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By CIVICUS
Feb 27 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses the criminalisation of dissent in the Philippines with Kyle A Domequil, spokesperson of the Free Tacloban 5 Network, a campaign supporting journalist Frenchie Mae Cumpio, human rights defender Marielle Domequil and their co-accused and advocating for their release.

Kyle A Domequil

On 22 January, a Philippines court convicted Cumpio and Domequil of terrorism financing, sentencing them to between 12 and 18 years in prison. The two were among five people arrested in February 2020 following unlawful police and military raids. Rights groups condemned the verdict as a miscarriage of justice, arguing it exemplifies how anti-terror laws silence critics through ‘red-tagging’, a practice of publicly accusing people of communist or terrorist links without evidence, subjecting them to surveillance and exposing them to arrest and violence.

What were the circumstances of the arrests?

In the early hours of 7 February 2020, police and military forces raided the offices of several organisations in Tacloban City. Five people were arrested: Cumpio, a community journalist and Domequil, a Rural Missionaries of the Philippines lay worker, along with Alexander Philip Abinguna, a member of Karapatan’s National Council, People Surge Network spokesperson Marissa Cabaljao and Mira Legion of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Eastern Visayas. They’re collectively known as the Tacloban 5.

The raids followed Karapatan publicly raising concerns about extensive surveillance of its office and other organisations in the city. Days before her arrest, Cumpio reported to the Centre for Media Freedom and Responsibility that masked men had been tailing the staff of Eastern Vista, the local news website where she served as executive director. Cumpio was already being followed and Legion received a very suspicious call from a man saying who just kept saying ‘stop it’. Cumpio was able to publish on Eastern Vista about what was happening to them just a few days before the arrest.

The Tacloban 5 have denounced that evidence was planted during the raid. Ammunition, explosives, firearms and a Communist Party flag were allegedly found where they slept, under pillows and mattresses and even near Cabaljao’s one-year-old child’s crib. They were unable to witness the seizure because they were turned away during the search. Authorities also seized ₱557,360 (approx. US$9,600) in cash.

Cabaljao and Legion faced bailable charges of illegal possession of firearms and were eventually granted bail. On top of that, Abinguna, Cumpio and Domequil faced non-bailable charges of illegal possession of explosives. Since their arrest, they remained detained while facing successive charges widely viewed as politically motivated. Now Cumpio and Domequil have been convicted, while Abinguna remains in pretrial detention six years after being detained.

What evidence did the court rely on to convict Cumpio and Domequil?

The conviction rested almost entirely on testimonies from four ‘rebel returnees’, people who claim to have left armed groups and who receive financial support from the military. They testified that on 29 March 2019, they saw Cumpio and Domequil at a camp of the New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party, handing cash, ammunition and clothing to an NPA commander.

There was no corroborating proof or documentary or photographic evidence, just those testimonies from military assets whose credibility should have been questioned. The defence presented evidence that Cumpio and Domequil were elsewhere that day and they also presented documents of their activities, but the court dismissed this.

The court acquitted Cumpio and Domequil of the illegal possession of explosives and firearms charges, ruling the evidence was based on unreliable witnesses and inconsistent narratives and there was indeed an opportunity for planting evidence. Yet on the same lies and perjured testimonies, the same court found them guilty of terrorism financing and sentenced them to 12 to 18 years in prison.

This verdict is particularly troubling given that in October 2025 the Court of Appeals had overturned a civil forfeiture case against them, finding there was little reason to believe they were connected to the NPA. The Court of Appeals even warned against the hasty labelling of human rights workers as terrorists.

How do anti-terror laws and red-tagging enable cases such as this?

They function as tools of political persecution. Red-tagging labels people as linked to insurgent or terrorist groups without credible evidence. Once red-tagged, they face arrest, harassment, surveillance and threats. It creates a climate where suspicion replaces due process.

The anti-terrorism law contains vague, overly broad provisions. Authorities can associate community organising humanitarian work and journalism with armed groups, even without intent to commit violence. Cumpio was reporting on red-tagging and illegal searches before her arrest. Her radio programme was also red-tagged.

Public vilification combined with expansive security legislation produces a repeatable pattern: stigmatise, raid, charge and detain for years. Cumpio and Domequil’s case reflects this architecture of repression.

