ELIAMEP

• Since landing ships, made in Turkish shipyards in order to enable the invasion of Cyprus, reached their designated beachheads on the 20th of July of 1974, the Turkish defence technological industrial base (TDTIB) has been locked in a see saw pattern.
• From the late 1960’s to today the TDTIB has advanced in order to enable Turkey to exercise strategic autonomy. The very exercise of this strategic autonomy has recurrently caused ruptures with Turkey’s western allies. These ruptures have, in turn, disrupted the industrial partnerships on which the TDTIB depends.
• This pattern is experiencing a historic high currently with the TDTIB’s product range, which includes sophisticated UAVs and naval ships being employed by Turkey in support of an aggressive challenge of European interests, and most prominently in a comprehensive challenge of Greek rights, solidly established under UNCLOS, to an exclusive economic zone and to the laying of a subsea electricity cable linking Greece with Cyprus.
• At the same time, due to the European Union’ s (EU) rearmament effort, and the possibility of third countries participating in it, already provided from in the SAFE funding facility, the TDTIB has the opportunity to further grow in volume and sophistication.
• This policy paper will argue that this opportunity should be denied to the TDTIB both on the basis of past behavior of Turkey but also on solid evidence of the current and future priorities of the Erdogan regime.
• As in the past nearly sixty years, it is clear that the current Turkish leadership prioritises the exercise of its strategic autonomy, facilitated by the TDTIB, and not the TDTIB’s participation in the EU’s rearmament. Such a prioritization makes structurally unstable the relationship, and in particular highly prone to disruption, between the TDTIB and the EU’s rearmament effort.
• Additionally, the participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament effort by boosting the capacity of Turkey to challenge Greece’s and Cyprus’ sovereign rights, corrodes the principles of collective security, and thus undermines the ability of the EU to mobilise the collective resources necessary for its own strategic autonomy.
• Thus the TDTIB neither can nor should participate in the EU’s rearmament effort.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Antonis Kamaras, ELIAMEP Research Associate.

Introduction

This policy paper will posit that the Turkish defence technological industrial base (TDTIB) neither can nor should benefit from the EU’s collective rearmament effort and for the same set of reasons.  Turkey’s internal repression and external aggression make participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament both highly vulnerable to disruption and corrosive to the intra-EU consensus that collective rearmament requires for its realization.

The first section will chart the evolution of the TDTIB, from the effort to prepare for military intervention in Cyprus, culminating in the invasion of the island in 1974, to today’s integration of Turkish-made UAVs either in the cross border operations of the Turkish Armed Forces or in the military operations of Turkey’s proxies and allies.  The pattern will emerge of a see saw movement whereby strategic autonomy enabled by the TDIB creates bilateral or multilateral ruptures which in turn derail the TDTIB’s partnerships with key western partners.

The second section will argue that the interaction of the TDTIB with Turkey’s striving for a strategic autonomy that is mostly antithetical to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as well as increasing domestic repression, will continue to be a mainstay of the Erdogan regime. Consequently, even if the TDTIB is allowed to benefit from the EU’s collective defence funding, the participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament effort is bound to be a structurally unstable, and thus an inherently unreliable proposition.

The third section will explore the way in which the EU’s collective rearmament effort is both constitutive and reliant upon the construction of a new EU polity, as it involves greater collective mobilisation of resources in the service of the defence needs of all EU members. These defence needs are already more diverse than the Russo-Ukrainian war suggests and bound to get more so in the future, due to the size and diversity of the Union. By extension, this polity, the ‘geopolitical Europe’ as it has been called, cannot privilege one threat over another, nor one or more member-states’ threat perception over the threat perceptions of other member-states, if it is to achieve the cohesion and mobilisational capacity that are indispensable to its viability.  Yet the participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament, by undermining the Greek and Cypriot deterrence over Turkish aggression, discriminates in terms of which threat is considered to be important, and for which member-states, at the EU-collective level and which is less so.

The fourth section will review arguments made in favour of the participation of the TDTIB in Europe’s rearmament, and policies recommended to that effect, and evaluate whether they can indeed supersede the considerable disadvantages of such participation indentified by the author.

The concluding section will, on the basis of the above, argue that the TDTIB should be excluded from participating in the EU’s collective rearmament effort.

The evolution of the relationship between the TDTIB and Turkey’s strategic autonomy

On the 20th of July 1974 Turkish landing ships reached the designated beachheads in Cyprus out of which poured Turkish infantry, tanks and armoured personnel carriers.  As the authors of the definitive study of the Turkish invasion to Cyprus point out this was the commencement of “the only successfully completed amphibious and airborne landing against a determined defender since 1945”[1]. The invasion of Cyprus was also one of the largest, in terms of the proportion of territory lost by a sovereign state via military means, partial conquests in the post WW II era, partial as opposed to total conquests being the dominant form of territorial conquest in this period[2].     It is worthwhile mentioning that as a result of this military operation 36 % of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is still occupied by Turkey whereas Russia, today and after more than three years of war, occupies approximately 20 % of Ukrainian territory.

Preparation for the invasion also included the founding act of the creation of the TDTIB, in the post WW II era, in the service of Turkey’s strategic autonomy.   Although discussions among Turkish civilian and military policy makers on a possible invasion of Cyprus started as early as 1955 it was after the Cyprus crisis of 1964 and the humiliating Johnson letter, in which the US President explicitly forbade Turkey from employing US equipment to invade Cyprus, that Turkey set itself on a path to acquire its own technical means necessary for such a successful invasion. Specifically, a US embargo on the sale of landing ships, tank (LSTs), led Turkey to convert ships to this configuration, acquired by other countries, and more importantly for Turkish shipyards to acquire the capability to construct 600-ton LSTs in the 1970S, twelve of which had joined the Turkish navy by 1974[3].

Importantly, the invasion of Cyprus set in motion a see saw pattern which has exercised, still today, a bit more than half a century, determinative influence over the interaction between the TDTIB and Turkey’s strategic autonomy. In essence, the TDTIB by enabling Turkey’s strategic autonomy would contribute to the implementation of weapons embargoes by Turkey’s main Western weapon systems suppliers, subsequent to the exercise of such an autonomy. In return these embargoes would both disrupt the evolution of the TDTIB while also pushing Turkish policy makers to double down in developing the TDTIB, with Turkey’s own resources, albeit subject to the structural and fiscal constraints of the country[4].

The invasion of Cyprus catalysed the mobilization of the politically influential Greek-American community which, in the aftermath of Watergate, managed to convince the US Congress to impose a weapons embargo to Turkey on all US weapons sales, which lasted for three years. This ‘rule of law’ lobby successfully argued that the invasion of Cyprus was not simply a Greek and Greek-Cypriot matter but constituted a gross violation of the universal norm of sovereignty, and as such warranted Congressional restrictions placed on the US Administration, regarding the management of the US-Turkey relationship[5].  Analysts of the TDTIB are in agreement, that the US embargo catalyzed the determination of Turkey’s policy makers to invest in a long term effort to develop comprehensively their defence industrial capacity such that a future embargo would not threaten to cripple the Turkish Armed Forces, considering for example that Turkey’s Air Force in 1974 was completely depended on US spare parts[6].

A brief review[7] of the key incidents that negatively affected Turkey’s access to Western weapon systems, including the provision of such access via bilateral or multilateral DTIB partnerships, demonstrate continuity with the pivotal Cyprus invasion and its aftermath.

The repression of the Kurds in the 1990’s, at a time when Turkey was under military tutelage, resulted in suspension of weapon sales from Western European suppliers, particularly land systems. The 1996 Imia crisis with Greece had a similar effect. Both the repression of the Kurds, which entailed massive violations of human rights, and the Imia incident which was accompanied and justified by a baseless challenge of Greek sovereignty of the Imia as well as other Aegean islets constituted norm breaking behavior to Western perceptions[8].

The Mavi Marmara crisis in 2010 which led to a complete breakdown of the defence relationship between Israel and Turkey, including the cessation of a productive for the TDTIB relationship with leading Israeli defence firms, also constituted an exception, in terms of a European and North American canon. This canon mandates that Europeans at the country and EU level, due to the status of the Holocaust as a genocide implemented in European soil, by Nazi Germany and the active collaboration of important societal forces in Nazi-occupied countries, from Lithuania to Greece,  will make allowances to the Jewish state (with suspension of weapons sales imposed on Israel in the 1960’s  by France and the UK driven solely by commercial and geopolitical considerations and in particular the need to sustain relationships with the Arab world).  Turkey, as a predominantly Muslim country which did not fall under Nazi occupation and was not a combatant in WW II, is clearly outside this canon.   The point here is not whether the EU and its constituent member-countries are in the right in not taking a more robust attitude towards the death and destruction visited upon Gaza at the time of writing by Israel’s armed forces – but rather to underline that EU member states, their diversity notwithstanding, share in a historical past and normative preferences to a greater degree among themselves than they do with Turkey.

The acquisition of the Russian S400 ground to air system, and the resulting expulsion of the TDTIB from the dominant, globally, 5th generation aircraft’s supply chain also reflects Turkish exceptionalism. In effect, Turkey struck such a close defence relationship with a country, Russia, presenting a clear threat to European security already two years prior, as the conquest of Crimea which reanimated fears of Russian intent in the Western camp had already taken place in 2014. Indicatively, France had to revisit its 2011 decision, under the Sarkozy Presidency, to sell two Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia, cancelling the sale by 2014, under the Hollande Presidency. The decision to sell the Mistrals to Russia was misaligned, to say the least, with the strategic interests of the western alliance France was a member of, which furthermore threatened its overall defence relationship with front line states of the EU and NATO[9]. To the extent that the S400 decision was motivated by Erdogan’s suspicion that the US instigated the 2016 coup attempt against him and he had to, in effect, acquire a ground to air defence system that could guard him against his own US-equipped and trained Air Force[10], this procurement decision also points to an exceptional distrust of the US by a fellow NATO-member country, exceptional even by the standards set by the second Trump Presidency.

In 2018 Turkey’s deliberated-upon partnership with Italy and France for the co-production of SMT missiles was suspended due to Turkey’s divergent interests in Syria and the Mediterranean[11].  Turkey’s aggressive challenging in the field of Greek and Greek-Cypriot sovereign rights led to Turkey’s exclusion from the PESCO and EDF R&D defence funds in the early 2020’s to today. Turkey’s military operations in Syria, against Kurdish forces, its human rights record, and other such issues, also generated opposition to weapon sales in Holland which has a strong lobby arguing for a normative-informed weapons export policy[12].    Last but not least, the sale of Eurofighter aircraft to Turkey was suspended, in early 2025, due to the opposition of the previous German government, engendered by the imprisonment of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglou and Erdogan’s most formidable challenger for the office of the Presidency. This decision was reversed by the succeeding CDU-led government while there is ongoing speculation on whether Greece will manage to impose commitments by the government of Turkey that the Typhoons will not be used against her.

Importantly, Turkey’s policy in Libya which has alienated France was also induced by the former’s need to challenge Greek sovereign rights in the Mediterranean, by advancing through an agreement with Libya, the notion that Greece’s islands, even such large ones as Crete do not produce sovereign rights in terms of the delineation of exclusive economic zones, a notion widely accepted as contravening the international law of the seas[13]. We also mention that Greece exerted pressure, albeit unsuccessfully, to freeze the partnership between Spain and Germany and Turkey, involving respectively, the manufacturing under license of an aircraft carrier and advanced T214 submarines.

Overshadowing Turkey’s relationships with Western counterparts, is the contributing role itself of TDTIB in Turkey’s geopolitical exceptionalism. Turkish-made UAVs, and more largely their integration in combined arms operations initially in Southern Turkey and subsequently in Syria, Libya and Nagorno Karabach, have been a contributing factor in counter mobilization against Turkey by influential ethnic communities in Germany (Turkish Kurds) and the US (Greek-Americans, Armenian-Americans, Jewish-Americans).  In an action-reaction dynamic techno-nationalism, namely the vested interest of the Erdogan regime to demonstrate to domestic audiences the superiority of Turkish arms, the martial virtues of the Turkish soldier being leveraged by the indigenous technical means at his disposal, has been adding fuel to the fire[14].  Additionally, the ambitious naval shipbuilding programme of the Turkish Navy has fueled Turkish aggression in the Mediterranean, encapsulated in the Mavi Vatan doctrine, with parochial but influential economic and Service (Turkish Navy) interests being vested in Turkey’s geopolitical aggrandizement.      This package gets wrapped up in Turkey’s emergence as a classic middle power, its geopolitical ambitions informed by reimaginings of its imperial past and propelled forward by the US’s profound ambivalence of its role as a global policeman[15]. To top it all, the return of ‘Big War, as evidenced in Ukraine, has reinforced the link between a country’s ability to achieve escalation dominance and the size and capability of its DTIB, with even war gaming now including defence industrial capacity in the context of a sustained war effort[16].  As such the TDTIB, depending on its evolution, can very well contribute to the ‘war optimism’ of Turkeys’ leadership under an ever expanding range of military conflict scenarios.

All in all, what is observed in Turkey is a recurrent pattern over a period of approximately sixty years of divergent geopolitical interests, informed by geography, history and identity, as well as of impossible to dislodge for long domestic authoritarianism, derailing bilateral or multilateral defence relationships. Domestic and international Western norm breaking, or even lack of sharing of historically-informed western preferences, as in the case of Israel, are also an important factor. Geopolitical divergence and norm breaking also create fertile ground for the seeding and growth of coalitions in Europe and North America which prioritise the breaking up of such bilateral and multilateral defence relationships between Turkey and the West.  Such a counter-reaction is assisted by the fact that Erdogan has now been entrenched in a gallery of rogues, right next to Putin, of leaders willing to employ force to impose their will both to their own citizens and to neighbouring states[17].

Furthermore, the more capable the TDTIB has become and the greater a share of a sophisticated supply chain of a weapon system it can claim, the more disruptive the subsequent rupture becomes for its western partner(s).  This highly volatile relationship of weapons manufacturing and sales by the West to Turkey, of sixty years standing, started with the denial and then suspension of sales of weapon systems for which the nascent TDTIB would provide limited  maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) support services, such as the technologically simple, WW II-vintage LSTs, and culminated in the need by Lockheed Martin, the US manufacturer of F35s, the world’s leading fifth-generation fighter jet,  to replace in short order a total of 12 billion USD’s worth of supply chain production  by those Turkish firms which were expelled from the F35 manufacturing programme, after Erdogan’s  decision to procure the S400s[18]. Indeed, if the F35 imbroglio demonstrates anything is that the participation of the TDTIB to valuable for the Turkish economy supply chains, as much as to the its Western partners, will and can be sacrificed if domestic imperatives and or strategic autonomy rationales mandate so.

Can the Erdogan regime strike a viable partnership between the TDTIB and the EDTIB?

There is no doubt that the TDTIB stands to gain a lot in turns of both volume of sales and innovation capabilities were it to be incorporated in the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), in terms similar to those accessible to the UK and Norway. As with the case of South Korea, industrialised nations which doubled down in the development of their DTIBs due to geopolitical circumstances different from those enjoyed by most EU-members, are now in a position to meet rapidly increasing demand for everything military[19]. More largely, Turkey’s robust manufacturing base together with the geographic proximity to the EU, make the country one of the potential greatest beneficiaries of the EU’s need to build up resilient supply chains via near-shoring partnerships. Naturally such a geopolitically driven partnership between the EU and Turkey can also be translated in political leverage in terms of the enhanced ability of Turkish policy makers to make what EU interlocutors, including Greek ones, would consider as legitimate Turkish interests and policy priorities appreciated and respected both in Brussels and the chancelleries of Europe.

