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Bundesarbeitsministerin Bärbel Bas will das Renteneintrittsalter an die Beitragsjahre koppeln. Doch zu einer klugen Reform gehören ganz andere Schritte., Bundesarbeitsministerin Bärbel Bas regt für die geplante Rentenreform an, das Renteneintrittsalter an die Dauer der sozialversicherungspflichtigen Beschäftigung zu koppeln. Einige Ökonomen und Politikerinnen begrüßen den Vorschlag. Was auf den ersten Blick als fair erscheinen mag, entpuppt sich ...

Die Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen (UN) stehen politisch und finanziell unter Druck. In seinem Schreiben vom 10. Oktober 2025 hat UN-Generalsekretär António Guterres neun Missionen aufgefordert, Notfallpläne für Ausgabenkürzungen von bis zu 25 Prozent vorzubereiten. Die bereits 1964 geschaffene Friedensmission in Zypern (UNFICYP) zeigt, warum Europa ein fundamentales Interesse daran hat, dass die UN weiter engagiert bleiben.

Der Konflikt zwischen der Republik Zypern im griechischsprachigen Süden und der nur von Ankara anerkannten Türkischen Republik Nordzypern, dem türkischsprachigen Teil, ist seit der de facto Teilung der Insel weitgehend eingefroren. Daran hat UNFICYP einen konkreten Anteil. Seit dem Waffenstillstand von 1974 kontrolliert die Mission die sogenannte »Green Line«, einen 180 Kilometer langen Streifen, der die beiden Teile voneinander trennt und direkte Konfrontationen verhindern soll. 

Dennoch verzeichnet die Mission weiter zahlreiche militärische und zivile Verstöße in und entlang der Pufferzone. Sie verhindert also immer noch, »dass solche Funken in Flammen aufgehen«, wie Colin Stewart, bis August 2025 der Leiter von UNFICYP, es ausdrückte. Denn bis heute gibt es keinen direkten militärischen Kontaktpunkt zwischen den Konfliktparteien. Zuletzt hat die Bedrohungswahrnehmung auf beiden Seiten sogar wieder zugenommen.

Neuer Anlauf für Friedensbemühungen 

An einer weiteren Reduzierung oder gar einem Abzug der Mission können die Europäische Union und ihre Mitgliedstaaten schon deshalb kein Interesse haben. Gerade läuft der politische Prozess zaghaft wieder an. María Angela Holguín Cuéllar wurde im Mai 2025 erneut zur Persönlichen Gesandten des Generalsekretärs ernannt. Sie soll Möglichkeiten für die Aufnahme formaler Verhandlungen ausloten und die festgefahrene Situation in Bewegung bringen.  

Das ist ein schwieriges Unterfangen. Während der UN-Sicherheitsrat weiterhin eine föderale Lösung verfolgt, pochen Nordzypern und die Türkei seit Jahren auf eine Zweistaatenlösung. Die Wahl des nordzypriotischen Präsidenten Tufan Erhürman im Oktober hat jedoch die Hoffnung geweckt, dass sich die Tür für echte Verhandlungen unter UN-Ägide wieder öffnen könnte. Gerade gab es das erste Dreiertreffen zwischen ihm, dem Präsidenten der Republik Zypern und Holguín. Doch eine Annäherung dürfte Zeit brauchen. So bleiben vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen und die Absicherung des Friedens durch die UN essentiell.

Rolle der UN unverzichtbar 

Da die Republik Zypern Mitglied der EU ist, kann die Union selbst kaum als unparteiische Vermittlerin agieren. Sie unterstützt daher vorrangig den UN-geführten politischen Prozess. Auch sicherheitspolitisch hat die EU wenig Spielraum. Eine eigene EU-Mission, wie sie im Libanon aufgrund des Abzugs von UNIFIL angedacht ist, wäre unrealistisch – schon allein ob des angespannten Verhältnisses zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei, die beide neben Großbritannien Garantiemächte Zyperns sind. 

Daher bleibt die stabilisierende Funktion der UN-Mission absehbar unerlässlich. Sie schafft auch den Rahmen für praktische Annäherungsinitiativen wie die Projekte der Technischen Komitees. Diese fördern unter gemeinsamer griechisch-zypriotischer und türkisch-zypriotischer Leitung und unter Schirmherrschaft der UN die Verständigung zwischen den beiden Gemeinschaften. Die Finanzierung erfolgt zu einem großen Teil durch die EU. 

