European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Commission is due to publish its annual ‘Enlargement Package‘, a set of documents explaining its policy on EU enlargement, ahead of the European Council’s conclusions on the issue expected in December 2023. The European Union has found new impetus for enlargement in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine, leading to progress in the long-stalled process that was once known as the EU’s most successful policy.

A year ago, the EU granted Ukraine and Moldova official EU candidate status, and also opened this possibility for Georgia. Politicians and analysts are increasingly saying that the EU should become more involved in the Western Balkan countries – which saw their membership prospects initiated 20 years ago – or risk them drifting away politically from the Union which would exacerbate conflicts in the post-Yugoslavia region.

‘We need to set out a vision for a successful enlargement. I believe that the next enlargement must also be a catalyst for progress’, said the European Commission’s President, Ursula von der Leyen, during her annual ‘State of Union’ speech in September 2023. The EU itself will have to undergo profound reforms before it embarks on a next enlargement wave, politicians and analysts say.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on enlargement and the problems of EU accession countries. More papers on this issue can be found in a previous item in the series.

Moldova’s European future: A call to open accession talks
European Policy Centre, October 2023

Can the European political community survive?
Centre for European Reform, October 2023

Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2023

Western Balkans ‘nearshoring’ can turn the region into a strategic asset for the EU
Atlantic Council, September 2023

The tyranny of EU treaties
Bruegel, September 2023

A reluctant magnet: Navigating the EU’s absorption capacity
Carnegie Europe, September 2023

The EU’s Eastern enlargement and differentiated democracy support
Carnegie Europe, September 2023

The EU cannot give up on Serbia and Kosovo
Carnegie Europe, September 2023

Turkey’s European goals: Prospects and impediments as seen from Brussels
Carnegie Europe, September 2023

Balkans occidentaux: Le cep défend l’idée d’une réforme institutionnelle en vue d’un élargissement rapide de l’Union
Centre de politique européenne, September 2023

A difficult but essential partner: How Ukraine sees Germany
Centre for Eastern Studies, September 2023

The potential impact of Ukrainian accession on the EU’s budget
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2023

The EU and Ukraine
Clingendael, September 2023

Before it’s too late: How the EU should support the Western Balkans’ EU accession
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2023

From rhetoric to action on enlargement: A three-pronged way forward
European Policy Centre, September 2023

The perennial question: To widen or to deepen?
European Policy Centre, September 2023

Time for the Georgian dream to deliver Georgia’s dream
European Policy Centre, September 2023

A different way of thinking about EU enlargement and reform
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Internationale Politik, September 2023

How Germany can realize friend-shoring in its neighbourhood
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, September 2023

Sailing on high seas: Reforming and enlarging the EU for the 21st century
Franco-German working group on EU institutional reform, September 2023

Looking beyond the war: Planning for Ukraine’s reconstruction
Rand Corporation, September 2023

Four big geopolitical tests the European Union faces this year
Atlantic Council, August 2023

The fading star pupil: ten years of Croatia’s membership in the European Union
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2023

Embracing the Western Balkans’ accession process: A vital question mark for the EU
Fondation Européenne d’Etudes Progressistes, August 2023

Montenegro’s political transition: From Djukanović to where?
Fondation Européenne d’Etudes Progressistes, August 2023

Five things to expect from Spain’s EU presidency
Atlantic Council, July 2023

Russia’s influence in the Balkans: The interplay of religion, politics, and history
Berkeley Center, July 2023

Want Ukraine in the EU? You’ll have to reform the EU, too
Brookings Institution, July 2023

EU enlargement and the resolution of bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2023

Vision 2030: Four steps towards the new EU enlargement
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2023

The next European Union member is…
Atlantic Council, June 2023

Overcoming EU accession challenges in Eastern Europe: Avoiding purgatory
Carnegie Europe, June 2023

Eastern Europe joins the Western Balkans: A new start for the EU’s enlargement Policy?
German Marshal Fund, June 2023

Enlargement of the European Union: An unexpected revival
Institut Jacques Delors, June 2023

The legality of a temporal suspension of veto rights for new EU Member States
Open Society Foundation, CEPS, June 2023

European Political Community: Opportunities for the Western Balkans
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2023

Read this briefing on ‘EU enlargement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The European Union-United States Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which has met twice a year since 2021, aims to revitalise transatlantic cooperation, boost bilateral trade and investment, and strengthen the parties’ technological and industrial leadership while preserving shared values. The bi-annual ministerial meetings steer cooperation within the TTC and guide its work on areas such as technology standards, secure supply chains, tech regulation, global trade challenges, climate and green technologies, investment screening and export controls. Observers agree that since Russia’s war on Ukraine, the forum has become more geopolitical and strategic in nature, reflecting the growing importance of working out a common position on challenges posed by a rapidly changing world.

The TTC’s first three meetings focused on launching the forum, setting its agenda, and establishing political alignment and convergence of views. The most recent meeting, held in May 2023 in Luleå, (Sweden), is considered by many to have been the most productive so far, with an increasing number of results either materialising or having their pathways established.

The main outcomes included work on emerging technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence, quantum tech, 6G); standardisation (e.g. the standards related to charging heavy-duty electric vehicles); the green transition (e.g. through the EU-US Clean Energy Incentives Dialogue and the Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade, and through work on critical minerals); trade (e.g. on mutual recognition agreements and conformity assessment initiatives); and economic security tools (investment screening, export controls and economic coercion). The TTC also launched projects supporting the roll-out of digital connectivity in Costa Rica and the Philippines, and measures protecting human rights defenders, promoting a safe online environment for youth and children as well as addressing foreign information manipulation and interference. While a majority of observers welcome the TTC’s shift more towards results, some argue that many of the above initiatives and projects are far from completion, and that the TTC should step up its green transition ambition.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-US Trade and Technology Council: Political alignment yields results‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

On 4 October 2023, the European Commission published a notice of initiation of EU anti-subsidy investigations into EU imports of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China. This has already been announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her State of the Union Address on 13 September 2023. She stated that the ‘global market is flooded with cheaper electric vehicles’ the price of which ‘is kept artificially low’ owing to ‘huge state subsidies’. The probe comes after a surge in EU imports of electric vehicles (EVs) from China, outstripping other Chinese export markets. It may result in the Commission levying countervailing tariffs on EU imports of BEVs from China to offset state subsidies, if substantiated, and to level the playing field.

Background on EU anti-subsidy investigations

Anti-subsidy measures seek to offset international trade distortion and are one of three types of EU trade defence instruments (TDIs), which also include anti-dumping and safeguard measures. The EU TDI legislative framework is derived from and thus consistent with the three respective multilateralWorld Trade Organizationagreements. Anti-subsidy probes determine whether there is evidence that a non-EU country offers subsidies to industries exporting certain products to the EU that cause or threaten to cause injury to EU industries manufacturing similar products without benefiting from such subsidies, owing to strict EU State-aid rules. As anti-subsidy probes target state behaviour, they are politically sensitive and the EU uses them less than anti-dumping probes, which target companies instead. This is owing to the lack of transparency around state subsidy flows in non-EU countries and their lack of cooperation. By the end of 2022, 21 anti-subsidy versus 117 anti-dumping measures were in force. The United States (US), by contrast, uses anti-subsidy probes much more often. Investigations are typically triggered by EU industry complaints, but as for BEVs, ex-officio investigations need not arise from complaints if sufficient evidence is available. After investigations of up to 9 months, the Commission may impose provisional, and after 13 months definitive, countervailing tariffs for 5 years. These may be renewed for a similar period once a review proves that injury persists. EU Member States can block definitive tariffs based on a qualified majority of votes.

Why probe EU imports of BEVs from China? BEV exports from China by region, 2018-2022 in € billion

On 4 October 2023, the European Commission formally initiated anti-subsidy investigations into EU imports of BEVs from China. The aim is to establish whether Chinese BEV exporters’ competitive edge is genuine or artificial, and also whether EV imports from China have caused injury or threat of injury to the upscaling of the nascent EU EV industry. The probe alleges a recent surge in imports of EVs, at prices reportedly 20 % lower than those of similar EU products. Low-priced EVs, linked to a fierce price war on the Chinese EV market, may reflect battery oversupply and growing excess capacity in China. Allianz puts the EU car industry’s potential annual loss in net profits due to Chinese competition at above €7 billion by 2030. Figure 1 shows that China’s BEV exports have gone mainly to the EU – rather than to other markets. The US 27.5 % tariff on EVs from China (former US president Donald Trump imposed an additional 25 % on a range of imports from China in 2018 under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974), together with recent US green policies, e.g. the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act subsidies, act as a barrier to US market access, while the 10 % EU EV import duty has a ‘pull’ effect.

EU-China BEV trade, 2018-2022, in € billion

According to the Commission, the share of EVs from China sold in the EU recently jumped from less than 1 % to 8 %. This share could soar to 15 % by 2025. European car association ACEA suggests that the share of BEVs from China in total EU EV sales rose from 0.4 % in 2019 to 3.7 % in 2022. Various sources have stressed that Chinese firms’ EV export numbers remain small (e.g. BYD, Nio, and Xpeng), and that two-thirds of EU imports of EVs from China are from legacy EU and US firms manufacturing in China. Nonetheless, Western carmakers’ share of global EV markets has trended downwards (also because of a chips shortage), while BYD and Geely-Volvo have trended upwards. Moreover, EU-China BEV trade is becoming increasingly asymmetric (Figure 2). This has brought back memories of the EU market being flooded, more than a decade ago, with cheap Chinese solar panels, which continues to put pressure on an EU industry from which China had absorbed the technology. There is a sense of urgency for the EU to pre-empt a similar fate for the EU EV industry.

The anti-subsidy probe comes at a time when the EU is running a growing trade deficit with China (it reached an all-time high of almost €400 billion in 2022), which is likely linked in part to practices that call for an assertive use of the EU’s autonomous trade measures, including TDIs, to level the playing field. It also comes at a time when a new dependency on BEV imports from China would run counter to the European economic security strategy call for ‘de-risking’, and the proposed net zero industry act, designed to boost the manufacture of ‘strategic’ net-zero technologies, including solar and battery technologies. On the other hand, the EU has decided to phase out internal combustion engine vehicles by 2035 and to boost the EU’s green transition, spurring EV demand in the EU that Chinese EV firms are eager to tap into, as the Chinese economy continues to slow. Increasing the price of BEV imports from China through additional tariffs may prompt Chinese retaliation, e.g. in the form of export controls undercutting the EU’s still challenging access to critical raw materials. This may threaten the EU’s wider goal of reaching its Green Deal targets through affordable and widely available green goods.

Where does the Chinese BEV manufacturers’ competitive edge come from?

Chinese EV firms owe their competitive edge to government support and incentive policies that began two decades ago when the EU car industry was still focused on internal combustion engine vehicles, while Chinese R&D investment objectives into BEVs were integrated into the 10th 5-year plan (2001-2005) and the 11th 5-year plan (2007-2010). Speeding up BEV development became one of the ‘leapfrog development‘ priorities of the 12th 5-year plan (2011-2015) and the EV industry was identified as one of the seven strategic emerging industries. The 2015 ‘Made in China 2025‘ strategy includes BEVs as one of 10 strategic industries in which China seeks global leadership by 2049, with 80 % of BEVs to be made in China by 2025. Since 2009, China has used a variety of subsidies to scale up BEV production, boost market penetration, build a BEV charging station infrastructure and achieve global leadership. China’s early 2000s ‘going out policy’ to acquire overseas mining assets (e.g. the 2008 minerals-for-infrastructure deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo known as the Sicomines pact securing China’s access to cobalt supplies), and its 2013 flagship Belt and Road Initiative helped China reach a dominant position in cobalt and lithium refining that it can now leverage.

Stakeholders’ views

Some experts have taken the view that the probe will spark controversy between proponents of the EU’s autonomous trade measures and critics of protectionism. Others have warned that countervailing tariffs would make green goods more expensive, would fail to solve circumvention and competition issues in third markets, and are likely to trigger ‘tit-for-tat’ measures. European car association ACEA has called for a comprehensive industrial strategy to enable EU industry to compete on an equal footing. China’s Ministry of Commerce has criticised the EU probe as a ‘blatantly protectionist act’.

European Parliament position
In its 2021 resolution on a new EU-China strategy Parliament expressed its concern about the ‘increasingly unbalanced bilateral economic and trade relationship between the EU and China’ and stressed that ‘rebalancing and a more level playing field are vital to EU interests’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU anti-subsidy probe into electric vehicle imports from China‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud and Marin Mileusnic (1st edition).

In June 2023, the European Commission tabled a proposal for a regulation establishing a new strategic technologies for Europe platform (STEP). STEP would rely on the reprogramming of funds under existing EU instruments. It would also come with an additional budget of €10 billion. Overall, the platform could leverage up to €160 billion in investment, of which €110 billion would be triggered by the top-up. STEP would direct funding to strategic projects supporting the development and manufacturing of deep and digital technologies, clean technologies and biotechnologies, and the strengthening of their value chains, to meet the challenges of the green and digital transitions. This would help the EU limit or prevent strategic dependencies. STEP would be a test for, possible, further steps towards a European sovereignty fund.

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the Parliament, the file was allocated jointly to the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) (Rule 58 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure); they adopted their report on 9 October 2023. The report is due to be put to the vote in plenary during the October II plenary, fixing Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council, which has not yet adopted its mandate.

Versions

• October 2023: Strategic technologies for Europe platform (STEP) (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (‘STEP’) and amending Directive 2003/87/EC, and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) 1303/2013, (EU) 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241Committees responsible:Committee on Budgets (BUDG)
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2023)335 
20.6.2023Rapporteurs:Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany)
José Manuel Fernandes (EPP, Portugal)2023/0199(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Matthias Ecke (S&D, Germany)
Jonás Fernández (S&D, Spain)
Valérie Hayer (Renew, France)
Rasmus Andresen (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Henrike Hahn (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Izabela-Helena Kloc (ECR, Poland)
Bogdan Rzońca (ECR, Poland)
Cornelia Ernst (The Left, Germany)
Younous Omarjee (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Vote in plenary

Written by Clare Ferguson with Rebecca Fredrick.

Members gather for the second plenary session of October against a backdrop of continued and worsening geopolitical tension. The agenda features a formal address by Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of Armenia – with Members having recently called for the country to receive all necessary assistance to deal with the humanitarian crisis due to the violence in Nagorno‑Karabakh. Council and Commission representatives are also expected to make statements on the recent Hamas attack against Israel, condemned by President Roberta Metsola as ‘terrorism in its worst form’, and on the effectiveness of EU sanctions on Russia. A Commissioner will respond to Members’ questions regarding EU policy on tackling organised crime during the question time session. Following Council and Commission presentations, Members are scheduled to debate the forthcoming European Council meeting. The president of the Court of Auditors, Tony Murphy, is expected to be present for a debate on the Court’s 2022 annual report.