Equally, such an alignment of industrial and geopolitical interests is simply not realistic if Turkey, under Erdogan and his potential regime successors, stays on the same course, of a) geopolitical heterodoxy, a heterodoxy which includes the attempt to challenge the sovereignty of EU member-countries, namely Greece and Cyprus, as well as b) to effectively suspend democracy in Turkey, and go, as international commentators have noted, for ‘full autocracy’[20].  As with the previous instances of the disruption in TDTIB bilateral and multilateral partnerships which we briefly reviewed above, sooner or later this domestic and foreign policy mix, catalyzed by any one or more future incidents that it is bound to generate, will derail Turkey’s DTIB relationship with the EU.  Simply put, this Turkish comportment will, as it has so often done in the past, create the coalitions between pressure groups and states, the mutually reinforcing loop between norms and interests that will compel the EU to show the door to TDTIB, notwithstanding any defence industrial partnerships that may have been struck in the meantime. Indeed, several EU reports recurrently produced long lists of policy items where there is massive divergence between Turkey and the EU, a veritable minefield of unbridgeable gaps in interests and norms that can explode at any moment[21].

In the estimation of this policy paper, in the timeframe of any possible decision by the EU and its member-states, say the next 2-3 years, the second possibility of continuous divergence from CFSP is the most realistic one and not the first.

The fact that Erdogan is determined to hold on to power, despite the near certainty that any under conceivable scenario of free and competitive elections he will lose by any one of his  most formidable opponents, among CHP’s leadership roster, mandates repression at home and aggression abroad. The economic benefits of a geopolitically-based industrial partnership between the EU and Turkey are not enough, and cannot come fast enough, to make him prevail over any of his more charismatic opponents in the 2027 Presidential elections.   So he has to throw his opponents into prison, causing further trouble to the Turkish economy which has already eroded his popularity irrevocably.  Indeed, the more times passes, the more inexorable the process of eliminating the regime’s main political foe, CHP, as a viable political competitor becomes, with accretive imprisonments and suspensions from public life, directed against an ever widening circle of key CHP personalities[22].

Increased domestic repression, in turn, is legitimized by aggressive assertion abroad.  The militarization of Turkish foreign policy as a pillar of Erdogan’s effort to checkmate his domestic opponents has been well-documented, particularly through Turkish military operations in Syria[23].  Turkey’s currently ongoing challenge in the field, of Greece’s effort to lay an electric energy interconnecting cable between Crete and Cyprus, the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), a project of Common European Interest, partly funded by the EU, and executed by a leading French manufacturer with an expertise in subsea electricity cable laying, has reanimated Greece’s objections to the TDTIB benefiting from the EU rearmament. These objections were most prominently demonstrated in Greek efforts to eliminate the possibility that Turkish defence firms will benefit, as subcontractors, from EU defence procurement orders funded by the concessionary rates of the 150-billio euro SAFE programme[24]

The bigger picture is one of a Turkish leader who, from the 2010’s onwards, has grounded his hegemonic enterprise on extracting geopolitical rents and prestige from unilateral force projection as opposed through economic and geopolitical integration with the EU.

This strategic choice of Erdogan has nullified politically most if not all of the advantages that accrued to the New Democracy (ND) Greek Government by the ‘calm waters’ Greco-Turkish agreement  of 2023, namely the containment of illegal migration flows from the Turkish coast to the east Aegean islands, the visa facilitation of tourist flows from the Turkish  coast  to the East Aegean islands (essentially the agreement exchanged politically destabilizing migratory flows to Greece with politically beneficial tourist flows), the cessation of violations of the Greek air space by the Turkish Air Force and the containment of the geopolitical risk, as a factor which could derail  Greece’s still painfully gradual recovery from the ten year fiscal crisis and in particular threaten the lucrative for the Greek economy tourist season.

It is illuminating that at the present juncture, when Turkey has every interest to ‘play nice’ with Greece on the basis of this ‘calms water’ agreement, in view of the potential benefits that may accrue to her from a partnership with the EU, it is challenging as we mentioned above in the field the right of Greece, according to the international law of the seas, to explore the seabed and proceed to lay the GSI cable between Crete and Cyprus.  Turkish activism in Libya and Syria also aim at maintaining the idiosyncratic challenge, according to the international law of the seas, to Greece’s right for an exclusive economic zone, based on the position and size of its island territories, most prominently, but not exclusively, the largest such island territory, Crete.

This course of action pursued by Erdogan has created a dynamic in Greece in favour of a creation of yet another nationalistic party, threatening to eat into ND support, enabled the major opposition party, PASOK, to put the government on the spot on the issue of if and when the GSI will actually be implemented and has engendered critique, both within and outside ND, that primarily SAFE betrays the promise of collective European defence, by potentially benefiting the TDTIB.

Considering the above, and the fact that elections are to be held in Greece in 2027 at the latest, we may as well take for granted that Greece and Cyprus will energetically lobby against any type of participation by the TDITB in the rearmament of Europe.   While disagreements between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus on the financial viability of GSI have cast a shadow over the project’s viability, Greek policy makers have also provided assurances that Greece is determined to proceed with the laying of the cable, even if that means a testing of wills, militarily, in the field.

Indeed the fact that the Erdogan is being so reckless in pressing his claims against Greece, through diplomacy and force deployment, itself underlines the fragility of any future partnership between the EU’s rearmament effort and the TDTIB – it is proof positive that for the Erdogan regime such a partnership is a ‘nice to have’ whereas aggression against two EU member countries, Greece and Cyprus, are politically speaking ‘must haves’.      As it is, it is only because the Greek government has refrained, thus far, from forcing this issue via military means, in the field, as she is perfectly entitled and capable of doing so, that its fellow EU member-countries have not been compelled to admit the incongruity of Turkey’s participation in the EU’s rearmament effort.

Should the Erdogan regime be given the opportunity to strike a partnership between the TDTIB and Europe’s rearmament?

National commitments reached in NATO’s Hague summit, of a rise to 3.5 % of GDP to defence spending, and an additional 1.5 % of GDP spending to domains supporting NATO’s collective defence, should not be discounted as implausible. They reflect, on the one hand, the structural trend of the US to prioritise deterring a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which could be tantamount to nothing short of terminating US hegemony in Asia and the Pacific.  And, on the other hand, they illuminate Europe’s need to secure continued US fealty to NATO’s Article 5, premised on European countries picking up an ever greater share of the bill for conventional deterrence in Europe and, in exchange, retaining the US nuclear guarantee, as the ultimate deterrent against Russian aggression.

That being said, it is also commonly acknowledged that European states are determined to develop and deploy their own strategic enablers so that they do not become hostages to diverging US priorities, relating to collective European defence, or to US determination to leverage its military indispensability to extract rents from Europe via its trade and/or monetary policy[25].

Such enablers refer, first, to achieving economies of scale in the production of weapon platforms that are already within the technological reach of EU member-states, via EDTIB consolidation. Economies of scale in already available technologies would underpin strategic autonomy by producing enough quantities of limited in number platforms, by a consolidated EDTIB, so that the EU can deter against Russia, with the massive quantities of war materiel that the return of peer to peer conflict necessitates.

Second, strategic enablers are for the EU those technologies and weapon platforms which are currently provided by the US, as EU countries have not developed comparable capabilities. They refer, mainly, to strategic lift, ISR based on an extensive satellite network, sixth generation aircraft and long range ground to air and ground to ground missile systems.

Obtaining such enablers is a profoundly political exercise, the success of which would be constitutive of an essentially evolved European polity, which has already received the relevant coined terms, such as ‘a geopolitical Europe’ of a European ‘defence community’ and so on[26].  While EU member countries have indeed sacrificed the important for the sake of the urgent, as in the case of covering capability gaps which have accumulated over two decades by procuring US and Israeli weapon systems, setting back the cause of the EUs strategic autonomy, the direction of travel towards a European defence polity is still clear.

Such a polity, to come into being, requires achieving consensus, as per the Draghi Report recommendations[27], on a massive, recurrent programme of debt issuance by the European Commission. Such issuance would fund, among other priority domains, the research, development and production of the EU’s strategic enablers as well as provide the fiscal incentivisation of joint procurement necessary for the EDTIB’s drive for economies of scale through industrial consolidation.  The alternative, and more modest policy suggestion, is based on shifting resources from cohesion funding and the Common Agricultural Policy to collective European defence spending.

Both courses of action are highly contestable politically[28]. The former course of action needs to overcome the reluctance of net contributors among EU member states to underwrite fiscal issuance by the EU while the latter course of action means overcoming the reluctance of the net recipients, among EU member countries, to see a substantial decline in fiscal resources directed to those socioeconomic groups and regions most depended on EU transfers.

That being said, either exercise can also command a unique common ground among EU member states which were only recently, during the euro’s fiscal crisis, in opposing camps.  Strengthening the EU’s collective defence is a shared priority from the very end of both the North and the South, in the EU’s eastern periphery, from Lithuania to Cyprus.    Defence has shortened if not collapsed the policy distance separating the ‘frugals’ from the ‘spendthrifts’ with leading members of both cohorts facing existential threats due to the partial disengagement and growing unreliability of the US security guarantee.   To illustrate, when the US Department of Defence starts considering withdrawing military aid from the Baltics[29], Denmark, Sweden and Finland have every reason to boost the EU’s common defence and entertain financial arrangements, such as common bond issuance, that a fiscally constrained Greece would most welcome.

Significantly, the blatant assertion by the Trump Administration that Greenland will, one way or another, fall under US sovereignty, has universalized the perception of threat, cutting its unbiblical cord from Russia, and impressing on all member-states that the capacity for collective defence needs to be developed against all threat contingencies.  Simply put, it makes it that much easier for Greek policy makers to relate to their EU colleagues how serious as much as unacceptable is Turkey’s comportment on the basis of ‘might is right’ and, as such, deserving of a common European response. And once threat loses its specificity, threat representation becomes important, as each and every threat is entitled to be addressed and no threat posed to a member-states’ national security can be airily dismissed as an unrealistic obsession, as a mere domestic perception as opposed to a geopolitical fact.  Arguably, as the recommendations of the Niinisto report are implemented, particularly with regard to a common EU intelligence function, that will have the effect of Europeanising each member country’s valid threat perceptions[30], rendering ever more untenable defence industrial and other policies that are incompatible with such Europeanised threat perceptions. Suffice it to say here that Turkey’s gray zone playbook vis a vis Greece and Cyprus is starkly similar to that of Russia in CEE and in the Baltics and China in the South China Sea.

Denmark is emblematic in that regard, a small Scandinavian country, one of the ‘frugals’ during the Eurozone crisis, now in favour of rising defence expenditures, in order to deter Russia, as in the case of all Scandinavian countries which are with the exception of Finland in the second line of defence against Russia, while also being the first EU member country to have its sovereignty challenged by the US[31].

Τhe drive of the EU for strategic autonomy, tantamount to the construction of a new European polity, both puts the importance of the TDTIB, but also of the Turkish Armed Forces, in its appropriate scale, as important but by no stretch of imagination indispensable, in terms of providing scarce material and human resources to Europe’s collective defence. It is the intra-European consensus necessary for collective mobilization that is indispensable, not the contribution to such a vast mobilization of any one third party, Turkey included.

This is even more the case when such a third party participation is corrosive of the consensus that needs to be achieved. For that level of consensus to be generated, all member states need to be convinced that collective defence is one and indivisible, just as within any nation-state one region bordering to a third country has an absolutely equal claim to its integrity and rights, conferred by its inclusion in the sovereign entity, to all other regions of that country bordering with other third countries.  It is that foundational assumption that is indispensable to the project of the EU’s strategic autonomy.

It is also important to note that it is inevitable that the more the EU develops its strategic autonomy the less this autonomy will come to be limited to countering the Russian threat.  Military capabilities, as much as the modalities of their acquisition, will expand the domains of their application, commensurately with their growth.  These capabilities may be deployed in a massive operation to stabilize sub-Saharan Africa. On another occasion, they could embolden the EU to risk rupture with the US, by imposing punitive regulations to US IT titans operating in the EU, in case of a forceful acquisition of Greenland by the US.  In yet another possibility, the EU’s military capabilities could provide leverage to the EU to exert moderating influence over Israel’s behaviour in the West Bank due to the growing reliance of Israel’s DTIB on the rapidly growing EDTIB.

Greece together with Cyprus are not stowaways in this exciting European voyage but rather key members of the crew. Greece is the only country in the EU to be so physically distant to Moscow that in 2024 spent above 3 % of its GDP in defence – as much or nearly as much as those EU member countries close to Moscow.  Through the port of Alexandroupolis it has proven its significance, in terms of military logistics, for the integrity of the Southern part of the EU’s collective defence against the Russian Federation as well as for the support of the energy needs of Bulgaria and Romania through the Alexandroupolis FSRU.  Greece has also taken the lead in the setting up of EUNAVFPOR ASPIDES which seeks to mitigate Houthi attacks against the merchant marine in the Red Sea – where the Turkish navy has been conspicuously absent[32].  Needless to say in the years ahead, as the Hellenic Navy renews its fleet and as other EU Mediterranean Fleets similarly get strengthened, Greece will be a pillar of freedom of navigation in the critical seaways linking Asia with Europe.

Both Greece and Cyprus reaffirmed their strategic importance due to the wars of the Middle East with the heavy use respectively of the US Suda Bay base in Crete and the UK Akrotiri base in Cyprus.  Greece, as already suggested enjoys important leverage in the US, considering that US engagement will continue to be important for the EU’s collective defence.  The Suba Bay base is critical to the operations of the US Navy and Air Force in the Mediterranean. Alexandroupolis is a point of entry for US natural gas servicing Southern European energy needs, the defence relationship with Israel is growing as it involves strategic Israeli investments in the GDTIB and the Greek-American lobby, in alignment with the Jewish-American lobby enjoys considerable influence in the US Congress[33].

All in all, Greece, both on its own and together with Cyprus, as a typically medium-sized EU member country, with its contribution to the ongoing defence effort against Russian aggression, its participation in mitigating the negative consequences of the Middle East wars, its exceptionally high defence spending and its military and geopolitical contributions that it will be able to make in the future strategically autonomous Europe –  a Europe that will have to confront a threat diversity  commensurate with its growing strategic autonomy – represents  precisely the type of EU member country that needs to have its own threat environment acknowledged and addressed if there is to be a successful construction of a European polity that guarantees the safety of all its member-states. And in such a European polity there is no place for defence firms of a non-EU member that persists in threatening an EU member country, such as Turkey.

The TDTIB and the EU’s Rearmament: Simply not worth the trouble

A flurry of policy papers and press coverage have presented the TDITB as indispensable to the EU’s rearmament and/or, more largely, argued for the vital role that Turkey needs to play in Europe’s collective defence[34].

This advocacy is grounded in three claims.  First, that the TDITB is critical both in terms of filling the need of the EU for manufacturing of mass, reliable quality, NATO-standard defence articles as well as in addressing important niche capabilities as in the UAV domain. Second, such an TDTIB participation will enable the EU to avail itself of the Turkey’s Armed Forces manpower in case it decides to sent a peacekeeping force to Ukraine, considering that it is the second largest Army in NATO and that the Turkish government has a high tolerance, at least compared to European governments, for casualties in the field of battle. Third that such a package – TDTIB and the contribution of troops – will anchor Turkey in the Western alliance.

None of these arguments are to be easily dismissed but rather carefully weighted in the cost benefit calculations and robust risk assessments that are attendant to any difficult policy choice.

On the TDTIB aspect what is essential to point out is that its relative contribution to the EU’s rearmament effort is a declining rather than a rising asset, precisely because of the mobilisation of resources in EU member countries catalyzed by country-member, EU funding and strategic and portfolio investments in the EDTIB as well as in parallel developments taking place in key EU-allied countries, European and non-European, such as the UK, Ukraine, Norway and Canada.  On mass what we see in the EU is a combination of investment in new plants and machinery, investments in older plants including reactivation, with a special focus on the Central Eastern European defence industry which had not attracted FDI in the transition period, due to peace dividend dynamics. We can expect that German and CEE experience in activating industrial supply chains in the post – 1989 period in the civilian sector where it has excelled, will now prove its worth in the military domain.  In niche capabilities such as UAVs, innovation’s baton has been decisively transferred from Turkey to Ukraine with a variety of European defence firms operating in Ukraine and / or partnering with Ukrainian firms in order to be able to be innovative.   What is striking in the latest assessment of defence manufacturing in Europe[35] is the common playbook, on top of increases in defence spending, adopted by all significant, in defence manufacturing terms, European countries, all geared to increasing the supply of defence platforms, systems and materiel: relaxation of regulatory environment relating to defence manufacturing, the speeding up of procurement through reform, increased funding for innovation in defence, investing in the defence sector’s skills base, and so on.   Relatedly, the TDTIB is identified as a meaningful contributor only in one capability gap of collective European defence, in medium altitude long endurance (MALE) UAVs and, potentially, in land attack systems up to 1,000 kms[36].  This rather marginal role of the TDTIB in Europe’s capability building is also reflected in its export record of defence systems to European countries which mostly involves low or middle range technologies such as MALE UAVs, corvettes and armoured personnel carriers[37]. Inevitably Turkey’s mid size economy, with its mediocre innovation record, cannot rise to the challenge of contributing, let alone replacing, such US-originating capabilities as space-based ISR, integrated air and missile defence, battle management systems and long range attack systems[38].

