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Following the third wave of democratization, democracy and its proponents have recently experienced a shift towards autocratization. To date, however, little is known about the impact of this trend on democracy promotion. This article introduces a special issue that examines the complex relationship between autocratization and external democracy promotion. It provides a conceptual framework for understanding how the global trend of autocratization affects democracy promotion efforts. We identify two ways in which this is the case: first, autocratization requires democracy promoters to adapt to increasingly resistant environments in target countries where they seek to promote democracy or prevent autocratization; second, autocratization reduces the global leverage of democracy promoters due to the rise of autocratic competitors. We highlight the evolving strategies and responses of democracy promoters in the face of rising autocratic influence. We then provide an overview of the articles in this special issue, which examine the motives and strategies of traditional democracy promoters and their autocratic competitors and analyse how democracy promoters navigate the challenges of autocratization in target countries of democracy promotion and the strategic competition with autocratic regimes, using case studies from Southeastern Europe, the post-Soviet space, Africa and Latin America.

Following the third wave of democratization, democracy and its proponents have recently experienced a shift towards autocratization. To date, however, little is known about the impact of this trend on democracy promotion. This article introduces a special issue that examines the complex relationship between autocratization and external democracy promotion. It provides a conceptual framework for understanding how the global trend of autocratization affects democracy promotion efforts. We identify two ways in which this is the case: first, autocratization requires democracy promoters to adapt to increasingly resistant environments in target countries where they seek to promote democracy or prevent autocratization; second, autocratization reduces the global leverage of democracy promoters due to the rise of autocratic competitors. We highlight the evolving strategies and responses of democracy promoters in the face of rising autocratic influence. We then provide an overview of the articles in this special issue, which examine the motives and strategies of traditional democracy promoters and their autocratic competitors and analyse how democracy promoters navigate the challenges of autocratization in target countries of democracy promotion and the strategic competition with autocratic regimes, using case studies from Southeastern Europe, the post-Soviet space, Africa and Latin America.

Following the third wave of democratization, democracy and its proponents have recently experienced a shift towards autocratization. To date, however, little is known about the impact of this trend on democracy promotion. This article introduces a special issue that examines the complex relationship between autocratization and external democracy promotion. It provides a conceptual framework for understanding how the global trend of autocratization affects democracy promotion efforts. We identify two ways in which this is the case: first, autocratization requires democracy promoters to adapt to increasingly resistant environments in target countries where they seek to promote democracy or prevent autocratization; second, autocratization reduces the global leverage of democracy promoters due to the rise of autocratic competitors. We highlight the evolving strategies and responses of democracy promoters in the face of rising autocratic influence. We then provide an overview of the articles in this special issue, which examine the motives and strategies of traditional democracy promoters and their autocratic competitors and analyse how democracy promoters navigate the challenges of autocratization in target countries of democracy promotion and the strategic competition with autocratic regimes, using case studies from Southeastern Europe, the post-Soviet space, Africa and Latin America.

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This study explores the dynamics of Israeli–Turkish relations amidst two pivotal conflicts: the war in Gaza, where Turkey has vocally supported the Palestinian side, and the Syrian crisis, where both countries maintain significant territorial and strategic stakes. While Turkey and Israel operate from distinct ideological and strategic positions, their interactions are neither those of allies nor outright adversaries, but rather of two regional powers navigating overlapping challenges. The analysis highlights how these conflicts reveal a duality in their relationship characterized by ideological divergence in Gaza and pragmatic considerations in Syria, offering insights into their complex coexistence within the rapidly shifting Middle Eastern landscape.

