Damaturu, Yobe State, north-east of Nigeria. Credit: UN Women
By Zuzana Schwidrowski and Omolola Mary Lipede
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, Feb 19 2026 (IPS)
Africa is home to approximately 160 million adolescent girls aged 10 to 19 (according to 2022 data by the United Nations Population Division). They embody the energy, creativity, and potential of the continent. It is undeniable that The Africa We Want, as envisioned in the African Union’s Agenda 2063, will not be realized without the full participation of this group which represents a key component of the continent’s current and future workforce.
Yet one of the most persistent obstacles to realizing this vision is the prevalence of child marriage and its devastating impact on the lives and welfare of Africa’s girls, and its negative impact on the economic potential of the continent.
Child marriage is one of the most underestimated structural constraints on Africa’s capacity to harness its demographic dividend.
Yet millions are being left behind
The statistics paint a concerning picture. According to the World Bank, four out of ten girls aged 15 to 19 in Africa (excluding North Africa) are not in school and not working, or are married or have children, compared to just slightly above one out of ten boys. On average, nearly one-third (32 percent) of young women (ages 15–24) are not in education, employment, or training (NEET), compared with 23 percent of boys in that age range (Figure 1).
In Africa, 130 million girls and women today were married before their 18th birthday, the highest incidence of globally (UNICEF, 2025). The prevalence of child marriage varies across the continent. Central and West Africa bear a disproportionate share of the global burden.
But even North Africa, with the lowest yet significant rate of child marriages, shows that this harmful practice persists across the continent (Figure 2). Moreover, nine out of ten countries with the highest incidence of child marriage are in Africa (Figure 3).
The data reflect the most recent available information for the period 2016-2023.
And economic costs are staggering
Child marriage is most frequently portrayed as a human rights violation or a social and health issue. It is. And indeed, complications from pregnancy and childbirth remain a leading cause of death for adolescent girls.
These tragic and most visible aspects, however, are only part of the story. Less visibly, but most frequently, child marriages are associated with early pregnancies and effectively exclude girls from education and formal economic participation at the very stage when investments in skills and learning yield the highest returns (Figures 4 and 5). Besides limiting individual futures, this practice thus has major economic implications for African countries and regions.
For African countries, as for some other developing countries, child marriage is a major unaddressed economic distortion. It distorts human capital accumulation and labor allocation, with economy-wide consequences for productivity and growth.
More specifically:
The implications for Africa’s labor markets are particularly severe. Productive structural transformation requires a workforce that can move from low-productivity activities into higher value-added sectors, including manufacturing, modern services, and the digital economy.
When girls’ education and skills acquisition are cut short, the supply of skilled workers for these sectors is reduced. In turn, incentives of entrepreneurs to create and grow productive firms are curtailed. At the macro level, productivity growth, job creation in the formal sector, and diversification into high value-adding activities are diminished.
Economic costs of child marriages persist across generations. The practice is closely associated with early and high fertility, increased maternal morbidity and mortality, and poorer health and educational outcomes for children.
If unaddressed, these social outcomes lead to lower human capital (educational attainments and health) of the next generation, thus reducing labor productivity and innovation. Over time, they result in a persistent barrier to achieving fiscal sustainability, regional integration and inclusive growth.
These dynamics hamper Africa’s chances to seize demographic dividend. While the continent’s growing working-age population is viewed as a potential source of accelerated growth if accompanied by adequate investments in health, education, and job creation, child marriages are accompanied by reduced female employment in the formal sector (Figure 6).
Subsequently, productivity gains fall below potential and demographic opportunity risks becoming a demographic burden.
Despite the negative macroeconomic implications, child marriage is not included in the mainstream economic frameworks and discussions that inform macroeconomic planning and policies in Africa. It is typically addressed through social or legal interventions, while macroeconomic strategies, industrial policies, and fiscal frameworks proceed as if these aspects of human capital constraints were exogenous.
