A statisztikai hivatal adatai szerint jelenleg az orosz átlagfizetés 33.278 rubel, ami 150 ezer forintnak felel meg bruttó.
A különböző térségek között azonban jelentős különbség van, ami leginkább nem az olajmilliárdoknak köszönhető, hanem az északi, szibériai régiókban fizetett pótlékoknak. Mert hogy hideg van ugyebár.
Így a 10 legmagasabb bérű térségből 9 tartozik ebbe a körbe, egyedül Moszkva került be ide, de Szentpétervár már nem.
Az éllovasok:
Jamalo-nyenyeci körzet – 78-998 rubel
Csukotka – 78.847
Nyenyec körzet – 71.886
Moszkva – 62.855
Magadan – 61.863
A lista alján általában közép-orosz és kaukázusi körzetek vannak, a sort Dagesztán zárja, ahol mindössze 18.819 rubel az átlagbér.
A 85 orosz régióból egyébként mindössze húszban magasabbak az átlagbérek az országos átlagnál.
All aboard the two-level train to a Federal Superstate. Or not.
One of the staples of academic understanding of the EU is the notion of the two-level game. The idea – first articulated by Robert Putnam - is simply that there are situations where you can only understand an actor’s intentions and actions in one game/interaction if you also accept that these intentions and actions are shaped by their involvement in other games. Putnam was interested in the entanglement of international and national political arenas, so it’s not so surprising that EU scholars have taken to using the approach, since the tensions we find in European-level negotiations are often only understandable if we know the domestic pressures that national representatives are facing.
Central to this model are those representatives, since they connect the two level. Thus they function as conduits, as well as gatekeepers, since the relevant pressures at both levels might not be public knowledge. Most importantly, they work as arbitrators, trying to find acceptable compromises to trade off the array of interests and pressures. As an aside, we might note that this has the practical implication of strengthening national executives, as they are usually the representatives, and so can use European-level negotiations to out-manouver legislative and civil society elements.
It’s helpful to look at the UK’s renegotiation-n-referendum exercise in the light of this model, because it doesn’t yet fit very neatly.
Undoubtedly, the key driver is domestic politics: as I’ve long argued, David Cameron’s European policy is no more than a function of internal party management, framing by a broad desire to pursue the path of least resistance. The referendum commitment itself still looks like a misguided effort to put his backbenchers back into their box, at a time when a Tory victory in May 2015 looked less than likely.
This isn’t inconsistent with Putnam’s model, but where there is an issue is in the nature of the European level.
George Osborne’s speech to the German BDI this week was a case in point. While the BBC and other British media providers tagged along and provided copious amounts of coverage, the lack of German media interest was palpable: beyond some wire reports, none of the major German providers ran with the story.
This might be partly explained by the continuing failure of Osborne/the UK to provide any real detail of the renegotiation objectives – the least possibly alluring Dance of the Seven Veils – but it also reflects the general indifference in other member states – and, by extension, in much of the EU – to what Cameron is trying to do.
As we roll around to the end of the first six months of this government, the persistent impression from other member states has been that this is a British problem, that the British government has to sort out. The most telling comment around Osborne’s came from the BBC’s Laura Kuenssberg: “German govt source ‘Osborne must have his crusade… We are happy to play along’”
Evidently, the inability of the government to provide any detail on its demands only reinforces this dynamic, since it conveys the impression that the key issue is whether the Tory party leadership can ‘sell’ the renegotiation package to their backbench and to the public, rather than any particular matter of principle.
The challenge to the UK then is this: do national representatives still maintain their gatekeeping function?
At a functionally level, they still do, but the increased awareness of what’s happening in the other arena of negotiation makes it ever harder for them to play an arbitration role. All of the key British negotiation team are being closely watched at home for any sign of weakness or duplicity – even in the most tenuous of ways - with the very presence of the referendum given them cause to be concerned about displeasing too many people. Likewise, the very public nature of the British debate – again, causing in part by a government that won’t set a clear agenda – means that other member states have a good fix on what Cameron’s bottom-line will be.
In short, the space for the British government to build space between the two levels is getting smaller, rather than larger. Even the broad construction of the four key areas is under constant challenge, as both British and European voices try to close down particular interpretations or approaches.
Strikingly, the situation looks to be rather asymmetric, in that British visibility of the domestic constraints in European counterparts looks to be much weaker than vice-versa. This manifests itself in a number of ways, but again Osborne’s speech gives us an insight into the problems.
Osborne knows enough that his speech needed to be framed in more positive language than that of simple demands. To read the text is to see an approach that stresses collective benefits of both EU membership and reform for Germany and the UK. This message – that British intentions are actually good for the whole EU – make clear sense in building alliances of support, but they only get made outside of the UK: Domestically, the rhetoric is about fighting for British interests (whatever that might mean). And, unsurprisingly, that domestic rhetoric is heard outside of the UK.
In essence, the British renegotiation looks more and more like a single-level exercise for the UK. Unless and until the government can come to a public statement of its intentions from the exercise, the only people it’s really negotiating with are themselves.
The post Can the UK still play a two-level game in the EU? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
Member States can as of now profit from VAT exemption for projects run by the European Defence Agency (EDA). The recently adopted revised Council Decision defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the EDA includes the clause that cooperative defence projects and programmes are exempt from VAT as long as the Agency adds value to the initiative.
