienne a surtout à voir avec la situation en France, et l’avantage qu’il croit pouvoir tirer électoralement d’un discours d’apparence radicale. Mais refuser de reconnaître le caractère terroriste du Hamas est une faute politique et morale. Il faut ajouter des conflits avec les dirigeants du Crif qu’il a vécus affectivement. Il réagit alors très maladroitement, sans avoir tort sur le fond, car il sut vite intégrer des connaissances historiques qu’il n’avait pas, et caractériser le conflit israélo-palestinien comme un conflit colonial. Au total, ses maladresses et ses fautes sur le Hamas lui ont valu des soupçons d’antisémitisme injustes. Il aurait pu avoir sur le sujet une parole forte et rationnelle, il a cédé aux excès de langage, et c’est dommage pour toute la gauche.

 

Gaza : vers une trêve ? Mais après ?

IRIS - Tue, 23/01/2024 - 18:11

Les événements s’accélèrent à Gaza. Israël vient de connaître son plus lourd bilan humain en une seule journée : 24 soldats tués. Sous la pression des familles des otages et de la société israélienne, Benjamin Netanyahou semble prêt à accepter une trêve humanitaire de deux mois en échange de la libération de tous les otages détenus par le Hamas, mais toujours pas de cessez-le-feu. Mais sans réelle pression, ni même de sanctions internationales, il garde les mains libres pour poursuivre sa guerre et se maintenir au pouvoir. Quelles seront les perspectives de sortie du conflit après la trêve ? Le maintien d’un état de confrontation, au risque d’alimenter violence et terrorisme, ou la mise en place d’un véritable moyen de coercition de la part de la communauté internationale pour assurer la coexistence des États palestinien et israélien ?

“Africa has a lot of respect for Germany, but this must be preserved.”

SWP - Tue, 23/01/2024 - 14:09

 

Megatrends Afrika (MTA): Mr Sall, do you think the German view of Africa has changed over the five years you have been here, and how do you perceive the German debate on Africa in general?

H.E. Cheikh Tidiane Sall (CTS): We can indeed speak of a certain evolution over the last ten years. I think this first evolution became visible under Angela Merkel, especially with the launch of the G20 Compact with Africa (CwA) in 2017. Before that, Africa was not really high on the agenda of the German government, at least not at the level of the Federal Chancellery.

So there has been a positive development on the part of the German government, which has also been reflected in high-level visits to certain African countries. As far as Senegal is concerned, I can mention the visit of President Frank-Walter Steinmeier in February 2022. Three months later, we welcomed Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz, not forgetting the visit of his predecessor Angela Merkel in August 2018. For me, this is a very good indicator of Germany's growing interest in Africa.

MTA: Do you feel the same way about public debate or the media?

CTS: Unfortunately, we're seeing a very slow evolution. Up to now, the public debate in Germany has been dominated by clichés: Africa is the continent of problems, immigration, war, hunger and so on. I'd like to see a positive change in German opinion and media, one that reflects the reality of African countries. Africa is fifty-four countries. It's a very, very big continent. There are different developments and situations from one country to another.

I've noticed that the German public is hardly aware of what has happened economically in recent years. For example, these past years, the countries with the highest growth rates in the world were in Africa. Senegal has recorded an average growth rate of more than 5% since 2014 – whereas here in Europe, and even in Germany, we see rates that are not far from zero, or even negative. I take the example of Senegal, but there are other countries that have introduced reforms and are experiencing economic growth, even if they are still in the category of a developing country. Public opinion regarding the African continent still needs to change.

One way of doing this is to increase the number of high-level official visits. The German Chancellor's visit to Senegal attracted a lot of attention from the public and especially from the business community. These visits will enable us to make many more contacts, to develop cultural exchanges, economic exchanges in the private sector and between governments. I think there is a lot of work to be done on both sides so that public opinion can really let go of preconceived notions from twenty or thirty years ago. Sometimes it's easier for the public to cling to stereotypes than to try to understand what's really going on in our countries. And the media has a central role to play in changing attitudes and understanding the very positive dynamics at work on the African continent.

MTA: Looking at West Africa, which developments are not sufficiently taken into account in Germany and Europe?  What should Germany pay more attention to?

CTS: In West Africa today, we have a young generation that is quite well educated and, above all, well informed. In our democracies, the role of public opinion means that even our own governments can no longer behave as they did in the past, because we have a very strong civil society and committed young people. This is also the case in Senegal. I even have the impression that our young people are more politicised than young people in Germany, and they are extremely demanding. Our governments can no longer ignore this. We have a very young population: 75% are under 35. That's why the decision-making process in our countries has changed. When we talk about migration, for example, we have to be much more careful because public opinion is watching every action.

Another example: shortly after the invasion of Ukraine, some Senegalese made it clear that "this is not our war", that the government should not get involved, that it should remain neutral. We are a democracy, a democracy of opinion. Our presidents are elected every five years and they take opinion into account. Just like the leaders here in Germany.

MTA: A thorny issue between Europe and Africa is migration policy: Europe's desire to tighten controls, prevent illegal migration and send back citizens from countries like Senegal. What proposals and solutions do you think would help to overcome these differences?

CTS: The debate on migration in Europe needs to be more rational. I think there is too much passion in the debate. In 2021, the Institut Montaigne published an interesting study which concluded that only a very small minority of African migrants arrive in Europe. Most African migrants therefore remain on the continent. Many Senegalese go to Gabon, Gambia and the Ivory Coast, while others try to reach the United States of America or certain Gulf countries. All in all, it's really a tiny minority who come to Europe. I think there is a lot of work to be done at the level of European public opinion to deconstruct this idea that Africans are going to invade you. As for those who stay, we must give them the chance to succeed at home, which we have launched a Senegalese-German project called "Réussir au Sénégal" ["Succeeding in Senegal"]. This project is all the more important because we know that not everyone can succeed in Europe.

The other thing we have to think about is the conditions for regularisation in Germany. Some people have to wait five or ten years to be regularised, even if they speak the language well and are trained in professions where there is a shortage of labour. President Macky Sall has been very clear on this point: those who really cannot be regularised in Germany will be taken back here without any problem. But this migration policy must have two pillars: regularisation of those who meet the criteria and dignified return of those who want or need to return to Senegal.

MTA: Another current issue is energy, which is a priority sector for cooperation between Germany and Senegal. For about ten years now, German-Senegalese cooperation has been aimed at supporting the transition to renewable energies. More recently, the German government has expressed interest in importing Senegalese gas, which is due to come on stream in 2024. How does this fit in with your own energy supply objectives?

CTS: There's no contradiction with our objectives. We still have heavy fuel oil power plants, which are much more polluting. The objective of the Senegalese government is to replace these plants, hence our gas-to-power strategy. Senegal has already invested heavily in renewable energy, with photovoltaic and wind farms, but this will not be enough as part of our industrialisation policy. In our drive to create a competitive industry, access to electricity and affordable prices remain key challenges. Incidentally, I see that the same energy price debate is now taking place in Germany: Should industry and businesses benefit from a specific advantageous price? Our government believes that to be competitive, electricity must be available at all times and at an affordable price.

We will increase the share of renewable energy in our energy mix from 31% to 40% by 2030. This is part of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) that Senegal signed with its G7 partners in June 2023. Funding has been pledged by donors. At the same time, Senegal does not want to add to its debt. That's why we prefer grants and concessional loans. The idea is that our countries should not have to increase debt to comply with the Paris climate agreement.

This raises the question of how to finance the energy transition. In fact, the risk of investing in Africa is exaggerated by the rating agencies, which puts a strain on the possibilities of European financing, compared to financing from certain Asian countries that comes at concessional rates and with longer repayment periods. As a result, electricity produced by hydropower plants financed by European funds could be more expensive than that energy produced by different plants financed by other countries. African governments and the German government must therefore work to modify these rules. Otherwise, Western financing will not be competitive.

