ELIAMEP

This policy brief is authored by Dr. Isabelle Ioannides (Senior Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme – ELIAMEP) and published in the context of the project EMBRACing changE – Overcoming Obstacles and Advancing Democracy in the European Neighbourhood (EMBRACE). EMBRACE is a multi-country research initiative (2022–2025) that seeks to strengthen the capacity of EU policymakers and pro-democracy actors to develop effective strategies for democracy promotion across five regions: the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa. It combines comparative analysis, stakeholder engagement, and new data collection to identify the obstacles and enablers of democratisation and to design practical policy tools for European democracy promotion.

Focusing on Work Package 7 – The Geopolitics of EUDP, this policy brief addresses the turbulent geopolitical landscape in which EU democracy promotion must operate. Russia’s and China’s assertive roles, including disinformation campaigns, combine with heightened regional instability, conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the spread of polarisation and populism within and beyond Europe. These developments create a volatile environment that constrains democratic progress in the EU’s neighbourhood and, in some cases, drives democratic backsliding. The brief stresses that the EU’s democracy promotion cannot be viewed in isolation from these broader geopolitical dynamics.

Against this backdrop, the EMBRACE project organised scenario-building workshops in North Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia, and conducted stakeholder interviews in Algeria. These consultations had a twofold aim: to assess the democratic trajectories and risks facing each country by 2030, and to evaluate how the EU can mitigate challenges while reinforcing democratic enablers. The locally led approach ensured that country-specific insights and informal power dynamics were captured, helping to refine projections for how external and internal pressures may shape democracy in the coming years.

The brief concludes by offering recommendations for the EU to recalibrate its democracy promotion strategies under conditions of geopolitical competition and uncertainty. It underlines that effectiveness depends on tailoring approaches to local realities, anticipating risks through foresight and scenario planning, and reinforcing the EU’s credibility as a consistent and strategic actor. By integrating evidence-based insights and locally grounded perspectives, the policy brief contributes to EMBRACE’s broader mission of equipping the EU with more adaptive and resilient tools for advancing democracy in its neighbourhood.

Read the paper here in pdf.

The housing problem in Europe is linked to the trajectory from post-war de-commodification to the recent re-commodification and financialization of housing, which has made it increasingly unaffordable for the economically vulnerable. The European Union has launched numerous and diverse initiatives for affordable housing, which may have a significant impact despite their subsidiary role and the challenges they face.

In Greece, the housing question has followed a different path from that of the major countries of Western and Northern Europe. The post-war trajectory began with protective conditions for small market actors and, indirectly, for the wider public. These conditions gradually weakened, along with the housing systems they had supported (self-building and antiparochi), and were replaced by a major shift toward the market—most notably the entry of commercial banks into mortgage lending. Subsequently, the fiscal crisis, the gradual exit from it, the expansion of tourism, the influx of corporate and foreign capital into real estate, and the growth of short-term rentals created increasingly problematic conditions for those in need of affordable housing, particularly rental housing.

Measures introduced so far to address the housing crisis have been inadequate and ineffective, while the issue has now taken a central place in social and political debate in Greece for the first time.

Read here (in Greek) the policy paper by Thomas Maloutas, Researcher Emeritus, National Centre for Social Research (NCSR); Professor Emeritus of Geography, Harokopio University and Dimitra Siatitsa, PhD in Urban Planning, Postdoctoral Researcher National Technical University of Athens/National Centre for Social Research (NCSR).

This paper by Dr. Isabelle Ioannides, Senior Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP, is published in the context of the project EMBRACing changE – Overcoming Blockages and Advancing Democracy in the European Neighbourhood. EMBRACE is a multi-country research initiative that aims to enhance democracy promotion efforts in the EU’s neighbourhood by identifying key obstacles to democratisation and formulating evidence-based strategies to overcome them. The project draws on locally led research and stakeholder engagement across twelve case studies in five regions: the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa.

Focusing on Work Package 8 of the project, the report “Toolkit for EU decision-makers on the geopolitics of EU Democracy Promotion (EUDP)” outlines a conceptual design for a novel approach aimed at strengthening the EU’s ability to respond to democratic backsliding in its neighbourhood. Building on the EMBRACE project’s analysis of factors conducive to democratic opening, such as political structures, historical legacies, and the role of critical junctures, the paper proposes a shift from static and fragmented democracy promotion tools to a dynamic, adaptive, and context-specific system.

The report develops its blueprint based on findings from scenario-building workshops in North Macedonia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, as well as interviews with stakeholders in Algeria. These consultations interrogated the EU’s existing conceptual framework for democracy promotion and highlighted the need for locally grounded, evidence-based approaches. Central to the proposed Toolkit is a co-design process with local stakeholders, ensuring that EU policy instruments are informed by country-specific realities and informal power structures.

The paper underscores that the Toolkit’s added value lies in its integration of democracy measurement frameworks, data collection and management tools, foresight and forecasting methods, and alert and rapid response systems. These elements are conceived as part of a feedback loop where measurement informs foresight, foresight guides policy design, and outcomes feed back into continuous learning. In this way, the Toolkit leverages local expertise and EU instruments to achieve smarter and more resilient democratisation outcomes.

The report concludes that the EU’s democracy promotion efforts must evolve into a living, continuously adaptive system capable of moving from reactive responses to proactive strategies. By fostering country-specific customisation, local co-creation, and synergies across EU external action instruments, the proposed Toolkit offers a pathway to more effective and resilient democracy promotion both in the five case study countries and beyond.

Read the report here.

Spyros Blavoukos, Professor at the Athens University of Economics & Business; Head of ELIAMEP’s EU Institutions & Policies Programme and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP outline the broader framework of the EU defence cooperation, seeking to provide a concise overview of the Union’s key initiatives that shape its actions in the fields of defence (industrial) policy.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here (in Greek).

• The creation of additional fiscal space (NEC) and the provision of low cost lending (SAFE) of ReArm Europe will enhance Greece’s defence expenditures as well as demand for weapon systems throughout the EU.
• The Greek defence industry will exploit these growing opportunities due to its integration in pan-European supply chains, an outcome of the offset agreements of the 1990s and 2000s.
• With three additional policies the Greek defence industry can position itself with even greater effectiveness in this new environment.
• First, build further on the government’s ongoing energetic management of defence-related assets under state ownership, primarily with the exit of the Hellenic Aerospace Company from tight state control.
• Second, reform defence procurement so that the need for speed is addressed which is necessary for realizing Civil-Military Fusion (CMF), including through the transition of the Hellenic Court of Audit from ex ante to ex post review of defence procurement contracts.
• Third, strengthen the Hellenic Center for Defence Innovation (HCDI) with additional financial resources and appointment to its Board of distinguished Greek diaspora scientists so that HCDI can catalyse the participation of diaspora start-ups and diaspora scientific talent in the generation, by the Greek defence industry, of asymmetric force to counter the Turkish threat.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Antonis Kamaras, Research Associate, ELIAMEP.

The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Programme is the new EU financial instrument designed to allow EU Member States to speed up their defence readiness by enabling urgent and significant investments in support of the European defence industry, with a focus on filling critical gaps in capabilities and equipment. It is the first pillar of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 strategic plan that aims to unlock €800 billion in defence spending across the EU.[1]

SAFE will provide up to €150 billion in competitive long-maturity loans to Member States that request financial assistance for investments in defence capabilities. These loans will finance urgent and large-scale procurement processes, ensuring that Europe’s defence industry can deliver the requisite equipment.

The features expected of the submitted proposals

The proposals should be:

• Relevant to the defence capabilities of Member States and the EU (e.g. border protection, countering hybrid threats, protecting critical infrastructure, countering cyber warfare, etc.)
• For urgent, large-scale procurement efforts, not small projects
• Involve at least two Member States in a common procurement procedure
• However, requests from individual Member States can also be approved, but only if they are linked to an urgent need and broader geopolitical realities; the proposal must also be submitted on the basis of the timely procurement and delivery of critical assets[2] (for example, the need to procure drones to counter migration movements along routes experiencing a significant increase in traffic, or systems to protect critical infrastructure from potential terrorist threats linked to the situation in the Middle East, could be supported). This is a temporary exception with an initial duration of one year.
• In addition, no more than 35% of the cost of the products’ manufacturing components can originate from outside the EU, EEA-EFTA, or Ukraine, while the countries of origin must meet the conditions set out in the Programme Regulations.

What will SAFE fund?

Category 1:

• Ammunition and missiles
• Artillery systems, including deep-precision strike capabilities
• Ground combat capabilities and their support systems, including soldier equipment and infantry weapons
• Small drones (NATO 1 class[3]) and related anti-drone systems
• Systems and equipment for critical infrastructure protection
• Cyber defence and cyber security systems
• Military mobility, including counter-mobility

Category 2:

• Air and missile defence systems
• Maritime surface and underwater capabilities
• Drones other than small drones (NATO-2 and NATO-3 class) and related anti-drone systems
• Strategic enablers such as, but not limited to, strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, C4ISTAR systems (Command, Communications, Information, Control, etc.), as well as space assets and services
• Space asset protection systems
• Artificial intelligence and electronic warfare systems

Countries that have expressed an interest in participating in SAFE and a Timeline for the Next Steps

By 29 July 2025, when the Programme’s first key deadline expired, 19 Member States had expressed an interest in accessing loans through the SAFE mechanism, with potential defence purchases of at least €127 billion.

The Member States in question are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

The following resources have been tentatively allocated to the Member States as follows:

Member-State Allocation of Resources (€) Belgium 8,340,027,698 Bulgaria 3,261,700,000 Croatia 1,700,000,000 Cyprus 1,181,503,924 Czech Republic 2,060,000,000 Denmark 46,796,822 Estonia 2,660,932,171 Finland 1,000,000,000 France 16,216,720,524 Greece 787,669,283 Hungary 16,216,720,524 Italy 14,900,000,000 Latvia 5,680,431,322 Lithuania 6,375,487,840 Poland 43,734,100,805 Portugal 5,841,179,332 Romania 16,680,055,394 Slovakia 2,316,674,361 Spain 1,000,000,000

 

30 November 2025 Submission of National Defence Investment Plans

January 2026 Adoption of Council Implementing Decisions

February 2026: Negotiation of loan agreements and operational arrangements, triggering pre-financing.