On Monday evening, Members are set to consider a report jointly adopted by the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Foreign Affairs (AFET) on establishing the Ukraine Facility, to support the country’s recovery from Russia’s aggression and its EU ambitions. Sourcing the proposed €50 billion of financial support, in the form of grants and loans, would however necessitate a revision of the EU’s multiannual financial framework. This means that support from EU governments and Parliament must be unanimous. Parliament’s committees wish to see greater ambition and more accountability on use of the funding. They also propose that the Facility enable the use of frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. Agreement on establishing the Ukraine Facility is urgent if the EU is to continue to support Ukraine without interruption in 2024. Parliament’s decision on the file will set its mandate for interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

Despite Montenegro’s majority support for joining the EU, and with a new prime minister designate (Milojko Spajić, from the ‘Europe Now!’ movement), seeking to form a new government, Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) report scrutinising the European Commission’s 2022 report on Montenegro’s progress towards EU accession regrets the country’s failure to build on this support to build consensus. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to debate the AFET report, which expresses particular concern about the consequent delays to the reforms necessary for the country to aspire to EU membership. Nevertheless, AFET welcomes Montenegro’s alignment with the EU on foreign and security policy, particularly on sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Recent events have heightened the demand for 21st century technologies, such as artificial intelligence, 5G, semiconductors, green technologies and biotechnologies. On Monday evening, Parliament is set to consider a report, drawn up jointly by the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), on a proposal to set up a platform on strategic technologies for Europe (STEP) to help ensure EU industry can access the tech it needs. Using reprogrammed EU funding to leverage investment, and with a €10 billion reinforcement from the EU budget, the platform would direct funding to projects strategic to achieving the green and digital transition. The STEP platform should encourage EU development and manufacturing of digital and net-zero technologies, as well as biotechnologies and life sciences and medicines. The report as voted will form Parliament’s position for interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

All of the above initiatives will require sufficient budget to achieve the EU’s goals. On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is scheduled to debate the BUDG committee report on amendments to the Council’s position on the draft EU budget for 2024. The report stresses the need for additional funding to address both the economic and social consequences arising from the COVID‑19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine, the worsening climate crisis and resulting extreme weather events. The BUDG position aligns with Parliament’s position to raise budgetary ceilings in the mid-term revision of the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), and to integrate funding for STEP (see above), aid, migration and neighbourhood policies – and reverses the Council’s proposed reductions. Once adopted, the report will constitute Parliament’s reading of the 2024 EU budget., and its position for conciliation talks with the Council, which are scheduled to run until 13 November.

Turning to the current year’s budget, on Wednesday, Members are expected to vote on a BUDG committee report on draft amending budget No 3/2023. The BUDG report endorses the Council’s position to update the revenue side of the 2023 EU budget to account for the latest economic forecasts. It also makes adjustments to accommodate expenditure related to the new Defence Industrial Reinforcement Instrument and the European Chips Act; the cancellation of appropriations from the reserve line for the sustainable fisheries partnership; and the reinforcement of the budget of the European Data Protection Supervisor.

And, as every year, the European Parliament continues to closely scrutinise how the EU budget has been implemented. On Tuesday, Members are due to vote on a report by the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) which concludes that, due to a lack of cooperation from the Council, it cannot take an informed decision on granting discharge for the European Council and the Council for their 2021 budget, and thus Parliament should reject the discharge for them. The CONT committee calls on the Council to improve its legislative transparency, as it has every year since 2009.

EU citizens are strongly opposed to fur farming, on animal welfare grounds, but also due to the environmental risks of the toxic chemicals used in fur production and the animal waste from intensive farms, not to mention the potential for the development of infectious disease. However, Europe is a major producer of fur products, with Poland, Lithuania, Greece and Finland major producers of farmed mink. On Thursday morning, Members are set to debate a 1.5 million-signature European Citizens’ Initiative, demanding that the EU ban fur farms and their products. While support for a ban on fur farms is overwhelming, the economic consequences for fur farmers will have to be mitigated.

The EU’s common fisheries policy aims to conserve fish stocks and ensure European fishing fleets work in a sustainable manner. An EU fisheries control system makes sure everyone follows the rules, but the current framework has long been due a complete overhaul. On Monday evening, Members are expected to consider an agreement reached with the Council to revise the EU fisheries control system. The new legislation introduces tracking of all fishing vessels, electronic reporting of all catches, monitoring of recreational fisheries and improved product traceability – with CCTV to monitor vessels at high risk of not complying with their obligation to land all catches and conserve fish stocks. Parliament’s negotiators have succeeded in ensuring that the revised legislation will harmonise sanctions for non-compliance throughout the EU, where there are currently wide disparities between countries.

FURTHER READING

European Citizens’ Initiative: ‘Fur free Europe’

New EU fisheries control system

Strategic technologies for Europe platform

2022 report on Montenegro

Establishing the Ukraine Facility

Parliament’s reading of the 2024 EU budget

Discharge for the 2021 budget: European Council and CouncilAmending budget 3/2023: Revenue, Defence Industrial Reinforcement Instrument and European Chips Act

Written by Ivana Katsarova (1st edition).

On 5 July 2023, the Commission tabled a proposal for a regulation on certain new genomic techniques (NGTs). It establishes two categories of plants obtained by NGTs: plants comparable to naturally occurring or conventional plants, and plants with modifications that are more complex. The two categories will be subject to different requirements to reach the market, taking into account their different characteristics and risk profiles.

Feedback from stakeholders is mixed. While industry interest groups hailed the ‘game-changing proposals’ bringing innovation in plant breeding, the organic food and farming movement criticised the Commission’s plan to take NGTs out of the existing legal framework, as it could leave organic food systems unprotected.

In Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is responsible for the file under the co-decision procedure.

Versions

• October 2023: Plants produced by new genomic techniques (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on plants obtained by certain new genomic techniques and their food and feed, and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/625Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2023)411 final
05.07.2023Rapporteur:Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden)2023/0226(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Christophe Clergeau (S&D, France)
Pietro Fiocchi (ECR, Italy)
Silvia Sardone (ID, Italy)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

In her annual State of the Union speech to the European Parliament on 13 September, the European Commission’s President, Ursula von der Leyen announced an anti-subsidy probe into Chinese electric vehicles, steps to be taken to help Europe’s wind industry as well as measures to make business easier for small companies and to address the problem of labour shortages.

Von der Leyen presented her Commission as a promoter of European business and green policies, as she set out its track-record ahead of elections to the European Parliament next year. ‘In a world of uncertainty, Europe once again must answer the call of history’, she said about a wide range of policies, notably the EU’s support for Ukraine, green energy development and defence of business against unfair competition.

The Commission’s investigation could lead to countervailing duties to protect EU producers against cheaper Chinese electric vehicle imports if they are deemed to benefit from excessive state subsidies. Von der Leyen reiterated the EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine in its struggle against Russia’s military aggression, and the possibility of the country’s EU accession one day.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the State of the Union and related issues. Topical papers on the war on Ukraine can be found in a recent edition of What Think Tanks are Thinking.

Reactions to the State of the Union speech

The tyranny of EU treaties
Bruegel, September 2023

Making the most of Europe’s anti-subsidy probe into Chinese electric vehicles
Bruegel, September 2023

State of the Union: From Putin’s war to a trade war?
Centre for European Reform, September 2023

Rescue mission: Von der Leyen’s call of history and the rules-based global order
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2023

The Commission’s balance sheet is positive, but the level of ambition is still too low
European Policy Centre, September 2023

Assessing the European Citizens’ Panels: Greater ambition needed
European Policy Centre, September 2023

Dear Commission President, a good speech on the State of the Union but what about defending it?
Friends of Europe, September 2023

How upbeat should the EU’s messaging be?
Friends of Europe, September 2023

Sailing on high seas: Reforming and enlarging the EU for the 21st century
Jacques Delors Institute, September 2023

Earlier publications:

The State of the European Union speech must address the return of economic policy trade-offs
Bruegel, September 2023

A new governance framework to safeguard the European Green Deal
Bruegel, September 2023

Making sense of the European Commission’s fiscal governance reform plan
Bruegel, September 2023

Can the EU be a global player?
Carnegie Europe, September 2023

Entre inflation et croissance: Pour une BCE au service de la puissance et de l’autonomie stratégique européenne
Fondation Robert Schuman, September 2023

Europe, passer à l’Union pour répondre aux citoyens
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2023

Bipolar, multipolar, nonpolar all at once: Our world at the time of the Russia–Ukraine war
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2023

The crisis governance of the European Union
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2023

Four big geopolitical tests the European Union faces this year
Atlantic Council, August 2023

A roadmap for European asylum and refugee integration policy
Brookings Institution, August 2023

The war in Ukraine is about Europe’s future
Carnegie Europe, August 2023

The BRICS summit and Europe’s China challenge: A better EU offer for the global south
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

Onwards and outwards: Why the EU needs to move from strategic autonomy to strategic interdependence
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

The tech standards that shape the future: How Europeans should respond to China’s rising influence
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

EU-Ukraine wartime trade: Overcoming difficulties, forging a European path
European Policy Centre, August 2023

Regional actor, global: Can the EU get the best of both worlds?
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2023

Development aid and geopolitics: the EU’s Global Gateway initiative
Real Instituto Elcano, August 2023

Strategic security and critical raw materials: The role of the European Investment Bank
Istituto Affari internazionali, August 2023

Want Ukraine in the EU? You’ll have to reform the EU, too
Brookings Institution, July 2023

Ukraine has not transformed EU foreign policy
Carnegie Europe, July 2023

EU enlargement and the resolution of bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2023

The legality of a temporal suspension of veto rights for new EU Member States
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2023

Building UK-EU bridges: Convergent China policies
Centre for European Reform, July 2023

EU migration policy: Another Groundhog Day?
Egmont, July 2023

Unlocking Global Gateway towards the Green Transition
Egmont, July 2023

If the EU was a State in the United States: Comparing Economic Growth between EU and US States
European Centre for International Political Economy, July 2023

Spirit of ambition: The Ukraine war and European defence integration
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2023

Strengthening the European financial architecture for development through better coordination
European Centre for Development Policy Management, July 2023

Pour les générations qui bougent en Europe, encore tellement d’obstacles. Une odyssée européenne
Fondation Robert Schuman, July 2023

Green Deal watch, No. 10
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2023

EU tackles changes in global economic competition
Polish Institute of International Affairs, July 2023

Rethinking European energy relations in times of crisis
Clingendael, June 2023

Economic security: A new EU paradigm?
European Policy Centre, June 2023

What would Europeans want a European defence union to look like?
Bruegel, June 2023

European strategic autonomy 2.0: What Europe needs to get right
Carnegie Europe, June 2023

What the Russian crisis means for Europe
Carnegie Europe, June 2023

The European Political Community from Paris to Chisinau: An idea taking shape?
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, June 2023

How stringent would the new Stability and Growth Pact be? And for who?
Jacques Delors Institute, June 2023

The international role of the euro remains stable, but it needs more attention
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2023

An assessment of the state of the EU Schengen Area and its external borders
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2023

The European Political Community: From Prague to Chisinau and beyond
European Policy Centre, May 2023

EU convergence: Geographical dimension, impact of COVID-19 and the role of policy
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

Europe’s policies for a green transition: The European Commission’s geopolitical turn and its pitfalls
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, April 2023

Commission and Parliament propose changes to electoral law in the EU
Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 2023

Read this briefing on ‘State of the Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic and Mihalis Kritikos.

Algorithm-generated diets tailored to our individual needs could bring health benefits, but at the cost of having to share our most personal data, such as our DNA. The promises are many, but so are the open questions about interactions between genes, nutrients, environment and health, and the role of socioeconomic factors underlying food choices. Precision nutrition advice, services and products will need to be governed by a range of laws and policies, as they are at the intersection between food and medicine.

What we eat and drink can be adapted to help us live with conditions such as coeliac disease, phenylketonuria and lactose intolerance, and healthy diets are an important factor in preventing non-communicable diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, type-2 diabetes and cancer. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that there is no one-size-fits-all solution when it comes to dietary recommendations. Nutrigenomics studies the relationships between nutrients, diet, gene expression and, subsequently, health. Coupled with developments in advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence and big data, this points to a future where our diets could be specifically tailored to our individual profiles for better health outcomes. Could such precisely personalised diets become a part of precision medicine, helping us to live longer and healthier lives?

Potential impacts and developments

Rapid advances in this area have been made possible thanks to data science. The use of smart phones allows easier tracking of food and medicine intake, and biosensors of all kinds can monitor movement, sleep, blood parameters, the presence of infection and the effects of treatment. Biochemical and genetic assays can screen the human genome, the metabolome (small molecules involved in metabolism), and the microbiome (microbes living on and inside the human body). ‘Deep phenotyping‘ can unveil previously unknowable details of disease in individuals. The cost of such analysis is decreasing. At the same time, data processing capacities are growing thanks to advanced algorithms that extract meaningful patterns from big data. For example, one algorithm has been trained to predict the glycaemic response after a meal, on the basis of blood parameters, dietary habits, anthropometrics, physical activity and gut microbiota. In a modified diet based on this algorithm, test subjects improved their blood glucose levels and microbiota configuration. Research also shows that individuals, even identical twins, may respond differently to the same foods. This is where precision nutrition comes in, as it seeks to understand and manipulate the complex relationships between an individual’s metabolism, microbiome, genome, phenotype (the observable physical properties of an organism), lifestyle, and outside influences on the one hand, and their nutrition on the other.

The potential is fascinating but, for now, the science is not reliable enough to support precision nutrition services. More research and stronger evidence are required before scientists will be able to point out with confidence, and algorithms effectively predict, gene-diet-health relationships and outcomes. Before precision nutrition can become a reality, desired health outcomes and ways to identify and measure them will need to be defined. This will be highly important for people suffering from several or particularly complex health problems. For them, the same nutrients or foods may help with one issue, but worsen others, which means that the algorithms would have to ‘know’ what to prioritise when giving dietary advice. Moreover, as we grow older and our bodies and health change, we will have to regularly re-evaluate our needs and our bodies’ responses.

Another question is what conditions, health problems or genetic predispositions can really be influenced by diet. We eat a wide variety of foods, and our biology has a complex relationship with the factors shaping our environment. This alone represents a great challenge for nutrigenomic research. Furthermore, groups with a low socioeconomic status often make less healthy food choices. Precision nutrition advice alone is unlikely to help this situation. It remains to be seen whether such interventions could play a role in countering the obesity epidemic and decreasing public healthcare costs.

A range of soft impacts – such as more pressure to adapt to trendy, healthy behaviours, with related problems of self-image – is also probable. Preparing and eating food plays a strong social and psychological role. As we hand over more authority and autonomy to algorithms, any deviation from the prescribed diet may leave us with a feeling of guilt, draining some of the joy we get from food. Finally, focusing excessively on molecular-level health outcomes by following nutrition advice may affect our perception of health.

Another challenge relates to consumer protection: claims linking genetic information and dietary advice with effects on health need to be evidence-based and at the same time easy for ordinary people to understand. Ultimately, consumer acceptance of this technology will depend on whether the precision nutrition approach delivers clear benefits, with acceptable trade-offs (e.g. sharing of personal data) and price.

Nevertheless, early applications could target groups that have similar dietary requirements or roughly the same health status (for instance, pregnant women or the elderly), or provide information on how our bodies react to specific foods. More futuristic scenarios may involve continuous data gathering facilitated by omnipresent sensors in our living space, and in and/or on our bodies, to calculate optimal daily nutrition requirements and send the information directly to our household food printer.

Anticipatory policymaking

Neither the EU nor its Member States have legal instruments dealing specifically with precision nutrition services. To fill the gap, various existing pieces of legislation could be applied and some new ones may have to be adopted. One of the key challenges is that personalised nutrition is at the intersection between food and medicine, because some personalised nutrition products could help a person prevent the development of a disease to which they are genetically predisposed.

From a legal and regulatory perspective, there are several important aspects that need to be considered. Precision nutrition services are data intensive, as they rely on personal health data and genetic data for the advice they provide. This triggers questions about data protection, privacy and intellectual ownership. Whether it is developing and selling services and products or collecting data through medical devices and genetic testing, all these activities need to meet a set of rules and standards. Marketing activities – such as advice and claims about health effects made as part of precision nutrition services – would have to be regulated as well, to ensure that the information supplied to consumers is evidence-based and not misleading. Similar rules are already built into the Regulation on nutrition and health claims for foods. Protecting those receiving precision nutrition advice may mean adapting the consumer rights framework.