MTA: Which brings us to the last question: what do you expect from Germany's future policy in the region? How should it develop if Germany wants to be a strong and, above all, credible partner?

CTS: Germany has a very good reputation for the quality of its products. Germans are seen as rigorous and serious. Germany must make good use of this asset and be a driving force behind Europe's Africa policy.

President Macky Sall often says: "We want trade, not aid". He talks about partnership. We can all be winners. It's possible. In a few years, Africa will be the biggest market in the world. Its middle class is growing. In my opinion, German partners should not wait any longer, but get on this train, which is now leaving, and grab a seat while there is still time. It's about cooperation, working together, as you say: "auf Augenhöhe" ["at eye level"]. I often tease my German friends that they have a habit of saying "Das ist so" ["That's the way it is"], which locks them into options that can prevent compromise. I say "Nein, das ist nicht so" ["No, it's not like that"], because you don't know exactly what's going on in our countries. It's about listening, listening to each other and respecting each other.

Sure, there are problems, but West Africa is not just a few countries plagued by unconstitutional changes or hit by terrorism. And who would have thought that there would be another war in Europe in 2022? Nobody! No country is immune. We should support democratic countries and regimes in our own countries, because democracies are threatened everywhere, even here in Germany. Last year there was an attack on the Bundestag. On 6 January 2021 we saw what happened in the American Congress. Countries like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger must be supported, otherwise there is a risk that anti-democratic forces will triumph. Overall, Germany is on the right track, but we need to move faster. To this end, the German authorities can increase the number of meetings, invite African leaders to make official visits to Germany and visit our countries to better understand the realities on the ground. Parliamentarians must also make a much greater effort to reach out to decision-makers and ambassadors based in Berlin and, above all, to listen to them. Africa has a lot of respect for Germany, but this must be preserved.

H.E. Cheikh Tidiane Sall is the Ambassador of Senegal to Germany. He took up his duties on 28 August 2018.

This interview was conducted on September 8th, 2023. Responsibility for the content, opinions expressed and sources used in the articles and interviews lies with the respective authors.

Guinée : la fin des promesses

IRIS - Tue, 23/01/2024 - 12:45

Multiplication des violations du droit à la liberté d’expression et à l’accès à l’information, banalisation de la répression, gestion autoritaire de l’espace public, rumeurs de scandales financiers… La junte guinéenne s’éloigne de ses premières promesses de changement et de promotion des valeurs démocratiques. Au point de semer le doute sur le respect du calendrier de la transition.

En février 2023, Mamadi Doumbouya, le chef de la junte guinéenne affirmait solennellement son engagement à « rendre le pouvoir aux civils à l’issue de la transition, fin 2024 ». Celui qui a renversé le pouvoir du président Alpha Condé, le 5 septembre 2021, précisait alors : « Nous allons bien sûr organiser la transition mais nous ne ferons pas partie de l’après-transition. Pour nous, c’est clair et ça doit l’être ». Ces propos, souvent réitérés, ont contribué à présenter, aux yeux de l’opinion, la situation en Guinée, depuis le putsch de 2021, comme une « exception », en comparaison avec les juntes du Mali et du Niger, soupçonnées de vouloir prolonger indéfiniment leur séjour au sommet de l’Etat. D’ailleurs, pour signifier sa démarcation programmatique à l’égard de ses « frères d’armes »maliens et burkinabè, tout en exprimant sa solidarité envers eux, le CNRD (Comité national du rassemblement pour le développement, organe dirigeant de la junte guinéenne), avait, au début de l’année 2023, courtoisement signifié son refus d’adhérer au projet d’une « fédération » réunissant les trois pays. Ainsi, quelques mois plus tard, la Guinée prendra définitivement ses distances avec la création de l’Alliance des Etats du Sahel (AES), réunissant le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger,dirigés par des régimes issus de putschs.

Vague d’arrestations de journalistes, restriction d’accès à Internet…

Mais, si le CNRD n’a cessé de multiplier les gages d’un respect du calendrier de la transition devant déboucher, en 2024, sur des élections et un retour à un régime civil, l’opinion a commencé à exprimer ses doutes depuis le deuxième semestre 2023. Premier signal embarrassant, l’évocation, par les autorités, du budget du programme des activités menant à la fin de cette transition. Quelque 600 millions de dollars sont attendus de divers partenaires, sans que l’on sache réellement le contenu précis du cahier des charges etles sources escomptées de financement. Où en est le gouvernement, huit mois après l’énoncé de ce chiffre ? En réponse à cette question, le porte-parole du gouvernement, Ousmane Gaoual Diallo, s’est contenté de déclarer récemment : « Je n’ai pas les détails des contributions, puisque ce n’est pas de mon niveau, mais je sais quand même que les Etats-Unis, l’Union européenne, et d’autres partenaires ont commencé à mettre quelque chose ». Rien de bien précis, donc. Alors que les opérations de recensement de la population ne sont pas encore programmées, difficile, à l’heure actuelle, de déceler les signes d’un chantier d’achèvement de la transition. Difficile aussi d’avoir la moindre indication de calendrier pour le référendum constitutionnel prévu, ou encore la probable adoption d’un nouveau code électoral… En attendant, le gouvernement semble regarder ailleurs, insistant davantage sur ses projets de construction d’infrastructures afin de « marquer son passage » auxcommandes de l’Etat. De plus, le pouvoir souhaiterait voir la conclusion des procédures judiciaires en cours à l’encontre de certaines figures du régime renversé. Sans compter cette antienne de « refondation de l’Etat », inscrite dans son programme d’actions et dont nul ne saurait aujourd’hui cerner les contours et moins encore l’agenda. D’autant que l’on se demande toujours s’il est du ressort d’un régime de transition de refonder l’Etat…

Particulièrement inquiétant, le raidissement de l’Etat envers les espaces d’expression des libertés individuelles et collectives. Arrestations et incarcérations de journalistes, fermetures, suspensions et brouillages de médias -presse écrite et audiovisuelle-, restriction de l’accès à Internet, contrôle et contraction du territoire d’activité des partis politiques… Toutes choses aux antipodes de la profession de foi formulée par la junte après son putsch contre un régime liberticide et massivementdécrié. Aux journalistes protestant le 18 janvier dernier contre les atteintes à l’exercice de leur métier, le pouvoir a réagi par une vague d’interpellations et une brutalité pleinement assumée. Ce bras de fer entre les professionnels des médias et les autorités de la transition met en relief le refus de toute forme de contestation par la junte, qui a interdit les manifestations revendicatives depuis 2021. Elle avait dans le même temps prononcé la dissolution du Front national pour la défense de la Constitution (FNDC), qui fut le fer de lance de la vague de protestation contre le régime déchu du président Alpha Condé. La dissolution de cette coalition militante aura été l’une des premières erreurs politiques du CNRD. En prenant cette décision, les militaires transformaient un allié objectif de leur putsch en un adversaire de fait…

Mêmes causes, mêmes effets…

Mi-janvier 2024, face au Syndicat des professionnels de la presse de Guinée (SPPG) qui, en même temps que les ambassadeurs accrédités dans le pays, en appelait à la « libération des médias et réseaux sociaux », les autorités ont justifié ces mesures par des « problèmes sécuritaires », sans pour autant en préciser la nature… Déjà, en décembre 2023, Amnesty International avait relevé, dans un rapport,« la multiplication et la banalisation des violations du droit à la liberté d’expression et à l’accès à l’information par les autorités de transition ». Selon cette organisation, les actions de la junte guinéenne « perpétuent et aggravent une situation à laquelle elle affirmait vouloir remédier lors de sa prise de pouvoir ». Selon Samira Daoud, directrice régionale du bureau d’Amnesty International pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre, « les violations du droit à la liberté d’expression sont désormais permanentes, et s’ajoutent à celles du droit de réunion pacifique entre autres. Les autorités guinéennes ont choisi de tourner le dos aux droits les plus élémentaires garantis par le droit international, que la charte de la transition signée le 27 septembre 2021 par le chef de l’État prétendait pourtant défendre ».

