Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

On October 1, 2025, Robin Sogalla successfully completed his dissertation entitled „International Trade and Climate Policy: The Role of Firm Heterogeneity“ with summa cum laude at the Technische Universität Berlin. The dissertation was submitted and successfully defended by Robin as part of the ...

Drei mutmaßliche Hamas-Anhänger sind in Deutschland festgenommen worden. Ob die Terrororganisation nun auch international aktiv wird, erläutert Nahost-Experte Guido Steinberg.

Once viewed by Ankara primarily as a fragmented security frontier, Iraq now sits at the centre of its regional strategy. This recalibration is shaped by shifting regional dynamics in the aftermath of 7 October: the weakening of Iran’s influence across multiple fronts, the Gulf states’ rising economic and diplomatic weight, and the search for new stabilising axes in the Middle East. Turkey’s renewed engagement is not just about countering the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) – it signals broader regional aspirations that combines security cooperation with Baghdad and Erbil, a fragile domestic peace process in Turkey, and a strategic push to embed Iraq within Turkey–Gulf trade and key regional energy infrastructures, including oil pipelines, prospective gas exports, and electricity interconnections. At the heart of this shift is a geoeco­nomic logic: by investing in shared infrastructure and fostering mutual interdepend­encies, Ankara seeks to consolidate its regional role. For Europe, the outcome will reverberate beyond Iraq by reshaping connectivity, energy access, and the stability of its south-eastern neighbours.

This report (Vlassis, A., Psychogiopoulou, E, Kandyla, A. and Sarikakis, K. (Eds) (2025)) examines EU film promotion by states and EU policies. It highlights the need for stronger gender equality support in the audiovisual sector.

Part B, authored by Evangelia Psychogiopoulou (ELIAMEP), Anna Kandyla (ELIAMEP), Pelin Turan (SSSA), Apostolos Samaras (ELIAMEP), Laia Comerma (ELIAMEP), and Caterina Sganga (SSSA), forms part of T3.5 (EU law and governance and the promotion of the EFI on the international scene). It examines and assesses whether—and, if so, how—EU law and policies promote European audiovisual works and film beyond the borders of the EU. It does so by mapping the policies and instruments in place, identifying their characteristics, complementarities, enablers and limitations in enhancing the internationalisation of the European audiovisual industry. The analysis focuses in particular on agreements the EU has negotiated with third countries and regions concerning trade facilitation and cooperation in the audiovisual and film sectors. It also  considers EU funding instruments supporting the audiovisual sector and external action in this field. Methodologically, the study draws on extensive desk research and the analysis of a range of primary and secondary sources, complemented by insights gathered through semi-structured interviews with EU officials and film stakeholders. Overall, the findings indicate that EU agreements with third countries, along with audiovisual cooperation and external funding tools, include various elements that can boost the positioning of European films worldwide, although the scope of these instruments varies. The analysis also suggests that considerable untapped potential remains and calls for a comprehensive internationalisation strategy that promotes the competitiveness of the European audiovisual sector while supporting cultural diversity.

The report is available here.

Der slowakische Ministerpräsident Robert Fico gehört zu den lautstarken Kritikern der Russlandpolitik der Europäischen Union und des Westens insgesamt. Fico, der seit Herbst 2023 einem linksnationalen Regierungsbündnis vorsteht, fordert eine Kurs­wende gegenüber Moskau und eine »friedensorientierte« Neuaufstellung des Westens bei der Unterstützung der Ukraine. Für Ficos russlandfreundliches Gebaren gibt es historische und innenpolitische Gründe. Sein Agieren ist Bestandteil einer von ihm selbst so bezeichneten »Außenpolitik in alle vier Himmelsrichtungen«. Trotz der zur Schau gestellten Russlandnähe, einer Übereinstimmung mit Moskau in Fragen der sicherheitspolitischen Ordnung und zahlreichen Konflikten mit der Ukraine unterstützt Fico den EU-Beitritt des Nachbarlands und bilaterale Kooperationsformate. Für Deutschland ist von Bedeutung, ob die Slowakei zu einem Veto-Player in der EU-Russ­landpolitik wird oder ob sie ihre Kombination aus Russlandnähe, verbaler Kritik an der Sicherheitspolitik des Westens, doch gleichzeitig auch pragmatischer Unter­stützung für die Ukraine fortführen wird.

As Cyprus assumes its second Presidency of the European Union, it steps into a role defined by crisis and change. The contrast with its first Presidency (2012) could not be sharper. Then, multilateralism prevailed; collaboration was possible, and conflict manageable. Today, multilateralism is under siege, conflicts dominate, and Europe faces existential challenges: its Union and Security, its Internal and Capital Markets, its Competitiveness, its Freedom and Values.