Relatedly, the increasingly well-funded defence industrial strategies of those EU member state’s that have them, also focus on the UAVs and other niches so as to spur innovation in their own defence sectors.   Their twin motive is both to provide a qualitative edger to their own armed forces via homegrown innovation and to be able to leverage this edge to commercial success throughout Europe.  Indeed, the TDTIB itself partakes in this process with the industrial  presence in Ukraine of its most prominent UAV manufacturer, Bayraktar.    In the end nobody intimated this decline in relative terms of the TDTIB than one of its most fervent advocates, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. Pointing out that Europe in seeking to prevail militarily over Russia, needs  to prevail, by mobilising its economic prowess, over an “economy [that] is not bigger than Texas. So can you imagine that Texas, the State of Texas, producing more ammunition than the whole of NATO?”[39]. By the same token, how credible is to argue that the whole of the EDTIB cannot, when effectively mobilized, cannot produce the defence materiel necessary to deter against Russian aggression, without the participation of an economy, namely Turkey’s, which is just a bit larger  than that of the state of Illinois, which is to say 1/17th of the EU’s GDP?

Similar dynamics are operative in terms of the availability of sufficiently manned units to be fielded by EU and non-EU countries, most prominently the UK, in the much discussed prospect of a European peace keeping force in Ukraine.  The advisability of such a mission has been contested but that is not the issue. As with the EDTIB there is an ongoing effort across Europe to both hire more professional soldiers and reintroduce conscription[40].    We do not believe that higher tolerance of casualties, on the part of the Turkish government, and more largely polity and society is a valid argument for two reasons.  First, European states have demonstrated in Afghanistan, through participation in ISAF, that they are willing to suffer casualties in the service of vital allied goals (in this case supporting US operations in Afghanistan not least so as to help preserve US commitment to the collective defence of Europe).  It is worth pointing out that eight EU member countries, from Denmark (population 5.5. million) to Germany (population 82 million), suffered more casualties, both relative to their population and in absolute terms, through their ISAF participation, than Turkey did[41].  More generally the west’s democracies have demonstrated their ability to generate parliamentary consensus when invoking allied commitments in order to put troops in harm’s way[42].  Indeed, the rise of the EU as a collective provider has added a case example in this canon by enabling the Greek government to participate in the high risk EUNAVFOR ASPIDES freedom of navigation mission where the Hellenic Navy employed its guns for the first time since WW II, in an allied operation. Nor is it credible to suggest that in any such operation in Ukraine Turkey would play the role of the mercenary, putting at risk of death of injury a disproportionate number of its soldiers than other European states, in a mission that is definitive for the collective will of Europe and more specifically for the EU and its member states to defend themselves.  So, as in the case of the TDTIB, we are talking about a useful but not indispensable contribution in risk-taking troops.   As with the Rutte evocation of the disparity between collective European versus Russian economic-industrial mobilization, so with force generation we recall Poland’s PM rhetorical evocation of the EU’s collective population preponderance: ‘500 million Europeans are asking 300 million Americans help fight 140 million Russians’[43]. To suggest that such a Europe, of 500 million Europeans, cannot muster a peacekeeping force in the tens of thousands, for the defence of Ukraine, without Turkey’s troop contribution is simply risible.

The third argument of the TDTIB’s participation in the EU’s rearmament is about Turkey’s geopolitical and economic importance, and the importance of TDTIB participation in Europe’s rearmament as a means of engaging with Turkey, of in effect ‘not losing’ Turkey. It is important to note that within Turkish opinion, there is a diversity of opinion. We do have Imamoglou’s own advocacy in favour of lifting the embargo to the sale of Typhoons to Turkey[44]  as well as arguments of critics of the Erdogan regime to the effect that an EDTIB-TDTIB relationship will affirm Turkey’s European vocation and is bound to outlive Erdogan’s authoritarian turn[45]. Equally, we have voices arguing that the EU should not reward Turkey’s authoritarian backsliding, due to its potential contribution to the EU’s rearmament, as this backsliding no more entrenched it becomes there more bound it is to make Turkey even more of an unreliable security partner to the EU[46].

The position of this paper is that the imperative of Erdogan’s maintaining himself in power privileges further internal repression and external aggression and that the opportunity of the TDTIB to participate in the EU’s rearmament is not a sufficient incentive for him to abandon this twin track approach.   At the point of writing developments on both tracks prove our point, with further politically-engineered court actions seeking to neutralize CHP as an effective political force and the threat of military brinkmanship hanging over Greece’s and Cyprus’ perfectly legitimate plans to connect themselves energy-wise by laying the GSI undersea cable.  It is indeed hard to see how Turkey, even if its TDTIB is definitively excluded from the EU’s rearmament, can be lost to Europe more than it already has. It is, however, much more plausible to envisage a situation whereby a growing reliance ofEurope on the TDTIB could lead Erdogan to miscalculate his personal importance, and that of his country, and make him even more reckless vis a vis Greece and Cyprus.

Concluding Remarks

Turkey neither can nor should participate, through the TDTIB, in Europe’s rearmament effort and for the same set of reasons.

Under Erdogan’s leadership and in the current geopolitical juncture Turkey has reaffirmed a pattern in its relations with the West that has rendered partnering with the TDTIB highly unstable as much as undesirable.  Unstable because the combination of internal repression and external aggression, by the Turkish leadership, mobilises an influential counter-reaction by western states and influential lobby groups in these states, which prioritises the cut-off of bilateral or multilateral defence industrial relationships. Undesirable, because allowing for such defence industrial relationships to continue, despite Turkey’s internal and external comportment, is bound to be corrosive to the norms and interests binding collective security arrangements among EU member-states.

Greek-Turkish relations, from this ‘neither can nor should’ prism are both illuminating and definitive, historically and currently.  Historically, the birth of TDITB in the post WWII period was due to the need of Turkey to invade and partly conquer Cyprus, an act that destabilised NATO, led to an unprecedented US embargo of weapons sales to Turkey and which has as its only peer event in the European continent, in the entire post WW II period, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022.  Currently, Erdogan’s determination to challenge Greek sovereign rights through actions in the field and diplomatically, even more so if they are successful, they are bound to either create insurmountable blocks to the entry or generate risks in the ongoing participation of the TDITB in Europe’s rearmament effort. Appropriately enough such an incongruity is addressed by the SAFE regulation conditionalities, as in the case of article 17[51]. We have argued in these pages that Erdogan has, through his policy choices, to let these roadblocks in place, because doing so is a ‘must have’ whereas participation of the TDITB in Europe’s rearmament is only a ‘nice to have’.

This calculation between the ‘must have’ and ‘nice to have’ is even more pronounced in the case of Erdogan’s uninhibited suppression of democratic contestation, as allowing such contestation would be equal to his loss of power. Inevitably, external aggression and internal repression compound each other, strengthening both the ‘cant’ and ‘shouldn’t’ of the participation of the TDTIB in Europe’s rearmament.

Finally, we have argued that the resource mobilization necessary for the EU to gain strategic autonomy, both in the ambitious scenario (Draghi recommendations) and the modest scenario (reordering of the EU budget), would render the TDIB contribution to Europe’s rearmament if not marginal definitely not critical. At the same time such a participation, under the ‘can’t and shouldn’t’ perspective would be both highly uncertain in its implementation and much more trouble than its worth, due to the resulting corrosion of the intra-EU consensus on which this mobilization needs to rest upon.

As for the icing of the European cake, a strategically autonomous Europe would substantially fill the vacuum left from an Asia-oriented US, put an end to Turkey’s geopolitical heterodoxy and convince its leadership to integrate Turkey with the EU’s CS

[1] Erickson, Edward J., and Mesut Uyar. Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974. Marine Corps University Press, 2020, p. 90.

[2] See, Altman, Dan. “The evolution of territorial conquest after 1945 and the limits of the territorial integrity norm.” International Organization 74.3 (2020): 490-522.

[3]Erickson, Edward J., and Mesut Uyar. Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974. Marine Corps University Press, 2020, p. 55.

[4]Turkey belongs to the emerging innovator category, the lowest category of the European Innovation Scoreboard, dedicating modest resources to R&D, being ranked 31st among 39 EU member states and neighbouring countries, see European Commission, European Innovation Scoreboard 2024, 2024, p. 104.

[5] Kitroeff, Alexander. “Diaspora-Homeland Relations and Greek-American Lobbying: the Panhellenic Emergency Committee, 1974–78.” Journal of Modern Hellenism 11 (1994): 19-40.

[6] See indicatively, Bağcı, Hüseyin, and Çağlar Kurç. “Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?.” Defence Studies 17.1 (2017): 38-62 and Mevlütoğlu, Arda, et al. “Adapting security: The intersection of Turkiye’s foreign policy and defence industrialisation.” Center for foreign policy and peace research and international institute for strategic studies (2024).

[7] This overview draws from Mevlütoğlu, Arda, et al. “Adapting security: The intersection of Turkiye’s foreign policy and defence industrialisation.” Center for foreign policy and peace research and international institute for strategic studies (2024).

[8]Domestic repression and external aggression, singly or jointly, engendered official and unofficial weapons embargoes by Switzerland, Norway, Germany and the US, see, Egeli, Sıtkı, et al. “From client to competitor: The rise of Turkiye’s defence industry.” Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research and International Institute for Strategic Studies (2024). US diplomatic sources have confirmed that the Imia islets were Greek and should have not been contested by Turkey notwithstanding the fact that the US State Department did not communicate this conviction in public so as to not alienate Turkey, see Kostoulas, Vassilis, Fascinating revelations about the 1996 Imia crisis, Kathimerini, English edition, 14 February 2025.

[9] See, for a discussion Kamaras, Antonis. “Greece’s call for an embargo on weapons sales to Turkey.” ELIAMEP, (2020).

[10] See, T. Karako, Coup proofing? Making sense of Turkey’s S-400 Decision, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 28.4.22

[11] Mevlütoğlu, Arda, et al. “Adapting security: The intersection of Turkiye’s foreign policy and defence industrialisation.” Center for foreign policy and peace research and international institute for strategic studies (2024).

[12] Waldwyn, Tom. “Turkiye’s Defence-industrial Relationships with Other European States.” Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research and International Institute for Strategic Studies  (2024).

[13]  For an analysis of these forces in play shaping Turkey’s naval strategy see, R. Gingeras, The Turkish Navy in an era of great power competition, War on the Rocks, 30.4. 2019

[14] See, Soyaltin-Colella, Digdem, and Tolga Demiryol. “Unusual middle power activism and regime survival: Turkey’s drone warfare and its regime-boosting effects.” Third World Quarterly 44.4 (2023): 724-743.

[15] See J. Mankof, The war in Ukraine and Eurasia’s new imperial moment, The Washington Quarterly, 2022

[16] Ministry of Defence, Defence Indiustrial Strategy 2025: Making Defence an Engine for Growth, UK, 8 September 2025.

[17]See, typically, Rachman, Gideon. The age of the strongman: How the cult of the leader threatens democracy around the world. Other Press, LLC, 2022.

[18] See, https://www.statista.com/chart/17557/details-about–the-turkish-companies-supporting-f-35-development/

[19] For a discussion of South Korea’s DTIB see, Nemeth, Bence. “South Korean Military Power: Lessons Europe Can Learn from Seoul on Spending Defence Budgets Efficiently.” The RUSI Journal 169.1-2 (2024): 92-101.

[20] See, typically of solidifying international consensus on Erdogan’s power grab, Tol, Gonul, Turkey is now a full-blown autocracy. Foreign Affairs, March 21 2025.

[21] See, indicatively Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Turkyie, European Parliament, 15 4 2025.

[22] See, indicatively, the analysis of Erdogan’s attempt to reinstate at CHP’s helm the ineffective Kimal Kilicdaroglou, through a court case that would put of action more capable CHP figures, GZERO Daily Newsletter, Is democracy doomed in Turkey?, 16 September 2025.

[23] See, H. Zengin, Instrumentalising the army before elections in Turkey, Third World Quarterly, 2023 and S. Adar, Understanding Turkey’s Increasingly Militaristic Foreign Policy, APSA MENA Politics Newsletter, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2020.

[24] See indicatively Nedos, Vasillis, Turkish corvette off Crete signals Turkish intent, Kathimerini, English edition, 4,2.2025 and newsroom, SAFE could be a ‘backdoor’ for Turkish aspirations, warns Greek defence minister, Kathimerini, English edition, 29.05.2025.

[25] The discussion on Europe’s strategic enablers, and the modaliti4es of their acquisition, is based on Wolff, Guntram, Steinbach, Armin and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, The governance and funding of European Rearmament, Policy Brief 15/25, Bruegel, April 2025 and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Building Defence Capacity in Europe: An Assessment. Routledge, 2024.

[26] The debate on the EU’s defence vocation having as its starting point the first Trump Presidency and accelerating with the ongoing war in Ukraine, see indicatively President of the EU Commission acceptance speech reference to a Geopolitical Commission,  European Commission, Speech by President-elect von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary on the occasion of the presentation of her College of Commissioners and their programme, 27 November 2019 and the discussion, post Brexit, of the UK being an integral part of Europe’s defence community, Leonard, Mark, Britain and Europe are Changing together, European Council of Foreign Relations,  July 15 2025.

[27] Draghi, Mario. “The Future of European Competitiveness Part A: A competitiveness strategy for Europe.” (2024).

[28] See the op-ed article of the Prime Minister of Sweden arguing, as an alternative to joint issuance of debt, the restructuring of the EU Budget, Kristerson, Ulf, The next EU budget cannot be business as usual, Politico, July 14 2025.

[29] Nicholas Oakes, Baltic allies brace as US prepares to slash security assistance, Modern Diplomacy, 6 September 2025.

[30] The author makes that point in European Defence covers Greece, Ta Nea, 12 4 2025 (Η Ευρωπαϊκή άμυνα καλύπτει την Ελλάδα, Τα Νέα).

[31] Power, Jack, A frugal no more: Russian threat shifts Denmark’s thinking on defence spending,  July 7 2025.

[32] Cafiero, George, NATO member Turkey takes role of ‘active neutrality’ in Red Sea crisis’ Responsible Statecraft, March 24 2025.

[33] Greek lobby succeeds in US efforts, Ekathimerini, https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1189218/greek-lobby-succeeds-in-us-efforts/, 18 July 2022; Greek and Jewish Diaspora team up for Cyprus security, Knews, https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/greek-and-jewish-diaspora-team-up-for-cyprus, 7 May 2018.

[34] See indicatively, John Paul Rathbone and Henry Foy, Military Briefing: How Turkey became vital to European Security, Financial Times, 14.5.2025, Kadri Tastan, et al, EU-Turkiye Defense cooperation: Why now – and how far?, German Marshall Fund, Ilke Toygur, et al.,  Turkey, Europe and the quest for security, CEPS, June 2025, Sinem Adar, et al, Alignment of Necessity, Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2025.

[35] Progress and Shortfalls in Europe’s Defence – An Assessment, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2025.

[36] Ibid.

[37] See, Tom Waldwyn, Turkiye’s defence industry charts a growth for European Growth,International Institute for Strategic Studies, 20 January 2025.

[38] Progress and Shortfalls in Europe’s Defence – An Assessment, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2025.

[39] Rutte, Mark, Specch by the NATO Secretary General at the IISS Prague Defence Summit, 4 September 2025

[40] See, Lazarou, Eleni and Politis Lamprou, Panagiotis, Conscription as an element in European Union preparedness, European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2025.

