European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Karin Jacobs (1st edition).

On 1 June 2023, the European Commission presented the maritime safety package, focused on introducing modernised maritime safety and security rules on port state and flag state control, maritime accident investigation and ship source pollution. The package also includes a proposal to revise the Regulation on the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).

The revised regulation would give EMSA new and more numerous tasks since the last major revision of its mandate in 2013 and aim to make it ‘future proof’. Furthermore, it seeks to take better account of EMSA’s current tasks and objectives, which means that the agency would be legally mandated to fulfil these and provide EU Member States and the European Commission with technical, operational and scientific assistance, to ensure maritime safety, security and the green and digital transition of the maritime sector. At the same time, the agency would be provided with adequate human and financial resources to fulfil its role.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) is leading the work on this legislative file. The Fisheries (PECH), Environment (ENVI) and Budget (BUDG) Committees have been invited to submit an opinion.

Versions

• September 2023: Revised rules on the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Maritime Safety Agency and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism Committee (TRAN)COM(2023)269
1.6.2023Rapporteur:Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (EPP, Portugal)2023/0163(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Sara Cerdas (S&D, Portugal)
Caroline Nagtegaal (Renew, the Netherlands)
Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, Germany)
João Pimenta Lopes (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Karin Jacobs (1st edition).

On 1 June 2023, the European Commission presented a legislative package to modernise and reinforce maritime rules on safety and pollution prevention. This package contains proposals for the revision of five legislative acts, among them the revision of the Directive on Ship-source Pollution. The aim is to combat pollution from maritime ships thereby preventing all ship-owners and operators, regardless of the ship’s flag, from releasing any type of illegal discharge, in line with International Maritime Organization (IMO) rules, into European seas. The proposal contains a robust framework for penalties for infringements, and their application. In addition, there would be an extended range of substances classified as polluting, and enforcement would be strengthened.

Within the European Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) is leading the work on this legislative file and Marian-Jean Marinescu (EPP, Romania) has been appointed rapporteur. The Committees on Legal Affairs (JURI), Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), and Fisheries (PECH) have been invited to provide opinions.

Versions

• September 2023: Revision of the Directive on Ship-source Pollution (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties, including criminal penalties, for pollution offencesCommittee responsible:Transport and Tourism Committee (TRAN)COM(2023) 0273
1.6.2023Rapporteur:Marian-Jean Marinescu (EPP, Romania)2023/0171(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Sara Cerdas (S&D, Portugal)
Bergur Lokke Rasmussen (Renew, Denmark)
Carlo Fidanza (ECR, Italy)
Leila Chaibi (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Anne Altmayer (1st edition).

On 30 March 2023, the European Commission presented a proposal for a directive on common rules promoting the repair of goods. The proposed directive aims to mitigate the current business and consumption pattern, marked by frequent and premature replacement and discarding of goods. According to the Commission, this model generates additional costs for consumers, is a waste of natural resources and does harm to the environment. The proposal seeks to save costs for consumers and facilitate the development of a resource-efficient circular economy. The proposed directive would apply to the repair of goods within and outside the legal guarantee.

In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). René Repasi (S&D, Germany) has been appointed as rapporteur.

Versions

• September 2023: Right to repair: New consumer rights (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules promoting the repair of goods and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394, Directives (EU) 2019/771 and (EU) 2020/1828Committee responsible:Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2023) 155
30.3.2023Rapporteur:René Repasi (S&D, Germany)2023/0083(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Arba Kokalari (EPP, Sweden)
Catharina Rinzema (Renew, the Netherlands)
Anna Cavazzini (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Beata Mazurek (ECR, Poland)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the single market. Although it has generally been a success story, a number of challenges remain. For instance, there is still no EU-wide harmonisation of the technical requirements for the road circulation of non-road mobile machinery. This has a negative effect on the functioning of the single market. This sector covers a broad range of machinery fitted with the means for self-propulsion – such as combine harvesters, excavators, ride-on mowers and forklifts – and that may need to circulate on the road to go from one workplace to another.

On 23 March 2023, the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation that would set out the requirements for the EU type approval and placing on the market of non-road mobile machinery intended to circulate on public roads. It would also lay down rules and procedures on market surveillance of non-road mobile machinery. Stakeholders have broadly welcomed the proposal.

The proposed regulation is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In Parliament, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) is responsible for the file. The committee vote on the draft report is expected on 27-28 November 2023.

Versions

• September 2023: Non-road mobile machinery circulating on public roads (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approval and market surveillance of non-road mobile machinery circulating on public roads and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2023)178
30.3.2023Rapporteur:Tom Vandenkendelaere (EPP, Belgium)2023/0090(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal)
Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia)
Malte Gallée (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Beata Mazurek (ECR, Poland)  
ID: to be appointed
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Awaiting committee decision

Written by Mario Damen.

The Strategic Foresight Conversation (SFC) on the future of the EU and Ukraine was a multi-stage stakeholder consultation in which more than 50 experts from various backgrounds participated between June 2022 and June 2023. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and the ensuing war has not only changed all aspects of life in Ukraine, but is also affecting the EU in many significant ways and has shifted geopolitical and geo-economic paradigms. The SFC investigated future relations between the EU and Ukraine across a range of cross-cutting domains. Against the backdrop of the European Council decision of 24 June 2022 to give candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, a rather long time horizon of 2035 was chosen, to allow to look beyond the war and include views on reconstruction, EU enlargement and EU external relations.

The process consisted of three phases. Phase one explored the EU-Ukraine relationship and considered the impact of possible developments. Phase two identified drivers of change and developed four scenarios:

1. Fair Stability assumes that Ukraine would regain all of its territory and join the EU and NATO, while a new cooperative Russian regime signs a peace agreement.
2. Cold War II assumes that the front would get stuck without agreement between the parties, leading to a bipolar world and partial Ukrainian integration into the EU and NATO.
3. Frozen Conflict assumes that the parties would negotiate trade-offs after the front got stuck, leading to Ukrainian neutrality and a stagnant EU accession process.
4. Devastated Europe assumes that Russia would escalate the war, leading to NATO involvement in the war and a stronger and enlarged NATO, but a disunited, weak EU.

Scenarios are not predictions but a tool to imagine possible futures – both desirable and undesirable ones. They served as stepping stones to formulate policy considerations in phase three of the SFC; these policy considerations were put in the political context of European Parliament resolutions. The actionable conclusions of these considerations were clustered into four areas for EU action:

1. From military support towards a new European security architecture: the EU could transition from the coordination of and public support for short-term military and economic aid to Ukraine towards developing a future security architecture for wider Europe, which may involve diplomatic efforts.
2. Towards EU enlargement, reconstruction and recovery: Ukraine should address reforms needed for EU accession, in particular those regarding the rule of law. The EU could prepare for shifts in distribution of political power and financial means and develop a coordinated position on enlargement for several accession candidates, balancing the principle of individual merit and a group approach. Parallelism between Ukraine’s EU accession and its reconstruction is important. Reconstruction requires coordination, financing and the contribution of returning refugees.
3. Building an effective, green and sovereign European Union: the EU could prepare its institutions for enlargement, while addressing the double challenge of achieving strategic autonomy in its energy, raw material and agricultural needs and delivering on the European Green Deal. It could draw lessons from earlier enlargements.
4. Reviewing the EU’s external relations: the EU could prepare for different possible future relationships with Russia and Belarus, facing more antagonistic or cooperative governments. It could carefully calibrate its relations with Türkiye and China, taking into account US-China relations and the need for de-risking economic relations.