Who celebrated their conviction, and what does that reveal?

The National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) celebrated the verdict as a ‘decisive legal victory against terrorism’. NTF-ELCAC is a government body that systematically targets activists, human rights defenders and journalists through red-tagging. It has repeatedly accused Karapatan of being a communist front. It labels legitimate civil society organisations as terrorist supporters, creating the pretext for raids, arrests and prosecutions.

When a court convicts a community journalist based on compromised testimony and the government’s counter-insurgency apparatus celebrates, it reveals the conviction’s true purpose: silencing dissent and punishing those who document abuses.

What’s happened to the other members of the Tacloban 5?

Cabaljao and Legion were released on bail, but not without suffering frozen assets, multiple cases, extended detention and relentless red-tagging. Abinguna remains in pretrial detention and his trial continues at Tacloban City Regional Trial Court, where the prosecution has so far presented fewer than half its listed witnesses, effectively delaying proceedings and prolonging his detention.

While detained, Abinguna was hit with additional trumped-up charges: double murder and attempted murder, based solely on testimony from a ‘rebel returnee’ who tried to link him to an alleged NPA ambush in October 2019. Cumpio faced the same charges until a court granted her motion to quash them in November 2025. Abinguna’s motion was denied.

Beyond this case, what does Karapatan’s documentation reveal about the broader pattern?

Karapatan documents arbitrary imprisonment, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and militarisation across the Philippines. We conduct fact-finding missions, file cases through courts and international human rights bodies, provide psychosocial support to victims and help organise victims’ families.

Under the current government, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 and the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012 have been aggressively enforced not to protect the public, but to persecute critics and suppress dissent.

The Tacloban 5 case exposes how counter-terrorism laws, fabricated charges, judicial harassment and years of unjust detention silence activists, humanitarian workers, human rights defenders and journalists. It’s not an isolated incident; it’s a deliberate strategy.

According to our latest data, there are around 700 political prisoners in the Philippines. Many face the same pattern: red-tagging, questionable raids, planted evidence, reliance on testimony from military assets and prolonged detention.

What happens next?

The case is under appeal. All available legal remedies are being pursued. The conviction needs rigorous review, particularly of due process violations and evidentiary standards in terrorism-related cases. Courts must ensure national security claims don’t override fundamental rights.

But we need more than case-by-case appeals. Structural reforms are essential. Red-tagging must be explicitly prohibited with those responsible held accountable. The anti-terrorism law must be repealed or fundamentally amended to prevent misuse against human rights defenders and journalists. Safeguards must be strengthened to prevent unlawful raids, evidence-planting and security force abuses. NTF-ELCAC must be held accountable for its role in criminalising dissent.

Ultimately, prevention of similar cases requires the dismantling of mechanisms that treat dissent as crime. Without accountability and structural reform, the criminalisation of activism will continue.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Le processus de paix amorcé depuis fin 2024 entre l’État turc et le PKK replace au cœur des débats la question de l’inclusion des minorités ethno-culturelles au sein de la République de Turquie. Tuncer Bakırhan, co-dirigeant du parti de gauche multiculturaliste DEM et intermédiaire clef entre le leader emprisonné du PKK Abdullah Öcalan et l’État, a ainsi déclaré en janvier 2026 qu’était venu le temps « de reconnaître la réalité kurde ». Résumer la question de l’inclusion des minorités à cette seule cause serait pourtant une erreur. La mosaïque culturelle du pays se compose également de groupes plus discrets, à l’image des Lazes qui peuplent les côtes de la mer Noire proches de la Géorgie. Cette population apparaît
comme relativement bien intégrée à l’État-nation turc et peu revendicatrice de sa différence. Au contraire, les Lazes sont même souvent considérés comme plus conservateurs et nationalistes que le moyenne. Le président Recep Tayyip Erdoğan n’hésite d’ailleurs pas à instrumentaliser cette communauté pour mieux critiquer l’activisme politique kurde. Pourtant, les Lazes sont eux aussi porteurs de certaines revendications concernant la préservation de leur culture et en particulier leur langue, considérée comme « en voie de
disparition » par l’UNESCO.