• Turkey was among the first Muslim-majority countries to recognize Israel in 1949, establishing early diplomatic ties grounded in Turkey’s pro-Western orientation and NATO ambitions.
• The rise of the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the 2000s gradually transformed Turkish foreign policy, emphasizing solidarity with the Muslim world and a more vocal defence of the Palestinian cause.
• Divergences over Gaza, Syria, and energy politics in the Eastern Mediterranean further strained relations, while shared economic interests and US mediation prevented a complete breakdown.
• The 2023–2025 Gaza war became a defining moment, with Turkey’s strong condemnation of Israel paired with pragmatic economic continuity and, later, participation in the peace process.
• For the first time, many Israelis and Turks saw Turkey and Israel respectively as one of their country’s key security threats.
• The likelihood of direct conflict between Israel and Turkey has substantially decreased, as both states prioritize stability, reconstruction, and regional influence over open rivalry.
• While ideological and rhetorical tensions persist, Israeli–Turkish relations are entering a new phase characterized by pragmatic coexistence, mutual recognition, and shared regional responsibilities.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Senior Research Fellow, Head, ELIAMEP Turkey Programme and Electra Nisidou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP Turkey Programme.

Introduction

Turkey was one of the first Muslim-majority states to formally recognize Israel, in 1949, establishing diplomatic ties just a year after Israel’s foundation. This recognition stemmed from Turkey’s desire to align more closely with Western powers as it sought NATO membership and a place in the broader Western alliance, ultimately joining NATO in 1952. Turkey’s relationship with Israel remained steady during the early Cold War decades, supported by shared strategic interests in the Middle East. However, Turkey made sure that its relationship with Israel would not ruin its ties with the Arab world.

During the various Arab-Israeli conflicts, Turkey maintained a policy of neutrality to avoid alienating either side. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, Turkey refrained from openly supporting Israel, the United Kingdom, or France in their military operation against Egypt. This approach reflected Turkey’s alignment with NATO, yet it also aimed to avoid direct involvement that could jeopardize crucial relations with Arab states. During the 1967 Six-Day War, Turkey again adopted a non-interventionist stance, preserving diplomatic ties with Israel without openly endorsing its actions. The 1973 Yom Kippur War heightened pressure on Turkey to align with its Arab neighbours, especially as anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric was on the rise in Turkey, and targeted Israel’s supporters. In response, Turkey reduced its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv, a gesture meant to appease Arab states without severing ties with Israel. Throughout these conflicts, Turkey’s stance was shaped by a need to balance its Western and NATO alignment with regional considerations.[1] The 1970s and 1980s were marked by further fluctuations as Turkey recalibrated its regional stance, especially amidst growing Muslim solidarity on Palestinian self-determination and the rising influence of Turkish political Islam. Economic and commercial relations, however, continued to develop: Turkey exported textiles, food products, and raw materials to Israel, while Israel provided technological and agricultural innovations. This economic collaboration laid the foundation for a more robust partnership that would flourish in the 1990s.[2]

The end of the Cold War opened new avenues for Israeli–Turkish collaboration; both states recognized the benefits of strengthening their alliance. The 1990s represented the high-water mark of Israeli–Turkish cooperation, which developed into a strategic partnership with military cooperation at its core. Joint air and naval exercises, intelligence sharing, and arms modernization programmes reflected a deep level of strategic alignment. Importantly, this deepening cooperation benefited from the regional environment of the Oslo peace process: while Israel was engaged in negotiations with the Palestinians, its security cooperation with Turkey could develop without qualms or concerns.

Israeli–Turkish relations in the 1990s even survived the premiership of Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey’s first Islamist politician to rise to that post. As leader of the Islamist Welfare Party, Erbakan promised to promote closer ties with Muslim states and criticized close relations with Israel as incompatible with Turkey’s Islamic identity.[3] As prime minister, however, he avoided anything that could harm bilateral relations. In February 1996, a military cooperation agreement was signed, marking a milestone that allowed for joint training exercises, intelligence sharing, and defence collaboration. The agreement bolstered the position of both Israel and Turkey as regional powers and cemented a strategic partnership that aligned them with US interests in the region. Economic ties also flourished, with Israeli and Turkish businesses forming partnerships across sectors including technology, tourism, agriculture, and trade. The signing of a bilateral free trade agreement[4] meant that by the late 1990s, Turkey had become one of Israel’s most important trade partners.[5]