The research behind precision nutrition needs financial support to gather consistent high-quality evidence about why and how people respond differently to the same food, and what kind of approaches are effective and for whom. The cost of the benefits people can obtain from such hyper-personalised dietary advice will largely define its accessibility to those outside a small group of wealthy users. Nevertheless, even with affordable effective precision nutrition services, a broad set of policy measures is needed to make healthy eating and lifestyle choices easy and safe for everyone.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if algorithms decided what we should eat by looking at our DNA?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Citizens are calling on the European Parliament to strengthen its transparency rules. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject in September 2023. The European Parliament has swiftly taken a number of measures to strengthen its integrity, independence and accountability throughout 2023. 

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in English, French, German, Spanish, Finnish, Croatian, Hungarian, Dutch and Portuguese):

English

The European Parliament has swiftly taken a number of measures to strengthen its integrity, independence and accountability throughout 2023, while protecting Members of the European Parliament’s free mandate. These measures include: 

• An awareness-raising campaign on ethics and transparency obligations for Members and staff. Compliance and whistleblowing training will also be introduced.
• A six-month cooling-off period for former Members of Parliament following the end of their mandate for those who wish to lobby Parliament. Current Members are also banned from engaging with former Members who have left Parliament in the previous six months.
• Mandatory registration in the Transparency Register for any event on European Parliament premises in which interest representatives participate (12 000 events per year will be subject to the new rules).
• Members must declare a conflict of interest immediately. All Members taking a lead role on a file must submit a declaration of any conflict of interests.
• All Members and staff who have an active role on a file must declare meetings with diplomatic representatives of non-EU countries and with other interest representatives.
• Tighter rules on ‘unofficial groupings’ such as friendship groupings with non-EU countries where official Parliamentary interlocutors already exist and such groupings could cause confusion.
• Stricter rules for access to Parliament’s premises including registration of all visitors entering the Parliament.
• Access badges for former Members will be allocated on a daily rather than permanent basis.
• More transparency on Members’ employment elsewhere and their outside activities, with a revised declaration form on financial interests providing greater detail. Any remuneration over €5 000 per year must be declared in a detailed manner.
• A more powerful role for theAdvisory Committee on the Conduct of Members
• Stronger cooperation with national authorities to boost the fight against corruption.
• More severe penalties in cases of a serious breach of the rules. Members could lose up to 60 days of daily allowance (twice the current 30 days), and be banned from representing the European Parliament in delegations or conferences for up to a year. 
• Tighter rules on gifts valued above €150 and on declaring travel/daily allowances paid by third parties.
• Members must declare their assets at the beginning and end of every term of office (irrespective of requirements under national law).

How the measures were decided

The European Parliament adopted these new measures in several ways, by:

• European Parliament Bureau (senior Members of the European Parliament) decisions strengthening integrity, independence and accountability (See a detailed overview and press release on some of the new measures adopted in July 2023).
• European Parliament resolution to modify Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, with a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability (See procedural details in the Legislative Observatory; video of the parliamentary debate; text of the parliamentary debate; press release on the changes to the Rules of Procedure, from September 2023).
• Special Parliamentary Committee (ING2) investigation into disinformation, and the strengthening of integrity, transparency and accountability in the European Parliament (See resolution and press release of July 2023).

Proposed EU ethics body

The European Parliament has long called for the establishment of an independent EU ethics body with investigative powers. In a resolution adopted in July 2023, Parliament regrets that the initial European Commission proposal on an EU ethics body lacked ambition, and called for the body to have stronger investigative powers (for more information, see the press release and the Legislative Observatory). [BD1] 

French

Le Parlement européen a rapidement pris un certain nombre de mesures visant à renforcer son intégrité, son indépendance et sa responsabilité tout au long de l’année 2023, tout en protégeant le libre mandat des députés au Parlement européen. Ces mesures sont notamment les suivantes: 

• Une campagne de sensibilisation aux obligations en matière d’éthique et de transparence pour les députés et le personnel. Des formations axées sur la conformité et la dénonciation des dysfonctionnements seront également mises en place.
• Une période de carence de six mois pour les anciens députés après la fin de leur mandat pour ceux qui souhaitent exercer des activités de lobbying auprès du Parlement. Il est également interdit aux députés actuels de dialoguer avec les anciens députés qui ont quitté le Parlement au cours des six derniers mois.
• L’inscription obligatoire au registre de transparence pour tout événement dans les locaux du Parlement européen auquel participent des représentants d’intérêts (12 000 manifestations par an seront soumises aux nouvelles règles).
• L’obligation pour les députés de déclarer immédiatement un conflit d’intérêts. Tous les députés jouant un rôle de premier plan dans un dossier sont tenus de présenter une déclaration de conflit d’intérêts, le cas échéant.
• L’obligation pour tous les députés et membres du personnel jouant un rôle actif dans un dossier de déclarer les réunions organisées avec les représentants diplomatiques de pays tiers et avec d’autres représentants d’intérêts.
• Des règles plus strictes concernant les «groupements non officiels», tels que les groupements d’amitié avec des pays tiers où des interlocuteurs parlementaires officiels existent déjà et de tels groupements pourraient prêter à confusion.
• Des règles plus strictes pour l’accès aux locaux du Parlement, y compris l’enregistrement de tous les visiteurs entrant dans le Parlement.
• Des badges d’accès pour les anciens députés attribués sur une base quotidienne et non permanente.
• Davantage de transparence sur l’emploi et les activités extérieurs des députés, avec un formulaire de déclaration révisé qui demande plus de détails sur les intérêts financiers. Toute rémunération supérieure à 5 000 EUR par an doit être déclarée de manière détaillée.
• Un rôle renforcé pour le comité consultatif sur la conduite des députés.
• Une meilleure coopération avec les autorités nationales afin de renforcer la lutte contre la corruption.
• Des sanctions plus sévères en cas d’infraction grave aux règles. Les députés pourraient perdre jusqu’à 60 jours d’indemnité journalière (le double des 30 jours actuels) et se voir interdire de représenter le Parlement européen dans les délégations ou les conférences pendant une durée maximale d’un an. 
• Des règles plus strictes en ce qui concerne les cadeaux d’une valeur supérieure à 150 EUR et la déclaration des indemnités journalières/de voyage versées par des tiers.
• L’obligation pour les députés de déclarer leur patrimoine au début et à la fin de chaque mandat (indépendamment des exigences du droit national).

Comment ces mesures ont-elles été décidées?

Le Parlement européen a adopté ces nouvelles mesures de plusieurs manières:

• Par des décisions du Bureau du Parlement européen (membres de haut rang du Parlement européen) qui visent à renforcer l’intégrité, l’indépendance et la responsabilité (voir un aperçu détaillé et le communiqué de presse sur certaines des nouvelles mesures adoptées en juillet 2023).
• Par la résolution du Parlement européen qui modifie le règlement intérieur du Parlement en vue de renforcer l’intégrité, l’indépendance et l’obligation de rendre des comptes (voir les détails de procédure dans l’Observatoire législatif; la vidéo du débat parlementaire; le texte du débat parlementaire; le communiqué de presse sur les modifications du règlement intérieur de septembre 2023)
• Par l’enquête de la commission parlementaire spéciale (ING2) sur la désinformation et le renforcement de l’intégrité, de la transparence et de la responsabilité au Parlement européen (voir la résolution et le communiqué de presse de juillet 2023).

Proposition relative à un organisme européen chargé des questions d’éthique

Le Parlement européen demande depuis longtemps la création d’un organisme européen indépendant chargé des questions d’éthique doté de pouvoirs d’enquête. Dans une résolution adoptée en juillet 2023, le Parlement déplore le manque d’ambition de la proposition initiale de la Commission européenne relative à un organisme européen chargé des questions d’éthique et a demandé que cet organisme dispose de pouvoirs d’enquête renforcés (pour de plus amples informations, voir le communiqué de presse et l’Observatoire législatif).

German

Das Europäische Parlament hat rasch mehrere Maßnahmen ergriffen, um seine Integrität, Unabhängigkeit und Rechenschaftspflicht während des gesamten Jahres 2023 zu stärken und gleichzeitig das freie Mandat der Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments zu schützen. Hier einige dieser Maßnahmen:

• Eine Sensibilisierungskampagne zu Ethik- und Transparenzpflichten für Mitglieder und Bedienstete. Außerdem sollen es Schulungen zur Einhaltung der Vorschriften und zur Meldung von Missständen geben.
• Eine sechsmonatige Karenzzeit nach Ablauf ihres Mandats für ehemalige Mitglieder des Parlaments, die Lobbyarbeit im Parlament betreiben möchten. Aktuellen Mitgliedern ist es auch untersagt, mit ehemaligen Mitgliedern zusammenzuarbeiten, die in den letzten sechs Monaten aus dem Parlament ausgeschieden sind.
• Obligatorische Registrierung aller Veranstaltungen in den Räumlichkeiten des Europäischen Parlaments, an denen Interessenvertreter teilnehmen, im Transparenzregister (die neue Regelung betrifft 12 000 Veranstaltungen pro Jahr).
• Die Mitglieder müssen Interessenkonflikte umgehend melden. Alle Mitglieder, die eine führende Rolle bei einem Dossier übernehmen, müssen eine Erklärung über etwaige Interessenkonflikte abgeben.
• Alle Mitglieder und Bediensteten, die eine aktive Rolle bei einem Dossier spielen, müssen Treffen mit diplomatischen Vertretern von Staaten außerhalb der EU und anderen Interessenvertretern melden.
• Strengere Vorschriften für sogenannte inoffizielle Gruppierungen wie Freundschaftsgruppen mit Staaten außerhalb der EU, in denen es bereits offizielle parlamentarische Gesprächspartner gibt und derlei Gruppierungen Verwirrung stiften könnten.
• Strengere Vorschriften für den Zugang zu den Räumlichkeiten des Parlaments und Registrierung aller Besucherinnen und Besucher, die das Parlament betreten.
• Zugangsausweise für ehemalige Mitglieder werden für einzelne Tage und nicht dauerhaft ausgestellt.
• Mehr Transparenz mit Blick auf die Arbeitstätigkeit von Mitgliedern an anderen Orten und ihre Nebentätigkeiten durch überarbeitetes, detaillierteres Formular für die Erklärung über die finanziellen Interessen. Vergütungen von mehr als 5 000 EUR pro Jahr sind ausführlich anzugeben.
• Die Rolle des Beratenden Ausschusses zum Verhalten von Mitgliedern wird gestärkt.
• Engere Zusammenarbeit mit den Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten im Interesse der Korruptionsbekämpfung.
• Strengere Sanktionen bei schwerwiegenden Verstößen gegen die Vorschriften. Die Mitglieder könnten bis zu 60 Tagegeldsätze einbüßen (doppelt so viel wie die bisher geltenden 30 Tagegeldsätze) und dürfen das Europäische Parlament in Delegationen oder bei Konferenzen bis zu einem Jahr lang nicht mehr vertreten.
• Strengere Vorschriften für Geschenke, die mehr als 150 EUR wert sind, und für die Meldung von Reise- und Tagegeldern, die von Dritten gezahlt werden.
• Die Mitglieder müssen ihr Vermögen zu Beginn und am Ende jeder Amtszeit angeben (unabhängig von den Anforderungen des nationalen Rechts ihres Mitgliedstaats).

Wie wurden die Maßnahmen beschlossen?

Das Europäische Parlament nahm diese neuen Maßnahmen auf verschiedene Weise an, nämlich durch

• Beschlüsse des Präsidiums des Europäischen Parlaments (leitende Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments) zur Stärkung von Integrität, Unabhängigkeit und Rechenschaftspflicht (hier ein ausführlicher Überblick und eine Pressemitteilung zu einigen der im Juli 2023 angenommenen neuen Maßnahmen).
• Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments zur Änderung der Geschäftsordnung des Europäischen Parlaments zur Stärkung von Integrität, Unabhängigkeit und Rechenschaftspflicht (Einzelheiten zum Verfahren finden Sie bei der Legislativen Beobachtungsstelle;Video der Parlamentsdebatte; Text der Parlamentsdebatte; Pressemitteilung zu den Änderungen der Geschäftsordnung ab September 2023),
• Untersuchung des Sonderausschusses (ING2) zu Desinformation und zur Stärkung der Integrität, Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht im Europäischen Parlament (siehe Entschließung und Pressemitteilung vom Juli 2023).

Vorgeschlagenes EU-Ethikgremium

Das Europäische Parlament fordert seit langem die Einrichtung eines unabhängigen EU-Ethikgremiums mit Untersuchungsbefugnissen. In einer im Juli 2023 angenommenen Entschließung bedauerte das Parlament, dass der ursprüngliche Vorschlag der Kommission für ein Ethikgremium der EU nicht weit genug ging, und forderte mehr Untersuchungsbefugnisse für diese Gremium (mehr dazu in dieser Pressemitteilung und bei der Legislativen Beobachtungsstelle).

Spanish

El Parlamento Europeo ha adoptado rápidamente una serie de medidas para reforzar su integridad, independencia y rendición de cuentas a lo largo de 2023, protegiendo al mismo tiempo el libre mandato de los diputados y diputadas al Parlamento Europeo. Entre las medidas se incluyen las siguientes. 

• Una campaña de sensibilización sobre las obligaciones éticas y de transparencia para los diputados y el personal. También se introducirá formación en materia de denuncia de irregularidades y de cumplimiento.
• Un período de reflexión de seis meses para los antiguos diputados al Parlamento Europeo tras el final de su mandato para aquellos que deseen ejercer presión en el Parlamento. También se prohíbe a los diputados actuales colaborar con antiguos diputados que hayan abandonado el Parlamento durante los seis meses anteriores.
• Inscripción obligatoria en el Registro de transparencia de cualquier acto en las instalaciones del Parlamento Europeo en el que participen representantes de intereses (12 000 actos al año estarán sujetos a las nuevas normas).
• Los diputados deben declarar un conflicto de intereses inmediatamente. Todos los diputados que desempeñen un papel principal en un expediente deben declarar todo conflicto de intereses.
• Todos los diputados y miembros del personal que desempeñen un papel activo en un expediente deben declarar sus reuniones con representantes diplomáticos de países que no pertenezcan a la UE y con otros representantes de intereses.
• Normas más estrictas sobre las «agrupaciones no oficiales», como las agrupaciones amistosas con países no pertenecientes a la UE donde ya existen interlocutores parlamentarios oficiales y que, por lo tanto, podrían causar confusión.
• Normas más estrictas para el acceso a las instalaciones del Parlamento, incluido el registro de todos los visitantes que entren en el Parlamento.
• Las tarjetas de acceso para los antiguos diputados se asignarán diariamente y no de forma permanente.
• Mayor transparencia sobre el empleo de los diputados en otros lugares y sobre sus actividades externas, con un formulario de declaración sobre los intereses económicos revisado que ofrezca más detalles. Toda remuneración superior a 5 000 EUR anuales deberá declararse de forma detallada.
• Un papel más importante para el Comité Consultivo sobre la Conducta de los Diputados.
• Una cooperación más estrecha con las autoridades nacionales para reforzar la lucha contra la corrupción.
• Sanciones más severas en caso de infracción grave de las normas. Los diputados podrían perder hasta sesenta días de dietas (el doble de los treinta días actuales) y se les prohibiría representar al Parlamento Europeo en delegaciones o conferencias durante un máximo de un año. 
• Normas más estrictas sobre los obsequios con un valor superior a 150 EUR y sobre la declaración de dietas (incluidas las de viaje) financiadas por terceros.
• Los diputados deben declarar sus activos al principio y al final de cada mandato (con independencia de los requisitos establecidos por la legislación nacional).

