ELIAMEP

Spyros Blavoukos and Panos Politis-Lamprou give a brief overview of the new financial instrument for joint procurement of defence equipment in the field of European defence.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for April 2025.

A bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced legislation in the House of Representatives aimed at deepening U.S. security cooperation with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. The proposed legislation, titled the American-Hellenic-Israeli Eastern Mediterranean Counterterrorism and Maritime Security Partnership Act of 2025, was introduced by Rep. Nicole Malliotakis (R-N.Y.) and co-led by Reps. Thomas Kean Jr. (R-N.J.), Dan Goldman (D-N.Y.), and Josh Gottheimer (D-N.J.). It aims to bolster collaboration on counterterrorism and maritime security, while formalizing the 3+1 framework —a strategic dialogue initiative involving Greece, Cyprus, and Israel in partnership with the United States— as a platform for long-term strategic cooperation.

Having collaborated with President Donald Trump in the past, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis expressed confidence in his ability to do so again effectively, emphasizing the potential for a ‘win-win’ U.S.-EU trade deal, during an interview with Breitbart News, on April 9. Trump responded to Greek Prime Minister’s interview and his comments on a potential EU-US trade deal, stating “I agree. I know him, he’s a good man, I appreciate his comments. […] Yes, a deal can be made with any of them”.

Following a press release dated April 14, the American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce announced the establishment of its branch office in Washington, D.C., strengthening its presence in the United States. The new office will actively contribute to the further development of bilateral trade and economic relations between the two countries, supporting the international expansion of Greek businesses and attracting American companies and investments. The establishment of the branch is a strategic decision that has been carefully planned and prepared over time, marking a new era for bilateral economic and commercial relations.

With regard to defence procurement, a key component of the 12-year, €28 billion defense procurement plan approved by the Greek Government Council for Foreign and Defense Affairs (KYSEA) on April 16 is the upgrade of the F-16 Block 50 fighter jets to the Viper configuration. During the KYSEA meeting, the discussion focused on ongoing negotiations between Greece and the United States, which seek to resolve financial differences surrounding the upgrade program. Under the Long-Term Defense Armaments Program (MPAE), €1 billion has been allocated for the upgrade of 38 aircraft. However, this amount still falls short of the informal US offer, which stands at €1.5 billion. American manufacturing companies have said that there is very limited room to reduce costs. Despite this, according to Stavros Ioannidis (Kathimerini), negotiations remain active, with the two sides exploring different options.

Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Tasos Chatzivasileiou, responsible for Economic Diplomacy and Extroversion, met on April 16 with a visiting US Congressional delegation. Both sides reaffirmed the historically excellent relations between Greece and the United States, and discussed bilateral cooperation and the challenges the global community faces. At the same time, both sides discussed Greece’s strategy in extroversion and the attraction of investments. Chatzivasileiou underlined that Greece is a responsible force of stability in the East Mediterranean and a reliable partner for the future of economic cooperation and geopolitical stability.

Deputy Prime Minister Kostis Hatzidakis met on April 17 with a delegation of the US Congress, consisting of 10 Representatives from the Republican and Democratic Parties, led by Congressman Vern Buchanan (R-FL). During the meeting, Hatzidakis stressed that “the Greek economy is growing steadily and is increasingly becoming an economy of opportunities for investment and new jobs.” “The combination of political stability and a mix of economic policies further enhances the attractiveness of the country,” he stated in a post on social media.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

Ioannis Armakolas and Çelik Rruplli examine the results of the Albanian elections, providing early insights into the political dynamics and outcome.

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In an effort to avoid a repeat of the 2015 migration crisis, European states are increasingly turning to third-country agreements, exemplified by the recent deal with Tunisia. This paper explores two central questions: How effective are third-country agreements in addressing the complex and persistent challenges of European migration, and why do European leaders continue to favor this policy approach? The paper argues that Europe’s ongoing migration dilemmas stem from the inherently “wicked” nature of the crisis—one that defies simple solutions and requires policies that move beyond short-term deterrence logic. It assesses the policy’s effectiveness in deterring irregular migration, its role in enabling migration weaponization, and its potential to generate hypocrisy costs. It posits that third-country agreements serve immediate political interests by offering the appearance of control and responsiveness. Ultimately, the success of such agreements depends on the analytical lens—while they may appear effective in the short term, they risk entrenching long-term failures, thereby reinforcing the intractability of the crisis.

Read here the Working paper by Zoe Raptis,Tufts University.

Ιntroduction

Europe’s shortcomings in managing migration have been evident since the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis. Since then, the salience of migration for Europe has not abated, especially as illustrated by the recent 2024 European elections. The European struggle with migration, I argue, persists because of the inherently wicked character of the migration crisis, as illustrated by issues of border security and migration weaponization. Beyond illustrating the wicked character of the dynamic interplay of the aforementioned issues, the European case is particularly salient when evaluating a policy used as a common mitigating “solution” to the migration crisis: third-country agreements. These agreements come in different forms, but all agreements are a policy of externalization, which seeks to alleviate the wicked problem of border security by limiting the influx of refugees and asylum seekers through deterrence. I will conduct an evaluative policy analysis of these third-country agreements to answer two questions: First, how effective is the policy of third-country agreements in addressing the wickedness of the European migration crisis? Second, why is this policy so popular among European leaders? 

Regarding the first question, I will evaluate the effectiveness of third-country agreements based on two criteria: Firstly, whether these agreements successfully achieve their primary aim of deterrence, and secondly, whether they adequately address the European migration crisis in the long run. I hypothesize that the policy of third-country agreements is ineffective on both grounds. These agreements, at best, deter refugees and asylum seekers aiming to enter European states only in the short run. Europe’s deterrence-based approach to migration does not deal with its root causes, and even if some deterrence is produced, the costs incurred outweigh any positive effects of deterring migrants. Thus, the short run-long run paradox is at play, as the policy may lead to the short run benefit of reducing the number of irregular migrants, but this has exacerbated the possibility of long run failures. The most significant drawback of this policy is the weaponization of migration. That is, third-country partnerships grant the third countries disproportionate amounts of power, which can be used to weaponize migration. By mitigating border security issues, these agreements propel another wicked problem in the weaponization of migration. Lastly, these partnerships are ineffective due to hypocrisy costs for domestic and international actors. These agreements often violate human rights, contradicting the liberal ideals many European states promote. However, hypocrisy costs are the least significant drawback, as other states rarely impose them. For hypocrisy costs to significantly impact states, they must be imposed frequently, but they are primarily enforced by human rights organizations, which wield comparatively less influence than states. States seldom hold European states accountable for hypocrisy since they themselves are often guilty of similar policies. The absence of condemnation is also due to strong anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, so domestic and regional actors are not concerned with states acting hypocritically if it means keeping migrants out.

For the second research question, I will employ a short run rather than a long run framework to display why the policy of third-country agreements is so popular among European leaders. I propose that European leaders are not ignorant that these agreements are only short-term solutions; in fact, this is part of the appeal of such a policy. These partnerships improve the optics of the proactiveness of states in dealing with migration challenges, accomplishing a sufficient temporary reduction in migration numbers. While they serve only as a temporary fix, states are willing to bear the costs of such measures, considering that the alternative—structural reform—poses a formidable obstacle, as such an approach would conflict with the short-term political motivations of leaders. Thus, leaders respond to a crisis-by-crisis approach instead of considering long-term solutions, which I posit produces an inability to address the wicked problems at play.

The European migration crisis embodying wicked problems

The framework of wicked problems was formulated by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber by categorizing certain policy planning problems as “inherently wicked,” embodying ten characteristics.[1]A wicked policy problem defies straightforward solutions due to its interconnectedness with other problems and a multiplicity of stakeholders with conflicting interests and values. The European migration crisis is interwoven by many wicked problems, such as border security, weaponization of migration, and poverty, thereby making the crisis wicked. The European migration crisis embodies many of the ten characteristics defining wicked problems. There are multiple conflicting values, as seen by the disagreement within the EU on migration. The crisis is difficult to define, as it mutates and changes over time, as seen by the difference now in 2024 with Ukrainian refugees compared to 2015 with Syrian refugees. There is no single root cause of the crisis’s complexity as it is interconnected with many other problems, such as poverty in origin countries, wars, and environmental degradation. The European migration crisis, in short, is more than a security problem. It is “a humanitarian crisis based in the suffering of individuals who [have] abandoned their homes; a geopolitical conflict ranging across countries and continents; a security threat for both receiving and transit countries; a potentially heavy financial burden on already overtaxed states; and the breakdown of collaboration in the network of EU member states.”[2]

The wicked character of the European migration crisis points to the difficulty of solving the crisis, as we cannot even neatly define it. The solution to the crisis can never be right or wrong but good or bad. In this paper, I will argue that the policy of third-country partnerships falls into the “bad” category of solutions.[3] However, this policy can be seen as “good” from the short-run perspective of political leaders – which incidentally adds to the wickedness of the problem, as perspective and incentives greatly influence evaluations of third-country agreements.  The European migration crisis can never be solved entirely, as so many wicked problems are at play that, due to their nature, can never be fully answered. Even if push factors are weakened, several migrants will always want to enter Europe. Due to my focus on evaluating the policy of third-country agreements, I will focus on the wicked problems of border security and the weaponization of migration.

Explaining the policy of third-country agreements

Third-country agreements come in many different forms, but the overarching framework is that European destination countries use these agreements as an externalization policy to deter irregular migrants by either moving migrants to a safe third country or shifting the responsibility to transit countries to deal with asylum claims. This policy “has shifted beyond the state by both relocating the border outside the state’s territory (externalisation) and delegating border control functions to non-state and third-state actors (outsourcing).”[4] Through third-country agreements, European states focus on shifting the burden to border states instead of burden-sharing. This policy may often come in the form of a safe third country agreement. This agreement transfers the responsibility of a state to process asylum claims to another state – a safe third country. A third country is considered safe if it respects the principle of non-refoulement and treats an asylum seeker in accordance with accepted international standards, such as obeying the Geneva Refugee Convention and Protocol.[5]

An example of this policy being considered successful is Spain and Morocco’s transactional migration agreement.[6] A form of a third-country agreement that many examples I discuss fall into is transactional forced migration. Adamson and Greenhill coined this term and define it as the process surrounding “political deals intended to facilitate and/or forestall engineered cross-border population movements, wherein the parties to the deal do not include the displaced themselves.”[7] In the Spain-Morocco example, “Morocco is also cooperating with its neighbour Spain in efforts to stem the flow of illegal migration by sea with the attendant humanitarian concerns.”[8] Another prominent example is the infamous EU-Turkey deal, where Greece could return new irregular migrants to Turkey in exchange for six billion euros in financial support for Turkey.[9] One of the most extreme examples of this policy is the UK’s current Rwanda Plan, where “anyone entering the UK illegally – as well as those who have arrived illegally since 1 January 2022 – may now be relocated to Rwanda” even if they have never set foot in Rwanda, distinguishing it from the EU-Turkey deal.[10]

Deterrence

To evaluate the effectiveness of the third-country agreement policy, I will first examine whether the policy fulfills its main objective – deterrence. The primary aim of the policy is to deter irregular migrants from entering European states. For example, the goal of the UK’s Rwanda Plan is to “stop the boats” and “deter dangerous and illegal journeys.”[11]  The policy relies on the belief that people claiming to seek asylum in the UK will be deterred if they believe they will be sent to Rwanda. Similar logic applies to all third-country agreements, as European leaders think the threat of being sent away from a European state will deter irregular migrants from making the journey in the first place. However, this policy rarely provides a stable long-term deterrence effect. Many scholars agree that “there is limited evidence to suggest that the Rwanda deal will reduce the number of small boats crossing the Channel.”[12] One of the critical reasons this policy fails to provide deterrence is due to the limited enforcement of these agreements. For example, in 2015, the number of migrants arriving in Greece was approximately 885,386.[13] The EU-Turkey deal was intended to curb this, but only 2,140 people have been returned from Greece to Turkey after the deal.[14] This occurrence is not limited to the EU-Turkey deal, as “just 20 percent of eligible Dublin cases were actually transferred between EU Member States.”[15] Thus, transfer rates are low, and this is due to practical challenges, but also legal obstacles, as many European states are subject to EU and international law, which prevents them from rejecting asylum seekers.

Another reason why deterrence fails in the long run is because it underestimates asylum seekers’ persistence and determination to flee from persecution in their home countries. Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan state, “refugees remain resourceful despite the plight they are forced to endure, and may exhibit extraordinary resilience in their efforts to find safety and protection.”[16]  For example, in the hope of finding safety in Europe, at least five people died in icy waters in January 2024 near northern France as they tried to traverse the English Channel to Britain.[17] Asylum seekers have to decide whether it is best to stay home where they know they will face persecution or risk fleeing to European countries where it is not certain if they will be granted refugee status. If lethal violence is the main push factor, asylum seekers will not be easily deterred.[18] The latter option is more appealing to asylum seekers, especially since European states have a reputation for not properly enforcing their deterrence measures.  If the policy third-country agreements do not effectively secure their main aim, deterrence, then this questions if the policy truly ameliorates the wickedness of the European migration crisis.

Nonetheless, this policy at times succeeds in yielding the desired deterrence effect, albeit in the short run. Even though I questioned the EU-Turkey deal in achieving deterrence, it is undeniable that the numbers, albeit not significantly, went down when viewing irregular migration flows. The deal is seen as a success in European policy circles as it achieved its aim of deterring people in the short run.[19] However, third-country agreements as a policy will not provide a sustainable or stable deterrence. The aspect of the EU-Turkey deal that contributed most to a decrease in flows was not safe third-country provisions but rather interceptions of migrant boats in the Aegean by the Turkish Coast Guard.[20] According to the Turkish interior ministry, more than 79,000 migrants and refugees were intercepted attempting to cross into Greece during the first four months of 2019—dwarfing the number of people returned under the safe third country agreement.[21]  If deterrence is best achieved through deals that involve interceptions, this is far from a sustainable, long-term solution that appreciates the wickedness of the migration crisis.

Assuming deterrence is even effective under this policy, its efficacy is undermined if it does not adequately deal with the wicked problems interwoven in the European migration crisis. Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan argue that “while specific deterrence measures may be successful in stemming a particular migration path in the short term…displacement of migration flows towards alternative routes often significantly, if not completely, undermine the effect over time.”[22] They cite the EU-Turkey deal as an example showing that while the number of asylum seekers decreased along the Balkan route, the number of refugees and migrants using the Central Mediterranean route via Egypt or Libya dramatically increased during the same period.[23] Thus, by closing the Greek point of entry the policy did not effectively deter people as they simply found a new route to enter Europe, proving how unsustainable the policy is. Even the Spain-Morocco agreement, which is also viewed as a success, does not come close to dealing with the wickedness of migration. The moment Spain stops complying with Morocco’s demands, the number of asylum seekers will instantly rise at the Spanish border. Already the EU’s deal with Tunisia does not seem to provide a stable deterrent, as MEP Jeroen Lenaers of the European People’s Party, has openly denounced lagging results as “arrivals continue to increase” after the conclusion of the deal.[24] Not to mention the exorbitant costs countries face with this policy. For example, Italy had to pay Libya five billion dollars in 2007 in a negotiation regarding irregular migration.[25]  Currently, as of December 2023, the UK government has spent a total of £240 million to Rwanda, and more is planned to be sent on a yearly basis.[26]

The policy of third-country agreements by European states wrongly focuses on one criterion: reducing numbers. Viewing the European migration crisis from the one problem-solving perspective of reducing numbers is a gross oversimplification of the complexity of the wicked problems at play. Wicked problems, due to their complex nature, cannot ever be fully solved, but there are better and worse ways to handle them. The wicked problem of border security in the European migration crisis requires policies that move beyond the logic of deterrence. The European migration crisis is a structural, long-term phenomenon that requires policies that transcend short-term objectives. The policy of third-country agreements is a crisis-by-crisis approach rooted in short run deterrence logic, which provides patchy results at best. Irregular migration to Europe will never entirely be stopped, but instead of trying to prevent migrants from coming through these agreements, European states should employ a more long run sustainable policy of addressing the root causes of irregular migration or focusing inwards on its asylum systems instead of outwards. As Moreno-Lax and Pedersen state, “The short-term European goal of preventing asylum seeker flows thereby risks compromising the stated long-term goal of tackling the root causes of displacement, which is sacrificed in the altar of externalised ‘integrated border management.’”[27]  Externalization policies are not new, despite each third-country agreement being presented as a new, innovative solution. Third-country agreements have existed for decades, and the European migration crisis still exists and is mutating in different forms, proving this deterrence-based policy did not adequately address the crisis or the wicked problem of border security.