A Relationship in Flux

The rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in the 2000s gradually shifted the course of Turkish foreign policy towards closer alignment with the broader Muslim world. Erdoğan’s growing emphasis on the Palestinian issue and criticism of Israeli policies, particularly regarding Gaza, diverged sharply from the cooperative approach of his own first term in government. The deterioration in relations after the 2008–2009 Gaza War reached a symbolic climax at the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, where Erdoğan confronted Israeli President Shimon Peres in the “One Minute incident”. This marked a turning point in the public perception of bilateral relations, framing Turkey as a defender of the Palestinian cause. This trajectory culminated in the 2010 Mavi Marmara crisis, which brought relations to their lowest point in decades. Both episodes demonstrated Erdoğan’s propensity to instrumentalize high-profile confrontations with Israel to galvanize domestic and regional audiences, while also pushing the relationship toward long-term estrangement.

As Turkey pursued a more assertive regional role in the 2010s, often challenging Western positions on issues like Palestine, Syria, and Libya, Israel moved closer to other regional players, including Greece and Cyprus.

As Turkey pursued a more assertive regional role in the 2010s, often challenging Western positions on issues like Palestine, Syria, and Libya, Israel moved closer to other regional players, including Greece and Cyprus. The discovery of natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean added further fuel to this realignment. Israel’s prospective collaboration with Greece and Cyprus in energy exploration and transport provoked Turkey, which felt isolated and treated as a regional outsider, despite its geographical proximity and significant energy demands. But while energy dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean have highlighted the strategic divergence between Israel and Turkey, they have also underscored the potential for future realignment. Natural gas reserves and energy transport corridors in the region could serve as both a source of tension and an opportunity for cooperation. However, the political rift between the two states, exacerbated by disputes over maritime boundaries and Turkey’s exclusion from the EastMed Gas Forum, has stalled any meaningful collaboration.

Within this dynamic, the Kurdish question has emerged as a persistent source of mistrust. Israel’s growing ties with Kurdish groups across the Middle East, and especially in Iraq, were perceived in Ankara as a potential tool to challenge Turkey’s security interests. This perception reinforced Turkish suspicions that Israel could use Kurdish aspirations as leverage in times of political tension. The United States has added yet another layer to this equation, acting as both a stabilizer and a complicating factor. Washington has historically encouraged Israeli–Turkish cooperation, particularly in the 1990s. However, divergences between Ankara and Washington—ranging from the Iraq War to US support for Kurdish forces in Syria—have strained the triangle, with Israel’s close alignment with the United States amplifying Turkey’s sense of marginalization. At the same time, both Israel and Turkey remain indispensable—if difficult—allies for Washington. The US role therefore remains pivotal in determining whether Israeli–Turkish relations evolve toward renewed cooperation or slip irreversibly into strategic competition.

The Palestinian Issue and the War in Gaza

The Palestinian issue has historically played a catalytic role in shaping the regional dynamics of the Middle East, influencing both bilateral and multilateral relations. Before the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power, Turkey’s stance on the Palestinian issue was marked by cautious pragmatism. 

The Palestinian issue has historically played a catalytic role in shaping the regional dynamics of the Middle East, influencing both bilateral and multilateral relations. Before the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power, Turkey’s stance on the Palestinian issue was marked by cautious pragmatism. During much of the Cold War, Turkey sought to balance its relations with Israel and the broader Arab world, reflecting its desire to maintain strategic neutrality in a polarized region. While Turkey recognized Israel in 1949 and maintained diplomatic ties, it also supported Palestinian self-determination as a fundamental principle. Turkish leaders often criticized Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories, particularly after the 1967 Six-Day War, but avoided overt confrontation to preserve bilateral relations. This delicate balancing act was further shaped by Turkey’s alignment with Western powers through NATO, its growing trade relations with Israel, and its need to maintain good standing with the Arab states, which were significant trade and energy partners. While Turkey recognized the Palestinian state in 1988, by the 1990s, during what has been described as the “golden era” in Israeli–Turkish relations, Turkey’s approach to the Palestinian issue remained measured, focusing on multilateral dialogue and development initiatives rather than direct ideological opposition to Israeli policies. Since Erdoğan’s rise to power, the Palestinian cause has increasingly attracted Turkish attention; this has often been framed as part of its broader ambition to assert moral leadership in the Muslim world.

