Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Trump foretrækker ’New Europe’

Dr. Annika Schnücker, who graduated in 2018, is receiving this year's Ernst-Reuter-Preis for Outstanding Young Scientists at Freie Universität, Berlin.

She is being honored for her dissertation "Model Selection Methods for Panel Vector Autoregressive Models," which is selected as one of the 5 most outstanding dissertations of 2018 at Freie Universität, Berlin.

Georg Weizsäcker, Dean of the Graduate Center, and Helmut Lütklepohl, first supervisor of the dissertation, congratulate her earning this distinguished award.

Das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts über Leistungskürzungen bei BezieherInnen von Arbeitslosengeld II kommentiert Jürgen Schupp, Vize-Direktor des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels am Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Das heutige Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfG) zur Rechtmäßigkeit von Sanktionen ist durchaus wegweisend. Ab morgen besteht für viele betroffene Langzeitarbeitslose Rechtssicherheit darüber, dass ihnen einerseits Mitwirkungspflichten zur Überwindung der eigenen Bedürftigkeit auferlegt werden dürfen, andererseits aber im Falle der Verletzung dieser Verpflichtungen die Leistungen um maximal 30 Prozent gekürzt werden können. Das Urteil stärkt die Rechte der Leistungsberechtigten zudem dadurch, dass das Jobcenter künftig vor finanziellen Sanktionierungen stets die Verhältnismäßigkeit dieser Maßnahme überprüfen muss. Das BVerfG hat heute aber auch festgestellt, dass die Wirksamkeit dieser Leistungsminderung bisher nicht hinreichend erforscht sei. Neben der Sanktionsbeschränkung und -prüfung stärken diese offenkundigen Zweifel an einer vermeintlichen „Alternativlosigkeit“ zu Sanktionen die Grundrechte betroffener Langzeitarbeitslose. Mit welchen Methoden man eine solche Wirksamkeit von sozialpolitischen Maßnahmen wissenschaftlich erforschen kann, haben die diesjährig ausgezeichneten Wirtschaftsnobelpreisträger eindrucksvoll unter Beweis gestellt. Anhand wissenschaftlich begleiteter Feldexperimente mit einer von Maßnahmen betroffenen Gruppe sowie einer Kontrollgruppe könnte man innerhalb weniger Jahre die Wirksamkeit von Sanktionierungen, aber genauso auch die Wirksamkeit von vollkommener Sanktionsfreiheit – oder bedingungsloser Gewährung von Geldleistungen – empirisch ermitteln. Das Gericht stellt in seiner Begründung fest, dass je länger eine gesetzliche Regelung in Kraft ist, der Gesetzgeber umso stärker in der Pflicht ist, die Wirkung und Angemessenheit konkret zu belegen. Deshalb Mut zu Experimenten!

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United Nations peace operations often operate in complex theaters where a wide array of actors are also deployed by specific member states or regional organizations to effectively address peace and security challenges, and on November 4th, IPI and the French Ministry of Armed Forces held a policy forum to explore peacekeeping partnerships.

The event featured two panel discussions and launched two IPI publications, Partners and Competitors: Forces Operating in Parallel to UN Peace Operations by IPI Senior Fellow Alexandra Novosseloff and Lisa Sharland, Head of the International Program  of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), and Lessons for “Partnership Peacekeeping” from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by Paul D. Williams, Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University.

Jake Sherman, Director of IPI’s Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, opened the morning-long discussion by noting that six UN operations are now fielded in partnerships with regional, subregional, and other non-UN forces, and he suggested this pattern presaged upcoming deployments. “Regional and subregional bodies are increasingly authorized by the UN Security Council to take on roles for which the UN peacekeeping forces are ill-suited,” he said. “Parallel forces will be an essential aspect of planning and deploying all UN peacekeeping in the future.”

Laure Bansept of France’s Ministry of the Armies said there had been around 40 such coalition deployments since the end of the Cold War and that they were “helpful in situations where the UN lacks the capacity or skills to work in certain sensitive contexts” and allowed the UN to “focus on its mandates.” Referencing France’s support for African-led peace operations, she said these partnerships proved essential “when humanitarian situations rapidly deteriorate and threaten the stability of a region, and no other organization can address it as immediately.”

IPI Research Fellow Namie Di Razza said that regional organizations “offer what UN peace operations don’t have—they have different entry points and different resources and capacities.” Citing her experience researching the case of Mali, she warned, however, that while all actors pursue the same objective in different ways, they also risk “confusion, conflation with peacekeeping operations, and duplication.” She suggested there should be “a clear division between forces.”