UNFICYP steht finanziell besser da als viele größere UN-Einsätze, da Griechenland und die Republik Zypern etwa die Hälfte des Budgets tragen. Doch werden personelle und operative Einsparungen notwendig sein. Gleichzeitig wird die Existenzberechtigung der seit Jahrzehnten laufenden Mission immer mal wieder infrage gestellt. Ende Januar 2026 steht erneut eine Verlängerung des Mandats an. Die Haltung des UN-Sicherheitsrates ist trotz aller Kritik der türkischen und der früheren nordzypriotischen Führungen bislang unverändert geblieben. 

Um die festgefahrenen Positionen für Verhandlungen aufzubrechen, wird es jedoch mehr wirtschaftliches Engagement von europäischer Seite brauchen, das die Lage im Norden verbessert. Kurzfristig aber sollten die Mitgliedstaaten der EU keinen Zweifel daran lassen, dass nicht nur UNFICYP, sondern das Instrument der UN-Friedensmissionen insgesamt unentbehrlich ist. 

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) ist eine der größten und am längsten laufenden multidisziplinären Panelstudien weltweit, für die derzeit jährlich etwa 30.000 Menschen in knapp 15.000 Haushalten befragt werden. Das SOEP hat den Anspruch den gesellschaftlichen Wandel zu erfassen und steht immer neuen vielfältigen Themen- und Aufgabenfeldern gegenüber. Zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt suchen wir eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 12 Wochenstunden.

Sie wirken am Projekt "RDCnet" mit, das den Zugang zu sensiblen Forschungsdaten, wie den Daten des SOEP, für Forschende erleichtern soll. Dafür sollen Datenzugangspunkte direkt an Universitäten und bei anderen Kooperationspartnern bereitgestellt werden. Zur Umsetzung soll eine groß angelegte Bedarfsumfrage durchgeführt werden, die den Fokus Ihrer Tätigkeit darstellt.

The 2023 Tax Expenditures Report, published by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, estimates that Zambia forfeited revenue equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP, representing 7.5 percent of total taxes and levies collected in the year. It is important to note that this figure excludes Value Added Tax (VAT)-related tax expenditures, which, according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), are a substantial source of revenue forgone. Tax expenditures in Zambia are delivered through a variety of mechanisms, including reduced rates, exemptions, and suspensions, applied across both domestic and trade-based taxes.
Transparency: Zambia published its first tax expenditure report, covering fiscal years 2022 and 2023, in December 2024, a milestone toward improving fiscal transparency. To build on this progress, while reinforcing the legal requirement for timely disclosure under the Public Finance Management Act of 2018, Zambia should institutionalise mandatory annual reporting on the cost and effectiveness of tax expenditures, thereby strengthening continuity and public accountability and ensuring this is not a once-off effort.
Complex landscape: Over the years, Zambia has adopted a range of tax incentives through rate adjustments, exemptions, and deferrals—to encourage investment, promote industrial growth, and stimulate trade. These policy tools reflect the government’s broader commitment to using the tax system as a lever for achieving inclusive and sustainable development. However, while these measures serve noble goals, they also add complexity by introducing different rates, exemptions, and rules that make the system harder for taxpayers to navigate.
Evaluation challenges: The absence of a comprehensive evaluation framework requiring regular assessments limits systematic review of TEs. With only one tax expenditure report produced to date, limited historical data also restricts possible evaluations of the economic and fiscal impact of tax incentives. This undermines the ability to determine whether current tax expenditures are achieving their intended policy objectives.
Fiscal sustainability: The fiscal cost of tax expenditures, coupled with Zambia’s mounting debt obligations, pose risks to fiscal sustainability. Without careful monitoring and rationalisation, tax expenditures could erode the domestic revenue base, compromising the country’s ability to meet its development goals.
Policy recommendations:
• Mandate and institutionalise the annual publication of a comprehensive Tax Expenditure Report as part of the National Budget process to support evidence-based policy and fiscal accountability.
• Publish comprehensive reports by December 31 each year, in time to inform the national budget.
• Include detailed disclosures on the scope, legal basis, objectives, and outcomes of each tax expenditure to enable performance evaluation and policy refinement.
• Establish an inter-agency working group (including Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), MoFNP, and Zambia Development Agency (ZDA)) to coordinate the identification, recording, and review of TEs.
• Subject major tax expenditure provisions to periodic cost-benefit analysis to assess their effectiveness and fiscal trade-offs.