Erdoğan’s rhetoric during the Gaza war reflected the complexity of Turkey-Israel relations. While publicly denouncing Israel, Turkey continued to foster its bilateral economic ties, reflecting a pragmatic approach.

The recent war in Gaza, triggered by Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack on Israel and followed by Israel’s counter-attack, intensified the scrutiny of Israeli–Turkish relations. While taking an initially circumspect position, Erdoğan gradually shifted to powerfully condemning Israel’s military actions, which he framed as disproportionate and accusing Israel of committing war crimes. This rhetoric was consistent with Turkey’s historical position, but was amplified by Erdoğan’s aspirations to position Turkey as a defender of Palestinian rights on the international stage. Erdoğan’s rhetoric during the Gaza war reflected the complexity of Turkey-Israel relations. While publicly denouncing Israel, Turkey continued to foster its bilateral economic ties, reflecting a pragmatic approach. Reports of Turkish goods being shipped to Israel via Greece or Azerbaijan,[6] despite an official trade ban, underscored that fully severing mutually beneficial economic relations was easier said than done.[7]

The war in Gaza unfolded against the backdrop of significant geopolitical shifts in the Middle East. The normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab reshaped the region’s diplomatic landscape and further marginalized the Palestinian issue. These developments presented both challenges and opportunities for Turkey. On the one hand, they isolated Turkey as it sought to position itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause. On the other, they created an opportunity for Turkey to reassert its influence by portraying itself as a mediator and advocate for Palestinian rights—a role that resonated with domestic and regional audiences.

The war in Gaza provided Erdoğan with an opportunity to recalibrate Turkey’s stance, leveraging its criticism of Israel to galvanize domestic and regional support, while seeking to counterbalance the emerging strategic alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean. The conflict further strained Israeli–Turkish relations, which had already been marked by periodic diplomatic freezes in the years preceding the war. Turkey’s decision to coincided with the—albeit discreet—maintenance of economic engagement, reflecting the multifaceted nature of their relationship and the mutual interests that continue to bind them in areas such as trade, tourism, and technology.[8]

The Palestinian issue remains a persistent point of divergence, yet it also has potential as a platform for soft-power diplomacy.

The Palestinian issue remains a persistent point of divergence, yet it also has potential as a platform for soft-power diplomacy. In the broader context of a rapidly shifting Middle East, the trajectory of the Palestinian issue and the fallout from the war in Gaza will be pivotal in shaping the future of Israeli–Turkish relations. Whether these tensions can be mitigated through pragmatic diplomacy, or whether the ideological divide will deepen, remains an open and pressing question.

Israel and Turkey in the Aftermath of the War

As the guns fall silent in Gaza and a ceasefire takes hold after two years of devastation, Israel and Turkey find themselves facing a familiar yet profoundly altered landscape; both countries must navigate a new regional reality shaped by exhaustion, mistrust, and necessity.

The ceasefire agreement, brokered through intense negotiations involving the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, marks a significant though fragile turning point. Israel has begun a partial withdrawal of its forces, while the release of hostages and prisoners is underway. For thousands of displaced Palestinians, this moment signals the beginning of an uncertain return to their devastated homes. Humanitarian access is being cautiously restored, and international actors—with Turkey among them— are seeking to ensure that aid can flow into the Gaza Strip and reconstruction begin without a renewed escalation being triggered.

