European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Andrés García Higuera

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) has a mission to bridge the gap between science and policy. To further this understanding, four Members of the STOA Panel visited leading research institutions in Barcelona on 27 June 2025. Ivar Ijabs (Renew, LV; Vice-Chair of STOA), Laura Ballarín Cereza (S&D, ES), Herbert Dorfmann (EPP, IT) and José Cepeda (S&D, ES) visited the Barcelona Supercomputing Center (BSC-CNS), the ALBA Synchrotron and the Institute for Photonics (ICFO).

With a staff of over 1 000 scientists and an overall budget of €70 million, the BSC specialises in high performance computing (HPC) and provides support services within the AI Factory EU programme to over 2 000 EU companies. The ALBA Synchrotron is a unique scientific infrastructure exploring the details of matter in a wide range of scientific fields. The Institute for Photonics (ICFO) conducts wide-scope, basic and applied research at the highest international level in several branches of the sciences and technologies of light.

The delegation was hosted by the Department of Research and Universities of the Local Government of Catalunya under counsellor Núria Montserrat, who was represented by General Manager Josep-Oriol Escardíbul Ferra. Eva Ortega-Paíno, General Manager at the Ministry of Science, Research and Universities represented the Central Government of Spain.

The delegation had the opportunity to engage with top-level scientists from all three institutions. The Members were particularly interested in funding needs and sources, as well as in new developments in software, hardware (from chips to quantum and photonics) and third-country competition. The EU’s quantum and AI strategies and the development of dual-use technologies were addressed, together with green tech, regulatory initiatives and the need for policy to consider the flexibility required for research and development. The requirements of fundamental research and plans for keeping and attracting talent in the EU were also discussed. The STOA Panel Members gained a first-hand understanding of the issues at stake for scientists and experts, who shared their ideas in the spirit of contributing to the policy-making process.

Written by Jurgita Lekaviciute with Oona Lagercrantz.

Initiatives to restore European primary forests and thereby reverse centuries of decline are gaining traction. Such restoration could deliver significant ecological, environmental, climate-related and socio-cultural benefits, ranging from biodiversity conservation, water regulation and climate mitigation, to ecotourism and renewed human relationships with nature. However, a number of challenges and trade-offs need to be addressed, including the lack of primary forest mapping, concerns over human exclusion and potential economic losses.

The Białowieża Forest, located on the border between Poland and Belarus, began growing after the last ice age. It is home to 59 mammal species, 250 bird species, 13 amphibian species and over 12 000 invertebrate species. It also hosts Europe’s largest bison population. It is Europe’s single major ‘primary forest’ and embodies the continent’s natural heritage. However, like the vast majority of Europe’s original forests, Białowieża has been significantly altered, despite conservation efforts dating back to the 16th century. Disturbance rates have seen a significant increase over the past 40 years.

European Union (EU) law, aligning with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), defines a primary forest as a ‘naturally regenerated forest of native tree species, where there are no clearly visible indications of human activities and the ecological processes are not significantly disturbed’. Terms describing forests as ‘primeval’, ‘virgin’ and ‘old-growth’ are often used interchangeably with the term ‘primary’, with each having a slightly different meaning. Current data on European primary forests typically cover old-growth forests, defined as ‘late-successional forests, which contain structures and species which distinguishes them from forests of younger age classes’, such as deadwood. Mapped primary forests total just 3.2 million hectares (less than 3 % of the EU’s total forest area), with around 90 % concentrated in Sweden, Finland, Bulgaria, and Romania. However, there is a significant mapping gap: approximately 4.4 million hectares – an area larger than the Netherlands – remain unmapped.

Due to the very small amount of primary forests in Europe, merely protecting them may not suffice to meet biodiversity targets. Therefore, initiatives to restore primary forests in Europe have gained traction, connected to rewilding efforts. For instance, French botanist Francis Hallé, known for his work on tropical forests, has proposed developing a new primary forest on a lowland cross-border area of around 70 000 hectares – roughly the size of the island of Menorca. Hallé and others want to connect existing wilderness areas that are large enough to sustain megafauna and leave them undisturbed until they recover their original characteristics. However, restoring primary forests is a slow process: approximately 800 years if starting from an existing forest and 1 000 years from bare soil.