Such disconnect results in systematic underinvestment in one of the most binding constraints on Africa’s productive capacities.
Policymakers and the population at large need to rethink child marriage
From an economic perspective, the case for investing in girls is compelling. Analysis consistently shows that investments in girls’ education and health yield high returns, raising lifetime earnings, boosting productivity.
Under the ‘full gender equality scenario’, including closing gender gaps in education, employment, and decision-making could add up to a trillion USD to Africa’s GDP by 2043. Estimates also suggest that every dollar invested in adolescent girls’ health, education and empowerment can generate multiple dollar economic returns over time.
Translating evidence into effective policies will require a shift in approach — a one where ending child marriage is seen as a core component of Africa’s economic strategy. Indicators on adolescent girls’ education, employment, and unpaid care burdens should thus become an integral part of macroeconomic frameworks, labor market projections, and assessments of productive capacity.
Against this background, addressing the child marriage issue in Africa is a matter of economic necessity, given that successful Africa’s transformation requires unlocking the full productive potential of its population. This, in turn, demands sustained investment in girls as economic actors and not merely as beneficiaries of social programs.
Africa must finance Africa’s girls, and measures such as strengthened domestic resource mobilization, gender-responsive budgeting, and gender bonds could go a long way in this regard. Moreover, policymakers should view public spending aimed at reducing child marriages and supporting girls’ continued education as capital expenditure instead of pure social spending. This would help align fiscal frameworks with longer term growth targets.
Ending child marriage practice will not, on its own, ensure that Africa will reach its development goals. However, unless addressed, this structural barrier will continue to hamper productivity, competitiveness, and the delivery of the Agenda 2063.
Recognizing that ending child marriage is an economic as much as social imperative would be an important step forward. It would also place the girls’ empowerment where it belongs: at the center of Africa’s development strategy and its pursuit of inclusive and sustainable growth.
Zuzana Schwidrowski is the Director of Gender, Poverty and Social Policy Division at the ECA and Omolola Mary Lipede Fellow in the same Division.
Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations
IPS UN Bureau
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
Les éléments du commissariat frontalier de Tchetti, localité située dans la commune de Savalou (département des Collines), ont procédé mercredi 18 février 2026, à une importante saisie de produits psychotropes.
Les policiers ont repéré dans la nuit du mercredi 18 février, un motocycliste au comportement suspect. À la vue des forces de l'ordre, l'individu a pris la fuite dans la brousse, abandonnant sur place sa motocyclette.
La fouille a permis de découvrir trois sacs de jute contenant au total 140 plaquettes de chanvre indien soigneusement conditionnées. La marchandise a été immédiatement transportée au commissariat pour les besoins de la procédure.
Une enquête est en cours afin d'identifier et d'interpeller le propriétaire de la cargaison.
Les suppléants Mounifa Tidjani Karim et Idrissou Amadou pourraient siéger dans les prochains jours à l'Assemblée nationale en remplacement des ministres élus.
Mounifa Tidjani Karim, suppléante de la ministre Assouman Alimatou Shadiya, et Idrissou Amadou, suppléant du ministre d'État Abdoulaye Bio Tchané, pourraient être appelés à siéger prochainement à l'Assemblée nationale au titre de la 10e législature de l'Assemblée nationale.
Le ministre d'Etat chargé de la Coordination de l'action gouvernementale Abdoulaye Bio Tchané et la ministre de l'Industrie et du Commerce Assouman Alimatou Shadiya demeurent, pour l'instant, membres du gouvernement. Leur maintien à l'Exécutif ouvre donc la voie à l'activation du mécanisme de suppléance prévu par la loi.
À la date du mercredi 18 février 2026, deux ministres ont officiellement décidé de siéger au Parlement. Il s'agit de Ladékan Yayi Eléonore et de Jean-Michel Abimbola, qui ont informé le Chef de l'État de leur volonté de rejoindre l'Assemblée nationale, « en se conformant ainsi aux prescriptions légales ».