Although certain elements of the scenarios and policy considerations have already materialised, there are still many open questions that are relevant for future policymaking.

Read the complete study on ‘EU-Ukraine 2035: Strategic foresight analysis on the future of the EU and Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Summary of EU-Ukraine 2035 scenarios

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román.

What happened?

On 15 September 2023, three EU Member States bordering Ukraine – Poland, Hungary and Slovakia – unilaterally restricted the import of certain Ukrainian agricultural products. This move comes in the wake of the European ‘Commission’s decision not to extend a previous ban on the import (although allowing transit) of Ukrainian grain into these countries.

Why were there restrictions in the first place?

Ukraine is one of the world’s top agricultural producers, especially of grain and vegetable oils. It is also an important food supplier to many countries in Africa and the Middle East.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has deliberately targeted Ukrainian food production and Black Sea exporting facilities, seeking to undermine the country’s economy and threaten global food security.

The EU responded to Moscow’s ‘food weaponisation’ strategy through temporary trade liberalisation with Ukraine, and by setting up the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes in May 2022. These measures have allowed Ukraine to export over 44 million tonnes of blocked agricultural product through EU territory, and had an immediate effect on global food prices, averting a wider crisis.

However, lower prices and competition from Ukrainian producers affected farmers in the EU Member States bordering Ukraine, who called for protectionist measures. Pressure from these groups led to five Member States (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) to restrict the import or transit of Ukrainian agricultural products in April 2023, in violation of the EU’s exclusive competence on trade policy.

The European Commission reached a deal with these Member States, agreeing to temporarily restrict import of four Ukrainian products (wheat, corn, rapeseed, and sunflower seeds) into these countries, but allowing their transit to non-EU countries. A coordination platform consisting of the Commission, Ukraine and the affected Member States was also set up. These temporary restrictive measures were extended for three additional months on 5 June 2023.

In addition to the temporary import restrictions, the EU has channelled substantial financial resources to support farmers affected by Ukrainian grain imports. In March 2023, the European Commission mobilised €56.3 million from the agricultural reserve for Bulgarian, Polish and Romanian farmers (€16.75 million for Bulgaria, €29.5 million for Poland and €10.05 million for Romania). Later in May, the Commission put forward an additional €100 million package, extended to Hungary and Slovakia (which provides €9.77 million to Bulgaria, €15.93 million to Hungary, €39.33 million to Poland, €29.73 million to Romania and €5.24 million to Slovakia).

What triggered the latest dispute?

When import restrictions expired on 15 September 2023, the Commission announced that it would not renew the import ban, as the initial market disruption had subsided. Ukraine had also committed to prevent future grain supply surges, and the Russian termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 increased the importance of the EU Solidarity Lanes for global food security.

Three Member States (Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) opposed the termination of the import ban, and announced the reintroduction of unilateral restrictive measures on several Ukrainian agricultural products.

In response, Ukraine announced its intention to file a lawsuit against these Member States before the World Trade Organization (WTO).

What is the position of the European Parliament?

On 24 March 2022, the European Parliament plenary called for the establishment of safe transport and food corridors to and from Ukraine, as well as support for EU farmers affected by the war in Ukraine. On 12 September 2023, the Parliament debated the impact of Ukrainian grain exports on EU farmers after Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative with the European Commission.

Is the EU’s solidarity with Ukraine weakening?

No, the EU remains steadfast in supporting Ukrainians against Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression. Since the Russian illegal invasion of 24 February 2022, the EU, its Member States and financial institutions have mobilised nearly €40 billion to support Ukraine’s State and economy, and a further €20 billion in military assistance. Poland and Slovakia in particular are among the top international supporters of Ukraine. EU citizens too continue to stand strongly alongside Ukraine, with two-thirds in favour of supporting Kyiv’s path toward European integration.

Food Security in 2023

If you wish to learn more about how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and climate change are impacting global food security in 2023, watch this video.

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Written by Karoline Kowald and Marianna Pari.

The EU’s long-term budget for 2021 to 2027 was set at €1.1 trillion, together with a specific instrument to support the EU’s recovery from the pandemic, Next Generation EU (NGEU), providing €750 billion (2018 prices). Since 2021, the EU budget has already mobilised significant additional resources to cope with the pandemic and its impact, providing direct support totalling €70 billion to help EU citizens and enterprises, and countries outside the EU, cope with the COVID‑19 crisis. In 2022, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine generated more unexpected financing needs. The EU budget alone has contributed €50 billion to support Ukraine and its people, and help Member States cope with the multiple effects. As a result, the EU’s funds and instruments for addressing unexpected situations are severely depleted. The EU budget needs meaningful reinforcement to be able to respond to the challenges that still lie ahead.

On 20 June 2023, the Commission presented a revision of the EU’s long-term budget, including a package of budgetary and legislative proposals. It proposed an overall reinforcement of the EU budget by €65.8 billion, covering an increase in the budget headings, the special instruments and €17 billion in grants for Ukraine. For the Ukraine Facility, a further €33 billion in loans is proposed, bringing overall support to Ukraine to €50 billion. The Commission is also proposing a ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP), to be financed through redeployments and with €10 billion of additional funds. Additional budgetary means are set aside for responses to migration challenges, and a specific instrument to cover the increasing borrowing cost of NGEU.

According to the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets, the proposed revision is a positive step towards equipping the EU budget with the necessary financing means. However, the rapporteurs’ draft report argues that an additional €10 billion is required to address future challenges effectively.

This is a follow up to an earlier briefing on the EU’s long-term budget, published in June 2023.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Revision of the EU’s long-term budget for 2021 to 2027: Securing sufficient resources for the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Revision of the 2024-2027 MFF: Budgetary overview of Commission proposal

Written by Alina Dobreva (1st edition).

On 22 December 2021, the European Commission announced its proposal for the introduction of new own resources. The underlying objective is to decrease the share of own resources based on gross national income (GNI) in the revenue mix while preserving existing long-term EU policy commitments. The initiative also seeks to secure the necessary resources to cover new budgetary expenditures, such as the repayments of the debt arising from the Next Generation EU recovery fund and the recently adopted Social Climate Fund. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has generated further needs for additional funds to finance support for Ukraine, for Ukrainian refugees in the EU, and for sectors of the EU economy severely affected by the war. The 2021 Commission proposal on own resources included the extended emissions trading scheme and a carbon border adjustment mechanism, and reallocated profits of very large multinational companies (on the basis of Pillar 1 of the OECD/G20 agreement). Parliament adopted a legislative resolution approving that proposal.

On 20 June 2023, the Commission put forward an adjusted package for the next generation of own resources, amending its previous proposal and completing its proposal by increasing the ETS call rate and introducing a temporary statistical own resource based on company profits. The proposal is subject to a formal re-consultation of Parliament.

