Waterscapes with mining activities are often sites of water resource degradation and contestation. To prevent this, policy-makers deploy an increasing number of measures that purportedly align the interests of different water users. In Mongolia, mining-related protests led to the prohibition of mining in and close to rivers. However, implementation of these regulations has been slow. In this paper, we investigate why that is the case, drawing on an extended elaboration of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to disentangle the web of formal and informal rules, incentive structures, discourses, and other elements that characterize Mongolian miningscapes. We find that i) a combination of insufficient resources for lower-level actors, large areas to cover and high mobility of extractive operations, ii) a lack of information among implementing entities, combined with time pressure on decision-making and a lack of involvement of local actors, and iii) cultural norms and political context conditions that privilege the pursuit of private interests are key obstacles. Irrespective of these challenges, the prohibition of mining in riverbeds entrenches a social imaginary in the Mongolian governance framework that prioritizes water resources protection over resource extraction, offering a counterweight to dominant discourses that cast mining as a necessary requirement for social and economic development. Our analysis illustrates the usefulness of looking at implementation processes through the lens of mining- and waterscapes to identify how social power is embedded in social-political artifacts and impacts hydro-social outcomes. Strong discrepancies between the formal description of governance processes and interactions on the ground support the need to look at how processes play out in practice in order to understand implementation obstacles.
Waterscapes with mining activities are often sites of water resource degradation and contestation. To prevent this, policy-makers deploy an increasing number of measures that purportedly align the interests of different water users. In Mongolia, mining-related protests led to the prohibition of mining in and close to rivers. However, implementation of these regulations has been slow. In this paper, we investigate why that is the case, drawing on an extended elaboration of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to disentangle the web of formal and informal rules, incentive structures, discourses, and other elements that characterize Mongolian miningscapes. We find that i) a combination of insufficient resources for lower-level actors, large areas to cover and high mobility of extractive operations, ii) a lack of information among implementing entities, combined with time pressure on decision-making and a lack of involvement of local actors, and iii) cultural norms and political context conditions that privilege the pursuit of private interests are key obstacles. Irrespective of these challenges, the prohibition of mining in riverbeds entrenches a social imaginary in the Mongolian governance framework that prioritizes water resources protection over resource extraction, offering a counterweight to dominant discourses that cast mining as a necessary requirement for social and economic development. Our analysis illustrates the usefulness of looking at implementation processes through the lens of mining- and waterscapes to identify how social power is embedded in social-political artifacts and impacts hydro-social outcomes. Strong discrepancies between the formal description of governance processes and interactions on the ground support the need to look at how processes play out in practice in order to understand implementation obstacles.
Waterscapes with mining activities are often sites of water resource degradation and contestation. To prevent this, policy-makers deploy an increasing number of measures that purportedly align the interests of different water users. In Mongolia, mining-related protests led to the prohibition of mining in and close to rivers. However, implementation of these regulations has been slow. In this paper, we investigate why that is the case, drawing on an extended elaboration of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to disentangle the web of formal and informal rules, incentive structures, discourses, and other elements that characterize Mongolian miningscapes. We find that i) a combination of insufficient resources for lower-level actors, large areas to cover and high mobility of extractive operations, ii) a lack of information among implementing entities, combined with time pressure on decision-making and a lack of involvement of local actors, and iii) cultural norms and political context conditions that privilege the pursuit of private interests are key obstacles. Irrespective of these challenges, the prohibition of mining in riverbeds entrenches a social imaginary in the Mongolian governance framework that prioritizes water resources protection over resource extraction, offering a counterweight to dominant discourses that cast mining as a necessary requirement for social and economic development. Our analysis illustrates the usefulness of looking at implementation processes through the lens of mining- and waterscapes to identify how social power is embedded in social-political artifacts and impacts hydro-social outcomes. Strong discrepancies between the formal description of governance processes and interactions on the ground support the need to look at how processes play out in practice in order to understand implementation obstacles.
Condamné à cause de son caractère raciste par l’histoire, et banni des petits et des grands écrans du monde entier, le Blackface, appelé aussi le grimage en Noir, a quand même trouver son chemin vers l’écran du téléspectateur Algérien, et de plus est, via la télévision publique, et plus exactement grâce à la série culte, […]
L’article Blackface à l’ENTV : un épisode de Achour 10 à la limite du racisme est apparu en premier sur .
Emmanuel Macron, président de la République Française a adressé, mercredi 12 mai 2021, un message au président Patrice Talon à la suite de sa réélection à la présidence du Bénin.
« A la suite de la confirmation par la Cour constitutionnelle de votre réélection à la Présidence de la République du Bénin, je vous transmets, ainsi qu'au peuple béninois, mes vœux de succès ».
C'est en ces termes que commence la correspondance du président français Emmanuel Macron en date du 12 mai 2021 adressée au président béninois Patrice Talon.
Rappelant les relations existant entre la France et le Bénin, le chef de l'Etat français a souhaité que ces liens se renforcent au bonheur des populations.
« La France se tient aux côtés du Bénin pour contribuer à son développement, au bénéfice des populations et de la cohésion sociale et contribuer à la prospérité de son économie », s'est engagé Emmanuel Macron.
Le président Macron s'est dit également prêt à accompagner les pays du Golfe de Guinée dont le Bénin dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. « Sur le plan de la sécurité régionale, dans un contexte d'extension vers le Sud de la menace terroriste venue du Sahel, il apparaît plus que jamais indispensable que les pays du Golfe de Guinée, dont le Bénin, renforcent leur coopération et leurs moyens pour sécuriser leur frontière nord. La France se tient, là aussi, prête à apporter sa contribution », a précisé Emmanuel.
Le numéro 1 de l'Elysée n'a pas manqué de faire des recommandations au président béninois dans le cadre de la gestion des violences préélectorales et de la décrispation du climat socio-politique au Bénin. « (…) Au lendemain d'une élection présidentielle au Bénin qui a été marquée par des tensions et des violences, je voudrais souligner le nécessaire travail de justice, dans le plein respect des droits des justiciables, comme l'importance du dialogue avec l'ensemble des acteurs politiques et sociaux. Vous êtes le premier à pouvoir créer les conditions d'un climat apaisé, vital au maintien de l'attractivité du Bénin et à la mise en œuvre des réformes que vous portez », a plaidé Emmanuel Macron.
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