ARF: Whether you think that Budapest has, indeed, failed to offer Ukraine a more tangible security ?
AIT: After the collapse of USSR in 1991, Ukraine made the huge mistake of giving up the use of nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons remained on its territory after the collapse of the USSR) in exchange for some vague political promises.
The Budapest Summit in 1994 could not provide more tangible guarantees to Ukraine because the OSCE (former CSCE, 1973-1994) itself was established as a soft security institution. This means that its decisions are not binding on its members. With this “compromise” they could only guarantee that every country in Europe (+ USA, Canada, URSS) could actually be a member of the conference/organization (and remain so in the long term, although there were of course conflicts, despite the fact that some members sometimes boycott the meetings). The goal and most important result of the CSCE/OSCE is to provide a forum for political dialogue for its members in all situations, while dialogue is already broken off in every other international forum. From the beginning, CSCE/OSCE did not aim to provide security guarantees because it is not a hard security institution like NATO.
ARF: Whether things could have been different if those commitments had been taken more seriously?
AIT: In 2008, my Institute (Europa Varietas Institute ) wrote an analysis based on what (in connection with the Georgian conflict) was said at the Valdai Club, stating that Russia was essentially just waiting for a favorable opportunity to take back the Crimea from Ukraine, which Khrushchev had “easily given” as a gift. Our research group only deal with the Russian topic tangentially, and Russian experts reacted by saying that Russians are talking nonsense. Yet we were right. At the time (2008), there would have been enough time to prepare and launch countermeasures, and the West (like Hungary) did nothing, of course. The other side of the coin is that in the meantime – especially since 2005 – American political and economic penetration in Ukraine has accelerated. And in 2014, we also expected that the Russian advance would automatically continue to create a land corridor all the way to Transnistria – because geostrategic logic would have required this.
In my opinion, Russia itself was surprised by how easily, without any serious Western backlash, it managed to annex Crimea. We were therefore certain that the Russians would move forward, it was only a question of when. From a strategic point of view, Putin wasted valuable years by not taking advantage of the unique opportunity presented by the moment to move forward, although of course, clashes continued to take place in the Donbass from 2014 until well before 2022. Furthermore, some Russian weapons systems were not yet ready for use, which prompted further caution on the Russian side.
In my opinion, the course of history could have turned out differently in three cases:
1) The first and most important case is if Ukraine had insisted on keeping the nuclear weapons (and the nuclear weapons themselves) on its territory. Let’s think of North Korea. This is an important lesson for all states possessing nuclear weapons.
2) The second case is if the Western (American) economic and political intervention in Ukraine after 2004 had been less aggressive. During this, the American lobby squeezed out, for example, Chinese partners from strategically important military plants for the Russians (Moto Sich, Dnepropetrovsk SS-18 factory, etc.).Since a power vacuum has developed in the region and the logic of international relations shows that the great powers fill these, in our opinion, a conflict would have definitely arisen, only later in time. There is a grain of truth in the arguments from the Russian side that the West did not comply with certain points of the CFE Treaty, while of course the Russians also interpreted it quite loosely when their interests demanded it.
3) The third case is that when Russia annexed Crimea by force, the West would have responded much more harshly. Let’s say the Crimean peninsula (and/or other Russian interests, such as Kaliningrad), would have been placed under a NATO blockade. Of course, this would have required unified, harmonised action, the European countries would have had to « step out of their comfort zone » (theoretically) and step out of NATO’s territorial scope (in practice).
For example, the Crimean peninsula and/or other Russian interests, such as Kaliningrad, would have been placed under a NATO blockade. With the necessary determination, a chicken run game situation could have been created, such as the one that developed in Cuba in 1963 (the antecedent of which was the installation of an American missile capable of reaching Moscow on Turkish territory.) Russian policy is based only on force & counterforce. Sanctions and other soft tools cannot affect it, even if they naturally affect Russia sensitively.
ARF: What is realistic that we expect now from the “coalition of the willing”?
AIT: I have published countless books and articles on EU missions and military operations. In recent years, the emphasis has (with a few exceptions) shifted to “power point missions”, with minimal personnel, mainly training or, at best, CMCO tasks. 20 years ago, we could say that the political will was essentially lacking, the capabilities were available or at least they showed dynamic development. We have seen in the Sahel what disastrous results unintelligible, adventurous political ideas have brought. (Special commando units to perform classic OPEX peacekeeping tasks or territory control). So today France has practically ceased to be a factor in the region. Nowadays, the available capabilities have also decreased dangerously, plus BREXIT has meant another blow to the common European defense policy.