President Erdoğan has confirmed that Turkey will take part in the international task force to be formed as part of the ceasefire deal, alongside contingents from Egypt, Qatar, and the United States. 

Turkey’s involvement in the mediation process has been significant. Ankara’s participation in the US-backed agreement now extends beyond diplomacy: President Erdoğan has confirmed that Turkey will take part in the international task force to be formed as part of the ceasefire deal, alongside contingents from Egypt, Qatar, and the United States. The Turkish Defence Ministry announced on 10 October 2025 that, “with their extensive experience in peacekeeping operations,” its armed forces were ready to take on any assigned mission.[9]

During the two-year war, Turkey escalated its measures against Israel, recalling its ambassador, suspending bilateral trade, restricting airspace access, and leading international criticism of Israeli operations. These moves resonated deeply with Turkish public opinion, strained economic ties, and tested Ankara’s ability to balance moral rhetoric with strategic pragmatism. Now, as the ceasefire takes effect, Turkey’s new role in the task force reflects an attempt to translate political capital into concrete influencethat Ankara can be both principled and indispensable.

For Israel, the post-war challenge lies in transforming battlefield outcomes into lasting security. The war, initially triggered by Hamas’s attacks, has left Israeli society weary and politically divided. More than a thousand Israelis were killed in the initial assault, while the subsequent military campaign in Gaza resulted in tens of thousands of Palestinian deaths and the near-total devastation of the Strip. Entire neighbourhoods have been erased, infrastructure shattered, and hundreds of thousands displaced—many with nowhere to return to. The “day after” brings neither triumph nor stability, but rather a complex mix of humanitarian responsibilities, diplomatic recalibration, and domestic reckoning.

If Ankara’s participation in the task force proceeds smoothly, it could set a precedent for Turkish involvement in humanitarian and reconstruction missions without marking the full normalization of its diplomatic relations with Israel.

Working indirectly with Turkey through a US-brokered mechanism may prove uncomfortable for Israeli policymakers–yet it could also open limited channels of technical cooperation, even amid political estrangement. In parallel, Gaza’s reconstruction looms as the most immediate and contentious test. Turkey, which previously funded key infrastructure in the enclave, including the Turkish–Palestinian Friendship Hospital, is likely to seek a prominent role in rebuilding efforts. Israel, wary of foreign political influence, may prefer such contributions to occur under international coordination. If Ankara’s participation in the task force proceeds smoothly, it could set a precedent for Turkish involvement in humanitarian and reconstruction missions without marking the full normalization of its diplomatic relations with Israel.

Still, old sources of friction persist. In Syria, Israeli and Turkish interests continue to diverge sharply, with Israel targeting Iranian networks and Turkey confronting Kurdish forces and trying to balance Russian and Iranian influence. Both countries remain active in overlapping, volatile theatres where a miscalculation could reignite confrontation. This has led many experts and a sizeable part of the public opinion in both countries to view each other as one of their country’s key security threats. Still, a further remains the least likely scenario.

Internationally, Turkey is likely to continue advocating for Israel to be held account for its wartime conduct, while Israel defends its actions as legitimate self-defence. These competing narratives—humanitarian moralism versus security necessity—will shape both nations’ diplomacy in the months to come.

The role of US policy in the Middle East must also be taken into account in any projections on the future of Israeli–Turkish relations. The fundamental reconfiguration of regional and global politics that the Gaza war has brought about will be strongly nuanced by the degree of US commitment to the Middle East.

Domestic politics is also going to weigh heavily on the future. While the Palestinian problem was used to serve domestic political goals in Turkey and , the two-year Gaza war also gave the Israeli government and Prime Minister Netanyahu the opportunity to paper over domestic failures and silence dissent by declaring a security crisis, forcing all Israeli citizens to rally around their government and deeply polarizing and fragmenting Israeli society in the process.