Jusqu’à récemment encore, le pouvoir militaireguinéen avait subtilement choisi de gérer la transition en s’assurant la prudente bienveillance -à défaut d’un soutien affirmé- de ses principaux partenaires extérieurs. Mais, à présent, nombre d’observateurs et diplomates n’hésitent plus à exprimer leur préoccupation à l’égard des dérives et abus du CNRD. Le goût de plus en plus affiché du président Mamadi Doumbouya pour les attributs de sa fonction, les rumeurs de scandales financiers dans les cercles du pouvoir, l’affirmation d’une gestion autoritaire de l’espace public… Des tendances lourdes qui ne permettent pas d’entrevoir une issue sereine et consensuelle au processus de transition dans les délais attendus…

Toutefois, mis à part les arguments, voire les prétextes d’ordre budgétaire ou logistique, de quelles justifications pourrait user le CNRD pour prolonger la transition au-delà des délais consignés ? Au sein de ce régime, pas de discours « souverainistes », d’arguties « néo-panafricanistes » ou d’odes russophiles pour transformer le coup d’Etat en une rupture systémique, comme chez les voisins du Mali, du Burkina Faso et du Niger. Pas de crise sécuritaire, non plus, pour justifier -fallacieusement- une prolongation de la période de transition. On pourrait alors redouter que la junte guinéenne, succombant à la funeste logique du report de la fin de la transition, n’ait d’autre choix que de recourir aux mêmes méthodes qu’elle disait combattre en commettant son coup d’Etat : une campagne de répression soutenue pour dissuader toutes les velléités de contestation. Ce serait oublier qu’ici, en Guinée, les mêmes causes pourraient fatalement produire les mêmes effets. Les forces contestataires et les déçus du putsch de septembre 2021 pourraient, par des moyens encore insoupçonnables, mettre fin à ce régime qui aura foulé du pied ses propres promesses de changement et de promotion des libertés démocratiques. Ces libertés que nombre de Guinéens tentent sans relâche de conquérir depuis plus d’une décennie, souvent au péril de leur vie. Il est, peut-être, encore temps, pour les membres du CNRD de tirer les enseignements utiles de cette aspiration constante et irréductible de leurs concitoyens…

Publié par LSi Africa.

Honoring Warren Hoge, Former IPI Vice President of External Relations

European Peace Institute / News - Fri, 05/01/2024 - 18:00

“He was a consummate professional, a dear friend to so many and so wonderfully decent. He will be sorely missed.” – Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President & CEO of the International Peace Institute

By profession, Warren was a journalist, but by nature he was a diplomat—fully aware of the power of words to engage, to inform, to inspire, to change the world,” said Gillian Sorensen, former Assistant-Secretary-General for External Relations at the UN, when she spoke at Warren’s Celebration of Life on November 29th. The event brought together Warren’s beautiful family, friends, and colleagues to remember and honor Warren Hoge, and the positive impact he had on so many lives.

Warren came to the International Peace Institute as the first Vice President of External Relations following his extraordinary, event-filled 32-year career at The New York Times. Prior to coming to IPI he was the Chief UN Correspondent for the Times. He joined IPI in 2008—the same year IPI opened its own, dedicated event space, The Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security & Development. I had recently joined the organization at that time, and I was fortunate to have him as my supervisor.

When I first met Warren, I was pregnant with my first child. Not long after meeting him, I experienced what many first-time mothers do and was rushed to the hospital thinking something was wrong, only to find I had Braxton Hicks (false labor). It happened so quickly that my husband called the office to let them know I had to miss work to go to the hospital. Not long after I was admitted, the phone rang in my hospital room and – to my surprise – I heard a kind, radio-quality voice coming through the receiver. It was my new supervisor, Warren Hoge, who was calling to check on how I was doing and make sure I was OK. I was moved by his thoughtfulness and the concern he showed. This is one of countless stories that exemplify the compassion Warren had for his colleagues. His management style centered around kindness and care. He was deeply committed to the importance of family life and his face would light up whenever he spoke of his family. I am forever thankful for the opportunity to have learned from him, a person who valued connection and consistently acted with empathy and compassion—the building blocks of peace.

It was very fitting that he came to work at IPI after retiring from journalism. It was at a moment when IPI was beginning to reach out beyond the UN community and organize more events to bring together different sectors working toward our goal of creating a more peaceful and sustainable planet. Warren’s vast knowledge of world affairs, his deep conviction for the importance of international cooperation, coupled with his way of being in the world, informed how the organization evolved.

Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, IPI President and CEO reflected that, “He was a consummate professional, a dear friend to so many, and so wonderfully decent. He will be sorely missed.”

In her speech about Warren’s work with the UN, Gillian Sorensen rightly said, “He was an idealist without illusion. A caring critic of the UN. Never demeaning, never dismissive.” She also said, “He knew its [the UN] potential and its limits. He knew its impact on New York City and its many functions beyond peace and security, including health and human rights, and so much more… He believed the UN was imperfect but indispensable. That it was there … as a location for representatives from every nation on earth to come to be heard, to connect, to engage. He believed in the power of diplomacy to make a better world.”

During his time at IPI, Warren spearheaded the original redesign of the organization’s website, wrote NYT-quality coverage of our events, and created the “Distinguished Authors Event Series,” a series of evening receptions featuring authors of recently published books connected to pressing international relations concerns and peace. He co-produced and narrated IPI’s 40th Anniversary film; conducted interviews with world leaders and experts—including almost all of the 2016 candidates for UN Secretary-General; and was the most well-prepared of moderators for countless IPI panel discussions. He was also a devoted mentor to interns and junior staff, and someone who always took the time to provide advice and guidance to those who sought it.

He had a zest for life that uplifted those around him. Being from Manhattan, he developed throughout his life a great love for music, good food, and the theater. He also loved to sing and often filled the office with music, bringing a spirit of joy to the work.

After Warren’s passing, the UN Secretary-General’s Spokesperson, Stephane Dujarric, announced to the UN press core, “After retiring from the Times, Warren moved to the International Peace Institute, where he remained deeply involved in international affairs, and kept in touch with so many of you. As we extend our condolences to his wife Olivia and their children, we remember Warren as a true gentleman reporter who was unfailing in his kindness, his easy grace, and detailed reporting of the ups and downs of this institution.”

Following this announcement, American journalist and UN Correspondent for the Associated Press, Edie Lederer, stated: “On behalf of the United Nations Correspondents Association, we would also like to send condolences to the family and many friends of Warren Hoge around the world. He was a terrific journalist who reported from South America, Brazil, London, and many global hotspots before coming to the UN. As you so rightly said, he was a charming man and a great raconteur. And he will be greatly missed by all of us who knew him.”

Warren elevated IPI’s work beyond the UN community and into the broader international affairs community around the globe. He exemplified what peace means in practice. He had a natural way of connecting at a heart-level with all those he worked with and interacted with. He led IPI’s External Relations to new heights, broadening its audience and reach – always with sincerity, kindness, and respect. IPI is deeply grateful for his extraordinary contributions.