Cómo se decidieron las medidas

El Parlamento Europeo aprobó estas nuevas medidas de varias maneras.

• Decisiones de la Mesa del Parlamento Europeo (altos cargos del Parlamento Europeo) sobre el refuerzo de la integridad, la independencia y la rendición de cuentas (véanse un resumen detallado y un comunicado de prensa sobre algunas de las medidas aprobadas en julio de 2023).
• Resolución del Parlamento Europeo para modificar el Reglamento interno del Parlamento con vistas a reforzar la integridad, la independencia y la rendición de cuentas (véanse los detalles del procedimiento en el Observatorio Legislativo; vídeo del debate parlamentario; texto del debate parlamentario; y comunicado de prensa sobre las modificaciones del Reglamento interno, de septiembre de 2023).
• Investigación de la Comisión Especial (ING2) sobre la desinformación y el refuerzo de la integridad, la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas en el Parlamento Europeo (véanse la resolución y el comunicado de prensa de julio de 2023).

Propuesta de un órgano de la UE encargado de las cuestiones de ética

El Parlamento Europeo pide desde hace tiempo la creación de un órgano independiente de la Unión con competencias de investigación encargado de las cuestiones de ética. En una resolución aprobada en julio de 2023, el Parlamento lamentaba la falta de ambición de la propuesta inicial de la Comisión Europea sobre un órgano de la Unión encargado de las cuestiones de ética y pedía que el órgano tuviera mayores competencias de investigación (para más información, véanse el comunicado de prensa y el Observatorio Legislativo).

Finnish

Euroopan parlamentti toteutti vuoden 2023 aikana nopeasti useita toimenpiteitä vahvistaakseen lahjomattomuuttaan, riippumattomuuttaan ja vastuuvelvollisuuttaan suojellen samalla Euroopan parlamentin jäsenten edustajantoimen riippumattomuutta. Näitä toimenpiteitä ovat muun muassa:

• Tiedotuskampanja eettisistä ja avoimuusvelvoitteista jäsenille ja henkilöstölle. Lisäksi otetaan käyttöön sääntöjen noudattamista ja väärinkäytösten paljastamista koskeva koulutus.
• Kuuden kuukauden karenssiaika entisille parlamentin jäsenille heidän toimikautensa päättymisen jälkeen, jos he haluavat harjoittaa lobbaustoimintaa parlamentissa. Nykyiset jäsenet eivät myöskään saa olla yhteydessä entisiin jäseniin, jotka ovat lähteneet parlamentista kuuden edellisten kuukauden aikana.
• Pakollinen rekisteröiminen avoimuusrekisteriin, kun on kyse Euroopan parlamentin tiloissa järjestettävistä tilaisuuksista, joihin edunvalvojat osallistuvat (uudet säännöt koskevat 12 000:ta tapahtumaa vuodessa).
• Jäsenten on ilmoitettava eturistiriidasta välittömästi. Kaikkien jäsenten, jotka ovat vastuussa asiakokonaisuuden valmistelusta, täytyy tehdä ilmoitus mahdollisista eturistiriidoista.
• Kaikkien jäsenten ja henkilöstön, joilla on aktiivinen rooli asiakokonaisuuksien valmistetussa, on ilmoitettava tapaamisista EU:n ulkopuolisten maiden diplomaattisten edustajien ja muiden edunvalvojien kanssa.
• ”Epävirallisia ryhmittymiä” koskevien sääntöjen tiukentaminen. Esimerkkeinä ystävyysryhmät sellaisten EU:n ulkopuolisten maiden kanssa, joissa on jo virallisia parlamentaarisia keskustelukumppaneita, sillä tällaiset ryhmittymät voivat aiheuttaa sekaannusta.
• Tiukemmat säännöt pääsystä parlamentin tiloihin. Esimerkiksi kaikki parlamenttiin saapuvat vierailijat rekisteröidään.
• Kulkuluvat entisille jäsenille myönnetään päiväkohtaisesti eikä pysyvästi.
• Lisää avoimuutta jäsenten työskentelystä muualla ja viranhoitoon kuulumattomista toimista. Taloudellisten sidonnaisuuksien ilmoittamiseen tarkoitettua lomaketta on tarkistettu, ja se nyt yksityiskohtaisempi. Kaikki 5000 euroa vuodessa ylittävät korvaukset on ilmoitettava yksityiskohtaisesti.
• Vahvempi asema jäsenten toimintaa käsittelevälle neuvoa-antavalle komitealle.
• Tiiviimpi yhteistyö kansallisten viranomaisten kanssa korruption torjunnan tehostamiseksi.
• Ankarammat seuraamukset, jos sääntöjä rikotaan vakavasti. Jäsenet voivat menettää jopa 60 päivän päivärahan (kaksinkertainen määrä nykyiseen 30 päivään verrattuna), ja heitä voidaan kieltää edustamasta Euroopan parlamenttia valtuuskunnissa tai konferensseissa enintään vuoden ajan.
• Tiukemmat säännöt, jotka koskevat yli 150 euron arvoisia lahjoja sekä kolmansien osapuolten maksamien matka- ja päivärahojen ilmoittamista.
• Jäsenten on annettava ilmoitus varallisuudestaan kunkin toimikauden alussa ja lopussa (kansallisen lainsäädännön vaatimuksista riippumatta).

Kuinka toimenpiteistä päätettiin

Euroopan parlamentti hyväksyi uudet toimenpiteet monin tavoin:

• Euroopan parlamentin puhemiehistön (Euroopan parlamentin johtavat jäsenet) päätökset lahjomattomuuden, riippumattomuuden ja vastuuvelvollisuuden vahvistamisesta (ks. yksityiskohtainen katsaus ja lehdistötiedote joistakin heinäkuussa 2023 hyväksytyistä uusista toimenpiteistä).
• Euroopan parlamentin päätöslauselma parlamentin työjärjestyksen muuttamisesta lahjomattomuuden, riippumattomuuden ja vastuuvelvollisuuden vahvistamiseksi (ks. menettelyn yksityiskohdat Lainsäädäntövahdista; video parlamentin keskustelusta; parlamentin keskustelun teksti; lehdistötiedote työjärjestyksen muutoksista, syyskuu 2023).
• Parlamentin erityisvaliokunta (ING2) tutkii disinformaatiota sekä lahjomattomuuden, avoimuuden ja vastuuvelvollisuuden vahvistamista Euroopan parlamentissa (ks. päätöslauselma ja lehdistötiedote heinäkuulta 2023).

Ehdotettu EU:n eettinen elin

Euroopan parlamentti on jo pitkään kehottanut perustamaan riippumattoman EU:n eettisen elimen, jolla on tutkintavaltuudet. Parlamentti antoi heinäkuussa 2023 päätöslauselman, jossa se piti valitettavana, ettei alkuperäinen Euroopan komission ehdotus EU:n eettisestä elimestä ollut kunnianhimoinen, ja kehotti vahvistamaan elimen tutkintavaltuuksia (lue lisää lehdistötiedotteesta ja Lainsäädäntövahdista).

Croatian

Europski parlament je brzo poduzeo niz mjera da ojača svoj integritet, neovisnost i odgovornost u 2023. štiteći istodobno slobodni mandat zastupnika u Europskom parlamentu. Neke od mjera su: 

• kampanja podizanja svijesti o obvezama u pogledu etike i transparentnosti za zastupnike i osoblje. Uvest će se također osposobljavanja na temu usklađenosti i zviždača
• šestomjesečno razdoblje mirovanja za bivše zastupnike u Europskom parlamentu nakon isteka njihova mandata za one koji žele lobirati u Parlamentu. Uz to, sadašnjim zastupnicima je zabranjeno surađivati s bivšim zastupnicima koji su napustili Parlament tijekom prethodnih šest mjeseci
• obvezni upis u Registar transparentnosti za bilo koje događanje u prostorima Europskog parlamenta u kojem sudjeluju predstavnici interesnih skupina (nova pravila primjenjivat će se na 12 000 događanja godišnje)
• zastupnici moraju odmah prijaviti sukob interesa svi zastupnici koji imaju glavnu ulogu u nekom predmetu moraju podnijeti izjavu o postojanju bilo kakvog sukoba interesa
• svi zastupnici i osoblje koji imaju aktivnu ulogu u nekom predmetu moraju obavijestiti o sastancima s diplomatskim predstavnicima trećih zemalja i drugim predstavnicima interesnih skupina
• stroža pravila o „neslužbenim skupinama” kao što su prijateljske skupine s trećim zemljama gdje su službeni parlamentarni sugovornici već prisutni i gdje bi takve skupine mogle izazvati zabunu
• stroža pravila za ulazak u prostore Parlamenta uključujući prijavu svih posjetitelja koji ulaze u Parlament
• iskaznice za pristup za bivše zastupnike neće biti trajne, nego će se dodjeljivati na dnevnoj bazi
• više transparentnosti o drugim poslovima zastupnika i njihovim vanjskim aktivnostima s pomoću revidiranog obrasca izjave o financijskim interesima s jasnijim pojedinostima. Svaka naknada veća od 5 000 EUR godišnje mora biti prijavljena na detaljan način
• jača uloga Savjetodavnog odbora o ponašanju zastupnika
• bolja suradnja s nacionalnim vlastima kako bi se potaknula borba protiv korupcije
• strože kazne u ozbiljnim slučajevima kršenja pravila. Zastupnici bi mogli izgubiti dnevnicu za razdoblje do 60 dana (dvostruko više od trenutačnih 30 dana) i dobiti zabranu da predstavljaju Europski parlament u delegacijama ili na konferencijama za razdoblje do jedne godine 
• stroža pravila o darovima čija je vrijednost veća od 150 EUR i o prijavljivanju putnih naknada/dnevnica koje su isplatile treće strane
• zastupnici moraju prijaviti svoju imovinu na početku i kraju svakog mandata (neovisno o uvjetima nacionalnog zakonodavstva).

Kako su mjere uvedene

Europski parlament je uveo nove mjere putem:

• odluke Predsjedništva Europskog parlamenta (stariji zastupnici Europskog parlamenta) za jačanje integriteta, neovisnosti i odgovornosti (pogledajte detaljni opis i priopćenje za medije o nekima od novih mjera uvedenih u srpnju 2023.)
• rezolucije Europskog parlamenta o izmjenama Poslovnika Europskog parlamenta radi jačanja integriteta, neovisnosti i odgovornosti (pogledajte pojedinosti o postupku na internetskim stranicama Zakonodavnog opservatorija, u videozapisu parlamentarne rasprave, tekstu parlamentarne rasprave i priopćenju za medije o izmjenama Poslovnika Europskog parlamenta iz rujna 2023.)
• istrage Posebnog odbora (ING2) o dezinformiranju i jačanju integriteta, transparentnosti i odgovornosti u Europskom parlamentu (pogledajte rezoluciju i priopćenje za medije iz srpnja 2023.)

Prijedlog o osnivanju tijela EU-a za etička pitanja

Europski parlament već duže vrijeme poziva na osnivanje neovisnog tijela EU-a za etička pitanja s istražnim ovlastima. U rezoluciji donesenoj u srpnju 2023. Parlament je izrazio žaljenje što prvi prijedlog Europske komisije o osnivanju tijela EU-a za etička pitanja nije bio dovoljno ambiciozan te je pozvao na osnivanje tijela s jačim istražnim ovlastima (za više informacija pogledajte priopćenje za medije i Zakonodavni opservatorij).

Hugarian

Az Európai Parlament 2023 folyamán számos gyors intézkedést hozott feddhetetlenségének, függetlenségének és elszámoltathatóságának megerősítése érdekében, miközben arról is gondoskodott, hogy az európai parlamenti képviselők továbbra is szabadon gyakorolják megbízatásukat. Ilyen intézkedés például: 

• Tájékoztató kampányok a képviselők és a személyzet etikai és átláthatósági kötelezettségeiről. Új képzések a képviselők részére a megfelelés és a visszaélések bejelentése kapcsán.
• Hat hónapos várakozási időszak a hivatalukból távozó képviselőknek a mandátumuk lejártát követően arra az esetre, ha lobbizni kívánnak a Parlamentben. Az aktív képviselők szintén nem léphetnek kapcsolatba olyan volt képviselőkkel, akik az előző hat hónapban távoztak a Parlamenttől.
• Az Európai Parlament épületeiben tartott minden olyan rendezvény kötelező regisztrálása az átláthatósági nyilvántartásban, amelyen érdekképviselők vesznek részt (az új szabály évi 12 000 rendezvényt érint).
• Az esetleges összeférhetetlenségek haladéktalan bejelentése. A témavezető szerepet betöltő képviselőknek nyilatkozatot kell tenniük a fennálló összes összeférhetetlenségről.
• Egy adott témában aktív képviselőknek és alkalmazottaknak be kell jelenteniük a nem uniós országok diplomáciai képviselőivel és az egyéb érdekképviselőkkel tartott találkozókat.
• Szigorúbb szabályok a „nem hivatalos csoportosulásokra”, például azokra a nem uniós országokkal kialakított baráti csoportosulásokra, amelyekkel párhuzamosan már létezik hivatalos parlamenti tárgyalópartner az adott országban, és amelyek így megtévesztőek lehetnek.
• Szigorúbb szabályok a Parlament épületeibe való belépésre, többek között a Parlamentbe belépő valamennyi látogató kötelező nyilvántartásba vétele.
• Napi belépőkártyák a volt képviselőknek állandó belépők helyett.
• Fokozott átláthatóság a képviselők Parlamenten kívüli foglalkoztatása és külső tevékenységei tekintetében, többek között a pénzügyi érdekeltségeikről szóló részletesebb, átdolgozott nyilatkozat révén. A képviselőknek minden évi 5000 eurót meghaladó díjazásról részletes nyilatkozatot kell tenniük.
• Több hatáskör a képviselők magatartásával foglalkozó tanácsadó bizottság számára.
• Szorosabb együttműködés a Parlament és a nemzeti hatóságok között a korrupció elleni küzdelem fokozásához.
• Súlyosabb szankciók a szabályok súlyos megsértése esetén. A képviselők a jelenlegi 30 nap helyett 60 napi napidíjtól eshetnek el, és akár egy évig nem képviselhetik az Európai Parlamentet küldöttségi látogatásokon vagy konferenciákon.
• Szigorúbb szabályok a 150 eurót meghaladó értékű ajándékokra és a harmadik felek által fizetett utazások/napidíjak bejelentésére.
• Kötelező nyilatkozat a vagyoni eszközökről a képviselők megbízatásának kezdetén és végén (a nemzeti jog követelményeitől függetlenül).

Kik és hogyan hozták meg ezeket az intézkedéseket?

Az Európai Parlamenten belül több fronton is történtek lépések:

• Az Európai Parlament Elnökségének tagjai (az Európai Parlament vezető tisztségviselői) határozatokat fogadtak el a feddhetetlenség, a függetlenség és az elszámoltathatóság megerősítéséről (a 2023 júliusában elfogadott új intézkedések egy részéről itt talál részletes áttekintést és sajtóközleményt).
• Az Európai Parlament állásfoglalást fogadott el a Parlament eljárási szabályzatának módosításáról, hogy erősítse feddhetetlenségét, függetlenségét és elszámoltathatóságát (az eljárás részleteit lásd: Jogalkotási Figyelő; a parlamenti vita felvételről; a parlamenti vitáról készült jegyzőkönyv; az eljárási szabályzat módosításáról szóló sajtóközlemény, 2023. szeptember).
• Parlamenti különbizottság (ING2) folytatott belső vizsgálatot a dezinformációról, valamint a feddhetetlenség, az átláthatóság és az elszámoltathatóság Európai Parlamenten belüli megerősítéséről (lásd a 2023 júliusában elfogadott állásfoglalást és a kapcsolódó sajtóközleményt).