Se pencher sur leur situation, au moment où s’écrit un nouveau chapitre de la question des minorités en Turquie, permet une compréhension plus fine des enjeux liés à cet enjeu capital pour le pays.

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L’article Les Lazes de Turquie, une minorité oubliée ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Your morning cup of coffee could soon cost more, thanks to climate change, which is raising the heat on the production of the world’s most loved beverage. Increased episodes of high heat in top coffee-growing regions of the world are affecting the production of coffee, leading to low harvests and high prices for consumers. This […]

Mamadou Ba, president and founder of Maison des Talibés, speaks to talibés in Saint-Louis, Senegal, at the opening ceremony of the organisation's centre on Jan. 1, 2026. Courtesy: Ramata Haidara

By Megan Fahrney
SAINT-LOUIS, Senegal, Feb 27 2026 (IPS)

When you walk through the streets of Senegal’s cities, you notice them almost immediately: young boys in worn clothes, clutching plastic cans or tin bowls, weaving between cars and pedestrians to ask for spare change or food. They are often barefoot, alone and hungry. These children are known as talibés.

Boys aged approximately 5-15, known as talibé children, reside in daaras, schools run by marabouts.

Human Rights Watch says many marabouts, “who serve as de facto guardians, conscientiously carry out the important tradition of providing young boys with a religious and moral education.”

However, many of the schools are unregulated.

“However, thousands of so-called teachers use religious education as a cover for economic exploitation of the children in their charge, with no fear of being investigated or prosecuted,” the report says. The talibés from these ‘schools’ spend much of their days begging for food on the streets and suffering a range of human rights abuses. They regularly experience beatings, inadequate food and medical care, and neglect.

Mamadou Ba, president and founder of Maison des Talibés, is striving to change the narrative. Ba created the organisation Maison des Talibés (“House of Talibés”) three years ago in Saint-Louis, Senegal, with the goal of empowering talibés, improving their living conditions, and teaching them skills to help them succeed in young adulthood.

“I want to improve talibés’ lives,” Ba said. “I’m trying to help them in the future when they grow up [to be] self-sufficient.”

Ba himself was a talibé as a child. A Senegal native, Ba was sent away to Daara at the age of seven in a city called Sokone. He said he remained there for eight years, enduring very tough conditions and was not fed by his marabout.

Once Ba aged out of the daara, he moved to Dakar and later Saint-Louis to be a marabout.

While in Saint-Louis, Ba began to devote his time to French and English study. He got involved with an international organisation that supported talibés but found their approach of simply donating food to the talibés was not going to cut it. Ba knew he needed to equip the children with skills to succeed in young adulthood after leaving the daara.

“They have one way out, which is becoming a marabout,” Ba said. “I don’t want them basically to have one choice, which is a Quranic teacher. I want them to have different choices, different options, [to become] whatever they want.”

Maison des Talibés began as a true grassroots effort. Ba formed relationships with local marabouts, gaining their trust and allowing him to enter the daaras to provide the talibés services. He reached out to his friend, Abib Fall, a doctor in the area, who agreed to provide medical care to talibés in his free time. Ba himself began teaching the children English, providing food and rehabilitating the daaras.

“It’s very fundamental to have a connection with the marabouts; otherwise, you cannot do this work,” Ba said. “I speak the language that they speak, so they listen to me more … I’m a former talibé, so I know them very well.”

Equipped with English language skills, Ba expanded the organisation by speaking with international visitors and businesses in Saint-Louis to request financial support and recruit volunteers.

“The objective is education and handcraft,” Ba said. “I know that if they have the education and the handcraft, they will be like me or better.”

“I know how you get them there, because I went through that and I experienced it,” Ba said.

A 2019 report by Human Rights Watch documented 16 talibé deaths from abuse and neglect and dozens of cases of beatings, neglect, sexual abuse and the chaining and imprisonment in daaras. An estimated 50,000 young boys live as talibés across Senegal, as of 2017.

Though families often send their children to live in daaras voluntarily, the system is widely considered to be trafficking. Many talibés in Senegal come from impoverished communities in Guinea-Bissau and other neighbouring countries.