Potential impacts and developments

Restoring primary forests in Europe would generate wide-ranging positive ecological, environmental and socio-economic impacts. Primary forests, even when small in size, support biodiversity by providing a home to a broad range of endangered plant and animal species. At a time when only a quarter (27 %) of species protected under EU law have good conservation status, primary forest restoration can help prevent species loss. Primary forests also deliver a range of ecosystem services to humans: they maintain groundwater levels, reduce flood risk and improve soil quality. In primary forests, fallen leaves and organic matter decompose naturally, enriching soil fertility and preventing soil degradation. Primary forests also help mitigate climate change, as they absorb and store significantly higher levels of carbon than newer forests. Moreover, they are more resilient to environmental change, help reduce wildfire risks and mitigate heat waves through their cooling effect.

Restoring primary forests could also create new opportunities for tourism, recreation, and spiritual and aesthetic experiences, ultimately enhancing the quality of life for Europeans. Such restoration projects represent a paradigm shift in human interaction with nature, moving away from strict management towards a ‘free evolution‘ of ecosystems. The effort to restore primary forests has the potential to provide profound meaning for individuals across generations, akin to the construction of cathedrals in Europe centuries ago, highlighting society’s imperative to look towards the future.

A point of contention is the role of humans in primary forests. A key criticism against primary forest restoration is that it reinforces an artificial separation between humans and nature. The question of how an ‘undisturbed’ forest will be defined and enforced needs to be answered. In proposals such as the one by Francis Hallé, humans are allowed to visit but not alter the forest in any way, including by treading on the forest floor. These restrictions could have negative effects on cultural and recreational activities typically associated with forests, such as berry and mushroom picking and walking.

Economic trade-offs also need to be addressed. Restoring primary forests comes with significant opportunity costs for forest business owners, as managed forest areas would need to be set aside, resulting in lost wood product incomes. Farmers and forest owners near primary forests could experience decreased crop or livestock production, leading to economic losses due to natural disturbances like wildfires or insect infestations. These issues highlight the necessity of establishing buffer zones around primary forests and providing for compensation schemes for affected landowners.

In addition, restoring primary forests would require resources to monitor and strictly protect existing primary forests and areas designated for restoration. To achieve this, technology – including artificial intelligence, drones, satellite imagery and remote sensing technologies, such as Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), which uses lasers to create 3D models of the Earth’s surface – will be indispensable. Remote sensing technologies can play a crucial role in mapping primary and old-growth forests, especially in inaccessible areas, by providing efficient, large-scale and less labour-intensive biodiversity data.

Anticipatory policymaking

The EU’s network of protected areas, Natura 2000, plays a pivotal role in conserving existing primary and old-growth forests. About 93 % of the mapped primary and old-growth forests are part of the Natura 2000 network, and 87 % are strictly protected. However, these figures should be interpreted cautiously due to mapping gaps. The EU biodiversity strategy to 2030, part of the European Green Deal, aims to protect 30 % of the EU’s land and 30 % of its sea areas, with 10 % under strict protection – including all remaining primary and old-growth forests. The goal is to prevent logging and preserve their ecosystem services. Under the EU forest strategy to 2030, the European Commission released guidelines in March 2023 to enhance the protection of these vital ecosystems. The guidelines assist national authorities in identifying, mapping, monitoring and strictly protecting remaining primary and old-growth forests, providing identification criteria and suggested timelines for conservation efforts.

The proposed forest monitoring law, which is currently being discussed in the European Parliament, seeks to implement an EU-wide integrated forest monitoring framework to improve data-sharing on the state of forests in the EU. If adopted, it would require all Member States to map and share the location of their primary forests by 1 January 2028.

The EU Nature Restoration Law, enacted in August 2024, aims to restore at least 20 % of the EU’s land by 2030, as well as all ecosystems in need of restoration by 2050. This law provides a legal framework for measures to restore degraded forest ecosystems that go beyond the restoration of forest habitats protected under the EU Habitats Directive.

Finally, the EU Climate Law sets a binding 2050 climate neutrality target and a 55 % emissions cut by 2030, indirectly supporting the protection of primary forests as vital carbon sinks.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if Europe restored its primary forests?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mar Negreiro.