Versions

• September 2023: System of own resources of the European Union (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European UnionCommittee responsible:Budgets (BUDG)COM(2021)0570, 22.12.2021
COM(2023)0331 (amended
legislative proposal for reconsultation), 20.6.23Rapporteur:José Manuel Fernandes (EPP, Portugal);2021/0430(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Eider Gardiazabal Rubial (S&D, Spain)
David Cormand (Greens/EFA, France)
Roberts Zīle (ECR, Latvia)
Joachim Kuhs (ID, Germany)
Younous Omarjee (The Left, France)
Dimmitrios Papadimoulis (The Left, Greece)CNS – Consultation
procedure (Parliament
adopts a non-binding
opinion only)Next steps expected: Awaiting committee decision

Own resources of the EU budget, 2007-2024

Written by Michael Adam with Clotilde Hocquard.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a powerful tool thanks to technological advances, access to large amounts of data, machine learning and increased computing power. The release of ChatGPT at the end of 2022 was a new breakthrough in AI. It demonstrated the vast range of possibilities involved in adapting general-purpose AI to a wide array of tasks and in getting generative AI to generate synthetic content based on prompts entered by the user. By 2026, 90 % of online content may be synthetically generated.

AI is an opportunity to improve the democratic process in our societies. For example, it can help citizens to gain a better understanding of politics and engage more easily in democratic debate. Likewise, politicians can get closer to citizens and eventually represent them more effectively. Such an alignment between citizens and politicians could change the face of electoral campaigns and considerably improve the policymaking process, making it more accurate and efficient.

Although concerns over the use of AI in politics have been present since the late 2010s, those related to democracies and the election process in particular have grown with the recent evolution of AI. This emerging technology poses multiple risks to democracies, as it is also a powerful tool for disinformation and misinformation, both of which can trigger tensions resulting in electoral-related conflict and even violence. AI can, for example, generate false information, or spread a bias or opinions that do not represent the public sentiment. Altogether, despite its benefits AI has the potential to affect the democratic process in a negative way.

Despite the above risks, AI can prove useful to democracies if proper safeguards are applied. For example, specific tools can be employed to detect the use of AI-generated content and techniques such as watermarking can be used to clearly indicate that content has been generated by AI. The EU is currently adapting its legal framework to address the dangers that come with AI and to promote the use of trustworthy, transparent and accountable AI systems.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Artificial intelligence, democracy and elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Höflmayr (1st edition).

A digital euro can be understood as central bank money offered in digital form for citizens and businesses to be used for their retail payments. It would be a central bank digital currency (CBDC) –an electronic equivalent to cash, complementing banknotes and coins – and the central motivation to develop a CBDC can be explained by the increasing digitalisation of financial services. Banknotes and coins, currently the only public money, are considered the ultimate anchor of the financial system. However, in recent years the number of cash payment transactions has declined substantially while digital payments have soared. At the same time, private currencies, such as Bitcoin, are challenging the role of sovereign currencies. Another argument for pursuing a digital euro relates to Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ and the external dependency on foreign payment-related service providers.

In October 2021, the ECB launched the investigation phase for the digital euro project. It is the ECB’s prerogative to decide whether or not to issue a digital euro, but the decision requires the approval of a regulation establishing a legal framework for a digital euro. The European Commission has therefore put forward a digital euro package. While the proposal would grant legal tender status to the digital euro, the legal tender status of the physical form of central bank money would also be ensured for the first time in secondary legislation.

Versions

• September 2023: Digital euro package (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of the digital euro; Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the provision of digital euro services by payment services providers incorporated in Member States whose currency is not the euro and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1230 of the European Parliament and the Council; Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coinsCommittee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2023)369; COM(2023)368;
COM(2023)364
28.6.2023Rapporteur:Stefan Berger (EPP, Germany)2023/0212(COD)
2023/0211(COD)
2023/0208(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Paul Tang (S&D, Netherlands); Gilles Boyer (Renew, France); Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany); Michiel Hoogeveen (ECR, Netherlands)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Committee draft report

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

During the September plenary session, Members heard the annual State of the Union speech from the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. Other highlights included exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s address to a formal sitting of Parliament. Members debated disaster resilience in the EU, the EU-Tunisia memorandum of understanding, combating the normalisation of extremist discourse, a relief package for smaller businesses, and violence and discrimination in sport. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, made statements on Iran, Latin America and Chile, and answered questions on the situation in west and central Africa in the light of the recent coups d’état. Finally, Members approved the appointment of Iliana Ivanova to the European Commission.

European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act

As Russia persists in its war on Ukraine, highlighting gaps in EU defence investment, Members considered and adopted a text agreed in trilogue negotiations backing a Commission proposal for a €300 million fund to incentivise joint procurement of urgent and critical defence products – the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA). This should result in funding being made available for defence procurement by consortia of at least three EU Member States.

Critical raw materials

In the face of growing geopolitical challenges, Members debated and adopted a report from the Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee, setting Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council on establishing a framework to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (‘CRMs act’). Parliament would like to see higher benchmarks, more regular review of the lists of CRMs, and greater support for ‘strategic projects’ eligible for streamlined permitting processes and easier access to financing.

Improving the environment

Members debated and adopted Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations on a Commission proposal to update water pollution legislation. The legislation would add over two dozen substances, including glyphosate, to the lists of priority water pollutants that EU government authorities must monitor and control. Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) seeks stricter threshold values for groundwater, as these environments are more vulnerable to stressors.

Air pollution is the largest environmental health risk in the EU. Members considered and adopted an ENVI committee report setting Parliament’s position for negotiations on revising air quality legislation with the Council. Parliament seeks stricter limit and target values for several pollutants by 2030, stricter rules on compensation, and suggests Member States finance air quality measures with funding from penalties.

Modernising the energy sector

The EU needs to raise the share of renewables in energy consumption, to tackle climate and energy security challenges. Members adopted the text agreed with the Council on a new revision of the Renewable Energy Directive. Setting a target for a 42.5 % share by 2030, the new legislation should simplify permitting procedures for renewable energy projects and set specific targets for the buildings and transport sectors.

Members also adopted the text reached in trilogue negotiations on the ReFuelEU aviation initiative. The text places requirements on the uptake of aviation fuel at EU airports, to fight the practice of carriers taking on more fuel than necessary where prices are lower, which increases emissions. The minimum share of sustainable aviation fuels suppliers must provide to EU airports will be progressively increased.

Single market emergency instrument

Aiming to plan for future shocks to the EU internal market disrupting the free flow of goods, services and people, such as in the recent pandemic, Members considered a report by the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on the proposed single market emergency instrument (SMEI) package. Parliament proposes to change the instrument’s governance structure, and underlines the importance of accountability in making emergency decisions and of protecting supply chains, and seeks a greater role in triggering the proposed crisis ’emergency mode’. Parliament proposes to formalise the use of ‘fast lanes’ to facilitate free movement, especially where relevant to an emergency affecting the internal market.