Over the years, the daara system has evolved from what it once was. Historically, talibés resided predominantly in rural environments, where they worked on farms in exchange for food or received donations from villagers. With urbanisation, the system has transformed into exploitation and begging.

Ramata Haidara, an American Fulbright fellow in Saint-Louis, met Ba outside of a museum in the city. After learning about Maison des Talibés, Haidara immediately got involved as a volunteer English teacher.

Haidara said she has witnessed her students’ confidence grow over time.

“[We] show them that you deserve to have resources and an education and people who are kind to you,” Haidara said.

On January 1, 2026, Maison des Talibés unveiled its first physical building to support talibés by giving them a safe space outside of the daara to learn skills, attend classes, eat, shower and receive medical care.

The centre’s opening ceremony drew over 100 talibés. Ba said the organisation serves many more than that in total, and that he hopes to expand its reach in the future.

Cheikh Tidiane Diallo, a perfume and soap maker living in Morocco, was one of Maison des Talibés’ first students. Diallo said he credits Ba and the organisation with giving him the skills and connections to move to Morocco and pursue his career.

“He has a good heart,” Diallo said of Ba. “He has never given up. I really appreciate that passion from him.”

Ba said he sees his younger self in the talibés he serves and is inspired by them just as they are inspired by him.

“This is a place where they can laugh, a place where they can eat, a place where they can feel okay,” Ba said. “This is our home.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Deux semaines après un premier round de négociations à Madrid, le Maroc, l'Algérie, la Mauritanie et le Front Polisario se sont retrouvés à Washington les 23 et 24 février pour de nouveaux pourparlers confidentiels. Depuis plusieurs mois, l'administration Trump accélère la cadence diplomatique pour clore le dossier du Sahara occidental au profit de son allié marocain.

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Dans le viseur de la police "pour son implication dans la traite d'êtres humains", Festus Omwamba a été arrêté, a annoncé la police kényane dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi. Une enquête a décrit cet homme de 33 ans comme "le cerveau" de l'opération qui aurait envoyé plus de 1 000 Kényans rejoindre les rangs de l'armée russe.

Ino Afentouli, Senior Policy Advisor; Head of the Geopolitics and Diplomacy Observatory, ELIAMEP 

The return of fear 

If anything changed in Europe after 24 February 2022, it was the conviction that our continent had seen a definitive end to war. In the eight decades since the end of World War II, European leaders had done everything they could to consolidate the peace which they won in 1945, with American help. “Never again” was the driving force behind the founding of the European Economic Community, NATO, and other organizations created to eliminate conflict and establish a framework for peaceful coexistence motivated by a supranational interest that would be the sum of all national interests.

The columns of Russian tanks wresting territory away from Ukrainian metre by metre brought that historical era to an end, reanimating the old demons that had wreaked destruction across the continent for centuries. Objectively speaking, the institutions have held firm. Neither NATO nor the European Union has collapsed. Fortunately, because without them, Russia would not have stopped at Ukraine and broadened the European front; many countries would now be occupied, as they were between 1914 and 1944.

Still, Europe does not feel—and is not—secure. Worse still, in many countries, an alarming proportion of Europeans have begun to doubt whether these supranational institutions can protect them better than a return to national supremacy. This shift is the result of a fear which, if it becomes generalized, will erode the European unity that is already being tested by the war in Ukraine. Unity will be further undermined by the desire of certain EU member states to return to business as usual with Russia if peace is achieved. But Russia does not want peace. It wants Europe to remain in a state of perpetual insecurity, forever awaiting the next blow. It envisions a European Union divided into Moscow’s friends and enemies, rendered incapable of addressing its threats effectively. Russia wants a Europe unable to select its future members and forced to rearm at the expense of other policies, whose downgrading will drive segments of its population towards pro-Russian choices. This is the existential dilemma facing the EU. If it fails to address it, the bloc will indeed face the risk disintegration.

Jens Bastian, Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its fifth year, two new strategic parameters of the war have come into focus. The first is that the dictator in the Kremlin is deliberately targeting energy infrastructure in order to force Ukrainian citizens to surrender. With the help of Iranian-manufactured Shahed drones and incessant missile attacks, power grids and energy pipelines are being destroyed in the middle of a brutal Ukrainian winter.

