European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Rebecca Torpey.

At the 21-22 March European Council meeting, discussions will focus on Ukraine, security and defence, the Middle East and enlargement. Concerning security and defence, EU leaders will consider the new European defence industrial strategy presented by the European Commission. On Ukraine, they are expected to reiterate their commitment to supporting the country, and welcome the establishment of a Ukraine Assistance Fund regarding military aid as well as the 13th package of sanctions against Russia. The leaders may also discuss anew the use of revenues from frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine. As the Middle East remains a delicate topic, with differing positions, concrete conclusions with clear positions are unlikely. On enlargement, EU leaders will probably welcome the Commission’s recommendation to open negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. As is usual in the spring, EU leaders will endorse the policy priorities of the annual sustainable growth survey, and meet in an inclusive Euro Summit format.

1.     General

Following the customary opening address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, the Prime Minister of Belgium, Alexander De Croo, as leader of the country currently holding the six-month presidency of the Council of the EU, is expected to provide an overview of progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions.

Following recent national elections in Portugal, this will probably be the last time that long-time European Council member Antonio Costa represents Portugal at a regular European Council meeting. As regards Bulgaria, it is not yet clear who will represent the country: after Nikolai Denkov’s resignation as prime minister on 6 March 2024, Mariya Gabriel is expected to become the next prime minister in accordance with the power-sharing agreement between the political parties in the Bulgarian government. If Gabriel is sworn in on time, she will attend the European Council; if not, according to the Bulgarian Constitution, it would be the President, Rumen Radev, attending.

EU leaders will also have a lunch with UN Secretary-General António Guterres and meet with their counterparts of the countries in the European Economic Area, namely Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, to mark the 30th anniversary of their relationship.

2.     European Council meeting Ukraine

Ukraine remains top of the agenda at the European Council more than two years after Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine, and ten years since the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. The European Council will reiterate its willingness to support Ukraine for as long as it takes, while condemning the actions of Russia and those who support its war. In line with this, EU leaders will welcome the adoption of the 13th package of sanctions, and most likely also restate their support for ongoing efforts to prosecute the Russian leadership for their crimes. Back in February, the European Council had welcomed the agreement reached on the Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning revenues from frozen Russian assets. Recently, however, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed using the profits to buy much needed military equipment for Ukraine. This idea has received pushback from some Member States, as the general agreement was that the money would be used to help to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. After the 12 March meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council, the Belgian finance minister stated that there should be a proposal by the end of that week on the mobilisation of profits from frozen Russian assets. Therefore, it is likely that the March European Council will review progress and define the next steps on the use of these profits to support Ukraine.

The European Council may welcome the Council decision to establish the Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF), as part of the ongoing reform of the European Peace Facility (EPF). High Representative (HR/VP) Josep Borrell initially proposed the creation of the fund, which would be part of the EPF, but dedicated solely to Ukraine. The €5 billion fund will be used to refund Member States for their military donations to Ukraine. There have been disagreements among Member States regarding the specifics of the scheme. France has demanded a ‘buy European’ clause – some of the biggest players in the EU defence industry are French companies. Meanwhile, Germany has asked for bilateral aid to be taken into consideration when determining how much each Member State should contribute to the fund – Germany is the largest European military donor to Ukraine. Nevertheless, Coreper managed to reach a compromise whereby around 50 % of bilateral aid would be taken into account when considering contributions, and there would initially be flexibility on the ‘buy European’ aspect.

The EU failed to reach its target of sending a million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine in 2023, this – combined with a lack of agreement on US military funding – has left Ukraine without vital military support as it continues defend against Russia’s war machine. However, EU leaders may welcome a recent Czech-led initiative that has been launched to obtain 800 000 units of ammunition that could be delivered within weeks. The European Council may also support the bilateral agreements providing security commitments that Ukraine has concluded with several Member States.

The European Council will most likely also condemn the illegal ‘elections’ held by Russia in occupied Ukrainian territories (Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzia and Kherson). Following the death of Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most high-profile political prisoner, EU Heads of State or Government may also criticise the mistreatment of political prisoners in Russia.

Security and defence

The war in Ukraine has lent new impetus to discussions on EU security and defence. The European Council may reiterate its commitment to increasing defence expenditure and to boosting EU defence industry competitiveness, in line with the Strategic Compass and the Versailles Declaration. The Strategic Compass 2024 annual report is due to be presented in the course of the spring. If released before the European Council meeting (as was last year’s annual report), then EU leaders may review the findings and discuss implementation of the Strategic Compass.

At the December 2023 meeting, the European Council had asked the HR/VP and the Commission to present the European defence industrial strategy as soon as possible, including a proposal for a European defence investment programme (EDIP). EU leaders are likely to welcome the strategy, which was presented on 5 March, and invite the Council to take work forward. The EDIP will give access to €1.5 billion in funds over three years to support the defence industry. However, European Commissioner Thierry Breton has stated that the industry could need closer to €100 billion. Estonia, France and Poland have also called for increased funds for the EU’s defence industry. In that context, French President Emmanuel Macron and Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, then followed by the Belgian prime minister, have suggested issuing joint debt to support the weapons industry. However, Germany, the Netherlands, and other ‘frugal’ Member States, are against the use of common bonds. Ways of finding extra funding for defence investment may be a discussion point during the meeting.

Middle East

The European Council did not manage to agree on extensive conclusions on the Middle East at its two most recent meetings (December 2023 and February 2024). The topic remains extremely sensitive, with Member States holding differing views on many aspects. However, the topic has been put on the agenda, which shows a willingness to address recent developments at the upcoming meeting. EU leaders are likely to reiterate: i) their condemnation of Hamas; ii) their call for the return of all hostages; iii) their support for the two-state solution – as the best foundation for lasting peace; and iv) Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international humanitarian law.

Since the 7 October attack by Hamas, over 31 000 Palestinians have reportedly been killed by Israeli forces. This has led to accusations that Israel is not doing enough to protect civilian lives as it carries out its war on Hamas. On 14 February, the Irish Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, and Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, sent a letter to the Commission requesting an ‘urgent review’ to determine whether Israel was complying with the obligations (respect for human rights and democratic principles) included in the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The Taoiseach stated that he believed the EU-Israel Association Agreement would be discussed at the March European Council meeting.

Concerns are mounting regarding a potential Israeli military operation in Rafah, where 1.5 million displaced Palestinians are thought to be sheltering. On 16 February, the HR/VP released a statement calling on the Israeli government not to launch a military operation in Rafah. After the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 19 February, Borrell confirmed that all but one of the Member States supported the statement. The lone Member State against the statement is thought to be Hungary.

With famine said to be ‘imminent’ in Gaza, EU leaders may welcome the aid that, on 12 March, began making its way to Gaza through the Cyprus-Gaza humanitarian corridor. The mission involves several international partners including the United Arab Emirates and United States.

A key point in the discussion at the European Council’s October 2023 meeting was whether or not it should call for (a) humanitarian pause(s). The wording has now evolved, with some, including von der Leyen, calling for ‘an immediate humanitarian pause leading to a sustainable ceasefire’. However, it is still to be seen whether all Member States will agree to such a wording. In December 2023, a number of EU countries voted against or abstained in a UN General Assembly vote calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza.

EU leaders may also condemn the violence carried out by Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Yet there is no unity among Member States on this matter. The HR/VP has confirmed that, after suggesting imposing sanctions on violent settlers at the Munich Security Conference, not all Member States were in agreement with this proposal. The Council has been working on sanctions against extremist Israeli settlers who are breaking international law through the illegal expansion of Israeli settlements beyond pre-1967 borders, but Hungary and Czechia have opposed these sanctions, further demonstrating the divisions between Member states. Some countries, such as France, have already unilaterally placed sanctions on extremist settlers.

Enlargement

On 12 March, during the European Parliament’s plenary debate ahead of the European Council meeting, von der Leyen announced that the Commission had decided to recommend that the Council open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Member States such as Slovenia, Croatia, and Italy have supported BiH’s membership prospects; others, including Austria, have called for the membership process of Ukraine and Moldova to also include BiH. The Member States will officially decide whether or not to open negotiations. As requested by the European Council, the Commission has put forward proposals for draft negotiating frameworks for Ukraine and Moldova. These may also be included in discussions on enlargement in the European Council.

Other items Migration

EU leaders will discuss migration, following up on the discussion held in December 2023, during which they underlined the need to pursue a strategic and comprehensive approach in this area. The leaders will take stock of progress on orientations given at previous meetings.

Agriculture

In response to widespread farmers’ protests, the European Council discussed the challenges facing the agriculture sector at its 1 February meeting, committing to keep the issue under review. Twenty‑two EU agriculture ministers (all except Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden) have called on the Commission to ‘propose concrete steps forward and precise solutions’ to the issues outlined at the 26 February meeting of agriculture and fisheries ministers. In response, on 15 March, the Commission put forward legislative proposals to simplify certain elements of the common agricultural policy, and a document on the food supply chain. EU leaders will probably discuss the issues facing the sector and the Commission’s proposals.

Strategic Agenda 2024-2029

The indicative leaders’ agenda for 2024 announced a debate on the ‘strategic agenda and internal reforms’. European Council President Charles Michel will probably take stock of reflections so far in the process of setting the new long-term priorities for the EU, the strategic agenda 2024-2029. He will also update EU-leaders on the second series of meetings, each with a small number of EU leaders, representing a mix of geographical regions, political party affiliations and opinions. Possible dates for these meetings are 1-2 April and 11-12 April, ahead of the 16-17 April European Council meeting, which is expected to discuss a first draft. The European Council is scheduled to adopt the strategic agenda 2024-2029 at the end of June.

European Semester

As part of the European Semester process, EU leaders are expected to endorse policy priorities for the 2024 annual sustainable growth survey and the Council recommendation on euro-area economic policy. The discussion on the high-level report written by Enrico Letta on the future of single market, requested by EU leaders for the March meeting, may be postponed owing to the packed agenda. Meanwhile, in a non-paper, 15 Member States, led by Finland, have proposed ideas for further developing the EU’s single market.

3.     Euro Summit

The Euro Summit will convene on Friday 22 March to discuss the economic situation and policy coordination. It will take stock of Eurogroup work on capital markets union, since well‑functioning capital markets are viewed as essential to ensure EU competitiveness.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 21-22 March 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Present-day European children have been through a lot: a global pandemic, a global financial crisis and wars in the EU’s neighbouring regions. In just a few years, once they become adults, they will have to face the consequences of the decisions taken today. Therefore whether these decisions have to do with the protection of the environment, public health policies or demographics, governments should seek to ensure that children are sufficiently empowered to contribute to responsible choices for their generation’s future.