[41] Wikipedia, Coalition casualties in Afghanistan.

[42] Wagner, Wolfgang. “Is there a parliamentary peace? Parliamentary veto power and military interventions from Kosovo to Daesh.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20.1 (2018): 121-134.

[43]See his statement in the following youtube segment,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yX06zhJf20o

[44] Imamoglu calls on Germany to lift veto on Eurofighter – “Turkey is not only Erdogan”

[45] Gonul Tol, Don’t cut Turkey out of European defence efforts because of Erdogan, Financial Times, 23 June 2024.

[46] Hurjan Asli Aksoy and Salim Cevik, Turkey’s authoritarian turn: Imamoglu’s arrest and Europe’s strategic dilemma, Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, 25 March 2025.

[47] Ruth Michaelson and Nevin Sungar, Turkish opposition leader criticizes Starmer for ingoring arrest of Istanbul Mayor, Guardian, 11 April 2025.

[48] Ekrem Imamoglou, Why Turkey’s democratic future matters for the world, Financial Times, April 16 2025.

[49] Sinem Adar, et al, Alignment of Necessity, Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2025.

[50]

[51] Council Regulation (EU) 2-25/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument, Official Journal of the European Union, 28.5.2025

• From Ottoman-era modernization through to its advanced capabilities today, Turkey has transformed itself into a major global defence exporter, with $6.3 billion in exports in 2024 and flagship products like the Bayraktar TB2 drone.

• Turkey leverages its NATO membership and geographic position to strengthen defence ties and secure influence in alliance decision-making, while at the same time contributing to the Alliance advanced technologies.

• The EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative allocates €150 billion for joint defence procurement to boost Europe’s defence industrial base, reduce reliance on non-EU suppliers, and enhance interoperability.

• Ankara’s SAFE participation rationale rests on enabling technological collaboration, market access, and stronger EU ties, leveraging Turkey’s expertise in drone systems, cybersecurity, and unmanned technologies.

• Turkey’s SAFE participation should remain conditional on Ankara improving its bilateral political relations with member states, and on making explicit assurances on the inviolability of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all EU member states.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Dimitris Tsarouhas, Senior Non-Resident Fellow, ELIAMEP Turkey Programme.

Introduction

During NATO Summits, it is customary for leaders to engage in bilateral meetings on issues of common concern to coordinate policy or clarify policy positions. The 2025 NATO Summit in the Hague was no exception, with US President Trump dominating the spotlight on account of his reluctance to assure the US’s European allies of his country’s commitment to Article 5 (NPR 2025). The meeting between the US President and his Turkish counterpart, Tayyip Erdoğan, attracted a lot of media attention and confirmed the positive personal relations between the two leaders (Hürriyet Daily News 2025). More importantly, the fact that cooperation in the defence industry was explicitly included in the talks speaks volume about the evolution of Turkey’s defence industry over time, and its added value for the country’s economic, diplomatic and military status.

Over the past two decades, Turkey has emerged as a key player in the global defence landscape.

Over the past two decades, Turkey has emerged as a key player in the global defence landscape. It has done so in the context of increasing self-reliance, as it seeks to position itself as an emerging regional power and deepen both its sales volume and capacity to act independently of prior commitments or treaty-based obligations. This transformation is exemplified by the development of its domestically-produced Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have reinforced Turkey’s military capabilities but also been exported to countries such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan, showcasing Turkey’s technological prowess. TB2s have also allowed Ankara to enhance its leverage in the Russia-Ukraine war, and became the world’s most exported drone in 2024 (Defence Security Asia 2024). As Turkey aspires to deeper integration with the newly-created SAFE (Security Action for Europe) Regulation of the European Union (EU), the opportunities and challenges for its defence industry, as well as for Europe, multiply.

This paper begins by dissecting the opportunities and obstacles which participation in European defence initiatives (with a specific focus on SAFE) present for Turkey, while contextualizing the discussion within Turkey’s historical defence innovation journey and the state of its relationship with the European Union. The next section offers a historical context, exploring the evolution of Turkey’s defence industry over time and emphasizing the longevity of this complex project. The following section analyzes the growth of Turkey’s defence industry in the context of its NATO membership and outlines some of the advantages the country’s membership of the Alliance has brought with it. The next section presents a structured discussion of the SAFE Regulation, analysing its objectives and structure as well as its relevance to Turkey’s defence policy and innovation strategies. Opportunities and challenges follow in the subsequent sections. The paper details the potential benefits of Turkey’s engagement with SAFE, including technological partnerships and financial incentives. At the same time, it draws attention to the hurdles Turkey faces, and is likely to continue to face, in aligning with European defence frameworks; these range from political trust-building and technical compatibility to geopolitical tensions. Prior to its conclusion, the paper offers specific policy recommendations on how to shape the EU-Turkey relationship in the defence field while navigating the relationship’s multiple political and diplomatic complexities.

Historical Context of Turkey’s Defence Industry

The roots of Turkey’s defence industry can be traced back to the Ottoman era, when military innovation was the Empire’s first concrete act aimed at modernizing and prolonging its existence (Levy 2006). The Ottoman leadership understood the need to import technological know-how from the then dominant European states and do so in the military field in order to maintain operational capacity and prevent the Empire’s collapse. Although the latter proved impossible, it is no coincidence that the modernization and westernization of Ottoman structures, which were mostly inspired by Germany’s principles of operation, was initiated by the military and geared towards what would today be interpreted as the defence industry. During the early years of the Republic, reliance on foreign suppliers was significant and Turkey was largely unable to invest in the sector, which slowed down the development of the domestic defence industry (Özlü 2021).

The defence-industrial complex of today began to emerge in the late 20th century in line with a policy aimed at combining NATO membership with a more robust defence industry. Institutionally, the origins of change go back to the Cold War period, however, when companies such as ASELSAN and TUSAŞ were set up in the 1970s and 1980s respectively. They marked the beginning of a domestic focus on defence technology, which accelerated following the imposition of the US arms embargo on Turkey in 1975. These efforts were further reinforced by legislative measures, such as the Defence Industry Law of 1985, which aimed to enhance indigenous production capabilities. That law facilitated the creation of a structured framework for defence procurement and manufacturing, establishing financial incentives for domestic companies, and encouraging collaboration between the public and private sectors. It also mandated the prioritization of local resources and expertise to reduce dependency on imports, making the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) the primary institution for enacting that policy (Wicaksono and Perwita 2020: 54). The implementation of these policies provided the defence industry with a clear roadmap and fostered an environment conducive to innovation and sustained growth. Over time, this institutional foundation enabled Turkey to produce advanced technologies such as drones, naval warships, and missile systems, laying the groundwork for its modern defence capabilities.

During the 1990s, Turkey’s prioritization of domestic supplies for its own defence industry became manifest. At that time, Turkey’s tumultuous relations with neighbouring states and the sanctions imposed on it by western states led to a decision to initiate long-term strategic investments in the sector, in order to reap the benefits of the approach in later years. By investing heavily in research and development, Turkey was able to launch domestic production projects for drones, armoured vehicles, naval warships, and missile systems (Baysal 2025). Today, notable products such as the Bayraktar TB2 drone and T129 ATAK helicopter have gained international recognition for their capabilities. It is important to note that Turkey’s military products carry the “distinction” of being battle-tested, given Turkey’s multiple war fronts and military operations in its near abroad. For potential buyers, this constitutes an added advantage, as the Turkish armed forces have already tried and tested the products before they are made available for export.

…the defence industry that Turkey relies on today did not result from the vision of a single leader or party, but is the product of decades of strategic planning and innovation.

In the early 2000s, a paradigm shift was introduced by Turkey’s political and military decision-makers. Strategic investments were made in research and development, bolstered by partnerships between public institutions and private companies (Demir 2020). The period of rapid economic growth in the first decade of the 21st century enabled large-scale public investment in Research and Development, the fruits of which Turkey is still enjoying to this day. This transformation was driven by geopolitical pressures, including sanctions on Ankara imposed by western powers and the need for operational independence in regional conflicts. At the same time, Turkey’s discourse on cultivating domestic defence production also serves political ends, in so far as it allows for the deepening of nationalist sentiment and despite the need for consolidation that the sector is exposed to (Kurç et al. 2025). Even so, there is little doubt that the defence industry that Turkey relies on today did not result from the vision of a single leader or party, but is the product of decades of strategic planning and innovation, which included setbacks and mistakes along the way.

Today, Turkey has not only achieved prominence through its cutting-edge drone technology, it has also diversified its export portfolio to include a wide range of defence products such as armoured vehicles, naval corvettes, and advanced communication systems. Turkish firms such as Aselsan, Roketsan, and Havelsan have secured deals to supply electronic warfare systems and smart munitions to countries including Pakistan, Qatar, and Malaysia. The export of MILGEM-class corvettes to the Pakistani Navy and the delivery of T129 ATAK helicopters to the Philippines underscore Turkey’s ability to compete in complex, high-value segments of the global arms market (Rakesh 2022).

In 2023 alone, Turkish defence exports exceeded $4 billion, making it one of the fastest-growing exporters in the global arms market; by 2024, the figure had risen to $6.3 billion.

Beyond individual sales, Turkey has increasingly focused on strategic partnerships and technology transfer agreements with Western defence companies. Collaborations with European firms, such as joint ventures between Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and Airbus, have broadened Turkey’s access to aerospace technologies and global supply chains. Additionally, Turkish defence companies have participated in co-development projects with Italy’s Leonardo and the UK’s BAE Systems, most notably in the ongoing development of the TF-X next-generation fighter jet. These agreements facilitate the exchange of technical expertise, but also open new avenues for Turkish firms to integrate with European defence ecosystems. Importantly, they also create the sort of cordial political atmosphere in which arguments for including Turkey in SAFE sound rational. In 2023 alone, Turkish defence exports exceeded $4 billion, making it one of the fastest-growing exporters in the global arms market; by 2024, the figure had risen to $6.3 billion (Kuyucak 2025).

Leveraging NATO membership

As an Alliance member since 1952, Turkey has contributed to several NATO missions, deploying troops, hosting military bases, and sharing intelligence pivotal to counter-terrorism operations. In recent years, Turkey’s focus on cybersecurity and unmanned systems has provided NATO with solutions to modern challenges (Akgül-Açıkmeşe and Aksu 2024). The country’s expertise in drone technology has been particularly noteworthy, with its UAVs gaining recognition for their operational effectiveness and adaptability to various conflict scenarios. Turkey’s cybersecurity initiatives have also enhanced NATO’s ability to safeguard its networks against increasing cyber threats, demonstrating the country’s forward-thinking approach to emerging security dimensions. Turkish defence exports to NATO and partner countries reinforce political relationships and create interdependencies that enhance Turkey’s negotiating position within the Alliance. This leverage was evident in Turkey being able to insist on technology transfer and joint production in major procurement programs, such as the modernization of tanks and aircraft. These stipulations often shape NATO’s broader industrial cooperation and encourage the alignment of Alliance standards with Turkish capabilities.

Additionally, Turkey utilizes its geographic and technological assets to push for a greater role in NATO’s strategic decision-making. Its control over key logistical corridors and access to critical regional intelligence mean that Turkish support is often essential for the success of collective operations. By coupling its defence production prowess with its pivotal location, Turkey can ensure its interests are considered in Alliance planning. In leveraging its defence industry, Turkey enhances the operational strength of NATO, but also ensures that its national interests are served. In other words, Turkey leverages its modern and capable defence industry in the NATO context to attain broader objectives. Turkey’s defence industry should not, therefore, be viewed in isolation from its foreign policy objectives, but rather in the broader context of Ankara’s regional ambitions and willingness to capitalize on the nation’s location and resources that may appear only remotely linked to its defence industry.

As a longstanding member of the Alliance and one of its largest standing armies, Turkey often underscores its self-proclaimed role as a security anchor on NATO’s southeastern flank, while also providing a bridge between Europe, the Middle East, and the Black Sea. In recent years, Turkey’s investment in indigenous defence technologies has enabled the country to support NATO missions with advanced, homegrown equipment, enhancing both operational flexibility and Alliance resilience. The development and fielding of Turkish-made drones, such as the aforementioned Bayraktar TB2, have provided NATO with proven assets in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. These platforms have been tested in multiple conflict zones, including Syria and Libya. Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have enabled NATO allies to benefit from interoperable systems that can be quickly integrated in joint operations and exercises. It has also been frequently argued that Turkey’s expertise in electronic warfare, smart munitions, and secure communications has expanded NATO’s technological toolbox, particularly in areas where timely, reliable information and rapid responses are crucial. Turkish firms supply a range of command-and-control, radar, and defensive countermeasure systems that have been deployed in alliance exercises and operations (Kasapoğlu and Özakaraşahin 2024).

Turkey’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war and longstanding disputes with both EU and NATO members have not deterred NATO partners from deepening cooperation with Ankara in an attempt to expand mutual defence ties and allow for mutual benefit through technology transfer and knowledge exchange.

Politically, Turkey’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war and longstanding disputes with both EU and NATO members have not deterred NATO partners from deepening cooperation with Ankara in an attempt to expand mutual defence ties and allow for mutual benefit through technology transfer and knowledge exchange. To illustrate, Turkey and Finland signed a memorandum of understanding to boost cooperation through joint technology development and joint production in June 2025 (Helsinki Times 2025), and a similar deal has been agreed between Turkey and Romania (Blank 2025). These come in the wake of similar agreements between NATO and EU member states such as Italy, Spain and the UK, as well as expanding ties with Central and East European members (Waldwyn 2024).

The SAFE Regulation in Context

The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) was proposed in direct response to an increasingly unstable security landscape. The ongoing Russian war against Ukraine, coupled with Russia’s shift to a wartime economy, has significantly heightened the threat environment, leading to worrying debates as to the possibility of further acts of military aggression committed by Russia against European states. EU leaders recognized that Europe must take a major leap forward in its defence capabilities—not just in support of Ukraine, but also to protect the Union’s own sovereignty and bolster its resilience (European Commission 2025). In that context, SAFE is one of five pillars in the broader ReArm Europe Plan introduced by the Commission in March 2025. The Plan aims to unlock €800 billion in defence-related investments. The other ReArm pillars include the flexible application of fiscal rules to ease national defence investments, reprogramming cohesion policy funds to enhance the defence dimension, and providing EIB support through the mobilization of private capital to fund strategic defence projects, as well as direct financing.

In the specific case of SAFE, the Commission has proposed, and member states accepted, a €150 billion defence fund instrument in the form of loans to Member States for the joint procurement of defence capabilities. The loans are conditioned on collaborative procurement, which is meant to encourage joint projects, cost savings, and increased interoperability. The SAFE instrument focuses on strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) by boosting production capacity in critical areas such as missiles, artillery, drones, cyber-defence, military mobility, and enhancing EU-wide defence readiness (Council of the European Union 2025). SAFE also aims to support deliveries to Ukraine (for those member states that do not wish to add to their own stockpiles, preferring to support Kiev instead) and reduce defence market fragmentation by providing clear incentives for Member States to work together, rather than competing or relying on non-EU suppliers, such as the United States.

SAFE is grounded in Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which allows for emergency financial instruments in extraordinary situations. It draws inspiration from past tools like SURE (which funded employment support during the COVID-19 pandemic), providing a temporary but powerful mechanism to unlock EU-wide support and demonstrating that the Union can make creative use of existing instruments under crisis conditions. The regulation sets a three-stage process for participation: first, member states express interest (within 2 months of SAFE entering into force); then a tentative loan allocation is made by the Commission; finally, each interested member state submits a detailed investment plan.

SAFE reduces EU reliance on non-EU suppliers by ramping up European defence industrial capabilities, and enables the kind of fast-track joint procurement initiatives that had been sorely lacking in Europe for several decades.