Ms. Sharland listed three “rationales” for deploying parallel forces:

• Where there is a humanitarian imperative, and immediate action is necessary, they can respond more rapidly and robustly than a UN force.
• Since parallel forces can be more advanced militarily, they can overcome reservations about the capability of UN peace operations.
• They can serve national interests and intervene to protect their own nationals.

She also listed four “classifications” of parallel forces:  military stabilization, crisis response, insurance or deterrence, and capacity building, and three different types of actors: bilateral, multinational, and regional organizations.  “No two parallel forces are the same,” she said, “so while we can draw some broad lessons, we must be conscious of each unique context.”

Her co-author, Dr. Novosseloff, addressed some of the challenges these parallel force partnerships pose. “UN and parallel forces may have different motivations and goals, and this impacts the way they work on the ground and also their effectiveness,” she said. “The lack of mutual understanding and communication at the strategic level can be more damaging than we think. The divisions of labor that should be at the heart of the deployments are not clear enough.”

She said that central to these concerns was “the impartiality of UN peace operations and how partners can work with non-UN forces that may have different objectives. It impacts the perception of local populations so the impartiality of the UN will be at stake.” Such a lack of distinction, she said, could be exploited by “those seeking to undermine the peace or the process by going after the UN.” And potential mission overlap raised the danger of UN forces being “dragged into situations for which they are not equipped.” Airing these objections, Dr. Novosseloff said, should not be seen as minimizing the positive elements of parallel deployments, “such as additional niche capacities, military robustness, and political support. But the various stakeholders have to make stronger efforts to make them less of competitors and more genuine partners.”

The report makes a series of specific recommendations, but in general, Dr. Nosovoleff concluded, it represented a “plea for a stronger cooperation between all stakeholders involved in crisis management because all the money spent comes from the same pockets, and there needs to be a greater accountability.”

Col. Richard Decombe, Defense Mission of the Permanent Mission of France to the UN, said that while there remained room for improvement in how parallel forces operate, “it’s already an achievement.” Detailing the work of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), he explained how a coordinating forum involving five different partners (MINUSMA, Barkhane, G5 Sahel Joint Force, Malian Armed Forces, and EU training mission) met every two months. “What is in place is quite good, in terms of coordination and communication so the partners are at least informed on what the others are doing,” he said. What they can do better, he said, was having a stronger focus on building up the capacity of local security forces.

Naomi Miyashita, Senior Political Affairs Officer, UN Department of Peace Operations, said that parallel forces were of great value to the UN, which typically confronts situations with a dense web of competing regional and international interests and no clear path to a comprehensive political solution. “Parallel operations shape the space that others have for alternative approaches,” she said.

Self-criticism was essential, she added. “We must be constantly asking ourselves what the progression of the conflict has been and be constantly critically evaluating whether our interventions are having the desired effect and whether stability in itself is a good enough long term objective. We need to be clear about where we add value and where we have strength and comparative advantage. For the UN, it’s its political role, support for political processes and ability to protect civilians.”

The second panel of the morning provided an opportunity to discuss Paul D. William’s IPI report on Lessons for “Partnership Peacekeeping” from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The report describes AMISOM as the AU’s “longest, largest, most expensive and deadliest” peace operation and says that for the UN it is “the most profound experiment not only with providing logistical support in a war zone, but also with partnering on the political front.” Dr. Williams described AMISOM as “probably the most complicated model for any modern peace operation we’ve ever seen,” a model, he said, that “evolved in response to a series of crises and in an ad hoc manner.” As a consequence, he said, the AMISOM model is “not one that screams out for replication, but there are a lot positive things we can draw from it.”

Since AMISOM reflected “the primacy of politics”, the fraught state of politics in Somalia, a country with no state authority for decades, has prevented the mission from becoming effective, he said. “AMISOM has been unable to deliver a peace dividend because the Somali government did not come in behind it and support it.”

In Dr. Williams’ account, AMISOM was less nimble than its principle adversary, the Islamist militant group al-Shabab, and the conflict became “cat and mouse”, with the government regularly “displacing” al-Shabab but “not destroying its capabilities.” The result was starkly counter-productive, he said. “Extending state authority and consolidating it in a place where the central government is not universally accepted as legitimate is not peacebuilding, it’s actually conflict-provoking.”

AMISOM has also failed to stabilize the polarized society, attract local support, shape an exit strategy, or design what kind of government structure it should leave behind, he said. “At a fundamental level, there are real limits to what a peace operation can achieve when the local actors do not want to see the issue reconciled and resolved. Until the parties in Somalia reconcile, AMISOM will be stuck holding the line and not generating the means for its successful exit.”