According to EU and international instruments, children have the right to be heard and to have a say in all decisions that may affect them and their well-being, whether in their home, community, school, or in legal and administrative matters. Ensuring children’s right to express their views on matters relevant to them is a key objective of the European Union. Children’s participation can take many forms, in ways that are adapted to their age and maturity; for instance they can express their views through writing and speech but also through painting and drawing. The upcoming European elections in June 2024 further highlight the importance of engaging children in the EU’s democratic processes. Four Member States (Belgium, Germany, Malta and Austria) allow their 16-year-old citizens to vote.

Stakeholders call for more extensive consultations with children while stressing the need to make policy and decision making in areas concerning children both accessible and child-friendly. An open and inclusive consultation would provide children with the opportunity to contribute to the definition of new policy priorities and to the evaluation and revision of existing measures.

This briefing looks at the international and EU policy framework relevant to children’s participation in democratic life. It also gives practical examples of how this participation is enabled through local youth parliaments, municipal children’s councils and ad hoc consultations.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Children’s participation in the democratic life of the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

On 7 March 2024, the President of the United States (US), Joe Biden, used his State of the Union (SOTU) address to a joint session of the 118th US Congress (2023‑2024) to start his re‑election campaign in earnest. Biden has been trailing Donald Trump, his only remaining Republican challenger in the presidential race, in polls in six swing states that Biden won in 2020 and where several thousand voters are expected to decide the outcome of the US elections on 5 November 2024. The SOTU was an opportunity for the President to tout his achievements and set out his vision for a second term in stark contrast to that of Trump, whom he referred to as his ‘predecessor’ rather than by name. With his age seen by many as a liability, Biden’s performance seemed more relevant than the substance of his speech, and was widely perceived as a forceful demonstration of his readiness to fight.

Background

President Biden delivered his 2024 SOTU address against the backdrop of severe global security challenges and a domestic audience that is deeply and increasingly divided over both domestic and foreign policy priorities. Throughout 2023, Republicans in the House of Representatives were engulfed in infighting, ousting former Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R‑California) and replacing him with Mike Johnson (R‑Louisiana), but passing only a scant number of bills. The 118th Congress therefore risks becoming the most unproductive in modern history. Reagan‑era Republicans who believe in the benefits of US leadership in the world and of supporting Ukraine against Russia have largely been side‑lined by Trump‑era Republicans eager to divert US funds away from Europe and towards the Indo‑Pacific or towards bolstering security at home.

State of the Union address
The SOTU address is mandated by the US Constitution, which in Article II dictates that the President ‘shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient’. From 1790 to 1946, the speech was referred to as the ‘Annual Message’, and since 1947, it has been known as the SOTU address. Over time, both its content and form have changed, with some presidents choosing to present the address in writing.

This ideological shift has recently also reverberated in the Senate. In response to President Biden’s 2023 emergency supplemental funding request for key national security priorities in 2024, which included appropriations for Israel, Taiwan, Ukraine, border security and humanitarian aid for Gaza and Ukraine, the Senate negotiated a bipartisan border security and immigration package that ultimately failed to pass because of election politics. Speaker Johnson stated that the bill would be ‘dead on arrival‘ in the House. However, on 13 February 2024, the Senate passed (70-29) the National Security Act (H.R. 815), which includes US$60 billion for Ukraine but is devoid of border security provisions. Speaker Johnson has not brought the amended bill to the House floor, calling it a ‘status quo‘ bill that lacks the provisions of the House Republican‑spearheaded Secure Our Border Act (H.R. 2). (NB: five days after the SOTU, House Democrats launched a rare ‘discharge petition‘ which, if it receives enough signatures, would force the Speaker to bring the bill to the floor. Its outcome remains uncertain.) Amid Trump’s tightening grip on the Republican Party, the longest‑serving Republican Senate leader, Mitch McConnell (R‑Kentucky), who has been a strong advocate of US support for Ukraine, announced that he would step down from his position in November. As Biden gave his address, Ukraine funding continued to be blocked in the House, with border security becoming a politically charged campaign topic, Republican support for Ukraine steadily diminishing, and new conflicts (Gaza) and other flash‑points (Taiwan Strait) capturing Americans’ attention.

Foreign policy: Ukraine, Gaza, Red Sea and China

Whereas US foreign policy played a marginal role in the 2023 SOTU, Biden’s 2024 SOTU featured prominent references to the need for the US to support Ukraine, the US response to the Hamas‑Israel conflict and the Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea, and US policy on China. In a departure from the traditional SOTU structure, Biden began by addressing foreign policy, comparing the current reality with the ‘unprecedented moment’ in US history that President Franklin Roosevelt faced when he delivered his 1941 ‘Four Freedoms Speech‘ to Congress as war raged in Europe. Biden framed his SOTU as a similar effort to ‘wake up the Congress and alert the American people’ that ‘freedom and democracy are under attack, both at home and overseas’. In a swipe at Trump, he made an energetic and passionate case for US leadership in the world, continued US support for Ukraine, and for speaking the truth and burying the lies about the ‘stolen’ 2020 elections and the 6 January 2021 attack on the US Capitol. He reminded Congress that ‘history is watching’ and urged it to pass the bipartisan National Security Bill, pledging that he would not bow down to Russia, unlike his predecessor who, Biden highlighted, said he would encourage Russia to do ‘whatever the hell they want‘ to NATO members that do not spend 2 % of their gross domestic product (GDP) on national defence. Biden welcomed Sweden to NATO and greeted Sweden’s Prime Minister, who was present in the Chamber as one of the President’s private SOTU guests.

Biden’s references to the Hamas‑Israel conflict were a delicate balancing act between affirming Israel’s right to pursue Hamas and reminding Israel that humanitarian assistance ‘cannot be a secondary consideration or a bargaining chip’ and that ‘protecting and saving innocent lives has to be a priority’. The President has drawn heavy criticism for his strong backing of Israel after the October 2023 massacre and hostage‑taking by Hamas and for failing to obtain a ceasefire to ease the suffering of innocent Palestinians in Gaza. Many Arab and Muslim Americans and young progressive voters in key swing states voted ‘uncommitted‘ in recent primaries, rather than for Biden. Biden, while not able to announce a ceasefire, stated that he would be directing the US military ‘to lead an emergency mission to establish a temporary pier in the Mediterranean on the Gaza coast that can receive large ships carrying food, water, medicine and temporary shelters’. The pier would complement ongoing US airdrops of humanitarian aid packages. The day after the SOTU, the activation of the Cyprus maritime corridor – a joint effort of the EU, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the US – was endorsed.

Regarding the Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea, Biden stated that he had ‘built a coalition of more than a dozen countries (Operation Prosperity Guardian) to defend international shipping and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea’ and had ‘ordered strikes to degrade Houthi capabilities and defend U.S. forces in the region’. With China, Biden emphasised that the US seeks competition, not conflict, underscoring that his China policy has been more successful than that of his predecessor. Countering assertions that the US is falling behind China, he stressed the strong US GDP, the US trade deficit with China being at its lowest point in over 10 years, US measures taken against China’s unfair economic practices and to prevent the most advanced US technologies being used in Chinese weapons, US promotion of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and the bolstered US partnerships and alliances in the Indo‑Pacific.

Domestic policy: Health, education, tax fairness and voting and labour rights

Biden showcased his accomplishments in terms of numbers of jobs and infrastructure projects created and the volume of private investments in manufacturing and research. As many Americans believe they were better off under Trump, Biden touted the strong economic recovery from COVID‑19, GDP growth, declining inflation and lower prescription drug costs seen during his administration. He set out a laundry list of initiatives for a second term, each time needling Republicans over positions he believes are backwards rather than future-oriented. Notably, he bolstered his case for fixing the immigration system by calling out Trump’s demonising statement that immigrants ‘poison the blood of our country‘. His plans address extremely divisive subjects such as defending reproductive freedom (including abortion rights and in vitro fertilisation, topics set to once again play a major role in mobilising the electoral power of women), extending caps on prescription drug costs and making tax credits for healthcare premiums permanent. He announced plans to use tax credits to lower mortgage rates, to build and renovate affordable homes, to provide access to pre‑school for three and four year‑olds, to make college more affordable, to restore the child tax credit, to raise the corporate minimum tax from 15 % to at least 21 % and to introduce a minimum tax of 25 % for billionaires now paying 8.2 %. He called on Congress to pass a bill to transform women’s health research, to pass the Shrinkflation Prevention Act to crack down on price gouging and deceptive pricing, and to finally pass the Freedom to Vote Act, the John Lewis Voting Rights Act, the Equality Act, the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act and a ban on assault weapons. Commentators noted the SOTU’s ‘far feistier tone‘ designed ‘to prove his doubters wrong by flashing his combative side’, and how he at times went off‑script to respond to hecklers and jokingly tackled concerns about his age. Fact checking of his figures revealed most of them to be accurate, although some claims were found to lack context.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘President Biden’s 2024 State of the Union address‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marc Jütten with Dorothee Falkenberg.

On 1 January 2024, BRICS – the intergovernmental organisation comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – admitted four new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The group’s decision to open the door to new members was taken at its Johannesburg summit in August 2023, sparking a debate about its growing international influence.

According to estimates, BRICS+, as the organisation has been informally called since its expansion, now accounts for 37.3 % of world GDP, or more than half as much as the EU (14.5 %). However, besides an increase in economic power the new members could bring potential conflicts (Saudi Arabia/Iran or Egypt/Ethiopia) into the group, making the reaching of consensus on common political positions more difficult.

Since the new members would only contribute roughly 4 % to the group’s cumulative GDP, the significance of the expansion should be seen beyond the purely economic effect, in the form of greater influence for the group and for developing countries as a whole within international organisations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods institutions.

The EU engages with BRICS+ countries individually. For instance, it has strategic partnerships with Brazil, India and South Africa, and is negotiating a free trade agreement with India. On the other hand, current conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza show the divergent approaches to security taken by the EU and BRICS+.

The European Parliament has stressed that further political dialogue with the BRICS countries is needed, including on an individual basis. In an exchange of views with European Commission representatives in October 2023, Members of the Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) underlined the need to keep an eye on the group’s expansion, especially considering the effect of a potential BRICS+ currency and the consequences for EU trade policy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Expansion of BRICS: A quest for greater global influence?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

‘This is Europe’ – an initiative proposed by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola – consists of a series of debates with EU leaders to discuss their visions for the future of the European Union. The trilogy of resilience, competitiveness and security was at the centre of the vision of Europe that the Prime Minister of Finland, Petteri Orpo, shared with the European Parliament on 13 March 2024. Regarding competitiveness, he mentioned the single market, State aid, trade and economic governance. On security, he argued that the concept not only included security and defence, but also border protection and preparedness to make the EU more resilient. Orpo also emphasised that, for Finland, ‘the EU is the most important political and economic frame of reference and community of values’, and stressed that EU leaders had to ‘fight against any pessimism and show an example and leadership’.