Ultimately, the “day after” for Gaza is not yet peace; it is a transitional moment, fragile and contested, where political manoeuvring replaces open warfare[10]. For Israel, it is a test of restraint and restoring diplomatic ties; for Turkey, it provides an opportunity to convert words into a tangible regional presence. Whether participation in the international task force becomes a platform for cautious engagement, or another point of friction, will depend on how both sides manage this uneasy coexistence.

Conclusion

Israel and Turkey stand at a crossroads: no longer outright enemies, they are still far from partners. What unfolds now will determine whether this ceasefire becomes a bridge to stability, or merely the pause between two storms.

The fact that the peace agreement in Gaza became possible thanks to the decisive intervention of US President Donald Trump adds a crucial dimension to the debates over the future of Israeli–Turkish relations.

President Trump has claimed a special relationship with both President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Netanyahu, and will probably use both to promote his vision on the Middle East. It would be difficult for either of the two leaders to go against US policy in Gaza and the Middle East as a whole. While Israel’s ability to influence US foreign policy in the Middle East remains substantially larger than Turkey’s, the degree and depth of President Trump’s involvement in the Palestinian problem will likely be influenced by the course of his relations with Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. In that respect, Turkey’s role in the reconstruction process will be influenced by the degree of involvement of these states and Egypt.

In the aftermath of the war, Turkey’s active participation in the peace process creates the prospect of greater closeness after a period of intense hostility–at the level of rhetoric and public political discourse, at least. This new phase holds the potential to replace confrontation with cooperation, laying the groundwork for a more stable and pragmatic relationship between the two states.

Ultimately, the trajectory of Israeli–Turkish relations after the Gaza war will depend on the ability of both states to transform pragmatic cooperation into sustained diplomatic engagement. Both countries now face a rare opportunity to move beyond decades of mistrust and redefine their regional roles not through rivalry, but through dialogue and mutual recognition. If managed wisely, Turkey’s involvement in the peace process can serve as a foundation for long-term stability, while Israel’s openness to collaboration may help consolidate a broader environment of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The rhetoric of enmity may be maintained for domestic purposes, but beneath it lies an emerging understanding that coexistence, rather than confrontation, is the only viable path forward. In this sense, the end of the Gaza war could mark not merely the cessation of hostilities, but the beginning of a gradual, enduring reconciliation between two pivotal powers in the Middle East.

 

References

Soylu Ragip, Turkish goods shipped to Israel via Greece despite official ban, Middle East Eye, June 2024: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkish-goods-shipped-israel-greece-despite-official-ban

Soylu Ragip, Turkey severs all relations with Israel, says Erdoğan, Middle East Eye, November 2024: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-severs-all-relations-israel-says-Erdoğan

Turkey-Israeli Free Trade Agreement: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2455/download

Ghariani Jonathan, Turkish-Israeli relations: ‘the golden years’, 1991–2000, Israel Affairs, 30(1), 5–24’: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/13537121.2023.2295602?needAccess=true

Altunisik Meliha, “The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr, 2000)

Yusuf Can & Seda Güneş, Turkey-Israel Relations After October 7: Layers of Complexity and Posturing, Wilson Center, October 2024: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/turkey-israel-relations-after-october-7-layers-complexity-and-posturing

Hale William, Turkey, the US, Russia, and the Syrian Civil War, Insight Turkey, Vol. 21, No. 4

Hale William, “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis”, International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct 1992)

Akçalı Emel, Görmüş Evrim and Özel Soli, Energy Transitions and Environmental Geopolitics in the Southern Mediterranean (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2022)

Muhammed Kafadar, What is Turkey’s role in the Gaza peace plan?, https://www.dw.com/en/from-bystander-to-player-what-is-turkeys-role-in-the-gaza-peace-plan/a-74310735

Omar Shaban, Gaza’s day after: Reconstruction and governance challenges, Brookings, April 2025: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/gazas-day-after-reconstruction-and-governance-challenges/?utm

 

 

[1] William Hale, Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 679-692

[2] Jonathan Ghariani, Turkish-Israeli Relations: ‘The Golden Years’, 1991–2000, Israel Affairs, 2024, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 5-24

[3] His rhetoric drew on the earlier Islamist-nationalist ideas of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, stressing “resistance to Western dominance” and “solidarity with Palestinians”—foreshadowing the tensions that would later deepen under Erdoğan and the AKP. Bülent Ecevit added another layer by adopting a critical stance toward US policy, fueling anti-Americanism and skepticism of the West. While diplomatic relations with Israel were maintained, they were increasingly shaped by Turkey’s broader tensions with Washington and its shifting stance toward the West.