Consumer credits

With inflation rising, it is more important than ever to protect consumers who need to obtain credit to pay for goods and services. Members approved a provisional agreement on a proposal for a new consumer credit directive. The new legislation will ensure consumers have all the information they need to make an informed choice before they sign for a loan, with the updated consumer credit directive also covering risky loans, those under €200, and loans offered through crowdfunding.

Labelling requirements

Members adopted a provisional agreement reached on regional non‑food craft and industrial products, establishing intellectual property rights to protect products whose quality, reputation or other characteristic is attributable to a specific geographical area. Members also adopted a provisional agreement for a regulation aligning the labelling requirements for organic pet food with those for organic human food.

Standards for substances of human origin intended for human application

Members adopted an ENVI committee report setting Parliament’s position on a proposal to update EU law protecting donors and recipients of substances of human origin used in medical treatments. The proposal seeks to improve donation collection rates and planning for emergencies. Parliament seeks stronger measures to improve protection for citizens who donate or are treated with human blood, tissues or cells.

Management plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean

As a contracting party to the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), which manages the stock of eastern bluefin tuna in the Atlantic, the EU updates fisheries laws to match ICCAT recommendations. As bluefin tuna populations have recovered, Members adopted an agreement setting new rules reflecting the latest ICCAT management plan in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

Administrative cooperation on taxation:

Tax authorities struggle to obtain information on tax-payers gains in the fast-moving crypto-asset sector. Members voted on a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report on the revision the directive on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (‘DAC8’), while underlining the need for broader rules, covering ownership information on moveable assets such as yachts and private jets.

Mechanism to resolve cross-border legal and administrative obstacles

Members debated a Committee on Regional Development (REGI) legislative-initiative report seeking to revive proposals for a European cross-border mechanism (ECBM). Parliament proposes that Member States tackle obstacles to cross-border development by establishing cross-border coordination points.

2022 report on Türkiye

The Commission’s 2022 annual report on Türkiye notes ‘serious deficiencies’ in the functioning of the country’s democratic institutions, and points to a lack of progress on relations on Cyprus. Members debated and adopted the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) assessment of the Commission’s report, and called for ‘a parallel and realistic framework’ for EU-Türkiye relations. 

Opening of trilogue negotiations   

Eight decisions – from the ECON, IMCO, ITRE and EMPL committees – to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were approved without a vote. A further mandate from the ITRE committee, on EU electricity market design, was approved by a plenary vote. 

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – July 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marc Jütten.

Leaders met in New Delhi, India, for the 18th summit of the G20, the intergovernmental forum for international economic cooperation of the world’s major economies. The 2-day meeting (9 to 10 September 2023) hosted by the Indian G20 presidency took place at a time of increasing political and economic rivalry, in which the world’s leading and emerging economies are shaping new alliances around the globe. The themes chosen by the Indian presidency and the decision taken by the G20 leaders to grant permanent member status to the African Union (AU) reflect the growing importance that the G20 members attach to the states from the ‘Global South’.

Main results of the summit: G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration

The G20 leaders issued a declaration supported by all G20 members at the end of the summit in New Delhi at which Charles Michel, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, represented the EU.

Responding to the Indian presidency’s six G20 priorities (green development, inclusive growth, progress on the UN SDGs, technological transformation, multilateral institutions for the 21st century, and women-led development), the leaders committed to a series of actions and goals in a wide-ranging 83-paragraph-long declaration under the theme ‘One Earth · One Family · One Future’. The declaration also responded to calls from the EU, for example, for a reform of the multilateral development bank and action to address climate change, for instance by tripling renewable energy capacity by 2030. Some of the deliverables were to:

• accelerate the full and effective implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;
• act on an agreement to triple renewable energy capacity globally by 2030;
• pursue low-GHG/low-carbon emissions, and climate-resilient and environmentally sustainable development pathways;
• scale up financing from all sources and accelerate efforts towards achieving the Paris Agreement, including its temperature goal;
• improve access to digital services and digital public infrastructure, and leverage digital transformation opportunities to boost sustainable and inclusive growth;
• close gender gaps and promote the full, equal, effective and meaningful participation of women in the economy as decision-makers;
• call for a reform of the multilateral system and reform the international development finance system including more effective multilateral development banks (MDBs);
• commit to a rules-based, non-discriminatory, fair, open, inclusive, equitable, sustainable and transparent multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organization at its core.

Geopolitical issues

The absence of China’s President Xi Jinping, leader of the world’s second largest economy, attracted significant media attention and there was speculation as to whether Xi, who was represented by China’s Premier, Li Qiang, did not show up because of tensions in India-China relations or because of the challenging domestic situation. Other analysts came to the conclusion that China is disillusioned with the G20 as it is too dominated by US influence, and that the country prefers to pursue a new global system of governance. In the run-up to the summit, it seemed questionable if the G20 leaders would manage to agree on a final communiqué given divisions in the group, in particular over Russia’s war against Ukraine. However, in the end – after 200 hours of negotiations and 300 bilateral meetings – the G20 sherpas managed to produce a text on which all leaders were able to agree. Nevertheless, compared to last year’s leaders’ communiqué, the G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration has been watered down. While the 2022 declaration still contained a reference in which members (according to their national positions) deplored in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, this year’s text does not condemn Russia explicitly but states that all countries should ‘refrain from action against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state’. They also called for the implementation of initiatives such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative to ensure immediate and unimpeded deliveries of grain.

As with last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin did not attend the summit and was represented by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The latter called the summit a success, and said that because of the ‘consolidated position of the Global South in defence of its legitimate interests’ it was possible ‘to prevent the success of the West’s attempt to again ‘Ukrain-ise’ the entire agenda to the detriment of discussing the urgent problems of developing countries’. Ukraine criticised the G20’s final declaration but thanked its allies for doing their part to advance Ukraine’s position in the declaration. Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who participated in the 2022 summit by video-conference, was not invited to attend the meeting this time. According to reports, key emerging economies of the Global South (India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa), who are avoiding taking sides in an increasingly polarised world, were decisive in negotiating a compromise that allowed all G20 members to sign the final declaration. The decision by the G20 leaders to grant permanent member status to the African Union (which represents 55 African member states) acknowledges the growing role of the emerging countries from the Global South.  

Side events: Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment

Several side events took place on the margins of the summit. US President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi co-hosted a group of G20 leaders to accelerate investments to scale up high-quality infrastructure projects and the development of economic corridors through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), which was launched last year by the EU, the US and Indonesia during the G20 summit in Bali. A memorandum of understanding on the India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), seen as a possible alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, was signed by the US, India, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, Italy and the European Union. The planned corridor would link India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Israel and the EU, with the objective to boost trade and economic growth. In addition to this, the EU and the US decided to join forces to promote the Trans-African Corridor connecting southern Democratic Republic of Congo and north-western Zambia to regional and global trade markets via the Port of Lobito in Angola.