We now find ourselves at a key moment in history, one that calls for our courage, unity, and determination.  

Petteri Orpo Background

Roberta Metsola launched the ‘This is Europe’ initiative shortly after her election as President of the European Parliament in January 2022. Petteri Orpo is the 13th EU leader to have addressed the Parliament since its Conference of Presidents endorsed the initiative on 28 April 2022. A similar Parliament initiative, ahead of the 2019 European elections, saw 20 EU leaders speak in Parliament’s plenary sessions about their views on the future of Europe. A 2019 EPRS analysis of the future of Europe debates pinpointed the similarities and differences in EU leaders’ views.

Figure 1 – Time devoted by Petteri Orpo to various topics in his speech. Source: EPRS.

The ‘This is Europe’ initiative is particularly relevant in the context of the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), and the preparations for the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. The CoFoE produced 49 proposals on the EU’s future policies and functioning (see the EPRS overview), including more than 300 measures by which they might be achieved. Research by EPRS has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council, as expressed in the latter’s Strategic Agenda 2019 2024 and its conclusions.

On the initiative of European Council President Charles Michel, EU leaders have started the reflection process on the priorities for the next institutional cycle, which will lead to the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. The first step in the reflection process was a discussion at the informal European Council meeting in Granada on 5‑6 October 2023. The second step entailed a series of meetings, each with a small number of EU leaders representing a mix of geographical regions in the EU, political party affiliations and diversity of opinion. Four meetings have taken place to date, on 13 November in Berlin, 14 November in Copenhagen, 16 November in Zagreb, and 29 November in Paris. Another series of small group meetings will take place in early April, ahead of the special European Council meeting on 17-18 April.

Main focus of Petteri Orpo’s speech

Orpo covered a number of topics in his speech to Parliament (see Figure 1), devoting most attention to i) security and defence, ii) the war in Ukraine, iii) EU resilience, and iv) climate.

Security and defence

In Orpo’s view, ‘we are living in a time where practically all policy fields are linked to our security, and without security, we cannot ensure a prosperous future for Europe’. Security and defence is an important pillar of ‘European comprehensive security’, and the Finnish Prime Minister sees the strengthening of the EU’s defence industry as ‘priority number one’. He called on Member States to pool their resources.

War in Ukraine

Prime Minister Orpo stressed that the war in Ukraine threatened the very principles on which the European Union was built. He reiterated that agreeing unanimously on the EU’s Ukraine Facility had been crucial, and called on Member States to strengthen the support for Ukraine so that it can win this war, while at the same time enhancing the EU’s own defence capabilities. The next step is to deliver swiftly on ammunition production and to agree on additional funding for the European Peace Facility and Ukraine Assistance Fund.

EU resilience

For Orpo, the EU and its Member States must be better prepared for a growing number of increasingly complex crises. Therefore, he proposed that the Commission should develop an EU strategy for a ‘Preparedness Union’. This strategy should be based on a whole-of-society approach, in which the needs and contributions of all policy sectors are taken into account.

Climate

Orpo stressed that the EU should combat climate change and support biodiversity in a way that acknowledges the diverse circumstances across the Member States. In his view, a technology-neutral, cost-effective clean transition will pave the way for sustainable growth. He called for the EU’s climate policy to be recalibrated in the next institutional cycle, moving away from overly detailed regulation to fostering innovation.

Specific proposals and positions

Prime Minister Orpo used the opportunity to present his views on how the European Union should advance in specific areas, summarised below.

Policy issuePriority action and proposals (quotes)Economic governance‘We must also utilise existing instruments more effectively. This means reforming the next MFF and seeking more financial resources from the markets, for example through the EIB and by developing the Capital Markets Union.’State aid‘It is crucial that we restore the normal State aid rules. A healthy single market benefits all European citizens and businesses – today and in the long term.’Trade policy‘If we want to be globally relevant, we need a better ability to conclude, ratify and implement trade deals, not a better ability to bring them down.’Competitiveness‘We must build our competitiveness by developing our strengths, and through market-based solutions, with a fully functioning internal market at the core.’Innovation and research‘We must foster innovation and skills, strengthen our internal market, and ensure significant funding for innovation and research.’Table 1 – Specific proposals made by Petteri Orpo, by policy area

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Petteri Orpo, Prime Minister of Finland, 13 March 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Colin Murphy.

Cybercrime is a major threat to society that generates billions of euros for its perpetrators. It is a form of crime that is continuing to grow, with criminals showing increasing sophistication and resourcefulness. These criminal activities occur at all levels of society and take many forms, from investment fraud to phishing and the creation of bogus entities, including fake charities.

The rise in the use of digital solutions for everyday activities in business and public services is matched by the number of digital devices being used by citizens. People are now connecting to numerous digital accounts and are spending more time online than ever before. Coupled with this, cyberattacks and digital scams are on the rise. Not only is the number of incidents growing, but the complexity and the subsequent negative impact is also increasing.

Cybercrime can be relatively simple in appearance, such as spurious emails and text messages, or complex, involving a number of actors spreading malicious content through entire business or public service systems in order to block access for ransom purposes or to disable critical entities for ideological reasons.

The EU is active in tackling cybersecurity and cybercrime, as demonstrated by its cybersecurity strategy. It has a number of pieces of legislation in place or in the pipeline to tackle vulnerabilities, increase the resilience of essential services and address associated cybersecurity risks. Likewise, EU agencies are proactively dealing with the threat posed by cybercrime by supporting Member States and stakeholders in addressing emerging threats and strengthening resilience.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding cybercrime‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

Is the EU facing a migration crisis? Are the EU’s borders on the brink of collapse because of increased irregular migration? Would border fences help to stop or reduce irregular migration? How many of the world’s refugees and asylum seekers are headed towards the EU? Are the protection claims of asylum seekers genuine, or is subterfuge used to gain access to the EU? And what happened with the Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war into the EU? These are among the most common and important questions shaping the current discussion around migration and borders in the EU.

This briefing provides an overview of key trends and figures on migration, borders and asylum in the EU. The analysis critically situates these topics in the broader global and historical context, providing a synthetic, data‑rich and accessible presentation of major issues.

The analysis leads to several interesting findings that may challenge common perceptions about migration and borders in the EU, including the following.

• The majority of migrants enter the EU through legitimate legal channels.
• Most irregular migrants do not cross the EU’s external borders irregularly.
• There are significantly more legal migrants than irregular migrants in the EU.
• Building fences at the EU’s external borders does not seem to reduce irregular entries.
• The view of a dramatic increase in the number of migrants and refugees is contested.
• The EU’s share of the world’s refugees and asylum seekers remains limited.
• Reducing or stopping immigration would worsen the EU’s demographic challenges.
• The EU’s temporary protection scheme showed the Union’s capacity to provide protection swiftly to a significant number of people in need.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU migration and borders: Key facts and figures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Global refugee population Refugees as a share of population (in %) The EU’s refugee population The EU’s share of world’s refugees (in %) Protection status and EU citizenship acquisitions by Syrian nationals (in thousands) Applications for international protection submitted in the EU Asylum applications and recognition rates in the Member States – 2013 2022 Beneficiaries of temporary protection in the EU (in millions) Fences at the EU’s external borders (in km) Border fences and irregular entries at the EU’s external land borders Dead and missing at the EU’s sea borders International migrants Stock of international migrants by main region of origin (in millions) Stock of international migrants by main region of destination (in millions) EU citizens and non EU citizens living in the EU (in millions) Lawful immigrants and detections of irregular entries (in millions) EU population projections (in millions) Visa access to the EU EU visas issued at Member States’ consulates (in millions) Visa verifications in the VIS and detections of irregular entries (in millions) Irregular entries in the EU and the US (in millions) Detections of irregular entries and refused entries at EU borders (in millions) Third country nationals found to be illegally present in the EU (in millions)

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Among the highlights of the March 2024 plenary session were the debates on preparation of the European Council meeting on 21 and 22 March 2024; the need to address urgent concerns regarding Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia, and the need to ensure the stability of EU agricultural production and impose sanctions on imports of Russian and Belarussian food and agricultural products to the EU. Members also debated the return of Romanian national treasure illegally appropriated by Russia.

Other important debates took place, inter alia, on: deteriorating living conditions in the EU; a healthy lifestyle and active ageing; the inclusion of the right to abortion in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, rising anti-LGBTIQ rhetoric and violence; and EU climate risk assessment. Members also discussed the annual designation of European capitals for children, and the Commission’s treatment of requests for public access to documents.

Representatives of the world cup-winning Spanish women’s national football team participated in Parliament’s official celebration to mark International Women’s Day. The last ‘This is Europe’ debate for this term followed a speech by Petteri Orpo, Prime Minister of Finland.

Revising financial rules, and guidelines for the 2025 EU budget

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on changes to the EU’s financial rules. The new rules are needed to align with changes in the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), aimed at ensuring more transparent, digital and value-based EU funding. Members also debated and adopted Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget, which the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) insists should be people-centred, prioritising investment that improves people’s lives and EU competitiveness. The adopted guidelines set Parliament’s position ahead of the Commission’s adoption of the draft 2025 budget, which will be debated in Parliament in the new term.

Protecting our environment Green claims

Parliament debated and voted a report at first reading on a proposal to regulate ‘green claims‘. The report from the Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) sets a timescale for verification of environmental claims and labelling schemes, which must be tailored to the complexity of the claim and company size.

Waste Framework Directive

Members adopted at first reading a proposal aimed at accelerating the fight against food waste and pushing textile producers to act to reduce clothing waste, by amending the Waste Framework Directive. The ENVI committee report on the proposal seeks to raise binding reduction targets in food processing and manufacturing to 20 % by 2030, and to 40 % per capita in retail, catering, food services and households.

Industrial pollution

The Industrial Emissions Directive sets rules on industrial pollution in the EU, including from industrial farming. Members adopted a provisional political agreement to update these rules. The ENVI committee succeeded in substantially amending the proposal, to include mining and battery production, placing ‘best available technique’ principles at the heart of granting permits, and setting binding environmental performance limit values for water. However, to lighten the administrative burden, governments must put e-permitting in place by 2035. ENVI Members also successfully introduced a 2026 deadline to reassess the need to address cattle farm emissions (currently excluded), and those from imported agricultural products.

Protecting EU businesses and consumers Compulsory licensing of patents

Members voted at first reading on a proposal to clarify rules on the compulsory licensing of patents. The Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) report proposes a number of changes, including that voluntary agreements should have greater priority than compulsory licensing, and licensees, not the rights-holder, should be responsible for any liability linked to a product. The Commission should have to identify all rights-holders, who would be paid for compulsory licences used within a set timeframe. When necessary, the Commission should compel rights-holders to disclose (against remuneration) trade secrets and know-how.