Overall, then, SAFE comes with a number of important advantages that member states should be able to leverage: It reduces EU reliance on non-EU suppliers by ramping up European defence industrial capabilities, and enables the kind of fast-track joint procurement initiatives that had been sorely lacking in Europe for several decades, despite the Union having long aspired to enhancing its military and political role. In addition, European states, through structured collaboration, can now avoid duplication and reduce the fragmentation of the defence market that many have been complaining about for years. Furthermore, SAFE enables Europe’s continued support of Kiev, not least by treating Ukraine as an EU member state for SAFE purposes at a time when Russia’s advances on the ground are making the outcome of the war all the more difficult to predict. On the financial side, €150 billion in loans will drive large-scale public defence spending and investment, likely resulting in new industrial contracts, factory expansions, and jobs in key defence sectors, potentially boosting the European economy. The provision allowing member states to use SAFE loans in a fiscally flexible manner under the Stability and Growth Pact also provides them with some much-needed breathing space to invest without breaching EU budget rules. To date, 16 member states have activated the national escape clause allowing them to boost military expenditure by an additional 1.5% of annual GDP over the next four years without being found in violation of the Union’s fiscal rules (Moller-Nielsen 2025).

SAFE and Turkey: can they go together?

How does Turkey and its burgeoning defence industry fit into the SAFE framework, if at all? The Commission Regulation makes clear that, to qualify for SAFE loans, a minimum 65 percent of the value of the weapon system being acquired must be made in an EU member state, Ukraine, or European Economic Area (EEA)/European Free Trade Association (EFTA) country. Other states can take part subject to eligibility conditions. Specifically, Article 16.8 foresees the possibility of third-country participation up to 35%, but excludes components from states which pose a risk to the EU’s security and defence interests. While non-EU countries can take part in joint procurements, it is noteworthy that they are not eligible to receive the loans (Tidey 2025). Turkish defence companies are keen to ensure they will not be excluded from the sort of large contracts SAFE is likely to lead to, but their participation remains uncertain. In August 2025, the European Commission noted that Turkish firms are currently barred from SAFE procurement, since Turkey has not yet signed an international agreement under Article 218 TFEU that ensures there will be no conflict with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (European Parliament 2025).

Opportunities offered by Turkey’s Participation

Although Turkey is not an EU member state, its existing partnership with NATO provides a foundation for potential collaboration within SAFE. Ankara’s ability to adapt and innovate within collective frameworks highlights its readiness to contribute. By leveraging its history with NATO, Turkey is seeking to reinforce its credentials as a reliable and capable partner for SAFE, fostering mutual benefits in technological and strategic domains.

Turkey’s active participation in NATO projects provides valuable lessons for its potential involvement in SAFE. As discussed above, NATO has benefited from Turkish contributions in cybersecurity and unmanned systems. Turkey has already engaged in successful joint ventures with European defence companies, too, and these partnerships demonstrate the feasibility of technological integration, while underscoring the mutual benefits of collaboration. Turkish defence products, and in particular its drones and missile systems, are globally recognized for their cost-effectiveness, innovation, and operational success.

Moreover, Turkey’s existing expertise in drone technology could complement the EU’s efforts to enhance its autonomous defence capabilities. SAFE offers financial incentives to nations participating in joint projects and research. Turkey’s inclusion could bring significant funding opportunities, enabling it to scale innovation projects. By engaging with SAFE, Turkey has the potential to strengthen its ties with Europe. Cooperation could also both sides to address shared challenges, such as terrorism and cyber security. SAFE could also open European markets to Turkish defence products.

Challenges posed by Turkey’s Participation

Turkey’s involvement with SAFE is not merely an issue of defence technology or cooperation potential; it is also undeniably affected by longstanding political tensions with the EU and several of its member states.

Turkey’s involvement with SAFE is not merely an issue of defence technology or cooperation potential; it is also undeniably affected by longstanding political tensions with the EU and several of its member states. These tensions stem from a myriad of issues, including territorial disputes with Greece, the continued impasse over Cyprus, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 Russian missile system, as well as growing concerns over autocratization on Turkey’s domestic political front. Historically, Turkey’s assertive and, on occasions, aggressive stance on issues such as maritime boundaries and energy exploration in contested waters has fuelled disputes with EU member states like Greece and Cyprus, leading to heightened diplomatic friction. Migration management remains another contentious area, with Turkey often leveraging its role as a transit country for migrants heading to Europe in negotiations with the EU, not least through the EU-Turkey deal of 2015-2016. Meanwhile, critiques of Turkey’s handling of human rights and political and media freedoms further strain relations, casting doubt on its alignment with EU values and willingness to abide by EU standards. Finally, some EU member states perceive Turkey’s involvement in SAFE as a threat to Europe’s strategic autonomy, given its democratic backsliding and attempt to balance its relations with Russia, despite the latter’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine.

These tensions are no transient obstacles; they are deeply entrenched legal and political challenges. Turkey’s growing strategic autonomy, as evidenced by its independent foreign policy decisions and defence capabilities, clash with the EU’s goal of maintaining unified regional governance and a rules-based approach anchored in international legal practice. Furthermore, the SAFE Regulation could exacerbate these divides, as Turkey’s integration might be perceived by certain EU member states as encroaching upon Europe’s strategic autonomy and contradicting the message that Europe wishes to send to the world by adopting SAFE.

Given these factors and historical precedents, political tensions between Turkey and the EU are likely to persist. The SAFE Regulation, while offering opportunities for cooperation, will require sustained diplomatic efforts to address the underlying mistrust and conflicting priorities that have long defined the relationship between the two sides, but also substantial material change in Turkish foreign policy in the direction of greater alignment with the EU acquis. Turkey’s strained relations with the EU, including concerns relating to Turkey’s commitment to democratic governance, present significant barriers to SAFE participation.

Recommendations to the EU

Turkey’s involvement with SAFE comes with an important set of challenges that would need to be overcome prior to its participation. To effectively integrate Turkey into the SAFE framework, the European Union must take proactive steps that prioritize inclusivity, strategic collaboration, and mutual growth.

Turkey’s SAFE participation should remain conditional on Ankara improving its bilateral political relations with member states, and on Turkey making explicit assurances as to the inviolability of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all EU member states. 

First off, the EU should intensify its political dialogue with Turkey to rebuild trust and address long-standing geopolitical tensions. Turkey’s SAFE participation should remain conditional on Ankara improving its bilateral political relations with member states, and on Turkey making explicit assurances as to the inviolability of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all EU member states. This should build on the positive momentum Ankara has brought to Turkey-Greece relations over the last couple of years. If Ankara is serious about a long-term structural improvement in relations with its EU neighbour, implementing the Greek PM’s proposal that the Turkish Parliament revoke its 1995 “casus belli’” declaration towards Greece (which stated that Athens extending its territorial waters beyond 6 nautical miles in the Aegean would constitute a cause for war) would be a symbolic, yet powerful, declaration of Turkey’s intentions. Moreover, EU conditionality could be operationalized too, with Brussels reassuring member states as to Ankara’s intentions, but also nudging Turkey towards peaceful and harmonious cooperation with every EU member state by declaring that its political and military capacities guarantee the inviolability of EU borders. Establishing dedicated forums for defence and security collaboration, coupled with high-level diplomatic engagement, can create an atmosphere of mutual respect and shared objectives, but also make it clear to Turkey that its participation in SAFE hinges on its policy behaviour.

By framing Turkey’s inclusion in SAFE as a means to bolster Europe’s collective strength, the EU can align member states’ perspectives with a unified vision for strategic autonomy and ensure that Turkey’s participation genuinely adds value to EU endeavours.

Second, the EU could support Turkey in aligning its defence technologies with EU standards through co-funded research initiatives and technical workshops. Turkey’s defence systems may need modifications to meet EU standards, which could involve substantial investment and time. Joint investments in testing facilities and innovation hubs can accelerate integration and ensure interoperability within the SAFE framework. Moreover, Turkey’s participation would depend on compliance with EU regulations, intellectual property norms, and export controls. These are issues the EU and Turkey have discussed over the years, but without a successful resolution being achieved as yet. Navigating these legal complexities is a prerequisite for successful integration. In this context, the EU must emphasize shared objectives such as regional stability, technological innovation, and resilience against security threats. By framing Turkey’s inclusion in SAFE as a means to bolster Europe’s collective strength, the EU can align member states’ perspectives with a unified vision for strategic autonomy and ensure that Turkey’s participation genuinely adds value to EU endeavours in the field of defence.

Conclusion

Turkey’s defence industry is at a pivotal moment in its evolution, and stands poised to leverage its considerable expertise. While challenges such as political tensions and the alignment of technical standards continue to complicate in EU-Turkey relations, they should not be viewed as insurmountable barriers. Turkey has demonstrated its capacity to participate in international defence initiatives with its contributions to NATO projects and joint ventures with European companies, while continuing to push for more defence autonomy through the development of a wide industrial base. At the same time, there is little doubt that Turkey’s foreign policy is often misaligned with EU priorities, and Turkish foreign policy priorities are increasingly at odds with the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), especially on Russia but also with respect to Turkey’s stance on Hamas and its interventionist role in the Middle East (European Commission 2023). Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system in 2017, and Ankara’s refusal to recognize Cyprus, despite Turkey being an EU candidate country, continue to complicate its relations with Brussels, as do flare-ups in tensions with Greece and open policy disagreements with EU foreign policy priorities on a number of other issues.

This policy paper has argued that leveraging EU conditionality can allow Brussels to not only assuage some of its member states’ concerns about Ankara’s intentions, but also to re-engage with Ankara from a position of principles and values, rather than engaging with it purely on the basis of instrumentality and expediency. In other words, the value-oriented and practical aspects of SAFE can come together in a way that proves beneficial to the Union as a whole, while calming the fears of some of its member states regarding the role Turkey could play in the context of this initiative.

Turkey stands to gain in terms of both technological advancement and financial investment, not to mention the diplomatic overtures that such participation will allow, especially to member states that Ankara is close to, such as Hungary, Italy and Spain.

For Turkey, there is little doubt that SAFE participation would be another step towards consolidating an important position in the regional geopolitical landscape. Turkey stands to gain in terms of both technological advancement and financial investment, not to mention the diplomatic overtures that such participation will allow, especially to member states that Ankara is close to, such as Hungary, Italy and Spain. Moreover, its collaboration with SAFE would constitute an opportunity to contribute meaningfully to Europe’s autonomy and stability, shaping a future where security challenges are met with collective strength and innovation instead of threats and regional antagonism. This is a future that would vindicate the setting up of SAFE, and prove that lessons from the war of Russia against Ukraine have been widely learned.

 

References

Akgül-Açıkmeşe, S. and Aksu, F. (2024) “Türkiye’s Relations with/within NATO: The Ontological Security Dilemmas of Türkiye’s Transatlantic Identity”, Alternatives, Onlinefirst, 6 November.

Baysal, B. (2025) “Evaluating the advances and challenges in Turkey’s defence industry: a comparative analysis”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 25(1): 31-52.

Blank, S. (2025) “Turkish-Romanian Defense Deal a Model for Europe”, Center for European Policy Analysis, 9 June.

Council of the European Union (2025) “Council Regulation 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025

 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument”, Official Journal of the European Union 2025/1106

Defence Security Asia (2024) “Bayraktar TB2 Emerges as the World’s Most Exported Drone This Year”, 20 November.

Demir, I. (2020) “Transformation of the Turkish Defense Industry: the story and rationale of the great rise”, Insıght Turkey, 22(3): 17-40.

European Commission (2023) “State of Play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations”, JOIN (2023) 50 final.

European Commission (2025) “Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of European Defence Industry Instrument”, COM (2025) 122 final.

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Helsinki Times (2025) “Finland and Turkey sign defence pact as tensions with Russia grow”, Helsinki Times, 4 June.

Hürriyet Daily News (2025) “Erdoğan, Trump discuss defense ties at NATO summit”, 25 June.

Kasapoğlu, C. and Özkaraşahin, S. (2024) “Turkey’s emerging and disruptive technologies capacity and NATO: Defense policy, prospects, and limitations”, Atlantic Council Issue Brief, 8 July.

Kurç, Ç., Güvenç, S., Mevlütoğlu, A. and Egeli, S. (2025) “Balancing aspiration and reality: autarky in Turkish defence industrial policy”, Defence Studies, 25(2): 383-406.

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Waldwyn, T. (2024) “Turkiye’s Defence-industrial Relationships with Other European States”, Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September.

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This report (Vlassis, A., Psychogiopoulou, E, Kandyla, A. and Sarikakis, K. (Eds) (2025)) examines EU film promotion by states and EU policies. It highlights the need for stronger gender equality support in the audiovisual sector.

Part B, authored by Evangelia Psychogiopoulou (ELIAMEP), Anna Kandyla (ELIAMEP), Pelin Turan (SSSA), Apostolos Samaras (ELIAMEP), Laia Comerma (ELIAMEP), and Caterina Sganga (SSSA), forms part of T3.5 (EU law and governance and the promotion of the EFI on the international scene). It examines and assesses whether—and, if so, how—EU law and policies promote European audiovisual works and film beyond the borders of the EU. It does so by mapping the policies and instruments in place, identifying their characteristics, complementarities, enablers and limitations in enhancing the internationalisation of the European audiovisual industry. The analysis focuses in particular on agreements the EU has negotiated with third countries and regions concerning trade facilitation and cooperation in the audiovisual and film sectors. It also  considers EU funding instruments supporting the audiovisual sector and external action in this field. Methodologically, the study draws on extensive desk research and the analysis of a range of primary and secondary sources, complemented by insights gathered through semi-structured interviews with EU officials and film stakeholders. Overall, the findings indicate that EU agreements with third countries, along with audiovisual cooperation and external funding tools, include various elements that can boost the positioning of European films worldwide, although the scope of these instruments varies. The analysis also suggests that considerable untapped potential remains and calls for a comprehensive internationalisation strategy that promotes the competitiveness of the European audiovisual sector while supporting cultural diversity.

The report is available here.

As Cyprus assumes its second Presidency of the European Union, it steps into a role defined by crisis and change. The contrast with its first Presidency (2012) could not be sharper. Then, multilateralism prevailed; collaboration was possible, and conflict manageable. Today, multilateralism is under siege, conflicts dominate, and Europe faces existential challenges: its Union and Security, its Internal and Capital Markets, its Competitiveness, its Freedom and Values.

Every Presidency has one duty: to carry the Union’s business forward. For Cyprus, the central test will be guiding the negotiations on the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). This is an exercise in listening, negotiation, and compromise. More than anything, it will demand that Cyprus acts as an honest broker — a role where smaller member states often succeed more than larger ones.

Three Tests of Success

Like all Presidencies, Cyprus will be judged on three fronts:

• Institutional: Can it leave a footprint by steering the MFF to conclusion?
• Representational: Can it represent a policy theme, bigger than its national interest that endures? Water, as a scarce resource and driver of conflict and migration –with impact across continents -, could anchor a “Nicosia Declaration on Water.”
• Reputational: Can it use neutrality to build a legacy as a convener of peace and compromise?

It is commendable that Cyprus wants to include regional neighbors as observers in EU deliberations. The EuroMediterranean region — 500 million people, 10% of global GDP — is paradoxically the least interconnected in the world. Intra-regional trade is just one quarter of total trade. For a decade, progress has been negligible.

Cyprus, as the EU’s southeastern border, can help change this. By bringing neighbors into the European conversation, it can foster trade, collaboration, and peace. But this must be pursued with neutrality and as part of a long-term strategy and within EU’s governance model— not as a one-off gesture.

The Presidency is about Europe’s collective good, not national gain. Yet Cyprus’ reality cannot be ignored. It remains divided, with EU law barred from 30% of its territory. And, it is Europe’s only isolated island Member State.

This Presidency can remind Cypriots of the benefits of EU membership. It can remind Europeans of the reality that part of EU territory remains occupied by Turkey — an EU trade partner and NATO member. That contradiction must never be normalized, and it must never be replicated elsewhere.

Cyprus should not instrumentalize its occupation and division but deploy it as a precedent and the learnings which point to European security risks, given the current world order, prevailing Russia threats across the EU’s borders and continuing conflict between Israel, Palestine and regional actors.

Cyprus’ Presidency comes at a moment when Europe needs resilience and vision. It is an opportunity for a small state to leave a large footprint. To prove that neutrality can be strength. To show that Cyprus is not an island on the margins, but a player at the heart of Europe’s frontier.