Weaponization of migration

A key aspect of what makes wicked problems so complex is that attempted solutions “after being implemented, will generate waves of consequences over an extended -virtually an unbounded- period of time.”[28] When evaluating a potential solution, in this case, a policy, I aim to determine if “the next day’s consequences of the solution may yield utterly undesirable repercussions which outweigh the intended advantages or the advantages accomplished hitherto.[29] I posit that the policy of third-country agreements in attempting to tackle the wicked problem of border security in the European migration crisis inadvertently creates another wicked problem: the weaponization of migration. Thus, by focusing on short-term deterrence logic this helps the probability of long- term failures, specifically migration weaponization.

Greenhill significantly elevated the discourse surrounding the issue of the weaponization of migration, emphasizing its pertinence as a wicked problem. She underscores the compelling incentives for states to “create, manipulate, or simply exploit migration crises, at least in part, to influence the behavior of target states.”[30] Coercive engineered migration is pertinent to understanding the wicked problem of migration weaponization: “Cross-border population movements that are deliberately created or manipulated by state or non-state actors in order to induce political, military and/or economic concessions from a target state or states.”[31] It is important in the context of the policy of third-country agreements that Greenhill asserts the incentives are particularly compelling for weak states, as they lack the recourse for traditional methods of influence.[32] Thus, the threat of using migrants as weapons can be more effective than unsuccessfully attempting to extract concessions using military means.[33] An infamous example of coercive engineered migration was in 2004 when the then leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, threatened the EU to lift remaining sanctions and financially assist Libya in exchange for cooperation on the migration issue.[34]

I will now show the connection between the policy of third-country agreements and the wicked problem of weaponization of migration. Third-country agreements as a policy are ineffective in addressing the wickedness of the European migration crisis as they grant the third countries disproportionate amounts of power, which can be used to weaponize migration. For example, Libya has been weaponizing or threatening to weaponize migration against Italy and the EU since 2004. In 2008, Italy and Libya signed a migration deal, in which Italy agreed to pay Libya five billion dollars to stop the flow of African migrants to Europe.[35] This deal gave Libya’s leader, Gaddafi, considerable leverage as in 2010, he threatened to “turn Europe black” if the EU did not comply with his demands, such as lifting arms sanctions and providing aid.[36] Additionally, during the 2011 Arab Spring, Gaddafi tried to deter the EU from providing support to the rebellion by warning the EU would be “bombing a wall which stood in the way of African migration to Europe.”[37]  Per Greenhill’s theory, Gaddafi acted as a generator as he threatened to create cross-border population movements unless the EU complied with his demands.[38] However, Libya has acted as an opportunist as well, proving that third-country agreements can promote distinct types of challengers. Despite Libya’s threats, Italy did not learn its lesson as the two nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Migration with Libya in 2017. Italy provides Libya with financial support to prevent irregular migration to Europe by intercepting migrants at sea, establishing temporary refuge within its borders to screen asylum seekers, and repatriating individuals willing to return to their countries of origin. The EU has also financially assisted Libya, allocating 57.2 million euros for “Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya” since 2017.[39]  Libya capitalized on Europe’s migration crisis in 2015 by negotiating this deal following the blueprint set out by the EU-Turkey deal. Thus, according to Greenhill’s theory, Libya acted as an opportunist as it did not create the migration crisis but carefully exploited it for its own gain.[40] As Greenhill states, “a crisis can help level the playing field, enhance the credibility of weak actors, increase the potency of their threats, and thereby improve their coercive capabilities.”[41] Another notable threat was from Ergodan during the EU-Turkey deal, as he threatened to “open the gates and send 3.6 million refugees your way” if the EU did not stop calling his Syrian offensive “an invasion.”[42]

The problem with the policy of third-country agreements is that the third countries are aware of Europe’s struggle to deal with migration, so they can exploit Europe’s weakness and keep asking for concessions. Turkey knew it had the upper hand during negotiations with the EU and did not just ask for money but also political concessions, such as making the EU reopen talks about Turkish EU membership.  Thus, I take it as far as to say no partnership is safe from the threat of coercive engineered migration. Even the Spain-Morocco partnership, which is seen as a policy success, has been subject to the weaponization of migration. This was seen in 2021, as Morocco acted as a generator by threatening Spain there would be “consequences” after the leader of the Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali, who is subject to a Moroccan arrest warrant for terrorist acts, was admitted for treatment in a Spanish hospital.[43] Morocco weaponized migration by letting down its guard on the border with Ceuta, which allowed thousands of migrants to enter Spain. Thus, the short run benefit of reducing the numbers of irregular migrants to Spain caused the long run problem of migration weaponization, which is a problem Spain has been facing for years and will continue to do so under this policy.

Another example was in 2022, Morocco shifted Spain’s Western Sahara policy by creating a border crisis.[44] This is an example of exportive engineered migration, as Morocco engineered migration to fortify a domestic political position.[45] Thus, despite the partnership between the two nations spanning decades, this failed to deter Morocco from using migrants as an instrument to exert pressure on Spain. Spain and Morocco will continue to perpetuate the same pattern of engagement as they have done since the late 1990s, so Spain will always have to comply with Moroccan demands to curb irregular migration flows. In 2015, countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon tangentially benefitted from the post-2015 European fear, allowing them to negotiate migration deals without threatening refugee arrivals due to European trauma.[46] It may not be 2015, but Europe will continue to expect migration crises, as seen since the influx of Ukrainians refugees and predictions of future migration due to climate change.

European states must decide what wicked problem they want to prioritize. The policy of third-country agreements may address the wicked problem of border security, albeit I argue not effectively, but it further propels and ignites the wicked problem of weaponization of migration. Looking at the numbers, it is undeniable that the Spain-Morocco partnership reduced the number of irregular migrants entering Spain. However, the question is: how sustainable is this deterrence effect, and is the cost of potential weaponization worth it? I have argued that this deterrence effect is far from sustainable, and if an over-30-year partnership is susceptible to weaponization, then all partnerships are under threat. Thus, the EU-Tunisia MOU is also under threat of weaponization of migration, and so is the UK vis a vis Rwanda. Already, Tunisia is wielding significant power against the EU as in October 2023, Tunisian president Kais Saied rejected financial support from the EU, claiming the money “was a small amount,” and Saied was unsatisfied that the EU “lacks respect.”[47] The European Commission said it would disburse 127 million euros to Tunisia as part of their deal to curb illegal immigration to Europe.[48]  However, rejected what the EU announced, saying that “the proposal conflicts with the memorandum of understanding signed in July.”[49] The July deal included a pledge of 1 billion euros in aid to Tunisia. During the dispute between the two parties, a record number of migrants arrived on the Italian island of Lampedusa from Tunisia and North Africa.[50]  However, migrant numbers have been rising in many places in Europe, but I still question if this was a coincidence and is potentially proof of Tunisia weaponizing migration against the EU. Thus, Tunisia would not have been able to weaponize migration as easily against the EU and extract financial concessions without the third-country agreement between them. The agreement increased Tunisia’s legitimacy on the negotiating table by giving Tunisia a platform to increase its power in migration diplomacy. Hence, threats to alter or suspend third-country agreements in response to political disagreements or disputes can create a dynamic where migration becomes a tool for exerting influence. Due to geographical limitations, Rwanda may not directly weaponize migration by sending migrants to the UK. Still, it has the power to cause instability in the region and potentially threaten the UK. The weaponization of migration should not be underestimated, and I argue that the policy of third-country agreements is ineffective due to underestimating the power of migration weaponization that it is facilitating. As Greenhill’s research shows, coercers achieved at least some of their objectives in about three-quarters of the cases. In more than half the cases, coercers obtained all or most of what they sought.”[51]

Hypocrisy costs

Another significant cost of the policy of third-country agreements is hypocrisy costs. Greenhill defines hypocrisy costs as “those symbolic political costs that can be imposed when there exists a real or perceived disparity between a professed commitment to liberal values and norms and demonstrated actions that contravene such a commitment.”[52] Third-country agreements often violate human rights, contradicting the liberal democratic ideals many European states promote. However, I previously argued that the policy fails to provide an effective deterrence effect, as although European states want to keep migrants out, states rarely send many migrants back due to legal constraints. Nonetheless, just because European states are constrained by international law does not mean they do not incur hypocrisy costs. In fact, this policy creates a lose-lose situation: if the European state fails to keep unwanted immigration out, it fails the policy’s original aim of deterrence. However, if European states do manage to keep migrants out, this is usually a result of illiberal means, potentially incurring hypocrisy costs. Thus, I want to ensure that I do not appear contradictory by introducing the drawback of hypocrisy costs to the policy, as even if deterrence is not effective, hypocrisy costs may still be incurred because human rights organizations have criticized European states for making deals with authoritarian leaders.

Hathaway argues that the right of states to remove refugees is conditional if the safe third country implements and respects the rights of the refugee under the Refugee Convention or any other legal instruments it is subject to.[53]  I use Hathaway’s formulation of the expectations of safe third countries and the principle of non-refoulement as a baseline to determine if third-country agreements have abided by human rights expectations. For example, the EU-Turkey deal rested on the notion that Turkey is a safe third country. However, Turkey’s safe third-country status has been questioned, mainly due to the surge in Turkish state violence against minorities since 2017.[54]  Greek courts in early 2018 found that Turkey was not a safe third country, delaying the number of migrants that could be sent back.[55] Thus, the deal was ineffective in offering sustainable deterrence and displayed hypocritical behavior. Hypocrisy costs were incurred as, the Greek national court, not just human rights organizations, condemned state behavior for human rights, thereby highlighting the discrepancy between the liberal values European states must obey by law versus the restrictive agenda leaders want to pursue. The UK’s Rwanda Plan is an even more extreme example, as the UK’s Supreme Court has declared the policy unlawful, and the European Court of Human Rights has also prevented the first scheduled flight taking asylum seekers to Rwanda.[56] The policy also goes against the principles of non-refoulement due to the severe risk asylum seekers would be returned to their home countries from Rwanda.[57] Instead of listening to the Supreme Court, the government tried to create legislation to enforce its Rwanda plan. Thus, the Rwanda Plan is a policy that incurred huge hypocrisy costs, as both domestically and internationally the government was being rebuked.  The UK is one of the leading proponents of liberal democracies globally, yet this policy goes against the values it espouses.

The MoU between Libya and Italy is laden with human rights abuses. Firstly, Libya is not a party to the UN Refugee Convention and its Protocol, which already raises legal and ethical questions about whether migrants should be sent to Libya from Italy. UNHCR expressed concern, stating ‘it is far from clear that Italy has taken the necessary precautions to ensure that it is not sending back any bona fide refugees to Libya, which cannot be considered a safe country of asylum.”[58] Additionally, UNHCR stated that refugees being removed from Libya to their country of origin violate the principle of non-refoulement.[59] Both Italy and the EU have provided technical and financial support to Libya to stop migration flows to Europe, but a UN report states the migrants that are intercepted at sea and sent back face “murder, enforced disappearance, torture, enslavement, sexual violence, rape, and other inhumane acts … in connection with their arbitrary detention.”[60] Similarly, an ICC prosecutor stated crimes against migrants in Libya “may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes.”[61] Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch have argued that the EU and Italy are thus complicit in such crimes.[62] Hence, the Libya case study is a salient example of exposing the hypocrisy displayed by European leaders, as “the anxiety over a refugee invasion from Africa reveals the contradictions present in Europe today, where, on the one hand, the moral imperative of universal emancipation is proclaimed, but on the other, policies and practice continue the trend of refusing a safe haven to the very refugees they have helped to create.”[63] Beyond the case of Libya, the EU is facing scrutiny for atrocious human rights abuses in Tunisia by EU funded security forces.[64]

Hence, European states are seen as hypocritical as they advocate for human rights protection on the world stage yet are knowingly putting migrants in a situation where their rights are violated. Moreno-Lax and Pederson argue that “EU border externalization entrenches forms of undemocratic governance in third countries, empowering undemocratic actors, transforming their relative weight within domestic structures, and weakening democratic channels of scrutiny, accountability, and power control.”[65] Hence, the EU may espouse democratic values and condemn authoritarianism, but concerning migration, they are more than willing to shift the responsibility to third countries and embolden their undemocratic, illiberal practices to keep migration out of Fortress Europe. As stated by Galeotti, European states are “underscoring a fundamental point, that authoritarian regimes can get not only a free pass from the EU on many issues but also lucrative assistance, so long as they continue to keep migrants out.”[66]

Nonetheless, I argue that hypocrisy costs are a less significant drawback of the policy than other drawbacks, such as the weaponization of migration. My reasoning is based on strong anti-immigrant sentiment in the countries where this policy is used. For example, data by Pew suggests that “Greeks and Italians are also the most likely to be concerned about immigration from outside the EU (84% and 76%, respectively, are concerned about this).”[67] I am not arguing that European states are predominantly anti-immigrant, but rather that anti-refugee/migrant camps in European states are strong and current populist governments in Europe feed on anti-immigrant sentiment. Migration has moved from low politics to high politics and is now at the center of many political debates.[68]  The Leave campaign during Brexit attributes its success partially due to exploiting xenophobic views in British society when it came to migration.[69] As stated by Greenhill, “popular political discourses within the EU draw upon traditional nationalistic sentiments and xenophobic assertions that current waves of migrants and refugees reduce national living standards by siphoning away social resources from ‘real’ citizens, taking employment away from more qualified applicants, bringing tensions from their home state with them and committing a disproportionate amount of crime.”[70] Thus, it is irrelevant if migrants pose a real threat, but “if they are perceived as fundamentally threatening to their security, culture or livelihood, anxious and motivated individuals and groups will mobilize to oppose their acceptance.”[71] Thus, due to migrant opposition, hypocrisy costs are less of a drawback to the policy of third-country agreements as many European citizens, particularly those who border the Mediterranean, are not concerned with migrant rights or if states are being hypocritical, so it is less likely the cost will be imposed.

Likewise, while European states are acting hypocritically, it does not mean hypocrisy costs are incurred. For the cost to be incurred, another actor needs to condemn the state for displaying hypocritical behavior. However, this policy is used globally from the US to Australia, thereby shielding European states from hypocrisy costs as many states themselves engage in the same behavior. Thus, it is usually human rights groups that condemn European states for their hypocritical behavior, which holds less weight compared to if another state did the same.

Examining the popularity of the policy among European leaders

This paper has primarily focused on evaluating the effectiveness of third-country agreements and concluding that the policy fails to address the wicked problem of border security and, in turn, creates significant drawbacks, such as the wicked problem of weaponization of migration and hypocrisy costs. Thus, this raises the question why the policy is so widespread in Europe. Thus far, my analysis has been centered on a long run perspective that aims to address the wickedness of the crisis. I assumed the European migration crisis is a long-term structural phenomenon; thereby, my evaluation of the policy of third-country agreements is predicated on a long run rather than a short run analysis. For this section, I am viewing the policy from the eyes of the European leaders who created and implemented the policy. Hence, I will now view the policy from a short run perspective, as the actors involved are short-term political actors.