Reactions and next steps

The simple fact that the G20 leaders agreed upon a final declaration has been considered a success for the Indian presidency and for Modi. Moreover, some experts stress that India used the G20 presidency effectively as an opportunity to present itself as the voice of the Global South, in particular by choosing topics that are relevant for developing countries and by proposing to invite the AU to be a permanent member of the G20. The decision of President Xi to skip the summit at a moment in which India is emerging as a counterweight to China within the developing world, brings Michael Schuman, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, to the conclusion that President Xi turned out to be the biggest loser of the summit. Regarding commitments on climate change, experts make a rather critical assessment of the G20 summit. While some credit the Indian presidency with selecting sustainable themes, and see the G20’s commitment to triple renewable energy positively, many other responses from the civil society come to a negative assessment on the final declaration. For Greenpeace, for example, the outcome was disappointing, not least since leaders failed to reach agreement on the phasing out of fossil fuels. India will host the speakers of parliaments of G20 countries (including the European Parliament) from 12‑14 October 2023 in the new Parliament building in New Delhi. The next two G20 presidencies will also be held by members of the BRICS group: Brazil will formally take over the annual G20 presidency on 1 December, with South Africa following a year later. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced at the closing of the G20 summit that Brazil’s G20 presidency would have three priorities: i) social inclusion and the fight against hunger; ii) energy transition and sustainable development in its three aspects (social, economic and environmental); and iii) reform of global governance institutions.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi, India‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou and Branislav Stanicek.

With war having returned to the European continent, measuring the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world – as the ‘Normandy Index’ does – is more important than ever. The annual Index was presented for the first time at the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace.

Take a look at our interactive infographic on Peace and Security

This paper sets out the findings of the 2023 exercise, which draws on data compiled in 2022, and explains how the Index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country’s performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 61 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

Read the complete study on ‘Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide: Normandy Index 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Normandy Index, 2023

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Written by Marin Mileusnic.

The Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument and its centrepiece, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), are the main EU-level tools to help the Member States recover from the socio-economic fallout caused by the COVID-19 crisis and address structural challenges. Implementing the RRF in a transparent manner is particularly important for the overall success of NGEU, all the more so due to the latter’s large volume, result-based spending model and limited implementation period. This briefing discusses efforts to ensure the transparency of RRF implementation at both EU and national levels of governance.

At the EU level, the European Commission engages in recovery and resilience dialogues with the European Parliament; publishes implementation reports; and updates the RRF Scoreboard with information on completed milestones and targets set in the individual national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs), as well as on the disbursement of funds to the Member States.

The Parliament’s involvement is vital for ensuring transparency and democratic scrutiny of the RRF implementation process. At the national level, Member States report on NRRP implementation to their national parliaments. As Member States have a primary role in protecting EU financial interests, timely and comprehensive reporting on their part is crucial, as it has the potential to contribute to higher accountability and transparency standards. These, combined with timely disclosure of information at the EU level, play a role in strengthening the added value of the Facility.

To check performance in regard to the regularity and comprehensiveness of national-level reporting, this briefing focuses on a selection of eight Member States – Spain, Italy, France, Portugal, Slovenia, Ireland, Croatia and Romania. In addition, it also sheds light on the role of the informal expert group, composed of Member States’ authorities and Commission representatives, in the exchange of views on RRF implementation. The group publishes the agendas and minutes of its meetings, thereby introducing a novel, hybrid way of promoting transparency in implementation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Transparency in the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte and Silvia Kotanidis.

In May 2023, the Council of the EU confirmed that the next elections to the European Parliament – the tenth since the first direct elections in 1979 – will take place from 6 to 9 June 2024. Ahead of Election Day, candidates and political parties will carry out electoral activities throughout the European Union (EU) to explain their political programmes and vision for the future of the EU to the electorate. In the same context, debates will take place on national platforms and media.

Currently, election campaigns are largely regulated at national level, which means that there are differences among the EU Member States as to the activities allowed during the election period. However, election campaigns across the EU share a number of traits in terms of prohibitions and limitations. For example, although not all Member States have rules on whether and as from when election silence applies, most of them restrict election canvassing or the publishing of election polls on Election Day or immediately before the opening of the ballots.

Pending the adoption of an electoral reform intended to harmonise at least some of the aspects of the election campaign, such as its start (not earlier than 8 weeks before Election Day) and its end, as well as the start and the end of the election silence period (48 hours before Election Day), this briefing looks at the Member States’ rules on the length of the election campaign period and the election silence period ahead of the European Parliament elections (European elections).

This briefing is one in a series published in the run-up to the 2024 European Parliament elections. It does not focus on election advertising, election funding or how election procedures are regulated in the individual Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Length of the election campaign and the electoral silence period in European Parliament elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Aidan Christie.

The September plenary session is always an important moment in the Parliamentary year, with Members returning to Strasbourg to hear the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen’s annual statement on the State of the Union, as well as setting to work on a very full agenda. Other highlights are set to include an address to a formal sitting of Parliament by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the exiled Belarusian opposition leader (and 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate). Members will also vote on the appointment of Iliana Ivanova as a member of the European Commission. On Tuesday, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission Josep Borrell is expected to attend question time to discuss the situation in west and central Africa following the coups d’état that have rocked the region in recent months.

Weather patterns over the summer months have highlighted the need to raise the EU’s ambition when it comes to the share of renewables in energy consumption to tackle current climate and energy security challenges. Members are scheduled on Monday to consider the final text of an agreement reached with the Council on a new revision of the Renewable Energy Directive, setting a target for a 42.5 % share by 2030. If agreed, the new legislation should simplify permitting procedures for renewable energy projects. It would set specific targets for the buildings sector and use of biofuels in the transport sector and aims at promoting innovation and cooperation on cross-border projects.

Members are also set to discuss a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report on the ReFuelEU aviation initiative, in a debate scheduled for Tuesday afternoon. A provisional regulation agreed in trilogue negotiations places requirements on the uptake of aviation fuel at EU airports, to fight fuel tankering practices (when carriers avoid high fuel prices at a destination airport by refuelling an aircraft with more fuel than is necessary at departure, which increases emissions). The text also places progressively increasing requirements on the minimum share of sustainable aviation fuels suppliers must provide to EU airports, as well as on the proportion of synthetic fuels in the fuel mix.

As clean water is essential for healthy ecosystems, as well as for drinking, bathing, and agriculture, on Monday, Members are set to debate Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations on a Commission proposal to update water pollution legislation. If adopted, the legislation would add over two dozen substances, including glyphosate, to the lists of priority surface and groundwater pollutants that EU government authorities must monitor and control. Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) wishes to amend the proposal to set much lower threshold values for groundwater than surface water, as groundwater environments are more vulnerable to stressors than surface ecosystems. The ENVI report also calls for a system of extended producer responsibility for water pollutants, and adds provisions on access to justice in cases of breach of the Water Framework Directive.

The largest environmental health risk in the EU, however, is air pollution, causing chronic disease and early death. Members are due to consider an ENVI committee report on a proposal to revise EU air quality legislation on Tuesday afternoon. The committee seeks stricter limit and target values for several pollutants, to be put in place by 2030. It proposes strict rules on compensation, and suggests Member States finance measures to improve air quality with money collected from penalties. The report proposes aligning future monitoring and review with World Health Organization guidelines and using comparable air quality indices across the EU. Adoption of the report would set Parliament’s position for negotiations on cleaner air with the Council.