On the one hand, there is a lack of the appropriate political background, of national consensus on the issue. If Macron is removed, for example, in 2027, then the French contingent could end up like it did in Afghanistan after the fall of Sarkozy. Therefore, I think that the sending of troops may be a political “as if we are doing something”, but their strategic, or even tactical, value will be small. Also, in terms of personnel, they will remain significantly below the level actually needed. I am sceptical about what a common European force would be capable of in Ukraine. First of all, the Europeans have been trying to create a common army since 1947, and a common peacekeeping force since the 1980s and then in 1999 (Helsinki Headline Goal).
(I wrote a lot about this in my book) Partial results have been achieved, but the number of participants in EU military operations is very small and, considering the trend over the past 20 years – excluding maritime missions – is increasingly moderate. The only war theater is the Balkans, where a significant number of European forces have been deployed under the auspices of UN missions. Their number has gradually decreased since then, but in view of the events in Bosnia, it is questionable whether there will not be a need for a larger European presence there again.
On the other hand, if we consider France, 15 years ago there were still approx. it was able to send 15,000 men to African missions (OPEX) in strategically and economically important regions, significantly using the country’s financial capabilities. (Note, that Poland has spent 4.12 and 4.7% of its GDP on the development of its army since the Russian aggression, the most in all of Europe.) They have already essentially withdrawn from the Sahel and Ukraine is hardly the place where they could replace the lost potential there. In addition, the lack of French forces deployed in Ukraine would be strongly felt in other operational areas and constantly stationing them there would also mean a significant financial outlay.
Thirdly, the whole idea is also outdated in its concept. Since an economically strong great power with a significant military arsenal, and moreover a nuclear power, wants to “deter” it with peacekeeping tools, conventional weapons, which are traditionally weaker and usually only bring temporary results in third world countries with limited military equipment.
Politically, it would probably be impractical and completely unthinkable to install French or English nuclear weapons in Ukraine for the purpose of deterrence, at least as long as Ukraine is not a NATO member. If Ukraine becomes a NATO member, even then it would be necessary to take steps that, for example, the French do not take for the benefit of their close German ally, namely to extend their domestic nuclear umbrella to a foreign country.
ART: And what are the risks of “going” into Russia has European troops?
AIT: Russian geostrategy has considered the Ukrainian territory as its sphere of interest for centuries, so it is absolutely unlucky to station European troops in the region. The UN Brahimi report published in 2000 states as a basic principle that if foreign troops are stationed in the territory of a country for the purpose of peacekeeping, it is not lucky if those troops come from neighboring (interested) countries, but rather they should strive to come from neutral regions (preferably from another continent). Why do they think that if consistent violations of these principles, for example in Africa, always lead to inefficiency, then they still achieve success on the fringes of Europe? How long do they want to keep these European forces there? Until a political upheaval occurs in Russia? Those who think this way do not understand the rules of the system of international relations and geopolitics. Sending European troops to Ukraine makes little strategic sense, but it is perfect for politically provoking the Russians.The recent Balkan wars have also proven that whoever is within their territory has the advantage. On the other hand, the Russians have not yet tolerated the appearance of troops other than their own “peacekeepers” in their sphere of interest. These steps, devoid of both military and political rationality, are nothing more than sowing the seeds of a future war.
The success of any peacekeeping presence essentially depends on whether the (former) warring parties agree to the deployment of the peacekeeping force and whether they consider the presence of this force legitimate. Well, the situation in Ukraine speaks for itself in this regard.
It is not a good idea to play politics out of resentment. Macron was led by Putin by the nose for months before the invasion of Ukraine, and for a while he positioned himself as a peacemaker, but then hi came a cropper. A phone recording of the negotiations was made public. It seems that Macron will never forgive Putin for this. Macron told in May 2025 about “a few thousand” soldiers, a number that cannot be taken seriously in a military sense. Moreover, these would not be neutral UN troops, but specifically troops supporting (fighting?) Ukraine. This idea is as much nonsense as Macron’s idea a few years ago to transfer the peacekeeping and military presence in the Sahel from traditional peacekeeping forces to special commandos. (The plan failed in record time. I wrote about it here)
And it will be difficult because, among others, the Germans, Poles, and Spaniards fundamentally oppose the plan. Of course, there have been even stranger plans, for example, Macron wanted to open a debate on the use of French nuclear power in the defense of Europe in relation to Ukraine. I note that in February 2024, we already knew about about 100 French people fighting in Ukraine from French security sources, including former French soldiers and members of humanitarian organizations. According to the official version, all of these Frenchmen are under contract with the Ukrainian army, have Ukrainian military books and receive a basic salary of 500 EUR (20,000 hryvnia), to which a supplement of 2,500 EUR is added for each month spent on the front. (According to the unofficial version, there is talk of mercenaries, which is illegal under French law.)
The answers do not necessarily coincide with the official position of EuVI/CERPESC and can only be considered the personal opinion of Andràs Istvàn Türke.