Although they will have to live with the decision for longer than anyone else, young people will have the least say on whether Britain stays in the EU.
Ironically, what is arguably the world’s oldest unelected group of legislators – the House of Lords – voted recently to give 16-to-17-year-olds a vote in the EU referendum. But this month the elected House of Commons threw out the Lord’s proposal.
It means that over 1.5 million 16-and-17-year-olds in the UK will not have a say in Britain’s future in Europe – even though it’s their future, in the long term, that will be most affected.
For sure, their votes could have clinched the referendum result, because surveys show that most younger people want Britain to stay in the EU.
It’s sometimes said that you cannot miss what you never had. But that’s not the case for many of the 121,000 16-and-17-year-olds in Scotland. They were permitted to vote in last year’s referendum on Scottish independence and most of them did.
Commented the Electoral Commission, “This referendum showed that for young people, indeed for all voters, when they perceive an issue to be important and are inspired by it, they will both participate in the debate and show up on polling day.”
“Importantly,” the Commission added, “97% of those 16-17 year olds who reported having voted said that they would vote again in future elections and referendums.”
They would vote, and last year they could vote; but now they can’t. It must seem strange winning a right that’s then taken away.
In the UK 16-to-17-year-olds can work, pay tax, join the army and get married, but they can’t vote in the forthcoming EU referendum.
Too young? Well, that wasn’t the reason given by the House of Commons for denying access to democracy for younger people. The Commons rejected the enlightened wisdom of their elders in the House of Lords, “Because it would involve a charge on public funds.”
What price democracy, eh?
But whilst 16-and-17-year-olds would vote but can’t, those aged 18-to-24 can vote, but mostly don’t. In elections, this age group is almost half as likely to vote as those aged 65 and over.
Around 40% of the 18-24s vote, compared to almost 80% of those of pensionable age.
And yet, once again, surveys show that these young people are by a large majority in favour of Britain’s continued membership of the European Union.
A poll last month revealed that EU membership is supported by 70% of the UK’s two-million University students, but less than half of them said they would definitely vote in the referendum.
Giving lip service to the EU isn’t enough. Without casting a vote, it doesn’t matter what these young adults think. No vote means no say.
In summary:
• Most over 60s want Britain to leave the EU; they outnumber 18-24 year-olds two-to-one, and they are most likely to vote.
• Most under 25s want Britain to remain in the EU, but there are just 7 million of them compared to around 14 million over 60s, and they are least likely to vote.
In other words, it seems that the oldies may have a bigger say in Britain’s future in Europe, simply because they can vote, and they will.
And even though most young people are pro EU, they will have less of a say in the referendum because they can’t vote, or they won’t.
In addition, two other groups of citizens who will be greatly affected by the EU referendum won’t vote because they can’t.
They include most of the citizens from the rest of the EU who have made Britain their home. And they include all of the British citizens who are living in other parts of the European Union for more than 15 years.
These two groups of citizens are living the EU dream by voting with their feet for free movement of people across our continent. But they will have no say on whether that dream continues. And if the referendum decision is ‘LEAVE’, their dream could turn into an involuntary nightmare of uncertain proportions.
Yet, despite the fact that many of the people who will be most affected by the EU referendum can’t or won’t vote, latest opinion polls show that voters who have made up their minds are split down the middle.
In online polls, those voters who want to ‘LEAVE’ the EU and those who want to ‘REMAIN’ are equal at about 40%, with (curiously) slightly more wanting Britain to ‘REMAIN’ when polls are conducted by phone.
Almost a fifth of voters, however, are still unsure how they will vote in the referendum.
These undecided voters may hold the key to the referendum result; together, of course, with those young voters who can vote – if only they can be persuaded to vote.
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This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM observed ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including the use of multiple-launch rockets systems and mortars. In Luhansk region, the SMM was prevented* to reach the border in an area outside the control of the Government. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor the repairs of a water pipeline in Donetsk region.
The SMM recorded ceasefire violations, including the use of multiple-launch rockets systems (MLRS; BM-21Grad, 122mm) and mortars in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions[1]. From a position at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), between 8:02 and 14:00hrs[2], the SMM heard six explosions, two airbursts and small-arms fire at locations 3-4km north-west of its position. In Staromykhailivka (“DPR”-controlled, 16km west of Donetsk), between 9:09 and 9:18hrs, the SMM heard six undetermined detonations as well as two outgoing salvos of MLRS (BM21 Grad, 122mm) 2-3km west of its position. Whilst in Petrovskyi district (“DPR”-controlled, 12km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 8-10km north-north-west of its position (in the direction of Staromykhailivka).
