Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Alexander S. Kritikos, Forschungsdirektor am DIW Berlin, äußert sich zu den Folgen der Krise in Thüringen:

Mit der Annahme der Wahl zum Ministerpräsidenten von Thüringen hat der FDP-Politiker Thomas Kemmerich ein politisches Beben ausgelöst, was sich zuletzt im Rückzug der CDU-Vorsitzenden Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer manifestiert hat. Die Entwicklung birgt auch ökonomische Risiken. Denn es geht um das Vertrauen in die Entwicklung Deutschlands. Der Wohlstand nicht nur Thüringens, sondern ganz Deutschlands hängt davon ab, dass es als Wirtschaftsstandort für Unternehmen attraktiv bleibt. Dafür braucht es Offenheit für Innovation und für Freihandel, offene Arbeitsmärkte und Kapitalströme. Insofern beschädigt die Wahl eines Ministerpräsidenten mit Stimmen einer Partei, die dezidiert gegen eine solche „offene Wirtschaftspolitik“ ist, das Vertrauen in die zukünftige politische Entwicklung Deutschlands. Im Inland wie im Ausland fragt man sich: Wann wird das nächste Tabu gebrochen, wenn es um den politischen Machterhalt geht? Solche Befürchtungen erfahren durch den angekündigten Rücktritt der CDU-Vorsitzenden noch zusätzliche Nahrung. Im Sinne des Landes bleibt zu hoffen, dass die Wahl von Thüringen kein Versuchsballon für einen nächsten Tabubruch war.

Med anholdelse af tre eksil-iranere, der sigtes for at spionere for Saudi-Arabien lægger Danmark jord til Mellemøstens konflikter. Men hvem er egentlig venner og fjender?

The Republic of Korea will host the next UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference in April 2021. In the context of the secretary-general’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, the objective of the 2021 ministerial is to strengthen UN peacekeeping, in part by improving the performance and impact of UN peacekeeping operations, closing capability gaps through concrete pledges, facilitating new partnerships and strengthening existing ones, and promoting systemic changes that will improve operations.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations organized a roundtable to identify potential themes and outcomes for the 2021 ministerial. The meeting focused on eight issues: (1) protection of civilians (POC); (2) safety and security; (3) technology; (4) performance; (5) training and capacity building; (6) women, peace, and security (WPS); (7) conduct of UN peacekeepers; and (8) sustaining peace, including during peacekeeping transitions. Participants agreed that the 2021 peacekeeping ministerial is an opportunity for member states not only to reaffirm their commitment to UN peacekeeping but also to expand this commitment by addressing systemic challenges facing missions.

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In Buenos Aires on 30 November and 1 December 2018, the G20 is having its 10th anniversary as a summit format at the leaders’ level. On 14 and 15 November 2008, this previously-obscure group of finance ministers and central bankers of the nineteen most “systemically relevant” countries and the EU was transformed into a forum for international leaders to meet with a view into the abyss of the global financial crisis that originated in the US and spread fast across the world. Ten years and 12 leaders’ summits later, the G20 has moved beyond its 2008-09 role as a crisis-management forum and became the self-described “premier forum for […] international economic cooperation.” In this capacity it is now facing new demands to tackle global challenges such as climate change, digitalization and pandemics. As its agenda has expanded and the urgency of the crisis fades, the G20 faces questions regarding its relationship to other formal institutions of global governance, such as the United Nations, its effectiveness in dealing with global challenges as well as its legitimacy and accountability vis-à-vis its people and the 174 non-members.

At the G20 @ 10 Conference, organized by the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), together with Chatham House and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), we took the occasion to reflect on the role of the G20 in its tenth year of summitry from both academic and policy-making perspectives. The conference brought together researchers of various disciplines, high-ranking government officials and experts from international organisations representing a broad range of G20 and non-G20 countries.

In Buenos Aires on 30 November and 1 December 2018, the G20 is having its 10th anniversary as a summit format at the leaders’ level. On 14 and 15 November 2008, this previously-obscure group of finance ministers and central bankers of the nineteen most “systemically relevant” countries and the EU was transformed into a forum for international leaders to meet with a view into the abyss of the global financial crisis that originated in the US and spread fast across the world. Ten years and 12 leaders’ summits later, the G20 has moved beyond its 2008-09 role as a crisis-management forum and became the self-described “premier forum for […] international economic cooperation.” In this capacity it is now facing new demands to tackle global challenges such as climate change, digitalization and pandemics. As its agenda has expanded and the urgency of the crisis fades, the G20 faces questions regarding its relationship to other formal institutions of global governance, such as the United Nations, its effectiveness in dealing with global challenges as well as its legitimacy and accountability vis-à-vis its people and the 174 non-members.

At the G20 @ 10 Conference, organized by the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), together with Chatham House and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), we took the occasion to reflect on the role of the G20 in its tenth year of summitry from both academic and policy-making perspectives. The conference brought together researchers of various disciplines, high-ranking government officials and experts from international organisations representing a broad range of G20 and non-G20 countries.