In search of a European strategic culture and interoperability: Behind the Lines

1. The Programme is part of the EU’s overall strategy on the indivisibility of external and internal security—a strategy which informs every strategic and institutional document it produces in relation to internal and foreign policy. SAFE follows in the wake of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, but also the intensification of hybrid threats. It is therefore to be expected that it bears the imprint of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well Moscow’s hybrid attacks against Ukraine and its hybrid operations against EU Member States. Apart from blurring the lines between war and peace—which is a key characteristic of hybrid threats in general—, the specific threat posed by Russia highlights the extent to which internal security is now significantly threatened by a malicious external actor, which can also be a state. This constitutes a further significant change in the recognition and assessment of threats.
2. The main threats that can be addressed through projects submitted to SAFE for funding extend beyond military attack by a hostile nation to include hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, the weaponization of migration and mass border breaches, terrorist attacks, malicious acts, and the sabotaging of critical infrastructure. Which is to say, precisely those threats that are stressed in the broader strategic and political philosophy underpinning the new EU defence policy, mainly via the White Paper on European Defence Preparedness 2030.
3. This works in tandem with the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, which sets out an integrated approach to every threat to the Union’s preparedness for conflict, anthropogenic and natural disasters and crises, the White Paper on European Defence Preparedness 2030, and the Internal Security Strategy: Protecting the EU.
4. SAFE emphasizes investment in the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure/entities, cyberspace, borders, transport, supply chains, information and communication technologies, as well as space investments, technologies and facilities. It is worth noting that most Member States are in the process of transposing the Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities into national law and developing related strategies.
5. SAFE is a Programme that can further enhance interoperability between the armed and security forces, as well as dual use in the defence / security / civil protection sectors in line with the framework put in place by the EU Preparedness Union Strategy to prevent and react to emerging threats and crises—in particular those in the areas of hybrid threats, border protection, the resilience of critical infrastructure, and cyber security.
6. It can act as a bottom-up catalyst for the emergence of a European strategic culture in both threat identification and investment planning; for the creation of collaborative economies of scale; and for the increased interoperability of assets and systems on the basis of a common European defence capability. This procedure has been followed in other cases where there were difficulties reaching an agreement at the Council level—for example, in the prevention of radicalization. However, there is always the risk that the absence of a statutory coordinating body could lead to fragmented proposals that simply reproduce the various strategic cultures and assessments of risk. Let’s hope that this time, the glass is half-full.

 

[1] For details on SAFE, see the relevant EXPLAINER by S. Blavoukas and P. Politis-Lamprou at https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/EXPLAINER-4-EL.pdf. More generally, on the European Defence Fund and the EU Defence Industrial Ecosystem, see S. Blavoukos; P. Politis-Lamprou and G. Matsoukas at https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Policy-paper-182-Blavoukos-Politis-Matsoukas-FINAL-EL.pdf

[2] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/safe-security-action-europe_en

[3] The classification is based on their weight and the altitude they can reach under normal conditions. Specifically, they are:
Class I: small>20 kg; mini 2-20 kg, micro<2kg
Class II: 150-600 kg (regular)
Class III: >600 kg with three subcategories (strike, HALE, MALE).
On the categories, and more generally on NATO’s approach to unmanned aerial vehicles, see Joint Air Power Competence Centre https://www.japcc.org/

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for August 2025.

On August 4, 2025, the Greek Minister of Environment and Energy, Stavros Papastavrou, met with the new Chargé d’Affaires at the US Embassy in Athens, Josh Huck, to discuss energy cooperation between Greece and the US and electricity interconnection projects in the Eastern Mediterranean. Papastavrou said that the discussion focused on energy cooperation, the South-North Vertical Gas Corridor, the utilization of infrastructure for American LNG in Revithoussa and Alexandroupolis, and the keen interest in electricity interconnection projects in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On the same day, a statement released by the American Hellenic Chamber of Commerce on the recent EU-US Trade Deal noted that the deal may present important opportunities for Greece. As it is specifically noted in the statement: “As a member of both the EU and NATO, and as a growing logistics, energy, and digital hub in Southeastern Europe, Greece stands to benefit significantly from the strengthening of transatlantic trade ties. In fact, improved market access, increased regulatory coordination, and the prospect of expanded zero-for-zero tariff arrangements can translate into tangible results for Greek exporters, investors, and technology-driven sectors”.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a call with Prime Minister of Greece Kyriakos Mitsotakis on August 8 regarding the strategic importance of US–Greece energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. During the call, Secretary Rubio reaffirmed the continued strength of the United States’ bilateral relationship with Greece and its role as a key NATO Ally.

At the same time, Greece and the United States are in talks to revise their Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), a move that could see the establishment of two new bases for US forces in mainland Greece and a significant expansion of the American military footprint in the country. The ongoing negotiations are also focused on upgrading existing facilities. The US will remain in the strategic northeastern port of Alexandroupoli and is set to spend $42 million to upgrade its naval base at Souda Bay in Crete. According to officials, the two new locations being considered for US forces are the Petrochori firing range in the western Peloponnese and the Dalipis Army Base near Thessaloniki.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

ELIAMEP and the Institute of Global Affairs of The American College of Greece (ACG) organised the 5th Summer Academy titled “Leadership Beyond Boundaries: Empowering the Next Generation of Mediterranean Leaders”, which took place at the premises of the International Olympic Academy from Monday, July 14 2025, to Saturday, July 19 2025. In total, the 5th ELIAMEP-ACG Summer Academy brought together 29 participants (emerging leaders from various fields) and 21 distinguished speakers from 19 countries across the Mediterranean, Europe, and Asia, to discuss critical issues concerning the Mediterranean. The Summer Academy included lectures, discussions as well as trainings in negotiations and public speaking & media. The report of the 5th Summer Academy is available here. The agenda and the list of speakers and staff members who contributed to the 5th Summer Academy are available here.

Emmanuella Doussis, Professor, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head of the Climate and Sustainability Programme and Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP

Guterres’ recent report and speech to the General Assembly present clean energy as a reality, and one which must not and cannot be held back. It is already creating growth, jobs and energy security, and billions of dollars are being channelled into the green transition. Renewable energy sources are now more cost-effective than fossil fuels, and new renewable energy capacity is outstripping conventional fuels on every continent. However, progress is not fast enough and, still more crucially, not fair enough. Africa and developing countries receive only a small share of the global funding, while fossil fuel subsidies continue.

The General Assembly can serve as a key forum for cooperation, even amidst geopolitical antagonisms, as environmental and climate issues are, and must increasingly be, perceived as peace and security issues. Multilateral alliances (G77, LDCs, AOSIS), as well as regional blocs like the EU, often play an active role in helping build majorities, making concerted demands, and putting pressure on major powers that often act unilaterally (e.g. China, the US, Russia), as well as on other polluting states. The General Assembly’s unanimous decision to consult the International Court of Justice on states’ obligations with regard to climate change has recently led to a landmark opinion relating to the international law governing the response to the phenomenon. Although non-binding, the opinion could shape practice and open the way for appeals, in particular from the countries most affected by climate change. So, while the General Assembly does not produce legally-binding texts directly, its actions can produce important results indirectly. Which is to say the General Assembly can keep the debate around the green transition in the spotlight and act as a catalyst for multilateral cooperation, especially in areas where convergences and potential partnerships (should) transcend geopolitical divisions.

Maria Gavouneli, Professor, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Member of the Board, ELIAMEP

There is a short answer: none at all! The General Assembly has always been a forum for big words and little action. Over the decades, we have had a series of declarations and statements that rarely translate into binding obligations for UN member states, and then only after their content has been transposed in treaties or monitoring and accountability mechanisms as a result of difficult and often lengthy negotiations. Lately, even texts that formerly would have been adopted by consensus have been subject to complicated and lengthy voting processes.
The longer answer is, of course, different and more involved. It is on the sidelines of the General Assembly, in the UN’s corridors of power, that the big issues are discussed and often decided. While world leaders read their prepared monologues in turn, it is the organized meetings in smaller chambers—and ad hoc huddles—that can make the difference. This is especially true in times like the present, when simply setting-up a session is problematic, even before one considers the agenda and items ranging from the Middle East ceasefire and the peace plan in Ukraine to energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the resolution of bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey. Truth be told, this has always been where the General Assembly, and the UN in general, has made its most important contributions.

Mihalis Kritikos, Adjunct Professor, School of Governance, University of Brussels; Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

The UN is back: the example of artificial intelligence

Amidst a frantic and ever-escalating geopolitical rivalry in the sphere of technology, artificial intelligence is redefining the dynamics of global power while its governance has become the subject of hundreds of separate initiatives. Given this somewhat fragmented landscape, the recent decision by the UN General Assembly to create two new mechanisms to promote international cooperation in AI governance—the UN Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and the Global Dialogue on AI Governance—is especially important. There are three reasons for this:

First, because the UN is setting out to create a global platform for dialogue that will give developing countries an equal voice in shaping the future of AI, while aligning the discourse with the ambitions of the Global South. Second, because the resolution seeks to put in place a framework based on a human-centred approach to AI that promotes the transparency and social utility of the technology. And third, because it sends a powerful signal to the world that the UN remains capable of achieving convergence and laying the foundations for a common framework to address the challenges of a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

If the scientific independence of the committee and the multilateralism of the global dialogue are safeguarded, then the future global governance of this influential technology will be in safe hands.

Panayotis Tsakonas, Professor, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head, Foreign Policy & Security Programme, ELIAMEP

The retreat of multilateralism, the systematic erosion and/or removal of international norms/rules, and the ascendancy of the logic of power in inter-state relations that followed Trump’s election and have largely been imposed by the United States is expected to detract markedly from the Great Powers’ ability to cooperate in a meaningful and effective way at the upcoming 85th General Assembly of the United Nations. There, the United States (the strongest but least legitimate part of a divided—if not fragmented—West), an ever-stronger China, which is already working towards building an enlarged anti-Western coalition, the dynamically “anti-Western” Russia, and India, the most populous nation in the world, are expected to reaffirm their positions and roles in the new and continually evolving “post-Western” world.