The 2023 Tax Expenditures Report, published by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, estimates that Zambia forfeited revenue equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP, representing 7.5 percent of total taxes and levies collected in the year. It is important to note that this figure excludes Value Added Tax (VAT)-related tax expenditures, which, according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), are a substantial source of revenue forgone. Tax expenditures in Zambia are delivered through a variety of mechanisms, including reduced rates, exemptions, and suspensions, applied across both domestic and trade-based taxes.
Transparency: Zambia published its first tax expenditure report, covering fiscal years 2022 and 2023, in December 2024, a milestone toward improving fiscal transparency. To build on this progress, while reinforcing the legal requirement for timely disclosure under the Public Finance Management Act of 2018, Zambia should institutionalise mandatory annual reporting on the cost and effectiveness of tax expenditures, thereby strengthening continuity and public accountability and ensuring this is not a once-off effort.
Complex landscape: Over the years, Zambia has adopted a range of tax incentives through rate adjustments, exemptions, and deferrals—to encourage investment, promote industrial growth, and stimulate trade. These policy tools reflect the government’s broader commitment to using the tax system as a lever for achieving inclusive and sustainable development. However, while these measures serve noble goals, they also add complexity by introducing different rates, exemptions, and rules that make the system harder for taxpayers to navigate.
Evaluation challenges: The absence of a comprehensive evaluation framework requiring regular assessments limits systematic review of TEs. With only one tax expenditure report produced to date, limited historical data also restricts possible evaluations of the economic and fiscal impact of tax incentives. This undermines the ability to determine whether current tax expenditures are achieving their intended policy objectives.
Fiscal sustainability: The fiscal cost of tax expenditures, coupled with Zambia’s mounting debt obligations, pose risks to fiscal sustainability. Without careful monitoring and rationalisation, tax expenditures could erode the domestic revenue base, compromising the country’s ability to meet its development goals.
Policy recommendations:
• Mandate and institutionalise the annual publication of a comprehensive Tax Expenditure Report as part of the National Budget process to support evidence-based policy and fiscal accountability.
• Publish comprehensive reports by December 31 each year, in time to inform the national budget.
• Include detailed disclosures on the scope, legal basis, objectives, and outcomes of each tax expenditure to enable performance evaluation and policy refinement.
• Establish an inter-agency working group (including Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), MoFNP, and Zambia Development Agency (ZDA)) to coordinate the identification, recording, and review of TEs.
• Subject major tax expenditure provisions to periodic cost-benefit analysis to assess their effectiveness and fiscal trade-offs.

The 2023 Tax Expenditures Report, published by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, estimates that Zambia forfeited revenue equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP, representing 7.5 percent of total taxes and levies collected in the year. It is important to note that this figure excludes Value Added Tax (VAT)-related tax expenditures, which, according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), are a substantial source of revenue forgone. Tax expenditures in Zambia are delivered through a variety of mechanisms, including reduced rates, exemptions, and suspensions, applied across both domestic and trade-based taxes.
Transparency: Zambia published its first tax expenditure report, covering fiscal years 2022 and 2023, in December 2024, a milestone toward improving fiscal transparency. To build on this progress, while reinforcing the legal requirement for timely disclosure under the Public Finance Management Act of 2018, Zambia should institutionalise mandatory annual reporting on the cost and effectiveness of tax expenditures, thereby strengthening continuity and public accountability and ensuring this is not a once-off effort.
Complex landscape: Over the years, Zambia has adopted a range of tax incentives through rate adjustments, exemptions, and deferrals—to encourage investment, promote industrial growth, and stimulate trade. These policy tools reflect the government’s broader commitment to using the tax system as a lever for achieving inclusive and sustainable development. However, while these measures serve noble goals, they also add complexity by introducing different rates, exemptions, and rules that make the system harder for taxpayers to navigate.
Evaluation challenges: The absence of a comprehensive evaluation framework requiring regular assessments limits systematic review of TEs. With only one tax expenditure report produced to date, limited historical data also restricts possible evaluations of the economic and fiscal impact of tax incentives. This undermines the ability to determine whether current tax expenditures are achieving their intended policy objectives.
Fiscal sustainability: The fiscal cost of tax expenditures, coupled with Zambia’s mounting debt obligations, pose risks to fiscal sustainability. Without careful monitoring and rationalisation, tax expenditures could erode the domestic revenue base, compromising the country’s ability to meet its development goals.
Policy recommendations:
• Mandate and institutionalise the annual publication of a comprehensive Tax Expenditure Report as part of the National Budget process to support evidence-based policy and fiscal accountability.
• Publish comprehensive reports by December 31 each year, in time to inform the national budget.
• Include detailed disclosures on the scope, legal basis, objectives, and outcomes of each tax expenditure to enable performance evaluation and policy refinement.
• Establish an inter-agency working group (including Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), MoFNP, and Zambia Development Agency (ZDA)) to coordinate the identification, recording, and review of TEs.
• Subject major tax expenditure provisions to periodic cost-benefit analysis to assess their effectiveness and fiscal trade-offs.