Deepfakes – videos, images and audio created using artificial intelligence (AI) to realistically simulate or fabricate content – are booming on the internet. They are becoming increasingly accessible, as what previously required powerful tools can now be done with free mobile apps and limited digital skills. At the same time, they are becoming increasingly sophisticated and therefore more difficult to detect, especially audio deepfakes. While deepfakes have applications in entertainment and creativity, their potential for spreading fake news, creating non-consensual content and undermining trust in digital media is problematic, as they are evolving faster than existing legislative frameworks. A projected 8 million deepfakes will be shared in 2025, up from 500 000 in 2023. The European Commission states that pornographic material accounts for about 98 % of deepfakes.

Deepfakes pose greater risks for children than adults, as children’s cognitive abilities are still developing and children have more difficulty identifying deepfakes. Children are also more susceptible to harmful online practices including grooming, cyberbullying and child sexual abuse material. This highlights the need for legal action and cooperation, including developing the tools and methods needed to tackle these threats at the required scale and pace. Furthermore, there is a growing need for enhanced generative AI literacy for children, educators and parents. There is also a need for increased industry efforts and better implementation of relevant European Union (EU) legislation such as the Artificial Intelligence Act and the Digital Services Act. Monitoring indicators on children’s online use at the EU level are currently non-existent, highlighting the need for their implementation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Children and deepfakes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nikolina Šajn.

CONTEXT

Two and a half years since the new rules on the common agricultural policy (CAP) started to apply, the Commission is amending them for the second time. The proposal comes just weeks before the Commission aims to make a separate proposal for the CAP rules that would be in force after 2027. While the first package of amendments, adopted in July 2024 after widespread farmer protests, lowered some of the environmental conditionality requirements and did away with the conditionality controls and penalties for farms under 10 hectares, this current package tackles further stakeholder complaints of overly complex CAP rules and procedures. It aims to offer more flexibility regarding the environmental requirements, greater use of simplified payments for small and medium-sized farms, less bureaucracy for organic farms, simpler procedures for supporting farms affected by climate change and severe weather, and less red tape for the national authorities. After the adoption of the final act, Member States would still need to amend their CAP strategic plans before they can apply the new rules. For the changes to be implemented in 2026, the final act would have to be adopted well before the end of 2025.

Legislative proposal

2025/0236(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 as regards the conditionality system, types of intervention in the form of direct payment, types of intervention in certain sectors and rural development and annual performance reports and Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 as regards data and interoperability governance, suspensions of payments annual performance clearance and controls and penalties – COM(2025) 236, 14 May 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘CAP simplification package: Omnibus on Agriculture‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Colin Murphy.

The growth in accessibility of online spaces and digital channels has been remarkable in recent years, providing citizens with many benefits, including enhanced communication, greater learning opportunities and easier access to private and public services. However, this growth has seen a commensurate increase in the associated risks and harms. Cyberbullying, cyber-violence and sexual extortion are just some of the dangers to which people, particularly vulnerable people, are exposed in the digital environment. In our ‘always-on’ world, issues such as cyberbullying can be a relentless experience and can leave victims with a constant sense of being under attack.   

Like the digital space itself, these dangers know no borders, which can make the problem a global issue. The solutions therefore are not ‘one size fits all’, but a combination of regional, national and transnational actions. The examples outlined here at regional level, while varying in size and scope, all have a common thread, which is the recognition of the risks to people and the desire to make a positive change.

The approaches taken often involve a coordinated or cooperative style, with the involvement of students, teachers and parents. The message is consistent on the importance of recognising the dangers of the internet. It is important for victims to be able to quickly identify cyberbullying, cyber-violence and sexual extortion, and know how to deal with it and whom to turn to, in order to prevent risks from turning into harm.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Tackling cyberbullying at regional/local level‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Olga Dunderberg.

The European Parliament resumes business on Monday, for the last session ahead of the summer recess. The session is likely to be dominated by the motion of censure of the Commission, tabled by the required tenth of Members. A debate on the motion is to be held on Monday evening, followed by the vote on Thursday.