In essence, governments focus on the short term, as democratic countries are all plagued by short-termism. Offe argues in Europe Entrapped that democratically elected governments cannot address the structural issues afflicting the European Union because citizens are focused on the short-term, stating “the problem is one of ‘time inconsistency’: The implementation of promising long-term strategies is obstructed by the failure of ‘presentist’ electorates fixated on a short-term time horizon to grant them green light, unless political leaders can persuade their constituencies to adopt a more far-sighted perspective.”[72] Thus, due to how democracies are structured, it is not politically palatable to campaign on long-term strategies. Politicians’ primary goal is to get elected and to stay in power, so when it comes to migration management, politicians are not incentivized to devise policies focused on a long-term perspective on migration that addresses structural and wicked problems. As Streeck puts it, “long-term solutions are not even attempted because short-term problems take priority; holes keep appearing that can only be plugged by making new holes elsewhere.”[73] In the case of the policy of third-country agreements, the “new holes” are the wicked problem of migration weaponization.

I will now examine the statements of European leaders to showcase how short-term political perspectives connect with the externalization policy of third-country agreements. Meloni states in regard to her support of the MoU with Tunisia that “work[ing] on the external dimension and stop[ping] the illegal departures of immigrants” is “the only way to seriously address the problem.”[74] She continues, “this is what European citizens are asking of us.”[75] Thus, European leaders recognize that citizens want solutions, and leaders believe third-country agreements can yield short-term tangible results. Von der Leyen echoes Meloni, stating that “irregular migration is a European challenge” that “needs a European answer.”[76] This European answer is not dramatic structural reform on fixing Europe’s asylum systems or improving legal pathways to residency or citizenship. Instead, externalization persists as the preferred approach and will likely remain so: “We want our agreement with Tunisia to be a template. A blueprint for the future. For partnerships with other countries in the region.”[77]  The UK is following suit, as Sunak states, “In order to fully solve this problem, we need a deterrent. We need to be able to say pretty simply and unequivocally that if you come to our country illegally, you won’t get to stay.”[78] For European leaders, “an immediate reduction in irregular arrivals is sufficient for a deal to be considered successful, and a partner country to be cooperative and effective.”[79] Thus, while I criticize the EU-Turkey deal and the Italy-Libya partnership, in EU circles, these deals are considered a success when viewed merely from the lens of a short-term number.

Thus, depending on what lens you evaluate the policy it is possible to view it as a success, which adds to the wickedness. These deals manage to decrease numbers, albeit for a short period. According to figures provided by the Italian government, between 5 May and 31 December 2009, 3,185 migrants landed on Italian coasts, compared with 31,281 over the same period in 2008.[80] Other factors besides the Italy-Libya agreement affected the numbers, but it is undeniable that the agreement played an important role. In large part, though, this reduction was not due to migrants being deterred but because they were intercepted at sea and returned to Libya. Nonetheless, now Italy is facing the same problem it did back in 2023, but instead of Libya being the main partner, now it is Tunisia. It is the same story but slightly different characters, as European leaders use the same policy of third-country agreements as a temporary band-aid to reduce numbers. As Hansen states, “‘root cause’ approaches are often eclipsed by the more ‘instant impact’ control policies.”[81]

European leaders are not ignorant that the policy of third-country agreements is a short-term solution. The crisis-by-crisis approach is more politically appealing than undergoing structural reform. As previously stated, migration has moved from low politics to high politics. Polling suggests that migration will be a central issue in the upcoming June 2024 elections, where it is predicted right-wing, anti-immigrant parties will significantly benefit.[82] Thus, since migration is now, at times, the center of political discussions, European leaders must look at least optically that they are addressing the issue. As stated previously, European citizens, particularly those who border the Mediterranean, are not open to refugees and asylum seekers. Not only are they not open, but European citizens are very biased, and “pundits, politicians and even some policy makers may argue that migrants who are from different religious, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds than the majority in their newly adopted homelands are a danger to societal security.”[83] For instance, during the 2015 migration crisis, a median of 59% across 10 EU countries voiced concern about the prospect of increased terrorism, and 50% believed refugees are a burden to society because they take jobs and social benefits that would otherwise be available to citizens of each nation.[84] Mediterranean states saw refugees from Syria and Iraq as a major threat: 69% of Greece and 65% of Italy.[85] Pew also concluded that negative views towards refugees are tied to negative views about Muslims.[86] Thus, this explains why Ukrainian refugees in 2022 were more welcome than Syrians in 2015.

Thus, the refugees and asylum seekers are not always viewed as people in desperate need of protection but as a national liable infringing on cultural identity and economic opportunities. European leaders, instead of trying to change the perceived negative image of migrants, capitalize on this xenophobic sentiment and use it to justify their externalization policies. Most importantly, these policies, such as third-country agreements, do not need to accomplish much. A short-term reduction in numbers will suffice. Overwhelmingly, regardless of one’s position regarding refugees, most Europeans believed that the EU did a poor job in handling the 2015 refugee crisis. This includes a staggering 94% of Greeks and 88% of Swedes.[87] Disapproval was high among many segments of society but exceptionally high among people with favorable views of the anti-immigrant parties in Britain (UK Independence Party), Germany (Alternative for Germany), and the Netherlands (Party for Freedom).[88] Thus, European leaders recognize now that, at least optically, they need to show they are taking a hard line on migration to assure the public there will not be a repeat of 2015. This is why the policy of third-country agreements is so appealing: politicians need a fast reduction in numbers, and it does not matter if it’s not sustainable. More sustainable policies addressing the problem’s wickedness, such as expanding legal channels for migrants to access the EU’s labor market, are not as politically desirable as the immediate impact of third-country agreements.

If the policy of third-country agreements is more about optics than about effectively dealing with the European migration crisis, this begs the question of whether the policy is an instrument of political theater. To properly answer this question, more time and research need to be dedicated beyond what this paper can offer, but I want to briefly touch on it as it pertains to my second research question, which is why European leaders implement this policy. In his book Border Games, Andreas outlines in Chapter 1 his thesis of border enforcement as political theater.[89] The book focuses on the US-Mexico border, but Andreas describes the border as a “political stage” that can also apply to the European context.[90] In essence, what Andreas means by political theater is that actors enforce certain policies not because of their practical effectiveness but for their symbolic significance. Thus, the policy of third-country agreements is not just to prevent migrants from coming to Europe but also to send a message to the public about the government’s commitment to border security. If we assume the policy of third-country agreements is more about optics, then this explains why leaders care less about incurring hypocrisy costs. If this policy is “for show,” then it does not matter how effective the policy is. It only matters if the public believes their leaders are doing something about combating the migration crisis. For instance, is the Rwanda Plan a product of political theater, or is it about creating an effective policy to deal with irregular migration in the UK?

Conclusion

Thus, by viewing the European migration crisis as a microcosm of a wicked problem or as a wicked problem itself, I determined that the policy of third-country agreements fails to treat the crisis as the long-term structural issue it is. The policy is a product of short run reasoning which fails to address the wickedness of the crisis. Most of my paper viewed the European migration crisis as a complex problem that begets policies that transcend the logic of deterrence. Firstly, I evaluated the policy’s effectiveness on its intended aim of deterrence and concluded that third-country agreements do not provide a sustainable, long-term deterrent effect. The policy deters migrants only in the short run, and even then, results are patchy at best, as seen by the small number of migrants returned from Greece to Turkey under the EU-Turkey deal. Next, I assert that the policy of third-country agreements in trying to address the wicked problem of border security exacerbates the wicked problem of weaponization of migration. I argue that this is the most critical drawback of the policy, as migration weaponization should not be underestimated, and its wickedness entails a whole host of other problems. Migration weaponization is also a notable example portraying how short run deterrence logics leads to creating a bigger problem in the long run. Lastly, I argue that the policy incurs hypocrisy costs but argue that this drawback is less significant compared to the weaponization of migration due to anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe overriding human rights concerns at times.

For my second research question, my analysis was rooted in short run rather than long run logic, as I viewed the policy from the perspective of the leaders who implement these agreements. I concluded that the policy fulfills the short-term political aims of the politicians implementing the policy. European leaders need to look optically that they are being proactive in tackling migration crises and need to curb migration flows, albeit for a limited period. Thus, the policy of third-country agreements is seen as a politically effective solution as politicians are not aiming at adequately addressing the wicked problems at play but rather putting a band aid over the problem as by the time the problem resurfaces, another political actor will need to deal with it. Through my analysis of political leaders, I infer that what makes the crisis increasingly wicked is that depending what lens you employ -short run or long run- the success of the policy is evaluated differently.

Recent developments with the EU’s MoU with Tunisia show that this policy appears to be here to stay. The deal with Tunisia already is displaying issues of weaponized migration and hypocrisy costs. Moving beyond the logic of deterrence will be a challenge, but it is the only way to tackle the wickedness of the European migration crisis. Complex problems need innovative solutions, and Europe needs to choose how it wants to deal with a recurring policy crisis. It remains to be seen how the new EU Migration and Asylum Pact will play out and what this means for the policy of third-country agreements, but unless Europe shifts its mindset to the long run, then these wicked problems will only resurface.

1 Horst W. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (June 1973): 160, https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01405730

[2] Karin Geuijen et al., “Creating Public Value in Global Wicked Problems,” Public Management Review 19, no. 5 (August 25, 2016): 622, https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2016.1192163

[3] Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 162.

[4]Agnese Pacciardi and Joakim Berndtsson, “EU Border Externalisation and Security Outsourcing: Exploring the Migration Industry in Libya,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 48, no. 17 (April 13, 2022): 4010, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2022.2061930

[5]“Safe Third Country,” European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed April 17, 2024, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum-and-migration-glossary/glossary/safe-third-country_en

[6] Kelly M Greenhill and Hugo Brady, “Arriving at a Crossroads: Can Europe Avoid Replaying the Policy Failures of the 2014-16 Migration Crisis?,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, publ. online March 2024, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/03/21/arriving-at-a-crossroads-can-europe-avoid-replaying-the-policy-failures-of-the-2014-16-migration-crisis/

[7] Fiona B Adamson and Kelly M Greenhill, “Deal-Making, Diplomacy and Transactional Forced Migration,” International Affairs 99, no. 2 (March 6, 2023): 709, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad017

[8] Commission Communication on the monitoring and evaluation mechanism of the third countries in the field of the fight against illegal immigration. COM(2005) 352 final, of 28 July, paras. 5.1

[9] Kelly M. Greenhill, “Open Arms behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis,” European Law Journal 22, no. 3 (May 2016): 327, https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12179.

[10] “Q&A: The UK’s Policy to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda,” Migration Observatory, accessed April 16, 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/qa-the-uks-policy-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda/

[11] Megan Specia, “Three Myths around the U.K.’s Rwanda Push for Asylum Seekers,” The New York Times, publ. online January 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/16/world/europe/uk-rwanda-asylum.html

[12] Marley Morris and Amreen Qureshi, “UNDERSTANDING THE RISE IN CHANNEL CROSSINGS,” Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), 2019, 23, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep53541.

[13] Risk analysis for 2016 | Frontex, accessed April 17, 2024, https://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf , 6

[14] Angeliki Dimitriadi and Asli Selin Okyay, “Are Partnerships with Third Countries an Effective Way Forward for EU Migration Management?” ELIAMEP, November 2023, 10,  https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Perspectives-2-Migration.pdf.

[15] Susan Fratzke, “International Experience Suggests Safe Third-Country Agreement Would Not Solve the U.S.-Mexico Border Crisis,” Migration Policy, publ. online February 2022, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/safe-third-country-agreement-would-not-solve-us-mexico-border-crisis

[16]Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nikolas F. Tan, “The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy,” Journal on Migration and Human Security 5, no. 1 (February 16, 2017): 43, https://doi.org/10.14240/jmhs.v5i1.73

[17]Aurelien Breeden and Megan Specia, “At Least 5 People Die Trying to Cross Icy English Channel,” The New York Times, publ. online. January 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/14/world/europe/migrants-die-english-channel.html.

[18] Helen Hintjens and Ali Bilgic, “The EU’s Proxy War on Refugees,” State Crime Journal 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2019), 87, https://doi.org/10.13169/statecrime.8.1.0080.

[19] Dimitriadi and Okyay, “Are Partnerships with Third Countries an Effective Way Forward for EU Migration Management,” 20

[20] Susan Fratzke, “International Experience Suggests Safe Third-Country Agreement Would Not Solve the U.S.-Mexico Border Crisis,” Migration Policy, publ. online February 2022, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/safe-third-country-agreement-would-not-solve-us-mexico-border-crisis

[21] Ibid

[22] Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, “The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy,” 43.

[23] Ibid

[24]Mared Gwyn Jones, “Eu Lawmakers Clash over Controversial Tunisia Migration Deal,” euronews, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/09/12/eu-lawmakers-clash-over-tunisia-migration-deal-denounce-lack-of-results

[25] Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, “The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy,” 44.

[26] “Q&A: The UK’s Policy to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda,” Migration Observatory, accessed April 16, 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/qa-the-uks-policy-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda/

[27] Violeta Lax Moreno, and Martin  Lemberg Pedersen, “Border-Induced Displacement: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Distance-Creation through Externalization,” Questions of International Law (February 28, 2019), 17,http://www.qil-qdi.org/border-induced-displacement-the-ethical-and-legal-implications-of-distance-creation-through-externalization/.

[28] Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 163.

[29] Ibid

[30] Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2016),  2.

[31] Ibid, 13

[32] Ibid, 2

[33] Ibid, 3

[34] Ibid, 331

[35] Mark Galeotti, “How Migrants Got Weaponized,” Foreign Affairs, June 26, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/belarus/how-migrants-got-weaponized

 [36]Kelly M. Greenhill, “Morocco ‘weaponized’ migration to punish Spain. That’s more common than you think,” publ. online June 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/01/morocco-weaponized-migration-punish-spain-thats-more-common-than-you-think/

[37]“How Libya Holds the Key to Solving Europe’s Migration Crisis,” BBC News, publ. online July 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44709974

[38] Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign, 23

[39]“Italy Reups Funding to Force Migrants Back to Libya,” Human Rights Watch, publ. online February 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/01/italy-reups-funding-force-migrants-back-libya

[40] Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy, 30

[41] Ibid, 23

[42] Galeotti, “How Migrants Got Weaponized.”

[43] Aritz Parra, “An Ailing Sahrawi Leader Shakes Spain and Morocco’s Alliance,” AP News, publ. online May 2021, https://apnews.com/article/europe-spain-morocco-africa-health-f14419ce2f00ea07b0ac5c1d5c49e83c

[44]Ruben Andersson and David Keen, “‘Weapons of Mass Migration’: How States Exploit the Failure of Migration Policies,” The Guardian, publ. online December 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/14/weapons-of-mass-migration-how-states-exploit-the-failure-of-migration-policies

[45] Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy, 14

[46] Kelsey P Norman, “The Post-2015 Migration Paradigm in the Mediterranean,” Chapter. In Reluctant Reception: Refugees, Migration and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 172.

[47]Bouazza Ben Bouazza and Sam Metz, “Tunisia Rejects European Funds and Says They Fall Short of a Deal for Migration and Financial Aid,” AP News, publ. online October 2023, https://apnews.com/article/tunisia-europe-migration-851cf35271d2c52aea067287066ef247

[48] Ibid

[49] Tarek Amara, “Tunisia Rejects EU Financial Aid, Casting Doubt on an Immigration Deal | Reuters,” Reuters, publ. online October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/tunisia-rejects-eu-financial-aid-casting-doubt-an-immigration-deal-2023-10-02/

[50] Ibid

[51] Kelly M. Greenhill, “Morocco ‘weaponized’ migration to punish Spain. That’s more common than you think,” June 1, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/01/morocco-weaponized-migration-punish-spain-thats-more-common-than-you-think/

[52]  Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy, 4

[53]James C. Hathaway, “The Rights of Refugees under International Law,” 2005, 332-3 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511614859

[54] Hintjens and Bilgic, “The EU’s Proxy War on Refugees,” p. 85

[55] Dimitriadi and Okyay, “Are Partnerships with Third Countries an Effective Way Forward for EU Migration Management?”10

[56] “Q&A: The UK’s Policy to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda,” Migration Observatory, accessed April 16, 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/qa-the-uks-policy-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda/

[57] Emilie McDonnell, “UK Supreme Court Finds UK-Rwanda Asylum Scheme Unlawful,” Human Rights Watch,  publ. online November 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/15/uk-supreme-court-finds-uk-rwanda-asylum-scheme-unlawful

[58] UNHCR Press Release, ‘UNHCR deeply concerned over Lampedusa deportations’, 18 Mar. 2005.