Toy safety

The EU Toy Directive helps to ensure toys sold in the EU are safe for our children. Members voted on an IMCO committee first-reading report that seeks to reduce the number of unsafe toys still sold in the EU. IMCO wishes to see digital product passports available for 10 years, for example, and linked to the Safety Gate Portal – allowing us all to report risks. The committee also proposes that the Commission provide small businesses with assistance to comply with the stricter toy safety rules.

EU customs

A central EU customs authority could offer traders lower compliance costs and ensure a more efficient, fraud-proof customs union. Members voted at first reading on proposals to establish an EU customs data hub and an EU customs authority. While the IMCO report on the file is generally supportive of the proposal, it would like to see a swifter process and a platform allowing everyone to report non-compliant goods.

Product design

Members adopted a provisional agreement on two files seeking stronger protection for product design against counterfeiting. Endorsed by the JURI committee, the agreement should future-proof design protection, protect registered designs for five years, renewable to a maximum 25 years (for a fee), liberalise the spare parts market, and give EU governments three years to transpose the EU rules into national law.

Protecting our democracy and the rule of law Media freedom act

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on a regulation setting the first-ever EU rules on media freedom, pluralism and protecting journalists – the European media freedom act. Under the new rules, governments must respect editorial freedom and exempt journalists from identifying their sources. Media companies will have to make their ownership structures public, and EU countries will investigate cases where media outlets become too concentrated. To protect journalists from government spying, Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) succeeded in eliminating ‘protecting national security’ as grounds for surveillance and ensured that all public authorities have to publish information about their annual advertising expenditure, including online.

Penalties for violating EU sanctions

Parliament adopted a political agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for violating EU sanctions, such as arms embargoes. The agreed text envisages criminalising the commission of certain crimes involving serious negligence and maintains fines proposed by the Council at 1 % or 5 % of companies’ total worldwide turnover (or €8 million or €40 million respectively), a choice left to Member States.

Freezing and confiscation of criminal money

Europol estimates the proceeds from organised crime in Europe at around €139 billion per year. Little of this money is confiscated. Members adopted a provisional agreement, reached after three rounds of trilogue negotiations with the Council, on a directive covering freezing and confiscation of criminal money. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) proposed a wider scope for the directive and to use confiscated property in the public interest.

Protecting our freedom of movement Cross-border associations

Parliament has long called for EU rules to help non-profit organisations to operate freely across borders. Members debated and voted at first reading on a JURI committee report, which although largely in favour of the Commission’s proposal, highlights the need for stricter definitions in regulating cross-border associations, and for such associations to be treated in the same way as other non-profits. LIBE Members propose that a minimum of three people should sit on their boards, and that such organisations should also pledge respect for European values, with funding blocked for those who breach them.

European Maritime Safety Agency

Members considered and voted at first reading on a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report on a proposal to revise the framework of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), assigning it new roles on safety and sustainability and providing the means to carry out these revised objectives. The TRAN committee wants to see EMSA supervise European coast guard cooperation, support inspection training, monitor suspicious behaviour around pipelines and carry out other new functions.

Question time – EU governments’ preparedness to combat foreign interference, including from Russia

Věra Jourová (Vice-President of the Commission) answered Members’ questions on the EU preparedness to combat foreign interference, an increasing phenomenon, particularly in the light of Russia’s attempts to undermine support for Ukraine, as well as cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns in the run-up to the European elections.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from the Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Budgets (BUDG) committees, on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, was approved without vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – March 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Claudia Vinci (1st edition).

In December 2023, the Commission presented a proposal on the protection of animals during transport, with a view to replacing and updating Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005.

This proposal, along with another on welfare and traceability of dogs and cats, is part of a legislative package to reform the current EU rules on animal welfare. The reform was announced in 2020 with the launch of the ‘farm to fork’ strategy, which aims to create a fairer, healthier and more environmentally friendly food system.

The proposed text introduces stricter rules regarding travel times, the minimum space between animals, transport conditions for vulnerable animals, transportation in extreme temperatures, safeguarding of animals transported to third countries, the utilisation of technological systems and the protection of cats and dogs in commercial transport.

In the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) and to the Committee of Transport and Tourism (TRAN), with Daniel Buda (EPP, Romania) and Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg (Greens/EFA, Germany) as co-rapporteurs.

Complete version

• March 2024: ‘Review of the rules on the protection of animals during transport‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of animals during transport and related operations, amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005Committee responsible:Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI)
Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2023)770
7/12/2023Rapporteur:Daniel Buda (EPP, Romania)
Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg (Greens/EFA, Germany)2023/0448(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Benoît Lutgen (EPP, Belgium)
Marianne Vind (S&D, Denmark)
Elsi Katainen (Renew, Finland)
Rosanna Conte (ID, Italy)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Antonio Albaladejo, Laurence Amand-Eeckhout, Pieter Baert, Anna Caprile, Polona Car, Micaela Del Monte, Clément Evroux, Liselotte Jensen, Monika Kiss, Silvia Kotanidis, Tarja Laaninen, Katrien Luyten, Rafal Manko, Hendrik Mildebrath, Maria Niestadt, Marketa Pape, Marianna Pari, Jakub Przetacznik, Magdalena Sapala, Rosamund Shreeves and Jaan Soone.

As the only European Union (EU) institution elected directly, the European Parliament is at the heart of representative democracy, the foundation upon which the EU is built. As the current – 2019 to 2024 – term wraps up, this paper from EPRS looks at a selection of the many achievements of the Parliament over the past five years in seeking to improve the European Union for its citizens. This term has not lacked for challenges, with an unprecedented pandemic closely followed by war on the EU’s eastern border, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Union, with Parliament frequently in the lead, has developed strong responses to these extraordinary challenges.

Parliament’s power and influence have evolved significantly over the years, and it is now a fully fledged legislative body whose influence is felt in virtually all areas of EU activity. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law‑making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. In recent months, the European Parliament has engaged in a process of reform, seeking to enable it to use these various powers more effectively and efficiently.

Parliament has been influential in shaping a range of new laws this term, including the Digital Services Act and the IRIS2 Regulation. Agricultural policy has seen reform, and major environmental legislation has been adopted, in the shape of the European Climate Law and the ‘fit for 55’ package. Responding to the pandemic, Parliament has focused on health. In the context of promoting democratic values, meanwhile, Parliament was able to shape key aspects of the Media Freedom Act and the directive addressing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

Since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Parliament has played a key role in the EU’s response, including: several rounds of macro-financial assistance, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, and the Ukraine Facility. In external relations, however, Parliament’s real power often lies more in the area of agenda-setting.

Another important set of European Parliament prerogatives concerns the scrutiny and control of the executive, in particular the European Commission. Prominent examples of scrutiny work over the last five years have been the committee of inquiry on the Pegasus spyware scandal, successive special committees on tax scandals, culminating in creation of the new subcommittee on tax matters (FISC), and the working group scrutinising the activities of Frontex, the Border and Coast Guard Agency.

Since Parliament gave its consent in 2020 to the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021 to 2027, the Union has had to respond to huge challenges, including the economic fall-out from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine. Parliament has pushed for reforms, and has focused on the implementation of the Next Generation EU recovery instrument.

In the constitutional field, Parliament has sought to use its powers to uphold the EU’s values, for instance triggering a preventive mechanism in respect of the serious breach of EU values with regard to Hungary. The 2020 Conference on the Future of Europe meanwhile offered citizens the opportunity to help Parliament fine-tune recommendations for Treaty change.

Lastly, the power to set the EU agenda is a thread that runs through all Parliament’s work as a forum for debate and engagement. Stand-out examples during this term include the Parliament’s work on the forthcoming artificial intelligence act, and in the area of a minimum wage and minimum income. Parliament’s constitutional powers include appointments of people to certain senior positions in other EU institutions. Even when its opinions are not legally binding they allow it to exercise political leverage. This point was proved with the appointment in 2019 of the first European Chief Prosecutor.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024 – Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

Written by Gisela Grieger.

The EU adheres to a one-China policy that recognises the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legitimate government of China. It does not therefore maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The EU nonetheless shares with Taiwan common interests and values, including democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The general elections held in Taiwan in January 2024 once again testified to the maturity of the island’s democracy. The EU engages Taiwan in a number of policy areas, notably on trade and investment. In its resolutions, the European Parliament has, among other things, called repeatedly for closer cooperation with Taiwan, notably for the negotiation of agreements on supply chain resilience and bilateral investment relations.

Outcome of the January 2024 general elections in Taiwan

On 13 January 2024, the Taiwanese elected a new president from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for a third consecutive term, with robust voter turnout of almost 72 %. The DPP presidential candidate, Lai Ching-te, who has pledged to continue his predecessor’s non-confrontational approach to mainland China and has argued that Taiwan already enjoys de facto independence, will take over from his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, in whose cabinet he has served as Vice-President. He will be sworn in on 20 May 2024. Lai secured 40 % of the votes, down from the 57 % that marked Tsai’s 2020 landslide re-election victory, in a three-way race against opposition candidates Hou Yu-ih from the Kuomintang (KMT) and Ko Wen-je from the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who garnered 33 % and 26 % of the votes respectively after their failed joint ticket.

Seat distribution changes in the Legislative Yuan (2016-2024)

In the 2024 legislative elections, for the first time since 2004 no party has obtained the absolute majority, as the DPP lost its previous absolute majority of 61 seats in the unicameral Legislative Yuan, which has 113 seats (Figure 1). With 51 seats, it is now only the second-largest party. By contrast, the KMT increased its seats from 38 to 52, becoming the largest party. The TPP now holds eight seats and KMT-leaning Independents two seats. It is also worth noting that all other small parties have lost their seats. For now, the resulting hung parliament has turned the TPP, who gained a mere three seats, into a kingmaker and vital coalition partner for the DPP or the KMT to avoid legislative gridlock and to help shape cross-strait relations and thereby US-China relations, around one of the world’s major geopolitical flash points. On 1 February 2024, when Taiwan’s new legislative term began, Han Kuo-yu from the KMT was elected president of the Legislative Yuan.

EU policy towards Taiwan and EU-Taiwan cooperation

The EU pursues a one-China policy, which means that it recognises the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China and does not have official ties with Taiwan. The 2021 EU Indo-Pacific strategy references Taiwan with respect to the impact of the growing geopolitical tensions in the Taiwan Strait for the EU’s security and prosperity, to existing cooperation on data protection and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and to new opportunities on trade and investment and semiconductors to tackle supply chain vulnerabilities. The EU is represented in Taiwan through its European Economic and Trade Office, which reports annually on bilateral activities. The EU holds annual human rights consultations with Taiwan. In 2021, the bilateral trade consultations were upgraded to a trade and investment dialogue that oversees bilateral sectoral working groups on investment, intellectual property rights, sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures, technical barriers to trade and pharmaceuticals/cosmetics. The dialogue provides a forum to discuss renewable energy, digital trade facilitation, research and innovation and other topics of common interest.

EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations EU-Taiwan trade in goods and services, in € billion

According to Eurostat data (Figure 2), bilateral trade in goods decreased from €84.3 billion in 2022 to €77.6 billion in 2023 amid contracting global trade. EU imports from Taiwan shrunk from €49.2 billion to €47.1 billion and EU exports to Taiwan from €35.1 billion to €30.5 billion. In 2023, the EU ran a trade in goods deficit with Taiwan of €16.6 billion, up from €14.1 billion in 2022. In 2022, major Taiwanese export items to the EU were integrated circuits and electronic components (23 %), transport equipment (10.7 %) and electronic data processing and office equipment (10.6 %). The main EU export items to Taiwan were non-electrical machinery (32.7 %), transport equipment (15.5 %) and chemicals (15.4 %). According to Eurostat service trade data as of February 2024, in 2022 the EU and Taiwan traded services worth €18 billion, up from €13.9 billion in 2021.

EU-Taiwan FDI, stocks, outward and inward, in € billion

In 2022, EU foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks in Taiwan stood at €28.4 billion after steady growth from €6.8 billion back in 2013 (Figure 3). Taiwan’s FDI stocks in the EU remained at a low level between 2013 and 2019, ranging from €0.9 billion to €2.4 billion, but leapt in 2020 to €12 billion and again in 2022 to €20.7 billion. Recent examples of Taiwanese investment projects in the EU include a €3.5 billion investment in a semiconductor foundry in Dresden (Germany) by the world’s largest contract chipmaker, TSMC, and the investment of more than €5 billion in a battery plant in Dunkirk (France) by Prologium, the world’s only successful commercial manufacturer of solid-state electric vehicle batteries.

Since 2002, Taiwan has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with the status of a customs territory. It has never been the respondent in a WTO case, but has lodged a total of seven complaints against other WTO members, including one (DS377) against the EU in 2008 concerning the EU’s tariff treatment of certain information technology products under its commitments made under the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA). The most recent WTO trade policy review report on Taiwan was drawn up in 2023. Unlike the PRC, Taiwan is a party to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.

Although the EU has never launched a WTO complaint against Taiwan, the European Commission nonetheless lists a total of six trade barriers for Taiwan in its database, including local content requirements in public procurement for transport, localisation requirements for wind energy and several SPS measures pertaining to various animal diseases, including the non-recognition of the regionalisation principle.

In its resolution of 28 February 2024, the European Parliament ‘reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region’. It ‘strongly condemns China’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which endangers regional stability’. It ‘calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs’. It ‘highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law’. It ‘notes that neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other’. It ‘expresses grave concern over China’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance’. It ‘denounces China’s blocking of Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations’. Finally, it ‘welcomes the visits to Taiwan, since 2021, by consecutive official delegations from Parliament committees’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-Taiwan ties after Taiwan’s 2024 elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Parliament to vote against EU political and economic agreements with Chile and Kenya, with many people writing to the President of the European Parliament on this subject in March 2024. These citizens are concerned that the agreements would be detrimental to local populations and environmental protection. They demand that Parliament review the EU’s trade policy.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French):

English

On 29 February 2024, the European Parliament approved EU agreements with Kenya and Chile.

On Parliament’s website, you can find the results of the votes. To display them, click on the + to the left of the headings (points 1, 4 and 5). The votes are sorted into three groups: in favour (+), against (-) and abstentions (0), and are listed by political group. At the top of the page, you can filter the results by political group, country or Member of the European Parliament (MEP).

The European Commission negotiates EU international agreements on the instructions of the Council of the EU (the governments of member countries). At the end of the negotiations, the Council adopts the agreement. Parliament’s role is then limited to approving or rejecting the agreement. It has no power to amend it.

The President of the European Parliament cannot influence Members’ votes. In accordance with Article 2 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, Members exercise their mandate freely and independently.

You may also be interested in some additional information about the two agreements.

Agreements with Chile

In December 2023, the EU and Chile signed agreements to modernise and replace the 2002 Association Agreement that currently governs their relations.

The agreements establish a framework for deeper and broader political and economic cooperation with Chile, for example on foreign affairs and security, climate change, sustainable energy and human rights.

Under the agreements, over 95 % of trade between the EU and Chile will be duty-free. However, trade restrictions will remain in place for the most sensitive agricultural products, notably meat, certain fruit and vegetables, and olive oil. More information is available in this press release.

The European Parliament voted on two separate agreements with Chile: an Interim Trade Agreement, which is ratified at EU-level only, and a broader agreement (Advanced Framework Agreement), which must also be ratified by every EU country. The Interim Trade Agreement will expire when the Advanced Framework Agreement enters into force.

Parliament also adopted a resolution explaining its position on these agreements.

Agreement with Kenya

In December 2023, the EU and Kenya signed an Economic Partnership Agreement, with the aim of boosting bilateral trade, increasing investment, contributing to sustainable economic growth and working towards a green transition away from fossil fuel use. The agreement focuses on climate and environmental protection, workers’ rights and gender equality.

This agreement will further open the European market to Kenyan products and encourage European investment in Kenya. It aims to strengthen the EU’s relations with Africa.

French

Le 29 février dernier, le Parlement européen a approuvé les accords UE-Kenya et UE-Chili.

Sur le site du Parlement, vous pouvez trouver les résultats des votes, en cliquant sur le + à gauche des titres (points 1, 4 et 5). Les voix sont classées en trois catégories : pour (+), contre (-) et abstention (0), et sont listés par groupe politique. En haut de la page, vous avez la possibilité de filtrer les résultats par groupe politique, par pays ou par député.

Les accords internationaux sont négociés par la Commission européenne sur instruction du Conseil de l’UE (gouvernements des pays membres). À l’issue des négociations, le Conseil adopte l’accord. Le rôle du Parlement se limite alors à approuver ou rejeter l’accord. Il n’a pas le pouvoir de le modifier.

Nous tenons à préciser que la Présidente du Parlement européen ne peut pas influencer le vote des députés européens. Conformément à l’article 2 du règlement intérieur du Parlement, les députés européens exercent leur mandat de façon libre et indépendante.

Par ailleurs, quelques informations supplémentaires par rapport aux deux accords pourraient vous intéresser.

Accords avec le Chili

En décembre 2023, l’UE et le Chili ont signé des accords en vue de moderniser et de remplacer l’accord d’association de 2002 qui régit actuellement leurs relations.

Les accords établissent le cadre d’une coopération politique et économique plus approfondie et plus étendue avec le Chili, par exemple dans les domaines des affaires étrangères et de la sécurité, du changement climatique, de l’énergie durable et des droits humains.

Plus de 95 % des échanges commerciaux entre l’UE et le Chili seront exemptées de droits de douane. Cependant, des restrictions commerciales demeureront en place pour les produits agricoles les plus sensibles, notamment la viande, certains fruits et légumes, et l’huile d’olive. Plus d’information est disponible dans ce communiqué de presse.

Le Parlement européen a voté sur deux accords distincts avec le Chili : un accord commercial intérimaire, qui doit être ratifié uniquement au niveau de l’UE, et un accord plus large (accord-cadre avancé), qui doit être également ratifié par chacun des pays de l’UE. L’accord commercial intérimaire expirera lorsque l’accord-cadre avancé entrera en vigueur.

Par ailleurs, le Parlement a adopté une résolution expliquant sa position sur les accords.

Accord avec le Kenya

En décembre 2023, l’UE et le Kenya ont signé un accord de partenariat économique, avec pour objectifs de stimuler le commerce bilatéral, augmenter les investissements, contribuer à une croissance économique durable, et œuvrer à la transition écologique. L’accord met l’accent sur la protection du climat et de l’environnement, les droits des travailleurs et l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.

Cet accord ouvrira davantage le marché européen aux produits kényans et encouragera les investissements européens au Kenya. Il vise à renforcer les relations de l’UE avec l’Afrique.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Parliament is set to mark International Women’s Day in Strasbourg this year, with a debate on the Council decision inviting EU countries to ratify the 2019 International Labour Organization’s Violence and Harassment Convention on Tuesday. A European Commission statement is expected on its communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews due for adoption that same day. There will also be a Question Time session at which the Commission is called to answer Members’ questions regarding EU governments’ action to combat foreign interference, including from Russia. On Tuesday morning, Members are set to hear Council and Commission statements on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 21 and 22 March 2024. The following day, Members are due to hold a ‘This is Europe’ debate – the last of this term – with the Prime Minister of Finland, Petteri Orpo.

In a debate expected on Tuesday afternoon, Members are set to consider a provisional agreement on changes to the EU’s financial rules. The new rules are needed to align with changes introduced by the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), aimed at ensuring more transparent, digital and value-based EU funding. Members will then debate Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget, which the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report insists should be people-centred, prioritising investment to improve people’s lives and EU competitiveness. The guidelines adopted will set out Parliament’s position ahead of the Commission’s adoption of the draft 2025 budget.

Protecting our environment

Most people today want to contribute to a more sustainable way of life, but the European Commission finds that unscrupulous firms take advantage of consumers. Fully 53 % of the environmental claims the Commission looked at in the EU were vague, misleading or unfounded, and 40 % were unsubstantiated. To counter this fraud, on Monday evening Parliament is due to debate a report on a proposal to regulate ‘green claims‘. The report from the Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) sets a timescale for verification of environmental claims and labelling schemes, which must be tailored to the complexity of the claim and company size. The committees consider the verification system should be simpler.

Despite our efforts, we still waste nearly 60 million tonnes of food a year in the EU – more than half of it at home. On Wednesday, Members are expected to vote on a proposal to accelerate the fight against food waste and push textile producers to act to reduce clothing waste, by amending the Waste Framework Directive. The ENVI committee report on the proposal would raise binding reduction targets to 20 % by 2030, in food processing and manufacturing, and to 40 % per capita in retail, catering, food services and households.

The Industrial Emissions Directive sets rules on industrial pollution in the EU, including from industrial farming. On Tuesday, Members are set to vote on a provisional political agreement to update the rules. The ENVI committee succeeded in substantially amending the proposal, to include mining and battery production, placing ‘best available technique’ principles at the heart of granting permits, and setting binding environmental performance limit values for water. However, to lighten the administrative burden, governments must put e-permitting in place by 2035. ENVI Members also successfully introduced a 2026 deadline to reassess the need to address cattle farm emissions (currently excluded), and those from imported agricultural products.