[4] Sectors such as textiles, machinery, chemicals, and agriculture benefitted significantly from this agreement. Additionally, it encouraged the development of joint ventures and investments, with Israel bringing advanced technologies and Turkey providing a cost-effective production base. The FTA’s success exemplified how mutual economic interests could drive cooperation, serving as a model for pragmatic collaboration in an often-fractured region.

[5] Meliha Altunisik, The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr 2000), pp. 176-178

[6] Ragip Soylu, “Turkish Goods Shipped to Israel via Greece Despite Official Ban,” Middle East Eye, June 2024: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkish-goods-shipped-israel-greece-despite-official-ban

[7] Ragip Soylu, “Turkey severs all relations with Israel, says Erdoğan,” Middle East Eye, November 2024: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-severs-all-relations-israel-says-Erdoğan

[8] Yusuf Can & Seda Güneş, Turkey-Israel Relations After October 7: Layers of Complexity and Posturing, Wilson Center, October 2024: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/turkey-israel-relations-after-october-7-layers-complexity-and-posturing

[9] Muhammed Kafadar, “What is Turkey’s Role in the Gaza peace plan?”, Deutsche Welle (DW) https://www.dw.com/en/from-bystander-to-player-what-is-turkeys-role-in-the-gaza-peace-plan/a-74310735

[10] Omar Shaban, “Gaza’s Day After: Reconstruction and Governance Challenges”, Brookings Commentary, April 2025: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/gazas-day-after-reconstruction-and-governance-challenges/?utm

 

 

 

 

 

 

Le Parlement temporise avant d’approuver l’accord transatlantique négocié entre Bruxelles et Washington, espérant que des modifications soient apportées aux concessions commerciales accordées par l’UE aux États-Unis ainsi que des garanties supplémentaires soient accordées.

The post Le Parlement européen cherche à « améliorer » l’accord commercial UE-États-Unis appeared first on Euractiv FR.

The ammonia value chain is struggling with uncertainty as emissions trading requirements change – the culprit is, incoming carbon border levy on imports

La Commission Electorale Nationale Autonome (CENA) a publié, ce 23 octobre 2025, la liste provisoire des duos de candidats dont les dossiers ont été jugés complets et conformes pour l'élection présidentielle prévue en avril 2026.

Les dossiers de deux (02) duos ont été retenus à l'élection présidentielle d'avril 2026, selon la liste provisoire publiée ce jeudi 23 octobre 2025 par la Commission Electorale Nationale Autonome (CENA).

Il s'agit de Kossi Mbueke Romuald WADAGNI, candidat à la présidence de la République, et Mariam CHABI TALATA, candidate à la vice-présidence de la République ;

Paul HOUNKPÈ, candidat à la présidence de la République, et Rock Judicaël HOUNWANOU, candidat à la vice-présidence de la République.

Trois (03) duos candidats ont vu leurs dossiers de candidature rejetés par la CENA. Il s'agit de : Anatole Jackson Prince OUINSAVI, candidat à la présidence de la République, et Kaossarath Remilekoun Agathe BELLO, candidate à la vice-présidence de la République ;

Vignilé Renaud Léandre N'doufou AGBODJO, candidat à la présidence de la République, et Jude Bonaventure LODJOU, candidat à la vice-présidence de la République ;

Elisabeth AGBOSSAGA épouse JAWAD, candidate à la présidence de la République, et Boni Neto GANSARE, candidat à la vice-présidence de la République ;

Les candidats recalés disposent d'un délai de 48 heures, à compter de la notification de la décision, pour saisir la juridiction compétente, rappelle la CENA.