[59] Ibid

[60] “Italy Reups Funding to Force Migrants Back to Libya,” Human Rights Watch, February 1, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/01/italy-reups-funding-force-migrants-back-libya

[61] Ibid

[62] Ibid

[63]Marco Scalvini, “Humanitarian Wars and Rejected Refugees,” OpenDemocracy website, 17 April 2011, accessed 17 April 2024, http://www.opendemocracy.net/marco-scalvini/humanitarian-wars-and-rejected-refugees

[64] “Europe has questions to answer over migrant abuse in Tunisia, say MEPs and activists,” The Guardian, September 20, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/sep/20/europe-has-questions-to-answer-over-migrant-abuse-in-tunisia-say-meps-and-activists

[65] Moreno and Pedersen, “Border-Induced Displacement: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Distance-Creation through Externalization,” 17

[66] Galeotti, “How Migrants Got Weaponized.”

[67]Jacob Poushter, “Refugees Stream into Europe, Where They Are Not Welcomed with Open Arms,” Pew Research Center, April 24, 2015, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2015/04/24/refugees-stream-into-europe-where-they-are-not-welcomed-with-open-arms/

[68] Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy,  5

[69] Eugene Quinn, “The Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Europe’s Challenge,” Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 105, no. 419 (2016): 275–85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24871398, 275

[70] Kelly M. Greenhill, “Open Arms behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis,” European Law Journal 22, no. 3 (May 2016): 317–32, https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12179, 323.

[71] Ibid, 324

[72] Claus Offe, Europe Entrapped (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 42.

[73] Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (London: Verso, 2014), 14.

[74] “President Meloni’s Press Statement during Her Visit to Lampedusa with President von Der Leyen,” www.governo.it, September 17, 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-press-statement-during-her-visit-lampedusa-president-von-der-leyen/23599

[75] Ibid

[76]“Press Statement by President von Der Leyen with Italian Prime Minister Meloni in Lampedusa,” European Commission – European Commission, September 17, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_4502

[77] “Tunisia Migration Deal a Model for Others, EU’s von der Leyen Says,” Reuters, July 23, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/tunisia-migration-deal-model-others-eus-von-der-leyen-says-2023-07-23/.

[78] Eleni Courea, “Rishi Sunak Defends Rwanda Plan during GB News Q&A Session,” The Guardian, publ. online February 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/feb/12/sunak-defends-rwanda-plan-to-doubtful-tv-audience

[79] Dimitriadi and Okyay, “Are Partnerships with Third Countries an Effective Way Forward for EU Migration Management?” 20.

[80] Governo Berlusconi (2010) Fermare l’immigrazione clandestina: stop agli sbarchi, espulsioni più semplici, www.governoberlusconi.it/page.php?idf=450&ids=452

[81] Thomas Graae Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Outsourcing Migration Management: EU, Power, and the External Dimension of Asylum and Immigration Policy,” Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006,  2

[82] Nicolas Camut, “Right Wing Set for Big Gains in 2024 EU Election, Polling Shows,” POLITICO, publ. online August 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/european-election-2024-polls-right-wing-big-gains/

[83] Greenhill, “Open Arms behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis,” 323.

[84] Jacob Poushter, “European Opinions of the Refugee Crisis in 5 Charts,” Pew Research Center, publ. online September 2016, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/

[85] Ibid

[86] Ibid

[87] Ibid

[88] Ibid

[89] Peter Andreas, Border Games (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2022),  7.

[90] Ibid

Since 2001, the Eastern Mediterranean has been one of the key gateways for refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants seeking to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. This route encompasses crossings to Greece, Cyprus (and to a lesser extent Bulgaria), primarily via Türkiye, but increasingly also from Lebanon and Libya. Against the backdrop of regional instability, the Eastern Mediterranean route has remained a constant point of attention for European Union (EU) policymakers—especially after 2015, when the Syrian refugee crisis thrust it into the spotlight.

Although the COVID-19 pandemic and global border closures briefly slowed movement, recent years have seen a steady uptick in arrivals, particularly in Greece, with Cyprus also experiencing record numbers of irregular entries compared to previous periods. Both countries face complex, mixed migratory flows, still largely transiting through Türkiye but with a noticeable surge in movements originating from Lebanon and Egypt.

The reports produced under the ‘Mediterranean Migration’ project delve into these evolving migration dynamics and the policy responses in Egypt, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Greece, looking at the period 2021-2024. While these countries occupy different positions in the migratory journey—whether as points of origin, transit, or destination—the research reveals striking similarities in how they navigate and attempt to manage these roles within the broader regional migration landscape.

Country Reports:

Country Report Cyprus

Country Report Egypt

Country Report Lebanon

Country Report Greece

Policy briefs by Country:

Policy brief  Cyprus

Policy brief Egypt

Policy brief Greece

Policy brief Lebanon

Synthesis Report:

Extensive, Synthesis Report

More information can be found here.

Triantafyllos Karatrantos, ELIAMEP Senior Research Fellow, explains the crisis in Kashmir and the conflict between India and Pakistan.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here.

Greece is entering a new phase in European unification. In addition to monetary union, we now have a defence union.

The Greek Defence Technological Industrial Base (GDTIB) is in a position to rise to this challenge. With the help of realistic public policies, it could be included in the top three DTIBs among the eleven frontline EU states, alongside those of Finland and Poland.

The successful integration of the GDTIB into the pan-European DTIB will strengthen the Greek Armed Forces, make the defence sector one of Greece’s economy most capital- and knowledge-intensive ones , and enhance Greece’s strategic alliances.

Specifically, the more that the GDIB exports to the pan-European DTIB as it grows by leaps and bounds, the more it will advance the productive and innovation capacities which Greece’s military deterrence needs in an era which has witnessed the return of ‘Big War’.

 

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Antonis Kamaras, ELIAMEP Research Associate.

Introduction

The acceleration of the EU’s emergence as a collective security provider, as well as the rising defence expenditures of all NATO member-countries, presents a unique set of opportunities for Greece’s Defence Technological Industrial Base (GDTIB). Namely, the opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the Greek Armed Forces; to make a meaningful contribution to the transformation of the Greek economic model; and to strengthen the country’s strategic alliances.

For these opportunities to be grasped, however, concerted policy action is required from the Greek government in such domains as industrial strategy, military procurement reform, and the strengthening of the country’s R&D ecosystem.

This brief note will begin by summarising the main contours of the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), as it is shaped by national and EU policy across Europe and connecting this fast-evolving EDTIB to Greek military, economic and strategic imperatives. Secondly, it will provide a profile of the GDTIB and its actual and latent capabilities. Thirdly, it will situate the GDTIB within its peer group—the DTIBs of the eleven Eastern front-line EU member-states, including Greece—and argue that the GDTIB can and should be one of the three leaders of this group, together with the DTIBs of Finland and Poland. Finally, it will conclude by suggesting the policy set that needs to be adopted to allow the GDTIB to grasp the opportunities that are arising to the benefit of Greece’s national interest.

The opportunity: the rise of the EDTIB

The European Commission’s White Paper on European Defence[1] has catalysed the policy debate on the future of the EDTIB both ahead of and subsequent to its publication.

In it, the Commission was able to recommend two important funding instruments. First, the exemption from the excessive deficit procedure allowing member countries that want to increase their defence spending to do so without breaching the EU’s fiscal rules. The take-up can rise to a cumulative 650 billion euros, should all 27 member states make use of it. And, second, the 150 billion euro SAFE lending facility, offered at concessionary rates similar to Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) loans. Critics have, however, estimated that the two fall short of the amounts that would be required to catalyse defence investment in Europe. It has been calculated that, for France, a 10 billion euro procurement project would, if funded through SAFE, provide an 18 million euro interest rate subsidy per annum[2].  Turning to those EU member countries who could make use of the escape from excessive deficit procedure option, they would still worry that markets could respond negatively, thereby raising their borrowing costs. More importantly, without joint EU borrowing—and thus funding—for defence, the incentives will simply not be there for EDTIB to achieve the economies of scale and interoperabilities that have eluded it thus far.

That being said, the White Paper is arguably more important as a loud and clear statement of intent for a strategically autonomous Europe, rather than for the specific funding instruments it recommends. In our estimation, as a means of funding European defence at a satisfactory level, these funding instruments will soon be overshadowed by joint bond issuance by the European Commission, or another agreed vehicle for joint bond issuance such as the European Stability Mechanism. This is because:

• The new German government has decided to remove the debt brake and generously fund its defence effort; it is untenable politically and operationally, for the effort to rebuild collective European defence to be imbalanced due to Germany’s much greater fiscal space[3].

• The US will accelerate its disengagement from Europe’s defence, with US troop withdrawals from the Continent very much on the cards, in its effort to counter China’s pacing threat[4], and this accelerated withdrawal will further weaken the influence of those EU countries (such as Holland) that are hostile to joint bond issuance. Importantly, replacing the US’s strategic enablers, such as satellite-based ISR and anti-missile defence, is so expensive it will require pan-European industrial collaboration and funding.

• The question mark hanging over the US dollar as a store of value and the world’s dominant reserve currency[5] will make the arguments for creating what the Draghi report called a ‘common safe asset’[6] even more compelling. This asset is jointly raised EU bonds, with a virtuous circle making rising bond issuance cheaper and thus more attractive for    EU member countries to borrow collectively to fund the common good of European defence. Relatedly, the European collective defence that this bond issuance will fund will add further credibility to the euro as a reserve currency. Markets will perceive a strengthened European defence as a pillar of EU cohesion, and hence of the credibility of its collective borrowing.

We underline that trends that are already ongoing argue for an adequately funded EDTIB well into the future. Nearly all NATO member countries, under pressure from the Trump Administration, have committed to raising their defence budget at 2 % as a floor not a ceiling. To grasp the order of magnitude, it has been estimated that had all EU member states spent 2 % of their GDP on their defence in 2006-2025, there would have been an additional 1.1. trillion euros in defence spending over the 15-year period[7]. Relatedly, S&P has calculated that were EU member-states to raise their defence expenditure from 2.67 % of GDP (the current NATO weighted average) to 5 % of GDP (the extreme upper range of the increase President Trump is pressuring  European countries to make), that would have resulted in annual defence expenditure increasing from 242 billion USD to 875 billion USD[8].

In terms of the specific defence domains and imperatives to which this trend in increased funding for the EDTIB is connected, we highlight the following:

1.  The need for stocks of war materiel both to be replenished, due to the assistance provided to Ukraine, but also raised to the level whereby Russia can be credibly deterred. To put this in context, according to credible calculations, in purchasing power parity terms Russia’s defence spending exceeded the totality of Europe’s defence spending in 2024, with an estimated Russian expenditure of 145.9 billion $ equating to 461.6 $ billion in PPP terms and exceeding Europe’s 457 $ billion[9]. The EU therefore needs to translate its decisive collective economic superiority over Russia into a decisive superiority in war materiel by substantially outspending Russia in PPP terms.
2. The need to achieve strategic autonomy from the US, which means that a rising percentage of the procurement meant to establish clear military superiority over Russia will have to be directed at European companies (including non-European companies—be they US, Israeli or Korean—which have taken the trouble to indigenize their operations in Europe). This strategic autonomy encompasses both expensive and cheap innovation, meaning it ranges from R&D in sixth-generation weapon systems such as warships and fighter aircraft to AI-driven drones, as well as strategic enablers historically provided by the US, such as strategic lift, spaced-based ISR and communications, antimissile defence, and last-generation fighter aircraft, which now need to be developed and manufactured by the EDTIB.
3. The imperative to ‘produce and buy European’ to achieve economies of scale through industrial consolidation and joint procurement, as well as the interoperability of the EU’s Armed Forces. Economies of scale will enable the EU to buy more kit cheaper, while interoperability will make for a more effective collective deterrence[10]. Indicatively, Europe provided 7 types of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and 9 types of self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine, compared to the US’s 1 and 2 respectively[11]. EU funding will serve these goals by subsidizing the intra-European collaborative production and procurement of defence articles, thus incentivizing both the manufacturing and the buying of EDTIB-developed and -manufactured equipment.
4. The need to raise fiscal commitments in defence to benefit European economies, in order to legitimize the diversion of scarce fiscal resources from social welfare to defence and to maximize direct and indirect wealth generation through an innovative EDTIB. This need also has a strong regional aspect, with national governments keen to ensure that the EDTIB makes a meaningful contribution to the economic wellbeing of their less well-developed regions[12].

In turn, the growth of the EDTIB and the way public policy structures this growth will afford the GDTIB the opportunity to contribute to vital Greek military, economic and strategic goals[13]. In particular:

• GDTIB sales volumes can increase manifold, product and services ranges can be expanded, allowing the GDTIB to invest in upgrading its production facilities, achieve economies of scale, and reinvest in R&D—thus enhancing the security of supply to the Greek Armed Forces and contributing to Armed Forces innovation, with the two altogether meaningfully strengthening the Hellenic Armed Forces’ deterrence.  In other words, a GDTIB that can be an important and effective member of the EDTIB is a GDTIB that can provide both a greater quantity and quality of war material to the Greek Armed Forces. Such a GDTIB accords with Greece’s need to deter against a ‘Big War’, as the disengagement of the US, together with the commensurately increase in Turkish revisionism, means that Greco-Turkish strategic rivalry involves not only two opposing Armed Forces, but also two opposing DTIBs[14].

• As a constituent member of the EDTIB, a dynamically growing GDTIB will most probably be the Greek economy’s most capital- and knowledge-intensive sector, and make a meaningful contribution to the transformation of the Greek economic model and its resulting ability to export high-value-added goods and services.

• Sales to other EU member states of critical war materiel (and its reverse: increasing Hellenic Armed Forces procurement from European firms) as well as participation in European defence supply chains and production consortia, will strengthen and expand Greece’s alliances with other EU member-states, thus enhancing EU solidarity with Greece in relation to the threat posed by Turkey. This alliance-building will not necessarily exclude Israel and the US, as their major defence companies will seek EU corporate partners in order to be eligible for EU funding. Importantly, the growing contribution of the Greek DTIB to the collective defence of the EU would also give Greece a correspondingly greater claim to that common European defence.

Considering all the above, we would claim that an effective GDTIB would, as a bona fide member of the EDTIB, be the industrial equivalent of Greece’s participation in the EU monetary union, as it would sustain Greece’s status as a core, not marginal, member of the EU, this time in the context of the EU’s collective defence endeavour.

The GDTIB: positioning and possibilities

We would argue that the GDTIB has been underestimated for three reasons: the corruption scandals that cast a shadow over the GDTIB in the post-Imia weapons procurement spree (1996-2008), mismanagement in major state-owned defence enterprises that created cost overruns and delays in executing contracts for the Hellenic Armed Forces, and the fiscal crisis that led to Ministry of National Defence (MND) orders to Greek defence firms drying up for over a decade[15].