Every Presidency has one duty: to carry the Union’s business forward. For Cyprus, the central test will be guiding the negotiations on the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). This is an exercise in listening, negotiation, and compromise. More than anything, it will demand that Cyprus acts as an honest broker — a role where smaller member states often succeed more than larger ones.

Three Tests of Success

Like all Presidencies, Cyprus will be judged on three fronts:

• Institutional: Can it leave a footprint by steering the MFF to conclusion?
• Representational: Can it represent a policy theme, bigger than its national interest that endures? Water, as a scarce resource and driver of conflict and migration –with impact across continents -, could anchor a “Nicosia Declaration on Water.”
• Reputational: Can it use neutrality to build a legacy as a convener of peace and compromise?

It is commendable that Cyprus wants to include regional neighbors as observers in EU deliberations. The EuroMediterranean region — 500 million people, 10% of global GDP — is paradoxically the least interconnected in the world. Intra-regional trade is just one quarter of total trade. For a decade, progress has been negligible.

Cyprus, as the EU’s southeastern border, can help change this. By bringing neighbors into the European conversation, it can foster trade, collaboration, and peace. But this must be pursued with neutrality and as part of a long-term strategy and within EU’s governance model— not as a one-off gesture.

The Presidency is about Europe’s collective good, not national gain. Yet Cyprus’ reality cannot be ignored. It remains divided, with EU law barred from 30% of its territory. And, it is Europe’s only isolated island Member State.

This Presidency can remind Cypriots of the benefits of EU membership. It can remind Europeans of the reality that part of EU territory remains occupied by Turkey — an EU trade partner and NATO member. That contradiction must never be normalized, and it must never be replicated elsewhere.

Cyprus should not instrumentalize its occupation and division but deploy it as a precedent and the learnings which point to European security risks, given the current world order, prevailing Russia threats across the EU’s borders and continuing conflict between Israel, Palestine and regional actors.

Cyprus’ Presidency comes at a moment when Europe needs resilience and vision. It is an opportunity for a small state to leave a large footprint. To prove that neutrality can be strength. To show that Cyprus is not an island on the margins, but a player at the heart of Europe’s frontier.

Photo: Flickr

Depuis l'effondrement mortel de l'auvent de la gare de Novi Sad, le 1er novembre 2024, la Serbie se soulève contre la corruption meurtrière du régime du président Vučić et pour le respect de l'État de droit. Cette exigence de justice menée par les étudiants a gagné tout le pays. Suivez les dernières informations en temps réel et en accès libre.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Vucic, Serbie, Politique, Société, Gratuit

Durrës devrait devenir le nouveau « Dubaï de la Méditerranée », avec la création d'une immense marina et le transfert du port actuel sur le site de Porto Romano. Oui, sauf que les appels d'offres ont été passés en toute opacité, que les investisseurs étrangers se sont largement retirés du projet, que le sol est argileux et la zone sismique...

- Articles / Une - Diaporama, Adriatique, PS Albanie, Albanie, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Economie, Environnement, Une - Diaporama - En premier

L'entrée au Parlement des unionistes du Parti Démocratie à la maison, aux sympathies trumpistes affirmées, et le réseau social TikTok rebattent les cartes entre partisans de la « Grande Roumanie » et adeptes de la « Grande Moldavie ». Décryptage.

- Articles / Moldavie, Roumanie-Moldavie : gel, dégel et regel des relations bilatérales, Courrier des Balkans, Relations régionales, Politique, Une - Diaporama

Le Jardinier et la mort (Gradinariat i smurtta) de Guéorgui Gospodinov, traduit du bulgare par Marie Vrinat, Gallimard, 230 p., 21,50 €, numérique 15,99 €.

- Lettres de l'Est et des Balkans • Le blog de Pierre Glachant / Blogs - Diaporama, Bulgarie

This paper contributes to the extant literature by comparing and contrasting China’s and India’s rationale for leadership of the Global South in the Xi-Modi era and highlighting their motivations and strategies. Both China’s and India’s leadership styles can be characterized as flexible and pragmatic. Both have endeavoured to become the voice of the Global South, a goal pursued by organizing a myriad of international forums and conferences designed to facilitate dialogue, foster solidarity, and shape the collective agenda of developing countries on the global stage and by demonstrating a keen interest in championing the developmental aspirations of developing countries. In addition to diplomatic and political initiatives, both countries have focused on providing development-linked goods (including public goods) to nations within the Global South. However, their approaches to achieving this leadership exhibit notable differences, primarily in their engagement strategies and the extent of their global outreach.

This paper contributes to the extant literature by comparing and contrasting China’s and India’s rationale for leadership of the Global South in the Xi-Modi era and highlighting their motivations and strategies. Both China’s and India’s leadership styles can be characterized as flexible and pragmatic. Both have endeavoured to become the voice of the Global South, a goal pursued by organizing a myriad of international forums and conferences designed to facilitate dialogue, foster solidarity, and shape the collective agenda of developing countries on the global stage and by demonstrating a keen interest in championing the developmental aspirations of developing countries. In addition to diplomatic and political initiatives, both countries have focused on providing development-linked goods (including public goods) to nations within the Global South. However, their approaches to achieving this leadership exhibit notable differences, primarily in their engagement strategies and the extent of their global outreach.