As Russia persists in its war on Ukraine, highlighting gaps in EU defence investment, the Commission has proposed a €300 million fund to incentivise joint procurement of urgent and critical defence products – the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA). On Monday evening, Members are due to consider the text agreed in trilogue negotiations, which would make funding available for purchases by consortia of at least three EU Member States. Contractors would have to be established (or have their executive management structures) in the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein or Norway. If adopted, the agreement would set rules on the portion of component costs that may come from third countries. A 5 % funding bonus would also be added when manufacturing involves small or medium-sized enterprises, or, following Parliament’s position, when defence procurement benefits Ukraine or Moldova.

In the face of growing geopolitical challenges, Members are set to debate a report from the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) on establishing a framework to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (‘CRMs act’). While the proposal seeks to list 34 CRMs, including 16 ‘strategic’ raw materials and strengthen EU capacity to extract, process and recycle them, the committee would like to see higher benchmarks, more regular review of these lists and greater support for ‘strategic projects’ eligible for streamlined permitting processes and easier access to financing. Members will debate the ITRE report on Wednesday afternoon. If adopted, this would set Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Aiming to plan ahead against future shocks to the EU internal market that disrupt the free flow of goods, services and people, such as the recent pandemic, Members are set to consider a report by the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) regarding the proposed single market emergency instrument (SMEI) package, in a debate scheduled for Tuesday afternoon. The IMCO report proposes changing the instrument’s name to the ‘Internal market emergency and resilience act’ (IMERA), as well as its governance structure. The report underlines the importance of accountability in making emergency decisions and of protecting supply chains, and seeks a greater role for the Parliament in triggering the proposed ’emergency mode’ during a crisis. As during the pandemic, IMCO proposes to formalise the use of ‘fast lanes’ to facilitate the free movement of goods, services and workers, especially where relevant to an emergency affecting the internal market.

As EU border regions face specific challenges when working together on many projects, on Wednesday afternoon Members are expected to debate a new Committee on Regional Development (REGI) legislative-initiative report seeking to revive proposals for a European cross-border mechanism (ECBM). The committee proposes that Member States establish cross-border coordination points to coordinate and monitor projects that would remove obstacles to cross-border development. Member States would be free to decide whether to use the mechanism, which could also be used in regions bordering candidate countries.

With inflation impacting household spending, it is more important than ever to protect consumers who need to obtain credit to pay for goods and services. On Monday afternoon Members are therefore due to debate a provisional agreement reached between the co-legislators on a proposal for a new consumer credit directive. If adopted, the new legislation would ensure consumers have all the information they need to make an informed choice before they sign for a loan. Creditors would also have to make prior checks on their creditworthiness. As the financial landscape has changed since the original rules were set, the new consumer credit directive should also cover risky loans, those under €200, and loans offered through crowdfunding. Another new financial feature, the fast-moving crypto-asset sector, hampers tax authorities’ efforts to ensure citizens who invest in crypto contribute their fair share of the income they make to society. On Wednesday afternoon, Members are set to vote on a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report on the European Commission proposal to revise the directive on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (‘DAC8’). The committee strongly supports introducing a reporting framework requiring crypto-asset service providers report on crypto-transactions, to fight tax fraud. However, the ECON report also points to a need for broader rules, covering ownership information on assets such as yachts and private jets, or valuables held at free ports and customs warehouses.

Another domain that has advanced beyond recognition in the 20 years since EU legislation was introduced to protect donors and recipients is medical treatments involving substances of human origin (SoHOs), such as blood transfusions, stem cell, cornea and skin transplants, and in vitro fertilisation. On Tuesday, therefore, Members are set to vote on an ENVI committee report on a proposal to bring EU law up to date and create more flexibility to cope with future developments. The proposal seeks to improve donation collection rates and planning for emergencies, with better registration and reporting by entities working with SoHOs, as well as to develop an EU platform to gather information and increase transparency. The ENVI report seeks to reinforce these measures, particularly those that improve protection for citizens who donate or are treated with human blood, tissues or cells. If adopted, the report will set Parliament’s position for future negotiations with the Council.

While the EU has well‑established geographical indication schemes for food and drink products, protection of regional non‑food craft and industrial products (CIs) is handled – if at all – at the national level. A proposed regulation on CIs would establish intellectual property rights to protect products whose quality, reputation or other characteristic is attributable to a specific geographical area. At least one step of the production must take place in the defined area, and, as a result of Parliament’s push during trilogue negotiations, Member State authorities will be required to facilitate the application process for micro-, small and medium‑sized enterprises and keep fees to a minimum. The resulting provisional text is scheduled for debate on Monday.

On Tuesday, Members are scheduled to vote on a provisional agreement for a regulation on the labelling of organic pet food. Pet food has been included under the rules for labelling of organic feed (intended for food-producing animals) since 2022. The agreement brings the labelling requirements for organic pet food closer into alignment with those for organic human food: pet food will be eligible for labelling with an EU organic production logo if 95 % of its agricultural ingredients are organic (compared to the 100 % required for organic feed).

Further afield, the Commission’s 2022 annual report on Türkiye notes ‘serious deficiencies’ in the functioning of the country’s democratic institutions, and points to a lack of progress on relations on Cyprus. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are scheduled to debate the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) assessment of the Commission’s report. The AFET report reiterates EU commitment to and support for refugees in Türkiye, as well as underlining the humanitarian situation arising from the earthquake in February. However, the committee emphasises that, although Türkiye remains an EU accession candidate, this process cannot resume under the current circumstances, and calls for ‘a parallel and realistic framework’ for EU-Türkiye relations.

The EU is a contracting party to the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), which manages the stock of eastern bluefin tuna in the Atlantic. The EU is therefore obliged to update fisheries laws to match ICCAT recommendations, which are adjusted regularly. Thanks to fishing quotas and other restrictive measures, bluefin tuna populations have recovered, leading the ICCAT to move to a management plan in June 2019. However, while Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) adopted its report, supporting quotas for small-scale fisheries, in September 2020, the Council rejected the agreement reached in trilogue negotiations. Talks resumed in 2022, and Parliament will vote at second reading on a new agreement on Tuesday. The agreed text largely follows Parliament’s original position on fishing quotas for bluefin tuna, and sets new rules reflecting the latest ICCAT management plan.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Ukraine has made progress in recapturing its territory seized by Russia, 18 months after Moscow started its unprovoked war against its neighbour, as part of the counter-offensive launched in June. Ukrainian analysts say the drive to capture a succession of villages is paying off. Russia has dismissed the offensive as a failure, while admitting that things are not easy in parts of south-eastern Zaporizhzhia region.

Russia has unleashed a barrage of drone strikes on various targets, including the port city of Odessa. Some have reached the border of NATO member Romania, according to Ukrainian officials, and Romanian President Klaus Iohannis has said that strikes were less than a kilometre from Romania’s border.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Kyiv on 6 and 7 September to discuss how the counter-offensive is going and to assess battlefield needs, as well as any steps required to shore up Ukraine’s energy security ahead of winter. Meanwhile, Turkey has said that, together with the UN, it has prepared new initiatives to revive the grain deal, recently blocked by Russia, which had allowed Ukraine to transport the commodity safely through the Black Sea.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses on the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series. Publications on NATO ahead of its July summit can be found in another item in the series.