Javaslat egy uniós etikai testület felállítására

Az Európai Parlament régóta szorgalmazza egy vizsgálati hatáskörrel rendelkező független uniós etikai testület létrehozását. A Parlament egy 2023 júliusában elfogadott állásfoglalásában sajnálatosnak tartotta, hogy az uniós etikai testület létrehozására irányuló eredeti bizottsági javaslat nem kellőképpen ambiciózus. A képviselők nagyobb vizsgálati hatáskört kértek a leendő testületnek (további információkért lásd a kapcsolódó sajtóközleményt és a Jogalkotási Figyelőt).

Dutch

Het Europees Parlement heeft snel een aantal maatregelen genomen om zijn integriteit, onafhankelijkheid en verantwoordingsplicht in 2023 te versterken en tegelijkertijd het vrije mandaat van de Parlementsleden te beschermen. Het gaat onder meer om de volgende maatregelen: 

• Een bewustmakingscampagne over ethische en transparantieverplichtingen voor Parlementsleden en personeel. Ook komen er trainingen over de naleving van de regels en klokkenluiden.
• Een afkoelingsperiode van zes maanden na afloop van hun ambtstermijn voor voormalige Parlementsleden die bij het Parlement willen lobbyen. Daarnaast mogen de huidige leden geen contact hebben met voormalige leden die het Parlement in de afgelopen zes maanden hebben verlaten.
• Verplichte inschrijving in het Transparantieregister voor elk evenement in de Parlementsgebouwen waaraan belangenvertegenwoordigers deelnemen. Deze nieuwe regels zullen van toepassing zijn op 12 000 evenementen per jaar.
• De leden moeten een belangenconflict onmiddellijk melden. Alle leden die een leidende rol spelen in een dossier moeten een verklaring inzake belangenconflicten indienen.
• Alle Parlementsleden en personeelsleden die een actieve rol spelen in een dossier moeten vergaderingen melden met diplomatieke vertegenwoordigers van niet-EU-landen en met andere belangenvertegenwoordigers.
• Strengere regels voor “niet-officiële groeperingen”, zoals vriendschapsgroeperingen met landen van buiten de EU waar er al officiële parlementaire gesprekspartners zijn en zulke groeperingen verwarring kunnen veroorzaken.
• Strengere regels voor de toegang tot de gebouwen van het Parlement. Alle bezoekers die het Parlement binnenkomen, moeten zich registreren.
• Toegangspassen voor voormalige leden zullen niet meer op een permanente, maar op een dagelijkse basis worden toegewezen.
• Meer transparantie over functies van de leden buiten het Parlement en hun nevenactiviteiten, samen met een gedetailleerder herzien opgaveformulier over financiële belangen. Elke bezoldiging van meer dan 5000 euro per jaar moet in detail worden opgegeven.
• Een sterkere rol voor het raadgevend comité voor het gedrag van de leden.
• Nauwere samenwerking met de nationale autoriteiten om de strijd tegen corruptie op te voeren.
• Strengere straffen bij ernstige schendingen van de regels. De leden kunnen tot zestig dagen dagvergoeding verliezen − tweemaal zoveel als de huidige dertig dagen − en mogen het Europees Parlement tot maximaal een jaar niet vertegenwoordigen in delegaties of conferenties. 
• Striktere regels voor geschenken die meer dan 150 euro waard zijn en voor het vermelden van reis- en dagvergoedingen die door derden worden betaald.
• De leden moeten aan het begin en het einde van elke ambtstermijn een verklaring van hun vermogen geven, ongeacht de vereisten van het nationale recht.

Hoe zijn deze maatregelen tot stand gekomen?

Het Europees Parlement heeft deze nieuwe maatregelen op verschillende manieren vastgesteld, namelijk door

• besluiten van het Bureau van het Europees Parlement, dat bestaat uit hooggeplaatste Parlementsleden, om de integriteit, onafhankelijkheid en verantwoordingsplicht van het Parlement te versterken. Meer informatie vindt u in dit gedetailleerde overzicht en het persbericht over enkele van de nieuwe maatregelen die in juli 2023 zijn vastgesteld.
• de resolutie van het Europees Parlement om het Reglement van het Parlement te wijzigen voor meer integriteit, onafhankelijkheid en een grotere verantwoordingsplicht. Details van het reglement zijn terug te vinden in het Wetgevingsobservatorium, de video van het parlementair debat, het verslag van het parlementair debat, het persbericht over de wijzigingen van het Reglement van het Parlement van september 2023.
• het onderzoek van de Bijzondere Commissie buitenlandse inmenging over desinformatie en de versterking van de integriteit, transparantie en verantwoordingsplicht in het Europees Parlement. Meer informatie vindt u in de resolutie en het persbericht van juli 2023.

Voorgesteld ethisch orgaan van de EU

Het Europees Parlement heeft lang gepleit voor de oprichting van een onafhankelijk ethisch orgaan van de EU met onderzoeksbevoegdheden. Het Europees Parlement betreurde in een aangenomen resolutie van juli 2023 het gebrek aan ambitie van het voorstel van de Europese Commissie voor een ethisch orgaan van de EU. In de resolutie pleitte het Parlement voor een orgaan met meer onderzoeksbevoegdheden. Voor meer informatie kunt u het persbericht en het Wetgevingsobservatorium raadplegen.

Portuguese

O Parlamento Europeu tomou rapidamente uma série de medidas para reforçar a sua integridade, independência e responsabilização ao longo de 2023, protegendo simultaneamente o mandato livre dos deputados ao Parlamento Europeu. Estas medidas incluem: 

• uma campanha de sensibilização para as obrigações éticas e de transparência dos deputados e do pessoal. Realizar-se-ão também ações de formação em matéria de conformidade e denúncia de irregularidades;
• um período de incompatibilidade de seis meses para os antigos deputados após o termo do seu mandato, para aqueles que pretendam exercer a atividade de lóbi junto do Parlamento. Os atuais deputados estão igualmente proibidos de dialogar com antigos deputados que tenham saído do Parlamento nos seis meses anteriores;
• inscrição obrigatória no Registo de Transparência para todos os eventos nas instalações do Parlamento Europeu em que participem representantes de interesses (12 000 eventos por ano serão sujeitos às novas regras);
• os deputados devem declarar imediatamente um conflito de interesses. Todos os deputados que assumam um papel principal num dossiê devem apresentar uma declaração de conflito de interesses;
• todos os deputados e pessoal que desempenhem um papel ativo num dossiê devem declarar reuniões com representantes diplomáticos de países terceiros e com outros representantes de interesses;
• regras mais rigorosas para os «agrupamentos não oficiais», como os agrupamentos de amizade com países terceiros, onde já existem interlocutores parlamentares oficiais, podendo esses agrupamentos causar confusão;
• regras mais rigorosas para o acesso às instalações do Parlamento, incluindo o registo de todos os visitantes que entram no Parlamento;
• os cartões de acesso aos antigos deputados serão atribuídos diariamente e não de forma permanente;
• maior transparência no que respeita ao emprego dos deputados noutros locais e às suas atividades externas, com um formulário de declaração revisto e mais detalhado sobre os interesses financeiros. Qualquer remuneração superior a 5 000 euros por ano deve ser declarada de forma pormenorizada;
• um fortalecimento do papel doComité Consultivo sobre a Conduta dos Deputados;
• reforço da cooperação com as autoridades nacionais para reforçar a luta contra a corrupção;
• sanções mais severas em caso de violação grave das regras. Os deputados podem perder até 60 dias de ajudas de custo (o dobro dos atuais 30 dias) e ser proibidos de representar o Parlamento Europeu em delegações ou conferências durante um período máximo de um ano; 
• regras mais rigorosas em matéria de presentes de valor superior a 150 euros e de declaração de despesas de deslocação/ajudas de custo diárias pagas por terceiros;
• os deputados devem declarar os seus bens no início e no fim de cada mandato (independentemente dos requisitos previstos na legislação nacional).

Como foram decididas as medidas

O Parlamento Europeu adotou estas novas medidas de várias formas, através:

• das decisões da Mesa do Parlamento Europeu (destacados deputados ao Parlamento) que reforçam a integridade, a independência e a responsabilização (ver uma panorâmica pormenorizada e um comunicado de imprensa sobre algumas das novas medidas adotadas em julho de 2023);
• da resolução do Parlamento Europeu sobre a alteração ao Regimento do Parlamento, com vista a reforçar a integridade, a independência e a responsabilização (ver pormenores processuais no Observatório Legislativo, no vídeo do debate parlamentar, no texto do debate parlamentar e no comunicado de imprensa sobre as alterações ao Regimento, de setembro de 2023);
• da investigação da comissão parlamentar especial (ING2) sobre a desinformação e o reforço da integridade, da transparência e da responsabilização no Parlamento Europeu (ver resolução e comunicado de imprensa de julho de 2023).

Proposta de um organismo de ética da UE

Há muito que o Parlamento Europeu apelou à criação de um organismo de ética independente da UE, com poderes de investigação. Numa resolução aprovada em julho de 2023, o Parlamento lamenta que a proposta inicial da Comissão Europeia relativa a um organismo de ética da UE não tenha sido ambiciosa e apelou a que o organismo disponha de poderes de investigação mais fortes (para mais informações, consultar o comunicado de imprensa e o Observatório Legislativo).

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Citizens have expressed concern regarding the proposal to revise EU rules on driving licences. Many citizens have written to the European Parliament on this subject since September 2023, contesting the introduction of medical examinations for elderly drivers, new restrictions on novice drivers and changes in the maximum weight for vehicles that can be driven with a category B driving licence.

We replied to the citizens who took the time to write to the European Parliament (in German):

English The European Commission proposal

Given the still unacceptably high number of road deaths in the European Union, in 2017, EU transport ministers called on the European Commission to take action.

The Commission presented a legislative proposal for changes to the law on driving licenses, aimed at reducing the number of accidents and, in particular, the number of road deaths. The proposal was based on a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the changes, written in English and based on numerous academic studies on the issue.

Among other things, the impact assessment states that age is a key factor in determining a person’s mental and physical fitness to drive and their risk of being involved in a car accident. Driving licences for people over the age of 70 should therefore be renewed every five years, with the person being required to pass an examination verifying their competence as a driver before having their license renewed. In most EU countries, the validity of driving licenses is limited, and the proposed revision of the law would make this validity the same throughout the EU.

As new drivers also cause a higher than average number of accidents, training standards should be higher and a probationary period of at least two years should be introduced, during which a zero-tolerance approach would apply to driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. That said, EU countries can allow people to learn to drive at age 17.

The proposal would set vehicle weight restrictions for holders of category B driving licences at 3 500 kg. However, after a two-year trial period the weight limit would increase to 4 250 kg – but only for electric vehicles.

All the documents published on this proposed revision of EU law are available on the European Commission’s ‘Revision of the Driving Licence Directive‘ website.

Consideration of the proposal at the European Parliament

The Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) is working on this topic at the European Parliament.

The draft report drawn up by rapporteur Karima Delli (Greens/EFA, France), which you have probably read about in the news, is the first step towards determining Parliament’s position. It represents the rapporteur’s position and does not reflect the position of the European Parliament on the legislative proposal. MEPs have tabled amendments to the draft report, which are expected to be debated at the end of October 2023. It is anticipated that Parliament will adopt its position on the proposal in December 2023 at the earliest.

Next steps

Once both the Parliament and the Council (ministers of EU countries) have adopted their positions, the two institutions will negotiate an agreement on a final text.

You can follow this procedure using Parliament’s Legislative Observatory and its Legislative Train Schedule.

German Der Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission

Da die Zahl der Toten im Straßenverkehr in der Europäischen Union nach wie vor unannehmbar hoch war, forderten die EU-Verkehrsminister die Europäische Kommission 2017 auf, tätig zu werden.

Dementsprechend legte die Kommission einen Gesetzesvorschlag vor, um die Zahl der Unfälle und insbesondere der Verkehrstoten zu reduzieren. Die Kommission hat sich dabei auf eine umfangreiche Folgenabschätzung (in englischer Sprache) gestützt, die auf zahlreichen Studien basiert.

Dort heißt es unter anderem, dass das Alter ein wichtiger Faktor sei, wenn es um die geistige und körperliche Eignung zum Führen eines Fahrzeugs und die Gefahr gehe, in einen Autounfall verwickelt zu werden. Führerscheine für Personen im Alter von über 70 Jahren sollen deshalb nach jeweils fünf Jahren erneuert werden, wozu eine Fahrtüchtigkeitsuntersuchung erfolgreich absolviert werden muss. Die Gültigkeit von Führerscheinen ist in den meisten EU-Ländern bereits begrenzt, hier soll eine Vereinheitlichung der Fristen erfolgen.

Da auch Fahranfänger überdurchschnittlich viele Unfälle verursachen, soll die Ausbildung verbessert und eine Probezeit von mindestens zwei Jahren eingeführt werden, während der Nulltoleranz für das Fahren unter Alkohol- oder Drogeneinfluss gelten soll. Andererseits können die EU-Länder ermöglichen, bereits mit 17 Jahren fahren zu lernen.

Was das Gewicht der Fahrzeuge anbelangt, werden keine Einschränkungen des derzeit für Führerscheine der Klasse B zulässigen Gewichts (3 500 kg) vorgeschlagen. Im Gegenteil: Nach einer zweijährigen Probezeit würde die Gewichtsgrenze bei Elektrofahrzeugen auf 4 250 kg steigen.

Auf der Webseite der Kommission „Überarbeitung der Führerscheinrichtlinie“ finden Sie Links zu sämtlichen Dokumenten, die bisher zu diesem Gesetzgebungsverfahren veröffentlicht wurden.

Behandlung des Vorschlags im Europäischen Parlament

Im Europäischen Parlament befasst sich der Ausschuss für Verkehr und Tourismus (TRAN) mit dem Vorhaben.

Der Berichtsentwurf der Berichterstatterin Karima Delli, über den Sie wahrscheinlich in der Presse gelesen haben, ist der erste Schritt auf dem Weg zum Standpunkt des Parlaments. Er stellt die Position der Berichterstatterin dar und gibt nicht den Standpunkt des Europäischen Parlaments zum Gesetzvorschlag wieder. Die Abgeordneten haben Änderungsanträge zu dem Berichtsentwurf eingereicht, über die voraussichtlich Ende Oktober debattiert wird. Das Parlament wird seinen Standpunkt zu dem Vorschlag voraussichtlich frühestens im Dezember 2023 festlegen.

Das weitere Verfahren

Wenn das Parlament und der Rat (die Minister der EU-Länder) beide ihren Standpunkt beschlossen haben, müssen sich die beiden Organe in Verhandlungen auf einen gemeinsamen Text einigen.

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Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament or to the institution as such expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides an insight into the economic performance of Kazakhstan compared with the European Union (EU) and looks at the trade dynamics between them. Kazakhstan’s unemployment rate recorded a slight but steady decrease, stabilizing at 4-5% in the decade 2010-2020. Inflation rates, on the other hand, show less stability throughout the time series, and in 2022 reached their second-highest value since 2007. Foreign direct investment (FDI) fluctuated, with a notable spike in 2016, when Kazakhstan attracted record levels of FDI in12.5 % of gross domestic product (GDP). This was followed by a steep decrease in the inflows that in subsequent years have never exceeded 5% of the gross domestic product. Despite a significant yearly fluctuation, the EU’s trade with Kazakhstan shows a general upward trend, with a sharp increase after the 2020 global economic slowdown.