In this world, however, several “non-aligned” countries will, for reasons of pragmatism and self-interest, may choose not to place themselves under the “protection” or control of the US, China or Russia. These non-aligned nations, which include most of the almost forty that did not condemn Russia’s invasion at the UN General Assembly in March 2022 and February 2023, not only do not form a distinct bloc (a “Global South”), they are often in conflict with one another.

The scope for cooperation between the Great Powers within the framework of the UN General Assembly will therefore be curtailed, with the few areas of potential cooperation limited to “global goods” such as the climate, health and/or development, and global security problems such as international terrorism, organized crime, unregulated AI development, and the uncontrolled militarization of space. The Great Powers may find themselves cooperating on these issues, either because they recognize the cost of non-cooperation, or because their interests largely converge. Moreover, the prospect of China, Russia, India, and a number of other medium- and small-sized states forging alliances in one or more of these domains cannot be discounted. Formed under an “anti-Western banner” at the forthcoming UN General Assembly, they may seek to create and promote new international principles and norms.

Dimitris Tsarouhas, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University; Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

To mark the UN’s annual assembly, the organization released a shocking report that accurately describes the state of the international community 80 years on from its founding. In 2024, military spending soared to 2.7 trillion dollars, an amount more than 13 times higher (!) than the official development aid provided by wealthy nations, and 750 times the UN’s regular budget.

Many member states are either actively engaged in, or preparing for, military conflict. The window for saving the UN mission is closing, even though its good offices are needed now more than at any other time since the end of the Cold War.

 

 

 

Domestic economic inequalities have now reached very high levels in both the developed and developing world. This study explores their impacts, their future prospects, as well as the main redistributive policies proposed to mitigate them. It finds, on the one hand, the increasing trend and explosive dynamics of economic inequalities, and on the other hand, the ineffectiveness of the proposed redistributive policies. If we want to curb the increasing inequality trends of the modern world and limit their adverse effects on the economy and society, we must devise new tools for redistributing wealth. I would like to propose such a tool here. I call it “voluntary taxes with benefits”.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Dimitris Konstadellis, Teacher of Economic Sciences in Secondary Education, Author.

Spyros Blavoukos, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business

& Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

The content of the Commission President’s speech is inevitably connected to the current year’s action programme, but it must also respond to international developments.

This year, the Commission is focusing on two main pillars: the competitiveness of the European economy, and the strengthening of European security and defence. With regard to the first, the EU is aiming to speed up the simplification of procedures, and the development of strategies, aimed at improving European competitiveness. Preparing the productive base for the challenges (and opportunities) presented by globalization, digitization and the green transition was a key point of last year’s State of the Union address, in which the President presented her vision for her second term of office to the plenary of the European Parliament. In relation to the second pillar, the White Paper on the future of European defence and the plan to rearm Europe, of which the SAFE Regulation is an integral part, have dominated the effort to consolidate European security. The main priority and common denominator remains the creation of a coherent framework for the development of European defence capabilities that will help the bloc achieve the strategic autonomy it seeks.

International developments—with the return of President Trump and the (neo)-protectionism he advocates, the continuing need to support Ukrainian resistance, but also the volatility of the global geo-economic and geopolitical environment—require similar objectives for the EU and the Commission. The two aforementioned pillars are thus expected to dominate von der Leyen’s speech this year. However, security is not limited to its military dimension. It is also linked to European society’s preparedness in the face of various forms of crises, the diversification of supply chains, energy autonomy, economic growth, and the resilience of democratic institutions and values—all of which are expected to emerge as priorities for the next programming period. The Union’s new (existential?) narrative is therefore taking shape around a “comprehensive defence” in which security and defence cut across every aspect of its internal policies, from energy to social cohesion, and the implementation of the proposals in the Letta and Draghi reports is a key priority to prevent the EU becoming the “grass that’s trampled when elephants fight”.

Alekos Kritikos, Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP; Former senior official, European Commission; former Secretary General, Ministry of the Interior

This year’s State of the Union address by the Commission President will be delivered at a juncture when Europe is seemingly being reduced ever more to the role of an observer of global developments rather than a protagonist in them. The Trump system’s dismissive treatment of the EU and the Shanghai summit are just two examples that point to this being the case.

The EU’s room for manoeuvre has narrowed dishearteningly—if it has not already been eradicated entirely—and it is of existential importance that the Union take immediate and comprehensive action. Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech should respond to this need by adopting the proposals made in the Letta and Draghi reports, and summarized afresh in Mario Draghi’s recent speech at the Rimini meeting, without further delay, hesitation or pettiness.

The completion of the internal market, the boosting of EU competitiveness, the development of a wide-ranging industrial policy, the unification of Europe’s capital markets, the pursuit of strategic and defence autonomy, the coordinated Research and Technology development, and the ongoing promotion of economic and social cohesion are the most fundamental, and there are certainly others of crucial importance. The implementation of these proposals will need to be accompanied by the defence of democratic values and the European social model, and by an immigration policy which, while respecting European values, preserves social cohesion while also helping the EU secure the human resources it needs for its economic and demographic growth. All of this will be very hard to achieve, however, unless it is accompanied by a bold political and institutional reorganization of the EU, leading to new forms of European integration.

On 10 September, we will know whether the European Commission has got the message.

Stella Ladi, Panteion University and Queen Mary University of London; Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

In the annual State of the Union address by the Commission President, we should focus not only on what is said, but also on what is left unsaid. The tense international situation, with its multiple conflicts but especially those in Gaza and Ukraine, and the new transatlantic (im)balance make it near certain that the common defence and security of Europe will be the main theme. And we would expect our partnerships and trade relations to figure centrally—those with Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, now that it is clear the EU needs to diversify and expand its trading networks. However, the most interesting question will be how much emphasis is placed on the two former flagships of European policy: the green economy and the regulation of new technologies and artificial intelligence. Because this year more than any other, the audience will not only be European citizens; it will also be the President of the United States, who would like to see backpeddling on both. It is critical for Europe’s dignity and global credibility that these priorities remain centre-stage, even if only at the symbolic level of this annual address.

Elena Lazarou, Director General, ELIAMEP

2025 finds the European Union facing external challenges and the threat of internal rifts. The annual State of the Union address by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, is an opportunity to chart a strategic course, but also to reinforce the conviction that the Union can respond to the political, economic, social and geopolitical challenges of our times.

At the heart of the speech is the long-term budget (2028-2034), which is causing political tensions between member states, agricultural and industrial interests, and political groups. Von der Leyen will be seeking to balance liberal and green priorities and issues such as re-industrialisation, social cohesion and immigration, and will also voice support for the proposed (enhanced) budget, with its added flexibility.

The key points of the speech, however, will relate to foreign policy: support for Ukraine and the need to strengthen European defence. Presenting a targeted plan for transatlantic relations will pose a major challenge to the Commission President, as the recent EU-US trade agreement has already come in for harsh criticism from many parts of the EU.

The President will reaffirm the importance of democracy and the international legal order, as well as the need for the EU to support both in an era in which anti-democratic forces are on the rise and international and humanitarian law is breaking down.

The European Union is presented with a choice: advance towards strategic autonomy and unity, or be immobilized by internal contradictions and external coercion.

Manos Matsaganis, Professor, Polytechnic University of Milan; Head of ELIAMEP’s Greek and European Economy Programme

The threats Europe is currently facing have no precedent in its 80-year history.

Some may have arrived suddenly, but their roots run deep: Russian aggression, American antipathy, Chinese expansionism, conflict in the Middle East.

Others are the product of internal weaknesses that were not addressed in time, and have now festered: economic sluggishness, an innovation deficit, ageing populations, institutional inertia, political fragmentation.

Their combined impact means that our children and our children’s children are at risk of growing up in a continent that is vulnerable and insecure, unable to defend itself, with an obsolete economy, stagnant living standards, and angry societies.

The train of events that would make this a grim reality can be easily described. A Le Pen (or Bardella) victory in the 2027 presidential elections puts France on a collision course with the EU, while simultaneously paralyzing any attempt at a coherent European response. In the confusion that follows, each country tries to salvage what it can. I leave it to the reader’s imagination to work out what this might mean for Estonia, or for Denmark (and — why not? — for Cyprus or Greece).

The alternative scenario begins with the acknowledgement that no country can go it alone. This implies the need for close cooperation in defence, the economy, and immigration. It isn’t the likeliest scenario. It will be politically demanding. But it is the only thing that can save us from worse trouble ahead.

 

 

Ursula von der Leyen’s second term at the helm of the European Commission is structured around seven thematic priorities that reflect the executive branch’s effort to integrate diverse policy areas in pursuit of the prosperity of the European citizenry. The Commission’s 2025 Work Programme introduces 51 new initiatives and places particular emphasis on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden, highlighting the shift towards “a faster and simpler Union”. At the same time, there is a clear tendency for the EU to assume a more active role in policy domains where supranational involvement has traditionally been limited. For Greece, both the Union’s achievements to date and its forthcoming actions have a direct impact on key national sectors. Meanwhile, the Greek government is preparing for the decisive role it will play in the negotiations on the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034.

• The forthcoming State of the European Union address, though generally framed in broad terms, provides a clear indication of the EU’s trajectory for member states, citizens, businesses, and external partners, enabling them to adapt and align with upcoming initiatives.
• It is not merely a stock-taking exercise; rather, it represents a critical test of credibility, as it will raise the question of whether and to what extent the Commission can translate its announcements and ambitions into tangible measures. The shift from theory to action will determine both the Commission’s institutional credibility and citizens’ trust in the European project.
• At the same time, the new structure of the Commission will also come under scrutiny. Nine months after the creation of new portfolios within the College of Commissioners, it remains to be assessed whether these have delivered on their intended functions.
• Greece, holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2027, will be at the forefront of negotiations that will determine the scope of financial instruments across all policy areas. For Athens, the challenge will be not only to forge common ground among member states but also to advance its own national priorities.

The article is authored by Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Ursula von der Leyen’s second term at the helm of the European Commission is structured around seven thematic priorities, based on the political guidelines she presented before the European Parliament in July 2024. The priorities for the 2024–2029 period are as follows: sustainable prosperity and competitiveness, European defense and security, supporting people, strengthening societies and the social model, preserving quality of life, protecting democracy and safeguarding values, Europe in the world, and preparing the Union for the future.