IPI’s Vice President and COO, Adam Lupel, who worked with Warren for 15 years said it well: “He was among the most memorable of characters imaginable—genuinely kind and generous to all, the greatest of storytellers, a gentleman of capacious heart and warm smile. He will be dearly missed.”

His life lives on in the stories he told, the lives he influenced with his wisdom and wit, and his compassion and care. His empathy, genuine kindness, and contributions to creating a more peaceful world will always be remembered.

~ Mary Anne Feeney, IPI Senior Director for External Relations

Marcel Fratzscher: „Auch im Jahr 2024 dürfte die Inflation weiterhin sehr unsozial sein“

Das Statistische Bundesamt hat heute die vorläufige Inflationsrate für das Jahr 2023 veröffentlicht. Dies kommentiert DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher:

Die Inflation war mit 5,9 Prozent im Jahr 2023 noch immer viel zu hoch. Wir erleben nach wie vor eine höchst unsoziale Inflation, denn Menschen mit geringen Einkommen erfahren eine zwei- bis dreimal höhere Inflation als Menschen mit hohen Einkommen. Das liegt daran, dass in den vergangenen beiden Jahren besonders die Dinge teurer geworden sind, für die Menschen mit geringen Einkommen einen viel höheren Anteil ihres monatlichen Einkommens aufbringen müssen als andere Menschen. Dies sind insbesondere Energie und Lebensmittel.

Das größte Problem für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger ist nicht die Inflation per se, sondern die Tatsache, dass für die meisten Menschen in den vergangenen beiden Jahren die Preise für ihren Lebensunterhalt stärker gestiegen sind als ihre Löhne und Einkommen. Vor allem Menschen mit geringen und mittleren Einkommen haben heute eine geringere Kaufkraft als noch vor zwei Jahren und müssen deshalb den Gürtel enger schnallen. Dies wirkt sich auch negativ auf die Konjunktur und gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Deutschland aus. Denn weniger Nachfrage bedeutet auch weniger Wachstum und Umsatz für die Unternehmen. 

Die Chancen stehen gut, dass die Inflation 2024 deutlich abnehmen wird und – nach neuster Prognose des DIW Berlin – bei 2,4 Prozent liegen könnte. Gleichzeitig ist eine solche Prognose mit viel Unsicherheit behaftet, denn eine Eskalation der Kriege in der Ukraine und im mittleren Osten, zunehmende Handelskonflikte oder Naturkatastrophen können schnell wieder zu stark steigenden Preisen führen. Zudem dürfte 2024 die Inflation wiederum sehr unsozial sein und Menschen mit geringen Einkommen deutlich härter treffen. Vor allem die Mieten könnten weiter deutlich steigen. Und auch die Energiekosten könnten wieder steigen, da steuerliche Entlastungen wegfallen und der CO2-Preis weiter zunehmen wird.  

Die Politik kann die Inflation nicht kontrollieren. Aber sie kann besonders hart betroffene Menschen finanziell gezielt entlasten. Die Bundesregierung sollte daher 2024 ihr Hauptaugenmerk auf eine stärkere Erhöhung des Mindestlohns und die Umsetzung des Klimageldes legen. Dies sind die effektivsten Instrumente und vor allem Menschen mit geringen Einkommen zu entlasten und ihre Einkommen zu stärken.

Marcel Fratzscher: „Die Hochwasserkatastrophe in Niedersachsen zeigt die Unsinnigkeit der Schuldenbremse“

Wegen der Hochwasserkatastrophe in Niedersachsen und anderen Bundesländern wird aktuell diskutiert, die Schuldenbremse auszusetzen. DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher kommentiert diesen Vorschlag wie folgt:

Die Hochwasserkatastrophe in Teilen Deutschlands wird wohl eine Ausnahme von der Schuldenbremse, sowohl für den Bund als auch für einige Länder wie Niedersachsen, notwendig machen. Diese Katastrophe wird den Staat voraussichtlich einen erheblichen Milliardenbetrag kosten, der nicht aus den laufenden Haushalten gedeckt werden kann. Die Alternative zu einer Ausnahme der Schuldenbremse wäre ein noch härterer Sparkurs, der die deutsche Wirtschaft in eh schon schwierigen Zeiten weiter schwächen und Wohlstand kosten würde.

Die Hochwasserkatastrophe in Niedersachsen zeigt die Unsinnigkeit der Schuldenbremse, so wie sie nun durch das Bundesverfassungsgericht noch weiter eingegrenzt wurde. Es wird voraussichtlich künftig kein Jahr in Deutschland ohne Naturkatastrophe oder eine andere Notsituation vergehen, die erhebliche Ausgaben des deutschen Staates erfordert. Ein Festhalten an der Schuldenbremse wird daher bedeuten, dass der deutsche Staat künftig fast jedes Jahr eine Ausnahme von der Schuldenbremse erklären muss. Eine so definierte Schuldenbremse ist kontraproduktiv und schädlich, weil sie Unsicherheit schafft und immer wieder zu politischen Konflikten führen wird.

Wenn in Zukunft nicht fast jedes Jahr eine Ausnahme von der Schuldenbremse erklärt werden soll, dann muss der deutsche Staat erhebliche Überschüsse einplanen, damit er den nötigen finanziellen Spielraum hat, um auf Krisen reagieren zu können. Alternativ könnte der Staat versuchen, vorbeugend ein Sondervermögen für Naturkatastrophen zu schaffen mit Verfassungsrang – so wie das Sondervermögen für die Bundeswehr –, um schnell und flexibel auf künftige Krisen reagieren zu können. Allerdings gibt es viele andere Notsituationen und besondere Finanzierungsbedarfe für den Staat, so dass dies letztlich die Schuldenbremse sinnlos macht. Daher sollte die Politik dringend die gegenwärtige Schuldenbremse reformieren und bis dahin weitere Sondervermögen schaffen, um notwendige Ausgaben finanzieren und vor allem auch schnell und flexibel auf Notsituationen reagieren zu können.

Studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für die Abteilung Klimapolitik

Die Abteilung Klimapolitik des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt

eine studentische Hilfskraft (m/w/div)

für 10 Wochenstunden.


Marcel Fratzscher: „Härtere Sanktionen beim Bürgergeld wären eher Symbolpolitik“

Ein Gesetzentwurf aus dem Bundesarbeitsministerium sieht offenbar vor, die Sanktionen beim Bürgergeld zu verschärfen. So sollen Personen, die wiederholt zumutbare Jobangebote ablehnen, künftig vorübergehend kein Bürgergeld erhalten. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Der Vorschlag von Bundesarbeitsminister Heil, härtere Sanktionen beim Bürgergeld gegenüber jenen auszusprechen, die Arbeitsangebote ablehnen, ist richtig. Er wird aber nichts grundlegend an der Tatsache ändern, dass viel zu viele Menschen auf das Bürgergeld angewiesen sind. Der effektivste Weg, um mehr Menschen in Arbeit zu bringen, ist ein stärkeres Fördern, mehr Qualifizierung und eine direktere Unterstützung. 

Die härteren Sanktionen würden eine sehr kleine Minderheit treffen. Die große Mehrheit derer, die Bürgergeld beziehen, bemüht sich. Die Maßnahme ist eher Symbolpolitik, um die Reputation des Bürgergelds – nach den Attacken von manchen aus FDP und CDU – wieder zu verbessern. Ich habe Zweifel, dass diese Symbolpolitik funktionieren und stattdessen nicht vielmehr von populistischen Politiker*innen genutzt werden wird, um weiterhin die falsche These vom Missbrauch des Bürgergelds zu verbreiten. Eine deutlich bessere Vorbeugung, eine effektivere Förderung durch Qualifizierung sowie bessere Perspektiven und Hilfen bei der Integration von Geflüchteten sind die einzig effektiven Maßnahmen, um die Anzahl der Bezieher*innen von Bürgergeld mittelfristig deutlich zu reduzieren.