Read this infographic on ‘Kazakhstan: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU imports of goods from Kazakhstan (2022) EU exports of goods to Kazakhstan (2022) Kazakhstan’s share in EU total trade (exports plus imports) Top EU partners (2022) Trade in goods Main trade partners (2022) Trade in goods, exports plus imports EU trade with Kazakhstan Kazakhstan’s business environment and socio-economic indicators FDI and remittances Public finances, monetary and financial data Female labour force participation rate (% of female population aged 15+) GDP growth (Annual change, %) Total unemployment rate (% of total labour force) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with José René Ernault.

EU leaders met on 5 and 6 October 2023 in Granada for an informal meeting of the European Council, preceded by a meeting of the European Political Community (EPC). On 5 October, leaders at the EPC issued messages of unity in support of Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s war against it. On other topics, such as facilitating peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EPC made little headway.

At their informal meeting on 6 October, EU leaders adopted the Granada Declaration, taking stock of progress made in achieving the objectives set at Versailles in March 2022. This follow-up exercise was crucial, as EU leaders are starting a discussion process on two critical and intertwined topics: i) the future political priorities to underpin the 2024-2029 strategic agenda, and ii) the process of EU enlargement and its consequences for EU institutions and policies. Furthermore, EU leaders discussed migration, reference to which was excluded from the Granada Declaration on account of opposition from Poland and Hungary. The European Council President thus issued a declaration on migration in his own name for the second time in a row, with the support of the other 25 Member States.

1.  The European Political Community meeting

On 5 October, the Spanish Presidency hosted the third meeting of the EPC – the constitutive meeting of which was held in Prague in October 2022, followed by a highly symbolic meeting in Moldova in June 2023. Originating in a proposal made by French President Emmanuel Macron, the EPC was designed as a forum to promote political dialogue and cooperation between EU and non-EU countries, while contributing to peace and security on the European continent. It brings together the heads of state or government of 47 countries, excluding Belarus and Russia, and the leaders of the EU institutions. The EPC has so far remained a largely informal platform, with no budget or secretariat to ensure continuity between meetings. The organisation of the summits has relied on the host countries, with little involvement on the part of the EU institutions.

EPC meeting format

The summit began with a plenary session opened by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. The session was dominated by messages of unity in support of Ukraine – tragically intensified by news of a Russian missile attack on civilian areas in the north of the country. Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, stressed the need to defeat Russia on the battlefield to avoid a new frozen conflict, and reiterated the need to offer security guarantees to countries vulnerable to Russia.

In his address, Sánchez stressed the shared aspiration of EPC members to tackle common challenges, such as energy sovereignty, artificial intelligence, digitalisation and how to maintain the international rules-based order. These challenges were then discussed in three thematic clusters: i) digitalisation; ii) energy, environment and the green transition; and iii) multilateralism and geostrategy. Unlike in Moldova, the theme of enlargement did not feature in the plenary session.

Outcome of the EPC meeting

The EPC meeting took place amid growing criticism of its loose format and unclear purpose. The final press conference, which was to outline results and hand over the preparation of the next EPC meeting to the United Kingdom (UK), was cancelled. Concrete outcomes indeed appear limited. Although stronger cooperation between EPC countries in the field of cybersecurity was one point agreed upon, as stressed by Macron, the meeting failed to make any significant progress in resolving conflicts between participating countries. Hopes for mediation between Kosovo and Serbia were dashed, with Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani refusing to meet Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić unless sanctions were taken against Serbia after the recent spike in violence in northern Kosovo.

Likewise, the prospect of facilitating peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and addressing the humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, was undermined by the non-attendance of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The issue was however raised in a meeting between European Council President Charles Michel, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Macron and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. They expressed unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Armenia, condemned Azerbaijan’s military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh and called for the resumption of dialogue. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU’s humanitarian aid to Armenia would be doubled from €5 million to €10 million. European Parliament President Roberta Metsola met with Pashinyan and invited him to address the European Parliament’s next plenary session.

Migration

Although the Spanish Presidency had not put the issue of migration on the agenda – an issue that had featured on the Moldova meeting agenda – the topic was mentioned in Michel’s speech as a challenge the EPC should address together, alongside its conflict resolution mission. Migration was discussed on the sidelines, notably at a meeting convened by UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, including Italy, the Netherlands, France, Albania and the European Commission. The participants committed to help one another tackle the challenges of irregular migration, fight smuggling, and develop comprehensive partnerships. The possibility of UK cooperation with the EU border agency Frontex was also discussed.

2. The informal meeting of the European Council

The informal European Council meeting began with an exchange with Metsola, who underlined that as a result of a series of crises, the EU’s budget was now stretched to its limit. In the context of the on-going revision of the EU’s multiannual financial framework, she stressed that to be able to address migration, support Ukraine, help Member States struck by natural disasters, and generate sustainable growth, the EU needed a budget that was ‘fit for purpose’. This was the first EU leaders’ meeting attended by Evika Silina as Prime Minister of Latvia.

The future of the European Union: The 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda

As proposed by Michel, EU leaders started a reflection process on the EU’s future priorities, the results of which would feed into the 2024-2029 strategic agenda to be adopted in June 2024. The discussion was based on general questions: ‘what do we want to do together? How can we assure we will be able to act together? How should our common ambitions be financed?

The topics that were identified for the discussion in Granada and the reflection process were: i) security, defence and cyber-resilience; ii) long-term competitiveness and the EU single market; iii) crisis-preparedness; iv) the green and digital transitions; v) multilateralism and global partnerships; vi) migration; and vii) enlargement and absorption capacity. The European Council President’s idea is to have specific topics dealt with in smaller groups, with discussions then scheduled for the various regular European Council meetings. First drafts are expected to be put forward in spring 2024. However, not all Member States were enthusiastic about the small groups’ approach, as some fear being excluded from parts of the debate.

Some EU institutions and Member States have begun offering input for the future strategic priorities and potential Treaty reform in the context of EU enlargement. The Spanish Presidency put forward its own paper, Resilient EU2030. The Commission contributed to the future priority policy objectives by outlining ways to increase EU resilience, competitiveness and sustainability. A much-discussed Franco-German reflection paper on the future of the EU, suggesting an EU made up of four distinct tiers: i) the inner circle, ii) the EU, iii) associated members, and iv) the EPC, each with different competences and obligations, also contributed to the debate. The proposals resulting from the Conference on the Future of Europe, at which Member States, EU institutions and citizens together indicated political priorities for the future, provided another contribution.

Granada Declaration

The objective of the Granada Declaration was to take stock of the progress made since the Versailles Declaration, adopted in March 2022 under the French Presidency of the Council, and which focused on the areas of defence, energy, and supply chain resilience. In the words of Michel, ‘Granada is the time to look back and critically assess progress in strengthening our European sovereignty, identifying our achievements as well as areas that still require our political action’.

The Granada Declaration calls on the EU to take action in the following areas:

• the EU’s defence readiness and capabilities;
• the EU’s resilience and global long-term competitiveness;
• reduction in vulnerabilities and improved crisis-preparedness;
• a more cohesive, innovation-driven, and interconnected single market;
• affordable energy, EU energy sovereignty and lower external dependencies;
• engagement with partners and protection of the rules-based international order;
• preparation for enlargement, both in future Member States and in the EU itself.

Until the last moment, it was unclear whether the Granada Declaration would obtain the support of all 27 Member State leaders needed for its adoption. In the end, Hungary and Poland only agreed on the declaration if all references to migration were deleted. While this position must be seen in the context of the upcoming Polish elections on 15 October 2023 and the national referendum on migration the same day, the difficulties in agreeing on the Granada Declaration indicate a crisis of unity in the European Council. For the second time in a row EU leaders could not agree on a common text owing to disagreements on migration (see EPRS Post-European Council Briefing, June 2023).

Since the European Council is responsible for ‘defin[ing] the EU general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union), the difficulties encountered when drafting the Granada Declaration do not bode well for the discussion process on the next strategic agenda. The European Council is also responsible for defining ‘the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice’ (Article 68 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), something EU leaders have not been able to agree on since 2019, mainly on account of differences over EU migration policy.

Migration

This informal leaders’ meeting also discussed European migration policy, notably its external dimension. Reporting on the discussions, both Michel and von der Leyen welcomed the Council’s recent agreement on a negotiating mandate for the regulation on crisis situations, a big step towards completing the European migration and asylum reform package. The agreement in the Council reached by qualified majority was however criticised by Poland and Hungary, which expressed their disagreement by again opposing the adoption of text on migration by EU leaders. Prior to the meeting, the Polish government stated that it would ‘present a tough veto against illegal immigration at the European Council’, while Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated that there would be ‘no compromise on migration. Not today, and not in the upcoming years’.

In the end, Michel issued a separate declaration on migration in his capacity as European Council President. The declaration summarises the EU’s comprehensive approach to migration, which combines: i) external action, notably mutually beneficial comprehensive partnerships with countries of origin and transit; ii) measures to address the root causes of migration; iii) opportunities for legal migration; iv) more effective protection of EU external borders; v) a resolute fight against organised crime, human trafficking and smuggling, and instrumentalisation of migration as a hybrid threat; vi) a higher rate of returns; and vii) internal aspects, in compliance with international law, EU principles and values, and the protection of fundamental rights. Michel stressed that migration would be on the agenda of the next formal European Council meeting on 26-27 October 2023.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Metsola reported on a detailed exchange with EU leaders on migration and stressed that for the first time in decades there was a realistic possibility of agreeing on a common European asylum and migration system. She criticised the lack of political will in the past to adopt ambitious legislation. Rather than making decisions supported by a majority of Member States, consensus had been sought, leading to a de facto veto in a policy area where the veto cannot be used. She stressed the public is very concerned about migration, having recently stated that ‘migration is the challenge of our generation’.

Enlargement

Michel indicated that discussions on enlargement had focused on ‘the consequences this expansion may entail’. Member States’ views are quite diverse on the matter, both on the question of internal reforms and regarding a possible date. While some, such as Lithuania, would prefer a quick enlargement ahead of any potential institutional reforms, many others, including Germany, acknowledge the need to carry out internal reforms first, this potentially even leading to Treaty reform, in order for an enlarged EU to be able to function.

Michel’s proposal of setting 2030 as the possible date for enlargement has been met by reservations on the part of many Member States, including the Netherlands, but also from the European Commission. The Irish Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, stressed the need to be ‘honest with people. From becoming a candidate to actually joining the EU takes many years’. Others, such as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas believe that 2030 is ‘too far away’ for enlargement. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, even shed doubt on the added value for the EU of Ukrainian membership.

One idea suggested by various actors – Member States and think-thanks – is that of ‘gradual integration’, by which candidate countries would be offered visible and tangible benefits early on to motivate their reform process and reduce the waiting time for full membership. Consequently, they could potentially already participate in some policies and/or EU institutions (without voting rights) before formally acceding to the EU. Ursula von der Leyen has indicated that the Commission will publish its progress reports in early November. A decision on opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova could potentially be taken at the 14-15 December 2024 European Council meeting.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Metsola described enlargement as the Union’s strongest geopolitical tool. The EU now needed to discuss its absorption capacity and internal reform, because ‘what works for 27 will not work for 32, 33 or 35’ EU Member States.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders, 5-6 October 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

The purpose of World Mental Health Day is to improve knowledge, raise awareness and mobilise efforts in support of mental health around the world. This year’s theme, ‘Mental health is a universal human right’, underlines that a mental health condition should never be a reason to deprive a person of their human rights.

Background

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines ‘mental health’ as a state of mental well-being in which people cope well with the many stresses of life, can realise their potential, can function productively and fruitfully, and are able to contribute to their communities. Multiple individual, social and structural factors may combine to protect or undermine mental health. Individual psychological and biological factors such as emotional skills, substance use and genetics can make people more vulnerable. Exposure to unfavourable social, economic, geopolitical and environmental circumstances (such as the pandemic, rising living costs, conflicts and war) also increases people’s risk of experiencing poor mental health.

World Mental Health Day was first celebrated on 10 October in 1992 on the initiative of the World Federation for Mental Health. The theme of World Mental Health Day 2023 – ‘Mental health is a universal human right‘ – is geared towards improving knowledge, raising awareness and driving actions that promote and protect everyone’s mental health as a universal human right. This includes the right to be protected from mental health risks, the right to available, accessible, acceptable, and good-quality care, and the right to liberty, independence and inclusion in the community.

Facts and figures

According to the WHO, in 2019 one in every eight people, or 970 million people around the world, were living with a mental disorder, with anxiety and depression the most common. In the EU, in that same year before the COVID-19 pandemic, mental health problems affected around 84 million people (1 in 6), and those figures have only worsened since. The pandemic put additional pressure on mental health, particularly among young people and categories at risk, such as the elderly and people in vulnerable situations.

EU action on mental health

Policies and services addressing mental health are the individual EU Member States’ responsibility. However, according to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU complements national policies while also fostering cooperation between Member States. The EU’s work on mental health, part of its activities on non-communicable diseases, is geared towards supporting action on the ground and promoting the exchange of best practice and knowledge. On 7 June 2023, responding to calls from the European Parliament and from citizens in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe, the European Commission adopted a communication on a new comprehensive approach to mental health, adding another pillar to the European health union. According to that approach, EU action on mental health will focus on three guiding principles. Every EU citizen should have access to adequate and effective prevention, access to high-quality and affordable mental healthcare and treatment, and be able to reintegrate into society after recovery.

The European Parliament has consistently supported the promotion of good mental health and putting mental health at the heart of EU policymaking, through numerous opinions, studies, debates, written questions and own-initiative resolutions. Its Subcommittee on Public Health (SANT) held a hearing on young people’s mental health on 29 June 2023 and is currently preparing an own-initiative report on mental health (rapporteur: Sara Cerdas, S&D, Portugal). A debate on the draft report took place on 19 September 2023, and focused notably on prevention, accessibility of mental health services, early diagnosis, treatment, and the social integration of people with mental health conditions in the community.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘World Mental Health Day 2023: 10 October‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

During the October I plenary session Members held a number of debates, including on the need for speedy adoption of the EU asylum and migration package. Other debates focused on: precarity in Europe and the need to aid the deprived; large-scale corrupt sales of Schengen visas; medicine shortages and EU strategic healthcare autonomy; the European Central Bank’s 10th consecutive increase in reference interest rates; proposals to extend glyphosate use; and on the Energy Charter Treaty. In the external relations field, topics debated concerned: EU–China trade relations, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after the Azerbaijan attack and threats against Armenia; Moldova’s EU path; and recent developments in the Serbia–Kosovo dialogue.

Parliament approved the appointment of Wopke Hoekstra as member of the European Commission responsible for climate action, and the allocation of an additional role, as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal, for Maroš Šefčovič. Members heard a statement by Parliament’s President marking 10‑years since the tragedy off the coast of Lampedusa. Petr Pavel, the Czech President, addressed Members in a formal sitting.

Revision of the EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework

In view of the need to address the urgent budgetary shortfall and to provide additional financial support to Ukraine, Members debated the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) interim report on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the 2021-2027 EU multiannual financial framework (MFF). The BUDG committee would like to see the amount proposed (€65.8 billion) increased by a further €10 billion. Of this increase, €2 billion should go to reinforcing the single market, an additional €1 billion to migration management, and an increase of €1 billion each to the budget allocations for security and defence and for EU action in the rest of the world. With the remaining extra €5 billion, the committee proposes to strengthen the EU Flexibility Instrument, and the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve. To prevent another payments backlog towards the end of the MFF period, the committee also wants to abandon the annual appropriation payment cap.