Ahead of that debate, President Roberta Metsola is due to open the session with a commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide. On Tuesday morning, Members will share their expectations for the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU with Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen. The presidency will have to tackle a variety of priorities, including defence, Ukraine, enlargement, climate, and the EU’s economy, trade and long-term budget. Parliament will discuss its priorities for the EU’s post-2027 long-term budget later on Wednesday with the Council and Commission. Also on Wednesday, Members will discuss the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 26 June 2025, while the previous day they will discuss preparations for the 2025 EU-China Summit, due in late July.

To become the 21st euro-area Member State, Bulgaria has demonstrated solid foundations for medium-term convergence and met the requirements for accession to the euro area, despite still tackling corruption, money laundering and governance issues. A report from Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) endorses the country’s adoption of the euro on 1 January 2026. As Parliament is consulted on the file, Members are due to vote their opinion on Bulgaria’s euro-area membership on Tuesday.

With draft amending budget No 1/2025, the €1.35 billion surplus from implementation of the 2024 budget would be entered as revenue in the 2025 budget. This would reduce Member States’ contributions to the 2025 budget accordingly. While noting that the surplus is low, a report from the Committee on Budgets underlines that financing needs remain high, and regrets the absence of progress in the Council on the reform of the own resources system. Members are likely to endorse the Council’s position on DAB 1/2025 on Wednesday.

In the midst of a heatwave, winter heating may seem far from Members’ minds, however preparation for next year’s cold season is already under way. The EU Gas Storage Regulation has helped counter strong demand and supply disruption, reducing the need for additional gas imports and stabilising energy prices. As the regulation expires at the end of 2025, it is proposed to extend the measures until the end of 2027. Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) negotiators have reached a provisional agreement with Council to make the filling targets more flexible and to oblige Member States to track the amount of gas originating in Russia. Members are due to vote on the agreed text on an amended Gas Storage Regulation on Tuesday.

The EU has had a fisheries agreement with Greenland since 1985, allowing EU vessels to fish in Greenlandic waters in the north-east Atlantic and also enabling quota swaps with Norway. To renew the protocol implementing the agreement, Members are set to vote on Tuesday on a new protocol running to 2030. The Committee on Fisheries (PECH) recommends that Parliament give consent to the conclusion of the new protocol to the fisheries agreement with Greenland, and has tabled an accompanying motion for resolution, underlining the importance of the agreement in today’s geopolitical context, while also expressing concern over the lack of data on the state of certain fish stocks.

For greater sustainability in fisheries shared with non-EU countries, and to protect EU fishers from unfair competition, Parliament’s negotiators reached agreement with the Council on tackling the issue of non-EU countries that do not cooperate on sustainable management of shared fish stocks. The agreed text refers specifically to regional management organisations, in line with Parliament’s demands to clarify the scope of the legislation. On Wednesday, Members are due to vote on the text amending existing legislation setting the rules for penalising third countries.

Members are set to consider progress on four candidate countries’ paths towards EU accession, with debates set for Tuesday afternoon on the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) reports considering the European Commission’s 2023 and 2024 reports on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Georgia. AFET’s report on Albania endorses the country’s progress and ambition to complete accession talks by 2027, yet underlines an urgent need for intensified reforms to ensure judicial independence, fundamental rights, and media pluralism and to tackle corruption and organised crime. In the face of political polarisation and malign foreign influence, AFET calls on Albania to enhance political dialogue and institutional resilience. AFET’s 2025 report on Bosnia and Herzegovina also reaffirms strong support for the country’s accession aspirations. However, while acknowledging the reforms undertaken, AFET also underlines stalled progress and weak implementation, and condemns divisive rhetoric and secessionist policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The report urges political leaders to carry out all steps in the Commission’s 2022 recommendation so the Council can adopt the negotiating network and set the stage for formal accession negotiations. On North Macedonia’s accession negotiations, AFET’s report notes the country is a fully aligned and trustworthy partner. AFET welcomes the €750 million in grants and loans which will become available to North Macedonia under the new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans. However, AFET’s report underlines that North Macedonia‘s political parties must engage in constructive dialogue to strengthen the country’s multi-ethnic character and accelerate progress towards EU membership. The report also highlights concerns about amendments that have weakened the legal framework for combating corruption. Turning to Georgia’s accession prospects, stalled for some years, the AFET report calls for new parliamentary elections, solidarity with the Georgian people and coordinated sanctions against key regime enablers.