Rick Martin, Director of the Division for Special Activities in the UN Department of Operational Support, acknowledged that the situation in which AMISOM is working is “very complex.” But he said there were lessons to be learned, principally that “a partnership of the sort we have in Somalia needs to start at the strategic level—it has to be built on planning, as a contingency for further cooperation, and focus on building capacities between the two organizations. ”He agreed with Dr. Williams that the AMISOM model should not be replicated but conceded that “something similar is likely to evolve again in the future.”

Alhaji Sarjoh Bah, Chief Advisor on Peace, Security, and Governance, AU Permanent Mission to the UN, said that the UN mission in Somalia compared favorably to the UN mission in Afghanistan. It illustrated, he said, the particular challenges that Africa presented. “The AU talks about peace operations, not peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is driven by consent, impartiality, but our peace operations range from peacekeeping to open warfare and counter insurgency. When we went into Somalia, there was a clearly identifiable enemy, so in the views of al-Shabab, we were ‘legitimate targets.’ We haven’t been deterred by the absence of peace to keep. We have gone in, created peace, and then maintained the peace, as in Somalia and Liberia.”

Among the lessons he said were learned from the mission in Somalia were that from the outset, there has to be a “political strategy” and “planning” for a subsequent “multi-dimensional phase,” and neighboring states must be “involved and committed.”

Chloé Marnay-Baszanger, Chief of the Peace Mission Section of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), said that “we are witnessing a reconfiguration of how the international community responds to conflict, and Somalia has been a good example of how to think through our processes. If the UN is not the primary vehicle for leading international intervention, then how can we make sure that human rights are still a priority in crisis response?”

She said that Somalia presented a distinct problem because there was no Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate to AMISOM. In its absence, she said, “what we managed to do through the human rights due diligence policy, we managed to strike a conversation about how we reduce the likeliness of violence against civilians in the context of complex violence.” She said that the most important lesson that the Somalia and the G5 Sahel experiences taught was “going forward, we put mechanisms in place so that from the beginning, we don’t have to course-correct.”

Dr. Di Razza moderated the first discussion on parallel forces, and Mr. Sherman the second on lessons from AMISOM.