In Buenos Aires on 30 November and 1 December 2018, the G20 is having its 10th anniversary as a summit format at the leaders’ level. On 14 and 15 November 2008, this previously-obscure group of finance ministers and central bankers of the nineteen most “systemically relevant” countries and the EU was transformed into a forum for international leaders to meet with a view into the abyss of the global financial crisis that originated in the US and spread fast across the world. Ten years and 12 leaders’ summits later, the G20 has moved beyond its 2008-09 role as a crisis-management forum and became the self-described “premier forum for […] international economic cooperation.” In this capacity it is now facing new demands to tackle global challenges such as climate change, digitalization and pandemics. As its agenda has expanded and the urgency of the crisis fades, the G20 faces questions regarding its relationship to other formal institutions of global governance, such as the United Nations, its effectiveness in dealing with global challenges as well as its legitimacy and accountability vis-à-vis its people and the 174 non-members.

At the G20 @ 10 Conference, organized by the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), together with Chatham House and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), we took the occasion to reflect on the role of the G20 in its tenth year of summitry from both academic and policy-making perspectives. The conference brought together researchers of various disciplines, high-ranking government officials and experts from international organisations representing a broad range of G20 and non-G20 countries.

At the beginning of a new decade, we suggest to look at the longer-term. Let’s consider the world of multilateralism two decade from now, i.e. well beyond the timeline of the 2030 Agenda. The setting in 2040 is likely to differ substantially from today. Things change, and the job of scenario-building is to imagine different futures without merely projecting existing trends or historic examples. Scenario-Building also provides us with ideas about what we need to do to land in the space we see as most preferable.

At the beginning of a new decade, we suggest to look at the longer-term. Let’s consider the world of multilateralism two decade from now, i.e. well beyond the timeline of the 2030 Agenda. The setting in 2040 is likely to differ substantially from today. Things change, and the job of scenario-building is to imagine different futures without merely projecting existing trends or historic examples. Scenario-Building also provides us with ideas about what we need to do to land in the space we see as most preferable.

At the beginning of a new decade, we suggest to look at the longer-term. Let’s consider the world of multilateralism two decade from now, i.e. well beyond the timeline of the 2030 Agenda. The setting in 2040 is likely to differ substantially from today. Things change, and the job of scenario-building is to imagine different futures without merely projecting existing trends or historic examples. Scenario-Building also provides us with ideas about what we need to do to land in the space we see as most preferable.

A decade ago the world was struggling with the repercussions of the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 that emerged in the interconnected transatlantic financial system. At this critical moment in time, the G20 was elevated from a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors to the level of heads of states and government. By including a number of rising as well as middle powers non G7 countries the first G20 summit in Washington in November 2008 made clear that current cross-border challenges cannot anymore be dealt with by the old powers of the traditional establishment. At the subsequent summits in London (April 2009) and Pittsburgh (September 2009) the G20 displayed an astonishing level of international cooperation by agreeing on wide-ranging commitments that helped to calm down international financial markets and strengthen the crisis response of international financial institutions. These early initiatives led some optimistic observers to conclude that the system worked.

A decade ago the world was struggling with the repercussions of the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 that emerged in the interconnected transatlantic financial system. At this critical moment in time, the G20 was elevated from a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors to the level of heads of states and government. By including a number of rising as well as middle powers non G7 countries the first G20 summit in Washington in November 2008 made clear that current cross-border challenges cannot anymore be dealt with by the old powers of the traditional establishment. At the subsequent summits in London (April 2009) and Pittsburgh (September 2009) the G20 displayed an astonishing level of international cooperation by agreeing on wide-ranging commitments that helped to calm down international financial markets and strengthen the crisis response of international financial institutions. These early initiatives led some optimistic observers to conclude that the system worked.

A decade ago the world was struggling with the repercussions of the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 that emerged in the interconnected transatlantic financial system. At this critical moment in time, the G20 was elevated from a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors to the level of heads of states and government. By including a number of rising as well as middle powers non G7 countries the first G20 summit in Washington in November 2008 made clear that current cross-border challenges cannot anymore be dealt with by the old powers of the traditional establishment. At the subsequent summits in London (April 2009) and Pittsburgh (September 2009) the G20 displayed an astonishing level of international cooperation by agreeing on wide-ranging commitments that helped to calm down international financial markets and strengthen the crisis response of international financial institutions. These early initiatives led some optimistic observers to conclude that the system worked.

Motivation

Close to 15 years have passed since the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which generated unprecedented efforts to advance effective development co‐operation with a central focus on developing country ownership. Under today's international development co‐operation realities, involving inclusive agendas, strategic divergence and increasing competition, discussions on ownership, harmonization and alignment have lost traction. Yet the reality and practices of development co‐operation relationships show strong continuities.

Purpose

This special issue examines how the principle of ownership may be understood and advanced under these new conditions. National ownership is prioritized in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development yet has so far been marginalized by a predominantly piecemeal response and by the rise of ‘mutual‐benefit' co‐operation.