Protecting EU businesses and consumers

The EU Toy Directive helps to ensure toys sold in the EU are safe for our children. However, to improve this protection and reduce the number of unsafe toys still sold in the EU, the legislation is now up for revision. Members are set to consider an IMCO committee report on Wednesday afternoon, which seeks to make digital product passports available for 10 years, for example, and link them to the Safety Gate Portal – allowing us all to report risks. The committee also proposes that the Commission provide small businesses with assistance to comply with the stricter toy safety rules.

A central EU customs authority could offer traders lower compliance costs and ensure a more efficient, fraud-proof customs union. In a vote scheduled for Wednesday evening, Members are due to vote at first reading on proposals to establish an EU customs data hub and an EU customs authority. While the IMCO report on the file is generally supportive of the proposal, it would like to see a faster process and a platform allowing people to report non-compliant goods.

A vote on a political agreement, reached in trilogue negotiations with the Council on an EU design package, is scheduled for Thursday morning. The two files seek stronger protection for product design against counterfeiting in the EU. Endorsed by the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), the agreement should future-proof design protection, protect registered designs for five years, renewable to a maximum 25 years (for a fee), liberalise the spare parts market, and give EU governments three years to transpose the EU rules into national law.

In crises like the recent pandemic, it is particularly useful to help companies obtain licences to produce products subject to patents – for new technologies, for example. Members are set to vote on Wednesday at first reading on a proposal clarifying rules for the compulsory licensing of patents. A JURI committee report proposes a number of changes. Voluntary agreements should have greater priority than compulsory licensing, and licensees, not the rights-holder, should be responsible for any liability linked to the product. The Commission should have to identify all rights-holders, who would be paid for compulsory licences used within a set timeframe. When necessary, the JURI Members consider the Commission should compel rights-holders to disclose (against remuneration) trade secrets and know-how.

Protecting our democracy and the rule of law

In a year of elections, ensuring journalists and media services are free from political and economic interference is particularly urgent. On Tuesday, Members are set to debate a provisional agreement on a regulation setting the first-ever EU rules on media freedom, pluralism and protecting journalists – the European media freedom act. Under the new rules, governments must respect editorial freedom and exempt journalists from identifying their sources. Media companies will have to make their ownership structures public and EU countries will investigate cases where media outlets become too concentrated. To protect journalists from government spying, Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) succeeded in eliminating ‘protecting national security’ as grounds for surveillance and ensured that all public authorities have to publish information about their annual advertising expenditure, including online.

Europol estimates the proceeds from organised crime in Europe at around €139 billion per year. Little of this money is confiscated. On Wednesday, Members are set to vote on a provisional agreement, reached after three rounds of trilogue negotiations with the Council, on a directive covering freezing and confiscation of criminal money. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) proposed a wider scope for the directive and using confiscated property in the public interest. LIBE Members proposed Member States help freeze property to facilitate confiscation and that profiting from circumventing EU sanctions be treated as criminal gains. EU countries should also strengthen their asset recovery offices, including to deal with cross-border cases.

Parliament is set to vote on Tuesday on a political agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for violating EU sanctions, such as arms embargoes. The agreement, endorsed by the LIBE committee, envisages criminalising the commission of certain crimes involving serious negligence and maintains fines proposed by the Council at 1 % or 5 % of companies’ total worldwide turnover (or €8 million or €40 million respectively), a choice left to Member States.

Protecting our cross-border freedom

Parliament has long called for EU rules to facilitate non-profit organisations to operate freely across borders. Although largely in favour of the Commission’s proposal, a JURI committee report, set for debate on Tuesday afternoon, highlights the need for stricter definitions in regulating cross-border associations. Such associations should be treated in the same way as other non-profits. LIBE Members propose a minimum of three people should sit on their boards. Such organisations should also pledge respect for European values, with funding blocked for those who breach them.

Finally, on Monday evening, Members are set to consider a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report on a proposal to revise the framework of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), assigning new roles on safety and sustainability and providing the means to carry out these revised objectives. The TRAN committee wants to see EMSA supervise European coast guard cooperation, support inspection training, monitor suspicious behaviour around pipelines and carry out other new functions. The committee demands that EMSA involve Parliament in appointing its executive director and that a Parliament representative sit on the management board.

• European Parliament Plenary Session March 2024
• International Women’s Day: Women in politics in the 2024 election year
• Question time: EU national action to combat foreign interference, including from Russia
• EU’s financial rules (recast)
• Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget: Section III – European Commission
• ‘Green claims’ directive
• Toy safety
• Revised EU rules on industrial pollution
• European media freedom act
• Revised rules on the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)
• Compulsory licensing of patents
• Freezing and confiscation of criminal money
• Harmonisation of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of EU sanctions

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

The European automotive industry is striving to adapt to market changes driven by the dual green and digital transition. Electrification has become the main strategy for reducing CO2 emissions, especially in urban traffic. At the same time, the average size and weight of cars have greatly increased. Big electric cars are the trend, but are they really the solution? Could better planning and optimisation of resources help?

According to Eurostat, average passenger car occupancy for urban mobility is usually less than 1.3 persons. Therefore, it is very common in cities for heavy cars to carry a single person. To transport the weight of that one person (80 kilogrammes for instance) means moving a full 1 800 kg. This could even reach 2 500 kg for big electric or hybrid cars with heavy long-range batteries. No matter the source of power used, this can never lead to efficient and sustainable mobility. Weight rates are usually over 10 times more favourable for the average motorbike or scooter and, of course, even better for lighter vehicles such as electric bicycles or kick-scooters.

Reducing CO2 emissions in transport is a key goal of the European Green Deal. However, specifications for choosing a city car are often based on the rare long trips that would best be made with a rented vehicle. Meanwhile, traditional emissions tests using gas analysers focus on the percentage concentration of pollutants and overlook references to the total quantity. The low speed limits generally established in Europe today also help to reduce emissions. However, efforts to reduce emissions may be counteracted by a trend towards bigger sports utility vehicles (SUVs), which are less agile and efficient but more comfortable and useful for longer drives.

Some people find themselves spending long periods every day in traffic, so they see their cars as a prolongation of their living rooms, with comfortable seats, plenty of space and ‘infotainment’, including big screens. Large vehicles also account for longer traffic jams. When anti-lock braking systems (ABS) were first introduced in premium cars, accidents increased initially for that sector owing to driver over-confidence. The same effect is again being seen with modern driving assist systems. Since large vehicles are especially safe for their occupants at low speeds, this has a pernicious effect on driver attention, consequently increasing casualty figures for other road users. Every year there are fewer victims of car accidents – but not among pedestrians, cyclists and other light vehicle users. This translates into further restrictions on the use of light vehicles, then considered unsafe, to the point of banning e-scooters and restricting the use of motorbikes – while cars are allowed in crowded areas. An alternative way to interpret these casualty figures would be to consider large heavy cars a menace to other users of public thoroughfares.

The EU automotive sector has traditionally excelled at producing vehicles with internal combustion engines (ICEs). The sector accounts for around 8 % of the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) and for 12.9 million direct and indirect jobs. However, the green transition, digitalisation and global competition have fundamentally altered its business model. Electrification has become the main strategy for decarbonising the sector, mostly through the extensive use of critical raw materials such as lithium-ion batteries, which have to be quite large to propel big cars with extended ranges.

Potential impacts and developments

Japan has been restricting car size in crowded areas since 1949, with the popular ‘Kei’ cars representing 40 % of the Japanese car market today. This Japanese regulation began with strict limits that have since evolved to set engine capacity at a maximum of 660 cc, vehicle length at 3.4 metres and total weight at 700 kg. Car ownership in Tokyo is restricted to corresponding parking spaces, following the idea that public thoroughfares are for public use, not for people to use for their exclusive benefit.

The high level of European industry specialisation in producing high quality ICEs accounts for its leading position in the market. However, electric vehicles do not require the same level of know-how, opening the door to other players. China became the top global car exporter in 2023, exporting mostly to Europe and Asia. China also dominates production of almost every raw material, technology and component used to make electric vehicles. Batteries require very polluting production and recycling methods, and they need to be charged.

Given the current electricity mix and the optimistic figures available, the equivalent emissions of a large electric car in Europe are of about 4 litres/100 km – not significantly lower than the emissions from a small ICE car (or Kei car). This figure is an average that results from considering: a total equivalent rising from 84 grammes CO2/km for some (partisan) sources to 125 g CO2/km considering the charging process alone for others; and that petrol produces 2.3 kg of CO2 per litre burned (i.e. divided by 23 to convert gCO2/km to l/100 km). In terms of the efficiency in transporting one person, a simple moped could do far better, not to mention public transport. Battery production process emissions are usually underestimated, considering that China produced the highest CO₂ emissions in 2022, accounting for nearly 31 % of the global total.

Anticipatory policymaking

On 4 October 2023, the European Commission initiated anti-subsidy investigations into EU imports of battery electric vehicles from China and is already considering provisional countervailing tariffs for five years. Although replacing one means of propulsion with another is clearly not enough, modest size electric cars are undoubtedly part of the solution. Even so, most European companies still lag behind in electric vehicle innovation. A smooth transition to alternative propulsion methods should be based on securing access to affordable batteries and semiconductors, improving innovation capacities in new technologies, reducing costs, and adopting a more circular approach – particularly on critical raw materials.

No European compact car qualifies as a ‘Kei’ car. As a result, 40 % of the Japanese car market is closed to competition from European manufacturers, and this share is increasing. The European Union regulation classifying vehicle categories already accounts for light four-wheelers or microcars (L7) and could be extended to include considerations regarding preferential access to urban areas. The various EU emission limits, such as the new Euro 7 regulation, propose values in g/km (not just concentrations) and revise measuring standards. The EU adopted an amendment to the EU light-duty vehicles (LDV) CO2 standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in April 2023, in line with the EU’s increased climate ambition. In July 2023, the European Commission tabled a package of three proposals for the greening of freight transport. These include CountEmissionsEU, a proposal for a single methodology to calculate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, this only refers to transport services. The European Commission also added a proposal for a regulation addressing the whole life cycle of vehicles, from design to end-of-life. With a view to ending the trend towards ever bigger and heavier vehicles, the European Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism is considering a proposal to overhaul the EU’s 2006 agreement standardising driving licence rules between Member States.

Promoting electric cars may lead to market distortions that run counter to European industrial interests. While complementary measures such as those contemplated in the critical raw materials act take effect, and besides the obvious move towards public transport, one way to allow the EU car industry to adapt while still reducing CO2 emissions could be to limit the size, weight and engine capacity of urban vehicles. An improved vehicle-to-passenger weight rate could hugely increase energy efficiency in urban transport.

Since light vehicles are especially suited to electrification – as increased use of bicycles and scooters can attest – and other alternative propulsion methods, it may become appropriate to let the market and European industry adapt at its own pace, with some institutional encouragement and support, to such new conditions of improved mobility efficiency.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if the problem with cars was not their method of propulsion?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if the problem with cars was not their method of propulsion?‘ on YouTube.

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Written by Stefano De Luca.

The European Union needs high-performing digital connectivity infrastructure to give all citizens the best access to digital services and to maintain prosperity. In the relentless pursuit of innovation and connectivity, the development of mobile communications technologies has been a defining force in shaping the way we communicate, work, and live.

As the 2030s approach, the groundwork for the next frontier in mobile communications is being laid – the era of 6G. Building upon the successes and advances of previous mobile generations, 6G promises to revolutionise the connectivity landscape. From ultra-high data rates and low-latency communication to the integration of artificial intelligence, 6G is poised to reshape the way we interact with the digital world.

However, with the promise of unprecedented capabilities comes a host of challenges. Critical aspects that demand attention in the development of 6G networks are privacy and cybersecurity. As 6G aims to push the boundaries of connectivity, enabling innovations such as holographic communication, seamless extended reality, and the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) on a massive scale, the potential risks to privacy and cybersecurity are magnified (e.g. mass data collection). Another critical aspect is its environmental footprint. While 6G aims for energy efficiency, the increasing demand for data and connectivity may still pose challenges related to energy consumption. Balancing technological progress with environmental considerations remains a key objective for the development of 6G.

Countries and companies that lead in 6G development and deployment are expected to gain a competitive edge in terms of technological innovation, economic growth, and influence in shaping global standards. The global race to 6G has already begun.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The path to 6G‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘The path to 6G‘ on YouTube.

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Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Jacques Delors, a passionate advocate of European integration, is widely considered to be the father of the European single market and the economic and monetary union. Previously a trade union activist, French Finance Minister, and MEP in the first directly elected European Parliament, he served three terms as the President of the European Commission, from 1985 to 1995. Jacques Delors died on 27 December 2023, aged 98.

Following his death, he leaves behind a huge legacy, with numerous commentators underlining his role as one of the architects of today’s EU. It was during his term in office that the Member States signed the Single European Act in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which paved the way for the transformation of the European Economic Community, and other pre-EU organisations, into the European Union.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Jacques Delors’ life and legacy.

A tale of two treatises: the Werner and Delors Reports and the birth of the euro
Bruegel, February 2024

Date with history: The birth of the European Union
Chatham House, February 2024

Ten reflections on Jacques Delors
Centre for European Reform, January 2024

Delors, Schäuble and Europe’s misdiagnosed competitiveness problem
Centre for European Reform, January 2024

Jacques Delors’ contributions were immense
European Centre for International Political Economy, January 2024

European Movement International’s obituary in commemoration of Jacques Delors
European Movement International, January 2024

Jacques Delors: European giant
European Policy Centre, January 2024

In memoriam: Jacques Delors
European University Institute, January 2024

Jacques Delors and a new European impulse
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, January 2024

The passing of Jacques Delors, architect of the euro: How will his legacy play out?
Institute for Research in Economic and Fiscal Issues, January 2024

“Come on, courage, the spring of Europe is still ahead of us!”
Jacques Delors Institute, January 2024

Jacques Delors (1925-2023) et l’Europe: Pensée, méthode, style
Le Grand Continent, January 2024

Disparition de Jacques Delors: Hommage à l’homme qui transforma l’Europe
Science Po, January 2024

Biographie: Jacques Delors
Toute l’Europe, January 2024

The Delors legacy: Lessons for the future
Trans-European Policy Studies Association, January 2024

Jacques Delors: A man ahead of his time
Wilson Center, January 2024

Europe according to Jacques Delors
Europe Jacques Delors, December 2023

Jacques Delors: Un message politique européen
Fondation Jean Jaurès, December 2023

In memory of president Jacques Delors
Fondation Jean Monnet pour Europe, December 2023

Delors: A great European
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, December 2023

Jacques Delors shaped the Europe we know today
Hertie School, December 2023

An architect of a united Europe
Jacques Delors Institute, December 2023

Personalism and European Integration: Jacques Delors and the legacy of the 1930s
Cambridge University Press, March 2023

L’héritage de Robert Schuman dans la vision et l’action de Jacques Delors
Institut Jacques Delors, 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Jacques Delors’ legacy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Union to set a strict EU 2040 climate target to keep the global temperature rise below 1.5°C. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since February 2024. They are asking the President to set the level of net emission reductions at 95 % compared to 1990 levels, in line with the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC) recommendation. Citizens want assurance that all EU countries will submit new individual 2035 climate targets ahead of the UN Climate Change Conference in 2025. They are also calling on the EU to phase out the use of all fossil fuels by 2040 and to limit the EU’s reliance on carbon capture technology.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in English and in French):

English European Parliament position

Parliament has long called for ambitious EU climate legislation, declaring a climate emergency prior to the United Nations Climate Change Conference COP25 in 2019.

In November 2023, ahead of the 2023 COP28 Conference, Parliament adopted a resolution outlining its position and giving a clear mandate to the Parliament delegation attending the summit.

Parliament welcomes the work of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change and its advice on determining an EU-wide 2040 climate target, and a greenhouse gas budget for 2030-2050. The resolution stresses that according to the Advisory Board, ‘the EU should take additional measures into account given that it has already exhausted its fair share of the global greenhouse gas budget in line with limiting global warming to 1.5°C’.

The resolution calls for an end to all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies, at national and EU level, as soon as possible and by 2025 at the latest. The European Parliament also supports a global target to triple renewable energy and double energy efficiency by 2030, together with a swift and tangible phasing out of fossil fuels, and to halt all new investment in fossil fuel extraction.

European Commission plans for 2040 targets

The European Climate Law established an initial target to reduce EU net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030. It also required the Commission to propose an intermediate EU 2040 climate target.

On 6 February 2024, the Commission published a plan outlining Europe’s 2040 climate target. You can read more about the Commission’s plan in the press release.

After European Commissioner for Climate Action Wopke Hoekstra presented the plan, Members of the European Parliament shared their views on this topic.

The European Commission based the plan on an Impact Assessment and European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change advice. The main elements include:

• By 2040, the EU should reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions by 90 % compared to 1990 levels.
• The Commission expects fossil fuel consumption for energy will fall by approximately 80 % between 2021 and 2040 and that coal will be phased out.
• In line with the international commitment to transition away from fossil fuels, the Commission recommends that policies ensure any remaining fossil fuel combustion will be coupled as soon as possible with carbon capture and storage.

Next steps

This plan is the very first step in the process of the EU 2040 climate target becoming law. After the European elections have taken place in June 2024, the current Commission has indicated that it will be the responsibility of the next Commission to put forward a legislative proposal.

Parliament will then consider this proposal and adopt a position on it.

Once both the Parliament and the Council (representing EU governments) have adopted their positions, the two institutions will have to agree a common text in negotiations, which will then become part of a revised European Climate Law.

French Position du Parlement européen

Le Parlement a longtemps appelé à une législation ambitieuse de l’UE sur le climat, déclarant l’urgence climatique avant la conférence des Nations Unies sur le changement climatique COP25 en 2019.

En novembre 2023, avant la conférence COP28 de 2023, le Parlement a adopté une résolution exposant sa position et donnant un mandat clair à la délégation du Parlement participant au sommet.

Le Parlement salue les travaux du Conseil scientifique consultatif européen sur le changement climatique et de ses conseils sur la détermination d’un objectif climatique à l’échelle de l’Union pour 2040 et d’un budget relatif aux gaz à effet de serre pour 2030-2050. La résolution souligne que, selon le conseil consultatif, l’UE « devrait prendre des mesures supplémentaires pour tenir compte du fait qu’elle a déjà épuisé sa part équitable du budget mondial des gaz à effet de serre, conformément à l’objectif de limitation du réchauffement climatique à 1,5 °C ».

La résolution appelle à mettre fin à toutes les subventions directes et indirectes aux combustibles fossiles, au niveau national et de l’UE, dès que possible et d’ici 2025 au plus tard. Le Parlement européen soutient également un objectif mondial consistant à tripler les énergies renouvelables et à doubler l’efficacité énergétique d’ici 2030, ainsi qu’une suppression rapide et tangible des combustibles fossiles, et à mettre un terme à tous les nouveaux investissements dans l’extraction des combustibles fossiles.

Intentions de la Commission européenne pour les objectifs de 2040

La loi européenne sur le climat a fixé un objectif initial visant à réduire les émissions nettes de gaz à effet de serre d’au moins 55 % d’ici 2030. Elle oblige également la Commission de proposer un objectif climatique intermédiaire de l’UE à l’horizon 2040.

Le 6 février 2024, la Commission a publié un plan décrivant l’objectif climatique de l’Europe pour 2040. Vous pouvez en savoir plus sur le plan de la Commission dans le communiqué de presse.

Après que le commissaire européen chargé de l’action pour le climat, Wopke Hoekstra, a présenté le plan, les députés au Parlement européen ont partagé leur point de vue sur ce sujet.

La Commission européenne a fondé le plan sur une analyse d’impact et l’avis du Conseil scientifique consultatif européen sur le changement climatique. Les principaux éléments comprennent:

• D’ici à 2040, l’UE devrait réduire ses émissions nettes de gaz à effet de serre de 90 % par rapport au niveau de 1990.
• La Commission s’attend à ce que la consommation énergétique de combustibles fossiles diminue d’environ 80 % entre 2021 et 2040 et que le charbon soit progressivement éliminé.
• Conformément à l’engagement international en faveur de la transition vers l’abandon des combustibles fossiles, la Commission recommande que les politiques garantissent que toute combustion restante de combustibles fossiles soit couplée dès que possible au captage et au stockage du carbone.

Prochaines étapes

Ce plan constitue la toute première étape du processus d’adoption d’une loi fixant l’objectif climatique de l’UE à l’horizon 2040. Après les élections européennes de juin 2024, la Commission actuelle a indiqué qu’il incomberait à la prochaine Commission de présenter une proposition législative.

Le Parlement examinera ensuite cette proposition et adoptera une position à ce sujet.

Une fois que le Parlement et le Conseil (représentant les gouvernements de l’UE) auront adopté leurs positions, les deux institutions devront s’accorder sur un texte commun, qui fera alors partie d’une loi européenne révisée sur le climat.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Pieter Baert (1st edition).

The pricing of goods and services that are traded within a multinational group is referred to as ‘transfer pricing’. The prices charged on such transactions affect the division of income between the different entities of the multinational group (and consequently, the taxable profits per country). To ensure that transactions between group entities are priced in a way that reflects their fair market value – i.e. as if the transactions were made between independent entities – countries have put in place strict transfer pricing rules. While these rules are made at national level, EU Member States generally stay close to (non-binding) OECD Guidelines. However, the number of transfer pricing tax disputes has risen over the years, with both tax authorities and companies spending significant time and resources on solving such cases.

On 12 September 2023, the European Commission tabled a proposal on harmonising transfer pricing rules within the EU. The main objective is to establish a common approach at EU level towards transfer pricing and define a number of key transfer pricing principles in order to enshrine them into EU law.

Complete version

• March 2024: ‘Harmonising transfer pricing rules within the EU‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council directive on transfer pricingCommittee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2023)532
12.9.2023Rapporteur:Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Greens/EFA, Denmark)2023/0322 (CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou (EPP, Greece)
René Repasi (S&D, Germany)
Gilles Boyer (Renew, France)
Andżelika Anna Możdżanowska (ECR, Poland)
José Gusmão (The Left, Portugal)Consultation
procedure (CNS) –
Parliament adopts
a non-binding
opinionNext steps expected: Vote in plenary on ECON committee report

© JeanLuc Ichard / Adobe Stock

Written by Anita Orav with Nefeli Barlaoura.

The fiction of ‘non-entry’ is a claim that states use in border management to deny the legal arrival of third-country nationals on their territory, regardless of their physical presence, until granted entry by a border or immigration officer. It is usually applied in transit zones at international airports between arrival gates and passport control, signifying that the persons who have arrived have not yet entered the territory of the destination country. Although physically present, they are not considered to have legally entered the state’s official territory until they have undergone the necessary clearance.

In the EU, all Member States make use of the fiction of non-entry in transit zones at ports of entry, but usually in a non-asylum context. In 2018, Germany was one of the first countries to extend this concept to include land crossings. Since the mass arrival of asylum-seekers in 2015-2016, other EU Member States have also increasingly looked into ways of using this claim to inhibit asylum-seekers’ entry to their territory and thereby avoid the obligation under international law to provide asylum-seekers with certain protection and aid. This, however, may lead to a risk of refoulement, as the fiction of non-entry limits asylum-seekers’ mobility and access to rights and procedures, including the asylum procedure.

The Screening Regulation is a legislative measure proposed as part of the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which aims to establish a pre-entry screening procedure applicable to third-country nationals before they are authorised to enter the territory. The use of the fiction of non-entry in EU legislation raises several concerns, such as the responsibility of the Member States, the asylum-seekers’ restricted access to rights, the use of detention, and possible violations of human rights.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Legal fiction of non-entry in EU asylum policy: Implications of the new Screening Regulation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Defence planning (including capability development planning) is the process of establishing the military forces and equipment that a state or alliance determines are required to meet its objectives or to counteract threats. There are three major capability development processes within the European Union: each Member State’s national planning; the NATO defence planning process, where applicable; and the EU’s planning, which has evolved gradually since the 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting and now consists of numerous components.

EU capability development planning

Rather than having one tool that determines its defence planning, the EU has set up several different processes. The EU’s capability process is neither cyclical nor linear, and is difficult to comprehend because it lacks a name and no formal document fully explains it. Furthermore, it involves a multitude of actors (see Annex I). These processes have evolved gradually since 1999.

The Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), which was established in 2003, is specifically mentioned in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and is solely under the control of the military structures, but has fallen ‘into obscurity‘. EU Military Staff, the source of military expertise in the European External Action Service (EEAS), identify the military requirements necessary to meet the EU level of ambition and highlight shortfalls.

To address long-term security and defence challenges, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has been creating Capability Development Plans (CDPs) since 2008, which draw on the CDM process. It examines potential security scenarios for the future and offers suggestions for the capabilities that European armies should have in order to respond to a range of possible events. Defence planners from Member States can use it to determine opportunities for cooperation and priorities. The latest CDP review, of 2023, contains 14 priorities across five military domains (land, air, maritime, space, cyber), and eight priorities categorised under strategic enablers and force multipliers. The EU introduced Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017, which is an additional tool for enhancing defence capabilities through collaboration. The Member States have since launched 68 projects, in areas such as maritime, cyber, space and air. They have made 20 legally binding commitments coordinating defence-planning initiatives. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) provides an overview of the EU defence landscape and promotes collaboration by pointing out collaborative opportunities. Launched in 2017, CARD is a key instrument in advancing EU capability development. It is designed to enhance coherence and act as a guide for defence collaboration. The second CARD cycle was completed in 2022. It concludes that increased EU defence budgets in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine pose both a challenge and an opportunity for European defence. The announced additional funding may even close long-standing capability gaps.

The 2022 Strategic Compass called for adaptation of the EU’s defence capability planning and development and annual defence ministerial meetings on EU defence initiatives, addressing capability development, the first of which was held in November 2022, within the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence). It also calls for a reduction in critical gaps by 2025 on strategic enablers such as strategic airlift, space communication assets and cyber-defence capabilities, and emphasises next generation capabilities – for example, a main battle tank. An important element added by the Defence Investment Gap Analysis is the Commission’s suggestion to move progressively towards a joint EU defence programming and procurement function to enable Member States to better define capability priorities with the greatest urgency.

One of the major efforts undertaken by the Commission in the area of capability development has been the European Defence Fund, launched in 2017 with a budget of €8 billion for 2021-2027 (which is set to be increased to €9.5 billion) to incentivise joint defence research, innovation and capability development. A more recent addition, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has been the Commission’s efforts to incentivise joint procurement. The 2023 European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) seeks to address the EU’s most urgent and critical defence capability gaps and incentivise Member States to procure defence products jointly, with a budget of €300 million. It will serve as the basis for a more long-term European defence investment programme (EDIP), a proposal for which is expected on 5 March 2024 as part of a broader European defence industrial strategy (EDIS). Furthermore, to incentivise the ramping-up of production of missiles and ammunition, the EU has established a €500 million fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production.

EU defence planning has been notoriously difficult. According to experts, ‘defence planning remains stuck at the national, rather than at the European or even Atlantic level’. The reason for this is broadly the lack of political will to change it. EU defence planning is even more crucial because, in the absence of coordinated action to acquire strategic enablers – which is prohibitively expensive for smaller Member States – Member States will continue to rely on US assistance, whose future is far from certain, for the foreseeable future.

EU-NATO capability development cooperation
From the inception of the EU’s Capability Development Mechanism, coherence between EU and NATO capability processes has been a priority. As such, as early as 2003 a NATO-EU capability group was set up to ‘ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement’ of both organisations’ efforts to close capability gaps, but progress was hampered by political blockages. Defence capabilities is one of the strategic areas of cooperation between NATO and the EU and its importance is stressed in all three EU-NATO declarations. The third EU-NATO declaration (January 2023) speaks of ‘tangible results’ in the field of defence capabilities; this is where the ‘single set of forces principle’ is important – the notion that capabilities are owned by the Member States and can be used for NATO, the EU and other purposes rather than being limited to use in one organisation, which should ensure efficiency and avoid duplication. Many of the EU’s capability priorities correspond to NATO capability priorities; air-to-air refuelling is one specific example of how EU and NATO capability priorities complement each other. Moreover, many PESCO projects correspond to relevant NATO priorities, such as military mobility. There are also overlaps between CARD and the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and efforts have been made to guarantee coherence between the two processes, adhering to the logic of complementarity and avoiding duplication. For instance, inviting EU staff to NDPP consultations and NATO staff to CARD meetings has become common, even though the membership, scope and responsibilities differ. Standardisation is another important area of cooperation, with complementary efforts in this area and cross-participation in the relevant NATO and EU standardisation committees.

NATO Allies have agreed to develop and maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against potential enemies. The main tool for determining and prioritising the capabilities needed for the Alliance is the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). It aims to provide a framework within which national and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonised to enable Allies to provide the necessary forces and capabilities in the most efficient manner. The NDPP is a four-year programme that consists of five steps (political guidance, determine requirements, review results, apportion targets and facilitate implementation), which are typically completed sequentially. The NDPP focuses on capabilities in the short and medium term (up to 20 years). The responsible committee in NATO is called the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC). It is in charge of creating policies pertaining to defence planning and overseeing the coordination of all NDPP operations. The DPPC supervises the work of NATO bodies and committees responsible for defence planning on behalf of the North Atlantic Council. NATO also actively supports the identification and implementation of multinational cooperation in capability development and procuring capabilities. For instance, NATO commonly procures and operates a fleet of airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), one of the few military assets that are owned and operated by the Alliance rather than its members. NATO bodies and agencies also support national capability development initiatives in line with the NDPP. NATO’s High Visibility Projects (HVPs) support Allies and partner nations in identifying opportunities for multinational capability cooperation in critical areas like air-to-air refuelling and ammunition. The NATO Support and Procurement Agency offers NATO Allies and partner countries acquisition, logistical, operational and systems support, and related procurement.

European Parliament position

Parliament welcomes the EU’s ambition to strengthen its defence capabilities, stresses the need to make better use of EU initiatives and budgets, and calls for increased budgets. MEPs underline the importance of developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities with NATO, and stress the need to ensure coherence of output between EU and NATO capability development planning processes.

EU INITIATIVEMAIN ACTORSESTABLISHEDThe Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) identifies military requirements necessary to meet the EU level of ambition and highlights shortfalls.EU Military Staff within the European External Action Service (EEAS) draw it up. The EU Military Committee makes a proposal to the Political and Security Committee. It is approved by ministers of defence and foreign affairs.2003The Capability Development Plan (CDP) is a tool to analyse Member States’ military capabilities and inform them about priorities and collaborative opportunities.The European Defence Agency (EDA), in close cooperation with the Member States, and with active contributions from the EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff (EUMS). It is approved by ministers of defence.2008Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a Treaty-based framework to deepen defence cooperation among EU Member States.The Council at political level, Member States at project level. The EDA and EEAS, including the EUMS, act as the PESCO Secretariat.2017The European Defence Fund (EDF) – worth €8 billion – incentivises and supports collaborative, cross-border defence research and capability development.Implemented directly by the European Commission. The Commission is assisted by the EDF programme committee, also involving the EDA and the EEAS.2017The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) provides an overview of the EU defence landscape and facilitates cooperation by identifying collaborative opportunities.The EDA in cooperation with the EEAS, including the EUMS. Based on permanent dialogue between Member States and EU institutions. It is approved by the EU defence ministers.2017The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) is a short-term €300 million instrument that incentivises the joint procurement of defence equipment.Implemented directly by the European Commission. The Commission is assisted by Member State representatives within a programme committee, also involving the EDA and the EEAS.2023The Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) facilitates the ramping-up of ammunition production capacity, with a budget of €500 million.Implemented directly by the European Commission. The Commission is assisted by Member State representatives within a programme committee, also involving the EDA and the EEAS.2023The European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) will be a longer-term programme incentivising the joint procurement of defence equipment.European Commission (expected)2024 (proposed)ANNEX I

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘European Capability Development Planning‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.