Bonn, 04.11.2019. Mit der Agenda 2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung wurde „Entwicklung“ zu einer globalen Angelegenheit. Wenn es um klima- und sozialgerechte Lebensweisen geht, sind auch die Länder des Nordens Entwicklungsländer. Dieser neue Blick auf globale nachhaltige Entwicklung erfordert neue Herangehensweisen. Immer wieder wird gefordert, Denksilos zu verlassen, um so den komplexen Herausforderungen der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDGs) gerecht zu werden. Als Mittel der Wahl für lösungsorientierte Wissenschaft gilt die transdisziplinäre und transnationale Kooperation auf Augenhöhe. Partner aus dem globalen Norden und Süden, aus Politik, Wirtschaft, Zivilgesellschaft und Wissenschaft sollen gemeinsam an wissensbasierten Lösungen arbeiten. Zwischen der Vision einer partnerschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit und deren konkreten Umsetzung klafft jedoch eine Lücke. Bestehende Kooperationen sind oft durch Ungleichheiten und Machtgefälle geprägt, zum Beispiel, wenn Forschende aus dem Norden die Forschungsfrage für ein Nachhaltigkeitsproblem des globalen Südens definieren, Daten interpretieren und den vermeintlich richtigen Lösungsansatz vorgeben, während Partner aus dem Süden bloße Datenlieferanten sind. Warum ist dies auch 2019 immer noch so? Zusammenarbeit ist anstrengend! Es ist herausfordernd, das Wissen aller beteiligten Akteure gleichermaßen wertzuschätzen. Alte Wissenshierarchien und traditionelle Rollenverteilungen müssen neu definiert werden, denn nur so kann der globale Norden auch vom globalen Süden lernen. Für Partner aus dem globalen Norden bedeutet das, alte Denkmuster und Privilegien zugunsten einer gleichberechtigten Partnerschaft aufzugeben – auch wenn die Finanzierung noch oft aus dem globalen Norden stammt. Und dennoch: Zusammenarbeit ist der Mühe wert, nicht nur weil SDG 17 die sektoren- und grenzübergreifende Kooperation als Instrument zur Lösung globaler Herausforderungen hervorhebt. Die Wertschätzung unterschiedlicher Wissensformen, ob aus globalem Süden oder Norden, ob aus dem gesellschaftlichen Alltag, der politischen Praxis oder der Wissenschaft, ist auch eine Frage des gegenseitigen Respekts. Zusammenarbeit erfordert deshalb, sich mit verschiedenen Sichtweisen auseinanderzusetzen, um jenseits aller Differenzen das verbindende menschliche Element zu finden. Indem wir gemeinsame grenzüberschreitende Werte formulieren und verhandeln, können wir auch gegenwärtigen Trends wie Nationalismus, Polarisierung und wachsender gesellschaftlicher Ungleichheit entgegentreten. Eine Grundvoraussetzung der grenzüberschreitenden Kooperation ist ein gemeinsamer Wertehorizont. Diesen scheint es auch zu geben. Der kanadische Philosoph Charles Taylor argumentiert, dass das Moralische jedem Menschen inne ist. Und in der Tat teilen Menschen in verschiedenen Weltregionen die Vision eines guten Lebens für alle. Aus Lateinamerika stammt das Konzept des „buen vivir“, das auf Lebensphilosophien indigener Völker basiert. Das südasiatische Königreich Bhutan setzt mit dem Bruttonationalglück dem Bruttonationaleinkommen einen ganzheitlichen Bezugsrahmen entgegen. Die UN-Menschenrechtscharta von 1948 oder die Agenda 21 von 1992 sind Ausdruck global geteilter grundlegender Werte. In Zeiten des Klimawandels und des Raubbaus an den natürlichen Ressourcen bedeutet dies auch, innerhalb der planetaren Grenzen zu leben. Für die Forschung, Ausbildung und Politikberatung des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklungspolitik ist deshalb das „globale Gemeinwohl“ ein Leitbild. Was können wir tun, um faire Kooperation Wirklichkeit werden zu lassen? Auf der individuellen Ebene heißt es, an sich selbst zu arbeiten und Vorurteile gegenüber anderen Wissensformen und Denkmustern abzubauen. In der Zusammenarbeit bedarf es einer gegenseitigen Offenheit: Wissen sollte auch vom globalen Süden in den Norden fließen. Im Managing Global Governance (MGG) Netzwerk fördern wir dies und diskutieren zum Beispiel über die Chancen und Risiken der Digitalisierung für nachhaltige Entwicklung – sowohl in Deutschland als auch in den Partnerländern. In unseren Wissensnetzwerken müssen wir uns immer wieder auf gemeinsame Werte und Problemdefinitionen besinnen. Auch wenn es trivial klingt: Gemeinsame Antworten und Lösungsansätze findet man nur, wenn man auch eine gemeinsame Frage stellt und ein Wir-Gefühl herrscht. Im MGG-Netzwerk arbeiten wir daher nicht nur zu konkreten Problemen, sondern auch an einer gemeinsamen Netzwerkidentität, um unsere gemeinsame Basis zu festigen. Auf struktureller Ebene ist es wichtig, Plattformen, Projekte und Netzwerke über Legislaturperioden von Regierungen hinaus zu finanzieren, um so nachhaltigen Austausch und intensive Wissenszusammenarbeit zu ermöglichen. Es gibt noch zu wenig Forschung zu den Auswirkungen von Netzwerken mit Transformationsanspruch: Wie gestalten wir die Kooperation so, dass sie sich positiv auf nachhaltige Entwicklungspfade auswirkt? Wie tragen an Netzwerken beteiligte Individuen zu weiterem institutionellem Wandel bei? Wir brauchen aber auch mehr Forschung zur Praxis der Zusammenarbeit: Wie gelingt respektvolle Wissenskooperation ganz konkret? Welche Methoden helfen uns, nachhaltiges Wissen auszutauschen und zu kultivieren? Dieses Handlungswissen müssen wir auch anderen Akteuren zugänglich machen, um die Skepsis an Zusammenarbeit zu nehmen. Denn Kooperation lohnt sich. Eine Kolumne anlässlich des DIE-Panels zu transnationaler Wissenskooperation im Rahmen der 19th Global Development Conference.

Figure 1. Past and current parallel forces around the world (Click for full graphic)

Figure 2. Timeline of parallel force and their type (Click for full graphic)

Since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has authorized or recognized the deployment of more than forty parallel forces that operate alongside UN peace operations. As the Security Council has deployed peace operations in increasingly non-permissive environments, the division of labor between UN missions and these parallel forces has blurred, and their goals have sometimes come into conflict. This raises the question of whether they are partners or competitors.