This paper contributes to the extant literature by comparing and contrasting China’s and India’s rationale for leadership of the Global South in the Xi-Modi era and highlighting their motivations and strategies. Both China’s and India’s leadership styles can be characterized as flexible and pragmatic. Both have endeavoured to become the voice of the Global South, a goal pursued by organizing a myriad of international forums and conferences designed to facilitate dialogue, foster solidarity, and shape the collective agenda of developing countries on the global stage and by demonstrating a keen interest in championing the developmental aspirations of developing countries. In addition to diplomatic and political initiatives, both countries have focused on providing development-linked goods (including public goods) to nations within the Global South. However, their approaches to achieving this leadership exhibit notable differences, primarily in their engagement strategies and the extent of their global outreach.

This deliverable of the project REBOOT (Kandyla, A., Turan P. and Vlassis, A. (Eds). (2025)) offers an overview and description of the structure and contents of the public database on ‘European Union (EU) laws and cross-national frameworks relevant to the European Film Industry (EFI)’. Developed within the framework of Work Package 3 (WP3) of the REBOOT project, the database is organised into three distinct sub-databases, each addressing key dimensions on the laws and policies governing the promotion of the EFI at the international level: the regulatory framework for filmmaking at the EU level and across EU member states; institutional and policy models across the EU Member States, and EU legal and policy instruments relevant to the internationalisation of the EFI. D3.6 is meant to act as a guide to these resources. It outlines the main types of information and data included in each sub-database and details the methodology employed in their compilation, including documentary sources, data collection structures, and other relevant information. The full sub-databases will be released as part of the ‘Film industry competitiveness dashboard’ (Task 6.2), which is scheduled to be submitted in November 2025. The dashboard will offer an online platform providing public access to both original data collected within the REBOOT project and existing statistics. It will enable visualisations and support future analysis of the evolving competitiveness of the European film industry.

The deliverable is structured in three parts as follows:

(1) Part 1 introduces the sub-database on ‘Multi-level mapping of the legal norms informing and regulating filmmaking in the European Union’. This sub-database reflects the scientific output of the research conducted under Task 3.1, led by Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (hereinafter referred to as ‘SSSA’). It offers a detailed mapping of legal and policy instruments across multiple governance levels (international, supranational, regional, and national) that influence filmmaking in the EU. It covers an array of areas critical to the sector’s competitiveness, including cultural diversity, copyright, media law, and the protection of minors. Norms have been extracted from legal instruments issued by organisations such as UNESCO, WIPO, WTO, the Council of Europe, the EU, and selected Member States.

(2) Part 2 presents the sub-database on the ‘Promotion of the EFI at the international level: Institutional and policy models across the EU Member States’. This sub-database reflects the output of Task 3.4, led by the University of Liège (ULIEGE), which explored how public institutions and practices contribute to the international promotion of their national film industries and, by extension, of the broader EFI. The sub-data includes quantitative data and materials, offering a structured, accessible, and comparative resource. Drawing on extensive documentary research, interviews, and market data, it provides a comparative mapping of public support strategies, funding mechanisms, and the actors involved in promoting the EFI across EU Member States and abroad.

(3) Part 3 presents the sub-database on ‘EU legal and policy measures on the promotion of the EFI on the international scene’. Developed as part of research conducted by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) under Task 3.5, it catalogues a range of agreements concerning trade facilitation and cooperation negotiated by the EU with third countries and regions, covering agreements that are currently in force, as well as agreements pending signature and ratification. It also covers selected EU funding instruments with relevance to the international promotion of European audiovisual works and audiovisual cooperation with third countries.

 

The deliverable is available here.

DIW-Themenbericht zum Jahrestag der Deutschen Einheit – Finanz- und Wirtschaftskraft der Länder sehr heterogen – Ostdeutsche Länder weiter schwach, schließen aber zu ärmeren westdeutschen auf – Finanzstarke Länder setzen sich ab – Produktivitätslücke zwischen Ost und West schließt sich – Stattdessen ...