Approach and Methods

This special issue takes an inductive approach to studying specific cases and actors bearing on the challenge of understanding and advancing ownership today, in order to inform future policy and research. The contributions to this special issue mainly draw from qualitative research designs that present detailed research inquiries into specific country and actor cases, drawing from interviews, structured desk reviews of policy documents and the rich body of literature on development effectiveness. They are complemented by two contributions that respectively present quantitative research and probe the critical and post‐development literature for additional insights.

Findings

Findings point to an increasing prevalence of pragmatism and self‐interest among all actors, to the detriment of national ownership. Broad co‐operation agendas, a sense of urgency interpreted as a search for quick results, and more diverse, interest‐ and outcome‐driven forms of multi‐stakeholder partnerships all entail a more assertive and proactive approach on the part of external actors. Under these conditions, local initiative may either become stifled or reasoned away. Given this, today's dominant approaches to co‐operation raise concerns about their ethics and sustainability.

Policy implications

Ownership remains both a requirement and a desired outcome of international co‐operation and is key to the effective use of public funding. A key requirement to revitalizing the debate on and practice of ownership is to gather better evidence as the basis for informed scrutiny. To this end, policy makers need to reprioritize independent evaluation at both the individual and collective level.

Motivation

Close to 15 years have passed since the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which generated unprecedented efforts to advance effective development co‐operation with a central focus on developing country ownership. Under today's international development co‐operation realities, involving inclusive agendas, strategic divergence and increasing competition, discussions on ownership, harmonization and alignment have lost traction. Yet the reality and practices of development co‐operation relationships show strong continuities.

Purpose

This special issue examines how the principle of ownership may be understood and advanced under these new conditions. National ownership is prioritized in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development yet has so far been marginalized by a predominantly piecemeal response and by the rise of ‘mutual‐benefit' co‐operation.

Approach and Methods

This special issue takes an inductive approach to studying specific cases and actors bearing on the challenge of understanding and advancing ownership today, in order to inform future policy and research. The contributions to this special issue mainly draw from qualitative research designs that present detailed research inquiries into specific country and actor cases, drawing from interviews, structured desk reviews of policy documents and the rich body of literature on development effectiveness. They are complemented by two contributions that respectively present quantitative research and probe the critical and post‐development literature for additional insights.

Findings

Findings point to an increasing prevalence of pragmatism and self‐interest among all actors, to the detriment of national ownership. Broad co‐operation agendas, a sense of urgency interpreted as a search for quick results, and more diverse, interest‐ and outcome‐driven forms of multi‐stakeholder partnerships all entail a more assertive and proactive approach on the part of external actors. Under these conditions, local initiative may either become stifled or reasoned away. Given this, today's dominant approaches to co‐operation raise concerns about their ethics and sustainability.

Policy implications

Ownership remains both a requirement and a desired outcome of international co‐operation and is key to the effective use of public funding. A key requirement to revitalizing the debate on and practice of ownership is to gather better evidence as the basis for informed scrutiny. To this end, policy makers need to reprioritize independent evaluation at both the individual and collective level.

Motivation

Close to 15 years have passed since the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which generated unprecedented efforts to advance effective development co‐operation with a central focus on developing country ownership. Under today's international development co‐operation realities, involving inclusive agendas, strategic divergence and increasing competition, discussions on ownership, harmonization and alignment have lost traction. Yet the reality and practices of development co‐operation relationships show strong continuities.

Purpose

This special issue examines how the principle of ownership may be understood and advanced under these new conditions. National ownership is prioritized in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development yet has so far been marginalized by a predominantly piecemeal response and by the rise of ‘mutual‐benefit' co‐operation.

Approach and Methods

This special issue takes an inductive approach to studying specific cases and actors bearing on the challenge of understanding and advancing ownership today, in order to inform future policy and research. The contributions to this special issue mainly draw from qualitative research designs that present detailed research inquiries into specific country and actor cases, drawing from interviews, structured desk reviews of policy documents and the rich body of literature on development effectiveness. They are complemented by two contributions that respectively present quantitative research and probe the critical and post‐development literature for additional insights.

Findings

Findings point to an increasing prevalence of pragmatism and self‐interest among all actors, to the detriment of national ownership. Broad co‐operation agendas, a sense of urgency interpreted as a search for quick results, and more diverse, interest‐ and outcome‐driven forms of multi‐stakeholder partnerships all entail a more assertive and proactive approach on the part of external actors. Under these conditions, local initiative may either become stifled or reasoned away. Given this, today's dominant approaches to co‐operation raise concerns about their ethics and sustainability.

Policy implications

Ownership remains both a requirement and a desired outcome of international co‐operation and is key to the effective use of public funding. A key requirement to revitalizing the debate on and practice of ownership is to gather better evidence as the basis for informed scrutiny. To this end, policy makers need to reprioritize independent evaluation at both the individual and collective level.

How security technologies impact state-society relations

Local actors and foreign powers are scrabbling for influence in Iraq and Syria

The direct, violent confrontations between the US and Iran are over for now, but conflicts in Iraq and Syria are far from resolved. The fragmented nature of the Iraqi and Syrian states and the presence of multiple militias backed by foreign actors mean that conflicts can easily escalate. The current turmoil and potential power vacuum may also provide fertile ground for the Islamic State (IS) to return.