This report examines the missions that have operated in parallel to UN peace operations to identify how to strengthen these partnerships in the future. It analyzes and categorizes the types of parallel forces that have been deployed and examines the rationales for deploying them. It also looks at strategic and operational challenges, including the challenges unique to peace operations operating alongside a counterterrorism force. Finally, drawing on lessons from past and current parallel deployments, it offers recommendations for member states, the Security Council, and the UN Secretariat. These include:

• Strengthening coordination of assessments, planning, and application of UN standards: The UN and actors deploying parallel forces should conduct joint assessments and planning when deploying or reconfiguring missions. The UN Security Council should also engage more regularly with parallel forces and encourage the continued development of human rights compliance frameworks for them.
• Clarifying roles, responsibilities, and areas of operation: Peace operations and parallel forces should clearly delineate their responsibilities and areas of operation, assess the risks of collocating, and improve strategic communications with the local population. The Security Council should also continue to put in place mechanisms to strengthen the accountability of parallel forces, especially when peace operations are providing support that could contribute to counterterrorism operations.

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The United Nations agendas for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and for Protection of Civilians (POC) both deal with protecting vulnerable populations. The comparison of these two agendas and opportunities to enhance protection were the focus of a November 1st IPI-Canada roundtable discussion, held under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution.

Discussants expressed concern that protection of women from sexual violence has been prioritized over other forms of gendered violence, such as female genital mutilation, child marriage, sexual violence against men and LGBTQ communities, trafficking, and domestic violence. One reason, agreed participants, is that gender-based violence is chronically underfunded. In addition, women are often appointed as gender experts solely because of their sex.

The experts lamented the fact that women tend to be seen only as victims of violence and not as agents of protection from violence. To overcome this barrier, speakers highlighted the need for more female uniformed and civilian personnel on the ground in peacekeeping missions with POC mandates and involved in developing POC strategy. Even so, they noted, women’s participation is often treated with a tokenistic, “tick the box” approach.

In order to insure that peacekeeping missions better and more safely engage communities, especially with women, participants agreed that accountability measures in peacekeeping should be strengthened, and that it was necessary to embrace a wider understanding of “protection.” One way to do this, they said, was to frame accountability around the UN Sustainable Development Goals, since UN member state governments have made public commitments to concrete goals and indicators and to carry out certain gender-sensitive measures of protection.

To truly mainstream these concepts, discussants suggested it would be useful to conduct local analysis in conflict communities and examine intercommunal conflicts. Speakers said that the strategic integration points of the WPS and POC agendas were climate change, gender-based violence, and sexual and reproductive health and rights.

The second session of the workshop focused on research questions. Participants pointed out that gender considerations are often an afterthought in peace operations, and explored ways to implement POC that do not reinforce the stereotype of women as victims. They pointed out programs that have been working well and recommended monitoring and scaling up these efforts.

One question that arose was whether domestic violence should be addressed in POC mandates. Discussants argued that intimate partner violence is not unrelated to conflict, and that it must be included in gender-based violence analysis and action. However, doubts were raised as to whether military and police personnel, who are the primary actors in peacekeeping, were the right people to address this intimate type of violence.

Finally, participants discussed how best to incorporate male victims in protection peacekeeping mandates and pointed out that because of patriarchal systems of power, the threats men and boys face are under-reported and protection of men and boys receives less attention. Discussants highlighted the fact that “gender” is not specific to women and that to say, “we need more women in peace operations to carry out the WPS agenda” takes the onus off of men to implement the WPS agenda and reinforces the stereotype of women as victims and men as perpetrators of violence.

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IPI President Terje Rød-Larsen was received on October 29th by His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa at Sakhir Palace, who welcomed advanced cooperation between the Kingdom of Bahrain and IPI. Mr. Rød-Larsen was accompanied by IPI Chief of Staff Camilla Reksten-Monsen, IPI MENA Director Nejib Friji, and IPI MENA Policy Analyst Dalya Al Alawi.

On October 30th, Mr. Rød-Larsen was received by the Bahrain Speaker of Parliament Fawzia Zainal. Parliament Members (MP) Mohammed Essa Al-Abbasi, Chairman of the Committee on Legislative and Legal Affairs, MP Ahmed Sabah Al-Salloum President of the Committee on Financial and Economic Affairs, and MP Ali Mohamed Ishaqi Member of the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee were in attendance.

Deputy Prime Minister H.H. Shaikh Ali bin Khalifa Al Khalifa received Mr. Rød-Larsen on October 30th to discuss IPI’s pivotal role in supporting multilateralism and efforts in strengthening the pillars of security and stability.

Interior Minister General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa received Mr. Rød-Larsen on October 30th and spoke on forms of cooperation to reinforce international peace and security. Public Security Chief Major General Tariq Al Hassan was also in attendance.