Notwithstanding these factors, we highlight the following from the pre-fiscal crisis and fiscal crisis periods:

• At a time when other EU member-countries’ DTIBs were retrenching due to the post-1989 peace dividend dynamics, the post-Imia defence procurement spree meant that a number of both private and state-owned firms performed a critical subcontracting role in the manufacturing and servicing of highly advanced weapon systems, ranging from US Patriot batteries to German T214 submarines[16]. The value of the offset agreements involving GDTIB production in this same period, which lasted from the 1990s to the late 2000s, has been estimated at 2.5 billion euros[17] and involved industrial partnerships with four out of the eight top European defence firms: namely Rheinmettal, Leonardo, Dassault and Airbus.
• During the decade-long Greek defence procurement drought, the private firms survived and even grew on the basis of exports. The poster child of this development was Theon International, which manufactures night vision equipment, is entirely export-oriented, and counts some of the world’s most advanced militaries among its clients[18].
• The lack of national funding also meant that private and state defence firms, as well as university and research institute teams under the aegis of the MND, focused on PESCO and EDF funding. This placed Greece among the top 5 countries in terms of number of participants, right after the leading DTIB powerhouses of Germany, France, Italy and Spain. As a result, defence-related expertise has been accumulating, and the GDTIB is thoroughly familiar with the technologies and capabilities which the EDTIB has prioritised for future development[19]. Crucially, these technologies and capabilities address key challenges the EU must resolve to achieve strategic autonomy[20]—a strategic autonomy which, as we mentioned above, is no longer purely aspirational due to the behaviour of the second Trump Administration.
• The fiscal crisis catalysed an effective restructuring of the critical shipyard sector, with the Skaramanga, Elefsina and Syros shipyards being acquired by well-capitalised outside investors, and partial rationalization efforts being undertaken in state-owned firms in aerospace (EAV) and land weapon systems (EAS).
• Last but not least, a maturing start-up ecosystem (now more than 10 years old) has been created in Greece,[21] due to recognition that the Greek economy needs to become increasingly innovative if it is not to relapse into systemic crisis. Greek VCs are increasingly focusing on deep tech, and are more able to enter the defence market due to the European Investment Bank (EIB), which is its anchor investor, relaxing its dual use restrictions. The Hellenic Centre of Defence Innovation (HCDI), the less-than-two-years-old MND vehicle for funding defence innovation, which recently put out its first batch of calls, can now take advantage of this long-term effort in deep-tech start-up development.

In the post–fiscal–crisis environment, a geopolitically-assertive Turkey, the return of ‘Big War’ and territorial conquest in continental Europe, and the US’s accelerating focus on Asia, has kept Greece a top spender in terms of weapon-system acquisitions and upgrades[22]. While the first procurement wave of this period was off-the shelf, mostly from France and secondarily from Israel with little GDTIB input, it has laid the foundations of the Greek government’s current emphasis on 25 % GDTIB participation in all major procurement contracts with non-Greek firms. Importantly, the geopolitical motivation aligned with major procurement choices has catalysed engagement by the French and Israeli DTIBs with the GDTIB. In the former case, Group Naval shared on its own volition some subcontracting work for the Belharra frigates; in the latter, Israel’s IAI acquiring Intracom Defence Electronics, a leading Greek private-sector defence firm. F16 upgrades to the Viper configuration by EAV, and more generally the pick-up of Follow On Support (FOS) in the Hellenic Air Force and Army and Naval Aviation, have also boosted Greece’s aeronautical sector. There has been little activity, however, in FOS work in Greek armour, despite Greece having one of the largest, if not the largest, MBT and self-propelled artillery fleets in Europe.[23] In addition, as another bequest of the post-Imia procurement spree, there are at least two companies which are now part of the supply chain of the main German manufacturers of armoured vehicles—most prominently METKA, a member of METLEN, one of Greece’s leading industrial conglomerates.

Equally important for the GDTIB, over the last five to seven years, several events and processes have accelerated the development of Greek competencies in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4DI) domain, either in the private sector or through public and private partnerships outside core defence. We highlight:

1. The gathering pace of state digitization during and subsequent to the pandemic, with RRF funding prioritising digitisation. This has meant that both within the state, and in private sector firms contracted to implement a diverse set of digitisation projects, digital competencies have been deepening in Greece[24] with the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector projected to reach 4.6 % of GDP in 2029, which equals 10.4 billion euros in sales. Public and private partnerships have been proposed and are being implemented to expand the pool of ICT personnel[25]. This investment has also included AI which, designated a strategic priority due to its undeniable significance, is receiving a mixture of national and European funds channelled to Greek research institutes.
2. The Greek state has also invested considerably in civil defence competencies[26], including cyber, as well as in border surveillance. In the light of the rising potency of natural disasters, cyber-attacks and population movements, these domains are both inherently synergistic and highly adaptable to the purposes of national defence.
3. The pandemic also catalysed investment by multinational firms, mostly in IT functions serving an international client-base, which has further refined and expanded the Greek IT skill pool.

The importance of such developments for the GDTIB can hardly be exaggerated; indicatively, in the context of Civil Military Fusion (CMF), even companies engaged in IT in Ireland, a country with minuscule Armed Forces, aspire to integrate themselves into the EDTIB[27].

Becoming a leader among the DTIBs of Eastern frontline EU member-states

Greece is one of the eleven EU member-states which have eastern front-line status; the other ten are Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus. Greece’s DTIB strategy should therefore aim to both present itself as, and aspire to becoming, one of this peer group’s three leaders, along with Finland and Poland.

On a geographic distance from Moscow basis, Greece it is the only comparable high spender in defence within the EU-27 which is not physically proximate to Russia. In context, in 2024 the only EU member-states apart from Greece to spend above 3 % of GDP on defence were Poland, Estonia and Latvia, with Lithuania hovering under 3 % and Finland just under at a still high by EU standards 2.5 %[28] (Cyprus’ defence spending is just below 2 %; it should be borne in mind that the Greek Armed Forces are also organised to defend the island in an event of military conflict with Turkey). Of course, Greek defence spending is so high for the same reason, though the threat is not Russia, but Turkey and its aggressively revisionist agenda.

Establishing the GDTIB in the top three of this peer group will—given the high legitimacy the group enjoys (not for nothing are the EU Commissioners of External Affairs and Defence from the Baltic countries, while the Report which informed the EU’s Preparedness Strategy bears the name of an ex-President of Finland)—allow Greece to promote an agenda that much more effectively within the EU that is facilitative both of its wider national defence effort and of the development of its DTIB.

On the military side, an effective Greek DTIB in the top three of this peer group would translate into being able to provide equipment and solutions to all the front-line states, given the commonality of the threat environment.

On the economic side, Greece can develop a common agenda whereby above-average defence spending in the front-line states does not develop into an inequitable core-periphery relationship with the countries with the stronger DTIBs (such as Germany, France, Italy and Sweden) being the major beneficiaries of the transfer of resources from EU member-states with a weaker industrial base and fewer fiscal resources to develop such an industrial base. Not only would such an arrangement be inequitable, and thus ultimately unsustainable politically, it would also be wasteful of the skills and know-how that front-line states can mobilise in shaping the cause of an innovation-prone EDTIB[29]. And if Ukraine has proven anything, it is that those nation-states which face the greatest existential threat also have the greatest incentive to innovate defence-wise.

In this context, Greece can partner with Poland and other Central Eastern European (CEE) front-line states to demand a partial recycling of their defence expenditures into their own R&D defence efforts. This would allow their DTIBs to mitigate the core-periphery last-link-in-the-chain conundrum—a policy challenge that has been particularly prominent for CEE countries since their accession to the EU[30].

On the strategic side, Greece shares a geopolitical hedging strategy with all the other front-line states[31], whereby they purchase some of their highly advanced weapon systems from non-EU defence firms, primarily from the US and secondarily from such close US allies as the UK, Israel and Korea. We mention, indicatively, the decision taken by Finland and Greece to buy US F35s, Greece’s prioritization of Israeli systems for its air defence, and Poland’s acquisition of US Abrams and Korean K2 MBTs. Greece therefore has an interest in developing a common agenda which: a) enables, under conditions acceptable to other EU member-states and premised on European indigenisation, the participation of the DTIBs  of non-EU member countries in the common EU defence , and b) excludes Turkey from this arrangement, for as long as Ankara  avoids joining the EU’s democratic and geopolitical canon. Indicative of the possibilities of developing a joint agenda of this sort is the annulment in 2014 of the sale of two Mistral amphibious assault ships to the Russian Federation by President Francois Hollande, following a concerted lobbying effort by the Baltic countries and Poland[32].

Is such leadership a realistic prospect, however, and are the benefits that would accrue from it feasible? The answer is a decisive yes.

Unlike Greece, all the CEE countries underinvested in defence in the 1990s and 2000s. This meant they could not benefit from the extensive industrial partnerships and knowhow transfer which, as we pointed out above, forms the foundations of Greece’s current DTIB[33]. The fact that defence was not a priority sector, given the peace dividend dynamics, particularly in Germany, meant that far less effort was expended on trying to incorporate the strong manufacturing sectors of CEE countries into defence-sector supply chains than, say, the civilian automotive sector.  Typically, countries like Bulgaria and Romania underinvested in their Eastern Bloc–vintage defence sectors, which mostly exported military equipment of Soviet origin in Africa and Asia. Accelerating efforts to rearm, particularly after the conquest of Crimea by the Russian Federation, could not make up for this lost time, while the most ambitious rearmament effort of all, by Poland, prioritized speed of delivery and/or cementing the security relationship with the US. Poland, which has undertaken the most ambitious rearmament effort of all EU member-states, has also experienced deep-seated politicization and limited R&D expenditure leading to the under-performance of its DTIB, in a situation not unlike that in Greece[34].

Limited interest in defence, or in the EU as a collective defence provider, as well as the small size of several of the eleven front-line states, also meant a limited uptake of EDF and PESCO facilities. In contrast to Greece, which belongs to the ‘vanguard’ category in terms of its PESCO/EDF uptake, Poland and Romania are in the ‘lukewarm’ category, while Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Cyprus are in the ‘loiterer’ category[35].

Furthermore, extensive FDI undertaken by Greek corporations in Bulgaria and Romania post-1989, coupled with a leading Greek presence in the Cypriot economy, means that Greek conglomerates already own subsidiaries in these three peer countries that could be part of a Group approach in terms of defence-related production. No doubt, due to the growth of the EDTIB, there will be additional incentives for M&A acquisitions in defence, with Greek corporates taking the initiative as integrators and mobilisers of needed capital.

Last but not least, Greece is also number two among Eastern front-line states on the European Innovation Scoreboard, after Finland (admittedly, the gap is a large one)[36]. Among the larger front-line countries that can occupy the top three DTIB positions, Finland is number three among the EU-27 on the European Innovation Scoreboard, while Greece is number 20, Hungary number 21, Poland number 23, Slovakia number 24, Bulgaria number 26 and Romania number 27. This means that the Greek research ecosystem can sustain Greek leadership among the front-line peer group. Even more so if, through its own and the European funding facilities this paper recommends, it manages to entice to defence-relevant domains a critical mass of its US-based scientists, given that this scientific pool is the deepest not only within the front-line peer group but among all EU-27 member countries bar Germany, and only then in absolute not relative-to-general-population terms[37].

We would be remiss in this analysis if we failed to highlight Finland’s leading status among the ten front-line countries, Greece included, in terms of the governance, strategic focus and outcomes of its DTIB[38]. Finland’s DTIB has actually benefited from Finland’s strategic isolation, which has translated into efficient use of scarce resources, a focus on an extensive Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) effort which has resulted in the life cycles of weapon systems procured from abroad being maintained and extended, efficient niche strategies—in, for instance, ship hull design and manufacturing—which have addressed the particular needs of the Finnish Defence Forces, and a distinct lack of corruption and politicization in the DTIB.  This set of features constitute a compelling template for Greece and Poland. As they seek to improve the performance of their DTIBs, and considering that the status of the US as the ultimate guarantor of their territorial integrity is now uncertain, it behoves them to see their respective DTIBs as a genuine, not nominal, pillar of their deterrence —just as Finland has done for decades.

Greek leadership of such a peer group would, of course, require recognition by the other nine members that such a group does exist, and that it is useful for each and all of its constituent members for this group to exist. We would argue that Greece’s status as the only Mediterranean country, together with Cyprus, to be a front-line state in the EU’s east validates both these propositions for three interdependent reasons. First, because it makes the imperatives of territorial defence a cause that is not limited to the centre and north of Europe’s eastern border, but also extends to the south. Second, because it makes this cause agnostic to the origin of the threat, thus universalizing it, increasing its normative strength within the EU along, by extension, with the credibility of the EU’s collective defence—a feature even more important today when even Denmark’s territorial integrity is being questioned from the West (i.e. the US). Third, because it adds numbers to the particular concerns of front-line states—ensuring that defence funding integrates elements that are equitable, for instance,  and enable the full participation of all EU member-states in the innovation that European collective defence needs and from which the economies of EU member states can benefit.

Building on the foundations of Greece’s extant DTIB

Given its present status, the GDTIB can, with the appropriate level of government support, become one of the three leaders of the eleven front-line EU DTIBs. Achieving this would translate into major benefits for the effectiveness of the Greek Armed Forces, the competitiveness of its economy, and the strength of its alliances. We believe that the following set of policies can be decisive in achieving this goal.

1. Fully capitalize the state-owned defence enterprises, namely EAV and EAS, and lift all restrictions on their managerial authority by taking them off Central Government supervision, as in their ability to offer competitive salaries. Doing so will a) improve their performance in critical undertakings for the Greek Armed Forces, as in case of EAV’s F16 upgrades to the Viper configuration and FOS on the Hellenic Army and Hellenic Navy Aviation branches; b) secure the human and capital equipment resources, in the case of EAS, required to allow the GDTIB to partake in the restocking of critical munitions at the pan-European level; c) allow the GDTIB to participate in newly-founded pan-European consortia for next-generation weapon platforms, as much as in the creation of European strategic enablers that will replace those historically provided by the US.

In a nutshell, the Greek government needs to invest amply in order to ensure: (a) that these two firms’ spare capacity is fully utilised   in terms of facilities, production lines – including testing sites – and skilled personnel, as spare capacity is in great demand throughout Europe due to the decades-long running down of the EDIIB, from 1989 to 2022; (b) with additional funding and expertise-injection, their embedded knowledge and skills become a stepping stone to participation in pan-European consortia, not only as subcontractors but also as innovative developers able to capture part of the value added to be created. After an accelerated restructuring effort of this sort, both EAV and EAS will also become attractive acquisition targets to both Greek and non-Greek investors, thus leveraging the government effort via additional inflows of capital and expertise. The private-sector firms, by aggressively expanding the manufacturing capability of their defence subsidiaries through ambitious investment plans (as in the case of METLEN most prominently[39]) are proof positive of what these two state-controlled enterprises can aspire and plan to achieve within the EDTIB, if liberated from their present constraints.

2. If Thessaloniki-based ELVO has retained important production capabilities and licenses—meaning spare capacity that can be resuscitated-ensure that ELVO acquires a credible industrial owner so that it play a role similar to that of EAV and EAS in its domain of expertise, which is military vehicles assembly and their FOS. As per the White Paper recommendations, investors in ELVO and other defence firms in Greece’s regions could make use of EU Cohesion funding, but only if Greek central and regional authorities act fast and make full use of the scheduled revision of this funding source.

3. Double the budget of HCDI, so it can issue more calls and finalise more contracts in order both to accelerate the introduction of innovative technologies in the Hellenic Armed Forces and to give Greek defence high-tech firms a fighting chance to export their goods and services in the pan-European market with the added credibility of already having the Greek Armed Forces as a client. Employ this additional HCDI allocation to defence tech and dual use firms which can submit proposals, on their own or in partnership with research teams from universities and research institutes, to HCDI beyond the remit of the calls issued by the latter. By doing so, HCDI can catalyse the growth of the GDTIB as a growing number of companies and research teams will be able to consider potential defence applications of their technologies and knowledge. We mention here that dual use investments are included in the White Paper and accepted as bona fide investments in defence by the GOFOG classification system. Relatedly, Turkey is dedicating a bit more than 10 % of its public R&D budget to defence compared with a little less than 5 % in Greece[40].

We also note that enhancing the ability of Greek defence tech and dual use firms to produce asymmetric advantages for the Greek Armed Forces, and  enhance Greek deterrence, is synergistic with the defence effort of the other ten frontline EU member-countries; they face similar operational challenges, ranging from Finland’s archipelagic defence in the Baltic Sea to enhanced border surveillance in Poland.