LIRE LA DECISION DE LA CENA

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La Cour de cassation belge a jugé mercredi 22 octobre qu'une plainte pénale déposée contre la présidente de la Commission européenne était irrecevable, mettant fin à trois ans de procédure, a confirmé à Euractiv un porte-parole de la Cour bruxelloise et des avocats.

The post Belgique : la Cour de cassation met fin à une procédure engagée contre Ursula von der Leyen concernant un accord sur les vaccins Covid appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Après sa nomination au poste de Nonce apostolique au Burkina et au Niger, Mgr Éric Soviguidi sera ordonné évêque en novembre à Cotonou.

Nommé nonce apostolique auprès de la Conférence épiscopale Burkina–Niger, le 15 août 2025, par le pape Léon XIV, Mgr Éric Soviguidi de nationalité béninoise, recevra sa consécration épiscopale, samedi 15 novembre 2025, à la paroisse Sacré-Cœur d'Akpakpa, à Cotonou.

L'annonce de la date de son ordination a été faite par la Conférence épiscopale du Bénin (CEB) à l'issue de sa première session plénière ordinaire de l'année pastorale 2025-2026, tenue du 19 au 22 octobre, à Porto-Novo.

Dans leur communiqué final, les évêques du Bénin ont salué cette nomination avec « grande joie » et ont exprimé leur « gratitude filiale au Saint-Père pour cette marque de confiance à l'endroit d'un fils de notre pays ». Ils ont également adressé leurs félicitations à Mgr Soviguidi et imploré « l'abondance des grâces divines pour une mission pastorale féconde dans sa mission diplomatique ».

Avec cette désignation, Mgr Éric Soviguidi devient le deuxième Béninois à accéder à la fonction de représentant pontifical. Le premier nonce apostolique originaire du Bénin est Mgr Dieudonné Datonou, actuellement en poste au Burundi.

AMENDMENTS 1 - 600 - Draft report Drones and new systems of warfare – the EU‘s need to adapt to be fit for today‘s security challenges
Committee on Security and Defence
Reinis Pozņaks

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Trump hatte Sanktionen zuvor hinausgezögert, in der Hoffnung, den russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin mit einer weicheren Linie zum Einlenken zu bewegen.

Le recours en annulation du parrainage du député Michel Sodjinou déposé par le parti Les Démocrates (LD), qui devait être examiné dans la matinée de ce jeudi 23 octobre, a été renvoyé en soirée.

L'audience, initialement reportée pour la matinée de ce jeudi 23 octobre, a été repoussée à 16 h. La Cour constitutionnelle a décidé de renvoyer le dossier pour la présentation d'un rapport.

Aucune information supplémentaire n'a été donnée sur le contenu du dossier ni sur les conclusions attendues.

Michel Sodjinou, le député au cœur de la polémique sur le parrainage était présent à l'audience.

Tous les regards sont désormais tournés vers la Cour constitutionnelle. La décision, très attendue, pourrait peser lourd dans la course à la présidentielle.

Dans le dossier objet de recours, le député Michel Sodjinou est accusé par son propre camp d'avoir refusé de remettre sa fiche de parrainage au profit du duo candidat retenu par la direction du parti. Le député conteste la méthode de sélection et dénonce un processus opaque et non consensuel. De son côté, le parti l'accuse de vouloir fragiliser la démarche collective, certains responsables évoquant même une collusion avec le pouvoir en place. Une accusation que le député rejette fermement, affirmant agir « par fidélité à ses convictions ».

Cette crise interne a pris une tournure institutionnelle après l'invalidation par le Tribunal, la délivrance d'un autre formulaire de parrainage à Michel Sodjinou par la CENA et le dépôt d'un recours devant la Cour constitutionnelle.

M. M.

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