Mr. Rød-Larsen had a meeting with Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa on October 30th, where they spoke on IPI’s role in reinforcing coexistence and sustainable peace in the MENA region and beyond.

H.H. Sheikh Faisal bin Rashid Al Khalifa, Vice President of the Supreme Council for Environment (SCE) received Mr. Rød-Larsen on October 27th. The meeting delved into SCE-IPI partnership on sustainable development with a focus on water challenges in the MENA region and beyond.

H.E. Shaikh Mohammed bin Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Minister of Oil met with Mr. Rød-Larsen on October 27th to discuss mutual cooperation and partnerships on sustainable development in the region with a focus on clean energy.

On the same day, Mr. Rød-Larsen had a meeting with Electricity and Water Affairs Minister Wael bin Nasser Al Mubarak, where efforts to sustain the availability of electricity and maintain economic growth in line with Bahrain’s 2030 Economic vision was discussed.

Related coverage:
Bahrain TV 7pm News on October 29 (coverage between 6:42-7:47)

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The international community’s role in supporting women as vital stakeholders in an inclusive and enduring peace in Afghanistan was the subject of an October 30th IPI policy forum cosponsored by Cordaid, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, and the NYU Center for Global Affairs.

Rina Amiri, Senior Fellow at the NYU center and longtime expert on peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, said that while the world’s weariness with the ongoing Afghan war was speeding up people’s eagerness to come up with a way to end it, it was also resulting in concessions being made on earlier promises of inclusion. “Women’s rights and inclusion has moved from an absolute priority of the international community to something that is relegated just to inter-Afghan talks,” she said.

In light of this, she asked, “What are the arguments that we need to make that we’re not making, how can we move from lip service to genuine commitment, what are the ways that we should be thinking about inclusion and process design?”

IPI Senior Fellow Sarah Taylor spoke of a disturbing discordance between the pledges of UN member states to the women, peace and security agenda that she heard voiced in the Security Council debate on the subject the day before and the reality that women are still being kept from positions of power and influence 19 years after the passage of the landmark resolution 1325. She alluded to the example of the work done in Sudan by women “putting their bodies on the line, breaking curfews, braving tear gas yet still excluded from the discussions that determine the future of their communities.”

Storai Tapesh, Deputy Executive Director, Afghan Women’s Network, said that recent peace negotiations between the Taliban and the United States in the Qatari capital Doha allowed for more women’s participation than in past talks but still did not attract the necessary support from the international community. “We saw the added value of women during the recent dialogues in Doha,” she said. “It was us, the women of Afghanistan, who were putting important issues on the table. As opposed to the men, we were not negotiating out of a position of self-interest but pushing the real issues such as human rights, the red lines of the constitution and the need for an immediate ceasefire.”

Though those talks have now stalled, Ms. Tapesh said the women of Afghanistan are still “very much committed” to them and want to see them resumed and “facilitated” by the international community. Clarifying the kind of support they needed, she said, “Afghan women do not want you to fight our battles; we need support for our voices and space to advocate for peace.”

Testifying to the importance of women’s inclusion to the sustainability of peace processes, Karen Pierce, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, said, “You cannot actually build a truly prosperous society that enables any country to realize its full potential if you exclude some 50% of the population from the economic and legal life of the country, never mind the social. More than half of all peace processes collapse within five years if they don’t have sustainable provisions, and those sustainable provisions have been shown in well-documented evidence to include gender and women’s provisions.”

Ambassador Pierce was asked by the discussion moderator, Jake Sherman, director of IPI’s Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, about how to balance the push for women’s rights with the overall push for a peace accord without one jeopardizing the other. “You must have some very robust clauses about human rights and women’s rights, but I don’t know if in a negotiation with an informal organization such as the Taliban, it is good to go in loudly with your red lines,” she said. Instead, she explained, “the point at which you ask for the things you really need is at the end when peace is in sight.” Signaling the critical nature of this sequencing, she warned, “When we sacrifice the long term goal for short term expediency, we end up regretting that quickly and find ourselves back at the table negotiating peace again.”

Ms. Pierce acknowledged that it was particularly difficult to introduce the subject of women’s rights into conversations with the Taliban, a group notorious for its overt sexism and violence against women. “But the fact that is a difficult argument isn’t an argument for not making it,” she said. She added that those who counsel taking up the subject only “at the pace that the Taliban want” are ignoring evidence of women’s rights having been brought into the process successfully with tact, good timing and persistence. “You do it incrementally, you do it gradually, but above all, you do it steadily, don’t go backward.”