Photo: Flickr

This deliverable of the project REBOOT (Kandyla, A., Turan P. and Vlassis, A. (Eds). (2025)) offers an overview and description of the structure and contents of the public database on ‘European Union (EU) laws and cross-national frameworks relevant to the European Film Industry (EFI)’. Developed within the framework of Work Package 3 (WP3) of the REBOOT project, the database is organised into three distinct sub-databases, each addressing key dimensions on the laws and policies governing the promotion of the EFI at the international level: the regulatory framework for filmmaking at the EU level and across EU member states; institutional and policy models across the EU Member States, and EU legal and policy instruments relevant to the internationalisation of the EFI. D3.6 is meant to act as a guide to these resources. It outlines the main types of information and data included in each sub-database and details the methodology employed in their compilation, including documentary sources, data collection structures, and other relevant information. The full sub-databases will be released as part of the ‘Film industry competitiveness dashboard’ (Task 6.2), which is scheduled to be submitted in November 2025. The dashboard will offer an online platform providing public access to both original data collected within the REBOOT project and existing statistics. It will enable visualisations and support future analysis of the evolving competitiveness of the European film industry.

The deliverable is structured in three parts as follows:

(1) Part 1 introduces the sub-database on ‘Multi-level mapping of the legal norms informing and regulating filmmaking in the European Union’. This sub-database reflects the scientific output of the research conducted under Task 3.1, led by Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (hereinafter referred to as ‘SSSA’). It offers a detailed mapping of legal and policy instruments across multiple governance levels (international, supranational, regional, and national) that influence filmmaking in the EU. It covers an array of areas critical to the sector’s competitiveness, including cultural diversity, copyright, media law, and the protection of minors. Norms have been extracted from legal instruments issued by organisations such as UNESCO, WIPO, WTO, the Council of Europe, the EU, and selected Member States.

(2) Part 2 presents the sub-database on the ‘Promotion of the EFI at the international level: Institutional and policy models across the EU Member States’. This sub-database reflects the output of Task 3.4, led by the University of Liège (ULIEGE), which explored how public institutions and practices contribute to the international promotion of their national film industries and, by extension, of the broader EFI. The sub-data includes quantitative data and materials, offering a structured, accessible, and comparative resource. Drawing on extensive documentary research, interviews, and market data, it provides a comparative mapping of public support strategies, funding mechanisms, and the actors involved in promoting the EFI across EU Member States and abroad.

(3) Part 3 presents the sub-database on ‘EU legal and policy measures on the promotion of the EFI on the international scene’. Developed as part of research conducted by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) under Task 3.5, it catalogues a range of agreements concerning trade facilitation and cooperation negotiated by the EU with third countries and regions, covering agreements that are currently in force, as well as agreements pending signature and ratification. It also covers selected EU funding instruments with relevance to the international promotion of European audiovisual works and audiovisual cooperation with third countries.

 

The deliverable is available here.

This policy brief is authored by Dr. Isabelle Ioannides (Senior Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme – ELIAMEP) and published in the context of the project EMBRACing changE – Overcoming Obstacles and Advancing Democracy in the European Neighbourhood (EMBRACE). EMBRACE is a multi-country research initiative (2022–2025) that seeks to strengthen the capacity of EU policymakers and pro-democracy actors to develop effective strategies for democracy promotion across five regions: the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa. It combines comparative analysis, stakeholder engagement, and new data collection to identify the obstacles and enablers of democratisation and to design practical policy tools for European democracy promotion.

Focusing on Work Package 7 – The Geopolitics of EUDP, this policy brief addresses the turbulent geopolitical landscape in which EU democracy promotion must operate. Russia’s and China’s assertive roles, including disinformation campaigns, combine with heightened regional instability, conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the spread of polarisation and populism within and beyond Europe. These developments create a volatile environment that constrains democratic progress in the EU’s neighbourhood and, in some cases, drives democratic backsliding. The brief stresses that the EU’s democracy promotion cannot be viewed in isolation from these broader geopolitical dynamics.

Against this backdrop, the EMBRACE project organised scenario-building workshops in North Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia, and conducted stakeholder interviews in Algeria. These consultations had a twofold aim: to assess the democratic trajectories and risks facing each country by 2030, and to evaluate how the EU can mitigate challenges while reinforcing democratic enablers. The locally led approach ensured that country-specific insights and informal power dynamics were captured, helping to refine projections for how external and internal pressures may shape democracy in the coming years.

The brief concludes by offering recommendations for the EU to recalibrate its democracy promotion strategies under conditions of geopolitical competition and uncertainty. It underlines that effectiveness depends on tailoring approaches to local realities, anticipating risks through foresight and scenario planning, and reinforcing the EU’s credibility as a consistent and strategic actor. By integrating evidence-based insights and locally grounded perspectives, the policy brief contributes to EMBRACE’s broader mission of equipping the EU with more adaptive and resilient tools for advancing democracy in its neighbourhood.

Read the paper here in pdf.

The housing problem in Europe is linked to the trajectory from post-war de-commodification to the recent re-commodification and financialization of housing, which has made it increasingly unaffordable for the economically vulnerable. The European Union has launched numerous and diverse initiatives for affordable housing, which may have a significant impact despite their subsidiary role and the challenges they face.

In Greece, the housing question has followed a different path from that of the major countries of Western and Northern Europe. The post-war trajectory began with protective conditions for small market actors and, indirectly, for the wider public. These conditions gradually weakened, along with the housing systems they had supported (self-building and antiparochi), and were replaced by a major shift toward the market—most notably the entry of commercial banks into mortgage lending. Subsequently, the fiscal crisis, the gradual exit from it, the expansion of tourism, the influx of corporate and foreign capital into real estate, and the growth of short-term rentals created increasingly problematic conditions for those in need of affordable housing, particularly rental housing.

Measures introduced so far to address the housing crisis have been inadequate and ineffective, while the issue has now taken a central place in social and political debate in Greece for the first time.

Read here (in Greek) the policy paper by Thomas Maloutas, Researcher Emeritus, National Centre for Social Research (NCSR); Professor Emeritus of Geography, Harokopio University and Dimitra Siatitsa, PhD in Urban Planning, Postdoctoral Researcher National Technical University of Athens/National Centre for Social Research (NCSR).

This paper by Dr. Isabelle Ioannides, Senior Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP, is published in the context of the project EMBRACing changE – Overcoming Blockages and Advancing Democracy in the European Neighbourhood. EMBRACE is a multi-country research initiative that aims to enhance democracy promotion efforts in the EU’s neighbourhood by identifying key obstacles to democratisation and formulating evidence-based strategies to overcome them. The project draws on locally led research and stakeholder engagement across twelve case studies in five regions: the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa.

Focusing on Work Package 8 of the project, the report “Toolkit for EU decision-makers on the geopolitics of EU Democracy Promotion (EUDP)” outlines a conceptual design for a novel approach aimed at strengthening the EU’s ability to respond to democratic backsliding in its neighbourhood. Building on the EMBRACE project’s analysis of factors conducive to democratic opening, such as political structures, historical legacies, and the role of critical junctures, the paper proposes a shift from static and fragmented democracy promotion tools to a dynamic, adaptive, and context-specific system.

The report develops its blueprint based on findings from scenario-building workshops in North Macedonia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, as well as interviews with stakeholders in Algeria. These consultations interrogated the EU’s existing conceptual framework for democracy promotion and highlighted the need for locally grounded, evidence-based approaches. Central to the proposed Toolkit is a co-design process with local stakeholders, ensuring that EU policy instruments are informed by country-specific realities and informal power structures.

The paper underscores that the Toolkit’s added value lies in its integration of democracy measurement frameworks, data collection and management tools, foresight and forecasting methods, and alert and rapid response systems. These elements are conceived as part of a feedback loop where measurement informs foresight, foresight guides policy design, and outcomes feed back into continuous learning. In this way, the Toolkit leverages local expertise and EU instruments to achieve smarter and more resilient democratisation outcomes.

The report concludes that the EU’s democracy promotion efforts must evolve into a living, continuously adaptive system capable of moving from reactive responses to proactive strategies. By fostering country-specific customisation, local co-creation, and synergies across EU external action instruments, the proposed Toolkit offers a pathway to more effective and resilient democracy promotion both in the five case study countries and beyond.

Read the report here.

Spyros Blavoukos, Professor at the Athens University of Economics & Business; Head of ELIAMEP’s EU Institutions & Policies Programme and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP outline the broader framework of the EU defence cooperation, seeking to provide a concise overview of the Union’s key initiatives that shape its actions in the fields of defence (industrial) policy.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here (in Greek).

• The creation of additional fiscal space (NEC) and the provision of low cost lending (SAFE) of ReArm Europe will enhance Greece’s defence expenditures as well as demand for weapon systems throughout the EU.
• The Greek defence industry will exploit these growing opportunities due to its integration in pan-European supply chains, an outcome of the offset agreements of the 1990s and 2000s.
• With three additional policies the Greek defence industry can position itself with even greater effectiveness in this new environment.
• First, build further on the government’s ongoing energetic management of defence-related assets under state ownership, primarily with the exit of the Hellenic Aerospace Company from tight state control.
• Second, reform defence procurement so that the need for speed is addressed which is necessary for realizing Civil-Military Fusion (CMF), including through the transition of the Hellenic Court of Audit from ex ante to ex post review of defence procurement contracts.
• Third, strengthen the Hellenic Center for Defence Innovation (HCDI) with additional financial resources and appointment to its Board of distinguished Greek diaspora scientists so that HCDI can catalyse the participation of diaspora start-ups and diaspora scientific talent in the generation, by the Greek defence industry, of asymmetric force to counter the Turkish threat.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Antonis Kamaras, Research Associate, ELIAMEP.

The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Programme is the new EU financial instrument designed to allow EU Member States to speed up their defence readiness by enabling urgent and significant investments in support of the European defence industry, with a focus on filling critical gaps in capabilities and equipment. It is the first pillar of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 strategic plan that aims to unlock €800 billion in defence spending across the EU.[1]

SAFE will provide up to €150 billion in competitive long-maturity loans to Member States that request financial assistance for investments in defence capabilities. These loans will finance urgent and large-scale procurement processes, ensuring that Europe’s defence industry can deliver the requisite equipment.

The features expected of the submitted proposals

The proposals should be:

• Relevant to the defence capabilities of Member States and the EU (e.g. border protection, countering hybrid threats, protecting critical infrastructure, countering cyber warfare, etc.)
• For urgent, large-scale procurement efforts, not small projects
• Involve at least two Member States in a common procurement procedure
• However, requests from individual Member States can also be approved, but only if they are linked to an urgent need and broader geopolitical realities; the proposal must also be submitted on the basis of the timely procurement and delivery of critical assets[2] (for example, the need to procure drones to counter migration movements along routes experiencing a significant increase in traffic, or systems to protect critical infrastructure from potential terrorist threats linked to the situation in the Middle East, could be supported). This is a temporary exception with an initial duration of one year.
• In addition, no more than 35% of the cost of the products’ manufacturing components can originate from outside the EU, EEA-EFTA, or Ukraine, while the countries of origin must meet the conditions set out in the Programme Regulations.

What will SAFE fund?

Category 1:

• Ammunition and missiles
• Artillery systems, including deep-precision strike capabilities
• Ground combat capabilities and their support systems, including soldier equipment and infantry weapons
• Small drones (NATO 1 class[3]) and related anti-drone systems
• Systems and equipment for critical infrastructure protection
• Cyber defence and cyber security systems
• Military mobility, including counter-mobility

Category 2:

• Air and missile defence systems
• Maritime surface and underwater capabilities
• Drones other than small drones (NATO-2 and NATO-3 class) and related anti-drone systems
• Strategic enablers such as, but not limited to, strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, C4ISTAR systems (Command, Communications, Information, Control, etc.), as well as space assets and services
• Space asset protection systems
• Artificial intelligence and electronic warfare systems

Countries that have expressed an interest in participating in SAFE and a Timeline for the Next Steps

By 29 July 2025, when the Programme’s first key deadline expired, 19 Member States had expressed an interest in accessing loans through the SAFE mechanism, with potential defence purchases of at least €127 billion.

The Member States in question are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

The following resources have been tentatively allocated to the Member States as follows:

Member-State Allocation of Resources (€) Belgium 8,340,027,698 Bulgaria 3,261,700,000 Croatia 1,700,000,000 Cyprus 1,181,503,924 Czech Republic 2,060,000,000 Denmark 46,796,822 Estonia 2,660,932,171 Finland 1,000,000,000 France 16,216,720,524 Greece 787,669,283 Hungary 16,216,720,524 Italy 14,900,000,000 Latvia 5,680,431,322 Lithuania 6,375,487,840 Poland 43,734,100,805 Portugal 5,841,179,332 Romania 16,680,055,394 Slovakia 2,316,674,361 Spain 1,000,000,000

 

30 November 2025 Submission of National Defence Investment Plans

January 2026 Adoption of Council Implementing Decisions

February 2026: Negotiation of loan agreements and operational arrangements, triggering pre-financing.

In search of a European strategic culture and interoperability: Behind the Lines

1. The Programme is part of the EU’s overall strategy on the indivisibility of external and internal security—a strategy which informs every strategic and institutional document it produces in relation to internal and foreign policy. SAFE follows in the wake of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, but also the intensification of hybrid threats. It is therefore to be expected that it bears the imprint of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well Moscow’s hybrid attacks against Ukraine and its hybrid operations against EU Member States. Apart from blurring the lines between war and peace—which is a key characteristic of hybrid threats in general—, the specific threat posed by Russia highlights the extent to which internal security is now significantly threatened by a malicious external actor, which can also be a state. This constitutes a further significant change in the recognition and assessment of threats.
2. The main threats that can be addressed through projects submitted to SAFE for funding extend beyond military attack by a hostile nation to include hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, the weaponization of migration and mass border breaches, terrorist attacks, malicious acts, and the sabotaging of critical infrastructure. Which is to say, precisely those threats that are stressed in the broader strategic and political philosophy underpinning the new EU defence policy, mainly via the White Paper on European Defence Preparedness 2030.
3. This works in tandem with the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, which sets out an integrated approach to every threat to the Union’s preparedness for conflict, anthropogenic and natural disasters and crises, the White Paper on European Defence Preparedness 2030, and the Internal Security Strategy: Protecting the EU.
4. SAFE emphasizes investment in the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure/entities, cyberspace, borders, transport, supply chains, information and communication technologies, as well as space investments, technologies and facilities. It is worth noting that most Member States are in the process of transposing the Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities into national law and developing related strategies.
5. SAFE is a Programme that can further enhance interoperability between the armed and security forces, as well as dual use in the defence / security / civil protection sectors in line with the framework put in place by the EU Preparedness Union Strategy to prevent and react to emerging threats and crises—in particular those in the areas of hybrid threats, border protection, the resilience of critical infrastructure, and cyber security.
6. It can act as a bottom-up catalyst for the emergence of a European strategic culture in both threat identification and investment planning; for the creation of collaborative economies of scale; and for the increased interoperability of assets and systems on the basis of a common European defence capability. This procedure has been followed in other cases where there were difficulties reaching an agreement at the Council level—for example, in the prevention of radicalization. However, there is always the risk that the absence of a statutory coordinating body could lead to fragmented proposals that simply reproduce the various strategic cultures and assessments of risk. Let’s hope that this time, the glass is half-full.

 

[1] For details on SAFE, see the relevant EXPLAINER by S. Blavoukas and P. Politis-Lamprou at https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/EXPLAINER-4-EL.pdf. More generally, on the European Defence Fund and the EU Defence Industrial Ecosystem, see S. Blavoukos; P. Politis-Lamprou and G. Matsoukas at https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Policy-paper-182-Blavoukos-Politis-Matsoukas-FINAL-EL.pdf

[2] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/safe-security-action-europe_en

[3] The classification is based on their weight and the altitude they can reach under normal conditions. Specifically, they are:
Class I: small>20 kg; mini 2-20 kg, micro<2kg
Class II: 150-600 kg (regular)
Class III: >600 kg with three subcategories (strike, HALE, MALE).
On the categories, and more generally on NATO’s approach to unmanned aerial vehicles, see Joint Air Power Competence Centre https://www.japcc.org/

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for August 2025.

