Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Following the publication of the long-awaited pre-enlargement policy reviews by the European Commission and just in time for the October Council Summit, Dr. Frauke Seebass (Research Fellow, Wider Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Ioannis Alexandris (Research Fellow, Wider Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) co-authored the policy brief “Preparing the EU for Enlargement Means Investing in Strategic Autonomy. And integrating the Western Balkans is key” in the framework of ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration which is supported by OSF-WB. 

Originally hailed as a possible “Helsinki Moment” for enlargement, this week’s Council Summit is unlikely to focus much on the issue. Work will continue in the Council and capitals in the coming months based on the long-awaited pre-enlargement policy reviews presented by the EU Commission on 6 October 2026 acknowledge the inherent connection between a bigger and a stronger Union. It will not be up to the Council to translate into practice suggestions for closer integration before accession and to prepare the EU itself.

European strategic autonomy risks remaining a buzzword if European leaders fail to understand it as a continent-wide strategic vision and not merely another EU-level policy and the Western Balkans as a key asset to include in their deliberations beyond the accession process. Locking the region into the EU is neither luxury nor charity – it is essential to the Union’s geopolitical actorness.

As can be seen in the current practice, candidates – with the possible exception of Ukraine in EU deliberations on common defence – are included in new initiatives most often as an afterthought rather than seeing their inclusion as a (geo-)strategic imperative. This is true for the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, as well as for the Democracy Shield. In the meantime, geopolitical competitors and adversaries are securing mining and defence contracts in countries like Serbia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, and North Macedonia while deepening strategic dependencies contrary to EU interests. This is a geopolitical lose-lose situation for the EU as it continues to miss opportunities to strengthen its strategic autonomy while its competitors increase their footprint on the continent. The more these trends persist and the longer Western Balkan countries remain outside the EU’s vision and policy debates, the more entrenched strategic dependencies will become and more difficult to reverse course. Evidently, anticipating enlargement strategically requires consultations beyond the EU to accomplish its purpose of European strategic autonomy.

You can read the policy brief here.

Zwei Wochen nach Einführung des Tankrabatts zieht Wettbewerbsexperte Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), Zwischenbilanz. Täglich verfolgt der Tankrabatt-Monitor des DIW Berlin die Preisentwicklung für Benzin und Diesel ...

The EU and Albania provisionally closedaccession negotiations on enterprise and industrial policy (chapter 20).

Eurogroup President Kyriakos Pierrakakis will represent the Eurogroup at the Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group in Bangkok, Thailand.

Council approves conclusions on inclusive democratic participation, and societal and community resilience.

The EU and Montenegro provisionally closed accession negotiations on economic and monetary policy (chapter 17), statistics (chapter 18) and social policy and employment (chapter 19).

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

The second annual EU-UK Summit after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will take place in Brussels on 20 November 2026.

The Council approved conclusions on the EU’s main negotiating positions ahead of the United Nations climate change (COP31) and biodiversity (COP17) summits.

President of the European Council, António Costa, delivered a speech at the opening session of the 24th edition of the European Week of Regions and Cities in Brussels, on 12 October 2026.

The Council adopted restrictive measures against three individuals and four entities supporting North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programmes and violating UN sanctions, including through Russia-DPRK cooperation.

The Council has established the EU Support Mission in Lebanon (EUSM Lebanon) to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces and support stability in the country.

Zwei Wochen nach Einführung des Tankrabatts zieht Wettbewerbsexperte Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), Zwischenbilanz. Täglich verfolgt der Tankrabatt-Monitor des DIW Berlin die Preisentwicklung für Benzin und Diesel an den Tankstellen.

Nach zwei Wochen Tankrabatt zeigt sich in unserem Tankrabatt-Monitor, dass nur rund zwei Drittel der Preissenkung von 16,7 Cent bei den Verbraucher*innen ankommen. Seit dem 1. Oktober sind die Preise in Deutschland im Durchschnitt um 10 bis 11 Cent je Liter stärker gesunken als in Frankreich, wo es keinen Rabatt gibt.

Noch deutlicher ist die Entwicklung über die Zeit. In den ersten Tagen sind die Preise um rund 12 Cent stärker gefallen als in Frankreich, beim Diesel um bis zu 13,6 Cent. Die Weitergabe ist über die Zeit kleiner geworden und liegt seit dem 8. Oktober bei durchschnittlich nur noch 9 Cent. Auch beim Tankrabatt im Frühjahr hat die sie mit der Zeit nachgelassen, damals allerdings erst gegen Ende.