ለስደተኞች እና ለስደተኛ ተቀባይ ማህበረሰቦች የስራ እድል እና ማህበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ያለው ሚና፡፡ በኢትዮጵያ ከተካሄደው የተፅዕኖ ግምገማ (Impact Assessment) የተገኘ ማስረጃ

መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች በቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና (ቴሙትስ) አማካኝነት የሥራ ዕድሎችን እና
ምርታማነትን የማሳደግ ከፍተኛ ምኞት አላቸው። ሥልጠናው በዋናነት የሥራ ገበያው የሚፈልገውን ሙያ
በማስተማር ብቃት ያለው የሰው ኃይል አቅርቦትን ማመቻቸት ይጠበቅበታል። እነዚሁ አካላት የቴክኒክና ሙያ
ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከሥራ ስምሪት ባሻገር አካታችነትን፣ የፆታ እኩልነትን እና ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን (social
cohesion) በኅብረተሰቡ ውስጥ እንደሚያሻሽል ይገምታሉ።
የሥራ እድል ተደራሽነት ፤ ማኅበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ውህደትን በማጎልበት እንዲሁም ተፈናቃዮችን መልሶ
በማቋቋም ረገድ ወሳኝ ሚናን ይጫወታል። በስደት ረዥም ጊዜ መቆየት እና ወደሶስተኛ አገር የሚደረጉ የቋሚ
መፍትሄ እድሎች ማሽቆልቆል፤ የስደተኞች የመጀመርያ መዳረሻ አገሮች ውስጥ ማኅበራዊ ውህደት (local
integration) ፍለጋን አነሳስቷል። ባለፉት አስርት ዓመታት የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከፍተኛ ትኩረትን
የሳበው ከዚህ አንፃር ነው።
የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና የእነዚህን መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች ምኞቶች ያሟላ ነው? በአጠቃላይ
በቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ላይ ያሉ ተጨባጭ ማስረጃዎች ውስን እና በአብዛኛው ወጥነት የሌላቸው
ናቸው። ከሥራና ከገቢ አንፃር ሲታይ ትንሽ አወንታዊ ውጤት እንዳለ መረጃዎች ቢጠቁሙም በአብዛኛው ውጤቶች
የሚታዩት ከመካከለኛ እስከ ረዥም ጊዜ (Medium and long term) ሲሆን፣ በአጠቃላይ ፕሮግራሞቹ ለረጅም ጊዜ
ሥራ አጦች በተሻለ ሁኔታ ይሰራሉ። ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና በማኅበራዊ ትስስር ዙሪያ
ሊያመጣ የሚችለውን ውጤት በተመለከተ ትልቅ የእውቀት ክፍተት አለ። በፖሊሲው ከተቀመጠው የገንዘብ
መጠን እና ከሚጠበቀው ከፍተኛ ግምት አንፃር፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና የተቀመጠለትን ዓላማ እንዴት
እንደሚያሳካ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ነው።
በዚህ የፖሊሲ ምክረ ሃሳብ በጀርመን ዓለም አቀፍ ትብብር ኤጀንሲ (ጂአይዜድ) አማካኝንት በኢትዮጵያ
የተተገበረውን ሁሉን አቀፍ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ጥናት ውጤት አቅርበናል። በዚህ ፕሮግራም ስደተኞችን
ተቀባይ ሀገር ነዋሪዎች እና ስደተኞች በጋራ ስልጠናውን የተከታተሉ ሲሆን፣ ዓላማውም ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን
ማጎልበት እና የሥራ እድሎችን ማመቻቸት ነው።
የጥናቱ ውጤቶቹ እንደሚያመለክቱት፣ በማኅበራዊ ትስስር በኩል የታዩ ተፅእኖዎች በብዙ ገፅታ ጥሩ ቢሆኑም፣
ከገቢ እና ከሥራ እድል አንጻር ውጤቶቹ ዝቅተኛ እና የተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ላይ ያተኮሩ ናቸው። አሃዛዊ እና አሃዛዊ
ያልሆኑ (quantitative and qualitative) ማስረጃዎች የሚጠቁሙት ስልጠናው የማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሳደግ
እንደሚረዳ ነው፡፡ ከፕሮግራም ዲዛይን ወይም ከአፈጻጸም ችግሮች በላይ እንደ የሥራ እድሎች ውስንነት፣ የሕግ
ማቆዎች እና የፆታ እኩልነትን መሰረት ያደረገ እድል ያለመኖር እና የመሳሰሉ በመዋቅራዊ ችግሮች ስልጠናው
በስራ እድል ፈጠራ በኩል ውጤታማ እንዳይሆን ዋና መሰናክል ሆነው ይታያሉ።
የጥናቱ ዋና ዋና ምክረ ሃሳቦች፥

  •  የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) ሲታቀድ ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት ጥናት ማለትም፤ ከጉልበት

ገበያው አቅም እና ከህግ ማእቀፉ አንጻር በበቂ ሁኔታ መታየት አለበት፡፡ በተለይ የሥራ እድሎችን
ከመፍጠር አንጻር ይህ በጣም ወሳኝ ነው፡፡

  • ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል ፤ አካታች የሆነ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና ውጤታማ መሣሪያ ሆኖ

ይስተዋላል። ነገር ግን ማኅበራዊ ትስስር ፣ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እንደ ተጨማሪ ውጤት ብቻ ሳይሆን
የስልጠናው ዋና ዓላማ ሆኖ የሚውሰድ ከሆነ፤ “ሌሎች የተሻሉ አማራጮች አልነበሩም ወይ?” የሚል
ጥያቄ ያስነሳል፡፡ በተለይ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እና ከገቢ አንጻር በተያያዘ ባለን ማስረጃ መሰረት ጥያቄውን
የበለጠ አስፈላጊ ያደርገዋል።

  •  አካታች የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) መርሃ ግብር የሚያመጣውን ለውጥ በተመለከተ፣ ሰፋ ያሉ

ተጨማሪ ጥናቶችን ይፈልጋል። መሞላት ካለባቸው የእውቀት ክፍተቶች መካከል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ሥልጠና
በስደተኞች ላይ የሚያሳድረው ተጽዕኖ፣ ሊያስከትል የሚችለውን አሉታዊ እና አወንታዊ ተጽዕኖ፤ ሊያስከትል
የሚችለው ማኅበራዊ ተጽዕኖ፣ እንዲሁም በፆታ በኩል እና ከመካከለኛ እስከ የረዥም ጊዜ ያለው የሥራ እድል
ፈጠራ እና ገቢ ላይ የሚኖሩት ውጤቶች ይገኙበታል።

ለስደተኞች እና ለስደተኛ ተቀባይ ማህበረሰቦች የስራ እድል እና ማህበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ያለው ሚና፡፡ በኢትዮጵያ ከተካሄደው የተፅዕኖ ግምገማ (Impact Assessment) የተገኘ ማስረጃ

መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች በቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና (ቴሙትስ) አማካኝነት የሥራ ዕድሎችን እና
ምርታማነትን የማሳደግ ከፍተኛ ምኞት አላቸው። ሥልጠናው በዋናነት የሥራ ገበያው የሚፈልገውን ሙያ
በማስተማር ብቃት ያለው የሰው ኃይል አቅርቦትን ማመቻቸት ይጠበቅበታል። እነዚሁ አካላት የቴክኒክና ሙያ
ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከሥራ ስምሪት ባሻገር አካታችነትን፣ የፆታ እኩልነትን እና ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን (social
cohesion) በኅብረተሰቡ ውስጥ እንደሚያሻሽል ይገምታሉ።
የሥራ እድል ተደራሽነት ፤ ማኅበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ውህደትን በማጎልበት እንዲሁም ተፈናቃዮችን መልሶ
በማቋቋም ረገድ ወሳኝ ሚናን ይጫወታል። በስደት ረዥም ጊዜ መቆየት እና ወደሶስተኛ አገር የሚደረጉ የቋሚ
መፍትሄ እድሎች ማሽቆልቆል፤ የስደተኞች የመጀመርያ መዳረሻ አገሮች ውስጥ ማኅበራዊ ውህደት (local
integration) ፍለጋን አነሳስቷል። ባለፉት አስርት ዓመታት የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከፍተኛ ትኩረትን
የሳበው ከዚህ አንፃር ነው።
የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና የእነዚህን መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች ምኞቶች ያሟላ ነው? በአጠቃላይ
በቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ላይ ያሉ ተጨባጭ ማስረጃዎች ውስን እና በአብዛኛው ወጥነት የሌላቸው
ናቸው። ከሥራና ከገቢ አንፃር ሲታይ ትንሽ አወንታዊ ውጤት እንዳለ መረጃዎች ቢጠቁሙም በአብዛኛው ውጤቶች
የሚታዩት ከመካከለኛ እስከ ረዥም ጊዜ (Medium and long term) ሲሆን፣ በአጠቃላይ ፕሮግራሞቹ ለረጅም ጊዜ
ሥራ አጦች በተሻለ ሁኔታ ይሰራሉ። ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና በማኅበራዊ ትስስር ዙሪያ
ሊያመጣ የሚችለውን ውጤት በተመለከተ ትልቅ የእውቀት ክፍተት አለ። በፖሊሲው ከተቀመጠው የገንዘብ
መጠን እና ከሚጠበቀው ከፍተኛ ግምት አንፃር፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና የተቀመጠለትን ዓላማ እንዴት
እንደሚያሳካ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ነው።
በዚህ የፖሊሲ ምክረ ሃሳብ በጀርመን ዓለም አቀፍ ትብብር ኤጀንሲ (ጂአይዜድ) አማካኝንት በኢትዮጵያ
የተተገበረውን ሁሉን አቀፍ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ጥናት ውጤት አቅርበናል። በዚህ ፕሮግራም ስደተኞችን
ተቀባይ ሀገር ነዋሪዎች እና ስደተኞች በጋራ ስልጠናውን የተከታተሉ ሲሆን፣ ዓላማውም ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን
ማጎልበት እና የሥራ እድሎችን ማመቻቸት ነው።
የጥናቱ ውጤቶቹ እንደሚያመለክቱት፣ በማኅበራዊ ትስስር በኩል የታዩ ተፅእኖዎች በብዙ ገፅታ ጥሩ ቢሆኑም፣
ከገቢ እና ከሥራ እድል አንጻር ውጤቶቹ ዝቅተኛ እና የተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ላይ ያተኮሩ ናቸው። አሃዛዊ እና አሃዛዊ
ያልሆኑ (quantitative and qualitative) ማስረጃዎች የሚጠቁሙት ስልጠናው የማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሳደግ
እንደሚረዳ ነው፡፡ ከፕሮግራም ዲዛይን ወይም ከአፈጻጸም ችግሮች በላይ እንደ የሥራ እድሎች ውስንነት፣ የሕግ
ማቆዎች እና የፆታ እኩልነትን መሰረት ያደረገ እድል ያለመኖር እና የመሳሰሉ በመዋቅራዊ ችግሮች ስልጠናው
በስራ እድል ፈጠራ በኩል ውጤታማ እንዳይሆን ዋና መሰናክል ሆነው ይታያሉ።
የጥናቱ ዋና ዋና ምክረ ሃሳቦች፥

  •  የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) ሲታቀድ ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት ጥናት ማለትም፤ ከጉልበት

ገበያው አቅም እና ከህግ ማእቀፉ አንጻር በበቂ ሁኔታ መታየት አለበት፡፡ በተለይ የሥራ እድሎችን
ከመፍጠር አንጻር ይህ በጣም ወሳኝ ነው፡፡

  • ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል ፤ አካታች የሆነ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና ውጤታማ መሣሪያ ሆኖ

ይስተዋላል። ነገር ግን ማኅበራዊ ትስስር ፣ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እንደ ተጨማሪ ውጤት ብቻ ሳይሆን
የስልጠናው ዋና ዓላማ ሆኖ የሚውሰድ ከሆነ፤ “ሌሎች የተሻሉ አማራጮች አልነበሩም ወይ?” የሚል
ጥያቄ ያስነሳል፡፡ በተለይ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እና ከገቢ አንጻር በተያያዘ ባለን ማስረጃ መሰረት ጥያቄውን
የበለጠ አስፈላጊ ያደርገዋል።

  •  አካታች የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) መርሃ ግብር የሚያመጣውን ለውጥ በተመለከተ፣ ሰፋ ያሉ

ተጨማሪ ጥናቶችን ይፈልጋል። መሞላት ካለባቸው የእውቀት ክፍተቶች መካከል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ሥልጠና
በስደተኞች ላይ የሚያሳድረው ተጽዕኖ፣ ሊያስከትል የሚችለውን አሉታዊ እና አወንታዊ ተጽዕኖ፤ ሊያስከትል
የሚችለው ማኅበራዊ ተጽዕኖ፣ እንዲሁም በፆታ በኩል እና ከመካከለኛ እስከ የረዥም ጊዜ ያለው የሥራ እድል
ፈጠራ እና ገቢ ላይ የሚኖሩት ውጤቶች ይገኙበታል።

ለስደተኞች እና ለስደተኛ ተቀባይ ማህበረሰቦች የስራ እድል እና ማህበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ያለው ሚና፡፡ በኢትዮጵያ ከተካሄደው የተፅዕኖ ግምገማ (Impact Assessment) የተገኘ ማስረጃ

መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች በቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና (ቴሙትስ) አማካኝነት የሥራ ዕድሎችን እና
ምርታማነትን የማሳደግ ከፍተኛ ምኞት አላቸው። ሥልጠናው በዋናነት የሥራ ገበያው የሚፈልገውን ሙያ
በማስተማር ብቃት ያለው የሰው ኃይል አቅርቦትን ማመቻቸት ይጠበቅበታል። እነዚሁ አካላት የቴክኒክና ሙያ
ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከሥራ ስምሪት ባሻገር አካታችነትን፣ የፆታ እኩልነትን እና ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን (social
cohesion) በኅብረተሰቡ ውስጥ እንደሚያሻሽል ይገምታሉ።
የሥራ እድል ተደራሽነት ፤ ማኅበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ውህደትን በማጎልበት እንዲሁም ተፈናቃዮችን መልሶ
በማቋቋም ረገድ ወሳኝ ሚናን ይጫወታል። በስደት ረዥም ጊዜ መቆየት እና ወደሶስተኛ አገር የሚደረጉ የቋሚ
መፍትሄ እድሎች ማሽቆልቆል፤ የስደተኞች የመጀመርያ መዳረሻ አገሮች ውስጥ ማኅበራዊ ውህደት (local
integration) ፍለጋን አነሳስቷል። ባለፉት አስርት ዓመታት የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከፍተኛ ትኩረትን
የሳበው ከዚህ አንፃር ነው።
የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና የእነዚህን መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች ምኞቶች ያሟላ ነው? በአጠቃላይ
በቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ላይ ያሉ ተጨባጭ ማስረጃዎች ውስን እና በአብዛኛው ወጥነት የሌላቸው
ናቸው። ከሥራና ከገቢ አንፃር ሲታይ ትንሽ አወንታዊ ውጤት እንዳለ መረጃዎች ቢጠቁሙም በአብዛኛው ውጤቶች
የሚታዩት ከመካከለኛ እስከ ረዥም ጊዜ (Medium and long term) ሲሆን፣ በአጠቃላይ ፕሮግራሞቹ ለረጅም ጊዜ
ሥራ አጦች በተሻለ ሁኔታ ይሰራሉ። ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና በማኅበራዊ ትስስር ዙሪያ
ሊያመጣ የሚችለውን ውጤት በተመለከተ ትልቅ የእውቀት ክፍተት አለ። በፖሊሲው ከተቀመጠው የገንዘብ
መጠን እና ከሚጠበቀው ከፍተኛ ግምት አንፃር፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና የተቀመጠለትን ዓላማ እንዴት
እንደሚያሳካ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ነው።
በዚህ የፖሊሲ ምክረ ሃሳብ በጀርመን ዓለም አቀፍ ትብብር ኤጀንሲ (ጂአይዜድ) አማካኝንት በኢትዮጵያ
የተተገበረውን ሁሉን አቀፍ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ጥናት ውጤት አቅርበናል። በዚህ ፕሮግራም ስደተኞችን
ተቀባይ ሀገር ነዋሪዎች እና ስደተኞች በጋራ ስልጠናውን የተከታተሉ ሲሆን፣ ዓላማውም ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን
ማጎልበት እና የሥራ እድሎችን ማመቻቸት ነው።
የጥናቱ ውጤቶቹ እንደሚያመለክቱት፣ በማኅበራዊ ትስስር በኩል የታዩ ተፅእኖዎች በብዙ ገፅታ ጥሩ ቢሆኑም፣
ከገቢ እና ከሥራ እድል አንጻር ውጤቶቹ ዝቅተኛ እና የተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ላይ ያተኮሩ ናቸው። አሃዛዊ እና አሃዛዊ
ያልሆኑ (quantitative and qualitative) ማስረጃዎች የሚጠቁሙት ስልጠናው የማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሳደግ
እንደሚረዳ ነው፡፡ ከፕሮግራም ዲዛይን ወይም ከአፈጻጸም ችግሮች በላይ እንደ የሥራ እድሎች ውስንነት፣ የሕግ
ማቆዎች እና የፆታ እኩልነትን መሰረት ያደረገ እድል ያለመኖር እና የመሳሰሉ በመዋቅራዊ ችግሮች ስልጠናው
በስራ እድል ፈጠራ በኩል ውጤታማ እንዳይሆን ዋና መሰናክል ሆነው ይታያሉ።
የጥናቱ ዋና ዋና ምክረ ሃሳቦች፥

  •  የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) ሲታቀድ ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት ጥናት ማለትም፤ ከጉልበት

ገበያው አቅም እና ከህግ ማእቀፉ አንጻር በበቂ ሁኔታ መታየት አለበት፡፡ በተለይ የሥራ እድሎችን
ከመፍጠር አንጻር ይህ በጣም ወሳኝ ነው፡፡

  • ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል ፤ አካታች የሆነ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና ውጤታማ መሣሪያ ሆኖ

ይስተዋላል። ነገር ግን ማኅበራዊ ትስስር ፣ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እንደ ተጨማሪ ውጤት ብቻ ሳይሆን
የስልጠናው ዋና ዓላማ ሆኖ የሚውሰድ ከሆነ፤ “ሌሎች የተሻሉ አማራጮች አልነበሩም ወይ?” የሚል
ጥያቄ ያስነሳል፡፡ በተለይ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እና ከገቢ አንጻር በተያያዘ ባለን ማስረጃ መሰረት ጥያቄውን
የበለጠ አስፈላጊ ያደርገዋል።

  •  አካታች የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) መርሃ ግብር የሚያመጣውን ለውጥ በተመለከተ፣ ሰፋ ያሉ

ተጨማሪ ጥናቶችን ይፈልጋል። መሞላት ካለባቸው የእውቀት ክፍተቶች መካከል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ሥልጠና
በስደተኞች ላይ የሚያሳድረው ተጽዕኖ፣ ሊያስከትል የሚችለውን አሉታዊ እና አወንታዊ ተጽዕኖ፤ ሊያስከትል
የሚችለው ማኅበራዊ ተጽዕኖ፣ እንዲሁም በፆታ በኩል እና ከመካከለኛ እስከ የረዥም ጊዜ ያለው የሥራ እድል
ፈጠራ እና ገቢ ላይ የሚኖሩት ውጤቶች ይገኙበታል።

Improving employment and social cohesion among refugee and host communities through TVET: evidence from an impact assessment in Ethiopia

In pursuit of employment opportunities and increased productivity, governments and donors have the highest ambitions for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. Most prominently, TVET is expected to facilitate access to employment and a qualified workforce by offering its graduates skills that the labour market demands. Beyond its employment impacts, TVET supporters also anticipate that it will improve societal outcomes such as inclusion, gender equality and social cohesion.

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and to foster socio-economic integration. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement opportunities have spurred the quest for local integration in countries of first asylum. It is in this context that TVET has gained additional salience in the past decade.

Does TVET live up to these promises? Overall, systematic empirical evidence on the impact of TVET is limited and often inconsistent. In terms of employment and income, evidence suggests that there is a small positive effect, but time plays an important factor. Often, impacts are only seen in the medium- to long-term, and in general, programmes tend to work better for the long-term unemployed. Evidence of societal effects is even more limited; there is a large gap of knowledge on the potential social cohesion impacts of TVET. Given the amount of funding and the high expectations found in the policy discourse, it is essential to better understand if and how TVET measures contribute to achieving their self-declared goals.

In this brief, we present the results of an accompanying research study of an inclusive TVET programme implemented by the German development cooperation organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ethiopia. In this programme, host and refugee participants are jointly trained, with the explicit goals of fostering social cohesion and improving employment opportunities.

The results indicate that while the social cohesion effect seems remarkable on several dimensions, the income and employment effect is at best weak and materialises only for specific groups of individuals. Qualitative and quantitative evidence supports the validity of the approach to achieve social cohesion. More than design or implementation problems, the lack of stronger employment effects appears to be driven by structural context conditions like limited labour market absorption capacity, legal work permission constraints, gender barriers and similar hindering factors.

We derive the following main recommendations from the analysis:

  • TVET measures need a careful context analysis (including labour market capacities, legal work barriers) to ensure that the necessary conditions for TVET to succeed are in place. This is particularly relevant in terms of employment effects, which appear to be elusive.
  • Inclusive TVET measures seem to be an effective tool to improve social cohesion. However, if social cohesion effects are valued not just as an “add-on” to employment effects but as primary goals, the question arises if alternative interventions might be more efficient. This question is particularly salient given the modest evidence regarding employment and income effects.
  • The evidence base of the impact of (inclusive) TVET programmes needs to be expanded. Knowledge gaps that need to be closed include TVET’s impact on displaced populations, its potential societal effects, differential gender effects, and medium- to long-term employment and income effects.

Improving employment and social cohesion among refugee and host communities through TVET: evidence from an impact assessment in Ethiopia

In pursuit of employment opportunities and increased productivity, governments and donors have the highest ambitions for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. Most prominently, TVET is expected to facilitate access to employment and a qualified workforce by offering its graduates skills that the labour market demands. Beyond its employment impacts, TVET supporters also anticipate that it will improve societal outcomes such as inclusion, gender equality and social cohesion.