Mahbouba Seraj, a member of the Afghan Women’s Network, urged the international community to adopt a principled position on Afghanistan without regard to pleasing one side or the other. “Do not worry about the Taliban or Trump, but take a stance because if you don’t do that and stay on the basis of being wishy washy with the Taliban, then they are going to take advantage of that.”

Teresa Whitfield, Director, Policy and Mediation Division, UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, said that actions to include women in peace processes had to go beyond the numbers. “We need to normalize the process that women have substantive contributions in peace processes and not just that there are two women at the table,” she said. She asserted that obtaining respect for Afghan women’s rights would require a “creative” approach, given the nature of the Taliban. “The Taliban doesn’t include women in leadership so we cannot recruit and include them through their political or military power,” she said. Among the alternatives from her office’s experience that she suggested were advisory boards, gender subcommittees, women lawyers, broad consultations with civil society, online platforms, and social media information sharing.

In conclusion, Ms. Whitfield stressed, “The absolutely fundamental need for those of us who represent the international community and are on the outside of conflicts is to put in the legwork, the analysis, the research, the knowledge, and always focus on harnessing international forces. The demand for Afghan women’s rights comes from Afghan women, and that’s what needs to be represented in some shape or form at the table in the peace process.”

Zusammenfassung:

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) ist im Oktober im Vergleich zum Vormonat leicht gestiegen und liegt nun bei gut 90 Punkten. Zwar dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in Deutschland im dritten Quartal gegenüber den vorangegangenen drei Monaten erneut gesunken sein (um 0,2 Prozent). Im laufenden vierten Quartal wird es aber wohl zumindest nicht weiter bergab gehen. Die Wirtschaftsleistung dürfte dann in etwa stagnieren.

An assertive Chinese foreign policy poses challenges for Danish and European interests both in faraway seas in Asia, but also increasingly at home, where China’s strategic and commercial interests mix within European borders.

The death of ISIS-leader al-Baghdadi isn´t necessarily the grand victory it’s been presented as. The actual effects hinge on the reaction inside the ISIS-hierarchy - and the Sunni population’s future stance towards the group

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Studie von ForscherInnen des DIW Berlin und ZEW Mannheim auf Basis von Befragung Geflüchteter – Kitas erleichtern Eltern die Integration, insbesondere Müttern – Nach Deutschland geflüchtete Familien sollten frühzeitig über mit Kita-Besuch verbundene Chancen informiert und genügend Kita-Plätze bereitgestellt werden

Besucht ein Kind aus einer nach Deutschland geflüchteten Familie hierzulande eine Kindertageseinrichtung (Kita), ist vor allem die Mutter deutlich besser in die Gesellschaft integriert. Unter anderem spricht und versteht sie besser Deutsch, hat eine höhere Arbeitsmarktorientierung und vermisst ihr Heimatland weniger. Unter dem Strich sind Mütter mit Kita-Kindern – gemessen an einem Gesamtindex für die Integration – um 42 Prozent besser integriert als nach Deutschland geflüchtete Mütter, deren Kind nicht in einer Kita betreut wird. Das haben ForscherInnen des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) und des ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrums für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung  in Mannheim erstmals auf Basis eines repräsentativen Datensatzes belegt. Dafür werteten C. Katharina Spieß und Ludovica Gambaro vom DIW Berlin und Guido Neidhöfer vom ZEW Daten der IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von nach Deutschland Geflüchteten aus den Jahren 2016 und 2017 aus.

Minda Holm presents research from the project World of the Right

Figure 1. The AMISOM model (Click for full graphic)

Figure 2. AMISOM’s force generation challenges (Click for full graphic)

Deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operates through a complicated and extensive system of partnerships. This has been referred to as the “AMISOM model” of “partnership peacekeeping.” While this specific configuration of forces and mechanisms is unlikely to be repeated, AMISOM remains the longest-standing case of a peace enforcement operation built on such international partnerships.

If the AU and UN are going to continue deploying missions into such difficult environments, AMISOM’s experience offers lessons for how partnership peacekeeping can work better. This report summarizes the main operational-level lessons across seven themes: force generation, logistics, security sector reform, protection of civilians, strategic communications, stabilization, and exit strategy. Many of these lessons have not been truly learned, internalized, and acted upon by the actors and organizations in question.

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The UN Security Council adopted the landmark resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security (WPS) in 2000 and since then, the international community has made notable strides toward implementing the WPS agenda through member state commitments. However, in recent years, the world has witnessed backsliding on these commitments and a backlash against robust attempts at women’s inclusion and gender parity.

On October 29th, experts on WPS gathered at an IPI roundtable to launch and discuss the findings of a new report from Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS), “The 10 Steps: Turning Women, Peace and Security Commitments to Implementation.” The report includes recommendations for action on women, peace, and security as the 20th anniversary of resolution 1325 approaches.