BMZ (Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development or Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) is consulting on how to implement a material reduction in its Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In this paper, we review where remaining funds would have the greatest impact, and propose a series of reforms accordingly. We recommend:

Focussed thematic allocation: Germany’s development projects have been substantially diluted over the last decade. We find that BMZ projects have progressively targeted a broader range of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The number of projects that target more than four goals, for example has risen almost nine-fold from 72 to over 600 in the last ten years. Evidence suggests that less complex measures would have been more efficient and effective.We suggest focussing on 4–5 SDGs that align with the Government’s priorities and BMZ’s expertise render overall ODA allocation more effective.

Strategic country allocations: BMZ currently funds projects in a 110 of the 141 ODA-eligible countries in total. It seems clear this will need to be reduced. Providing development finance makes the biggest difference to those in greatest need, so we undertake an analysis to ascertain the level of ODA that each of these recipients receives from other countries, expressed in terms of ODA per person in extreme poverty. We identify 31 BMZ partner countries that are under-prioritised—of which 13 are significantly under-prioritised. In contrast, we find 48 countries that are over-prioritised by other providers. We urge BMZ to fully protect budgets in the 31 under-prioritised countries, and concentrate reductions in the 48 over-prioritised. This enhances the impact of BMZ funding overall and enables German funding to represent a larger and more influential share of recipients’ economies.

Sharpening instruments: Over the last five years, funding for the “Multilateral and European development cooperation” federal budget instrument has been cut by 34 percent, while there has been 20 percent cuts in bilateral efforts. Germany is below average in the share of its international finance that is allocated multilaterally. We argue this split should be reversed. First, multilateral organisations are assessed as highly effective by independent assessments, and surveys of the German public also suggest they garner a high level of trust. But there is an additional compelling geopolitical case for allocating funding multilaterally. Following the abrupt withdrawal of the United States from a number of organisations, the international system is more vulnerable than ever. It is difficult envisage a future where Germany is secure and prosperous if the multilateral system fails to endure. We urge the German government to shield its multilateral contributions in from these cuts, refocus earmarked multilateral spend towards core funding, and increase its core multilateral share to at least 40 percent in the next two years. Regarding the remaining bilateral share, we propose that Germany reconsider its current approach to the volume and tendering of technical assistance.

BMZ (Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development or Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) is consulting on how to implement a material reduction in its Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In this paper, we review where remaining funds would have the greatest impact, and propose a series of reforms accordingly. We recommend:

Focussed thematic allocation: Germany’s development projects have been substantially diluted over the last decade. We find that BMZ projects have progressively targeted a broader range of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The number of projects that target more than four goals, for example has risen almost nine-fold from 72 to over 600 in the last ten years. Evidence suggests that less complex measures would have been more efficient and effective.We suggest focussing on 4–5 SDGs that align with the Government’s priorities and BMZ’s expertise render overall ODA allocation more effective.

Strategic country allocations: BMZ currently funds projects in a 110 of the 141 ODA-eligible countries in total. It seems clear this will need to be reduced. Providing development finance makes the biggest difference to those in greatest need, so we undertake an analysis to ascertain the level of ODA that each of these recipients receives from other countries, expressed in terms of ODA per person in extreme poverty. We identify 31 BMZ partner countries that are under-prioritised—of which 13 are significantly under-prioritised. In contrast, we find 48 countries that are over-prioritised by other providers. We urge BMZ to fully protect budgets in the 31 under-prioritised countries, and concentrate reductions in the 48 over-prioritised. This enhances the impact of BMZ funding overall and enables German funding to represent a larger and more influential share of recipients’ economies.

Sharpening instruments: Over the last five years, funding for the “Multilateral and European development cooperation” federal budget instrument has been cut by 34 percent, while there has been 20 percent cuts in bilateral efforts. Germany is below average in the share of its international finance that is allocated multilaterally. We argue this split should be reversed. First, multilateral organisations are assessed as highly effective by independent assessments, and surveys of the German public also suggest they garner a high level of trust. But there is an additional compelling geopolitical case for allocating funding multilaterally. Following the abrupt withdrawal of the United States from a number of organisations, the international system is more vulnerable than ever. It is difficult envisage a future where Germany is secure and prosperous if the multilateral system fails to endure. We urge the German government to shield its multilateral contributions in from these cuts, refocus earmarked multilateral spend towards core funding, and increase its core multilateral share to at least 40 percent in the next two years. Regarding the remaining bilateral share, we propose that Germany reconsider its current approach to the volume and tendering of technical assistance.