Enhancing the funding of defence startups can have another advantage: drawing to Greece startups with diaspora founders who, apart from gaining access to cost-competitive skilled staff in Greece, may also gain a ‘passport’ into a growing European defence market. Also reserve fiscal space for these deep-tech, Greek-only procurements so that successful prototyping can be converted into production and deployment by the Hellenic Armed Forces without delay.

4. Expand the FOS budget to all functional and upgradable platforms on a value-for-money basis, so that the Hellenic Armed Forces rapidly restore their strength and the GDTIB both gains valuable expertise and is further integrated into pan-European value chains. This imperative is particularly pertinent with regard to land systems, as in the case of MBTs and self-propelled artillery.

5. Strengthen the scientific capacity of the General Secretariat for Defence Investments and Acquisitions by hiring high-quality permanent civilian staff. On the basis of lessons learned from Ukraine about procurement in wartime, revamp the MND’s procurement processes. Also judiciously adopt Israeli practices aimed at enabling civilian firms to design and implement defence solutions, so that CMF can be better implemented in the defence domain in Greece. With additional technical expertise and facilitative processes, the MND would be able to catalyse defence innovation undertaken by the GDTIB, and especially innovation originating from Greece’s dynamically growing ICT sectors, as highlighted above[41].

6. In view of the tumult in the US research ecosystem, create a fund designated to attract top Greek diaspora scientists specialising in defence-relevant domains ranging from aerospace to automotive technology to AI, so as to deepen the scientific capital from which the GDTIB can draw ideas, and to enable its integration into the most cutting edge EDTIB projects. We reiterate that Greece has, relative to its population, by far the most numerous and distinguished scientific diaspora (i.e. Greek nationals who received their undergraduate education in Greece) in the US among the EU-27.matching.

7. Be ready to offer matching funds, as per the recommendation of the PWC study on Greek manufacturing, in order to allow the major firms in the GDTIB to participate in the more ambitious EDTIB consortia. There should be a particular focus here on sea warfare, manned and autonomous, given Greek shipyards’ ability to exploit synergies with their civilian work, which itself benefits significantly from its access to the globally dominant Greek merchant marine. Put in place the foundations for this process now by reviewing and selecting for future support the most promising domains among the EDF and PESCO projects in which Greek defence firms and research teams have participated. Such matching funds should be from national and not EU sources so as to ensure timely decision making in accordance with a national prioritisation strategy.

8. In coordination with the ten other frontline EU member-states, which spend far more than all other EU member-states on defence, undertake the initiative to receive disproportionate R&D funding for defence from collective EU funding sources on the basis of the national weighted average spending on defence as a percentage of GDP over the last five years. Such an initiative needs to be contextualized by the fact that, in the growing European defence market, frontline states would tend to channel a growing percentage of their comparatively larger defence budgets to non-frontline states such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain (and the UK which, while a non-EU member, is asked to financially contribute to common European defence) which have the most highly advanced DTIBs. Include in this support scheme the proposed institution of the EU professor: leading scholars from member-states, either resident or repatriated, who will have their salaries paid directly by the EU, so they may be compensated above the low civil service salaries in their homelands, which would render their repatriation unfeasible.

We underline that, barring such remedies, the growth of the EDTIB will further entrench intra-EU disparities as stronger national DTIBs, and better-funded national research ecosystems, would be able to attract the lion’s share of the collective resources the EU allocates for defence.

9. Aggressively pursue military mobility funding opportunities from the EU, so as to further increase Greece’s significance for the EU’s common defence, and cement relations with the other frontline member-states while improving the transportation infrastructure in Northern Greece.

10. Utilise the recently established General Secretariat of National Defence to coordinate the ministries of National Defence, Finance, Development, Citizen Protection, Education, Merchant Marine, and Digital Governance in pursuit of the policy aims listed above, as well as others aimed at facilitating the growth of the GDTIB.

Concluding Remarks

Considering both existing and highly probable trends in the funding of the EDTIB, as well as the foundations of the extant GDTIB and Greek dual use competencies, it is well within Greece’s grasp to build one of the top three DTIBs among the EU’s eleven front-lines states in the years to come.

Doing so will prove decisive in upgrading the deterrence of the Greek Armed Forces in an era of ‘Big War’, creating the most knowledge- and capital-intensive sector in the Greek economy, and putting Greece at the core of the EU’s collective defence effort.

This task is well within Greece’s fiscal and reform capacity.

Judicious recapitalisations and reforms in the major state-owned defence firms will position them so they can contribute to the restocking of Europe’s war materiel and participate in the next-generation weapon-systems development and manufacturing undertaken by pan-European consortia.

An increase in funding to defence deep tech linked to reforms in weapons procurement can also rapidly boost the Greek Armed Forces’ asymmetric advantages and create export opportunities to the EDTIB.

Larger private-sector core defence and dual use firms can also grow further and deepen their links with the EDTIB on the back of FOS provided to the Greek Armed Forces, as well as their ability to act as subcontractors to Greece’s major foreign suppliers of highly-advanced weapon systems. With matching funds by the Greek state, they will be able to build on their FOS and subcontractor skills to add value, on their own or as members of consortia, through de novo weapon systems developed via common EU funding.

Finally, all three cohorts of the GDTIB stand ready to make use of investments by the Greek state and the EU in Greece’s research ecosystem, as in the case of subsidising dual use consortia including both firms and research teams, repatriating distinguished defence-relevant scientists from the Greek diaspora, and funding basic and applied research applicable to defence purposes.

Almost a quarter of a century ago, and following years of systematic policy effort, Greece reaffirmed its status as a core member of the EU by adopting the euro as its currency. It is now well within the nation’s capabilities, as well as vital to its national interest, to maintain this status by developing an effective DTIB which is instrumental to both national and European defence.

[1] European Commission, White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, March 12 2025.

[2] Wolff, Guntram, Steinbach, Armin and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, The governance and funding of European Rearmament, Policy Brief 15/25, Bruegel, April 2025.

[3] For the political implications within the EU of an unbalanced growth of the German Armed Forces, see Kimmage, Michael and David-Wilp, Sudha, The Zeitenwende is real this time – Germany’s defense upgrade is necessary but could upset Europe’s balance of power, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2025.

[4] For an analysis of the ‘Asia first’ policy strain in the US, crystallised in the recent appointment of Elbridge Colby as Under Secretary for Policy at the Department of Defence, see Brands, Hal, Putting “Asia First” could cost American the world”, Bloomberg Opinion, August 5, 2024.

[5] For a comment on these dynamics see, Martin, Felix, Europe can take advantage of King Dollar’s wobble, Breaking Views – Reuters, April 25 2025.

[6] Draghi, Mario. “The Future of European Competitiveness Part A: A competitiveness strategy for Europe.” (2024).

[7] Clapp, Sebastian, Reinforcing Europe’s defence industry, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2024.

[8] Bellesia, Riccardo, Gill, Frank, European Defense Funding: What are the options? Standard and Poors, February 13 2025.

[9] Mackenzie, Lucia, Russian defense spending overtakes Europe, study finds, Politico, February 12, 2025.

[10] Clapp, Sebastian, Delivorias, Angelos, Lazarou, Elena, Pari, Marianna,                Financing the European defence industry, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2024.

[11] See, Wolff, Guntram, Steinbach, Armin and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, The governance and funding of European Rearmament, Policy Brief 15/25, Bruegel, April 2025.

[12] For a typical example of the political legitimation of rising defence spending see, Partington, Richard, Rachel Reeves vows to use defence spending to support UK’s ‘left behind’ industrial towns, Guardian, March 4 2025.

[13] The author has adopted the perspective of a national DTIB meeting a nation-state’s military, economic and strategic goals from Dorman, Andrew, Matthew Uttley, and Benedict Wilkinson. “A benefit, not a burden. The security, economic and strategic value of Britain’s defence industry.” Policy Institute at King’s Policy Paper (2015).

[14] For the need to prepare for a long war of attrition, and thus also deter such a war, see Freedman, Lawrence, D,. The Age of Forever Wars, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2025.

[15] For an account of the GDTIB see, Kamaras, Antonis, The Greek Defence Sector: Turning the page?, Policy Paper 126, ELIAMEP, February 2023.

[16] The following unpublished study is the most comprehensive treatment of this aspect of the GDTIB: Vlahou, Paraskevi, Defence Industry, Sectoral Study 222,IOVE, March 2009 (in Greek, unpublished).

[17] This figure has been tabulated in the following unpublished study: Mosholios, Panagiotis, Domestic Defence Industry Past-Present-Future, PASOK, March 2025 (in Greek, unpublished).

[18] See Theon International. Theon received new orders in January 2025 totaling 53 million euros, with embedded new options for an additional 95.5 million euros. It also joined the German Future Soldier Program on February 7 2025.

[19] See, Blavoukos, Spyros, Politis-Lamprou, Panos, Dellatolas, Thanos, Mapping EU Defence Collaboration – One Year on from the Versailles Declaration, Policy Paper 133, ELIAMEP, April 20 2023.

[20] For an analysis of the relation between these instruments and the EU’s strategic autonomy see, Fiott, Daniel, Strategic Autonomy: towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence?, European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018.

[21]See, indicatively, Adams, Lucy, Greece’s tech sector grew 15 % in 2024, Tech.eu, January 2 2025.

[22] For a review of current and future procurement decisions by the MND see, Feistead, Peter, Hellenic defence procurement poised to embark on a new modernization plan, EURO-SD, April 28 2025.

[23] See, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “Building Defence Capacity in Europe: An Assessment.” (2024).

[24] The growth of the ICT sectors has been well-documented in Greece, with the pandemic in particular and the post pandemic RRF funded state digitization acting as a catalyst. See indicatively, Deloitte, Study of the sufficiency of ICT specialists in the Greek labour market, December 2022 and Deloitte, The prospect of the ICT sector in Greece, December 2024.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Investments in civil defence have increased know-how of the use of drones and of sophisticated command and control systems while in Greece’s newly established National Cybersecurity Authority, a distinguished MIT scientist has assumed the reins. See indicatively, European Investment Bank, Greece to bolster civil protection with new EIB loan of 220 million euros, April 12 2024 and Ministry of Digital Governance, Michail Bletsas is the governor of the National Cybersecurity Authority, April 24 2024 (Υπουργείο Ψηφιακής Διακυβέρνησης, Ο Μιχάλης Μπλέτσας Διοικητής Της Εθνικής Αρχής Κυβερνοσφάλειας).

[27] See Webber, Jude, Tech Groups pivot to defence in neutral Ireland as EU rearms, Financial Times, April 28 2025.

[28] See, Wolff, Guntram, Steinbach, Armin and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, The governance and funding of European Rearmament, Policy Brief 15/25, Bruegel, April 2025.

[29] For a need for such an arrangement see, Witney, Nick, Commissioning defence: how to build a European defence Union, October 30 2024.

[30] For a discussion in particular of Poland’s developmental cul de sac, due to the hierarchical supply chain system which has driven its growth post 1989, see Boguslawski, Jan, Economic dependence curbs Poland’s rise, Politico, June 22 2023.

[31] Based on the ‘European Defence in a New Age’ research project, to which the author has been participating, and which profiles most national DTIBs in Europe, see indicatively,  Molling, Christian, Helmonds, Soren eds, Security, Industry and the lost European vision, DGAP Report, No 10, October 2023.

[32] For a discussion from a Greek perspective of the Mistral Case see, Kamaras, Antonis. “Greece’s call for an embargo on weapons sales to Turkey.” Policy Paper, 44, November 2020.

[33] Molling, Christian, Helmonds, Soren eds, Security, Industry and the lost European vision, DGAP Report, No 10, October 2023.

[34] See, Minder, Raphael, Poland struggles to rearm for era of war on its borders, Financial Times, May, 4 2025.

[35] See, Blavoukos, Spyros, Politis-Lamprou, Panos, Dellatolas, Thanos, Mapping EU Defence Collaboration – One Year on from the Versailles Declaration, Policy Paper 133, ELIAMEP, April 20 2023.

[36] See, European Commission, European Innovation Scoreboard, 2024.

[37] See, Yuret, Tolga. “An analysis of the foreign-educated elite academics in the United States.” Journal of Informetrics 11.2 (2017): 358-370.

[38] For these features of Finland’s DTIB see, Suorsa, Olli Pekka, and Brendon J. Cannon. “Ensuring security of supply: pragmatic defence autarky and Finland’s defence industry.” Defence Studies (2025): 1-21.

[39] Findikakis George, METLEN’S plan for the next day in 12 slides, euro.2day.gr, April 29,2025 [Φιντικάκης Γιώργος, Το σχέδιο της ΜΕΤΛΕΝ για την επόμενη μέρα σε 12 διαφάνειες, euro2day.gr].

[40] Mejino-Lopez, Juan, Wolff, Guntram, A European defence strategy in a hostile world, Policy Brief 29/24, Bruegel, November 2024.

[41] Ukraine and Israel are the templates for institutionalising the integration of technologies originating from the civilian sector into Armed Forces operations through suitable procurement processes and technical support for innovative firms. See respectively Bondar, Kateryna, How Ukraine Rebuilt Its Military Acquisition System Around Commercial Technology, Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2025 and Evron, Yoram. “4IR technologies in the Israel Defence Forces: blurring traditional boundaries.” Defence Innovation and the 4th Industrial Revolution. Routledge, 2022. 122-143.

• The EU Internal Security Strategy comes to complete the Union’s institutional security architecture until 2030, functioning as the inner circle of the ven diagram composed of the EU Strategy for Preparedness Union for preventing and responding to emerging threats and crises and the European Defence White Paper.
• The main feature of this new strategy is the concept and goal of Protection, which is why it is called ProtectEU.
• Security issues must be integrated into all EU legislation, policies and programmes, including EU external action.
• The Strategy reflects a broad list of threats, which are significantly influenced by the situation in the EU’s neighboring regional subsystems and, at the same time, have many interconnections with hybrid threats.
• It is based on four central pillars that function as umbrellas of actions: anticipate, detect, prevent and respond.
• The Commission will propose an ambitious revision of Europol’s mandate to transform it into a truly operational police service, better supporting Member States.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Triandafyllos Karatrantos, ELIAMEP Senior Research Fellow.

This Working paper draws on the emerging literature that has established that the employment rates and the earnings of men and women start to diverge once they have children, with women’s labour market performance deteriorating, while that of men’s left unaffected or even improving. This phenomenon has been dubbed the motherhood penalty (or the child penalty). The size of the penalty is affected by the choices parents make as regards employment and childcare, which in turn are affected by gender norms, instilled in women and men early in life, but also by public policies aiming to establish a better work-life balance and help working mothers and fathers combine bringing up a child with pursuing a career. The paper reviews cultural norms and institutional arrangements as potential determinants of mothers’ employment in two polar cases: Greece (where female employment is low, and child penalties large) compared to Norway (where female employment is high, and child penalties are virtually non-existent). The paper concludes with a list of policy recommendations, inspired by our understanding of the gradual emergence of family-friendly work-life policies in Norway, and informed by our awareness of constraints facing policy makers in Greece.

Read here in pdf the Working paper by: Manos Matsaganis, Head, Greek and European Economy Programme, ELIAMEP; A. G. Leventis Foundation Senior Research Fellow; Professor, Polytechnic University, Milan; Tone Fløtten, Senior Researcher, FAFO Institute for Labour and Social Research, Oslo; Chrysa Papalexatou, Research Fellow, Greek and European Economy Programme, ELIAMEP; European Institute, London School of Economics; Daphne Nicolitsas, Research Associate, Greek and European Economy Programme, ELIAMEP;
Assistant Professor, University of Crete and Bjorn Dapi, Researcher, FAFO Institute for Labour and Social Research, Oslo.