The 2025 Work Programme was published in February 2025 and is organized around these political priorities, while also taking into account the guidelines and mission letters assigned to members of the College of Commissioners. In total, it introduces 51 new initiatives, at least 18 of which are legislative. Particular emphasis is placed on simplification, with more than 60% of the legislative proposals falling within this scope. The Commission President has repeatedly stressed the urgent need to reduce administrative burden and simplify legislation. In her political guidelines, she explicitly referred to her vision of “a faster and simpler Union.”

In view of this year’s State of the Union address, during which Ursula von der Leyen is expected to present the achievements of the College of Commissioners since taking office (1 December 2024), attention now turns to the analysis of the policies to be advanced in the near future. The address, though generally framed in broad terms, provides a clear indication of the EU’s trajectory for member states, citizens, businesses, and external partners, enabling them to adapt and align with forthcoming actions.

While awaiting the address, it is useful to examine what has been achieved so far. This analysis is structured around the Commission’s political priorities and presents illustrative examples of its most significant actions from December 2024 to the present. These actions have taken different forms (e.g. legislative proposal, strategy, action plan, roadmap, etc.), depending on the political maturity and objectives of each initiative.[1]

The analysis then turns to the Greek perspective on both the Commission’s achievements and its planned actions. The final section looks ahead to what can be expected in this year’s State of the Union address. 

Sustainable Prosperity and Competitiveness

Mario Draghi’s September 2024 report served as the foundation for the Competitiveness Compass, published at the end of January 2025. In short, the Compass sets out how the Union can: (a) strengthen innovation, (b) shift towards cleaner and more affordable energy, and (c) diversify its supply chains. In this direction, the Commission has released a series of strategies and other documents (e.g. the Clean Industrial Deal in February, the Startup and Scaleup Strategy and the Single Market Strategy in May, and the Quantum Europe Strategy in July). As expected, however, a considerable share of the Commission’s output consists of (proposals for) legislative initiatives aimed at simplification. In particular, six “Omnibus” packages covering a wide range of policy areas have been tabled. Moreover, the political agreement in principle reached in the trade negotiations with four MERCOSUR states (December 2024) underscores the Union’s continued commitment to promoting free and mutually beneficial trade. As shown in Table I, proposals for six legislative initiatives, one strategy, and one plan are expected to be submitted later this year.

Table I: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (sustainable prosperity and competitiveness)

Type Title Legislative proposal Revision of the Sustainable Finance Disclosures Regulation Legislative proposal Digital Package Legislative proposal European Business Wallet Legislative proposal Accelerating industrial decarbonisation Legislative proposal Revision of the REACH Regulation (on chemicals) Legislative proposal Digital Networks Strategy/Legislative proposal Bioeconomy Strategy Plan Sustainable Transport Investment Plan

 

European Defense and Security

European defense and security have become a top priority for the Commission due, among other factors, to the war in Ukraine, broader Russian assertiveness, and U.S. disengagement from Europe. In this adverse geopolitical environment, Ursula von der Leyen created the portfolio of the Commissioner for Defense and Space, signaling the importance of this new dimension. The Commission subsequently announced the White Paper on the Future of European Defense and the “ReArm Europe” plan, which could channel up to €800 billion into strengthening Europe’s defense readiness.

Beyond strictly military initiatives, the Union appears to be embracing the ideas of the Niinistö’s Report of October 2024 and promoting strategies linked to the concept of “total defense.” Within this framework, the Preparedness Union Strategy, the proposal for a Critical Medicines Act, the Medical Countermeasures Strategy, the Stockpiling Strategy, combined with the Internal Security Strategy, the proposal for a Common European System for Returns, and the Action Plan on Cybersecurity for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers, all aim to provide a holistic safety net against multiple threats. Preparedness has thus become a central concern within the European family. In several national capitals, discussions are underway on reviving military conscription, moving towards a Scandinavian-style “total defense” model combining military and civilian dimensions. While the implementation of the SAFE Regulation appears to be the Commission’s main priority, Table II presents the three initiatives expected to be announced in the near term.

Table II: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (European defense and security)

Type Title Legislative proposal New rules on drug precursors Legislative proposal Firearms Trafficking Directive Strategy Migration and Asylum Strategy Supporting People, Strengthening Societies and the Social Model

The cost of living, social inequalities, and the center–periphery divide have undermined the European way of life, while the modern era demands new skills for businesses and workers to adapt to evolving circumstances. With the aim of reinforcing the European social model, the Commission launched the Union of Skills in March, designed to upgrade citizens’ skills and enable the Union to attract and retain talent in critical sectors within its borders. Although the 2025 Work Programme does not include new initiatives on the housing crisis, the Commission President has pledged to: (a) present a plan for affordable housing, and (b) cooperate with the European Investment Bank to establish an investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing.[2] By the end of the year, three initiatives are expected to be published to strengthen the social dimension, as indicated in Table III.

Table III: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (supporting people, strengthening societies and the social model)

Type Title Action Plan European Pillar of Social Rights Roadmap Quality Jobs Agenda Consumer Agenda 2030 Preserving Quality of Life

Agriculture is considered an integral part of the European way of life. Its support is a prerequisite for the Union’s sustainable growth and competitiveness. With the goals of food self-sufficiency and support for the food value chain, the Commission has placed particular emphasis on simplifying the procedures of the Common Agricultural Policy, while announcing the Vision for Agriculture and Food (February) to make farming and food sectors more attractive to young people. At the same time, the Commission has tabled a proposal to amend the European Climate Law (July), seeking to establish a 2040 climate target. Finally, the Ocean Pact and the Water Resilience Strategy, both announced in June 2025, aim to boost the blue economy and protect water resources, whose resilience “is regarded by the EU as a matter of security and crisis preparedness”. According to the current Work Programme, no new initiatives are expected in this policy area.

Protecting Democracy and Safeguarding Values

At a time when liberal democracy is under challenge, strengthening democratic resilience and societal preparedness are key objectives for the Commission. Furthermore, the defense and reinforcement of the rule of law remain a central duty of the EU’s executive branch as the “guardian of the Treaties.” In this context, the Roadmap for Women’s Rights (March) seeks to eliminate gender-based violence and ensure equal treatment of women. By year’s end, three initiatives are expected to be presented, as shown in Table IV.

Table IV: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (protecting democracy and safeguarding values)

Type Title Communication European Democracy Shield[3] Strategy Strategy to Support, Protect and Empower Civil Society Strategy Equality Strategies for LGBTIQ and Anti-Racism Europe in the World

As the international environment grows increasingly dangerous and hostile to EU interests, the European family must be able to leverage its strength and build meaningful partnerships with like-minded actors. Accordingly, the Union unveiled its Black Sea Strategy (March), built on three pillars: (a) security, (b) sustainable development and connectivity, and (c) environment and preparedness. Beyond the eastern flank, however, the Union is also placing emphasis on its southern neighborhood, as evidenced by the creation of a dedicated Mediterranean portfolio within the College of Commissioners and the establishment of a new Directorate-General for the Middle East (DG MENA). At the same time, preparations for the announcement of a Mediterranean Pact and the development of a coherent Middle East strategy reflect the Union’s clear interest in its southern dimension. Additionally, the EU is seeking to deepen ties with other regions across the globe, illustrated by the growing number of security and defense partnerships.[4] In the field of transatlantic relations, the Union reached an agreement with President Trump in July 2025 on tariff levels, while also striving to secure U.S. support for any future peace-monitoring mission in Ukraine. Table V presents the two initiatives expected to be announced shortly.

Table V: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (Europe in the world)

Type Title Pact Pact for the Mediterranean Joint Communication EU–India Preparing the Union for the Future

One of the Commission’s most significant priorities is the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034. Early preparation of the proposal ensures stability and predictability in the Union’s resources. According to the Commission’s proposal, the new budget will approach €2 billion, representing on average 1.26% of the EU’s Gross National Income per year. The innovation lies in structuring the funds around four pillars: (a) national and regional partnership plans, including cohesion and agricultural policy; (b) cross-cutting programmes and instruments, such as EU funds; (c) external dimension and Common Foreign and Security Policy; and (d) European public administration. At the same time, the Commission is expected to table proposals to prepare the Union for potential enlargement.

The Greek Perspective: Priorities and Challenges

For Greece, the Union’s actions have a direct impact on key national sectors. In the field of security and defense, Athens supports the new European initiatives and, in July 2025, formally submitted a request for loans worth at least €1.2 billion under the SAFE Regulation, seeking to bolster its defense capabilities through low-interest borrowing. Nonetheless, certain contentious issues remain, the most sensitive being the partial involvement of the Turkish defense industry in European schemes. Regarding the Union’s interaction with third actors, Greece seeks closer cooperation with like-minded partners while promoting stability in relations with the United States for both strategic and trade reasons. The Black Sea Strategy holds particular significance for Greece, as it explicitly states that “it proposes multiple avenues to forge closer cooperation with… Turkey,” highlighting that coordinated engagement with the neighboring country is “important” and that Turkey is “an EU partner of strategic importance.” At the same time, Greece aims to draw the attention of other member states to regions that have been partly sidelined due to the war in Ukraine, such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which directly affect the Union’s overall policy agenda (e.g. the war in Gaza and the crisis in the Red Sea).

With regard to preserving quality of life, as a coastal state with a strong shipping and fisheries sector, Greece is particularly interested in the sustainability of oceans and the management of marine resources, in cooperation with Cyprus and the Cypriot Commissioner responsible. The agricultural sector also remains crucial, especially amid growing pressures. As a predominantly agricultural country, Greece advocates for policies that will support farmers’ incomes during this difficult period. Transport is likewise a Greek priority, with an emphasis on safe and sustainable networks, reflected in the country’s strong interest in key positions both in the College of Commissioners and in the European Parliament. In the field of tourism, Greece, as a major tourist destination, looks forward to the European strategy for sustainable tourism, which is expected to include proposals to enhance the sector’s resilience and competitiveness. Finally, the housing crisis is becoming one of the most pressing social challenges in Europe. In Greece, it creates a suffocating environment for young people and the middle class, both struggling to cope with housing costs. As a key factor of social cohesion and demographic stability, Athens is keen to see whether the Commission will advance more targeted housing policies, drawing also on EU financial instruments.

All of these political priorities are closely linked to the issue of the new MFF 2028–2034. Greece, holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2027, will be at the forefront of negotiations that will determine the scope of funding across all the aforementioned policy areas. For Athens, the challenge will be not only to find common ground among member states but also to advance its own priorities.

What Lies Ahead?

The multitude of initiatives launched by the Commission may be welcomed as a sign of dynamism and an eagerness to act across key policy domains. However, the central question is not the announcement of new strategies, but their timely and effective implementation. The shift from theory to practice will ultimately determine the credibility of the institutions and citizens’ trust in the Union. In this context, the role of member states becomes pivotal.

Against this backdrop, this year’s State of the Union address will not merely be a stock-taking exercise, but rather a “credibility test.” The key question will be whether, and to what extent, the Commission can turn its ambitions into concrete action for the Union’s collective good. At the same time, the new structure of the Commission will also come under scrutiny. The creation of the two new portfolios for Defense and Space, and for the Mediterranean signals the Union’s evolving priorities in critical sectors and regions where its previous contribution and involvement were comparatively limited. Nine months after their establishment, it will be assessed whether these portfolios have delivered on their intended r

[1] As provided by the Treaties (Article 17 TEU), the European Commission holds the “right of initiative” and is responsible for proposing new EU legislation in policy areas where it has competence. For such proposals to acquire the force of secondary law, they must be adopted either through the ordinary legislative procedure or a special legislative procedure. In parallel, there are non-legally binding acts that serve as documents outlining political direction in specific areas. These carry less weight than legislative acts (which are adopted by the European Parliament and/or the Council of the EU), as they primarily express the Commission’s views. Although they emerge following consultations with stakeholders and member states, these may not fully endorse the same positions (or their exact implementation). Strategies, usually framed as “communications” to other institutions, set out the Commission’s stance and priorities on specific issues. Action Plans, Pacts, and Roadmaps generally fall into this same category.

[2] In December 2024, the European Parliament established a temporary Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU, tasked with examining the causes of the current crisis and submitting specific proposals to address it.

[3] In December 2024, the European Parliament decided to create a Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield to assess existing and planned legislation and policies. According to an EPRS briefing, the communication is “widely expected to be postponed”.

[4] The EU currently has security and defense partnerships with eight partners (Albania, North Macedonia, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Moldova, Norway, and South Korea).

The REACH National Consultation Report for Greece presents the outcomes of a series of citizen dialogues held in Athens and Thessaloniki, culminating in a national consultation on 5 May 2025. Citizens from diverse backgrounds came together with experts and stakeholders to deliberate on the future of Greece and Europe, addressing key themes of rule of law, European integration, and environmental sustainability.

The report sets out ten policy proposals, ranging from Erasmus-style exchange programmes for schools and national media literacy initiatives to local youth environmental groups and a stronger focus on LGBTQIA+ rights in the curriculum. These recommendations reflect citizens’ aspirations for a more inclusive, transparent, and participatory Europe, while also highlighting national challenges and opportunities for change. The project has demonstrated the potential of citizen engagement to inspire policy at both national and European levels, offering innovative solutions and reinforcing trust in democratic institutions.

You can read the report here.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for July 2025.

The Trump administration’s nominee for the next U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, fielded questions at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing on July 9. The Committee has approved the nomination of Kimberly Guilfoyle to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Greece, with 13 to 9 in favor of advancing Guilfoyle’s nomination. The nomination now heads to the full Senate for a final confirmation vote.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini), the U.S. has increased its use of key military facilities in Greece, including the strategically located Souda Bay and the northern port of Alexandroupoli, amid heightened tensions in the Middle East and shifting priorities in Washington. For Athens, the expanding US interest in Souda and Alexandroupoli reaffirms the long-term strategic importance of Greek territory in American defense planning.

The Greek government expressed hesitation and caution to comment on the EU-U.S. trade deal on tariffs reached between Ursula von der Leyen and Donald Trump on July 27. Greek Finance Minister Kyriakos Pierrakakis, speaking in the Hellenic Parliament, outlined the government’s thoughts on this critical issue. He noted that it puts an end to months of uncertainty following Trump’s election and the “back and forth” with the tariffs, and that is a positive thing. He stressed, however, that the government is studying the agreement to see how it can better manage the problems that will arise in areas of Greece’s commercial interest.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

Analyses on de-Europeanization have lately flourished, re-opening the path to explore whether Europeanization is still relevant for how the European governance system evolves. This article, taking the European climate policy (and in particular the European Green Deal) as a case study, which has been the spearhead of the 2019–2024 European Commission term, suggests the said exploration to focus on the EU climate/green policy. It utilizes the case of Greece, which has set the goal of decarbonization by 2028. It analyses the Greek parties’ public stances during two election periods (national in 2023 and European in 2024) to test whether they are consistent with the EU apparatus and goals. The article concludes by showcasing that Greek parties are relatively distant from being Europeanized in the field of climate policy and suggests revisiting Europeanization to better understand European and Member States’ politics.

Read here the article by Emmanuella Doussis, Head of the Climate and Sustainability Programme, ELIAMEP; Professor, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; George Dikaios, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP, and Marianna Terezaki, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

The new issue of the Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Journal is available here.

Cover photo: Tania Malréchauffé, Unsplash

In this merged edition of MORE, Bledar Feta and Çelik Rruplli examine the trajectory of Albania’s judicial reform, launched in 2016 as part of the country’s EU accession efforts and broader attempts to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, and public trust in institutions. A central component of the reform is the establishment of SPAK, the Special Anti-Corruption Structure, an independent judicial body tasked with investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption and organized crime.

Operational since late 2019, SPAK has filed charges against senior officials from both the current and former administrations. Public trust in the institution has grown significantly, with recent data from a Euronews Albania Barometer survey indicating that 52.1% of citizens now express confidence in SPAK, making it the most trusted institution in the country for the first time. Furthermore, 70.7% of respondents evaluated its performance positively, while both figures have risen by 10% since January 2025. High-profile cases including the arrest of Tirana mayor Erion Veliaj have further solidified SPAK’s credibility in the public eye. While this progress has contributed to Albania advancing its EU accession process, particularly in the areas of fundamental rights and the rule of law, major challenges remain. These include a shortage of magistrates, case backlogs, and perceptions of corruption that remain persistently high, despite signs of increased public cooperation with judicial institutions.

This paper is part of the Media Observatory Reports (MORE) and covers the period from October 2023 to February 2025. It highlights how media coverage of justice reform in Albania—particularly regarding SPAK—has been extensive but often polarized. While the media plays a vital role in shaping public understanding, it also tends to amplify political narratives, undermining objective scrutiny and contributing to confusion about the aims and progress of the reform. The Media Observatory Reports are part of the broader “ALGREE – Albania-Greece: Understanding. Connecting. Partnering” project implemented by the South-East Europe Programme of the Hellenic Foundation for Foreign & European Policy (ELIAMEP) with support from the Open Society Foundations Western Balkans (OSFWB) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Greece and Cyprus (FNF). They are based on the systematic monitoring and analysis of leading Greek and Albanian media, with a focus on how each country reports on the other as well as on issues of common interest.

You can read the paper in Greek, Albanian and English.

The new ALGREE thematic report entitled “Mapping the dominant media frames between Greece and Albania and exploring alternative frames to override negative stereotypes” is a key output of the “ALGREE – Albania-Greece: Understanding. Connecting. Partnering” project. Authored by Panagiotis Paschalidis and Kriton Kuci, and implemented by the South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP, the study investigates the ways in which Greek and Albanian media portray the other’s country and proposes constructive counter-narratives to challenge negative stereotypes.

Using a mixed-method approach that combines quantitative content analysis with qualitative frame analysis, the report explores media coverage through six case studies focused on politically and socially sensitive topics, such as Albania’s EU accession process, the Greek minority in Albania, maritime border disputes, regional dynamics, economic cooperation, and the high-profile “Beleri case.” It examines both the tone and framing of news stories and highlights how political alignment often influences media narratives on both sides.

Its key findings include a persistent politicization of media discourse, a strong focus on conflict-laden narratives, and a lack of attention to positive themes such as culture, society, and economic cooperation. While some progress is noted—particularly regarding regional cooperation and perceptions of economic partnership—the presence of stereotypes remains a significant obstacle to balanced representation.

The report offers a series of recommendations aimed at depoliticizing media narratives and encouraging more nuanced and constructive reporting. By fostering alternative frames that promote mutual understanding, the study contributes to the broader goals of ALGREE in support of evidence-based dialogue, informed policy-making, and improved bilateral relations between Greece and Albania.

You can read the thematic report here.

 

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for June 2025.

On June 5, 2025, the 15th Bilateral Military Cooperation between the Hellenic Navy and the United States Navy was held in Athens. The Greek delegation was headed by Commodore Stefanos Sarris HN, Director of Branch A, while the U.S. delegation was led by Rear Admiral Patrick S. Hayden, Director Maritime Headquarters (DMHQ), U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa. Discussions addressed issues of mutual interest and strengthening cooperation for stability and development in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region. On the sidelines of the talks, the head of the U.S. delegation held a brief meeting with the Deputy Chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff, Rear Admiral Spyridon Lagaras HN.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. State Department is formally moving forward with the nomination of Kimberly Guilfoyle as the next American ambassador to Greece, undercutting widespread media speculation that she had declined the post. In a move that clarifies the administration’s intent, the State Department issued on June 18 an official “Certificate of Competency” for the nomination, a standard step preceding a confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate. Guilfoyle is set to appear before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 9, 2025, as part of her confirmation process to become the next U.S. Ambassador to Greece.

During his visit to Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland from June 12 to 18, 2025, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yannis Loverdos conveyed a message of support from the Greek government to the Greek American community and of strengthening ties with Greeks abroad. During the visit, he had a series of meetings with prominent members of the Greek-American in several fields and informed them about the Greek government’s initiatives for the Greeks abroad.