The other development relates to Donald Trump’s request for a so-called “peace deal”. To the extent that we know what this entails (and its elements are fluid at best), Trump’s “acrobatic” negotiating tactics appear set to reward the aggressor in Moscow. The envoys Trump has despatched to Geneva, Qatar and Istanbul for trilateral “negotiations” are not acting as neutral mediators between Kiev and Moscow. The US administration has made its hostility to the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, absolutely clear, while welcoming Putin with full honours in Alaska.

So, on the one hand, Russia’s winter bombing campaign is seeking to create a rift between Ukraine’s resilient civil society and its courageous army. And, on the other, the stance adopted by the US administration is pushing for the imposition of a “peace agreement” that will eviscerate Ukraine’s sovereignty and gravely jeopardize European security.

Both developments are perilous. The Trump administration and some EU governments want to re-establish trade agreements with Russia, particularly in the energy sector. The political groundwork for the policy of appeasing Putin is being laid in Washington, Budapest, Bratislava and Prague.

For more than four years, Putin has made it quite clear he does not speak the language of diplomacy. This sombre anniversary of Russia’s aggression obliges Europe to do ‘whatever it takes’ to help Ukraine survive. Kiev’s leverage at the negotiating table needs to be bolstered through increased military aid, sustained funding, and the restoration of civilian infrastructure. Ukraine’s citizens and soldiers will one day remind us who stood within the alliance of solidarity to defeat the Russian invaders—and who did not.

Spyros Blavoukos, Professor at the Athens University of Economics and Business, Head of the “Ariane Contellis” European Programme at ELIAMEP

Four years on, is there a realistic exit from the war in Ukraine?

As we enter the fifth year of the war in Ukraine, international fatigue has become palpable. One has only to glance at the scarce media coverage of developments on the battlefield or of the ongoing (?) negotiations. After all, the change of leadership in the White House has provided ample fodder for discussion and reflection, from the unilateral dismantling of the post-war regulatory framework governing the international economic system to the blatant challenging of the concept of state sovereignty in instances ranging from Greenland to Venezuela, with Iran potentially next in line. Amidst this onslaught of (violent) changes, who still focuses on the drama playing out in Ukraine? This explains why calls for Ukraine to embrace pragmatism have intensified, urging Kiev to search for a realistic exit strategy from the war.

There is no doubt that our insights into the battle-readiness of the Ukrainian army and the fighting spirit of Ukraine’s civilian population come to us filtered and second hand. But, at the end of the day, only the Ukrainian people has the right to decide on when and if to end hostilities, bearing the consequences of their choices. However, there is a fundamental prerequisite linked to the feasibility and, above all, the viability of any agreement. A settlement born of pressure or exhaustion that fails to establish a stable equilibrium and condemns Ukraine to a state of (semi)permanent vulnerability, is no more than a temporary fix with no realistic prospect of long-term implementation. Consequently, any discussion on ending the war must encompass elements to consolidate Ukrainian security and provide a robust deterrent against a new round of hostilities. Otherwise, the “realism” of today may well become synonymous with disastrous “appeasement” in the future.

Triantafyllos Karatrantos, Research Associate, ELIAMEP

Can peace be made sustainable?

February 24, 2022 was one of those days that changed our world. Its impact on security, international relations, and national and supranational policies can only be compared to that of the September 11 attacks. For four years now, interstate war and invasions by revisionist powers and totalitarian regimes has no longer been a hazy memory of World War II, but the difficult everyday reality for a European country and its citizens as they bravely defend themselves in the face, too, of a significant asymmetry of power.

Since taking office in January 2025, the US President has been working to craft a peace plan that could serve as a foundation for an agreement. Over the intervening 13 months, we can discern two primary strategic manoeuvres: overtures to Russia and the exertion of pressure on Ukraine. The latter, and its President, have shown themselves willing to make difficult decisions and bear the cost of peace. Russia, the invader, has yet to show the same willingness. This disparity is crucial when addressing the question of how realistic a prospect peace truly is. Even the most difficult peace can be realistic; however, it is not necessarily just and—most crucially—it is exceedingly difficult to sustain. That is the big question and the issue here. Will the peace be sustainable? The experience of 2014 has shown us how extremely hard this can be to achieve. We should not forget, either, that the pressure being put on Ukraine to agree to terms may become a highly problematic factor in the future.