The “10 Steps” report is the product of consultations with over 200 organizations in conflict-affected states. It recommends precise and actionable steps for realizing the WPS agenda, with a particular focus on the role of civil society. GAPS and its partners found that commitments on Women, Peace and Security are “vast and comprehensive,” but that “in practice this has not translated into the inclusion of gender perspectives and women and girls’ rights in policy and programming.”

Participants began the discussion by addressing the current state of the WPS agenda, especially noting the regression on gender parity and women’s inclusion in formal peace processes. Despite considerable progress on women’s inclusion in peacekeeping, discussants lamented that “it has been easier to get women into military, police, and peacekeeping forces on the ground than to get women into negotiating rooms.”

When women are excluded from peace processes, it was noted, the resulting peace agreements include few or no gender provisions. Accordingly, the WPS agenda has aimed to improve gender inclusion in peace negotiations in order to strengthen the outcomes of such processes. Initially, some progress was made. Before resolution 1325, only 11% of peace agreements made any references to women and gender, but in the following 14 years, this number went up to 27%. However, since 2014, the number has dramatically decreased.

Some participants called for women’s increased “meaningful participation” in the face of such discouraging statistics, but others stressed that the term “meaningful participation” is itself far too vague. Suggestions included making calls for “consequential participation,” or even “feminist participation.” Irrespective of the terminology they chose to employ, many agreed that greater women’s participation is greatly needed.

The roundtable then shifted its focus toward ways to engage civil society in implementing the WPS agenda, as the GAPS “10 Steps” report stressed. Participants acknowledged that governments are not the only drivers of the agenda, and civil society continues to play a vital and integrated role in its actualization. Civil society provides insight that guides state action, and it helps governments stay in touch with challenges to implementation on the ground. Moreover, where state action is often slowed by bureaucratic processes and political tensions, civil society helps to push the agenda along and accelerate progress.

When considering what the next steps member states should take on WPS, participants called for action on an array of issues, including the need for gender-conflict analysis, addressing violence against women, and changing social norms around gender.

The work remaining for the international community, participants argued, is ensuring accountability to the commitments outlined in the nine WPS resolutions that have been adopted by the Security Council. Though the agenda is often thought of as a “gender issue” or “security challenge,” it has much broader implications than these characterizations suggest.

“We are all guardians of this incredible WPS agenda,” agreed participants, and its realization will require creativity and widespread action.

From left: Lauri Mälksoo, Professor of International Law, University of Tartu, Estonia; Adam Lupel, IPI Vice President; and Kristi Raik, Director of the Foreign Policy Institute

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In October, Estonia and Finland brought IPI Vice President Adam Lupel to two separate forums to discuss the sometimes challenging but critical role small states play in policymaking and global affairs.

In April 2019, Dr. Lupel and Lauri Mälksoo, Professor of International Law at the University of Tartu in Estonia, published a policy paper entitled, “A Necessary Voice: Small States, International Law, and the UN Security Council.” The paper concluded that small states on the Security Council are well-placed to provide an important, credible voice with moral authority to remind all member states of their obligations under international law.

Dr. Lupel’s first stop was the Estonian Academy of Science in Tallinn on October 29th, where he delivered remarks during a half-day event. “Recent years have witnessed several cases where small states have driven debates on the Security Council defending international law and the rule based order, in particular international humanitarian law,” he said. The event featured Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid, Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu, and State Secretary Taimar Peterkop, along with academics from Columbia University, the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, and others.

As an example, Dr. Lupel provided this: “In early 2016, the small state of New Zealand (population under 5 million) initiated discussion on a possible Security Council resolution to help reinforce that bedrock of IHL by convening a multi-stakeholder round table at its UN mission. Soon, a draft resolution was being negotiated by five penholders from a diverse range of countries: Egypt, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Uruguay. After extensive negotiations, the final resolution served to clearly remind member states that ‘intentionally directed attacks’ on health facilities and medical workers during armed conflict are war crimes.

“From a negotiation standpoint, the resolution was a tremendous success. It was adopted unanimously, with eighty-five member states as co-sponsors—spearheaded by the bridge-building diplomacy of two small states in partnership with others.”

Dr. Lupel then went on to Helsinki, where on October 30th, about 50 participants from a broad cross-section of the diplomatic community attended a Finland launch of the small states paper, where he delivered an expanded version of his Tallinn talk followed by an extensive Q&A session. The event was moderated by Anna Salovaara, Director of the Unit for UN and General Global Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland.