European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marc Jütten.

Digital trade has become a key element in the EU’s trade policy. Every modern trade agreement that the EU has concluded contains a dedicated digital trade chapter. The digital trade provisions in EU trade agreements have evolved over time, which reflects the increasing role digital trade plays today in the world economy. While there is no clear measurement of digital trade yet, the OECD estimates nevertheless that digital trade represents around 25 % (in 2020) of total trade.

The EU, as the world’s largest exporter and importer of digitally deliverable services, has a strong market position. Therefore, the development towards more digital trade provides opportunities for European consumers and the economy. In order to exploit the full potential of digital trade, it is essential to overcome fragmentation and set international standards and common digital trade rules. The EU aims to shape digital trade rules at the WTO and through free trade agreements.

Moreover, the EU’s digital trade policy is an important instrument for its green and digital transition. The European Commission stated in its 2021 ‘Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ that the Union’s (multilateral and bilateral) trade policy – as a priority – should support Europe’s green and digital agenda and pursue the objective of ensuring a leading position for the EU in digital trade.

The key difference between digital trade and traditional trade is the prominence of cross-border data flows. The free flow of data is key for economic growth and can increase the benefits from digital trade. However, certain data are considered ‘sensitive’ and require protection and/or specific processing conditions. The absence of comprehensive, binding multilateral rules specifically for cross-border data flows and privacy is challenging. That is why 87 WTO Members, including EU Member States, are currently engaged in e-commerce negotiations at the WTO.

Most recently, the EU started to strengthen its digital ties with like-minded partners. In April 2023, the Council of the EU authorised the Commission to open negotiations on digital trade principles with Singapore and the Republic of Korea.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU’s digital trade policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Hendrik Mildebrath (1st edition).

Ever since the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) became applicable in May 2018, the European Parliament and civil society organisations have been flagging deficits in its enforcement and pushing for better implementation, but little has changed. To address the situation, in July 2023 the Commission tabled a proposal aimed at improving GDPR enforcement.

The proposal seeks to support the smooth functioning and timely completion of enforcement procedures in cases of cross-border processing. To this end, the Commission suggests harmonising parties’ procedural rights, streamlining and frontloading cooperation among supervisory authorities, and detailing the GDPR’s dispute resolution mechanism.

Views on the Commission proposal diverge. Digital rights organisations advocate for enhanced complainant rights, an equal say for the lead supervisory authority and the supervisory authorities concerned on the substance of enforcement decisions, a stronger role for the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), new mechanisms to facilitate cross-country enforcement, and stricter deadlines. Industry and allied organisations favour increased transparency for the parties under investigation, a stronger role for the lead supervisory authority and lesser roles for the supervisory authorities concerned and the EDPB.

The Parliament and the Council are in the process of assessing whether the Commission’s proposal presents an adequate response and are working on their respective positions.

Versions

• January 2024: ‘Newly proposed rules to strengthen GDPR enforcement in cross-border cases‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2008/98/EC on wasteCommittee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2023) 348
4.7.2023Rapporteur:Sergey Lagodinsky (Greens/EFA, Germany)2023/0202(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Axel Voss (EPP, Germany)
Petar Vitanov (S&D, Bulgaria)
Yana Toom (Renew, Estonia)
Beata Kempa (ECR, Poland)
Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD) (Parliament
and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Committee vote

In 2023, people from across the European Union (EU) and elsewhere in the world turned to the European Parliament and its President, Roberta Metsola to request information, call for action to be taken, express their opinions, or suggest ideas on a wide range of topics. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) replied in the 24 EU official languages.

© European Parliament -Ask EP

People wrote to us on many topics, notably democracy, the war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza, seasonal time changes, corruption, Iran, the political situation in Spain and many others. Ask EP also received questions related to the European Parliament and its Members, its traineeship offers and how to visit Parliament. In 2023, Ask EP received 13 467 individual messages and 69 911 campaign enquiries.

Most frequent topics in individual enquiries in 2023

The most frequently addressed topic in 2023 was issues concerning the EU area of freedom, security and justice. People made comments and asked questions on various topics, such as the death penalty, amnesty for Catalan politicians, the rule of law, migration and freedom of movement, amounting to more than 3 040 enquiries.

The second most frequent topic on which people contacted Ask EP last year related to the European Parliament itself, with over 2 040 enquiries. Citizens expressed interest in the Members of European Parliament and their activities, enquired about traineeship and job opportunities and the possibilities to visit Parliament. They also requested information on topics such as parliamentary questions, committee meetings and the right to petition the Parliament.

© European Parliament -Ask EP

Moreover, Parliament replied to approximately 970 enquiries concerning democracy. Citizens made comments, asked questions and raised concerns about the state of democracy in the EU and around the world, for example the Reichsbürger issue in Germany.

Many citizens also contacted Ask EP last year on issues related to foreign affairs, with over 930 enquiries. In particular, people voiced their concerns about the wars taking place in Ukraine and Gaza and their consequences.

Finally, the European Parliament received many enquiries about citizens’ personal situations with requests for assistance to help them solve problems (financial support, legal aid, cross-border administrative issues, cases of discrimination, etc.). Although neither the European Parliament nor its President are able to resolve many of these types of requests directly, the Ask EP service provided citizens with a contact point and sources of information whenever possible.

Campaign messages sent to the European Parliament in 2023

As a response to political, humanitarian and economic events, citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament, expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. These messages may sometimes be identical, as part of wider public campaigns.

© European Parliament -Ask EP

Between September and December 2023, the European Parliament received a large number of messages – over 39 100 and Ask EP’s largest campaign ever – from citizens expressing concern regarding the proposal to revise EU rules on driving licences. Citizens called on the Parliament to reject the ideas put forward by the lead Member of the European Parliament on the file, which would introduce new driving licence rules, including medical examinations for elderly drivers, set new restrictions on novice drivers and make changes to the maximum weight for vehicles that can be driven with a category B driving licence.

In the reply to the campaign, we pointed out that this represented the rapporteur’s position and did not reflect the position of the European Parliament as a whole.

In March 2023, the President received over 10 100 messages calling on the Parliament to vote against the European Commission’s new legislative proposal to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. Citizens expressed their concerns that this new legislation would breach data protection and privacy rights.

In its proposal, the Commission wanted to make it mandatory for online service providers to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse material on their services. According to the Commission, investigation of suspicious content would follow strict rules and conditions; it would not entail general monitoring of individuals’ communications.

At the start of 2023, the President continued to receive a large number of messages – around 7 500 – about a pro-life conference, which took place in the European Parliament in November 2022. Citizens called on the President to take measures against Members and staff who, they claimed, tried to intimidate the participants.

In the reply to the campaign, we stressed that the demonstrators were invited into the room by the organisers, provided that they did not disrupt the meeting. The meeting took place without incident.

The President also received over 5 200 enquiries from citizens calling on Parliament to support those protesting in Iran. Parliament condemned the killing of Mahsa Amini, as well as the widespread and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against protesting citizens. Parliament called on the Iranian authorities to immediately release and drop any charges against demonstrators.

A separate campaign, which sent around 2 140 messages, called on the President to act to fight biodiversity loss and climate change and urged her to support a European law on nature restoration.

Are you curious about our answers to other campaign messages in 2023? You can find replies to campaigns on the EPRS blog. A selection of answers to questions frequently posed to the European Parliament can also be found on the blog.

If you wish, you can put your questions and/or comments to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP), using our contact form, the Citizens’ app, or by post. We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

We look forward to your enquiries in 2024 and beyond!

Your Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass with Alexander Tyssen.

‘Auschwitz didn’t appear from nowhere’, remarked Marian Turski, Holocaust survivor and child prisoner in the Auschwitz death camp, in January 2020 at the solemn ceremony on International Holocaust Remembrance Day. The former Auschwitz prisoner described the path from tiny hardships in everyday life and growing discrimination and persecution laws, to the genocide of Jews, the Holocaust. The consecutive stages of shrinking freedom can be summarised as 10 stages of genocide, in a process that could happen anywhere, with perpetrators potentially from all walks of life and ethnicities. However, anyone with enough courage can stop it at any stage.

Every year in January, the EU institutions honour the memory of the victims of the Holocaust and pay tribute to the survivors, of whom fewer and fewer remain to bear witness to the horrors of the Nazi persecutions. The EU bears a responsibility to keep the painful memory of those darkest days in Europe’s history alive. Repeating ‘Never again’ is not enough, and that is why the EU, which emerged from the ashes of World War Two, and is based on the principles of peace, freedom, human dignity and fundamental rights, has a duty to protect minorities, the Jewish minority in particular, from discrimination, hate speech and violence.

The EU strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life, the nomination of the coordinator on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life, European Parliament resolutions condemning growing antisemitism and warning against neo-Nazi organisations making their come back across the EU, all demonstrate the EU’s awareness of these dangerous phenomena and its determination to halt them.

Read the complete briefing on ‘International Holocaust Remembrance Day: The fragility of freedom‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The first January 2024 plenary session opened with a statement by Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, commemorating Jacques Delors, the former Commission President, who passed away on 27 December. The highlight of the session was the presentation by Prime Minister Alexander De Croo of the programme of activities of the Belgian Presidency of the Council. There was also a debate on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 14-15 December 2023 and on the preparation of the special European Council meeting on 1 February, together with the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds.

Further debates took place on the review of the economic governance framework; the recent ecological catastrophe involving plastic pellets lost off a ship and its impact on micro-plastic pollution in the maritime and coastal habitats; addressing urgent skills shortages and finding the right talents to boost job creation; improving the socio-economic situation of farmers and rural areas; ensuring fair incomes, food security and a just transition; the revision of the European Labour Authority’s mandate; and the fight against the resurgence of neo-fascism in Europe, in particular following the parade that took place in Rome on 7 January. Several debates were held on international issues: keeping commitments and delivering military assistance to Ukraine; the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the need to reach a ceasefire and the risks of regional escalation; the need for an EU and international response to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and for continued support to the Yemeni peace process; the state of emergency in Ecuador; and Norway’s recent decision to advance seabed mining in the Arctic.

Finally, Jan-Christoph Oetjen (Renew, Germany) was elected a Vice-President of Parliament, replacing Nicola Beer.

Gas emissions

Although the Ozone Regulation is working to cut emissions from ozone-depleting substances (ODS), old products containing ODS remain a source of emissions. Parliament debated and adopted an agreed text, endorsed by its Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), to amend the current regulation. The text sets out how EU countries should deal with traders who do not comply with the rules. It commits the European Commission to maintaining a list of processes for which ODS use is banned, and to assess the availability of alternatives. It also extends the substances that must be recovered and destroyed, recycled or reclaimed to all those found in air conditioning, heat pumps and fire protection.

Because fluorinated greenhouse gas (F-gases) emissions also have big global warming potential, the EU has been regulating them since 2006. A Commission proposal seeks to reduce emissions even further by reducing the supply of hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), banning F-gases in specific applications, and updating rules on implementing best practice. Parliament debated and adopted the provisional agreement reached between Parliament and the Council, which the ENVI committee had earlier endorsed. The text sets deadlines for phasing out altogether the placing of HFCs on the market (2050) and phasing down their production (2036), and allows room for additional quotas. However, the text does not include the minimum administrative fines Parliament proposed.

Empowering consumers for the green transition

Parliament debated and adopted a provisional agreement with the Council on a proposal that amends two key directives to protect consumers against misleading environmental claims, endorsed by its Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). The text includes several of Parliament’s demands, updated definitions, and sets rules for traders making environmental claims regarding goods, including digital components. It introduces a commercial guarantee of durability to improve consumer access to information on the sustainability and reparability of the things they buy, including the duration of the availability of software updates. The legislation will also cover claims made using audiovisual media.

Debt–equity bias reduction allowance (DEBRA)

Corporate debt rose to 110 % of EU gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021, risking insolvencies and possibly even longer-term economic instability. When a company takes out a loan to boost business, this is often tax-deductible, but the same does not apply to investment. To encourage greater investment in European companies and reduce debt levels, Members voted on a report from the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON), under the consultation procedure, on addressing the debt–equity bias reduction allowance (DEBRA). Largely in favour of the proposal, the committee nevertheless seeks to ensure the impact on tax revenue is limited, given the current economic climate. The committee would reduce equity allowances from 10 to 7 years for large company groups and postpone the stricter interest deduction rules to 2027. The Council must now vote unanimously on the proposal.

EU-India relations

The EU and India have been strategic partners since 2004, cooperating in fields such as climate change, maritime security, digitalisation and health. The EU is India’s largest trading partner and its second largest export destination. Parliament held a debate and adopted the report of its Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on EU-India relations. The report recommends strengthening the strategic partnership, based on democratic governance and international law, and calls for shared action and leadership, while recognising the importance of security and defence policy. It also expresses concern at India’s deteriorating human rights situation, inviting India to work with the EU on democratic and human rights.

Activities of the European Ombudsman: 2022 annual report

In the presence of Emily O’Reilly, European Ombudsman, Members considered and adopted the Committee on Petitions (PETI) report on the 2022 annual report on the European Ombudsman’s activities. The PETI committee endorses the report, congratulating Emily O’Reilly on her efforts to improve administrative practices and to promote the accountability and full transparency of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The Ombudsman’s report discusses ethical concerns, including conflicts of interest due to external employment of high-level officials once they have left, interactions with lobbyists, and the inquiry into Frontex.

Fisheries package

It is now 10 years since the last major reform of the EU’s common fisheries policy (CFP). In response to the Commission’s fisheries package, Members debated and adopted three own-initiative reports from the Committee on Fisheries (PECH). The first looks at the CFP’s execution and future perspectives, in the light of the European Commission’s decision not to propose further reform. The second considers the 2013 revision of the Common Market Organisation (CMO) Regulation for fisheries and aquaculture products. The third report largely criticises the Commission’s proposed marine action plan. Here, the PECH committee regrets in particular the lack of a socio-economic study into the effects of the plan. The report also considers the blanket ban on bottom trawling in all marine protected areas to be ‘simplistic’.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee, on the European Disability Card, was approved without vote, another from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee, on effective coordination of economic policies and multilateral budgetary surveillance, was approved in a vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – January 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

While efforts to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) both globally and in the United States intensify, the prospects for broad Congress-passed legislation remain doubtful. In October 2023, President Biden issued a wide-reaching executive order on safe, secure and trustworthy AI. It is a positive step, but implementation will be challenging.

Current global artificial intelligence policy landscape

According to the September 2023 Global AI Legislation Tracker, ‘countries worldwide are designing and implementing AI governance legislation commensurate to the velocity and variety of proliferating AI‑powered technologies. Legislative efforts include the development of comprehensive legislation, focused legislation for specific use cases, and voluntary guidelines and standards’. Stanford University has reported a massive increase in the number of countries with laws containing term ‘AI’ – growing from 25 countries in 2022 to 127 in 2023. While these individual jurisdictions, including the EU, advance with their own frameworks and approaches, multilateral efforts to coordinate them are also intensifying, be it through uptake of the AI principles of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or discussions in the United Nations and G7. The Centre for Strategic & International Studies explains that in essence these unilateral and multilateral laws and guidelines focus on the need to ‘balance the potential risk of AI systems against the risk of losing the economic and social benefits the new technology can bring’.

Developments in the United States

Against this background, the United States (US) has also been taking steps to regulate AI. The first federal laws on AI have been enacted over the past few Congresses, either as standalone legislation or as AI-related provisions and clauses placed in broader acts. Worth particular mention is the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (H.R. 6216), which established an American AI Initiative and guidance on AI research, development and evaluation activities at federal science agencies. Other acts have obliged certain agencies to drive AI programmes and policies across the federal government – such as the AI in Government Act (H.R. 2575) and the Advancing American AI Act (S.1353). Altogether, in the 117th Congress, at least 75 bills were introduced that focused on either AI and machine learning or related provisions. Six of those were enacted. The 118th Congress, as of June 2023, had introduced at least 40 AI-relevant bills, none of which has been enacted. Altogether, since 2015 nine bills have been passed. In November 2023, as many as 33 legislative pieces were still pending for consideration by US lawmakers. In January 2023 the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy published its Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights and the National Institute of Standards and Technology released an AI Risk Management Framework. In the summer of 2023 two more broad policy frameworks, SAFE Innovation Framework for AI Policy and Blumental & Hawley Comprehensive AI Framework, seeking bipartisan support, were announced to guide the Congress in developing future AI legislation. Furthermore, in April 2023 – in a joint statement – four federal agencies underlined that their enforcement powers applied to AI and that advanced technology should not be an excuse for breaking the law. At state level, Stanford University reports that, between 2016 and 2022, 14 states passed legislation, the leader being Maryland with seven AI-related bills, followed by California with six, and Massachusetts and Washington with five.

President Biden’s executive order on AI

In an increasingly dense legislative environment, US President Joe Biden issued an executive order (EO) on the ‘Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of AI’ on 30 October 2023. It builds on earlier work, such as an EO directing agencies to combat algorithmic discrimination and the securing of voluntary commitments from major US companies (such as Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft and OpenAI) to drive safe, secure, and trustworthy AI development. The order covers eight policy fields.

First, it focuses on new standards for AI safety and security. For instance, it requires developers of the most powerful AI systems to share their safety test results and other critical information with the US government. Government agencies are tasked with developing standards, tools and tests to help ensure AI systems are safe, secure, and trustworthy. New standards will also be set to protect against the risks of using AI to engineer dangerous biological materials and protect US citizens from AI-enabled fraud and deception. The administration is due to establish an advanced cybersecurity programme to develop AI tools that find and fix vulnerabilities in critical software. The National Security Council and White House Chief of Staff have been tasked with developing a national security memorandum to direct further action on AI and security.

To protect citizens’ privacy from AI-related risks, the order prioritises federal support to accelerate the development and use of privacy-preserving techniques; it strengthens relevant research and technologies, requires evaluation of how agencies collect and use commercially available data, and calls for the development of guidelines for federal agencies to evaluate the effectiveness of privacy-preserving techniques. To advance equity and civil rights, the EO calls for clear guidance for landlords, federal benefits programmes and federal contractors, and measures to address logarithmic discrimination and fairness certainty throughout the criminal justice system by developing best practice on AI use. To protect consumers, patients and students, the order calls for measures to advance the responsible use of AI in healthcare and shape its potential to transform education.

To support workers, the EO calls for the development of principles and best practice to mitigate harm and maximise the benefits of AI, and for a report on AI’s potential labour-market impacts and on ways to mitigate them through stronger federal support. To promote innovation and competition, the order seeks to catalyse research across the US and calls for new measures to support fair, open, and competitive AI ecosystems, and for efforts to attract highly skilled immigrants and non-immigrants with expertise in critical areas to study, stay and work in the US. To advance US leadership abroad, the EO requires the expansion of bilateral and multilateral AI engagements, accelerated development and implementation of vital AI standards, and promotion of the safe, responsible, and rights-affirming development and deployment of AI abroad to address global challenges.

Finally, to ensure responsible and effective government use of AI, the EO seeks new guidance for agencies using AI, more efficient and rapid contracting to acquire AI products and services, and government-wide acceleration in hiring AI experts. The EO was followed by detailed implementation guidance from the Office of Management and Budget.

Reactions

Most observers have characterised the EO using terms such as ‘landmark’ and ‘sweeping’. The polling of both Democrat and Republican supporters revealed that there is strong bipartisan support for its main provisions. While some commentators have also hailed the ‘rare example of bipartisan consensus on Capitol Hill’, the EO did not entirely escape criticism from the Republicans for lacking a ‘light touch and market-driven approach’, placing ‘regulatory burdens that could hinder the development of … technology’ and based on an unlikely timetable. Conversely, the Democrats hailed the EO’s ambitious scope. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) sees the EO as confirmation that the US will not follow the EU risk classification embedded in the AI Act. The CSIS also sees a limit to what an EO can achieve unless Congress passes broad legislation, which it deems unlikely. It assesses that, unlike in the EU, the most likely outcome over the next few years ‘is a bottom-up patchwork quilt of executive branch actions’. The Brookings Institution considers that the EO sends a strong signal to the international community that the US is finally taking a stance on AI. It argues, however, that data privacy legislation is necessary to create effective and resilient AI. Industry has largely welcomed the EO, with some reservations concerning its heavy-handedness. Many experts consider it a good first step entailing major implementation challenges.

The EU and the US cooperate on AI under the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). They are implementing a joint roadmap on evaluation and measurement tools for trustworthy AI and risk management. The TTC expert groups have listed 65 key AI terms essential to understanding risk-based approaches to AI, accompanied by their EU and US interpretations and shared EU-US definitions. They have also mapped the respective involvement of both the EU and the US in standardisation activities, aiming to identify relevant AI-related standards of mutual interest. They are compiling a catalogue of existing and emerging risks, including an understanding of the challenges posed by generative AI. In January 2023, the EU and the US signed an administrative arrangement on ‘AI for the Public Good‘, aimed at boosting AI research collaboration.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘United States approach to artificial intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Van Tooren.

It’s a new year, a new EU Council Presidency and as we move into the final months of the current legislative term, Members of the European Parliament have limited time in which to achieve their goals before campaigning begins for the European elections in June. To kick off the year, the agenda for the first plenary session of this month features a presentation of the programme of activities of the Belgian Presidency. Members will also discuss the outcome of the December European Council meeting and look ahead to the special meeting on 1 February. A statement by the President commemorating Jacques Delors will open the week’s session.

One of the 10 things our team has identified to watch in 2024 is India’s rise on the global stage. The EU and India have been strategic partners since 2004, cooperating in fields such as climate change, maritime security, digitalisation and health. The EU is India’s largest trading partner and its second largest export destination. On Tuesday, Parliament is expected to consider the report of its Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on EU-India relations. The report recommends strengthening the strategic partnership, based on democratic governance and international law, and calls for shared action and leadership, while recognising the importance of security and defence policy. It also expresses concern at India’s deteriorating human rights situation, inviting India to work with the EU on democratic and human rights.

It is now 10 years since the last major reform of the EU’s common fisheries policy (CFP). In response to the Commission’s fisheries package, Members are due to debate three own-initiative reports from the Committee on Fisheries (PECH) on Thursday morning. The first looks at the CFP’s execution and future perspectives, in the light of the European Commission’s proposal for no further reform. The second considers the 2013 revision of the Common Market Organisation (CMO) Regulation for fisheries and aquaculture products. The third report largely criticises the Commission’s proposed marine action plan. Here, the PECH committee regrets in particular the lack of a socio-economic study into the effects of the plan. The report also considers the blanket ban on bottom trawling in all marine protected areas to be ‘simplistic’.

On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is expected to debate a draft agreement that would amend two key directives to protect consumers against misleading environmental claims, endorsed by its Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). The text includes several of Parliament’s demands, updated definitions, and sets rules for traders making environmental claims regarding goods, including digital components. It introduces a commercial guarantee of durability to improve consumer access to information on the sustainability and reparability of the things they buy, including the duration of the availability of software updates. The legislation will also cover claims made using audiovisual media.

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Although the Ozone Regulation is working to cut emissions from ozone-depleting substances (ODS), old products containing ODS remain a source of emissions. On Monday, therefore, Parliament is due to consider an agreed text, endorsed by its Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), to amend the current regulation. The text sets out how EU countries should deal with traders who do not comply with the rules. It commits the European Commission to maintaining a list of processes for which ODS use is banned and to assess the availability of alternatives. It also extends the substances that must be recovered and destroyed, recycled or reclaimed to all those found in air conditioning, heat pumps and fire protection (among other things).

Because fluorinated greenhouse gas (F-gases) emissions also have big global warming potential, the EU has been regulating them since 2006. A new proposal seeks to reduce emissions even further by reducing the supply of hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), banning F-gases in specific applications, and updating rules on implementing best practice. Parliament’s ENVI committee endorsed the provisional agreement reached between Parliament and the Council, which Parliament is set to consider on Monday. The text sets deadlines for phasing out placing HFCs on the market altogether (2050) and phasing down their production (2036), and allows room for additional quotas. However, the text does not include the minimum administrative fines Parliament proposed.

Corporate debt rose to 110 % of EU gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021, risking insolvencies and possibly even longer-term economic instability. When a company takes out a loan to boost business, this is often tax-deductible, but the same does not apply to investment. To encourage greater investment in European companies and reduce debt levels, Members are therefore set to consider a report from the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) on addressing the debt–equity bias reduction allowance (DEBRA) on Tuesday. Largely in favour of the proposal, the committee nevertheless seeks to ensure the impact on tax revenue is limited, given the current economic climate. The committee would reduce equity allowances from 10 to 7 years for large company groups and postpone the stricter interest deduction rules to 2027. Should Members agree, the report will set Parliament’s non-binding position, on which the Council must vote unanimously.

In the presence of Emily O’Reilly, European Ombudsman, on Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to consider the Committee on Petitions (PETI) report on the 2022 annual report on the European Ombudsman’s activities. The PETI committee endorses the report, congratulating Emily O’Reilly on her efforts to improve administrative practices and to promote the accountability and full transparency of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The Ombudsman’s report discusses ethical concerns, including conflicts of interest due to external employment of high-level officials once they have left, interactions with lobbyists, and the inquiry into Frontex.

FURTHER READING

• Agenda – European Parliament Plenary Session January I 2024
• Priority dossiers under the Belgian EU Council Presidency
• Outcome of the European Council meeting of 14-15 December 2023
• Jacques Delors: Architect of the modern European Union
• Parliament’s response to the fisheries package
• 10 Issues to watch
• EU-India relations
• Empowering consumers for the green transition
• Revision of the Ozone Regulation
• Review of the F-gas Regulation
• Debt–equity bias reduction allowance (DEBRA)Activities of the European Ombudsman: 2022 annual report

Written by Angelos Delivorias. Graphics: Györgyi Mácsai.

India was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community in 1962. Following the EU-India 1994 Cooperation Agreement, the parties built a multi-tiered institutional architecture of cooperation, and eventually upgraded their relationship to a ‘Strategic Partnership’ in 2004. During the same period, trade between the two partners grew significantly, reaching €115.4 billion in 2022. As a result, the parties began negotiations on a broad-based bilateral trade and investment agreement in 2007. However, after 15 rounds of negotiations, talks between the parties stalled in 2013, due to diverging ambitions between the counterparts. On 8 May 2021, the EU and Indian leaders agreed to resume negotiations for a ‘balanced, ambitious, comprehensive and mutually beneficial’ trade agreement, and to launch separate negotiations on an investment protection agreement and an agreement on geographical indications. The Commission and India aim to finalise the negotiations before the Indian elections in 2024. In addition, they decided in April 2022 to launch an EU-India Trade and Technology Council.

In its 5 July 2022 resolution on EU-India future trade and investment cooperation, Parliament encouraged the negotiators to achieve a comprehensive and mutually beneficial free trade agreement, giving priority to areas conducive to sustainable growth and addressing inequalities and the digital and green just transitions. They invited the Commission to ensure that the core principles of the ILO are applied in the future trade agreement and that the agreement is in line with the European Green Deal, the ‘farm to fork’ strategy and COP26. Lastly, they welcomed the willingness to negotiate an independent investment protection agreement, and urged negotiators to agree on the creation of a multilateral investment court and a specific EU-India investment court.

Free trade agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and India, of the other partother partCommittee responsible:International Trade (INTA)2021/2177(INI)Rapporteur:Geert Bourgeois (ECR, Belgium)

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-India free trade agreement‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Trade in services with India India’s top EU trade partners (2022)

Written by Polona Car.

Cyberattack numbers have surged in recent years, leading to the formation of entities at all levels to prevent attacks or mitigate the harm they may cause. An efficient EU-level response requires coordination and the timely exchange of information. Several bodies and networks have been set up to this end; this paper explains their respective roles.

Introduction

Nowadays, cybersecurity is embedded in public and private sector organisations to protect their vital interests and offer strategies to mitigate possible cyberattacks. Whereas national security, including cybersecurity, remains a national government prerogative, the potential cross-border impact of cyber incidents implies the need for cooperation and a common EU response. This need is increasingly reflected in EU legal acts defining new entities – at both EU and national level – to analyse threats and respond to cyber incidents. On top of that, Member States have been taking their own initiatives for cooperation at supranational level, both inside the EU and beyond (for instance within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and bilaterally, for example with the US). In view of the extent and speed of these legislative and organisational developments, this publication outlines the main actors at EU level and illustrates the complexity of the EU cyber landscape.

European Commission agencies and bodies

Several agencies are working with the European Commission and its directorates-general to build up EU cybersecurity capabilities and cooperation. Since 2004, the EU has had a dedicated agency for cybersecurity (ENISA). ENISA was strengthened by the EU cybersecurity act, which gave it a permanent mandate, more responsibilities and more resources to improve its ability to help achieve a high common level of cybersecurity across Europe. The agency’s role is to support and ensure a framework for operational cooperation, in particular in preparation for significant cross-border cyberattacks, to assist Member States with ad hoc cybersecurity-related issues, and to implement the relevant legislation. A number of EU legislative acts that are currently pending – such as the cyber resilience act –will enhance ENISA’s role and give the agency new responsibilities.

The European Cybersecurity Competence Centre (ECCC), established in 2021, is responsible for EU cybersecurity capacity building and competitiveness. The centre, which became operational in May 2023, aims to improve technological sovereignty through strategic cybersecurity investments; it works together with the network of national coordination centres. Its work is powered by artificial intelligence and complemented by the EU supercomputing infrastructure developed under the European high-performance computing joint undertaking.

CERT-EU is the computer security incident response team for all the EU institutions, bodies and agencies. It was set up in 2011 and formally established through an interinstitutional agreement in 2018. CERT-EU’s role is to prevent, detect, mitigate and respond to cyberattacks against EU institutions, bodies and agencies. It also serves as a hub for cybersecurity information exchange for its constituents.

The European Cybercrime Centre(EC3) was set up by Europol in 2013 to strengthen the law enforcement response to cybercrime in the EU. Since its establishment, it has helped to fight cybercrime and thus protect European citizens, businesses and governments.

Structured cooperation between Member States: European cyber networks

The directive on measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (referred to as the NIS Directive) established the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Cooperation Group to ensure strategic cooperation and information exchange between Member States and contribute to the development of trust and confidence. The group is composed of representatives of the Member States, the European Commission and ENISA. Among other things, it carries out coordinated security risk assessments of critical supply chains, discusses cases and requests from Member States for mutual assistance, provides strategic guidance for the activities of the computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) Network and the European Cyber Crises Liaison Organisation Network (EU-CyCLONe), and provides guidance and exchanges information and best practices on issues falling within its remit.

The NIS Directive established (and the NIS2 Directive later strengthened) the CSIRTs Network to promote effective operational cooperation on specific cybersecurity incidents and the sharing of information on cybersecurity risks. The network is composed of Member State-appointed CSIRTs, CERT-EU, and the European Commission as an observer, with ENISA providing the secretariat and support as needed.

The NIS2 Directive formally established EU-CyCLONe, which was launched in 2020. EU-CyCLONe is a cooperation network for Member States’ national authorities in charge of cyber crisis management. Supported by ENISA, the network aims to collaborate and develop timely information sharing and situational awareness, and to intervene in the event of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises; it supports the coordination and management and assesses the impacts of such incidents. As such, it provides a bridge between the technical (in the form of the CSIRTs Network) and political levels, which is tested through regular exercises. It cooperates with the CSIRTs Network on the basis of procedural agreements.

The prosecution of cyber criminals and enforcement of cyber legislation is crucial in the fight against cybercrime. Therefore, the European Judicial Cybercrime Network (EJCN) was established in 2016 to promote cooperation among cybercrime professionals and contribute to swifter prosecution of cybercrime offences. On the enforcement side, the European Union Cybercrime Task Force (EUCTF) was established in 2010 within Europol. EUCTF is a network – composed of the heads of Member States’ national cybercrime units and representatives from Europol, the Commission, the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). It provides a forum in which to identify, discuss and prioritise the key challenges and actions in the fight against cybercrime. Detection and prevention of any form of cybercrime is its first objective.

Council and European External Action Service (EEAS) tools and defence cooperation

As the EU’s diplomatic service, the EEAS steers the EU’s cyber diplomacy and strategic communication. The Strategic Compass provides a plan of action for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030. In 2022, the High Representative, in line with the objectives of the Strategic Compass, established the EEAS crisis response centre (CRC) as a permanent crisis response capability and the single entry point on all crisis-related issues in the EEAS. The CRC brings together diplomatic, security and intelligence capabilities to increase the EU’s capability to respond to security and consular crises abroad.

The Council has several information sharing and coordination bodies. These include the Horizontal Working Party on Cyber Issues, which coordinates the Council’s cyber policy and legislative activities. In the event of a major incident, however, a fast and collective response is crucial to reassure citizens and international partners. The Integrated Political Crisis Response Mechanism (IPCR) provides the necessary protocols and procedures for rapid and coordinated decision-making by the EU and is the Council Presidencies’ tool to coordinate the political response to major crises. The IPCR works in close cooperation with the EEAS CRC to ensure a coherent and coordinated EU approach and response to crises. The cyber diplomacy toolbox provides a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities and a legal framework for sanctions against cyberattacks. The revised implementing guidelines of the cyber diplomacy toolbox define the practical implementation of the toolbox in a step-by-step process. Today, cyber threats are just as threatening to national security as physical ones. It goes without saying that the defence community has intensified its efforts to fight them, and the European Defence Agency (EDA) supports Member States in developing cyber resilience. In 2017, the Council established a framework for permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) to boost cooperation on defence among participating Member States. The EDA and EEAS are both part of the PESCO secretariat. Countries participating in PESCO have established several projects dedicated to cyber defence: cyber rapid response teams (CRRTs), the Cyber Ranges Federation (CRF) and the Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform (CTIRISP), to name just a few. Projects include a varying number of Member States that participate in PESCO, and are coordinated by one or more of these countries.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Cybersecurity actors in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias.

The EU-India Trade and Technology Council was announced by the European Commission in April 2022, and launched in February 2023. It is the EU’s second such endeavour after the one with the United States, and its aims are broadly similar, i.e. to increase bilateral cooperation, to boost bilateral trade and investment (in the same context as the free trade agreement under negotiation between the two parties), and to capitalise on both parties’ strengths to ensure their technological and industrial leadership while preserving their shared values.

Introduction

The decision to establish an EU-India Trade and Technology Council (TTC) was first announced by the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, and India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, in April 2022. After the TTC’s formal launch in February 2023, its first ministerial meeting was held in May 2023, alongside the FTA negotiations. The ministerial meeting was co-chaired by Commission Executive Vice-Presidents Margrethe Vestager and Valdis Dombrovskis on the EU side, and by the Minister of External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar; the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Piyush Goyal; and the Minister of State for Skill Development and Entrepreneurship and Electronics and Information Technology, Rajeev Chandrasekhar, on the Indian side. They were joined by the High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell, as well as the Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton.

The TTC is the second such bilateral forum for the EU, after the one launched with the United States (US) in June 2021, while being the first for India. For the EU, its TTC with India complements a series of partnerships it signed with Asian countries in 2022 and 2023, including Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, to address issues related to the digital divide and to strengthen ‘a fair, inclusive and equal digital environment for all‘. It also builds on other EU initiatives, such as the Joint Commitment to Digital Transformation in the EU-Africa Joint Vision for 2030, and the EU-Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Digital Alliance. These partnerships also form part of the EU’s idea of working with like-minded partners to promote a ‘positive and human-centric vision of the digital economy and society’ as envisioned in its 2030 Digital Compass (long-term strategy for the digital transformation of the EU).

India, for its part, has been actively participating in various platforms and initiatives aimed at strategic recalibration of trade and technology. These include the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad, comprisingAustralia, India Japan and the US) working group on emerging and critical technology, whose goal is to foster collaboration on setting standards and frameworks for emerging technology such as 5G/6G networks, AI, digitalisation and quantum computing. Together with Japan and Australia, India launched the supply chain resilience initiative in 2021, to share best practices and promote inclusive growth. India and the US also launched an initiative on critical and emerging technology (iCET) in May 2022, to expand the strategic technology partnership and defence industrial cooperation between the two countries.

Experts note that the TTC is part of a joint effort to steer the EU and India closer towards strategic autonomy by reducing the EU’s dependence on China, and India’s reliance on Russia. In this context, a January 2023 report by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations highlights some opportunities for the counterparts to enhance their cooperation on military technologies, technology and data governance, and other critical technologies (such as semiconductors, batteries, data), as well as on the restructuring of India’s and the EU’s supply chains. In the same vein, a September 2023 article notes that the EU, the US and India should focus on the resilience of the semiconductor supply chain and specifically increase India’s presence in semiconductor packaging (at present the industry is concentrated in China). They should also focus on quantum information science and technology (QIST). Here the authors see the potential in using the EU’s experience in managing and linking quantum projects across Member States (e.g. the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and the European Quantum Communication Infrastructure). Lastly, they should cooperate on digital infrastructure, especially next-generation wireless networks such as 6G.

The EU-India TTC working groups

In its current configuration, the TTC has three working groups that focus on i) strategic technologies, digital governance and digital connectivity, ii) green and clean energy technologies, and iii) resilient value chains, trade and investment. Following the May meeting, several initiatives have been highlighted.

The first working group has launched three initiatives. The first involves coordination within the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence(GPAI), a multi-stakeholder initiative announced in 2018 and launched in 2020, to bridge the gap between theory and practice on AI through research and applied activities. This enhanced coordination is happening in the context of the EU’s forthcoming artificial intelligence act, expected to be adopted early in 2024, India’s national programme on AI (adopted in March 2022) and its draft national data governance framework policy (July 2022).

The second initiative focuses on policy coordination in the semiconductorsector. India and the EU have sought to reduce vulnerabilities in their supply chains in this sector. In this context, the EU implemented its Chips Act in September 2023, to strengthen manufacturing and reduce critical dependencies. The Indian government has also stepped up its efforts by offering a production-linked incentive of US$10 billion for manufacturers to set up and invest in a manufacturing value chain for semiconductors. Multilaterally, India is working with its partners in the Quad semiconductor supply chain initiative. On 23 November 2023, the EU and India finalised a memorandum of understanding on semiconductors, committing to further deepen cooperation on the semiconductor ecosystem, its supply chain and innovation.

The third initiative involves work towards increasing interoperability between India’s and the EU’s digital public infrastructure (DPI) and towards promoting credible solutions for developing countries. India is a global leader in the development of DPI, where it has put in place an ecosystem for the implementation and adaptation of three critical aspects of DPI, also known as the ‘India stack‘: digital identity, digital payments and data-sharing. Under the Indian presidency of the G20, the 2023 G20 Leaders’ Declaration welcomed the ‘G20 Framework for Systems of Digital Public Infrastructure’, recognising the role of DPI in the delivery of services for the whole of society. The EU has also worked on these areas under its Digital Decade policy programme 2030 and its Global Gateway, which focuses on digital technology and infrastructure to promote inclusive growth and sustainable development.

In the area of green and clean energy technologies (second working group), the parties reiterated their commitments to net-zero goals and identified three areas of cooperation: renewable and low-carbon hydrogen, batteries for electric vehicles, and standards. India and the EU have cooperated with each other on clean energy and climate matters since 2016. Their cooperation expanded further under the 2020 EU-India strategic partnership, and following the joint statement released after the 2021 India-EU Summit. As part of this cooperation, India and the EU will start implementing joint wastewater treatment and management projects to facilitate their market uptake. They will also work on wastewater to energy and on waste to hydrogen. Another important deliverable is a gap analysis on how to tackle marine plastic litter and pollution. The counterparts will also share knowledge on circularity aspects of batteries and the possibility to recover raw materials. They have also pledged to develop standards that can ensure interoperability, including for renewable and low-carbon hydrogen.

Lastly, in the context of the third working group, the parties have agreed to work towards establishing principles on cooperation by identifying specific supply chains and mechanisms for the screening of foreign direct investment (FDI). To this end, the two sides intend, in the years to come, to focus on four areas. First, they will agree on broad principles for cooperation and then work towards establishing mutual interest for resilient value chains. They aim to identify and resolve market access issues in order to jointly remove identified trade barriers. They will also work on the exchange of information regarding each other’s mechanisms for FDI screening, to enhance mutual understanding about these mechanisms.

In the context of bilateral trade, it is noteworthy that remaining and possibly new challenges exist between the two parties. These include a dispute at the WTO level regarding New Delhi’s import duties on specific information and technology products, as well as India’s concerns over the implementation of the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM).

The next meeting of the co-chairs is scheduled for early 2024 in India, when the parties will take stock of the progress achieved and decide on further action.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-India Trade and Technology Council‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eszter Balázs and Isabel Teixeira Nadkarni (Legislative Planning and Coordination Unit, Directorate-General for the Presidency).

The Kingdom of Belgium is a federal constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy, with the monarch as Head of State and a prime minister as Head of Government.

The current monarch, King Philippe/Filip has been on the throne since 21 July 2013, his heir apparent is Princess Elisabeth, the daughter of the monarch. The King has wide legislative powers constitutionally but is relieved of all responsibility, with his ministers signing the bills and royal decrees. It is the King’s task to appoint the prime minister, who is usually the leader of the majority coalition after legislative elections. The King is the symbol of the unity of the nation.

Upon appointment by the King, the prime minister has to be approved by the parliament’s Chamber of Representatives. The current prime minister is Alexander De Croo of the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open Vld) party, which sits in the Renew Group in the European Parliament.

After the May 2019 federal, regional and European elections, caretaker governments of the outgoing Prime Minister Charles Michel (elected president of the European Council from December 2019) and then Sophie Wilmès ran federal affairs for a total of 494 days before the establishment of the De Croo government, which is a coalition of seven parties:

• Open Vld (Flemish liberal)
• MR (Francophone liberal)
• Vooruit (Flemish socialist)
• PS (Francophone socialist)
• CD&V (Flemish Christian democrats)
• Ecolo (Francophone greens)
• Groen (Flemish greens)

The significant delay in the formation of the government was due to a collapse of the centre in the 2019 elections. The three traditional political families – socialists, liberals and Christian democrats – lost representation in the Chamber, to the benefit of the Flemish far right (Vlaams Belang, 18 seats, +15), the far left (PTB–PVDA, 12 seats, +10), and the greens (Ecolo–Groen, 21 seats, +9). The socialists (PS–Vooruit, 29 seats, -7, one MP was later excluded from the PS) remained the largest political family, followed by the liberals (MR–Open Vld, 26 seats, -8) and the Flemish nationalists (N‑VA, 25 seats, -8).

The government does not have a majority in the Flemish language group. It has 15 ministers and has to consist of the same number of Dutch- and French-speakers, not counting the Prime Minister.

Since 1993, when Belgium became a federal state in a series of state reforms started in 1970, decision-making powers are divided between three levels of government: the federal government, three language-based communities (Flemish, French and German-speaking) and three regions (Flanders, Brussels Capital and Wallonia). Legally they are all equal, but have powers and responsibilities for different fields.

The federal level has retained power in areas that concern all Belgians: foreign affairs, defence, justice, finance, social security, public health and home affairs.

The communities are competent within language areas for all matters that concern their language speakers, e.g. culture, the audiovisual sector, and education. They are also competent for international affairs in these areas.

The regions have authority over the economy, employment, agriculture, housing, public works, energy, transport, environment and territorial planning in their territories.

As communities and regions are competent for international affairs of their internal competences, community or regional ministers can represent the Kingdom of Belgium in various formations of the Council of the EU. A cooperation agreement between Belgium and the Council, governing Belgian representation in the Council, has long been under negotiation.

Due to the country’s institutional complexity, the conclusion and implementation of EU level decisions is often a complex and prolonged process under which the different levels of power need to agree. This has been the case, for instance, in the area of the fight against climate change, the ratification of EU trade agreements and Belgian positions on the EU budget.

The federal parliament is bicameral, but effective power resides in the 150-member Chamber of Representatives, elected by popular vote for a five-year term. The upper house is the 60-member Senate, indirectly elected for a five-year term. It is a non-permanent assembly serving as a forum for reflection, that is expected to pronounce on proposals if it considers it necessary.

Chamber of Representatives: 150 members

• of which government: 87 members

Parti socialiste (PS, in S&D): 19 members
Mouvement Réformateur (MR, in Renew): 14 members
Écologistes Confédérés pour l’organisation de luttes originales (Ecolo, in Greens/EFA): 13 members
Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V, in EPP): 12 members
Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Open Vld, in Renew): 12 members
Vooruit (in S&D): 9 members
Groen (in Greens/EFA): 8 members

• opposition: 63 members

Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA, in ECR): 24 members
Vlaams Belang (in ID): 18 members
Partij van de Arbeid van België – Parti du Travail de Belgique (PVDA-PTB, in The Left): 12 members
Les Engagés (in EPP): 5 members
Démocrate fédéraliste indépendant (DéFI, not currently represented in the EP): 2 members
Independent: 2 members

The next federal, regional and European elections take place on 9 June 2024, in the last month of the Belgian Presidencyof the Council of the EU.

The country assumes the Presidency of the Council of the EU for the 13th time in 2024, after its previous stint in 2010, when it was conducted by a caretaker government. It is the middle member of a trio with Spain (at the helm in the second half of 2023) and Hungary (taking over from Belgium on 1 July 2024).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the Belgian EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot.

The eighth edition of this annual publication comes in a year in which the European political cycle comes full circle. Just 150 days after the launch of this paper, the results of the European elections will shape the European Parliament for the five years to come. The Parliament, which has launched an ambitious reform project to modernise and strengthen itself, will be ready for this new term, not least to elect the President of the European Commission and then deliver a vote of consent on the full college of Commissioners.

In this electoral year, it is fitting to look back before we look ahead. The issues we identified on the eve of the previous European elections – in 2019 – were the institutional changes following citizens’ votes, a changing world both climate-wise and in international relations, and the impact of the digital transformation on technologies, the economy and the social fabric of society. These issues were not only confirmed as being critical; they have accelerated over the past five years. The climate has seen ever more extremes and the issue of climate change become more urgent, as we each experience in daily life and as science has confirmed, most recently at the December 2023 COP28 climate change conference in Dubai. New wars and fronts have raged across the globe, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Europe’s eastern flank, to Azerbaijan’s attack and recapture of the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, to the conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Middle East. And at home, the digital transition is affecting more and more aspects of our daily lives.

To understand this uncertain and volatile world, this year again, the European Parliamentary Research Service has asked ten of its policy analysts to explain the latest developments in their respective areas. When it comes to selecting just ten issues, there has never been a lack of material. And certainly not this year. Our aim is to shine the spotlight on just a few issues which will be crucial in the year 2024, as highlighted in the timeline in Figure 1. Some will make the headlines, whereas others may get less publicity but nonetheless be critical in the legislative or budgetary agenda of the Union, and contribute to changing our lives and society over time.

This publication covers climate and also broadens the view to El Niño. It deals with the green and digital transition and zooms in on the automotive industry. It focuses on the United States elections as well as on its would-be challenger, India. It addresses both Ukraine’s reconstruction and the legal response to the aggression: prosecution of international core crimes and reparation for victims. And of course, in a year of elections, it looks at this major democratic exercise, involving hundreds of millions of citizens on our own continent, with a specific eye for young voters and fake reality and online misinformation.

Readers will find our analysis on other issues in previous editions of this publication (listed under the ‘Further reading section’) and in the thousands of publications EPRS has issued online and in paper over the years, to enrich the knowledge environment of the Parliament.

We hope that you will enjoy reading this latest edition of ‘Ten Issues to Watch’ and that it will stimulate your own reflection and ignite your curiosity as you explore the challenges and opportunities of 2024.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Selected events that will contribute to shaping the year 2024 US voters’ top priorities US citizens’ support for Ukraine Global food security situation and El Niño effects on rainfall patterns

Written by Drachenberg and Rebecca Torpey.

Despite predictions of a long and inconclusive meeting, EU leaders achieved a historic and highly symbolic agreement to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, grant candidate status to Georgia, and open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, once the latter complies fully with the membership criteria. Even if the European Council did not finalise discussions on the revision of the multiannual financial framework – which includes, inter alia, an aid package for Ukraine – it has moved much further towards an agreement than expected ahead of the meeting, with 26 EU leaders supporting the current proposal. The European Council held a strategic debate on the situation in the Middle East, but did not issue conclusions due to a lack of unity. EU leaders also addressed Ukraine, security and defence, migration, COP28, EU–Türkiye relations, the 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda and the fight against anti-semitism, racism and xenophobia.

1.     General aspects

The European Council began with the customary address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. It saw the return of Donald Tusk, former European Council President from 2014-2019, as Polish Prime Minister, a function he had previously held from 2007 to 2014.

2.     European Council meeting Ukraine

Ahead of the meeting, the Prime Ministers of Estonia and Finland stressed the critical importance of supporting Ukraine, stating that ‘a resolute demonstration of unfaltering long-term support for Ukraine is paramount’. They called for strong budgetary and military support, and for a landmark decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine. EU leaders reiterated their commitment to providing strong political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine, even if the lack of a decision on the €50 billion aid package appeared to be a setback.

In terms of military support, EU leaders stressed the importance of accelerating the delivery of missiles and ammunition, notably as part of the delayed initiative to provide one million rounds of artillery ammunition. They also called for more air defence systems for Ukraine, while Russia provided a timely reminder of how critical they were. EU leaders invited the Council to step up work on the reform of the European Peace Facility – an EU instrument which has provided military assistance to Ukraine – and increase financing. Following a European Council request last October, the High Representative (HR/VP) Josep Borrell presented a report on the EU’s future security commitments to Ukraine, which Member States are invited to take forward in the Council. The EU and the Member States will continue diplomatic work to ensure wide support for peace based on Ukraine’s Peace Formula, with a view to organising a Global Peace Summit.

Furthermore, the European Council took note, without endorsing them, of proposals on the use of extraordinary revenues resulting from frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction in line with EU and international law.

EU leaders reiterated that Russia and its leadership should be held accountable for the war crimes they have committed, and encouraged the establishment of a tribunal for that purpose. Both Russia and Belarus have been urged to safely return unlawfully deported Ukrainian children and civilians. The European Council reaffirmed its support for the Council of Europe’s register, which tracks the damage caused by Russia’s war of aggression, and calls on states to sign and ratify the Ljubljana-The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes.

EU leaders condemned the military support for Russia’s war provided by Iran, Belarus and the DPRK; while not specifically naming China, they urged all countries not to provide material or other support for Russia’s war of aggression. The European Council also welcomed the adoption of the 12th package of sanctions, covering new sectors such as trade in diamonds, despite concerns that Austria would block the agreement. EU leaders reiterated the importance of Ukraine’s grain exports and the EU’s solidarity lanes for food security, particularly for countries in Africa and the Middle East.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: President Roberta Metsola said that the EU had a moral and strategic obligation to continue political, military, humanitarian, and financial support to Ukraine.

Enlargement

Just after the February 2023 European Council meeting, President Zelenskyy had stressed the importance of opening talks on Ukraine’s EU future in the course of the year. Despite strong doubts ahead of the December 2023 meeting, the European Council managed to reach the historic decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine – thus bypassing Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s threats to block the opening of Ukraine’s accession negotiations. Even when entering the meeting room, the latter had said there was ‘no reason to negotiate membership of Ukraine now’. However, following a suggestion from German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, he left the room to allow a unanimous decision to be taken. EU leaders also agreed to open accession negotiations with Moldova and to grant the status of candidate country to Georgia, with the caveat that the relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendations of 8 November 2023 be taken. Moreover, EU leaders asked the Commission to report before March 2024 on the progress in compliance with the membership criteria of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH); if BiH successfully meets the criteria, the European Council would open accession negotiations. EU leaders called on North Macedonia to accelerate its implementation of the changes listed in the Council conclusions of 18 July 2022. As a follow-up to the Western Balkans summit, which preceded the European Council meeting, EU leaders reiterated their commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans, and called on them to speed up EU-related reforms and advance on regional economic integration.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola called for the EU to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and advocated not diluting the ambitions of the Western Balkans.

Multiannual financial framework

Even if the European Council did not finalise its position on the revision of the multiannual financial framework (MFF), EU leaders moved closer to an arrangement than anyone had expected prior to the meeting, even participants such as Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. President Charles Michel stated that the MFF revision, which in the latest negotiating box would reduce the fresh funding from €64.6 billion to €21 billion, is firmly supported by 26 EU leaders ‘in all its components and priorities’. Yet, despite attempts to revise the Ukraine proposal by shifting the balance between loans and grants, Orbán would not give in.

The 26 Member States agreed to reinforce new priorities with a total of €64.6 billion, of which €33 billion will be financed by loans and €10.6 billion by redeployments. Scholz stressed that the lion’s share of the reprioritisation of the EU’s budget will be financed through redeployments from the existing EU budget. Ukraine would be receiving an additional €50 billion, €2 billion would go to Migration and Border Management, €7.6 billion to Neighbourhood and the World, €1.5 billion to the European Defence Fund under the new STEP (Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform) instrument, €2 billion to the Flexibility Instrument and €1.5 billion to the Solidarity and Aid Reserve. These figures are significantly lower than the budget reinforcements requested by the European Commission and the European Parliament respectively. As unanimity is needed between Member States on this issue, Michel announced that the European Council will revert early next year to this topic, with the aim of ‘convincing all 27 of this proposal’. He subsequently announced that a European Council meeting will be held on 1 February. Michel and Scholz expressed their confidence that the EU will be able to reach an agreement with all 27 Member States.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen ‘wholeheartedly’ thanked the 26 EU leaders for their support and stated that the Commission would work towards an agreement at 27, while also preparing alternatives ‘to have an operational solution’ whatever the result of the extraordinary meeting.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola called on EU leaders to reach an agreement which respects the prerogatives of the European Parliament as budgetary authority, find a structural solution for managing borrowing costs, make progress on own resources, preserve the Union’s shared values and not cut into flagship EU programmes.

Security and defence

EU leaders did not discuss security and defence at length, but agreed to step up their efforts to implement the Versailles Declaration and Strategic Compass through various initiatives, such as a European defence industrial strategy and a European defence investment programme, which the European Commission was urged to present swiftly. Finland stressed that, with the current Russian threat, a stronger European defence industry was urgent, while Estonia underlined the need for defence readiness in the EU and for a single market for defence, as reflected in the conclusions.

External relations Middle East

Considering the lack of a common EU position, flagged up by Borrell, EU leaders held a strategic discussion on the situation in the Middle East, without written conclusions. Michel stressed that the aim of the discussion was to focus on convergence where it existed among EU Member States and to identify where the EU needed to work towards it. Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo said that the EU needed to have a common position in order to play a serious role in the conflict, but Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas noted how difficult it would be to achieve this.

Michel underlined the differences of opinion between EU Member States on the idea of a humanitarian pause. The Irish Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, stated that the ‘room has changed’ since the October European Council and ‘there is now a clear majority in favour of a humanitarian ceasefire’. The European Council’s tone, when addressing the situation in the Middle East, has developed from the statement on 15 October. The invitation letter stated that Israel had the right to defend itself ‘against Hamas’ – the nuanced change could be a diplomatic way of indicating that Israel should do more to prevent the killing of civilians when trying to eliminate the terrorist threat of Hamas. Von der Leyen said that both sides needed to do their utmost to protect civilian lives, and Hamas had to release all hostages, adding that getting aid into Gaza was the Commission’s key priority.

EU leaders also considered the future in the region after the end of hostilities, notably options for the management of Gaza and ways of advancing on a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. Moreover, Borrell and the Commission will compile, for foreign ministers to consider, a list of violent Israeli settlers, who could face sanctions and be banned from travelling to the EU.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola said the EU could play an important role in planning for real, sustainable, lasting stability based on a two-state solution.

Migration

Although finding common ground for joint conclusions has proved difficult at recent meetings, notably in June 2023, EU leaders reiterated their comprehensive approach to migration. As stressed by Michel, the migration topic is a regular discussion point at European Council meetings, making it a ‘rolling agenda point‘. Thus, beyond the lack of lengthy conclusions, placing the topic on the agenda shows the willingness of EU leaders to address the issue and to develop a common EU approach.

While ahead of the meeting several Member States had pushed for increased funds for migration policy as part of the MFF revision, that could not be achieved at this stage as a result of Orbán’s veto. Yet, for now, EU leaders strongly condemned all hybrid attacks, including the instrumentalisation of migrants by third countries for political purposes, stating that the EU would not accept the ongoing hybrid attacks at its external borders launched by Russia and by Belarus.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola urged swift agreement on the asylum package ahead of the EU elections, to show citizens that their concerns are addressed.

Other items Strategic Agenda 2024-2029

As expected, EU leaders took stock of consultations on the next Strategic Agenda, due to be adopted by the summer of 2024 and defining the Union’s priorities for the next institutional cycle.

COP28

The European Council welcomed the COP28 conclusions, notably agreements to keep the 1.5°C objective within reach, for example by accelerating emissions reductions and phasing out fossil fuels.

EU–Türkiye relations

EU leaders noted the joint report by Borrell and the Commission on the state of play of EU–Türkiye relations, and said they intend to return to the topic at a forthcoming European Council meeting.

Fight against anti-semitism, racism and xenophobia

The European Council reiterated its condemnation of all forms of anti-semitism and hate, intolerance, racism and xenophobia, including anti-Muslim hatred.

Schengen

The Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sanchez, indicated that he hoped Bulgaria and Romania would be able to join the Schengen area by the end of 2023.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome for the European Council meeting of 14-15 December 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Drawing on authoritative sources, this glossary offers an overview of common terms used in discussing situations of armed conflict.

• Armed conflict. ‘An armed conflict is said to exist when there is an armed confrontation between the armed forces of States (international armed conflict), or between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State (non-international armed conflict). Other situations of violence, such as internal disturbances and tensions are not considered to be armed conflicts.’ (International Committee of the Red Cross – ICRC)
• Armistice. A military agreement that puts an end to ongoing hostilities. There are two types of armistice: general (which halts all military operations) and local (which stops operations in a specific area). If the armistice’s duration is not specified, belligerent parties may resume operations at any time, subject to prior notice and in compliance with the terms of the armistice. The state of war continues, with all of its legal ramifications, even after an armistice ends.
• Ceasefire. A suspension of fighting decided by the conflict parties, usually as part of a political process. It often encompasses the whole geographic region affected by the conflict and is intended to be long-term. Usually, the goal is to facilitate communication between the parties, with the ultimate goal of reaching a long-term political agreement.
• Cessation of hostilities (or ‘truce’). The suspension of active hostilities, designed to give conflict parties permission to pause fighting for a variety of reasons, such as to engage in political discourse and work towards a long-term truce. The ICRC uses the term ‘truce’ interchangeably with ‘suspension of hostilities’.
• Civilian. ‘Any person who is not a combatant. When civilians take a direct part in fighting, they lose their protection from attack. (When there is any doubt about a person’s status, he or she shall be considered to be a civilian)’ – ICRC.
• Combatant. In international humanitarian law, the term ‘combatant’ in international armed conflicts refers to members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict (except medical and religious personnel) who are entitled to take a direct part in hostilities. Combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from civilians and to abide by international humanitarian law. If combatants fall into the hands of their adversaries, they are considered to be ‘prisoners of war’ – ICRC.
  • Non-combatant. ‘A civilian, or a combatant who is hors de combat’. Hors de combat, a term whose literal meaning is ‘out of the fight’, describes ‘combatants who have been captured or wounded or who are sick or shipwrecked, or who have laid down their arms or surrendered, and thus are no longer in a position to fight’ – ICRC.
• Customary international humanitarian law. General practice accepted as international law; this practice is evident, for instance, in official statements made by states, national laws, and case law.
• Days of tranquillity. A mechanism used mostly by UNICEF, frequently in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), to provide children with access to healthcare during times of conflict, such as by carrying out nationwide immunisation campaigns or other solely humanitarian endeavours. All relevant parties must consent to days of tranquillity, to allow access to medical and other personnel, and must refrain from interfering with their work during those days.
• De-confliction arrangements. The sharing of logistical data to arrange the timing and locations of relief operations between parties involved in the conflict and humanitarian actors. These agreements guarantee that military operations do not put beneficiaries in danger, obstruct the delivery of relief supplies or the execution of humanitarian operations, or jeopardise the lives of humanitarian actors.
• Geneva Conventions. Four treaties adopted in Geneva in 1949 that are the cornerstone of contemporary international humanitarian law and are universally accepted. Every state in the world had acceded to the conventions as of 2006. The four Geneva Conventions protect different groups of people during armed conflict: sick and wounded military personnel in the field; sick and wounded military personnel at sea; prisoners of war; and civilian populations.
  • Additional Protocol I. A treaty adopted in 1977 that applies to international armed conflicts and enhances the protection offered by the four Geneva Conventions. It reinforces the protection of civilians and places additional limitations on how military operations may be carried out.
  • Additional Protocol II. A treaty adopted in 1977 that applies in non-international armed conflicts of a higher intensity than the circumstances covered by Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions. It also enhances the protection offered by the four Geneva Conventions. Additional Protocol II covers non-international armed conflicts that occur on a state’s territory between that state’s armed forces and organised armed groups or dissident armed forces that are under responsible command, control a portion of the state’s territory, and are capable of conducting coordinated and prolonged military operations.
• Humanitarian corridor. Specific routes and logistical methods decided upon by all relevant parties to permit the safe movement of civilians and/or supplies between locations during hostilities.
• Humanitarian pause. A temporary cessation of hostilities purely for humanitarian purposes. It usually requires the consent of all relevant parties and is intended to allow humanitarian activities within a designated geographic area and timeframe.
• International armed conflict. Said to exist ‘when armed force is used by at least two States against each other even if one of the States does not recognize that it is at war. A state of occupation or a war of national liberation also constitutes an international armed conflict’ – ICRC.
  • Non-international armed conflict. Non-international armed conflict constitutes ‘the use of armed force between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. Situations of non-international armed conflict are regulated by common Article 3 and by Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions’ – ICRC.
• International humanitarian law. A body of international law comprised of treaties and customary laws that aims to protect those who are not, or who are no longer, engaged in hostilities. It seeks to restrict the methods and means that may be used in warfare and otherwise lessen the suffering that results from armed conflict.
• (International) human rights law. A body of laws established by custom and treaty with the aim of shielding people’s lives and human dignity from the capricious actions of governments. Everybody is subject to human rights law at all times.
• Jus ad bellum. Literal meaning: ‘law on resort to war’; denotes the legal circumstances, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (UN), when one state may resort to the use of force against another.

Article 2.4 UN Charter: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.’
Article 51 UN Charter: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.’

• Jus in bello. Literal meaning: ‘law in war’; also referred to as ‘international humanitarian law’ (IHL).
• Temporary cessation of hostilities. A suspension of fighting decided by all relevant parties, agreed upon for a specific timeframe. It may be undertaken for a number of reasons, including humanitarian ones. The agreement specifies the operational region as well as the timeframe within which particular humanitarian tasks will be completed. As long as the suspension of hostilities remains in force, and failing agreement to the contrary, there must be no change in the positions of the opposing forces.

Sources: ICRC Glossary, Exploring Humanitarian Law; Oxford Public International Law Database; UN OCHA: Glossary of Terms: Pauses During Conflict.

Read this infographic on ‘Armed conflict: A glossary of terms‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Cécile Remeur.

Blockchain and its applications, in particular cryptocurrencies, have grabbed the headlines, but many people still do not know how they work. This briefing provides an overview of the uses and challenges of this technology, based on published information.

Blockchain originated as part of the enabling digital ledger technology (DLT) developed at the end of the 20th century. DLT works as a digital database containing information (as a record book or ledger) that can be simultaneously used and shared through a network (as a shared digital ledger). The technology is considered to render the recorded elements unchangeable (immutable) and the process open (decentralised) by using a publicly accessible network. However, in practice, the outcomes can differ from the initial technological design.

Virtually anything of value (assets) can be tracked and traded on a blockchain. Blockchain works with tokens (values in the digital ledger), tokenisation (using the blockchain for existing assets) and smart contracts (computerised and pre-specified conditions that self-execute when they are met).

Currencies and assets can be exchanged and traded in both the ‘real’ and virtual world. The use of blockchain for currencies originated from an analysis of shortcomings in the traditional financial environment. Crypto assets range from tangible to non-tangible assets, and to understand them one must look into their substance and the conditions attached to them in their digital definition.

After more than a decade, a number of challenges have appeared, ranging from the protection of citizens to the preservation of the legal economy and the carbon impact of crypto assets. This briefing looks at both the implementation of blockchain technology over this period and at whether it has delivered the expected outcomes.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding crypto assets: An overview of blockchain technology’s uses and challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral system in the Cortes Generales (Spanish Parliament). The two chambers are the Congreso de los Diputados (Congress of Deputies) and the Senado (Senate). Both the Congress and the Senate represent the Spanish people, but the Senate is explicitly designated as the House of territorial representation.

Article 137 of the Constitution formalises a quasi-federal system of self-governing regions (CCAA) made up of 17 Comunidades Autónomas and two Ciudades Autónomas, each of which have their regional executive, legislative and judicial branches of governmental administration.

The members of the Congress are elected by universal, free, equal, direct and secret suffrage via a system of proportional representation with closed party lists. The electoral districts are provinces, and each province is allotted a minimum initial representation, while the remaining seats are distributed in proportion to population. Deputies are elected to serve four- year terms, but elections are often called earlier. The last time a term reached its full length was in 2011-2015. Since December 2015, five general elections have taken place, with the latest one on 23 July 2023.

Senators are either elected by provincial constituencies or appointed by regional parliaments. Most of the senators (around three quarters of them in past terms) are elected by universal, free, equal, secret and direct suffrage via a majority system. Voters cast ballots for individual candidates on open lists, meaning they can vote for candidates from different political groups. The appointment of senators by regional parliaments is made through indirect elections: one senator for each CCAA and additional ones for every million inhabitants.

Senators are – similarly to the Congress – elected for four years, but regional legislatures may recall their appointees (Section 18, f, Standing Orders of the Senate). Formally, elections for the Congress and the Senate can be held on different days, but in practice they have always taken place simultaneously.

The powers of the Cortes Generales are enshrined in the Constitution, which holds common provisions for the two Houses as well as specific provisions for each. The main functions of the Cortes Generales are legislative, budgetary (approval of annual state revenue and expenditure), and supervisory (controlling the actions of the government). As far as the CCAAs are concerned, the Constitution lists the competences they may assume (Article 148), allowing for successive expansions through negotiations and/or reforms of their Statutes of Autonomy, within the limits of the exclusive State competences (Article 149). The CCAAs have extended their authority to different areas due to the diversity in each region’s necessities.

The Congress possesses greater legislative power than the Senate. The Congress is the first to be informed about procedures of bills and budgets and it can over-ride most Senate measures. While the Senate offers the possibility of examining the decisions made by the Congress by means of vetoes or amendments, the Congress has the final decision. Furthermore, the Congress authorises the formation of the government and has authority to cause its cessation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Spanish Parliament and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Branislav Stanicek and Jakub Przetacznik with Antonio Albaladejo Roman.

The geopolitical dimension of enlargement policy became more pronounced in 2022, when Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia asked to join the EU. Since then, fresh geopolitical challenges have accelerated the need to reform enlargement policy and cemented a shift towards the merit-based integration of new countries. Geopolitical considerations include security and defence and also foreign policy alignment, for instance in terms of relations with strategic competitors, such as China and Russia. Enlargement also presents challenges for other areas, such as the EU’s budget, decision-making and agricultural policy. Regional cooperation and the resolution of bilateral disputes meanwhile remain key elements for aspiring members.

The European Commission presented its annual enlargement reports on 8 November 2023. Its strategic orientations and recommendations include accelerating the accession process with the Western Balkan countries, opening accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and granting candidate status to Georgia. They build on policy work done in recent years, including the new accession negotiation methodology adopted in February 2020 and a gradual approach to integration endorsed by the Council in June 2022. The European Council is expected to decide on these recommendations during its meeting on 14-15 December 2023.

The two countries most advanced in their accession negotiations, Montenegro and Serbia, opened negotiations in 2012 and 2014 respectively. North Macedonia and Albania opened accession negotiations in 2022. Candidate country since 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and potential candidate country, Kosovo*, have yet to open accession negotiations. Accession talks with Türkiye are on ice.

According to the European Parliament’s 2022 recommendation on the new EU strategy, enlargement policy is ‘the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and one of the Union’s most successful policies’. In 2023, Parliament supported the accession process and the opening of negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. In addition to its role as the budgetary authority, that endorsing the financial provisions and the budget, Parliament monitors candidates’ overall progress and their implementation of the EU acquis. Parliament’s consent is also required before any accession treaty can be signed.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Enlargement policy: Reforms and challenges ahead‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlight of the December plenary session was Parliament’s award of the 2023 Sakharov Prize to Jina Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in Iran. Members held a debate with the Council and European Commission on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 14-15 December 2023 and reviewed the Spanish Presidency of the Council. Further debates took place on Council and Commission statements on Parliament’s call for the right to disconnect, the defence of democracy package, European economic security strategy and the planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia and the implications for the rule of law. Members also debated the European defence investment programme, and discussed Frontex in the light of the fact-finding mission of Parliament’s working group for Frontex scrutiny. Members debated the outcome of the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (COP28). Debates were held on statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, among other topics, on the need to release all hostages, to achieve a humanitarian ceasefire and prospects for a two-state solution in Israel; and in the presence of Commission Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis, on the environmental consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Sakharov Prize

Members awarded Parliament’s 2023 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to the late Jina Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in Iran. Jina Mahsa Amini’s family members were prevented from leaving Iran and could not take part in the ceremony at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Amini family lawyer and representative, Saleh Nikbakht, and Afsoon Najafi and Mersedeh Shahinkar, Iranian women’s rights defenders, therefore received the prize on behalf of the family.

Critical raw materials

A secure supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) is essential if the EU is to transition to ‘net-zero’ and the digital age. Members debated and adopted the text on the proposed critical raw materials act agreed in interinstitutional negotiations by Members of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). To ensure supplies are secure and sustainable, the agreed text requires the EU to extract, process and recycle a certain amount of ‘strategic’ raw materials (SRMs) itself, and emphasises diversifying the EU’s SRM imports. The agreed text adds aluminium to the SRM list, increases the benchmark for EU SRM recycling capacity, and adds rules on waste streams.

European health data space

In the wake of the pandemic and the issues this raised for personal health data, the European Commission proposes to ensure individuals have easy access to their health data and that healthcare systems can exchange data efficiently, by creating a European health data space (EHDS). Parliament debated and adopted a joint Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) report on the EHDS proposal, which sets Parliament’s position for interinstitutional negotiations. The report calls for stronger rights for citizens to access and control their data and to set a framework for data re-use across the Union. It would also create a right for citizens to obtain a remedy against binding decisions by a digital health authority. The report demands that people can opt out from sharing their data, and that personal electronic health data are stored within the EU.

Minimum requirements for commercial drivers’ breaks and rest periods

As driver fatigue is a major danger to all road users, the EU wants to improve minimum requirements for commercial drivers’ breaks and rest periods for occasional passenger transport in the tourism sector. Members debated and adopted a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report, which welcomes the Commission proposals on breaks and rest periods, but requires changes to the way break and rest periods are split. It also calls for better multilingual facilities for uploading digital journey forms. The adopted report sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Revision of the EU ‘Breakfast’ Directives

Breakfast is an important meal in a healthy lifestyle and the EU’s marketing standards on breakfast foods seek to ensure they are top quality. The EU is proposing to revise the ‘breakfast directives’, a group of standards for labelling of foods often consumed at breakfast: honey, jams, jellies and juices. Members adopted an ENVI committee report setting Parliament’s position on the proposal. The report proposes stricter rules on honey labelling and a traceability system. The committee emphasises that ‘no added sugar’ statements should not lead to increased sweetener content or claims of beneficial health effects.

Private international law: Parenthood

When travelling between EU countries, some parents continue to face issues regarding the recognition of their parental status. Members debated and adopted, under the consultation procedure, a Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee report on proposed legislation to harmonise jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood. A European Certificate of Parenthood is also proposed. The committee report calls for adding a remedy for a Member State’s rejection of parenthood status established in a different Member State. It also calls for guidelines to be developed and to link this piece of legislation to that on digitalisation of cross-border judicial cooperation.  

EU-United States relations

With both European and United States (US) elections coming up next year, Members took stock of EU-US relations. Members considered and adopted an own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), which recommends deepening cooperation on foreign, security and defence policy. As recent US legislation on green and chip manufacturing subsidies, as well as ‘Buy American’ rules, create a challenging environment for the EU, the AFET report lists a number of policy recommendations aimed at strengthening transatlantic unity in the face of deteriorating global security. The committee also calls for reinforced parliamentary diplomacy and exchange between European Parliament and US Congress committees in charge of foreign affairs.

EU-China relations

In view of the recent 24th EU-China Summit in Beijing, Parliament debated and adopted an AFET own-initiative report on EU-China relations, stressing China’s international responsibilities: to uphold sanctions against Russia, to pressure Russia to end its war against Ukraine, and to commit to peak its CO2 emissions before 2030. Although partnership with China is essential to tackle global challenges like climate change and debt relief, China’s actions have led the EU to emphasise its role as competitor and systemic rival. The draft report, scheduled for debate on Tuesday, also calls for UN investigation into human rights violations in China, which Parliament has repeatedly criticised. The committee calls for action to suspend extradition treaties with China and Hong Kong, de-risk trade flows, and combat disinformation originating in China.

EU Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Kiribati

Parliament gave its consent to the conclusion of the protocol to the EU-Kiribati Fisheries Agreement. Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) report recommended consent to the protocol, which reactivates an agreement that has been dormant since 2015. It will allow four (usually very large) EU tuna purse seine vessels access to Kiribati fishing grounds, in return for a financial contribution and support for its sectoral fisheries policy. A five-year implementing protocol has applied provisionally since October 2023.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Sixteen decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were approved: four from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee, six from the TRAN committee, two from the LIBE committee, two from the ITRE committee and one from the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and JURI Committees.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – December 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

On 8 December, the European Parliament and Council reached a landmark agreement on the rules for using artificial intelligence (AI), including governments’ handling of AI in biometric surveillance and how to regulate AI systems such as ChatGPT. The political deal between the European Parliament and the Council came after more than 2 days of negotiations. If, as expected, the agreed text is formally adopted by both the Parliament and Council to become EU law, the EU will become the first major world power to adopt horizontal legislation governing AI.

The agreement on the Artificial Intelligence Act requires foundation models, such as ChatGPT, and general purpose AI systems (GPAI) to comply with transparency obligations before they are put on the market. These include drawing up technical documentation, complying with EU copyright law and disseminating detailed summaries about the content used for training.

The note offers links to recent reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on artificial intelligence. More publications on the topic can be found in a previous edition of What think tanks are thinking.

The competitive relationship between cloud computing and generative AI
Bruegel, December 2023

Policymakers should use the SETI model to prepare for AI doomsday scenarios
Center for Data Innovation, December 2023

Quantum technologies and cybersecurity in the EU: There’s still a long way to go
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2023

In tech, the death of the Brussels effect is greatly exaggerated
Centre for European Reform, December 2023

The AI assault on women: What Iran’s tech enabled morality laws indicate for women’s rights movements
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2023

Plato, love, and the philosophical problem of Europe’s AI Act
European Centre for International Political Economy, December 2023

USTR abandons the digital rule book: To China’s potential benefit
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2023

AI governance on a global stage: Key themes from the biggest week in AI policy
Atlantic Council, November 2023

How STEP Investment in strategic technologies could help EU regions catch up
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2023

How the AI Executive Order and OMB memo introduce accountability for artificial intelligence
Brookings Institution, November 2023

The turmoil at OpenAI reveals underlying structural tensions in the AI industry
Bruegel, November 2023

A dataset on EU legislation for the digital world
Bruegel, November 2023

Compliance principles for the Digital Markets Act
Bruegel, November 2023

The EU AI Act is a cautionary tale in Open-Source AI Regulation
Center for Data Innovation, November 2023

EU policymakers: You’ve done a (mostly) good job on the AI Act. Now finish it already
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2023

Generative AI: Global governance and the risk-based approach
Centre on regulation in Europe, November 2023

The drama at OpenAI shows that AI governance remains in the hands of a select few
Chatham House, November 2023

Gender is the missing frontier at the UK’s AI Safety Summit
Chatham House, November 2023

AI won’t be safe until we rein in Big Tech
European Policy Centre, November 2023

Towards sovereign AI: Europe´s greatest challenge?
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, November 2023

Powers of AI: A Conversation with Chris Schroeder
German Marshal Fund, November 2023

The geopolitics of generative AI: International implications and the role of the European Union
Fundacion Real Instituto Elcano, November 2023

Awareness of artificial intelligence: Diffusion of information about AI versus ChatGPT in the United States
Kiel Institute of the World Economy, November 2023

What does Biden’s new executive order mean for the future of AI?
Atlantic Council, October 2023

Data strategies for an AI-powered government
Atlantic Council, October 2023

The 5×5: The cybersecurity implications of artificial intelligence
Atlantic Council, October 2023

Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence: Balancing capabilities and accountability
Brookings Institution, October 2023

Preparing for the virtual AI revolution: EU’s flexible principles imperative
Bruegel, October 2023

Generative AI poses challenges for Europe
Carnegie Europe, October 2023

Why AI will change the core of foreign policymaking
Carnegie Europe, Global Policy, October 2023

Global AI governance is currently like the Tokyo Shibuya crossing: Scrambled
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2023

When we can no longer believe our eyes and ears
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2023

A global declaration on free and open AI
Center for Data Innovation, September 2023

How Europe can make the most of AI
Centre for European Reform, September 2023

From risk to revolution: How AI can revive democracy
Chatham House, September 2023

Why AI must be decolonized to fulfil its true potential
Chatham House, September 2023

The President’s inbox recap: AI’s impact on the 2024 U.S. elections
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2023

ChatGPT, chatbots, and more: How is Artificial Intelligence being used in corporate HR departments?
IfO Institute, September 2023

Employing artificial intelligence and the edge continuum for joint operations
Atlantic Council, August 2023

Adapting the European Union AI Act to deal with generative artificial intelligence
Bruegel, July 2023

The environmental dark side of digitalisation: an urban perspective
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, July 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Artificial intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Martin Höflmayr and Giulio Sabbati.

After showing unexpectedly strong economic resilience in the face of the pandemic and the energy price shock triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine, Europe is bracing for an uncertain soft landing. The latest economic forecast points towards weakening growth. Real GDP growth is expected to be 0.6 % in both the EU and the euro area in 2023, having been revised downwards for the second time this year. This is partly explained by a heavier toll from monetary policy tightening than expected, alongside weak external demand. Inflation has been declining over the past 12 months, to 2.4 % in November in the euro area from its 10.6 % peak a year ago. Nevertheless, annual inflation is expected to be 5.6 % in the euro area, and 6.5 % in the EU, still significantly above the 2 % target. Much of the inflation-dampening effect induced by monetary policy is yet to materialise, as estimates suggest the tightening will have its maximum impact in 2024.

Despite the gloomy economic backdrop, labour markets have proven particularly resilient, with unemployment rates at historic low levels, underscoring a record tight labour market. Higher interest rates are expected to show effects on public debt levels gradually. Debt-to-GDP ratios in the EU have dropped significantly from a historic high at close to 92 % at the beginning of 2021, to 83 % of GDP in 2023, remaining above the pre-pandemic debt levels of around 79 %, while the EU fiscal stance is projected to turn contractionary in 2023.

Downside risks to the economic outlook have increased, with continuing conflicts transmitting uncertainty, particularly visible in energy markets. A recent court decision in Germany that ruled a €60 billion off-budget fund unconstitutional, will compel Germany to re-structure its fiscal policy, with potential spill-over effects in other EU countries.

In that context, this publication, the fourth in a series updated twice a year, aims to track the state of the EU economy and trends in the recovery. It also provides a snapshot of the deployment of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument, which is about to enter the second half of its lifecycle. Its main tool for investment and reform, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is being reinforced, with new REPowerEU chapters focused on energy. In 2024, the RRF is projected to be a key driver of public investment in the EU.

Read this infographic on ‘Monitoring the EU’s economic outlook: Seeking to avoid a hard landing‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Quarterly GDP growth in the EU Member States % change, Q4-2019 and Q3-2023 Quarterly, % change compared to same period in previous year Change Q4-2019 vs Q2-2023, percentage points of GDP Unemployment rate by gender in the EU Member States Q2-2023, % of the labour force Total unemployment rate in the EU EU inflation, Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) monthly data, % EU inflation, share of HICP items by change in annual inflation rate, % 12-months moving average, January 2009 – September 2023 The roll-out of Next Generation EU (NGEU) and its Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) as % of GDP