Scars on their souls: PTSD and veterans of Ukraine
Globsec, September 2023

The impact of the war in Ukraine on the European defence market
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, September 2023

Russian offensive campaign assessment, September 2023
Institute of the Study of War, September 2023

The Russian imperial movement, the war in Ukraine and the future of Russian state
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, September 2023

Russia drives Switzerland closer to NATO
International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2023 

Russia is losing in Ukraine but winning in Georgia
Atlantic Council, August 2023

Putin’s Russia must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail
Atlantic Council, August 2023

Ukraine’s remarkable resilience may prove decisive in long war with Russia
Atlantic Council, August 2023

Here’s what F-16s will (and will not) mean for Ukraine’s fight against Russia 
Atlantic Council, August 2023

Putin’s Russia is trapped in genocidal denial over Ukrainian independence
Atlantic Council, August 2023

The return of the enemy: Putin’s war on Ukraine and a cognitive blockage in Western security policy
Brookings Institution, August 2023

Republicans are turning against aid to Ukraine
Brookings Institution, August 2023

The war in Ukraine is about Europe’s future
Carnegie Europe, August 2023

Ukrainians are slowly adapting to life in Germany
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2023

The end of Prigozhin: The Kremlin disciplines the elite
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2023

Partial success: Russia’s oil sector adapts to sanctions
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2023

The twilight of the Russian-Indian strategic partnership
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2023

Pushing Ukraine to negotiate now would be disastrous
Chatham House, August 2023

Who killed Yevgeny Prigozhin?
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

Three lessons from Europe’s response to Ukrainian migration
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

How tomorrow never comes: Russia’s war against Ukraine and its impact on Taiwan
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

EU-Ukraine wartime trade: Overcoming difficulties, forging a European path
European Policy Centre, August 2023

An opportunity for Ukraine’s allies
German Marshall Fund, August 2023

The wind rose’s directions: Russia’s strategic deterrence during the first year of the war in Ukraine
Institut français des relations internationales, August 2023

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institute of International Economy, August 2023

Seeking ways to exclude Russian vendors from UN procurement system
Polish Institute of International Affairs, August 2023

Russian aggression speeding up changes in religious situation in Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, August 2023

Hard times for U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control
Rand Corporation, August 2023

China ponders Russia’s logistical challenges in the Ukraine war
Rand Corporation, August 2023

Resisting Russia: Insights into Ukraine’s civilian-based actions during the first four months of the war in 2022
Rand Corporation, August 2023

Why Biden was justified to send cluster munitions to Ukraine
Rand Corporation, August 2023

The Russo-Ukrainian war has bolstered Ukraine’s non-state alliance network
Rand Corporation, August 2023

Nuclear rhetoric and escalation management in Russia’s war against Ukraine: A chronology
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2023

Did Russia commit a war crime in leaving the Ukraine grain deal?
Atlantic Council, July 2023

Ukraine must not forget fight against corruption while battling Russia
Atlantic Council, July 2023

Ukraine’s digital revolution is proving vital for the country’s war effort
Atlantic Council, July 2023

Want Ukraine in the EU? You’ll have to reform the EU, too
Brookings Institution, July 2023

Ukraine has not transformed EU foreign policy
Carnegie Europe, July 2023

NATO gives Ukraine no finishing line
Carnegie Europe, July 2023

How frozen Russian assets could pay for rebuilding in Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, July 2023

Russia killed the Black Sea grain deal: These countries could suffer most 
Council on Foreign Relations, July 2023

The 2024 U.S. elections and Ukraine
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, July 2023

Cluster munitions and international law
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, July 2023

The Ukrainian counteroffensive: Why Western allies should keep calm and carry on
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2023

In Ukraine I saw a brave but ravaged land in limbo: It needs a future, it needs NATO
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

Russia’s weaponisation of grain exports must not be tolerated
European Policy Centre, July 2023

The China nuclear taboo and Russia’s war in Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2023

Ukraine’s NATO membership will strengthen Europe’s security
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2023

The EU can’t treat Ukrainian refugees like short-term visitors
Rand Corporation, July 2023

Making military aid work
Rand Corporation, July 2023

China and the war in Ukraine
Fundacion Real Instituto Elcano, July 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias.

The 2023 G20 Summit will take place in New Delhi, India, on 9 and 10 September. In preparation for the summit, the G20 Presidency has focused on six priorities consistent with those of the G7, namely green development, inclusive growth, progress on the United Nations sustainable development goals (SDGs), technological transformation, multilateral institutions for the 21st century, and women-led development.

The G20’s informal nature makes it a vital global platform, gathering the leaders of all major developed and emerging economies, regardless of their political systems. For the EU, the summit is traditionally an opportunity to reaffirm its strong support for multilateralism and call for action to resolve important and/or urgent issues. A recent example is the letter sent by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Deal, asking his counterparts to join in placing pressure on Russia to return to the deal, given its importance for many developing countries.

While the outcomes of recent summits have not been as clear-cut and unanimous as in previous crises (e.g. 2008), experts maintain that the G20 can still serve as a forum to manage strategic rivalries and global challenges. In this context, major (Brazil and India) and rising middle powers (Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey) in the group play an increasingly important role. Their contribution to the final declaration condemning the war in Ukraine underlined this in 2022, as well as the inclusion of several topics which are important to emerging economies, such as the need to address food insecurity, reinforce pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, increase access to education, and strengthen the development agenda. At the same time, this should be considered in the light of China and Russia’s leaders’ decision not to attend the 2023 summit, which, coupled with the envisioned expansion of the BRICS group, can be seen as a desire from part of the China/Russia axis to dilute the G20’s importance.

This briefing draws on a previous edition, on the 2022 G20 summit, by Angelos Delivorias.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The 2023 G20 Summit: A deepening rift heralding an uncertain future‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

G20 and G7 member states G20 countries: Total GDP, GDP per capita and population in 2023 G20 countries: percentage of international trade, GDP, population and emissions

Written by Martina Prpic.

In the European Union, provisions concerning prisoners’ right to vote vary from one Member State to another. While a significant number of EU Member States place no restrictions at all on prisoners voting, many Member States deprive inmates of the right to vote, depending on the type of offence committed and/or the length of their sentence. A small number of Member States deprive inmates of the right to vote permanently, even after they have served their sentences. In those cases where inmates do have the right to vote, the process is facilitated in various ways, including postal votes, proxy votes and the creation of special polling stations.

The arguments in favour and against disenfranchisement on account of a criminal conviction are well known. Those in favour argue that depriving a person of the right to vote is part of the punitive process, while those against argue that voting is a right linked to citizenship and when individuals are convicted and lose their right to liberty, they do not cease to exist as citizens. They argue that deprivation of the right to vote should not be part of the punitive process because there is no evidence supporting the claim that disenfranchisement acts as a significant deterrent.