At the NATO Summit, on June 25, 2025, Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis held a high-level meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, underscoring the growing importance of Greek-American cooperation in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape. U.S. Secretary of State Rubio emphasized Greece’s role as a reliable NATO ally and a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. He acknowledged the importance of Greece’s contributions to regional security, while Minister Gerapetritis praised U.S. efforts to de-escalate tensions in the broader Middle East. Both officials reaffirmed their intent to further deepen bilateral strategic relations.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini), an undisclosed number of Greek Patriot missile systems are being relocated to the Hellenic Navy and NATO base at Souda Bay, Crete, to provide anti-ballistic protection to American assets in the region. The move comes amid increased U.S. military activity in the area following the escalation of the Israel-Iran conflict. Several U.S. F-16 fighter jets have also been temporarily deployed to Crete ahead of their participation in the upcoming “Anatolian Eagle” exercise in Turkey in early July.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

• The imposition of higher tariffs by President Trump or the threat to do so, while seemingly contradicting economic orthodoxy is not out of sync with the President’s view of the world.

• Tariffs are used as bargaining tool to force US trading partners into bilateral negotiations.

• A so-called “Mar-a-Lago Accord”, in the spirit of the 1985 Plaza Accord, could, in Trump’s view, help in responding to the key challenges of the American economy.

• According to the existing literature, the potential effects of higher US tariffs on the EU are going to be small to medium (0.10%-0.66%).

• Macroeconomic projections by the IMF, which combine the effects of higher tariffs with uncertainty and tighter financial conditions, place the medium-term effect for the EU at 1.75% of GDP.

• The effect of US trade policy uncertainty (TPU) on EU GDP with a two-standard deviation increase of TPU will be up to a drop of EU GDP by 0.73% after three years (the cumulative loss reaching 6.49%).

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Panagiotis Konstantinou, Assistant Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business; Spyros Blavoukos, Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business; Head of the ‘Arian Contellis’ European Programme, ELIAMEP and Panagiota Pagoni, Research Assistant, ELIAMEP.

This policy paper is authored by Ioannis Armakolas, Head & Senior Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP, Dimitar Bechev, Senior Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP, and Ana Krstinovska, Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP is published in the context of the of the project EMBRACing changE – Overcoming Blockages and Advancing Democracy in the European Neighbourhood. EMBRACE is a multi-country research initiative that aims to enhance democracy promotion efforts in the EU’s neighbourhood by identifying key obstacles to democratisation and formulating evidence-based strategies to overcome them. The project draws on locally led research and stakeholder engagement across twelve case studies in five regions: the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa.

Focusing on Work Package 7 of the project, the report “The EU’s Democracy Promotion and Geopolitical Competition” examines how the European Union’s democracy promotion efforts are shaped and challenged by both external authoritarian actors, primarily Russia and China, and internal political dynamics within partner countries. The report offers an in-depth comparative analysis of five case study countries: Algeria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine.

The authors analyse how authoritarian rivals deploy various forms of coercion, subversion, and co-optation, often exploiting internal political vulnerabilities. They also highlight how domestic elites navigate this external competition, at times instrumentalising their ties with Russia and China to entrench their power and limit EU influence. In this geopolitical context, the paper finds that EU democracy promotion tools are most impactful when tied to credible enlargement prospects and implemented with consistency and strategic sensitivity to local conditions.

The paper concludes that democracy promotion is no longer merely a matter of institutional design or normative appeal, it has become a geopolitical contest where foreign influence and domestic agency intersect. As such, future EU strategies must account for this complexity and tailor instruments to local realities while remaining steadfast in their democratic commitments. The report closes with concrete policy recommendations aimed at refining the EU’s approach, particularly in geopolitically contested environments.

You can read the policy paper  in pdf here.

The European Union’s capacity to foster democracy in its neighbourhood is increasingly constrained by a dual challenge: the pushback from authoritarian powers like Russia and China and the domestic political dynamics in partner countries. This policy report draws on granular empirical evidence and comparative analysis from five states—Algeria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine—to seize the nuances in the approach (objectives, tools, tactics) of Russia and China and to identify patterns in how EU leverage is shaped by external authoritarian strategies and internal political conditions. The report draws conclusions about the conditions under which EU democracy promotion has the potential to be impactful when facing geopolitical challengers, offering ideas for its future design improvements.

This policy report finds that:

• The EU’s democracy promotion tools are most effective when paired with credible enlargement prospects and coherent conditionality.
• Authoritarian rivals, particularly Russia, deploy a mix of coercion, subversion, and co-optation, capitalizing on internal vulnerabilities.
• Domestic elites play a decisive role in shaping the direction of foreign alignment, often exploiting ties with Russia and China to cement their hold on power and dilute EU influence.
• Societal attitudes significantly condition the success of EU or authoritarian leverage.

The policy report argues that, beyond geopolitical competition and authoritarian diffusion, as the most common explanatory devices for the spread of authoritarianism to be found in the scholarly literature, democracy is often undermined as an “unintended consequence” of the domestic actors’ multiple engagements with external actors.

The report also concludes that democracy promotion is not merely a matter of institutional engineering but a geopolitical contest where domestic politics and external power plays intersect. The outcome is contingent on EU consistency, strategic adaptation, and the good understanding of the limitations and opportunities of the domestic political context in partner countries.

Finally, the report offers recommendations for tailoring EU democracy promotion policies in response to the challenges faced by increasingly emboldened geopolitical and authoritarian rivals. The recommendations pertain to the type of instruments the EU is fielding in geopolitically contested states, the relationship to domestic political elites and civil society in these countries, and the communication and economic instruments intended to appeal to the wider societies.

Introduction to the EMBRACE project

The EMBRACE research project (2022-25) collects evidence-based knowledge on the obstacles to democratisation and ways to overcome them in five regions of the European neighbourhood: Southern Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. Its aim is to strengthen the capacity of policy-makers and pro-democracy forces to develop effective strategies to promote democratic progress in the European neighbourhood. In addition to research reports and policy briefs, new policy tools for EUDP practitioners and pro-democracy activists are developed based on the project’s findings.

The EMBRACE consortium consists of 14 partner organisations based in 13 countries, and places particular emphasis on locally-led research with deep contextual familiarity and stakeholder access within the regions under study. It brings together partners with unique and complementary strengths as well as shared areas of interest, in order to foster joint learning and development.

Empirical data was gathered in twelve case study countries through a variety of research approaches, investigating episodes of political closure and opening to identify, analyse and explain behavioural, institutional and structural blockages, and the conditions under which they can be overcome. A new quantitative dataset was generated on the larger trends of EU Democracy Promotion and its effects on democratisation over the last two decades in all 23 neighbours.

The research is structured around four thematic clusters: the re-configurations for democratic policy shifts after popular uprisings; democratisation and economic modernisation in authoritarian and hybrid regimes; the nexus between democratisation and peace; and the geopolitics of EUDP and the competition that the EU encounters in its democracy promotion efforts. This report focuses on Work Package 7, which aims to understand the EU’s democracy promotion potential when confronted with geopolitical challenges by powerful and authoritarian geopolitical rivals. It analyses how all these forces interact, compete, clash or cooperate, and how such interplay raises obstacles or offers opportunities for democracy promotion by the EU.

Introduction to this Policy Report

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) has positioned itself as a champion of democratic norms and values, using a combination of economic assistance and political conditionality to push for institutional and political reforms in target countries. These efforts are particularly pronounced in regions such as the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and North Africa—areas characterized by fragile institutions, hybrid regimes, and complex geopolitical alignments. As immediate neighbours of the EU, those regions have been the primary target of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU enlargement process, which now covers Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in addition to the Western Balkans.

However, EU democracy promotion now unfolds in a hostile strategic environment. Authoritarian powers like Russia and China have expanded their regional footprints and actively challenge the EU’s normative agenda.  With its aggression against Ukraine culminating in a full-scale invasion, Russia has resorted to crude military power to assert its primacy.  Faced with this reality, political elites in countries next door to the EU increasingly adopt hedging strategies, playing with all external powers to maximize regime survival or economic gain. This interplay between external pushback and internal resistance complicates the EU’s ability to shape political trajectories in its neighbourhood.

This policy paper is the outcome of rigorous research on the geopolitical competition to EU democracy promotion conducted in the context of the EMBRACE project. It draws on a cross-regional comparison of five countries—Algeria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine. It highlights the limitations of EU influence, identifies the modes of authoritarian contestation, and explores how domestic political contexts determine the effectiveness of democracy promotion. The aim is not only to diagnose challenges but to propose strategies that could help recalibrate the EU’s external democracy promotion.

EU Leverage: Dense Ties, Uneven Impact

EU democracy promotion rests on a set of well-established instruments: political conditionality, economic incentives, technical assistance, and societal engagement. These instruments are operationalized through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) for Algeria and through the Enlargement Policy for Serbia, North Macedonia, Ukraine and Georgia. All five countries in question have dense trade and investment ties with the Union, in most cases their leading economic partner, and are also linked to member states thanks to large diaspora populations. In that sense, both linkage and leverage – two variables highlighted by the literature on international promotion of democracy (Levitsky and Way 2005) – favour the EU’s role as a driver of political and institutional reform.

However, the EU’s track record is, at best, mixed.  Success is rare and setbacks common. North Macedonia and Ukraine are two cases giving grounds for qualified optimism. In both countries, the EU has demonstrated its potential to support democratic breakthroughs. In North Macedonia, the European Commission and the European Parliament played an important role in resolving the 2015-2016 political crisis, combining mediation, support to civil society, and conditionality tied to the broader EU accession agenda. Moreover, the Prespa Agreement concluded between Skopje and Athens, which resolved the long-standing naming dispute, was conditioned by the attraction of EU membership (Armakolas 2023, Bechev 2022).  However, the Europeanisation process ground down to halt in 2020 owing to new hurdles North Macedonia confronted because of France delaying, and later of Bulgaria blocking, its progress.

Similarly, in Ukraine, post-Maidan governments embarked on reforms under the impetus of societal demand, EU encouragement and the prospect of becoming a member of the 28-strong bloc. Russia’s full-scale invasion has shifted the priorities of the Ukrainian state from governance and market reform to ensuring state survival in the face of a mightier adversary.  Yet it has also propelled Kyiv further on the path to membership, with formal negotiations launched in 2024. Despite the political, economic and institutional obstacles going forward, at present Ukraine has a chance to enter the EU in the following decade. Particularly if NATO membership is off the table, accession to the Union would provide the highly desired anchor to the West that Ukrainians have pursued for at least two decades.

Yet these successes do not tell the full story of the complex landscape of EU democracy influence and other cases illustrate the limits of EU’s policies. In Georgia, despite robust public support for membership in the EU, which hovers around 80% of the populace, the government of the Georgian Dream (GD) party has slowed down (and arguably reversed) the effort to secure accession together with Ukraine and Moldova. GD gradually distanced itself from the EU, especially when democratization has threatened its political dominance. The passage of a highly problematic foreign agents’ law in 2024, inspired by legislation Russia adopted in the 2010s, coupled with the alleged irregularities at the October 2024 general elections have deepened the rift with the EU. In Algeria, the EU has largely prioritized stability and energy cooperation over democracy promotion. The 2019 Hirak protests received lukewarm support from Brussels, revealing a strategic preference for regime continuity over democratic change.

Even in the EU accession countries, conditionality is inconsistently applied. Serbia continues to slide into hybrid authoritarianism with little EU pushback. President Aleksandar Vučić has managed to simultaneously negotiate EU accession and cultivate ties with Russia and China, taking advantage of the EU’s reluctance to prioritize democracy over regional stability as well as its dire need to access critical resources. Europe’s reaction to an unprecedented wave of popular protests, which unfolded after November 2024 and demanded greater transparency and accountability, has been half-hearted at best. The outreach by Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos to pro-rule-of-law protesters has not moved the needle for the overall policy of the EU, which prefers engagement over confrontation with President Vučić.

EU credibility oftentimes falls prey to internal divisions. Member states diverge in terms of geographical focus, with some looking at Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe, others prioritising the Western Balkans while still others interested in the Maghreb, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Though the Russian aggression has helped soften such divisions by creating a sense of a common threat, they have not been fully overcome. Historically, member states have variable levels of commitment to enlargement too. While some see it as compatible with their strategic interests, others are concerned it might undermine the EU’s internal cohesion.

There are also institutional factors at play. Unanimity rules in enlargement decisions allow individual countries —such as Hungary or Bulgaria—to block or delay progress over bilateral issues or political calculations, as seen in North Macedonia and Ukraine. Though there have been multiple proposals coming from think tanks and academic researchers to reform decision-making on enlargement by introducing qualified majority voting (QMV), there is no sufficient mass in the EU Council to support such a move. As a result of all that, the EU has often struggled to deliver on promises to aspirant countries.

The experience of the countries under investigation shows that inconsistencies in EU policies, ambiguity over strategy, principles and priorities, as well as occasional failures in implementation limit the effectiveness of the EU’s democracy promotion tools. Local leaderships recognise the opportunity presented by these challenges and often devise a strategy of “pick and choose” of aspects of EU integration that suit their agenda and benefit their political, economic and strategic interests, while at the same time increasingly resist those aspects of EU ties that may challenge their authority or upset domestic equilibria. Aspects of these conclusions can be observed to a greater or lesser extent in all countries investigated. But the cases of Algeria and Serbia stand out as the ones where the ruling elites have found unique ways to make ties with the EU beneficial to their regime and its survival prospects.

Overall, the democracy promotion toolkit of the EU has the potential to foster democracy and strengthen resilience against external authoritarian pressure in aspiring countries. But the likelihood for success increases significantly when the pro-democracy policies are paired with a credible EU membership prospect and conditionality. Analysis shows that close economic, political, and institutional ties to the EU alone do not guarantee democratization, especially when the accession outlook is uncertain. Inconsistent application of democracy promotion tools or conflicting EU priorities risk undermining both their effectiveness and the EU’s overall credibility. Finally, authoritarian states—especially Russia—have shown a keen interest in shaping the democratization trajectories and undercut the EU’s positive influence on the examined countries.

Authoritarian Rivals: Strategies of Pushback

The EU is coming to terms with the fact that it is no longer the only game in town when it comes to influencing domestic politics. Authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states such as Russia, China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are growingly present on the European periphery. Of these, Russia and China are the two most remarkable cases. As early as 2008, the prominent scholar of democratisation, Larry Diamond, noted that “[the a]uthoritarian regimes in Russia and China are acting as black knights, supporting autocrats and undermining democratic transitions by providing diplomatic cover, economic aid, and sometimes even security assistance to embattled regimes.”

Russia and China are not ideologically committed to spreading authoritarianism per se, but they actively contest the EU’s influence when it threatens their strategic interests. In the Russian case, the latter include influence over institutions and elites in adjacent countries that are considered by Moscow as its “privileged sphere of influence” or its “near abroad.”   Beijing’s policies are more low-key, undermining alignment with the EU when it goes against China’s (predominantly business) interests, while increasing its political and economic footprint, but still without adopting the aggressiveness that Russia often uses. Russian and Chinese objectives, strategies and methods vary. Russia aims to blunt the EU’s – and more broadly the collective West’s – leverage, undermine its normative standing and accordingly increase their own room for manoeuvre. China, on the other hand, aims to secure allies to pursue its global agenda and opportunities to advance its economic priorities. In that context, while its objectives do not clash with enlargement countries’ bid to join the EU, Beijing’s approach is not always compatible with EU norms and standards, and it sometimes exploits structural governance weaknesses.

Russia’s and China’s strategies fall into three categories:

• • Coercion

Coercion involves the use of tools designed to compel a significant shift in the target’s behaviour. This includes direct military action or the threat of force, intervention in internal conflicts, terrorism, cyberattacks, and various forms of economic pressure such as sanctions or embargoes. These instruments are intended to impose costs that alter the target’s strategic calculus.

Russia’s approach in Ukraine demonstrates how far it is willing to go to prevent EU integration. After the 2013 Euromaidan protests and the pro-European turn, Russia responded with the annexation of Crimea, support for separatists in Donbas, and eventually a full-scale invasion in 2022. In Georgia, the 2008 war was a similar move to destabilize a reformist government and maintain influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

• Subversion

Subversion (or soft coercion), by contrast, seeks to weaken an adversary—be it the EU, the broader West, or Western-aligned governments—from within. The ultimate aim is behavioral change, achieved through the erosion of institutions, norms, or public trust. This domain is extensively covered in the literature on “hybrid” threats, which span both overt and covert activities below the threshold of open conflict.

Russia presents many examples of subversion. It excels at using hybrid tools to undermine democratic institutions and pro-Western narratives. In North Macedonia, Russian-linked actors used disinformation and Orthodox Church networks to oppose the Prespa Agreement in 2018-2019. In Serbia, Russian-backed media outlets reinforce nationalist sentiment and scepticism toward the West. Their message is amplified by the mainstream media, including TV channels, news portals and tabloids that are linked to President Vučić. In a similar way, China has worked to undermine trust in Western-style democracy – e.g. propagating its success in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21 and presenting the performance of EU members and the United States in negative light.

• Co-optation

Co-optation operates through the cultivation of relationships with domestic elites—political parties, business lobbies, media outlets, or civil society groups—to shape a target country’s foreign policy or internal choices. This approach provides external actors with channels of influence embedded within local power structures. A well-documented example is Russia’s strategic presence in the energy sector across Eastern Europe and even within the EU’s core.

Similarly, China primarily uses economic tools—investment, loans, and trade partnerships—to create dependencies and cultivate elite networks. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and bilateral deals often bypass transparency mechanisms, contributing to state capture and corruption. This strategy is evident in Serbia, where Chinese investments have expanded rapidly, including in strategic sectors like energy and infrastructure. Algeria presents a case of strategic triangulation, where both Russia and China are welcomed as partners in arms sales, infrastructure, and diplomacy. While their influence remains mostly co-optative, it offers the regime a buffer against EU democratization demands. In Georgia, the ruling party has allowed increasing Chinese economic presence and has taken a softer line on Russia since 2022, to offset the increasing EU influence over the country’s democracy and reform agenda. Strengthened ties with authoritarian countries became the counterbalance to EU’s pro-democracy influence which had the potential to undermine the power base and authority of the ruling political elites in Tbilisi.

Domestic Elites and Public Attitudes

The five cases under examination demonstrate that Russia and China are effective in countering the EU policies and influence only because they find allies within the countries. Domestic political elites early on draw the conclusion that closer ties with the EU come with policy impact that may prove challenging for the survival of their regime or the longevity of their governments. They quickly adapt to the situation, incorporate the EU impact on their cost-benefit calculations, and develop counterbalances to influence that is potentially harmful to their interests, including by increasing ties with EU’s rivals. Thus, both Russia and China often find the political circumstances in different countries ripe for increasing their footprint and unfolding their agendas.

Both Russia and China maintain strong military, economic, and diplomatic ties with Algeria while avoiding overt interference. Their influence is primarily co-optative—built on elite networks and strategic infrastructure investments—rather than subversive. Russia leads in arms sales and military cooperation, whereas China focuses on infrastructure and surveillance technology. Both actors also engage in vigorous public diplomacy, targeting Algerian media to counter Western narratives. Importantly, the role of Algeria’s regime is crucial in making the co-optative policies possible. The Algerian ruling elite triangulates between the EU and these external players to maximize its autonomy and expand its room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. This balancing act reinforces internal cohesion and bolsters authoritarian resilience.

A similar dynamic is evident in Georgia. The ruling Georgian Dream party prioritizes regime survival over alignment with EU democratic standards. It combines formal EU ties with growing cooperation with China and a muted alignment with Russia, especially following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While Russia exploits political polarization and institutional fragility—classic subversive tactics—the more decisive factor remains the agency of domestic actors. In Georgia as in Algeria, co-optation is the principal strategy used by Russia and China to blunt EU-led democratization, though Moscow retains also coercion as a viable tool, given its military capabilities and economic leverage.