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and to foster socio-economic integration. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement opportunities have spurred the quest for local integration in countries of first asylum. It is in this context that TVET has gained additional salience in the past decade.

Does TVET live up to these promises? Overall, systematic empirical evidence on the impact of TVET is limited and often inconsistent. In terms of employment and income, evidence suggests that there is a small positive effect, but time plays an important factor. Often, impacts are only seen in the medium- to long-term, and in general, programmes tend to work better for the long-term unemployed. Evidence of societal effects is even more limited; there is a large gap of knowledge on the potential social cohesion impacts of TVET. Given the amount of funding and the high expectations found in the policy discourse, it is essential to better understand if and how TVET measures contribute to achieving their self-declared goals.

In this brief, we present the results of an accompanying research study of an inclusive TVET programme implemented by the German development cooperation organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ethiopia. In this programme, host and refugee participants are jointly trained, with the explicit goals of fostering social cohesion and improving employment opportunities.

The results indicate that while the social cohesion effect seems remarkable on several dimensions, the income and employment effect is at best weak and materialises only for specific groups of individuals. Qualitative and quantitative evidence supports the validity of the approach to achieve social cohesion. More than design or implementation problems, the lack of stronger employment effects appears to be driven by structural context conditions like limited labour market absorption capacity, legal work permission constraints, gender barriers and similar hindering factors.

We derive the following main recommendations from the analysis:

  • TVET measures need a careful context analysis (including labour market capacities, legal work barriers) to ensure that the necessary conditions for TVET to succeed are in place. This is particularly relevant in terms of employment effects, which appear to be elusive.
  • Inclusive TVET measures seem to be an effective tool to improve social cohesion. However, if social cohesion effects are valued not just as an “add-on” to employment effects but as primary goals, the question arises if alternative interventions might be more efficient. This question is particularly salient given the modest evidence regarding employment and income effects.
  • The evidence base of the impact of (inclusive) TVET programmes needs to be expanded. Knowledge gaps that need to be closed include TVET’s impact on displaced populations, its potential societal effects, differential gender effects, and medium- to long-term employment and income effects.

Improving employment and social cohesion among refugee and host communities through TVET: evidence from an impact assessment in Ethiopia

In pursuit of employment opportunities and increased productivity, governments and donors have the highest ambitions for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. Most prominently, TVET is expected to facilitate access to employment and a qualified workforce by offering its graduates skills that the labour market demands. Beyond its employment impacts, TVET supporters also anticipate that it will improve societal outcomes such as inclusion, gender equality and social cohesion.

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and to foster socio-economic integration. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement opportunities have spurred the quest for local integration in countries of first asylum. It is in this context that TVET has gained additional salience in the past decade.

Does TVET live up to these promises? Overall, systematic empirical evidence on the impact of TVET is limited and often inconsistent. In terms of employment and income, evidence suggests that there is a small positive effect, but time plays an important factor. Often, impacts are only seen in the medium- to long-term, and in general, programmes tend to work better for the long-term unemployed. Evidence of societal effects is even more limited; there is a large gap of knowledge on the potential social cohesion impacts of TVET. Given the amount of funding and the high expectations found in the policy discourse, it is essential to better understand if and how TVET measures contribute to achieving their self-declared goals.

In this brief, we present the results of an accompanying research study of an inclusive TVET programme implemented by the German development cooperation organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ethiopia. In this programme, host and refugee participants are jointly trained, with the explicit goals of fostering social cohesion and improving employment opportunities.

The results indicate that while the social cohesion effect seems remarkable on several dimensions, the income and employment effect is at best weak and materialises only for specific groups of individuals. Qualitative and quantitative evidence supports the validity of the approach to achieve social cohesion. More than design or implementation problems, the lack of stronger employment effects appears to be driven by structural context conditions like limited labour market absorption capacity, legal work permission constraints, gender barriers and similar hindering factors.

We derive the following main recommendations from the analysis:

  • TVET measures need a careful context analysis (including labour market capacities, legal work barriers) to ensure that the necessary conditions for TVET to succeed are in place. This is particularly relevant in terms of employment effects, which appear to be elusive.
  • Inclusive TVET measures seem to be an effective tool to improve social cohesion. However, if social cohesion effects are valued not just as an “add-on” to employment effects but as primary goals, the question arises if alternative interventions might be more efficient. This question is particularly salient given the modest evidence regarding employment and income effects.
  • The evidence base of the impact of (inclusive) TVET programmes needs to be expanded. Knowledge gaps that need to be closed include TVET’s impact on displaced populations, its potential societal effects, differential gender effects, and medium- to long-term employment and income effects.

Development finance at a turning point: effects and policy recommendations

Development finance is at a turning point, as the macroeconomic environment has changed profoundly and the financing gap for low- and middle-income countries has widened. The events that led to this new situation are the multiple crises that the global economy is facing, such as the climate crisis, the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine. As a result, interest rates have risen sharply over the past year and are not expected to decline anytime soon. High interest rates further restrict low- and middle-income countries’ access to international financial markets by making borrowing more expensive. At the same time, debt levels in several countries are rising to levels that are almost impossible to repay. Poorer countries find themselves in a trap where financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) becomes a distant goal for them.
To “get back on track” in financing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, a number of reform proposals have been put forward within several processes and initiatives, including the Financing for Development (FfD) process, the Bridgetown Initiative and the Macron-led Paris Summit. Despite being initiated by different actors, these proposals all highlight the importance of reforming the international financial architecture in view of the changed macroeconomic environment. The Hamburg Sustainability Conference in June 2024, the United Nation’s Summit of the Future in 2024 and the next FfD Conference in 2025 should be used to strengthen and accelerate ongoing reform processes and come up with new, innovative and bold proposals to reshape development finance in these challenging times. Against the background of the multiple crises and its effects, our key recommendations for the reform of development finance are as follows.
First, new initiatives and frameworks are needed to provide urgent debt relief and restructuring for highly indebted countries. The international community should promote a reformed G20 Common Framework for debt restructuring and discuss a green Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)-like initiative for debt relief for low-income countries as a solution on a case-by-case basis, integrating short-term shock remedies with long-term sustainable development finance. Debt and climate risks should be addressed simultaneously by better incorporating climate risks in debt sustainability analyses conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and by considering the volume of investments in climate adaptation because these investments reduce the risks associated with climate change.
Second, tax revenues – the most important source of development finance – need to increase and countries need to expand their fiscal space by reforming their tax administrations and policies. Building fiscal buffers can help countries to become more resilient to future crises. In the short run, eliminating unnecessary tax expenditures such as fossil fuel subsidies is the lowest-hanging fruit to increase tax revenues, while in the long run, more green fiscal reforms (e.g. carbon pricing and environmental taxes) are needed, as well as more effective international tax cooperation. In addition, donor funds should be increased to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to tax and customs administrations.
Third, the Development Assistance Committee member countries should at least halve the gap between their current contributions and the official development assistance (ODA) contribution target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income by 2026, and reach the full attainment of the target by 2030. In particular, donors need to provide ODA in addition to (not as a substitute for) climate finance and channel more ODA to the poorest countries. In this regard, donors should report climate and development finance separately to mitigate the risk of over-reporting.
Fourth, we recall the need to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). The multiple crises have made the role of MDBs in closing the development financing gap even more important than before. As attracting private capital is becoming more difficult for low- and middle-income countries, MDBs should harness their proven ability to leverage private finance for financing the SDGs. MDBs should substantially increase their lending capacity, for example by lowering their equity to loan thresholds and raising additional capital from shareholders or private investors. MDBs should be reformed to include in their vision the provision of global public goods, such as tackling the climate crisis and preparing for pandemics. Development banks and private creditors should include clauses on natural disasters and pandemics in their financing instruments.

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