European media freedom act

Members debated a Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) report on a proposal to establish a common framework for media services in the internal market (known as the ‘European media freedom act’). The CULT committee proposes to include, among other things, greater transparency on state and non-EU financial support for media outlets, better protection for journalists who are pressured to reveal their sources, and stronger rules on the use of spyware against journalists suspected of criminal behaviour. The report sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

European green bonds

Members adopted the compromise text negotiated by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on the proposal to regulate European green bonds (debt securities for climate and environmental projects). While the EU is a global leader on the green bond market, the risk of market disruption through ‘greenwashing’ necessitates a uniform definition and a regulated standard. In the world’s first voluntary standard for using a ‘Green Bond’ label, Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in ensuring that all green bond proceeds go towards sustainable activities included in the EU taxonomy (with some flexibility). Companies will have to disclose how such investments feed into their transition plans, and respect greater scrutiny of the environmental claims made of green bonds in general.

Economic coercion by third countries

Non-EU countries are attempting economic coercion (restricting trade or investment to influence the EU or its Member States’ sovereign choices), and the phenomenon is on the rise. As the EU currently has no legal framework in place to fight such coercion, a new proposal seeks to deter countries from this type of action. Members adopted the political agreement reached by the International Trade Committee (INTA) in trilogue negotiations. The text sets a clear definition of economic coercion, and of EU action to counter it. Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in adding a timeframe and a broad list of possible responses. While retaliation should be proportionate, Parliament has insisted on stronger democratic control of the substance and process, and ensured that non-EU countries should pay for damages caused by economically coercive practices.

Intelligent road transport systems

Intelligent transport systems (ITS) use real-time traffic information to make transport safer and more efficient and reduce emissions and energy consumption. As current EU rules governing ITS date from 2010, the Commission proposes to bring them into line with the latest technological developments, to accelerate the availability of data to feed into ITS tools, and enhance its interoperability. Parliament’s negotiators ensured crucial data on road restrictions are included in this shared data. Members adopted the provisional agreement reached by the Transport and Tourism (TRAN) Committee in trilogue negotiations.

Urban wastewater treatment

With consequences for human and environmental health, micro-organisms, solvents, detergents, fats and oils, metals and other substances from households and industry all end up in urban wastewater. Members debated a Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report supporting a proposal to update EU urban wastewater legislation. As the new law would introduce a system where pharmaceutical and cosmetics companies pay for any water pollution they cause, the ENVI committee would like to see EU countries also contribute a maximum of 20 % of the financing to upgrade their wastewater treatment plants, to avoid a knock-on effect on medicine prices. The committee seeks stronger monitoring and better reuse of treated wastewater. It also calls for new washing machines to include microfiber filters. The adopted report sets Parliament’s position for future negotiations with the Council.

Classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures

Members debated an ENVI committee report on the classification, labelling and packaging of hazardous substances and mixtures, seeking to fine-tune the proposal, clarify rules on mixed substances, exempt renewable botanicals, and reinforce the scientific basis for classification. The ENVI committee would also like to see new hazard criteria for immunotoxicity and neurotoxicity by the end of 2025, and to assess progress in the development of alternative methods to animal testing. The adopted report sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Protection of workers from asbestos

Despite the ban on asbestos in the EU, exposure to this carcinogen kills more than 70 000 people a year in Europe. Members adopted the agreement reached by the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) in negotiations with the Council, on proposals to amend EU law on asbestos in the workplace, by lowering the limits to which workers may legally be exposed. According to the agreed text, new exposure limits would be 10 times lower than current limits, and demolition companies across Europe would need a permit. The new rules also aim to help workers avoid exposure to asbestos by setting protective equipment standards and decontamination procedures.

Question Time with the Commissions – EU–China trade relations

Valdis Dombrovskis (Executive Vice-President) answered questions on EU–China trade relations, where the EU’s trade deficit has risen substantially and there have been a number of confrontations between the two partners in recent years.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Three decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were approved without a vote: on reports on measures to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications network (ITRE); on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services (IMCO); and on the amendment of Protocol No 3 to the Statute of the Court of Justice (JURI). Members also voted to approve a LIBE committee decision to enter into negotiations on a report on the Schengen Borders Code.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October I 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

Consumers are faced with a wealth of claims on the ‘green’ nature of products. In the absence of specific EU rules, how can they be sure that these claims are reliable, comparable and verifiable throughout the EU? On 22 March 2023, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a directive on green claims. The proposed directive would require companies to substantiate the voluntary green claims they make in business-to-consumer commercial practices, by complying with a number of requirements regarding their assessment (e.g. taking a life-cycle perspective). No single method for the assessment would be stipulated. The proposal would also set requirements on how to communicate the claims and introduce rules on environmental labelling schemes. Compliance with these requirements would have to be verified and certified by a third party (‘verifier’). The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In Parliament, the file was allocated jointly to the Committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI).

Versions

• October 2023: ‘Green claims’ directive: Protecting consumers from greenwashing (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on substantiation and communication of explicit environmental claims (green claims directive)Committees responsible:
(Joint committee)Committee on Internal Market and Consumer
Protection (IMCO) and Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2023)166
22.3.2023Co-rapporteurs:Andrus Ansip (Renew, Estonia)
Cyrus Engerer (S&D, Malta)2023/0085(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Arba Kokalari (EPP, Sweden)
Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark)
Laura Ballarín Cereza (S&D, Spain)
Emma Wiesner (Renew, Sweden)
Kim Van Sparrentak (Greens/EFA, Netherlands)
Carlo Fidanza (ECR, Italy)
Annalisa Tardino (ID, Italy)
Petros Kokkalis (The Left, Greece)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Vote in committee on the draft report

Written by Ralf Drachenberg, Annastiina Papunen and Rebecca Torpey with José Ernault.

Established as an informal summit meeting in 1975, the European Council became a formal European Union institution, with a full-time President, in 2009, on the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission (Article 15(2) of the Treaty on European Union, TEU). The latter two individuals have no voting rights. Meetings of the European Council are normally also attended by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The President of the European Parliament is ‘invited to speak’ as the first item on the European Council’s agenda, followed by an exchange of views (Article 235(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, TFEU). At its formal meetings, normally four per year, the European Council adopts ‘conclusions’ that are aimed at identifying policy priorities and action to be taken by the Union as a whole.

Agenda-setting and crisis management

The European Council’s role is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15(1) TEU). It cannot exercise legislative functions. At the beginning of the 2014-2019 and the 2019-2024 institutional cycles, the European Council adopted an agenda of strategic priorities, designed to guide the work of the European Union over the five-year period.

Reflecting the direction taken by the 2017 Rome Agenda set out on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties, the 2019-2024 strategic agenda, adopted by the Heads of State or Government at their meeting in June 2019, defines migration and the protection of citizens as the top priorities for action in the upcoming five years. Then, comes the development of a stronger economic base, including the fight against unemployment, followed by climate change and social issues. Finally, it looks to increase the EU’s influence and defend its interest in the world. The four core priorities set out in the 2019-2024 strategic agenda broadly correspond to the concerns of EU citizens at the time, as reflected by the 2019 standard Eurobarometer.[1]

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020 and the prospect of a protracted economic recession of unknown length and severity has, however, prompted EU Heads of State or Government to review the above priorities in order to provide for a coordinated approach and joint action to tackle the crisis. They met virtually on a number of occasions, with their attention shifting from the initial pandemic-related crisis management to the more medium-term recovery process.

At their first video-conference dedicated to the management of the health crisis, on 10 March 2020, the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, alongside the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Central Bank and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agreed to work together along four main axes, with a view to: i) limiting the spread of the virus; ii) providing medical equipment; iii) promoting research, for instance on development of a vaccine; and iv) tackling the socio-economic consequences of the crisis. The EU leaders underscored the need for a joint European approach and close coordination with the European Commission in combating the pandemic.

Given the serious human, economic and social consequences of the health crisis, criticism has been directed towards the lack of overall preparedness in combatting the pandemic across the EU, and the lack of coordination among Member States at the start of the outbreak. Indeed, EU leaders have acknowledged that the EU needed to become better at ‘developing its executive capacity and at managing crises in a coordinated fashion’.

Following the immediate crisis-management phase, the European Council therefore shifted its focus more towards the medium-term recovery process, with the aim of relaunching and transforming the EU’s economies. In a ‘Joint Statement of the Members of the European Council’ adopted on 26 March 2020, EU leaders mandated the Presidents of the European Council, Charles Michel, and the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to put forward a roadmap for recovery.

Submitted on 21 April, the recovery plan places particular emphasis on the opportunities offered by the green transition and digital transformation, which are expected to foster new forms of growth and contribute to a more innovative and resilient EU. This dual transformation has been given a central role in the EU’s medium- to long-term action, and forms part of a broader ambition aimed at achieving ‘European strategic autonomy‘. Charles Michel mentioned the concept of strategic autonomy several times over the year 2020; most prominently, on 28 September, when he stated that ‘European strategic autonomy – these are not just words. The strategic independence of Europe is our new common project for this century. It’s in all our common interest’. This concept was then formally endorsed by the European Council, which presented it as ‘a key objective of the Union’ in its 1-2 October 2020 conclusions. Recent developments in Afghanistan are likely to give new impetus to the debate on the EU’s strategic autonomy, as events in August 2021 have highlighted once again the need for the EU to strengthen its defence cooperation.

As regards the funding for the EU recovery process, this will come from the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery fund, set up as a temporary mechanism and linked to the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). Yet, it was only after months of remote meetings that the European Council was able to convene again in person to discuss the financial package, and an intensive four-day meeting was needed on 17-21 July, to reach political agreement on the 2021-2027 MFF and NGEU. Together, the two instruments amount to €1 824.3 billion, with €360 in loans and €390 billion in grants making up the latter. After several negotiation meetings between European Parliament and Council representatives, a political agreement on the package was reached on 10 November 2020. However, following the refusal by Hungary and Poland to endorse the outcome, citing concerns with the rule of law mechanism, it took the European Council another two meetings, a video-conference on 19 November and a meeting in person on 11-12 December 2020, to finally agree on clarifications to the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, thus paving the way for the adoption of the MFF and the NGEU.

One and a half years after the outbreak of the crisis, boosting the EU economy and ensuring its future resilience remain the key priority of the EU. An improving health situation – coupled with increasing vaccination levels – allowed for the gradual restart of EU economies, which in turn led to a brighter economic outlook, with GDP forecast to grow by 4.8 % in 2021 in the EU. However, the speed of recovery varies by Member State and by sector.

Thus, immediately after the Commission’s first-ever bond issuance to feed the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the June 2021 European Council pushed for swift adoption by the Council and rapid implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans, with the aim of ensuring balanced recovery throughout the continent.

Hence, despite an evolution in the ranking of European citizens’ priorities for EU action as identified in the most recent standard Eurobarometer, the horizontal policy orientations set by the European Council in its 2019-2024 strategic agenda appear to remain fully relevant and in line with the expectations of citizens, who now consider the economic situation as their top concern at EU level.

Specific Treaty-based role

In addition to its horizontal priority-setting role as defined in Article 15(1) TEU, the European Council is also tasked with identifying the Union’s strategic interests, determining the objectives of, and defining general guidelines for common foreign and security policy (Article 26 TEU). Following a request by EU leaders, the then High Representative, Federica Mogherini, presented an EU global strategy, which the European Council welcomed in June 2016. The strategy sets five broad priorities for the EU external action in coming years: the security of the Union, state and societal resilience to the east and south, an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, cooperative regional orders, and global governance for the 21st century.

Furthermore, the European Council defines the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 68 TFEU). For the period until 2019, the priorities for the European Union in the area of freedom, security and justice, were to ‘better manage migration in all aspects; prevent and combat crime and terrorism; [and] improve judicial cooperation among EU countries’. Following the outbreak of the migration crisis, and a series of terrorist attacks on European soil, key strategic documents, notably the European agenda on security and the European agenda on migration, were adopted in 2015, either at the request of or with the endorsement of the European Council. A new set of ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning’ were expected to be adopted by the European Council at its meeting of 26‑27 March 2020. Since the ordinary spring European Council meeting had to be postponed because of the coronavirus crisis. However, more than a year and a half later, and despite the 15 European Council meetings held in the meantime, EU leaders have still not complied with this Treaty obligation, nor is the topic mentioned in the indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-2022.

The European Council has also to ‘consider each year the employment situation in the Union and adopt conclusions thereon, on the basis of a joint annual report by the Council and the Commission’ (Article 148 TFEU).

Decision-making procedures and working methods

The European Council’s decisions are taken mainly by consensus, but in certain cases, the European Council can also decide by qualified majority. For example, the President of the European Council is elected by qualified majority vote for a once-renewable term of two and a half years. The President’s role is ‘to ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission’, chair its meetings, ‘facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council’, and to ensure ‘the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (Article 15(5) TEU). The first two full-time Presidents of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy and Donald Tusk, served five years each between 2009 and 2019. The third permanent President of the European Council, Charles Michel, began his mandate at the beginning of December 2019.

While not directly accountable to the European Parliament, the President of the European Council presents a report to the Parliament after each (formal) meeting of the Heads of State or Government (Article 15(6)(d) TEU). Usually this takes the form of a declaration in person, followed by a plenary debate.

One of the most striking development in recent years has been the substantial evolution in the working methods and formations of the European Council. As a result of the series of crisis of the last decade, we have witnessed an exponential increase in the number and types of meetings. All meetings are indeed meetings of Heads of State or Government, but not all meetings are formal European Council meetings.

Over recent years, members of the European Council have met in seven different formats:

Next to 1) regular meetings of the European Council on a quarterly basis (Article 15(3) TEU), mentioned earlier, the President can convene 2) special meetings of the European Council ‘when the situation so requires’ (Article 15(3) TEU). In principle, conclusions are also adopted at these special meetings. But, there can be exceptions, e.g. the special meeting of February 2020 on the MFF.

In addition, 3) informal meetings of Heads of State or Government take place traditionally twice per year in the country holding the rotating presidency of the Council, such as for instance the Porto meeting on 8 May 2021, in connexion with the social summit.

As a result of, inter alia, the financial crisis, the UK’s decision to leave the Union, the Leaders’ Agenda proposed by the previous President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in 2017, and the coronavirus pandemic, meeting formations have evolved substantially.

The financial crisis has led to the increase in the number of special European Council meetings as well as to the establishment of the 4) Euro Summit, created as an informal gathering in 2008 and formalised in 2012 with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU. In principle, Euro Summits include the EU Member States which have adopted the common currency, currently 19 countries. However, more and more meetings take place in an inclusive format, i.e. with the participation of all 27 Member States. This was the case for instance of the June 2021 Euro Summit. This broad involvement could be linked to the fact that the Euro Summits are not crisis meetings anymore; they now aim at bringing forward the reform of EMU, which is of concern for all the Member States.

From June 2016, following the UK referendum, EU leaders felt the need to discuss a number of things among the 27. Thus, a number of informal meetings of Heads of State or Government at 27 took place without the UK to discuss the future of Europe, notably in Bratislava in 2016, Rome in 2017 and Sibiu in 2019. On those occasions a series of landmark declarations were adopted, which were not formal conclusions. Once the UK had triggered Article 50 and notified its intention to leave, then a new formal format was set up, the 5) European Council (Article 50), which adopted formal conclusions.