Wie viel genau ankommt, hängt auch davon ab, welchen Tag vor dem Rabatt man als Referenzpunkt nimmt. Vergleicht man die Entwicklung mit dem 27. September statt mit dem 30. September, liegt die Weitergabe bei über 80 Prozent, da die Preise in Deutschland schon im September stärker gefallen sind als in Frankreich. An der Entwicklung seit dem 1. Oktober ändert der Vergleichstag aber nichts: Die Weitergabe nimmt ab.

Die Steuersenkung kommt zuerst bei Raffinerien und Großhändlern an. Ob sie weitergegeben wird, hängt vom Wettbewerb auf dieser Stufe ab. Und dort gibt es deutliche Hinweise, dass der Wettbewerb schwach ist. Das Bundeskartellamt sollte seine Untersuchungen auf der Raffinerie- und Großhandelsstufe konsequent fortführen, denn der dortige mangelnde Wettbewerb ist nicht nur in Zeiten des Tankrabatts ein Problem.

The escalation of conflict in the Middle East in 2026 and the disruptions affecting major maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb/Red Sea corridor, threaten global food security through higher energy, fertilizer, and shipping costs. We argue that the shock is more structural than previous crises because it simultaneously affects core agricultural inputs and trade routes, unlike the 2022 price spike in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which primarily caused temporary supply shortages. This has specially severe consequences for import-dependent economies in the Gulf area, Africa, and other low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). While energy price shocks can be transmitted relatively quickly to food markets through immediate changes in production and transportation costs, shipping cost and fertilizer price shocks tend to operate with longer adjustment lags because they propagate through physical supply chains and agricultural production processes. Prolonged energy market disruptions stemming from conflict around the Strait of Hormuz, together with tensions affecting Bab el-Mandeb, or future disruptions from (geo)political conflicts, entail the risk of trade policy responses and further market disturbances that could exacerbate the ongoing crisis. We highlight that rising prices for energy, shipping, and food are placing an immense strain on LMICs already burdened by heavy debt, limited access to finance, and inflationary pressure, with implications for food security and hunger.

The escalation of conflict in the Middle East in 2026 and the disruptions affecting major maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb/Red Sea corridor, threaten global food security through higher energy, fertilizer, and shipping costs. We argue that the shock is more structural than previous crises because it simultaneously affects core agricultural inputs and trade routes, unlike the 2022 price spike in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which primarily caused temporary supply shortages. This has specially severe consequences for import-dependent economies in the Gulf area, Africa, and other low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). While energy price shocks can be transmitted relatively quickly to food markets through immediate changes in production and transportation costs, shipping cost and fertilizer price shocks tend to operate with longer adjustment lags because they propagate through physical supply chains and agricultural production processes. Prolonged energy market disruptions stemming from conflict around the Strait of Hormuz, together with tensions affecting Bab el-Mandeb, or future disruptions from (geo)political conflicts, entail the risk of trade policy responses and further market disturbances that could exacerbate the ongoing crisis. We highlight that rising prices for energy, shipping, and food are placing an immense strain on LMICs already burdened by heavy debt, limited access to finance, and inflationary pressure, with implications for food security and hunger.

The escalation of conflict in the Middle East in 2026 and the disruptions affecting major maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb/Red Sea corridor, threaten global food security through higher energy, fertilizer, and shipping costs. We argue that the shock is more structural than previous crises because it simultaneously affects core agricultural inputs and trade routes, unlike the 2022 price spike in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which primarily caused temporary supply shortages. This has specially severe consequences for import-dependent economies in the Gulf area, Africa, and other low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). While energy price shocks can be transmitted relatively quickly to food markets through immediate changes in production and transportation costs, shipping cost and fertilizer price shocks tend to operate with longer adjustment lags because they propagate through physical supply chains and agricultural production processes. Prolonged energy market disruptions stemming from conflict around the Strait of Hormuz, together with tensions affecting Bab el-Mandeb, or future disruptions from (geo)political conflicts, entail the risk of trade policy responses and further market disturbances that could exacerbate the ongoing crisis. We highlight that rising prices for energy, shipping, and food are placing an immense strain on LMICs already burdened by heavy debt, limited access to finance, and inflationary pressure, with implications for food security and hunger.