Finally, there are two more parameters to take into account: The first is how Russia is punished for its invasion. That cost, across multiple levels, is what could render the use of hard power a non-option in the future. Yet, there is little room for optimism here, given our ongoing drift towards a world governed by force, rather than international law and rules. The second parameter is the threat Russia poses to European security, a point I feel needs no further elaboration here.

Panagiota Manoli, Associate Professor at the University of the Peloponnese; Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

Fluctuating Deadlines

Russia’s “special military operation” against Ukraine, which was initially only supposed to last a few days, has stretched into its fifth year of full-scale war. The two sides began negotiating a ceasefire accord during the “Istanbul Talks” less than a month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. These talks failed, but left a foundation for a potential ceasefire. Under Trump’s term in office, diplomacy has restarted with fluctuating peace objectives, timelines, and places of negotiations. Trump has set June 2026 as the latest date for an agreement. Despite the growing cost of the conflict on both sides, negotiations appear to be moving slowly.  The same slow pace is observed on the battlefield. Russia’s daily gains on the ground are measured in meters. It appears that Kyiv is also unable to mark a decisive advancement. Is it possible that a cease-fire agreement will be concluded any time soon? The territorial issue appears to be the most challenging one on the table. Russia wants Kyiv to surrender all territories that have officially (and illegally) annexed, but Moscow does not control. Kyiv calls this an unacceptable capitulation.  In an effort to alter the situation on the ground, military activities are anticipated to step up alongside diplomatic efforts. However, there is another, equally significant political issue on the table, and that is nothing less than Ukraine’s sovereignty as an independent state.  Moscow’s objectives for Ukraine’s political subjugation remain unchanged, and on multiple occasions, Kremlin spokespersons have said that the “special military operation” will continue until “its goals are achieved”. Concerningly, US mediation focuses too much on the need for Ukraine to make concessions. Trump stated on 28 May 2025, that he would find out in two weeks if Putin was “tapping us along” or genuinely interested in ending the war. Since then, nine months have gone by, but Kyiv is instead held responsible for the lack of peace. “Ukraine better come to the table fast,” Trump repeated once again ahead of the latest round of talks in Geneva. Unless a major development happens, mainly on the battlefield, the prospects for a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, are grim.

Cover photo: publicdomainpictures.net

La France est le deuxième plus gros consommateur européen de benzodiazépines - des sédatifs plus connus sous le nom de Valium ou Xanax. Chaque année, près de 10 millions de patients s'en font prescrire pour contrer l’anxiété ou l’insomnie. Censés être des traitements de courte durée, ils sont pourtant souvent prolongés indéfiniment, sans réel suivi. La dépendance s'installe alors, des adolescents aux seniors. Reportage d'Olivia Bizot. 

Digitalisation is reshaping economies, politics and societies worldwide, creating both opportunities for inclusion and risks of deepening inequality. While digital literacy frameworks exist, they remain fragmented and insufficiently connected to broader goals of citizenship education. Without equipping teachers and learners with the competencies to think critically, act ethically and participate constructively in digital spaces, democratic institutions and individual well-being are at risk. Building on UNESCO’s Global Citizenship Education and Digital Literacy Global frameworks, this brief argues that integrating digital literacy into citizenship education, standardising teacher training across contexts and promoting international cooperation – particularly through the G20 – are key to ensuring that all citizens become empowered, responsible and globally connected digital actors.

Digitalisation is reshaping economies, politics and societies worldwide, creating both opportunities for inclusion and risks of deepening inequality. While digital literacy frameworks exist, they remain fragmented and insufficiently connected to broader goals of citizenship education. Without equipping teachers and learners with the competencies to think critically, act ethically and participate constructively in digital spaces, democratic institutions and individual well-being are at risk. Building on UNESCO’s Global Citizenship Education and Digital Literacy Global frameworks, this brief argues that integrating digital literacy into citizenship education, standardising teacher training across contexts and promoting international cooperation – particularly through the G20 – are key to ensuring that all citizens become empowered, responsible and globally connected digital actors.