As for 6) Leaders’ meetings, they were set up under President Tusk in 2017 and aimed at discussing sensitive issues in an informal way. Such discussions were based, not on draft conclusions, but on short notes prepared by the President. The idea is to have an open, relatively unstructured debate on controversial but highly consequential issues, with a view to facilitating agreement at a follow-up European Council meeting.

The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was prepared in very much the same way, by using the working method developed under the Leaders’ Agenda. Just ahead of the 2019 European elections, the EU‑27 met on 9 May 2019 in the Romanian city of Sibiu to assess the implementation of previous policy objectives and to reflect informally on future EU action over the coming five years. The EU leaders’ discussion was informed by President Tusk’s Leaders’ Agenda note, ‘Strategic agenda 2019-2024 – Outline’, which provided a first overview of the topics for future action. The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was then adopted at the June 2019 formal European Council meeting.

The process consisting of first holding an informal or inconclusive discussion on a topic and then seeking to adopt conclusions at a subsequent meeting has been kept in the Leaders’ Agenda 2020-2021, put forward by President Charles Michel at the special European Council meeting of 1‑2 October 2020 and then in the new indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-22, presented in June 2021. The idea is that, ‘where no immediate conclusions are drawn, the outcome of the debates will be reflected in later conclusions’. Designed to provide an important structuring framework for the European Council’s activities, both the 2020-21 and 2021-22 Leaders’ Agendas outline the planned meetings and main policy topics that EU Heads of State or Government are called to address in the months ahead. The third edition of the Leaders’ Agenda however, the indicative nature of which is specified in the title, appears to be less detailed and less comprehensive when compared to the first and second editions. Moreover, whilst maintaining the Leaders’ Agenda framework, Mr Michel seems more recently to have dropped the practice of preparing special notes and of organising an informal meeting to discuss sensitive issues.

Moreover, a number of EU priority topics appear to be missing in the listing of issues for discussion outlined in the latest Leaders’ Agenda. This is the case of migration for instance. Owing to the sensitivity of the issue and because EU leaders have not thus far been able to agree on the distribution of migrants beyond the Member State of arrival, migration has been absent from the European Council’s meeting agendas in 2019 and 2020. However, EU discussions on migration have resurfaced recently: the issue was debated at length at the October 2021 European Council meeting and is likely to feature among the highly sensitive topics of the coming months.

The newest feature of meetings of Heads of State or Government are video-conference meetings. In a context of lockdown, this new form of meeting has enabled EU leaders to take joint action to tackle the crisis. Video-conference meetings are clearly linked to the ongoing coronavirus crisis. However, it can be assumed that they be a lasting feature. Indeed, next to the coronavirus pandemic, other topics were often touched upon at video-conference meetings, thus using the opportunity of a virtual meeting to move forward on other pressing or even less pressing issues.

Obviously video technology enables urgent meetings to take place, and for the EU to take action if needed between physical meetings. Thus, given there is the necessary political will, the use of video-conferences could provide a new dynamic to the European Council, increasing its adaptability and reaction capacity.

Nevertheless, even if video-conferences are a good vehicle for rapid consultation, this type of meeting has its limits: Video-conferences are inappropriate to discuss sensitive issues, such as foreign affairs or budgetary matters. In such a format, EU leaders tend to be more cautious and to keep to their written statements, because the confidentiality of discussions is not ensured and participation is (de facto) broader than in formal physical meetings. Moreover, considering the particular nature of the European Council, small bilateral or side-meetings are crucial for achieving agreements on sensitive issues. We have witnessed it in the context of the negotiations on MFF in July 2020, when a physical meeting was necessary to enable political agreement to be reached on the MFF, and with the postponement of the discussion on Russia at the March European Council, which had to be held online due to the public health situation.

Altogether, the European Council has been active during the coronavirus crisis, and the institution has taken a digital leap. But video-meetings are unlikely to replace physical meetings fully when crucial decisions are on the agenda.

Read the complete study on ‘Key issues in the European Council: State of play in September 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

Under EU rules, EU citizens are free to reside and work in any Member State, and can be posted to any other EU country to provide a service job. By contrast, labour migration by third-country nationals (TCNs) is controlled by a different regulatory framework. However, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law provides that TCNs with work and residence permits in one Member State may be posted across the EU to perform temporary work. The posting of TCN workers is increasingly being used as a labour mobility channel.

Posting of workers

Key pillars of the EU acquis, the principles of free movement of workers, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services are rooted in the EU Treaties. The freedom to provide services serves as the basis for the practice of ‘posting’ workers. A ‘posted worker‘ is a worker sent by their employer to provide a temporary service in another EU Member State. While performing work in the receiving/host country, they do not shift their residence there. They remain connected to their sending/home country, where the employment agreement was concluded and where they remain subject to social security rules (under certain conditions). At the same time, while executing a service contract in a host country for their employer or a temping agency, posted workers are subject to the labour law of that country.

The posting of workers is becoming increasingly common and developing in new forms, including posting of TCN workers. While TCNs are legally ‘fixed’ by a work and residence permit in the country that granted the permits, the CJEU decided in 1994 that TCNs who have a valid work and residence permit in one Member State can be posted in any other Member State across the EU without needing another work permit (the Vander Elst case). The CJEU has confirmed this rule in subsequent case law.

Posting offers new migration opportunities to TCNs, especially low-and medium-skilled workers, who might otherwise have difficulty obtaining work and residence permits in Member States that privilege highly skilled labour migrants. Posted TCN workers mainly work in construction, transport and agriculture. The main receiving countries of posted TCN workers are Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, while Poland, Slovenia and Spain are among the main sending countries. The nationalities most represented among posted TCN workers are Ukrainian and Bosnian, followed by Serbian and Belarusian.

The combined statuses of ‘posted worker’ and ‘labour migrant’ make posted TCN workers doubly vulnerable, however, as they depend on their employers not only for employment but also for the renewal of their work and residence permits in the sending country. Often used as a business model for profit maximisation, posting of TCN workers has the potential to grow into a mobility channel on an equal footing with ‘traditional’ TCN labour migration.

EU legal framework

The 1996 Posting of Workers Directive (PWD) established a core set of rights in relation to the terms and conditions of employment of posted workers, addressing remuneration, rest periods, annual leave, and occupational health and safety requirements. The directive aimed both to protect these rights within the EU and to facilitate a level playing-field in the Member State of posting.

The 2018 revised PWD strengthened the principle of ‘equal pay for the same work in the same place’ (the original PWD had ensured only ‘minimum rates of pay’); extended to posted workers the rules on workers’ accommodation and on allowances or reimbursement of expenditure to cover travel, board and lodging; and confirmed the equal treatment of posted temporary agency workers.

The PWD applies to both EU and TCN workers. It does not define a minimum duration of posting or any visa or permit requirements. However, after 12 months of posting (18 months, if notified by the employer), all terms and conditions of employment of the host country will apply to the posted worker (except rules on contract termination, supplementary working pensions and social security, which apply after 24 months).

The Enforcement Directive 2014/67/EU sought to increase compliance with the PWD. It addressed issues relating to access to information and circumvention of rules, inspections and monitoring, joint liability in subcontracting chains and exchange of information between Member States.

EU rules on social security coordination (Regulation 883/2004/EC, implementing Regulation 987/2009/EC and Regulation 1231/2010/EU) guarantee posted TCNs the same social security protection received by EU citizens moving within the EU (under certain conditions). It has been observed, however, that despite harmonising efforts at EU level, short-term TCN workers’ access to social security is organised in a fragmented way both within and across national jurisdictions.

The right of residence of the TCN worker in the sending Member State falls under the EU common immigration policy, which is a shared competence between the EU and the Member States. The EU has adopted rules relating to admission criteria, procedures for the application for residence and work authorisations, and the rights of specific categories of legal migrants to the EU (including seasonal workers, workers on intra-corporate transfer, persons under temporary protection – first activated for persons residing in Ukraine fleeing Russia’s war – and highly skilled workers and their families).  

National rules applicable to posted TCN workers

While a TCN worker needs a work permit only in the sending Member State, the same does not apply for residence permits. Member States apply various administrative requirements regarding the right of posted TCN workers to stay on their territory. While some do not impose any requirements, most require prospective posted workers to apply for a temporary residence permit or a ‘Vander Elst visa’. For a posting shorter than 90 days – a ‘Schengen visa’ posting – most Member States waive this requirement.

Member States can regulate additional areas, such as the conditions for renewal or withdrawal of work and residence permits. In addition, several Member States have specific bilateral agreements that exempt certain TCNs from the requirement to have a work permit. Slovenia, for instance, allows citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia to obtain a special work permit to work in Slovenia, while TCNs of other nationalities must obtain both a work and a residence permit. This allows Slovenian companies to recruit TCN workers from these Balkan countries swiftly and post them in other EU countries. Similarly, Poland offers some simplified procedures to citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia.

Further national legal requirements are complex, fragmented and vary considerably. Compliance is difficult to verify and involves inspections. This requires cooperation from labour, social security and immigration authorities from other EU countries, whose differences in approach, competences, personnel and language capacities may complicate the process.

Transport sector: Directive 2020/1057/EU sets specific rules for posting drivers in the road transport sector, and clarifies the forms of international road freight transport to which the PWD applies. Drivers performing ‘cabotage’ (national transport undertaken by hauliers from another Member State) or ‘cross-trade’ (transport between two countries performed by a vehicle registered in a third country) are considered posted workers. However, bilateral transport (between the Member State of establishment and another country) and transit transport (crossing a Member State without loading or unloading) are not considered posted work. When a driver is posted, remuneration of the host Member State applies; when not, that of the Member State of establishment applies. While the directive also applies to TCN posted drivers, it does not deal with visas. European Parliament initiatives

Since 2014, Parliament has called repeatedly for improvements to the PWD. In 2016, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on better coordination of social security systems, seeking to clarify conflicts between social security coordination rules and the PWD. The file is currently on hold.

In the negotiations on the revision of the PWD, Parliament pushed for ‘equal pay for equal work’ and for Member States to be able to apply regional, sectoral or industry agreements to posted workers. It also sought to enable Member States to place foreign undertakings under the same national obligations in cases of sub-contracting. In 2021, Parliament called on the Commission to research trends affecting working conditions of posted TCNs, with a view to updating policy at EU or national level as appropriate.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Posting of third-country nationals in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Velina Lilyanova.

The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the main element of Next Generation EU (NGEU), the EU’s recovery plan, designed to help EU Member States navigate their way out of the COVID-19 crisis and towards a more resilient future. To receive financing from NGEU, each Member State had to prepare a national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) and include in it reforms and investment addressing six policy areas, or the six pillars of the RRF. The fifth pillar, ‘Health, and economic, social and institutional resilience’, has a broad scope, but around half of the measures included in it are health-related.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic put an unprecedented strain on the EU’s health systems and revealed a number of vulnerabilities, even in the best-performing Member States. Consequently, in 2020, in the framework of the European Semester, all Member States received country-specific recommendations (CSRs) in the area of health policy (up from around half of Member States in 2019). To address these recommendations, and their health systems’ weaknesses, all the Member States have envisaged investment and reform measures adapted to their national contexts, and included them in their NRRPs. The most recent annual report from the European Commission on the RRF estimated the total healthcare-related expenditure at €43 billion for the 27 NRRPs. Despite differences, the NRRPs reveal a number of common themes. These include the need to expand healthcare infrastructure, modernise primary care, address staff shortages, and – not least – digitalise health services. Taken together, these measures are expected to make national healthcare sectors more robust and efficient. With all national plans in place and the implementation of the RRF well under way, this briefing gives an overview of the main health-related measures in the plans, with a spotlight on digital (e-health) measures.

While Member States define and deliver their national health services and medical care, the EU is contributing greatly to the joint efforts to strengthen public health policy and build a European health union. The European Parliament has consistently promoted the establishment of a coherent public health policy, including the creation of a new stand-alone European health programme.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Health-related measures in the national recovery and resilience plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Breakdown of health pillar expenditure by policy area: ‘Healthcare’

Written by Pieter Baert (1st edition).

A massive increase in trade volumes – in particular thanks to the rise of e-commerce – combined with the fast growing number of EU standards that need to be checked at the border and continuously evolving trade strategies have put EU customs authorities under a lot of pressure in recent times. Concerns have been raised that the EU’s customs union is burdened by fragmented digitalisation, suboptimal coordination between national authorities and overall complexity, leaving traders with high administrative compliance costs and criminals with opportunities to commit fraud. To tackle these issues, the European Commission tabled a customs reform package on 17 May 2023. Along with a number of other provisions, key to the reform would be the establishment of an EU customs authority, which would oversee a new customs data hub. This would entail a more centralised and digitalised approach to customs that should lower compliance costs for traders, free up resources for national authorities and ensure a more efficient, strengthened and fraud-proof customs union.

The proposal is subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, requiring the support of both the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, following consultation of the European Economic and Social Committee. Within the Parliament, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) is working on the file.

Versions

• September 2023: Establishing a EU Customs Authority and Customs Data Hub (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the Union Customs Code and the European Union Customs Authority, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer ProtectionCOM(2023) 258
17.5.2023Rapporteur:Deirdre Clune (EPP, Ireland)2023/0156(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Maria Grapini (S&D, Romania)
Catharina Rinzema (Renew, the Netherlands)
Anna Cavazzini (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Draft report

Percentage of individuals in the EU-27 who purchased goods online from a non-EU seller in 2022 Customs duties paid into the EU budget as an own resource*, 2022, (€ million)

Written by Tim Peters, Head of the Budgetary Policies Unit.

The European Union’s budget is currently under significant pressure: the EU has sent massive financial aid to Ukraine. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to high inflation and high interest rates, which mean that the space available within the EU budget has become even tighter.

Against that background, three influential members of Parliament’s Committee on Budgets and one renowned academic expert discussed the future of the EU budget in Parliament’s library: the two co-rapporteurs for the revision of the MFF, Margarida Marques (S&D, Portugal) and Jan Olbrycht (EPP, Poland); one of the two co-rapporteurs for the reform of the own resources, Valérie Hayer (Renew, France); and Iain Begg, Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science. All panellists agreed that the current multiannual financial framework was not fit for purpose and urgently needed a pressing and meaningful revision. Albeit not perfect, the European Commission’s proposal was judged a significant step forward in the right direction. In their opinion, the European Parliament would, therefore, broadly support the Commission proposal and be likely to ask for top-ups for certain headings and an enhanced flexibility to cope with unforeseen events.

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The panellists concurred that the EU needed to reform its institutional and budgetary setup to be ready for the forthcoming enlargement to include Ukraine, Moldova and several Western Balkan countries. Due to the significantly lower level of prosperity and the high relevance of the agricultural sector in those candidate countries, the budgetary consequences of their accession would be massive.

The Members underlined that the EU has to commit the budgetary means necessary to meet its political priorities. It is not sustainable, in their view, for Member States to allocate more and more tasks to the EU while simultaneously refusing to provide appropriate financial and human resources allowing the EU to deal with those tasks. The Members pointed out the need to replace GNI-based own resources with genuine own resources, based on EU legislation such as the Emissions Trading Scheme or corporate taxation of large multinational companies.

© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP© European Union 2023 – Source : EP Further reading

• Topical digest: EU long-term budget: Does the EU have enough resources to finance its priorities?
• Revision of the EU’s long-term budget for 2021 to 2027: Securing sufficient resources for the EU
• System of own resources of the European Union
• Financing Ukraine’s recovery: Consequences for the EU budget and budgetary control, and principles for success
• Prof Begg’s presentation