On August 4, 2025, the Greek Minister of Environment and Energy, Stavros Papastavrou, met with the new Chargé d’Affaires at the US Embassy in Athens, Josh Huck, to discuss energy cooperation between Greece and the US and electricity interconnection projects in the Eastern Mediterranean. Papastavrou said that the discussion focused on energy cooperation, the South-North Vertical Gas Corridor, the utilization of infrastructure for American LNG in Revithoussa and Alexandroupolis, and the keen interest in electricity interconnection projects in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On the same day, a statement released by the American Hellenic Chamber of Commerce on the recent EU-US Trade Deal noted that the deal may present important opportunities for Greece. As it is specifically noted in the statement: “As a member of both the EU and NATO, and as a growing logistics, energy, and digital hub in Southeastern Europe, Greece stands to benefit significantly from the strengthening of transatlantic trade ties. In fact, improved market access, increased regulatory coordination, and the prospect of expanded zero-for-zero tariff arrangements can translate into tangible results for Greek exporters, investors, and technology-driven sectors”.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a call with Prime Minister of Greece Kyriakos Mitsotakis on August 8 regarding the strategic importance of US–Greece energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. During the call, Secretary Rubio reaffirmed the continued strength of the United States’ bilateral relationship with Greece and its role as a key NATO Ally.

At the same time, Greece and the United States are in talks to revise their Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), a move that could see the establishment of two new bases for US forces in mainland Greece and a significant expansion of the American military footprint in the country. The ongoing negotiations are also focused on upgrading existing facilities. The US will remain in the strategic northeastern port of Alexandroupoli and is set to spend $42 million to upgrade its naval base at Souda Bay in Crete. According to officials, the two new locations being considered for US forces are the Petrochori firing range in the western Peloponnese and the Dalipis Army Base near Thessaloniki.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

ELIAMEP and the Institute of Global Affairs of The American College of Greece (ACG) organised the 5th Summer Academy titled “Leadership Beyond Boundaries: Empowering the Next Generation of Mediterranean Leaders”, which took place at the premises of the International Olympic Academy from Monday, July 14 2025, to Saturday, July 19 2025. In total, the 5th ELIAMEP-ACG Summer Academy brought together 29 participants (emerging leaders from various fields) and 21 distinguished speakers from 19 countries across the Mediterranean, Europe, and Asia, to discuss critical issues concerning the Mediterranean. The Summer Academy included lectures, discussions as well as trainings in negotiations and public speaking & media. The report of the 5th Summer Academy is available here. The agenda and the list of speakers and staff members who contributed to the 5th Summer Academy are available here.

Emmanuella Doussis, Professor, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head of the Climate and Sustainability Programme and Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP

Guterres’ recent report and speech to the General Assembly present clean energy as a reality, and one which must not and cannot be held back. It is already creating growth, jobs and energy security, and billions of dollars are being channelled into the green transition. Renewable energy sources are now more cost-effective than fossil fuels, and new renewable energy capacity is outstripping conventional fuels on every continent. However, progress is not fast enough and, still more crucially, not fair enough. Africa and developing countries receive only a small share of the global funding, while fossil fuel subsidies continue.

The General Assembly can serve as a key forum for cooperation, even amidst geopolitical antagonisms, as environmental and climate issues are, and must increasingly be, perceived as peace and security issues. Multilateral alliances (G77, LDCs, AOSIS), as well as regional blocs like the EU, often play an active role in helping build majorities, making concerted demands, and putting pressure on major powers that often act unilaterally (e.g. China, the US, Russia), as well as on other polluting states. The General Assembly’s unanimous decision to consult the International Court of Justice on states’ obligations with regard to climate change has recently led to a landmark opinion relating to the international law governing the response to the phenomenon. Although non-binding, the opinion could shape practice and open the way for appeals, in particular from the countries most affected by climate change. So, while the General Assembly does not produce legally-binding texts directly, its actions can produce important results indirectly. Which is to say the General Assembly can keep the debate around the green transition in the spotlight and act as a catalyst for multilateral cooperation, especially in areas where convergences and potential partnerships (should) transcend geopolitical divisions.

Maria Gavouneli, Professor, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Member of the Board, ELIAMEP

There is a short answer: none at all! The General Assembly has always been a forum for big words and little action. Over the decades, we have had a series of declarations and statements that rarely translate into binding obligations for UN member states, and then only after their content has been transposed in treaties or monitoring and accountability mechanisms as a result of difficult and often lengthy negotiations. Lately, even texts that formerly would have been adopted by consensus have been subject to complicated and lengthy voting processes.
The longer answer is, of course, different and more involved. It is on the sidelines of the General Assembly, in the UN’s corridors of power, that the big issues are discussed and often decided. While world leaders read their prepared monologues in turn, it is the organized meetings in smaller chambers—and ad hoc huddles—that can make the difference. This is especially true in times like the present, when simply setting-up a session is problematic, even before one considers the agenda and items ranging from the Middle East ceasefire and the peace plan in Ukraine to energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the resolution of bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey. Truth be told, this has always been where the General Assembly, and the UN in general, has made its most important contributions.

Mihalis Kritikos, Adjunct Professor, School of Governance, University of Brussels; Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

The UN is back: the example of artificial intelligence

Amidst a frantic and ever-escalating geopolitical rivalry in the sphere of technology, artificial intelligence is redefining the dynamics of global power while its governance has become the subject of hundreds of separate initiatives. Given this somewhat fragmented landscape, the recent decision by the UN General Assembly to create two new mechanisms to promote international cooperation in AI governance—the UN Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and the Global Dialogue on AI Governance—is especially important. There are three reasons for this:

First, because the UN is setting out to create a global platform for dialogue that will give developing countries an equal voice in shaping the future of AI, while aligning the discourse with the ambitions of the Global South. Second, because the resolution seeks to put in place a framework based on a human-centred approach to AI that promotes the transparency and social utility of the technology. And third, because it sends a powerful signal to the world that the UN remains capable of achieving convergence and laying the foundations for a common framework to address the challenges of a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

If the scientific independence of the committee and the multilateralism of the global dialogue are safeguarded, then the future global governance of this influential technology will be in safe hands.

Panayotis Tsakonas, Professor, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head, Foreign Policy & Security Programme, ELIAMEP

The retreat of multilateralism, the systematic erosion and/or removal of international norms/rules, and the ascendancy of the logic of power in inter-state relations that followed Trump’s election and have largely been imposed by the United States is expected to detract markedly from the Great Powers’ ability to cooperate in a meaningful and effective way at the upcoming 85th General Assembly of the United Nations. There, the United States (the strongest but least legitimate part of a divided—if not fragmented—West), an ever-stronger China, which is already working towards building an enlarged anti-Western coalition, the dynamically “anti-Western” Russia, and India, the most populous nation in the world, are expected to reaffirm their positions and roles in the new and continually evolving “post-Western” world.

In this world, however, several “non-aligned” countries will, for reasons of pragmatism and self-interest, may choose not to place themselves under the “protection” or control of the US, China or Russia. These non-aligned nations, which include most of the almost forty that did not condemn Russia’s invasion at the UN General Assembly in March 2022 and February 2023, not only do not form a distinct bloc (a “Global South”), they are often in conflict with one another.

The scope for cooperation between the Great Powers within the framework of the UN General Assembly will therefore be curtailed, with the few areas of potential cooperation limited to “global goods” such as the climate, health and/or development, and global security problems such as international terrorism, organized crime, unregulated AI development, and the uncontrolled militarization of space. The Great Powers may find themselves cooperating on these issues, either because they recognize the cost of non-cooperation, or because their interests largely converge. Moreover, the prospect of China, Russia, India, and a number of other medium- and small-sized states forging alliances in one or more of these domains cannot be discounted. Formed under an “anti-Western banner” at the forthcoming UN General Assembly, they may seek to create and promote new international principles and norms.

Dimitris Tsarouhas, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University; Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

To mark the UN’s annual assembly, the organization released a shocking report that accurately describes the state of the international community 80 years on from its founding. In 2024, military spending soared to 2.7 trillion dollars, an amount more than 13 times higher (!) than the official development aid provided by wealthy nations, and 750 times the UN’s regular budget.

Many member states are either actively engaged in, or preparing for, military conflict. The window for saving the UN mission is closing, even though its good offices are needed now more than at any other time since the end of the Cold War.

 

 

 

Domestic economic inequalities have now reached very high levels in both the developed and developing world. This study explores their impacts, their future prospects, as well as the main redistributive policies proposed to mitigate them. It finds, on the one hand, the increasing trend and explosive dynamics of economic inequalities, and on the other hand, the ineffectiveness of the proposed redistributive policies. If we want to curb the increasing inequality trends of the modern world and limit their adverse effects on the economy and society, we must devise new tools for redistributing wealth. I would like to propose such a tool here. I call it “voluntary taxes with benefits”.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Dimitris Konstadellis, Teacher of Economic Sciences in Secondary Education, Author.

Spyros Blavoukos, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business

& Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

The content of the Commission President’s speech is inevitably connected to the current year’s action programme, but it must also respond to international developments.

This year, the Commission is focusing on two main pillars: the competitiveness of the European economy, and the strengthening of European security and defence. With regard to the first, the EU is aiming to speed up the simplification of procedures, and the development of strategies, aimed at improving European competitiveness. Preparing the productive base for the challenges (and opportunities) presented by globalization, digitization and the green transition was a key point of last year’s State of the Union address, in which the President presented her vision for her second term of office to the plenary of the European Parliament. In relation to the second pillar, the White Paper on the future of European defence and the plan to rearm Europe, of which the SAFE Regulation is an integral part, have dominated the effort to consolidate European security. The main priority and common denominator remains the creation of a coherent framework for the development of European defence capabilities that will help the bloc achieve the strategic autonomy it seeks.

International developments—with the return of President Trump and the (neo)-protectionism he advocates, the continuing need to support Ukrainian resistance, but also the volatility of the global geo-economic and geopolitical environment—require similar objectives for the EU and the Commission. The two aforementioned pillars are thus expected to dominate von der Leyen’s speech this year. However, security is not limited to its military dimension. It is also linked to European society’s preparedness in the face of various forms of crises, the diversification of supply chains, energy autonomy, economic growth, and the resilience of democratic institutions and values—all of which are expected to emerge as priorities for the next programming period. The Union’s new (existential?) narrative is therefore taking shape around a “comprehensive defence” in which security and defence cut across every aspect of its internal policies, from energy to social cohesion, and the implementation of the proposals in the Letta and Draghi reports is a key priority to prevent the EU becoming the “grass that’s trampled when elephants fight”.

Alekos Kritikos, Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP; Former senior official, European Commission; former Secretary General, Ministry of the Interior

This year’s State of the Union address by the Commission President will be delivered at a juncture when Europe is seemingly being reduced ever more to the role of an observer of global developments rather than a protagonist in them. The Trump system’s dismissive treatment of the EU and the Shanghai summit are just two examples that point to this being the case.

The EU’s room for manoeuvre has narrowed dishearteningly—if it has not already been eradicated entirely—and it is of existential importance that the Union take immediate and comprehensive action. Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech should respond to this need by adopting the proposals made in the Letta and Draghi reports, and summarized afresh in Mario Draghi’s recent speech at the Rimini meeting, without further delay, hesitation or pettiness.

The completion of the internal market, the boosting of EU competitiveness, the development of a wide-ranging industrial policy, the unification of Europe’s capital markets, the pursuit of strategic and defence autonomy, the coordinated Research and Technology development, and the ongoing promotion of economic and social cohesion are the most fundamental, and there are certainly others of crucial importance. The implementation of these proposals will need to be accompanied by the defence of democratic values and the European social model, and by an immigration policy which, while respecting European values, preserves social cohesion while also helping the EU secure the human resources it needs for its economic and demographic growth. All of this will be very hard to achieve, however, unless it is accompanied by a bold political and institutional reorganization of the EU, leading to new forms of European integration.

On 10 September, we will know whether the European Commission has got the message.

Stella Ladi, Panteion University and Queen Mary University of London; Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

In the annual State of the Union address by the Commission President, we should focus not only on what is said, but also on what is left unsaid. The tense international situation, with its multiple conflicts but especially those in Gaza and Ukraine, and the new transatlantic (im)balance make it near certain that the common defence and security of Europe will be the main theme. And we would expect our partnerships and trade relations to figure centrally—those with Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, now that it is clear the EU needs to diversify and expand its trading networks. However, the most interesting question will be how much emphasis is placed on the two former flagships of European policy: the green economy and the regulation of new technologies and artificial intelligence. Because this year more than any other, the audience will not only be European citizens; it will also be the President of the United States, who would like to see backpeddling on both. It is critical for Europe’s dignity and global credibility that these priorities remain centre-stage, even if only at the symbolic level of this annual address.

Elena Lazarou, Director General, ELIAMEP

2025 finds the European Union facing external challenges and the threat of internal rifts. The annual State of the Union address by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, is an opportunity to chart a strategic course, but also to reinforce the conviction that the Union can respond to the political, economic, social and geopolitical challenges of our times.

At the heart of the speech is the long-term budget (2028-2034), which is causing political tensions between member states, agricultural and industrial interests, and political groups. Von der Leyen will be seeking to balance liberal and green priorities and issues such as re-industrialisation, social cohesion and immigration, and will also voice support for the proposed (enhanced) budget, with its added flexibility.

The key points of the speech, however, will relate to foreign policy: support for Ukraine and the need to strengthen European defence. Presenting a targeted plan for transatlantic relations will pose a major challenge to the Commission President, as the recent EU-US trade agreement has already come in for harsh criticism from many parts of the EU.

The President will reaffirm the importance of democracy and the international legal order, as well as the need for the EU to support both in an era in which anti-democratic forces are on the rise and international and humanitarian law is breaking down.

The European Union is presented with a choice: advance towards strategic autonomy and unity, or be immobilized by internal contradictions and external coercion.

Manos Matsaganis, Professor, Polytechnic University of Milan; Head of ELIAMEP’s Greek and European Economy Programme

The threats Europe is currently facing have no precedent in its 80-year history.

Some may have arrived suddenly, but their roots run deep: Russian aggression, American antipathy, Chinese expansionism, conflict in the Middle East.

Others are the product of internal weaknesses that were not addressed in time, and have now festered: economic sluggishness, an innovation deficit, ageing populations, institutional inertia, political fragmentation.

Their combined impact means that our children and our children’s children are at risk of growing up in a continent that is vulnerable and insecure, unable to defend itself, with an obsolete economy, stagnant living standards, and angry societies.

The train of events that would make this a grim reality can be easily described. A Le Pen (or Bardella) victory in the 2027 presidential elections puts France on a collision course with the EU, while simultaneously paralyzing any attempt at a coherent European response. In the confusion that follows, each country tries to salvage what it can. I leave it to the reader’s imagination to work out what this might mean for Estonia, or for Denmark (and — why not? — for Cyprus or Greece).

The alternative scenario begins with the acknowledgement that no country can go it alone. This implies the need for close cooperation in defence, the economy, and immigration. It isn’t the likeliest scenario. It will be politically demanding. But it is the only thing that can save us from worse trouble ahead.

 

 

Ursula von der Leyen’s second term at the helm of the European Commission is structured around seven thematic priorities that reflect the executive branch’s effort to integrate diverse policy areas in pursuit of the prosperity of the European citizenry. The Commission’s 2025 Work Programme introduces 51 new initiatives and places particular emphasis on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden, highlighting the shift towards “a faster and simpler Union”. At the same time, there is a clear tendency for the EU to assume a more active role in policy domains where supranational involvement has traditionally been limited. For Greece, both the Union’s achievements to date and its forthcoming actions have a direct impact on key national sectors. Meanwhile, the Greek government is preparing for the decisive role it will play in the negotiations on the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034.