“The VAT exemption is a strong incentive to European defence cooperation: it generates an attractive business case for cooperative projects and programmes in the framework of the EDA. We will soon propose roadmaps for potential future cooperative programmes for which Member States will be able to benefit from the VAT exemption and thus achieve considerable savings”, comments Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency.
With the entering into force of the revised Council Decision on 13 October, the new provision can be applied immediately for any new EDA initiative meeting the Decision’s conditions. VAT exemption is not linked to the nature of the activity. It can thus be applied to any project and programme where the Agency adds value ranging from technical expertise, pooling demand, building a multinational capability or synergies with EU wider policies, promoting interoperability to full administrative and contractual management of a cooperative initiative. Member States are and remain the end-users of the capability.
Concrete savings
“While the VAT exemption should not be the driver for defence cooperation, tight defence budgets limit investment in research, innovation and capabilities. Any breathing space is appreciated. By incentivising defence cooperation financially, we will be able to do more and better together”, says Jorge Domecq.
One of the projects the VAT exemption will be immediately applied to is the EU SatCom Market, an EDA project where the Agency provides for satellite communication services for currently eleven Member States and the Athena mechanism. The EDA is responsible for procurement and contract tasks, manages orders as well as payments and provides technical advice as needed and thus adds clear technical and administrative value to the project. As a consequence, each order – which comes from Member States individually or by groups – benefits from VAT exemption.
One Member State has for example recently submitted an order of about 1.3 million Euros for one year of services. Due to the VAT exemption, this Member State will not have to pay VAT for a corresponding value of 273 thousand Euros which represents about three months of free services.
The Council Decision defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the EDA (Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835) was adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 12 October 2015. It foresees that VAT exemption applies to activities where the role of the Agency in administering projects or programmes in support of Member States brings an added value.
The legal basis for VAT exemption are Protocol No 7 of the EU Treaties on the privileges and immunities of the European Union and Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax.
The VAT exemption is compliant with EU law; and is not market distorting.
Background
The European Defence Agency was set-up in 2004 to support the Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the European Union’s defence capabilities for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This means running and supporting cooperative European defence projects; supporting research and technology development; boosting the European defence technological and industrial base; and working on wider EU policies.
More information:
Auf unseren Tagungen im September und Oktober haben wir Orientierungen für die Entwicklung einer umfassenden europäischen Antwort auf die Migrationskrise vorgegeben; diese Tagungen haben zu einigen positiven Ergebnissen geführt. Dass das Welternährungsprogramm dank europäischer Beiträge in der Lage war, mehr Unterstützung für Flüchtlinge in der Region zu leisten, gibt den am stärksten betroffenen Menschen Hoffnung. Die Lage ist jedoch sowohl in der Region als auch in Europa weiterhin sehr ernst. Ein Migrationsstrom von beispiellosem Ausmaß setzt sich fort. Im Oktober überquerten 218 000 Flüchtlinge und Migranten das Mittelmeer, was ein Rekordniveau darstellte.
Angesichts dieser Migrationswelle haben einige EU-Staaten an den internen Schengen-Grenzen unterschiedliche Maßnahmen ergriffen. Wie ich bereits früher angemahnt habe, besteht die einzige Möglichkeit zur Erhaltung des Schengen-Systems darin, das ordnungsgemäße Management der EU-Außengrenzen zu gewährleisten. Wir müssen alles in unserer Macht Stehende tun, um das Schengen-System unbeschadet zu erhalten, und daher sollte von jeglicher Initiative, die zur Wiedereinführung von Grenzen innerhalb des Schengen-Raums führen kann, Abstand genommen werden. Um das Schlimmste zu verhindern, müssen wir schneller handeln. Daher habe ich beschlossen, für den 12. November um 14:30 Uhr, d.h. unmittelbar nach dem Migrationsgipfel in Valletta, eine informelle Tagung der Staats- und Regierungschefs der EU einzuberufen.
Der Zweck dieses Treffens wird hauptsächlich darin bestehen, den Stand der Umsetzung unserer bisher beschlossenen Maßnahmen zu bewerten, und zwar insbesondere im Hinblick auf
1. die Intensivierung unserer Zusammenarbeit mit Drittländern, einschließlich der Türkei, um die Ströme einzudämmen;
2. die Umsetzung der Beschlüsse, die wir zur Umsiedlung gefasst haben;
3. die Einrichtung von Registrierungszentren in Griechenland und Italien sowie den Ausbau der Aufnahmekapazitäten und die erforderliche Abstellung zusätzlicher Experten für FRONTEX und EASO.
4. Schließlich sollten wir darüber sprechen, wie die Kontrolle unserer Außengrenzen wirksam verstärkt werden kann.
Angesichts der schnellen Entwicklung der Ereignisse ist es für uns alle von entscheidender Bedeutung, über neueste Informationen zu verfügen. Ich begrüße daher die Initiativen des luxemburgischen Ratsvorsitzes zur Aktivierung der integrierten EU-Regelung für die politische Reaktion auf Krisen und zur Einberufung einer außerordentlichen Tagung des Rates (Justiz und Inneres) am 9. November, auf der unsere Beratungen in Valletta sinnvoll vorbereitet werden sollten.
Auch wenn wir auf unserer planmäßigen Tagung im Dezember auf die Migrationsfrage zurückkommen werden, kann ich nicht ausschließen, dass wir bereits in Valletta weitere Orientierungen festlegen müssen. Ich werde Sie im Vorfeld unserer Tagung auf dem Laufenden halten.