BMZ (Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development or Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung) is consulting on how to implement a material reduction in its Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. In this paper, we review where remaining funds would have the greatest impact, and propose a series of reforms accordingly. We recommend:

Focussed thematic allocation: Germany’s development projects have been substantially diluted over the last decade. We find that BMZ projects have progressively targeted a broader range of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The number of projects that target more than four goals, for example has risen almost nine-fold from 72 to over 600 in the last ten years. Evidence suggests that less complex measures would have been more efficient and effective.We suggest focussing on 4–5 SDGs that align with the Government’s priorities and BMZ’s expertise render overall ODA allocation more effective.

Strategic country allocations: BMZ currently funds projects in a 110 of the 141 ODA-eligible countries in total. It seems clear this will need to be reduced. Providing development finance makes the biggest difference to those in greatest need, so we undertake an analysis to ascertain the level of ODA that each of these recipients receives from other countries, expressed in terms of ODA per person in extreme poverty. We identify 31 BMZ partner countries that are under-prioritised—of which 13 are significantly under-prioritised. In contrast, we find 48 countries that are over-prioritised by other providers. We urge BMZ to fully protect budgets in the 31 under-prioritised countries, and concentrate reductions in the 48 over-prioritised. This enhances the impact of BMZ funding overall and enables German funding to represent a larger and more influential share of recipients’ economies.

Sharpening instruments: Over the last five years, funding for the “Multilateral and European development cooperation” federal budget instrument has been cut by 34 percent, while there has been 20 percent cuts in bilateral efforts. Germany is below average in the share of its international finance that is allocated multilaterally. We argue this split should be reversed. First, multilateral organisations are assessed as highly effective by independent assessments, and surveys of the German public also suggest they garner a high level of trust. But there is an additional compelling geopolitical case for allocating funding multilaterally. Following the abrupt withdrawal of the United States from a number of organisations, the international system is more vulnerable than ever. It is difficult envisage a future where Germany is secure and prosperous if the multilateral system fails to endure. We urge the German government to shield its multilateral contributions in from these cuts, refocus earmarked multilateral spend towards core funding, and increase its core multilateral share to at least 40 percent in the next two years. Regarding the remaining bilateral share, we propose that Germany reconsider its current approach to the volume and tendering of technical assistance.

Deutsche Wirtschaft nach zwei Rezessionsjahren in diesem Jahr mit kleinem Wachstum von 0,2 Prozent – Dank fiskalpolitischer Impulse geht es 2026 und 2027 deutlich stärker aufwärts, um 1,3 und 1,6 Prozent – Weltwirtschaft trotz US-Zollpolitik robuster als erwartet Die deutsche Wirtschaft nimmt einen ...

Event Video 
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IPI and the Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations cohosted a public discussion on Navigating Frontline Challenges for the use of Technology in UN Peace Operations on December 11th.

The event examined how UN peace operations should navigate the changing technology landscape to maximize potential benefits for efficiency and effectiveness, address changing threats posed by the use of technology by conflict parties, and mitigate the risks and potential harms presented by the introduction of new technologies into peacekeeping environments. As the Secretariat’s ongoing review of the future of all forms of UN peace operations examines opportunities for new mission modalities and formats, this event considered the potential role of new technologies across various types of mission configurations. This could include, for example, the appropriate balance of remote sensing technologies and on-the-ground presence in a future ceasefire-monitoring mission. Panelists also discussed the political, operational, and ethical implications of new peacekeeping technologies within the current geopolitical and financial environment and proposed opportunities to adapt the UN’s technology and innovation agenda in light of these challenges.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Sanita Pavļuta-Deslandes, Permanent Representative of Latvia to the United Nations

Speakers:
Remi Clavet, Chief of Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC), UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (Virtual)
Dirk Druet, Non-Resident Fellow, International Peace Institute
Major Modris Kairišs, Head of Autonomous Systems Competence Center, National Armed Forces of Latvia (Virtual)
Barbara Nieuwenhuys, Digital Transformation Team, UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO)

Closing Remarks:
H.E. Usman Iqbal Jadoon, Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations (Virtual)

Moderator:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute

The post Navigating Frontline Challenges for the Use of Technology in UN Peace Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.