• The forthcoming State of the European Union address, though generally framed in broad terms, provides a clear indication of the EU’s trajectory for member states, citizens, businesses, and external partners, enabling them to adapt and align with upcoming initiatives.
• It is not merely a stock-taking exercise; rather, it represents a critical test of credibility, as it will raise the question of whether and to what extent the Commission can translate its announcements and ambitions into tangible measures. The shift from theory to action will determine both the Commission’s institutional credibility and citizens’ trust in the European project.
• At the same time, the new structure of the Commission will also come under scrutiny. Nine months after the creation of new portfolios within the College of Commissioners, it remains to be assessed whether these have delivered on their intended functions.
• Greece, holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2027, will be at the forefront of negotiations that will determine the scope of financial instruments across all policy areas. For Athens, the challenge will be not only to forge common ground among member states but also to advance its own national priorities.

The article is authored by Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Ursula von der Leyen’s second term at the helm of the European Commission is structured around seven thematic priorities, based on the political guidelines she presented before the European Parliament in July 2024. The priorities for the 2024–2029 period are as follows: sustainable prosperity and competitiveness, European defense and security, supporting people, strengthening societies and the social model, preserving quality of life, protecting democracy and safeguarding values, Europe in the world, and preparing the Union for the future.

The 2025 Work Programme was published in February 2025 and is organized around these political priorities, while also taking into account the guidelines and mission letters assigned to members of the College of Commissioners. In total, it introduces 51 new initiatives, at least 18 of which are legislative. Particular emphasis is placed on simplification, with more than 60% of the legislative proposals falling within this scope. The Commission President has repeatedly stressed the urgent need to reduce administrative burden and simplify legislation. In her political guidelines, she explicitly referred to her vision of “a faster and simpler Union.”

In view of this year’s State of the Union address, during which Ursula von der Leyen is expected to present the achievements of the College of Commissioners since taking office (1 December 2024), attention now turns to the analysis of the policies to be advanced in the near future. The address, though generally framed in broad terms, provides a clear indication of the EU’s trajectory for member states, citizens, businesses, and external partners, enabling them to adapt and align with forthcoming actions.

While awaiting the address, it is useful to examine what has been achieved so far. This analysis is structured around the Commission’s political priorities and presents illustrative examples of its most significant actions from December 2024 to the present. These actions have taken different forms (e.g. legislative proposal, strategy, action plan, roadmap, etc.), depending on the political maturity and objectives of each initiative.[1]

The analysis then turns to the Greek perspective on both the Commission’s achievements and its planned actions. The final section looks ahead to what can be expected in this year’s State of the Union address. 

Sustainable Prosperity and Competitiveness

Mario Draghi’s September 2024 report served as the foundation for the Competitiveness Compass, published at the end of January 2025. In short, the Compass sets out how the Union can: (a) strengthen innovation, (b) shift towards cleaner and more affordable energy, and (c) diversify its supply chains. In this direction, the Commission has released a series of strategies and other documents (e.g. the Clean Industrial Deal in February, the Startup and Scaleup Strategy and the Single Market Strategy in May, and the Quantum Europe Strategy in July). As expected, however, a considerable share of the Commission’s output consists of (proposals for) legislative initiatives aimed at simplification. In particular, six “Omnibus” packages covering a wide range of policy areas have been tabled. Moreover, the political agreement in principle reached in the trade negotiations with four MERCOSUR states (December 2024) underscores the Union’s continued commitment to promoting free and mutually beneficial trade. As shown in Table I, proposals for six legislative initiatives, one strategy, and one plan are expected to be submitted later this year.

Table I: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (sustainable prosperity and competitiveness)

Type Title Legislative proposal Revision of the Sustainable Finance Disclosures Regulation Legislative proposal Digital Package Legislative proposal European Business Wallet Legislative proposal Accelerating industrial decarbonisation Legislative proposal Revision of the REACH Regulation (on chemicals) Legislative proposal Digital Networks Strategy/Legislative proposal Bioeconomy Strategy Plan Sustainable Transport Investment Plan

 

European Defense and Security

European defense and security have become a top priority for the Commission due, among other factors, to the war in Ukraine, broader Russian assertiveness, and U.S. disengagement from Europe. In this adverse geopolitical environment, Ursula von der Leyen created the portfolio of the Commissioner for Defense and Space, signaling the importance of this new dimension. The Commission subsequently announced the White Paper on the Future of European Defense and the “ReArm Europe” plan, which could channel up to €800 billion into strengthening Europe’s defense readiness.

Beyond strictly military initiatives, the Union appears to be embracing the ideas of the Niinistö’s Report of October 2024 and promoting strategies linked to the concept of “total defense.” Within this framework, the Preparedness Union Strategy, the proposal for a Critical Medicines Act, the Medical Countermeasures Strategy, the Stockpiling Strategy, combined with the Internal Security Strategy, the proposal for a Common European System for Returns, and the Action Plan on Cybersecurity for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers, all aim to provide a holistic safety net against multiple threats. Preparedness has thus become a central concern within the European family. In several national capitals, discussions are underway on reviving military conscription, moving towards a Scandinavian-style “total defense” model combining military and civilian dimensions. While the implementation of the SAFE Regulation appears to be the Commission’s main priority, Table II presents the three initiatives expected to be announced in the near term.

Table II: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (European defense and security)

Type Title Legislative proposal New rules on drug precursors Legislative proposal Firearms Trafficking Directive Strategy Migration and Asylum Strategy Supporting People, Strengthening Societies and the Social Model

The cost of living, social inequalities, and the center–periphery divide have undermined the European way of life, while the modern era demands new skills for businesses and workers to adapt to evolving circumstances. With the aim of reinforcing the European social model, the Commission launched the Union of Skills in March, designed to upgrade citizens’ skills and enable the Union to attract and retain talent in critical sectors within its borders. Although the 2025 Work Programme does not include new initiatives on the housing crisis, the Commission President has pledged to: (a) present a plan for affordable housing, and (b) cooperate with the European Investment Bank to establish an investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing.[2] By the end of the year, three initiatives are expected to be published to strengthen the social dimension, as indicated in Table III.

Table III: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (supporting people, strengthening societies and the social model)

Type Title Action Plan European Pillar of Social Rights Roadmap Quality Jobs Agenda Consumer Agenda 2030 Preserving Quality of Life

Agriculture is considered an integral part of the European way of life. Its support is a prerequisite for the Union’s sustainable growth and competitiveness. With the goals of food self-sufficiency and support for the food value chain, the Commission has placed particular emphasis on simplifying the procedures of the Common Agricultural Policy, while announcing the Vision for Agriculture and Food (February) to make farming and food sectors more attractive to young people. At the same time, the Commission has tabled a proposal to amend the European Climate Law (July), seeking to establish a 2040 climate target. Finally, the Ocean Pact and the Water Resilience Strategy, both announced in June 2025, aim to boost the blue economy and protect water resources, whose resilience “is regarded by the EU as a matter of security and crisis preparedness”. According to the current Work Programme, no new initiatives are expected in this policy area.

Protecting Democracy and Safeguarding Values

At a time when liberal democracy is under challenge, strengthening democratic resilience and societal preparedness are key objectives for the Commission. Furthermore, the defense and reinforcement of the rule of law remain a central duty of the EU’s executive branch as the “guardian of the Treaties.” In this context, the Roadmap for Women’s Rights (March) seeks to eliminate gender-based violence and ensure equal treatment of women. By year’s end, three initiatives are expected to be presented, as shown in Table IV.

Table IV: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (protecting democracy and safeguarding values)

Type Title Communication European Democracy Shield[3] Strategy Strategy to Support, Protect and Empower Civil Society Strategy Equality Strategies for LGBTIQ and Anti-Racism Europe in the World

As the international environment grows increasingly dangerous and hostile to EU interests, the European family must be able to leverage its strength and build meaningful partnerships with like-minded actors. Accordingly, the Union unveiled its Black Sea Strategy (March), built on three pillars: (a) security, (b) sustainable development and connectivity, and (c) environment and preparedness. Beyond the eastern flank, however, the Union is also placing emphasis on its southern neighborhood, as evidenced by the creation of a dedicated Mediterranean portfolio within the College of Commissioners and the establishment of a new Directorate-General for the Middle East (DG MENA). At the same time, preparations for the announcement of a Mediterranean Pact and the development of a coherent Middle East strategy reflect the Union’s clear interest in its southern dimension. Additionally, the EU is seeking to deepen ties with other regions across the globe, illustrated by the growing number of security and defense partnerships.[4] In the field of transatlantic relations, the Union reached an agreement with President Trump in July 2025 on tariff levels, while also striving to secure U.S. support for any future peace-monitoring mission in Ukraine. Table V presents the two initiatives expected to be announced shortly.

Table V: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (Europe in the world)

Type Title Pact Pact for the Mediterranean Joint Communication EU–India Preparing the Union for the Future

One of the Commission’s most significant priorities is the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034. Early preparation of the proposal ensures stability and predictability in the Union’s resources. According to the Commission’s proposal, the new budget will approach €2 billion, representing on average 1.26% of the EU’s Gross National Income per year. The innovation lies in structuring the funds around four pillars: (a) national and regional partnership plans, including cohesion and agricultural policy; (b) cross-cutting programmes and instruments, such as EU funds; (c) external dimension and Common Foreign and Security Policy; and (d) European public administration. At the same time, the Commission is expected to table proposals to prepare the Union for potential enlargement.

The Greek Perspective: Priorities and Challenges

For Greece, the Union’s actions have a direct impact on key national sectors. In the field of security and defense, Athens supports the new European initiatives and, in July 2025, formally submitted a request for loans worth at least €1.2 billion under the SAFE Regulation, seeking to bolster its defense capabilities through low-interest borrowing. Nonetheless, certain contentious issues remain, the most sensitive being the partial involvement of the Turkish defense industry in European schemes. Regarding the Union’s interaction with third actors, Greece seeks closer cooperation with like-minded partners while promoting stability in relations with the United States for both strategic and trade reasons. The Black Sea Strategy holds particular significance for Greece, as it explicitly states that “it proposes multiple avenues to forge closer cooperation with… Turkey,” highlighting that coordinated engagement with the neighboring country is “important” and that Turkey is “an EU partner of strategic importance.” At the same time, Greece aims to draw the attention of other member states to regions that have been partly sidelined due to the war in Ukraine, such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which directly affect the Union’s overall policy agenda (e.g. the war in Gaza and the crisis in the Red Sea).

With regard to preserving quality of life, as a coastal state with a strong shipping and fisheries sector, Greece is particularly interested in the sustainability of oceans and the management of marine resources, in cooperation with Cyprus and the Cypriot Commissioner responsible. The agricultural sector also remains crucial, especially amid growing pressures. As a predominantly agricultural country, Greece advocates for policies that will support farmers’ incomes during this difficult period. Transport is likewise a Greek priority, with an emphasis on safe and sustainable networks, reflected in the country’s strong interest in key positions both in the College of Commissioners and in the European Parliament. In the field of tourism, Greece, as a major tourist destination, looks forward to the European strategy for sustainable tourism, which is expected to include proposals to enhance the sector’s resilience and competitiveness. Finally, the housing crisis is becoming one of the most pressing social challenges in Europe. In Greece, it creates a suffocating environment for young people and the middle class, both struggling to cope with housing costs. As a key factor of social cohesion and demographic stability, Athens is keen to see whether the Commission will advance more targeted housing policies, drawing also on EU financial instruments.

All of these political priorities are closely linked to the issue of the new MFF 2028–2034. Greece, holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2027, will be at the forefront of negotiations that will determine the scope of funding across all the aforementioned policy areas. For Athens, the challenge will be not only to find common ground among member states but also to advance its own priorities.

What Lies Ahead?

The multitude of initiatives launched by the Commission may be welcomed as a sign of dynamism and an eagerness to act across key policy domains. However, the central question is not the announcement of new strategies, but their timely and effective implementation. The shift from theory to practice will ultimately determine the credibility of the institutions and citizens’ trust in the Union. In this context, the role of member states becomes pivotal.

Against this backdrop, this year’s State of the Union address will not merely be a stock-taking exercise, but rather a “credibility test.” The key question will be whether, and to what extent, the Commission can turn its ambitions into concrete action for the Union’s collective good. At the same time, the new structure of the Commission will also come under scrutiny. The creation of the two new portfolios for Defense and Space, and for the Mediterranean signals the Union’s evolving priorities in critical sectors and regions where its previous contribution and involvement were comparatively limited. Nine months after their establishment, it will be assessed whether these portfolios have delivered on their intended r

[1] As provided by the Treaties (Article 17 TEU), the European Commission holds the “right of initiative” and is responsible for proposing new EU legislation in policy areas where it has competence. For such proposals to acquire the force of secondary law, they must be adopted either through the ordinary legislative procedure or a special legislative procedure. In parallel, there are non-legally binding acts that serve as documents outlining political direction in specific areas. These carry less weight than legislative acts (which are adopted by the European Parliament and/or the Council of the EU), as they primarily express the Commission’s views. Although they emerge following consultations with stakeholders and member states, these may not fully endorse the same positions (or their exact implementation). Strategies, usually framed as “communications” to other institutions, set out the Commission’s stance and priorities on specific issues. Action Plans, Pacts, and Roadmaps generally fall into this same category.

[2] In December 2024, the European Parliament established a temporary Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU, tasked with examining the causes of the current crisis and submitting specific proposals to address it.

[3] In December 2024, the European Parliament decided to create a Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield to assess existing and planned legislation and policies. According to an EPRS briefing, the communication is “widely expected to be postponed”.

[4] The EU currently has security and defense partnerships with eight partners (Albania, North Macedonia, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Moldova, Norway, and South Korea).

The REACH National Consultation Report for Greece presents the outcomes of a series of citizen dialogues held in Athens and Thessaloniki, culminating in a national consultation on 5 May 2025. Citizens from diverse backgrounds came together with experts and stakeholders to deliberate on the future of Greece and Europe, addressing key themes of rule of law, European integration, and environmental sustainability.

The report sets out ten policy proposals, ranging from Erasmus-style exchange programmes for schools and national media literacy initiatives to local youth environmental groups and a stronger focus on LGBTQIA+ rights in the curriculum. These recommendations reflect citizens’ aspirations for a more inclusive, transparent, and participatory Europe, while also highlighting national challenges and opportunities for change. The project has demonstrated the potential of citizen engagement to inspire policy at both national and European levels, offering innovative solutions and reinforcing trust in democratic institutions.

You can read the report here.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for July 2025.

The Trump administration’s nominee for the next U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, fielded questions at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing on July 9. The Committee has approved the nomination of Kimberly Guilfoyle to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Greece, with 13 to 9 in favor of advancing Guilfoyle’s nomination. The nomination now heads to the full Senate for a final confirmation vote.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini), the U.S. has increased its use of key military facilities in Greece, including the strategically located Souda Bay and the northern port of Alexandroupoli, amid heightened tensions in the Middle East and shifting priorities in Washington. For Athens, the expanding US interest in Souda and Alexandroupoli reaffirms the long-term strategic importance of Greek territory in American defense planning.

The Greek government expressed hesitation and caution to comment on the EU-U.S. trade deal on tariffs reached between Ursula von der Leyen and Donald Trump on July 27. Greek Finance Minister Kyriakos Pierrakakis, speaking in the Hellenic Parliament, outlined the government’s thoughts on this critical issue. He noted that it puts an end to months of uncertainty following Trump’s election and the “back and forth” with the tariffs, and that is a positive thing. He stressed, however, that the government is studying the agreement to see how it can better manage the problems that will arise in areas of Greece’s commercial interest.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

Analyses on de-Europeanization have lately flourished, re-opening the path to explore whether Europeanization is still relevant for how the European governance system evolves. This article, taking the European climate policy (and in particular the European Green Deal) as a case study, which has been the spearhead of the 2019–2024 European Commission term, suggests the said exploration to focus on the EU climate/green policy. It utilizes the case of Greece, which has set the goal of decarbonization by 2028. It analyses the Greek parties’ public stances during two election periods (national in 2023 and European in 2024) to test whether they are consistent with the EU apparatus and goals. The article concludes by showcasing that Greek parties are relatively distant from being Europeanized in the field of climate policy and suggests revisiting Europeanization to better understand European and Member States’ politics.

Read here the article by Emmanuella Doussis, Head of the Climate and Sustainability Programme, ELIAMEP; Professor, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; George Dikaios, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP, and Marianna Terezaki, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

The new issue of the Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Journal is available here.

Cover photo: Tania Malréchauffé, Unsplash