Ukraine represents a contrasting scenario. There, Russia has long since abandoned co-optation and subversion in favour of direct coercion. Since 2014, military aggression has become the primary instrument to thwart Ukraine’s EU aspirations, overshadowing earlier tools such as economic pressure and disinformation. China, by contrast, has adhered to a strategy of co-optation, maintaining economic engagement (e.g., Belt and Road projects) while presenting itself as a neutral actor. Beijing avoids direct confrontation, diplomatically supports Russia, and carefully manages its relations with both Ukraine and the EU.

In the Western Balkans, Russia counters EU influence through a dual approach: exploiting societal divisions (subversion) and cultivating networks with local actors—politicians, civic groups, businesses, and national Orthodox Churches. Serbia offers a textbook case. Since the mid-2000s, political elites and influential societal actors have aligned with Russia. Moscow’s influence has benefited from enablers such as state capture, media control by President Aleksandar Vučić and his allies, aggressive nationalism, and the marginalization of opposition forces. As in Algeria and Georgia, Serbia’s leadership uses its ties with both Russia and China to pursue a “multi-vector” foreign policy. This strategy supports regime durability and dilutes the impact of EU democratic conditionality. In North Macedonia, Russia has deployed media manipulation, proxy actors, and disinformation—often via Serbian networks and Orthodox Church links—to disrupt Euro-Atlantic integration. Influence operations peaked in the late 2010s following the Prespa Agreement with Greece. Tactics included propaganda and intelligence-driven subversion.

In both Serbia and North Macedonia, China has pursued a quieter path. It avoids direct confrontation with the EU agenda, instead promoting economic cooperation through infrastructure projects and trade. Its involvement—often via opaque loans and non-transparent procurement—undermines good governance by reinforcing corrupt practices. During the COVID-19 pandemic, China successfully leveraged propaganda and disinformation to boost its image, often with the active participation of local actors such as President Vučić. Still, China’s approach remains firmly co-optative; subversion is rare, and coercion is not a preferred tool.

Overall, our analysis has found that significant EU influence on domestic political dynamics, including in the democratisation process, tends to be resisted by ruling elites through seeking geopolitical counterbalances. Such resistance is more effective, and EU’s influence less powerful, the more a country in question is geopolitically contested between the EU and its authoritarian rivals. Influence is also a function of the type of pressure coming from the EU. When the EU does not have the ambition to significantly influence and alter the domestic political landscape or when receiving countries already have well-established and consolidated autonomous international role and they avoid being tied to one only geopolitical option, then any influence coming from Europe will tend to be more limited. Conversely, countries and ruling elites with limited autonomous international role and less foreign policy clout are less likely to seek extensive geopolitical realignment and more likely to accept the geopolitical anchoring to the West and its democracy implications.

The autonomous role of domestic elites and their resistance to EU democracy influence tend to be facilitated and made easier by matching public attitudes in their respective countries. In every country case that we have studied, higher popular support for non-EU influence or for foreign relations that counterbalance the EU makes it much easier for political elites to challenge the conditions set by the EU and the democracy requirements that accompany EU ties. The resilience of (semi-)authoritarian elites is stronger in countries where the EU and its influence are not popular.

In contrast, the role of the economic dimension proved more complicated to gauge than what we had originally expected. Our analysis has shown that there is no straightforward correlation between economic ties and propensity to align politically or accept pro-democracy influence. Rather, what we have found is that political elites chart a policy path between economic benefits and political autonomy. Decisions are not determined by economic dependencies alone but are also highly influenced by domestic popular attitudes, historical legacies, ruling elites’ political strategies and broader geopolitical dynamics. The role of the economic dimension is dynamic and context specific, always shaped by political strategies, elite priorities and the broader societal context.

Conclusions

Across these three regions—North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Western Balkans—several core conclusions emerge:

• Domestic factors are the primary obstacles to democratic development. Authoritarian norms, institutions, practices, and societal preferences, in combination with structural governance weaknesses, often present a complex, self-sustaining and with deep roots reality that severely challenges the EU’s ambitions for transformative influence. The EU’s transformative power, that comes through leverage (democratic conditionality) or diffusion (economic and societal linkages), can be drastically limited by the strong presence of these internal conditions.
• External authoritarian actors benefit from these domestic conditions both relatively and absolutely. In relative terms, the EU is at a disadvantage, providing rivals with a comparative edge. In absolute terms, domestic deficits—polarization, institutional fragility, underdevelopment, and state capture—create openings for external authoritarian influence. The motivations of EU’s authoritarian rivals—whether geopolitical rivalry or authoritarian promotion—are secondary to the methods used to achieve influence, as well as the outcome.
• Co-optation is the preferred method for both Russia and China. It is cost-effective and relies on partnerships with local elites. Subversion and especially coercion are riskier and more costly, potentially provoking backlash from within target states or from the EU. Coercive actions, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, can have unintended consequences, including closer alignment between the target and Western actors.
• Policy Implications

The case studies suggest that democracy promotion is not a technocratic process but a political contest. The EU’s credibility and effectiveness depend on three pillars: coherence, consistency, and contextual awareness.

• Coherence: The EU must align its strategic interests with its normative agenda, and this should be reflected by all EU actors – institutions and member states. Prioritizing short-term stability (e.g., on energy or migration) at the expense of democratic values weakens long-term influence. EU and member states should also work more to have their positions and agendas aligned. Internal divisions within the EU, especially when it comes to policies and ties that have impact on democracy, tend to dilute the EU’s message, undermine its leverage and make it overall less credible and relevant.
• Consistency: Conditionality must be applied uniformly. Turning a blind eye to democratic backsliding, as for example in Serbia, undermines incentives for reform in other countries.
• Contextual Awareness: Democracy promotion must be tailored to local conditions. Where public support for EU integration is high (e.g., Georgia, Ukraine), civil society should be a strategic ally. Where sovereigntist sentiment is strong (e.g., Algeria), EU engagement must be more subtle but no less principled.

Policy Recommendations

The changed geopolitical reality and pressing need for the EU to re-assert its influence in its immediate neighbourhood mandate a bolder approach in re-imagining the EU’s democracy support. Support for continuous democratization of the EU’s neighbourhood is an investment in the EU’s own security, reducing the space for manoeuvre of EU’s geopolitical rivals and building stronger allies that will be able to resist external actors’ pressure that indirectly affects EU’s interests (e.g., reducing migratory pressures, securing energy supplies, closing enforcement gaps in sanctions/restrictive measures, reducing disloyal competition for EU and local actors et al.). This is even more important as these countries progress towards EU membership, but also as means to address current loopholes and build resilience. The improved understanding of the specific links between democratization and geopolitics should translate into targeted policy improvements in several areas:

• Step up the geopolitical game: As both Russia and China speak the language of multipolarity, the EU needs to step up the game in demonstrating that its neighbourhood is its own “sphere of influence”. On the medium to long term, this can be achieved through a credible and consequential enlargement policy. On the short term, however, the European institutions and local EU actors (e.g, EU Delegations in the neighbourhood) need to be more vocal on geopolitical topics and call foul all direct attempts by both external and domestic actors to undermine democracy and European values, membership-related reforms and alignment with the acquis.
• Streamline gradual accession in CFSP: The gradual accession, that is the inclusion of negotiating countries in specific EU-level policies and instruments before membership, should extend to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Candidate countries with full CFSP alignment should be allowed to seat as observers in Council meetings where decisions are discussed. This will serve as encouragement to maintain full alignment, as well as incentive, through peer pressure, to candidate countries who are not fully aligned.
• Re-imagine democracy support in light of geopolitical needs: The new design and significant reduction in the volume of US Government funding has adversely affected democratization programs and projects in the EU’s neighbourhood. To mitigate the consequences, which are especially dire for civil society actors, the EU should re-design its democracy support programs in parallel with the adoption of the new MFF. While this would necessitate an increase in funding, streamlining to maximise the impact and better target the priorities is even more important, considering both the Court of Auditors’ recommendations and geopolitical challenges.
• Encourage local ownership: If they want to make progress in the accession process, candidate countries should take ownership of democracy promotion and contribute alongside the EU in supporting pro-democracy actors. While the EU should remain in charge of the rules, procedures and oversight, national governments should be asked to provide some amount of financial contribution (co-financing) to national democracy promotion programmes.
• Enhance resilience against foreign information manipulation: The EU should encourage candidate countries for EU membership to prioritise the adoption of its Foreign Interference and Manipulation of Information (FIMI) toolkit and align with the Digital Services Act, implementing stricter policies related to media and social media platforms’ control over information manipulation (content transparency, inorganic activity, state-controlled entities etc.). This should be teamed with support for media literacy programs, investigative journalism focusing on the dealings of third actors and their proxies, and media projects devising counter-narratives to the propaganda of external actors.
• Build economic resilience: The EU’s Economic Security Strategy should expand to include, both at the level of design and implementation, the countries in the EU neighbourhood. Their adoption of and alignment with specific instruments, like foreign direct investment screening mechanism or foreign subsidies regulation, have the potential to limit the economic penetration of external actors through their companies that often benefit from subsidies and/or undue practices, distorting the level-playing field to the disadvantage of local and EU companies.
• Improve strategic communication: While it cannot be expected that different EU actors, especially member states, speak with one voice on all topics of interests related to the EU’s neighbourhood, there should be clear strategic communication plans in place for each country. They should be regularly updated to identify and distinguish between (i) messages that form a clear consensus and need to be amplified, (ii) messages that may create unnecessary divisions, block democratization or empower external actors, hence need to be reviewed and addressed.

References

Armakolas, Ioannis 2023. “The Promise of European Integration: Breathing New Life into the Settlement of Bilateral Disputes”, Institute for Human Sciences – Europe’s Futures, www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/the-promise-of-european-integration-breathing-new-life-into-the

Bechev, Dimitar 2022. “The EU and Dispute Settlement: The Case of the Macedonian Name Issue”, East European Politics and Societies, 37 (2), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/08883254221101905

Diamond, Larry 2008. “The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State”, Foreign Affairs, 87 (2), https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032579

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way 2005. “International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy, 16(3): 20–34, www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/international-linkage-and-democratization/

 

The authors would like to thank EMBRACE project partners Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), Ukrainian European Studies Association (UESA) and Ilia State University for analysis of country cases that informed this policy paper and Isabelle Ioannides for feedback to earlier versions of this text. The authors alone are responsible for any errors.