 

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for March 2025.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimeri), Greece may receive more than the originally agreed 600 US-made Switchblade drones as increased production has lowered costs, defense officials say. As mentioned in earlier versions of the Transatlantic Periscope brief, the Greek military had secured a deal for Switchblade 300 block 20 and Switchblade 600 loitering munitions worth $75 million, with $50 million funded through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. However, with manufacturer AeroVironment ramping up production, the US has informed Athens that more drones could be acquired under the existing budget.

On March 18, 2025, a bilateral meeting was held between a delegation of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) and the U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Africa (MFEA) at “Papagos” camp, in Athens. The HNDGS delegation was headed by 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) Commander, Major General Dimitrios Drosos, representing the Commander of the Hellenic Special Warfare Command (SWC), while on behalf of the US MFEA, the meeting was attended by its Commander, Major General Robert B. Sofge, accompanied by members of his staff and officials from the U.S. Embassy in Greece. The discussions focused on the framework and opportunities for joint training of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) with the Greek marine in Greece, with the aim to further enhance the close cooperation between the Special Operations Forces of both countries in the near future.

National Defense Minister Nikos Dendias met on March 19 with US Embassy Chargé d’Affaires Maria Olson at the Hellenic Ministry of National Defense. Dendias posted on X that they discussed “bilateral defence relations and the ways they could be further strengthened. We also exchanged views on the regional and international security challenges.”

US president Donald Trump celebrated Greek Independence Day, hosting an event at the White House on March 24. “The legacy of the Greeks is all around us. It surrounds us,” he told a group from the Greek-American community gathered at the White House before signing a proclamation recognizing March 25 as Greek Independence Day in the US, “celebrating 204 years of glorious Greek sovereignty and freedom.” “Perhaps the greatest gift we have inherited from this amazing culture is our incredible Greek-American community, now more than 3 million strong,” he added. The US president was accompanied by Archbishop Elpidophoros of America, who congratulated him on his re-election.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

Migration management has become a critical axis of foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, moving beyond its traditional framing as a humanitarian or administrative challenge. Within Greek–Turkish relations, human mobility now functions as a means of exerting pressure, projecting power, and renegotiating geopolitical roles. The 2020 Evros crisis underscored this dynamic, triggering strategies that transcend the bilateral level and involve both European and regional actors. This report analyses the Evros crisis and the broader strategic approaches of Turkey and Greece through the lens of migration diplomacy, drawing on concepts such as issue-linkage and rent-seeking. It examines both coercive and cooperative tactics employed by the two states and the European Union’s often contradictory or defensive role. Finally, the report calls for a more resilient and institutionally coherent strategy that respects humanitarian principles and integrates migration into a broader vision of foreign policy and regional cooperation.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy Paper by Gerasimos Tsourapas, Professor of International Relations at the University of Glasgow; Non-Resident Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

The White Paper on the Future of European Defence, released in March 2025, represents a landmark initiative by the European Commission to articulate a cohesive vision for strengthening the EU’s defence posture amid mounting geopolitical instability. Acting as a framework for the ReArm Europe plan, the document proposes mobilising hundreds of billions of EUR in defence investments, making use of national and EU resources.

The ReArm Europe Plan and the White Paper clearly succeed in politically signalling the EU’s renewed commitment to defence investment and military readiness. However, despite their rhetorical strength, four major concerns could undermine their transformative potential:

1. Coordination gaps: Without a robust coordination mechanism, national funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic – objectives and interests. In the meantime, the Union will not achieve effectiveness and efficiency unless it focuses on standardisation and interoperability.
2. Financial markets’ sensitivity: While the activation of the national escape clause offers fiscal leeway, it is unclear how the financial markets will react to increased national debts. Alternative instruments, such as the Defence Eurobonds or the European Defence Mechanism, could be examined.
3. Creative ambiguity: The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation includes references presented vaguely enough to allow for multiple interpretations and thus avoid frictions. In view of the negotiations in the Council, the issue of a third country’s participation in a procurement consortium must be further elaborated and clarified.
4. Democratic legitimacy and parliamentary oversight: Article 122 TFEU sidesteps the European Parliament, despite the latter’s willingness to further support the EU defence initiatives. Without adequate parliamentary involvement, defence investments risk alienating public opinion in a policy area which requires broad societal consensus.

All the aforementioned shortcomings reflect a deeper structural issue: the absence of a common threat perception and a truly common foreign and security policy. Without a coherent strategic vision at the EU level, member-states remain inclined to prioritise national over collective objectives and interests.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Spyros Blavoukos, Senior Research Fellow, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Programme; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, EU Policies and Institutions Programme, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

In response to the new geopolitical and geoeconomic realities – including but not limited to the protracted Russian war on Ukraine and the Trump 2.0 administration – and following the earlier announcement of the ReArm Europe Plan, the White Paper on the Future of European Defence was published in March 2025. The White Paper outlines the path to enhanced EU defence capabilities and aims to mobilise hundreds of billions of EUR, detailing measures to finance and strengthen the EU’s military readiness.

The White Paper features well-intentioned objectives and its communication strategy was well orchestrated. It does provide answers to two key questions: first, where the money will come from and second, in what defence capabilities the EU is going to invest. Starting from the former, in the best-case scenario, national resources up to €650 billion will be mobilised through the activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which defines the fiscal governance framework for the EU member-states and sets rules for constraining national government deficit and debt. In essence, this clause will allow member-states to accommodate additional defence spending. The €650 billion will be topped by EU resources of up to €150 billion that will be gathered through the common issuance of bonds, as envisaged by the new SAFE instrument. In addition to these €800 billion, the White Paper proposes four additional -but rather vague and not quantified- ways to step up defence spending: a) redirecting existing EU funds towards defence (e.g., cohesion funds), b) contributions from the European Investment Bank (EIB), c) private investments, and d) ensuring financial predictability for the European defence industry in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), currently under negotiation. Overall, the resources envisaged in the White Paper are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Envisaged resources for EU defence in the White Paper

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Regarding the capability needs, the White Paper identifies seven priority areas: Air and missile defence, Artillery systems, Ammunition and missiles, Drones and counter-drone systems, Military Mobility, AI, Quantum, Cyber & Electronic Warfare and strategic enablers & critical infrastructure protection. Additionally, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation (i.e., the €150 billion funding instrument mentioned above that accompanies the White Paper) refers to the following two categories of defence products, the common procurement of which will be funded:

1. Category One: ammunition and missiles, artillery systems, small drones and related anti-drone systems, critical infrastructure protection, cyber and military mobility, and
2. Category Two: air and missile defence, drones (other than small ones) and related anti-drone systems, strategic enablers, space assets protection, AI and electronic warfare.

 ‘Money Makes the World Go Round’: Financing EU Defence

National resources for defence

In 2023, the EU member-states spent €279 billion on defence, marking an almost 10% increase in defence spending compared to 2022 (€254 billion). Approximately one fourth of this expenditure (26%) was directed to research, development and procurement of defence equipment.[1] In 2024, the total defence expenditure made by the EU member-states reached (provisionally) €326 billion, an almost 17% rise compared to 2023, which amounts to 1.9% of the EU’s GDP and is very close to the 2% NATO requirement. These figures are in line with the broader, decade-long trend of increased military spending, especially fuelled by the Russian invasion into Ukraine in 2022.

Still, Europe is lagging in military deterrence and defence, and much more money needs to be poured to close the gap in terms of military capabilities, especially should the US truly reconsider its military presence in Europe. This is the underlying logic behind the proposal to create additional fiscal space for member-states to invest more in defence, bypassing the strict framework of the EU’s macroeconomic governance. The ReArm Europe plan calls for such a fiscal margin for higher defence expenditures (of up to €650 billion) through the coordinated activation of the national escape clause by the member-states. The national escape clause will apply from 2025 to 2028, for expenditure up to 1.5% of GDP.  The reference year is 2021, i.e., the last pre-war year when the EU member-states had spent €214 billion on defence. In other words, if the national escape clause has been activated and a member-state’s increase of military expenditure remains within the 1.5% ceiling, the excessive deficit procedure will not be launched, even if the total budget deficit exceeds the limits set by the revised rules of the fiscal and macroeconomic governance framework. The EU’s executive branch has invited all – interested – member-states to submit a request to activate this escape clause by the end of April 2025. The member-states’ requests will be coordinated by the Council in order to accelerate the process, and the recommendations activating the national escape clause(s) will be adopted by qualified majority voting (QMV).

On- and Off-EU Budget resources for defence

Besides the financial resources under the full control of each member-state’s government at the national level, there are two main channels of financing defence-related activities at the EU level: first, a direct budget line from the EU budget and second, off-EU budget resources that are collectively managed by EU member-states. As regards the former, Article 41 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) forbids, in principle, the use of the Union budget for operations having military or defence implications. Hence, the Commission’s main defence-related initiatives have focused primarily on strengthening the European defence industry and supporting the development of dual use infrastructure, with an allocated budget of approximately €10.55 billion in the current MFF.[2] These initiatives comprise the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Military Mobility, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). The European Defence Industry Programme, which falls in this category and is agreed to provide 1.5 billion over the period 2025-2027, has yet to be adopted. The legal basis for financing the European defence industry lays primarily in Article 173(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which touches upon the industry’s competitiveness. Other relevant TFEU articles that could be used to finance European defence-related projects comprise Article 179, on the improvement of the EU’s scientific and technological base, Article 170 on the development and interconnection of trans-European networks, and Title XIX on research, technological development and space policy. As far as the second channel is concerned, the largest defence-related, off-EU budget tool is the European Peace Facility (EPF). As depicted in Figure 2, comparing the two categories, the biggest part of the funds allocated to EU defence remain under full member-states’ control.[3]

Figure 2: EU budget and off-budget major defence-related tools

 

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The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation has the potential to make available up to €150 billion, a huge upgrade compared to the current situation, as shown in Figure 3. The SAFE Instrument operationally looks very similar to the EDIRPA, as it focuses on providing the necessary financial resources to procure eligible defence equipment jointly. However, financially, the two instruments are totally different as SAFE, in its current format at least, will operate through loans (and subsequently debt), whereas EDIRPA provides grants. Consistent with the general approach of EU defence funding mechanisms, the SAFE Instrument promotes a cooperative format. In this context, common procurement under SAFE requires at least the involvement of one member-state in conjunction with either another member-state or an eligible third country.

Figure 3: EU Budget funding for defence(-related) initiatives

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From Reports to Action: Shaping the Future of EU Defence

A 2024 briefing from the European Parliamentary Research Service brought together the various proposals for the future of EU defence that were put forward in four different documents: a) the Mission Letter to the then Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space, b) Von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines, c) Draghi Report and d) Letta Report. The great majority of the proposals mentioned in the four documents have been integrated into the White Paper and the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation, as clearly shown in Figure 4. The interconnection between defence policy and economic competitiveness and the extent to which these two areas are mutually reinforcing are evident. The defence industrial policy aims to enhance military readiness, while also seeking to bolster economic growth, job creation and innovation. This relationship is highlighted in the Letta and Draghi Reports, both of which focus primarily on the economy, albeit emphasising the importance of a robust EU Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Most of their insights and proposals found their way into the White Paper.

The proposals that did not get through refer to sensitive political issues, such as the issuance of “Defence Eurobonds”, or older initiatives and/or institutional arrangements that are already in place, like, for example, EDIRPA & ASAP and the proposal for a Defence Commissioner. In addition, Letta’s proposal for the creation of a European Stability Mechanism (ESM)-like specialised credit line was not outrightly rejected but rather treated in a non-committing way. The White Paper vaguely notes that if the demand by member-states for funds for defence-related investments outstrips supply, then “the Commission will continue to explore innovative instruments, such as in relation to the European Stability Mechanism”.    

Figure 4: Proposals integrated into the White Paper/Proposal for a SAFE Regulation

 

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Critical Assessment and the Road Ahead

‘ReArm Europe’ and the White Paper have managed to raise awareness about the need to further invest in EU defence. Politically, they have sent a strong message about the Union’s commitment to security and enhancing defence capabilities. They have emphasised the necessity to direct money towards defence, reflecting a proactive approach and have signalled a level of readiness to act, especially in combination with the publication of the Preparedness Union Strategy. However, there are four main concerns that are hard to ignore:

• First, as discussed above, the lion’s share of the ReArm Europe plan will come from the national budgets. While the flexibility to use additional national resources is a positive first step, it remains unclear to what extent member-states will actually decide to invest in defence and, more importantly, whether those investments will be directed towards what is truly needed. In particular, the International Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), which will be used to measure the member-states’ defence expenditures, includes a very broad set of different sub-categories. For example, COFOG Category 02 – Defence entails expenditure on military personnel, other non-combat defence forces and military aid. There is a genuine concern that, without a robust coordination mechanism, funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic– objectives and interests. To be more specific, there is a possibility that additional defence spending may predominantly be allocated to cover personnel costs rather than addressing critical needs, such as the development of advanced military capabilities or training. Achieving the right balance in order to guarantee long-term strategic readiness is crucial. Furthermore, efficiency and effectiveness in defence cannot be assessed solely in financial terms. Without a clear focus on standardisation and interoperability, progress will likely remain incremental rather than transformative. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has underscored the critical importance of ensuring that national armed forces are capable of operating together effectively and efficiently. As such, the European family has yet to decide how to foster standardisation and interoperability. To achieve this goal, different options exist:

1. Alignment of EU defence initiatives with established NATO standards, and/or
2. Strengthening the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the Capability Development Plan (CDP) to improve alignment between member-states’ defence planning and capabilities, and/or
3. Use/strengthening of existing mechanisms (for example, the European Defence Agency) or launch of new – potentially pan-European – initiatives (for example, the European Defence Mechanism, see below).

• Regarding the fiscal space that the national escape clause may provide, an issue not addressed is how the (already destabilised due to the tariff war) financial markets will respond to potential increases in debt levels across the EU member-states. Southern EU member-states have already expressed their doubts on the possibility of further indebting themselves, which will undermine – or further derail – the long-term sustainability of their sovereign debt. Instead, they favour the issuance of “Defence Eurobonds”, which practically entails the EU borrowing money from the capital markets and then distributing it to member-states in the form of grants. Needless to say, in this case, the identification of the distribution criteria will be challenging. Another option would be the establishment of an ESM-like intergovernmental mechanism, called the European Defence Mechanism (EDM), as described in a Bruegel proposal prepared for the Polish Presidency. To be more precise, this extra-EU intergovernmental organisation could act as a “planner, funder and potentially owner of strategic enablers”, allowing the debt incurred to acquire certain defence assets to remain on the EDM’s books instead of national accounts.
• Although “implementation, implementation, implementation” is important, one of the key criticisms lies in the creative ambiguity that characterises parts of the White Paper. Given diverging views among member-states, certain concepts are not fully clarified and allow for multiple interpretations. For example, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation contains a European preference clause for the procurement source (at least 65% of the costs of the final product must originate from within the Union, Ukraine or EEA/EFTA states). However, the text seems to adopt an extremely wide definition vis-à-vis the potentially eligible third countries that may participate in a procurement consortium. In particular, it states that ‘the Union may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with like-minded countries, namely acceding countries, candidate countries other than Ukraine and potential candidates’. In that sense, all current and potential candidate countries constitute like-minded partners for the Union, which is – at least – disputable in the current geopolitical context.
• Finally, issues of implementation are closely linked to (the lack of) legitimacy. It is crucial to encourage public understanding and support for the need to boost defence investments. By having Article 122 TFEU as a legal basis, the Commission bypasses the European Parliament, although the latter has repeatedly positioned itself in favour of enhanced defence cooperation. For example, the European Parliament has recently proposed a higher budget for EDIP, indicating that it is ready to constructively back such defence-related initiatives. It has also called on the European Commission and the member-states “to enable and strengthen parliamentary oversight of EU external action…by involving Parliament in the proper further implementation and scrutiny of the EPF and the Strategic Compass”, thus highlighting its willingness and readiness to oversee key defence tools. The exclusion of the European Parliament from the legislative process could lead to mounting public criticism and a growing negative public disposition to increased defence spending.
• All the aforementioned arguments are deeply interconnected with the absence of a truly common threat perception and, by extension, the member-states’ unwillingness to establish a truly Common Foreign and Security Policy. As such, it becomes nearly impossible to effectively align national defence (industrial) strategies and investments. Obviously, in the absence of such a unified vision and foreign policy framework, governments prioritise national needs over broader pan-European strategic objectives. Can we realistically expect EU defence to emerge in such a political vacuum?