Le président de la Commission Électorale Nationale Autonome (CENA), Sacca Lafia, a reçu en audience, jeudi 19 février 2026, l'Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de la République du Bénin près la République française, Corinne Amori Brunet. C'est dans le cadre des préparatifs de l'élection présidentielle.
Les Béninois sont appelés aux urnes le 12 avril 2026 pour élire le prochain président de la République. Le président de la CENA Sacca Lafia a donc tenu une séance avec l'ambassadrice du Bénin en France en présence des membres du Conseil électoral ainsi que de la Direction générale des élections. Les discussions se sont axées sur l'organisation du vote dans la zone Europe, avec une attention particulière portée à la France, où réside une importante communauté béninoise.
Cette séance de travail témoigne de la volonté des autorités électorales d'assurer un scrutin inclusif, transparent et crédible, tant sur le territoire national qu'à l'étranger. La CENA entend ainsi garantir aux ressortissants béninois vivant en Europe les conditions nécessaires pour exercer pleinement leur droit de vote.
Elena Lazarou, Director General, ELIAMEP
The 2026 Munich Security Conference gave the sense of a forum negotiating the terms of what comes next. The tone was measured, but the subtext was unmistakable: the assumptions that underpinned three decades of relative geopolitical coherence are eroding. What replaces them remains unsettled. On the positive side, it could be an opportunity.
Three core dynamics defining Munich this year were particularly interesting: transatlantic recalibration, the rising agency of middle powers and the Global South, and the expanding definition of security itself to match the geotechnological nature of our times. These trends are not new: they echo debates and concerns from previous years, but the discussion has evolved and the participants have matured and diversified.
Transatlantic Recalibration?There was no open rupture between Europe and the United States. Yet neither was there a return to complacency. European leaders continue to affirm NATO’s centrality, yet strategic autonomy is no longer abstract rhetoric. From defense industrial capacity to energy diversification and digital infrastructure, Europe is hedging against systemic volatility. For the United States, alliance unity remains central but increasingly framed through domestic political sustainability – and domestic competition of identity related narratives. At the same time, for the European audience, one thing is clear: burden-sharing and alignment must be reciprocal and measurable. The transatlantic relationship is indeed recalibrating. And while the point was made that partnership endures; dependency does not.
Middle Powers and the Global South: From Participants to Architects?No one knows dependency as well as some of what we now refer to as the middle powers of the ‘Global South’. Perhaps the most striking shift in this year’s Munich was not in what Western leaders said, but in who spoke with confidence. Middle powers — India, Brazil, the Gulf states — are no longer navigating between blocs; they are shaping the environment in which blocs operate. Their diplomacy is pragmatic and transactional. Engagement is diversified. Alignment is selective. This is now referred to by pundits as ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy and is increasingly appealing to states north and south. It could be argued that it is a return to what we once simply called ‘realist’.
Voices from Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia present in the Bavarian capital underscored a structural gap (and not for the first time): global governance structures lag behind contemporary realities. Security debates emphasise defence and deterrence but still sideline debt distress, development financing, and climate vulnerability. In so doing, they do not resonate in much of the world.
For many of these countries, instability is fiscal, climatic, and demographic long before it manifests as military or territorial crises. Middle powers and Global South actors are asserting agency — and demanding that the architecture of order accommodate it.
One of the ‘quieter’ but consequential conversations focused on the intersection of development, humanitarian support, and security. Delegates from the Global South stressed that fragile states are destabilized not only by military threats, but by chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, social services, and governance. Humanitarian crises — from conflict-driven displacement to climate-induced food insecurity — are immediate pressures, but short-term aid alone cannot stabilize societies. But rather than just voicing concern, they also offered solutions, or at least proposals. An important one is that predictable development financing is preventive security. Long-term investment in education, health, energy, and infrastructure reduces the likelihood of crises escalating into broader regional instability.