Whilst approximately 4km south of the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled town of Kalynove (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six MLRS rockets (BM-21 Grad 122mm) being fired approximately 3-5km north from its position. The SMM assessed the location of the firing to be near Kalynove. In Bashtevych (“LPR”-controlled, 39km SW of Luhansk), the SMM heard numerous explosions assessed as live-fire exercise involving the use of artillery and mortars 5-6km north of its position.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited “DPR” permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and found that all weapons, previously verified as withdrawn to the sites, were present.
In violation of the relevant withdrawal line, in the area of “LPR”-controlled Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a mortar (2B11, 120mm) towed by a truck.
In areas beyond the withdrawal lines and outside storage sites, the SMM observed 11 tanks (T64) stationary in a training area near “DPR”-controlled Ternove (57km east of Donetsk). Additionally, outside this training area, the SMM noted 34 tanks (T64 and T72) stationary in a yard adjacent to a farmhouse. The SMM observed two stationary tanks (T64) (one placed on a trailer) near government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk). In government-controlled Oktiabrske (25km north-west of Mariupol), the SMM observed a tank inside a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of measures. The SMM is yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October notification (see SMM Daily Report 14 December 2015).
The SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.
In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such holding areas and observed: 36 howitzers (18 2A65 Msta B, 152mm and 18 2A36 Giatsint, 152mm). Two such areas – where the SMM had previously observed in total 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika 122mm) – were found abandoned for the first time. Two other areas, where the SMM had observed in total 11 MLRS (BM-21 Grad 122mm), were found again abandoned, as they have been for the past three months.
Near “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a UAZ truck loaded with six empty rocket tubes that were consistent with those found on a MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) moving south-west, away from the contact line. The truck was not a standard trans-loader for this type of MLRS.
The SMM noted that two known training areas beyond the withdrawal lines - in the areas of “LPR”-controlled Myrne and Uspenka (41km south-west and 23km south-west of Luhansk, respectively) – were empty, as they had been observed on 16 December. Earlier in December, the SMM had observed: in the area of Uspenka 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika 122mm); in the area of Myrne area – four tanks (see SMM Daily Report 14 December 2015 and SMM Daily Report 9 December 2015 respectively).
The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the water pipeline between “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) and government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk). In the vicinity of the site – one of the designated priority areas for mine clearance – the SMM heard a series of distant explosions to the north. The chief engineer of the repair team told the SMM that no repair work was to be done in “DPR” areas in the coming days as more demining work had to be done there before repairs could continue. On the Maiorsk side, the SMM noted that repair works continued despite the firing incidents. In “LPR”-controlled Mykolaivka (15km east of Luhansk) the “head” of the “local administration” (woman, approximately 45 years old) told the SMM that running water supply had been restored to the village on 17 December (residents confirmed that to the SMM). According to her, the village had been without water supply for over three weeks, due to issues with the pumping station, which is in a government-controlled area.
Armed “LPR” members prevented the SMM from travelling towards the border area near “LPR”-controlled Diakove (70km south of Luhansk)*. In the border area of government-controlled Harasymivka (38km north-east of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the SMM that the area was calm and that the crossing point was closed due to the presence of mines. The SMM observed a calm situation. At the Uspenka border crossing point (“DPR”-controlled, 73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a queue of 20 civilian cars, all with Ukrainian licence plates and 20 cargo trucks, all with Ukrainian plates except for one, which had Russian Federation plates, waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. The SMM observed a calm situation.
The SMM met in Mariupol two residents (a man and a woman, approximately 50 years old) of Kominternove (23km east-northeast of Mariupol). According to them, the explosive devices at the south-western entrance to the village (see SMM Daily Report 29 October 2015) were still in place. Both opined that a controlled detonation to remove the devices could damage nearby houses. They claimed that on 16 December they had seen Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in the village, while on 17 December they had seen a group of “DPR” armed men. They stressed what they said was lack of construction material for winterization in the village and insufficient coal supplies.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas alongside the border in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.
Denial of access:
[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] All times in this report refer to Eastern European time.
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