 

 

 

 

[1] Official data from the European Defence Agency (EDA).

[2] Different numbers may also appear due to inflation and changes in currency exchange rates.

[3] Other relevant expenditures comprise the national contributions to CSDP military missions and operations as well as EU Battlegroups. Although these are EU-led initiatives, the associated costs are, in principle, borne by the participating member-states under the ‘costs-lie-where-they-fall’ principle.

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The policy brief “From Migration Fears to Missed Opportunities: The Cost of Politicising EU Enlargement” follows upon the results of the report “The Rise of Radical Right and Eurosceptic Political Forces and the Impact on the EU’s Enlargement Policy.” It is part of the think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration initiative, led by ELIAMEP’s South-East Europe Programme and supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

As debates over EU enlargement intensify, migration has become a focal point for radical right and Eurosceptic parties across Europe. This brief by Ioannis Armakolas (Director, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Ioannis Alexandris (Research Associate, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) explores how these political forces frame enlargement as a migration risk, shaping public discourse and influencing policy decisions. The brief highlights how migration concerns are linked to fears over cultural identity, security, and economic stability, influencing public perception and national policies.

The analysis also examines the broader political landscape, including how national governments respond to these pressures and the role of public referenda in shaping enlargement outcomes. Drawing lessons from past accessions, the brief underscores the economic and strategic benefits of integration while cautioning against the long-term costs of stagnation. Offering concrete policy recommendations, the paper advocates for a proactive communication strategy that counters misinformation, highlights the economic advantages of enlargement, and reengages public opinion with a fact-based narrative.

You can read the policy brief here.

 

 

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network which is led by led by OSF-WB.

 

 

 

 

 

You can learn more about think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration by visiting the website of ELIAMEP and OSF-WB.

 

 

 

Funded by: OSF WB

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for February 2025.

Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Diplomacy and Openness Tassos Hatzivasileiou visited Washington to meet with high-ranking officials of the Federal Office of the United State Trade Representative (USTR). Specifically, on February 10, Hatzivasileiou met with the Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative Bryant Trick with Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative for Europe Michael Rogers and the official responsible for Greece, Dana Fager. The two sides discussed the further deepening of trade relations between Greece and the USA.

On February 23, 2025, the Minister of Culture Lina Mendoni held a working meeting at the State Department with the US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Darren Beattie and the Assistant Under Secretary for Education and Culture Scott Weinhold. According to a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both interlocutors expressed satisfaction  “for the fact that this was the first meeting between the Greek government and the new Trump government”. The meeting focused on the efforts to combat antiquities trafficking, a major global problem linked to organized crime and terrorism.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis on February 28, 2025. In its announcement on the meeting between the two ministers, the State Department said Rubio reaffirmed the strategic importance of the US-Greece partnership, emphasizing that Greece is a “valued NATO ally and critical to regional stability.” Reportedly the two ministers also discussed the importance of “confronting illegal immigration.” In addition, the United States applauded Greece’s strong commitment to meeting NATO defense spending obligations. Finally, the State Department statement noted that Secretary Rubio welcomed Greece’s presence on the UN Security Council for the 2025-2026 term.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The annual report prepared by Eda Gemi and Bledar Feta for the OECD Network of International Migration Experts, provides an in-depth analysis of migration trends, asylum processes, integration policies, and legislative developments in Greece, covering data from 2023 and the first nine months of 2024.

The analysis explores the composition and socio-demographic characteristics of the immigrant population in Greece, examining its size, distribution, and labour market participation. Special attention is given to the flows and stock of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, particularly those entering through Greek-Turkish sea and land borders. Additionally, the report highlights key policy developments in migration and asylum policy during 2023-2024, addressing the challenges and priorities Greece faces in managing migration and integration policies.

The report is structured into six chapters:

Chapter 1 provides a broad overview of recent migration trends, drawing on the statistical data to analyze the size, composition, and main characteristics of the migrant population, including their participation in the labour market.

Chapter 2 examines the presence of asylum seekers and refugees, assessing their size, demographic profile, and legal status. It also covers asylum applications, Dublin cases, relocation efforts, the decongestion of the Agean Islands, and transfers to the mainland, with a particular focus on unaccompanied minors (UAMs).

Chapter 3 addresses irregular migration flows, returns, and readmissions, providing insights into deportation procedures, detention policies, fast-track asylum processes, and push-back allegations.

Chapter 4 focuses on the reception and integration of Ukrainian refugees in Greece, outlining specific policies and measures implemented to support this group.

Chapter 5 examines the reception system, accommodation schemes, and broader integration policies for asylum seekers and refugees. Special emphasis is placed on the housing and protection of unaccompanied minors.

Chapter 6 discusses policy and legislative developments, including citizenship acquisitions, racism and xenophobia.

Between, 2023 and 2024, Greece’s migration landscape was significantly shaped by increasing migration flows, evolving policy reforms, and ongoing human rights concerns. While Greece’s foreign population grew, partially offsetting some of population loss, the country still faced considerable challenges in managing labour migration and regularization programs, outward migration, irregular migration and asylum pressures. These challenges highlight the complex interplay of political, humanitarian and economic factors that Greece faces in its efforts to manage irregular migration, while balancing the needs of the domestic labour market with its obligations under EU and international law.

You can read the full national report about Greece here.

You can read the 2024 edition of International Migration Outlook produced by OECD here.

 

As part of the CERV project (Re)uniting the East and West: Reflections on the 2004 EU Enlargement (REWEU), the South-East Europe Programme team contributed to the creation of an infographics booklet examining the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement on Greece. This visually engaging, data-driven resource explores how this historic milestone shaped both the newly acceding countries and the European Union as a whole.

Featuring infographics, charts, and graphics, the booklet presents complex information in a clear and accessible format, making it easier to understand the economic, political, and social transformations that followed the enlargement. Designed to reach beyond policymakers and experts, it seeks to engage citizens who are often left out of EU discussions by using visuals and concise narratives to illustrate key trends, challenges, and achievements. Through a blend of data and storytelling, it offers a thought-provoking reflection on the enduring impact of the EU’s largest expansion and its continued significance for Europe today.

You can read the booklet here.

Panagiotis Paschalidis, Research Fellow at ELIAMEP’s South-East Europe Programme, authored an analysis titled “The evolution of the Greek narratives on the ‘big bang enlargement’ from 2004 until today: the views of the political actors and the media” in the framework of the project (Re)uniting the East and West: Reflections on the 2004 EU enlargement (REWEU).

The project marks the 20th anniversary of the 2004 EU enlargement by examining its historical impact, benefits, and challenges through public events, research, exhibitions, and media outreach. Funded by the EU under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme, it focuses on eight selected countries—four older and four newer EU members—contributing to contemporary EU memory politics.

In his analysis, Panagiotis Paschalidis examines the 2004 EU enlargement as a transformative event that transcended political, social, economic, and cultural boundaries at both national and international levels. Based on interviews he conducted with key politicians involved in decision-making at the time, as well as journalists who extensively covered the topic, he highlights how such events give rise to multiple interpretations and narratives shaped by diverse perspectives and thematic correlations. Focusing on historical narratives, which intertwine objective facts with subjective understandings, he explores how Greece has perceived and interpreted the 2004 enlargement from its inception to the present day. His analysis underscores the evolving nature of these narratives and their role in shaping collective memory and public discourse.

You can read the analysis here.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for January 2025.

On January 15, 2025, Greece’s Ambassador to the United States Ekaterini Nassika met with the two newly sworn-in Greek-American members of Congress, Congresswoman Maggie Tamposi Goodlander (D-NH) and Congressman Mike Haridopoulos (R-FL). Shortly after they took office, both Representatives welcomed Ambassador Nassika to their offices, where she congratulated both lawmakers on their recent elections, expressing pride in their achievements and underscoring the significance of their roles in strengthening Greek-American relations.

Donald Trump was sworn in as the 47th US President on January 20. Prominent members of the Greek-American community with close ties to Trump were present at the Capitol for the new US President’s inauguration ceremony. Among the attendees was Konstantina Karampatsoli, the only Greek politician at the Trump inauguration. Karampatsoli, a member of the ruling New Democracy party, traveled to Washington DC after receiving an official invitation to the event from Republican Congressman Gus Bilirakis of Florida’s 12th District. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis congratulated President Trump on his return to the White House in a post on X.

On the same day as the US presidential inauguration, US Ambassador George Tsunis’ tenure ended, with Deputy Chief of Mission Maria Olson designated to serve as the top US diplomat in Athens until the new US ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, arrives and presents credentials to the head of state. Guilfoyle is expected to assume her duties as the US Ambassador to Greece by April 2025, pending confirmation by the Senate.

The Greek Minister of National Defence, Nikos Dendias, visited on 22 January the Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence in Oklahoma, which houses the Army’s Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) University. The Minister had the opportunity to be informed by the Commander of Fort Sill, General Major Winston P. Brooks, about academic training in the field of counteracting Unmanned Aircraft Systems, as well as about the development of state-of-the-art innovations and defence tactics for dealing with new threats. The Minister of National Defence also had the opportunity to meet with Officers of the Hellenic Army, undergoing training in modern Artillery fire directing technologies there.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

• During the current decade, Greece’s development policies are guided and supported by both the Cohesion Policy through the 2021-2027 Partnership Pact for Regional Development (NSRF) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) through the National Recovery and Resilience Plan “Greece 2.0”.
• The parallel action of these two programming and funding instruments represents an unprecedented development opportunity for Greece and its Regions, but raises important issues of strategy, coordination and management.
• This paper focuses on the institutional architecture and the governance and implementation mechanisms of the NSRF and the RRF and attempts to explore the implications of these institutional arrangements for public policy in Greece.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by George Andreou, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Assistant Professor at the School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (in Greek).

The publication “The rise of radical right and Eurosceptic political forces and the impact on the EU’s enlargement policy” is a result of the initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, funded by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

The initiative contributes to reimagining the EU’s engagement with the Western Balkans, as well as the region’s attractiveness for the EU in order to ensure a resilient EU integration strategy and ever-closer integration with a full membership perspective in mind.

The report authored by Ioannis Alexandris, Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP delves into the recent electoral victories of radical right parties and explores how these parties are reshaping the EU’s political landscape, particularly regarding its enlargement agenda. Key themes include public discontent over immigration, economic disparities, and concerns about national sovereignty, all of which fuel opposition to EU expansion.

While the positions of radical right parties vary, their collective influence introduces complexities into EU decision-making. This report provides valuable insights for policymakers, researchers and actors navigating these challenges and shaping the EU’s future trajectory.

Summary:

This think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration report examines the growing influence of radical right and Eurosceptic political forces within the European Union (EU) and their implications for EU enlargement policy. As these parties continue to gain traction across member states, they are altering the political landscape and challenging the long-standing consensus on EU integration.

The analysis takes stock of the recent electoral victories of radical right parties, such as Georgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) in Italy and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) in the Netherlands. These electoral results reflect a broader trend of rising right wing Euroscepticism, potentially posing substantial challenges to the EU’s enlargement agenda. Key drivers behind this significant shift of the political pendulum to the right include public discontent with immigration, economic disparities, and a perceived loss of national sovereignty.

The report delves deeper into how these political dynamics could shape the bloc’s decision-making processes, particularly those involving candidate countries pursuing EU membership. The radical right’s scepticism over further enlargement raises doubts over the feasibility of integrating countries such as Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in light of ongoing conflicts and political instability. Through a comprehensive examination of party manifestos, official statements, and expert interviews, this study identifies major patterns and trends among these parties with regard to their views on enlargement. It identifies the major enlargement-related concerns that may resonate with the public, hence influencing the EU’s future trajectory.

Even though several of these parties, including VOX in Spain and the Sweden Democrats, have yet to form cohesive views on enlargement or take clearly anti-enlargement positions, the issue is likely to become more politicised in the coming years. This is largely due to its linkages with other areas of political sensitivity for these parties, including migration, fiscal policy, agricultural policy, and national sovereignty, all of which are fundamental to their agendas. Building on its findings, the report concludes that radical right parties share core thematic concerns shaping their views towards EU enlargement. These can be categorised into five main driving forces:

1. Financial concerns: Opposing the financial costs associated with the accession of economically less developed states is a recurring theme among these parties. For example, the PVV in the Netherlands supports a “frugal” economic position, arguing that admitting less developed countries would place undue financial strain on net-contributing member states. Similar concerns are echoed by the Rassemblement National (RN) in France RN, AfD in Germany, SD in Sweden, and FPÖ in Austria, all of which represent net contributor countries concerned over further budgetary burdens.
2. Migration and security: Enlargement is also closely tied to migration and freedom of movement, which are key issues for radical right parties. The RN in its discourse often associates enlargement with increased illegal immigration and organised crime, a stance aligned with its broader domestic agenda. Both the AfD and FPÖ focus on anti-migration narratives targeting Muslim populations, while the PVV places more emphasis on cultural and social risks.
3. Foreign policy: Relations with Russia as well as concerns about geopolitical ramifications can also be a factor influencing the positions of these parties. The AfD’s longstanding tolerant –if not favourable- stance toward Russia drives its opposition to Ukraine and Moldova’s accession. Conversely, Italy’s FdI under Giorgia Meloni has so far adopted a pro-enlargement position, reflecting its broader pro-Western and NATO-aligned foreign policy strategy.
4. Popular support and electoral strategy: Public opinion and domestic political dynamics can also influence these parties’ positions. In Austria and Germany, where public scepticism towards enlargement is significant, the FPÖ and AfD have aimed to capitalise on these sentiments to gain electoral support. Additionally, these two parties have sought to appeal to specific demographics, formulating narratives that resonate with their target voter bases.
5. Concerns over EU functionality and sovereignty: Finally, radical right parties often link enlargement to broader discussions about EU governance. They claim that incorporating new members would necessitate institutional reforms, such as a shift to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in areas such as foreign policy and tax policy, which they perceive as undermining national sovereignty. This could signal a departure from traditional anti-federalist methods that favoured enlargement as a counterbalance to deeper EU integration. Even though a shift to QMV could streamline decision-making, it might also exacerbate tensions among member states, providing fertile ground for radical right parties to amplify their Eurosceptic discourse.

The EU needs to navigate these complexities carefully, balancing the challenges posed by radical right parties with its broader goals of unity and expansion. The growing influence of these parties introduces complexities into the EU’s decision-making processes. On the one hand, their scepticism can slow down or derail enlargement policy, particularly concerning Ukraine and the Western Balkans. On the other hand, their focus on sovereignty and national identity raises questions about the EU’s integration model, potentially leading to alternative frameworks such as “multi-speed Europe” or associate memberships.

It is important, however, to mention that the dividing lines between support and opposition to enlargement among radical right parties are far from uniform. For example, Italy’s FdI has adopted a pragmatic, pro-enlargement stance emphasising economic and strategic benefits, while parties such as the Netherlands’ PVV and Austria’s FPÖ maintain staunch opposition. Hence, a much more nuanced picture emerges from the findings, where radical right parties can be categorised as ‘’supportive’’, like the FdI, ‘’ambiguous’’, like VOX, and ‘’against’’, like the AfD, when it comes to their EU enlargement position.

Overall, this report intends to serve as a resource for understanding the intersection of radical right-wing political forces and the EU’s enlargement policy, offering valuable insights for policymakers involved in shaping the future of the EU in the coming years.

You can read the report here.

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network which is led by led by OSF-WB.

 

 

 

 

You can learn more about think nea by visiting the website of ELIAMEP and OSF-WB.

 

Funded: OSF WB