On humanitarian support, experts from across the globe re-emphasized that it must complement, not replace, structural solutions. Emergency aid is essential to alleviate suffering, but without sustained development mechanisms, fragile states remain vulnerable to repeated shocks. Several voices emphasized that equitable financing, and mechanisms to address systemic vulnerabilities are critical to prevent recurring humanitarian crises. This is perhaps more important than ever, as the future of the United Nations and their reform enters the microscope – North and South. An opportunity is there, but a risk too. But the related conversations inside and outside closed doors highlighted a simple but often overlooked principle: stability is built before crises erupt, and humanitarian support is only one pillar in that architecture. Development and crisis response are inseparable in designing durable security strategies. We are focusing a lot on crises these days (in fact ELIAMEP has launched a series of events entitled precisely ‘Crises in Focus’) but we should be doing the same for the other part of security: development.
Technology and Artificial Intelligence: The accelerator?Technology shaped nearly every conversation. Artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, digital infrastructure, and data governance are now integral to national power. Competitiveness in AI is by now established as a key source of strategic leverage, which allows states to ‘punch’ way above their size and to do so successfully. It has also changed irreversibly the nature of expertise that is required for geopolitical and foreign policy analysis, thus also becoming an important part of the conversation for the future of think tanks and policy advisory services.
Three undercurrents particularly stood out. First that technological sovereignty equals a degree of strategic autonomy: resilience in digital infrastructure is as fundamental as energy independence and military operational capacity. Second, that we stand at what is only the beginning of a major negotiation on the future of digital governance. From a European perspective, AI governance is seen as a mechanism for stability and for the upholding of fundamental human rights: without a governance framework with clear guardrails, AI-enabled disinformation, cyber disruption, and opaque military applications risk miscalculation. But to reconcile this with Mario Draghi’s urgency for global competitiveness, in a world of less or non-regulated actors, is a challenge. Finally, and related to global development, the AI divide has emerged as a strategic fault line: unequal access risks marginalizing countries and entrenching geopolitical inequality.
Details aside, the big question on everyone’s mind was: will technology set the agenda, or will it accelerate and support agenda setters?
Bringing it home: energy, connectivity and opportunities for Greece?The Conference reaffirmed that energy and regional connectivity are central instruments of influence and security. European states are recalibrating energy sourcing, infrastructure, and cross-border supply chains to mitigate risk. Connectivity — from transport corridors to ports and digital networks — is not just economic facilitation; it is geopolitical leverage.
For Greece, these insights are particularly relevant. Its geographic position makes it a natural hub linking the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle East. Pipelines, LNG terminals, and interconnections with regional grids enhance both diplomatic leverage and energy resilience. Port and transport projects, including Piraeus and rail networks, strengthen Greece’s role as a regional hub for trade and strategic partnerships. Diversifying energy sources and linking energy and digital infrastructure amplifies national influence and mitigates vulnerability to external shocks. Engaging in multipolar diplomacy and regional connectivity initiatives allows Greece to build flexible coalitions that advance its foreign policy objectives while supporting EU strategic autonomy. Going back to one of the initial points made, multi-vector foreign policies are not just about diversifying partners, it is also about diversifying across policy areas, to raise leverage and set the agenda in as many fields as possible.
All in all, the MSC 2026 did not produce a grand doctrine. Instead, it revealed a world in transition. The international order is not collapsing outright (or under destruction as the catchy title of this year’s MSC publication framed the question). However, it is no longer comfortably anchored. The world is indeed witnessing some of its old assumptions falter. But it is also under renegotiation, and the stakes have never been clearer.
Photo: from the Munich Security Conference 2026 website
La 20e journée de la Ligue 1, programmée vendredi et samedi, s’annonce décisive aussi bien pour le haut que pour le bas du classement. En […]
L’article MCO – MCA, ESM – JSK, USMA – JSS… sur quelles chaines voir les matchs de la 20e journée? est apparu en premier sur .