The current European Electoral Act on elections to the European Parliament does not provide for a uniform electoral system applicable in all the EU Member States. It contains a set of common principles that are to be upheld in the different domestic laws applicable to European elections. It does not define expressly and precisely who is entitled to vote or stand for election. Nor does it contain specific provisions concerning the exercise of the right to vote of prisoners. The definition of such provisions remains within the competence of each Member State. This briefing looks at the international and European standards applicable to the right to vote of prisoners. It also examines the existing provisions in the 27 EU Member States in relation the European Parliament elections.

This briefing is one in a series of publications looking ahead to the 2024 European elections.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Prisoners’ voting rights in European Parliament elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Most rare diseases are incurable. Research into new diagnostics and therapies is hampered by the low number of patients, limited amount of data, lack of multi-centre coordination and low profitability. Biosensors are a technology that, driven by continuous advances in artificial intelligence, can help disease detection, lower the cost of novel therapies, replace placebo groups in clinical trials and foster patient-centred, personalised (e)-medicine. Governance of biosensor technology involves targeted action addressing various EU laws and policies.

Up to 36 million people in the EU live with a rare condition, namely one that is defined by the European Medicines Agency as affecting fewer than 5 people in 10 000. Of these diseases, 80 % are genetic and chronic. Most appear in early childhood and lead to debilitating and degenerative conditions that diminish the patient’s quality of life. Many of them still have no cure. Examples include:

• cystic fibrosis – a genetic disorder affecting the lungs and often associated with secondary bacterial infections;
• sickle-cell disease – a genetic blood disorder that leads to cardiovascular deficiencies;
• amyotrophic lateral sclerosis – a progressive neurodegenerative disease that affects the muscles.

More than 90 % of rare diseases lack sufficient diagnosis and treatment tools. Treatment is limited by the high cost of research and development (R&D) and low success rate, creating market failures referred to as ‘unmet medical needs’. This is particularly problematic for rare diseases owing to their low prevalence and the lack of statistically significant clinical trials. A second common challenge is the limited sharing of research data, namely between industry and academia. This reality is driven by patents and other intellectual property (IP) protections, siloed research organised around single disorders, and limited coordination between research networks.

There is therefore a need for improved research, diagnosis and therapeutic developments. One way of tackling this issue is economic, revising the public incentives awarded to the pharmaceutical industry for R&D in the area of orphan medicinal products. This is one of the goals under assessment in the European Parliament with regard to the Commission’s proposals for revised pharmaceutical legislation.

A second approach is technological, by harnessing ongoing developments in artificial intelligence (AI) to find novel treatment approaches. Biosensors are an often overlooked tool that can facilitate early detection and treatment, while keeping costs down. They are medical devices that detect biological parameters, such as the presence of an ongoing infection, altered phenotypic levels, genetic mutations and pharmacological drug effects. These devices can be used as point-of-care equipment, as wearables (e.g. smart watches, smartphones, eyeglasses, patches, smart textiles) or even as ingestibles and implantables. They can be applied to various medical fields, from genetics and genomics, to neurology, oncology, immunology, cardiology and metabology. Examples of biosensor use for rare disease detection and treatment include:

• a neural network-based tool that can detect patterns in facial morphology to assist in diagnosis;
• nanoparticle therapies to treat chronic bacterial infections associated with cystic fibrosis;
• ‘human-on-a-chip‘ (HoaC) and ‘organ-on-a-chip‘ models, to study disease states in a cost-effective and patient-specific way;
• smartwatch monitors that can evaluate drug effect in patients with sickle-cell anaemia;
• ultra-sensitive biosensors that can detect cancer in a blood test;
• enzymatic and electrochemical sensors that can help diagnose and monitor phenylketonuria disease;
• graphene biosensors that detect DNA and RNA;
• a remote wound monitoring device.

Potential impact and development

Biosensors can be used for disease diagnosis, significantly reducing diagnosis times from the average of 4 to 5 years. They can also contribute to disease treatment, through monitoring of disease progression, prognosis and response to drug treatment. When applied to rare diseases, biosensors can unravel breakthrough advances in two fields: clinical trials and personalised medicine.

Clinical trial designs for rare diseases face limitations caused by the small number of study groups, requiring novel approaches to assess and monitor the safety and efficacy of the proposed interventions. Biosensors permit continuous data collection and analysis (e.g. heartrate or insulin levels), which can help define clinical endpoints and patient-reported outcomes. Biosensors help study the efficacy and safety of new drugs and approaches, namely gene editing and RNA therapies. In addition, they can enable a placebo group to be replaced with modelling based on real-world data, providing more robust statistical analysis.

Coupled with continuous advancements in AI, namely the internet of medical things (IoMT), biosensors have become a type of personalised medicine, whereby wearables can be used as smart medical devices to monitor vital parameters, ensuring high precision, continuity and comfort. They can send real-world data to be monitored and evaluated remotely by a general practitioner (telemedicine), allowing for better care that considers the patient’s environment and needs, for better decision-making. Data collection can then be funnelled towards basic and translational research, which is essential for R&D in the area of novel therapies for rare diseases. The application of biosensors also entails technical, financial, legal and ethical issues, however, that need to be considered when managing large volumes of data (e.g. General Data Protection Regulation).

Anticipatory policy-making

Advancements in AI have made large amounts of data available, data that can foster health research, drive innovative treatments and improve evidence-based care. Biosensors fall within the scope of the Medical Devices Regulation, but are also affected by several other pieces of EU legislation.

A key issue for the coming years pertains to data collection and coordination for R&D in the area of novel diagnostics and treatments. The EU has 24 European reference networks (ERNs) to strengthen coordination in R&D. The European Platform on Rare Disease Registration, meanwhile, seeks to reduce the fragmentation of patients’ data contained in hundreds of registries across Europe. Orphanet is an EU-funded consortium of 40 countries within Europe and the wider world. The upcoming European health data space legislative proposal aims to promote the use of big data on rare diseases, by assisting Member States in pooling resources, increasing cooperation between national health systems and enabling the secure use of health data for clinical, healthcare planning and patient care.

Further progress could be made in open science and data-sharing, a point left untouched in the Commission proposals to revise EU pharmaceuticals legislation. A 2021 STOA study proposed policy options to achieve this goal, namely through the creation of an EU body for R&D, with public ownership of IP rights.

Another challenge will be to ensure that access to patient care, treatment and therapies is made equitable and affordable across Member States and different socioeconomic groups, and that strong ethical standards are upheld, including for data privacy and security. The AI act aims to protect health data from potential misuse and unlawful access.

A fourth aspect pertains to R&D. The EU has financed over 440 research projects in rare diseases, for instance the Horizon Europe call on how to tackle rare diseases. Yet EU health research, including on rare diseases, still suffers from fragmentation, and requires better coordination. Another recent STOA study set out policy options here, which also included the creation of an EU body for health R&D coordination.

Biosensor governance is also impacted by the proposal for a ‘SoHO‘ regulation, regarding the treatment of samples of blood, tissues and cells, and the Cross-border Healthcare Directive.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if biosensors could help treat rare diseases?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if biosensors could help treat rare diseases?’ on YouTube.

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