Despite growing awareness, the global regulation of facial recognition technology (FRT) remains fragmented, much like the governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI). International initiatives from the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and World Economic Forum (WEF) provide guiding principles but fall short of enforceable standards. On 27 July 2025, UN tech chief Doreen Bogdan-Martin warned that the world urgently needs a global approach to AI regulation, as fragmented efforts risk deepening inequalities. 
This policy brief explores how FRT challenges existing governance frameworks due to its rapid development, complexity and ethical implications. Our research shows that delays in regulation are not only caused by the rapid pace of technological change but also by whose voices are included in the debate. In FRT debates, early warnings from civil society about privacy and rights were sidelined until echoed by governments and major tech firms. This lack of representation, as much as the rapid pace of innovation, helps explain why regulation so often lags behind public concerns. To better govern FRT, the policy brief proposes an adaptive and inclusive model that balances flexibility with democratic legitimacy. Adaptive governance, marked
by decentralised decision-making, iterative policy learning, and responsiveness, helps address the uncertainties and evolving risks of narrow AI applications like FRT. Inclusivity is equally critical in legitimising FRT governance. 
We propose three policy recommendations to national regulators, multilateral bodies and regional policymakers for future AI governance: (1) require transparent labelling of AI systems, 
(2) reframe AI as a societal issue, not just a security tool, and (3) embed civil society in AI governance forums. Taken together, these actions would promote a more proactive, equitable and context-sensitive framework for regulating AI globally. These recommendations are particularly timely ahead of the AI Impact Summit, scheduled for February 2026 in Delhi, which will bring global policymakers together to shape an international vision for AI governance that includes FRT.

 

Despite growing awareness, the global regulation of facial recognition technology (FRT) remains fragmented, much like the governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI). International initiatives from the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and World Economic Forum (WEF) provide guiding principles but fall short of enforceable standards. On 27 July 2025, UN tech chief Doreen Bogdan-Martin warned that the world urgently needs a global approach to AI regulation, as fragmented efforts risk deepening inequalities. 
This policy brief explores how FRT challenges existing governance frameworks due to its rapid development, complexity and ethical implications. Our research shows that delays in regulation are not only caused by the rapid pace of technological change but also by whose voices are included in the debate. In FRT debates, early warnings from civil society about privacy and rights were sidelined until echoed by governments and major tech firms. This lack of representation, as much as the rapid pace of innovation, helps explain why regulation so often lags behind public concerns. To better govern FRT, the policy brief proposes an adaptive and inclusive model that balances flexibility with democratic legitimacy. Adaptive governance, marked
by decentralised decision-making, iterative policy learning, and responsiveness, helps address the uncertainties and evolving risks of narrow AI applications like FRT. Inclusivity is equally critical in legitimising FRT governance. 
We propose three policy recommendations to national regulators, multilateral bodies and regional policymakers for future AI governance: (1) require transparent labelling of AI systems, 
(2) reframe AI as a societal issue, not just a security tool, and (3) embed civil society in AI governance forums. Taken together, these actions would promote a more proactive, equitable and context-sensitive framework for regulating AI globally. These recommendations are particularly timely ahead of the AI Impact Summit, scheduled for February 2026 in Delhi, which will bring global policymakers together to shape an international vision for AI governance that includes FRT.

 

Despite growing awareness, the global regulation of facial recognition technology (FRT) remains fragmented, much like the governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI). International initiatives from the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and World Economic Forum (WEF) provide guiding principles but fall short of enforceable standards. On 27 July 2025, UN tech chief Doreen Bogdan-Martin warned that the world urgently needs a global approach to AI regulation, as fragmented efforts risk deepening inequalities. 
This policy brief explores how FRT challenges existing governance frameworks due to its rapid development, complexity and ethical implications. Our research shows that delays in regulation are not only caused by the rapid pace of technological change but also by whose voices are included in the debate. In FRT debates, early warnings from civil society about privacy and rights were sidelined until echoed by governments and major tech firms. This lack of representation, as much as the rapid pace of innovation, helps explain why regulation so often lags behind public concerns. To better govern FRT, the policy brief proposes an adaptive and inclusive model that balances flexibility with democratic legitimacy. Adaptive governance, marked
by decentralised decision-making, iterative policy learning, and responsiveness, helps address the uncertainties and evolving risks of narrow AI applications like FRT. Inclusivity is equally critical in legitimising FRT governance. 
We propose three policy recommendations to national regulators, multilateral bodies and regional policymakers for future AI governance: (1) require transparent labelling of AI systems, 
(2) reframe AI as a societal issue, not just a security tool, and (3) embed civil society in AI governance forums. Taken together, these actions would promote a more proactive, equitable and context-sensitive framework for regulating AI globally. These recommendations are particularly timely ahead of the AI Impact Summit, scheduled for February 2026 in Delhi, which will bring global policymakers together to shape an international vision for AI governance that includes FRT.

 

Panos Ruci, le père d'une victime de la catastrophe ferroviaire de février 2023, est en grève de la faim. Il réclame que des examens toxicologiques pour déterminer les causes de sa mort de son fils, et « pour tous les enfants qui ont perdu la vie » dans cet accident qui a fait 57 morts.

- Articles / Grèce, Courrier des Balkans, Une - Diaporama, Défense, police et justice, Personnalités, Trains Balkans