Many of us purchase products online, and increasingly people are sourcing goods from outside the EU. However, such goods do not always conform to EU standards, and customs and other public authorities find it challenging to check large numbers of low-value imports. To protect EU consumers and businesses from unfair competition, Members are set to debate a report from the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on Monday evening, which analyses the issue and sets out a series of measures to tackle regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports. The report emphasises the need for strong enforcement of existing legislation and reforms under the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation. It also urges the Commission to assess the impact of proposed controls for bulk shipments, to further evaluate the proposed handling fee and investigate product safety compliance with World Trade Organization rules.  

Finally, on Thursday morning, Members are expected to debate a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) stating that EU cohesion policy should focus on regions with national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic aspects that differ from their surrounding regions. Several of Parliament’s committees held a joint public hearing on the ‘Cohesion policy for the equality of the regions and sustainability of the regional cultures’ ECI in June 2025, which emphasised the need to preserve cultural and linguistic elements of EU ethnic minority regions, and to address specific challenges. The Commission must examine the claims and provide a response by September.

• European Parliament Plenary Session agenda
• The European Parliament’s powers: Motion of censure
• Priority dossiers under the Danish EU Council Presidency
• Bulgaria to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026
• Draft amending budget No 1/2025: 2024 surplus
• Amendment of the Gas Storage Regulation
• EU fisheries agreement with Greenland: Conclusion of a new protocol (2025-2030)
• Measures against countries that do not cooperate on shared fish stocks
• 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania
• 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina
• 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on North Macedonia
• 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia
• Product safety and regulatory compliance in e commerce and non-EU imports
• Cohesion policy for the equality of the regions and sustainability of regional cultures (ECI)

Written by Eszter Balázs (Legislative Planning and Coordination Unit, Directorate-General for the Presidency).

INTRODUCTION

Denmark assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 July and will hold the office until 31 December 2025. It took over from Poland and will hand the baton to Cyprus, the three countries forming a presidency trio.

State and government

The Kingdom of Denmark (Kongeriget Danmark) is a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral parliamentary system. The head of govenment is the prime minister and the head of state is the monarch.

The current head of government is Mette Fredriksen, in office since the general election of June 2019. The Prime Minister is the leader of the Social Democrats party (Socialdemokratiet) and she served previously as minister of employment and justice. Since her re-election in November 2022, she has been heading a coalition government with the conservative-liberal Left (Venstre) party and The Moderates (Moderaterne).

After parliamentary elections, the government is drawn from the ranks of the national assembly, Folketing (Folketinget). The cabinets tend to be coalitions of multiple parties, or single-party minority governments, as no single party has had an absolute majority (90 seats) in the Folketing since 1903. To pass laws, the prime minister – appointed by the monarch on the basis of consultations with representatives of the parties – must form alliances outside their own party.

The head of state is King Fredrik X, reigning since 14 January 2024. His duties are representative and ceremonial but the monarch formally exerts authority, for instance, by appointing and dismissing ministers, declaring the government and signing legislation into law.

Parliament

The Folketing is the unicameral national legslative body of the Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland). Its 179 members are elected for four-year terms: 135 directly in constituencies using the D’Hondt method, plus 40 leveling seats to ensure proportional representation at the national level. In addiiton, there are two seats for Greenland and two for the Faroe Islands. The election threshold is 2 % of the national vote.

At present, the following 12 parties have seats in the Folketing: the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Denmark Democrats, the Green Left, the Liberal Alliance, the Moderates, the Conservative People’s Party, the Red-Green Alliance, the Danish People’s Party, the Social Liberal Party, the Alternative and the Citizens’ Party. In addition, the Inuit Ataqatigiit, the Siumut, the Sambandsflokkurin and the Javnaðarflokkurin hold the four seats for Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

The next general elections in Denmark are to be held no later than October 2026.

European elections 2024

Voters in Denmark elected 15 out of the 720 Members of the European Parliament on 9 June 2024, with a 58.2 % turnout and the following results (in brackets, the change from the 2019 elections):

• SF – Green Left (SF – Socialistisk Folkeparti): 17.4 %, 3 MEPs, Greens/EFA (↑)
• Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiet): 15.6 %, 3 MEPs, S&D (=)
• Venstre, Denmark’s Liberal Party (Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti): 14.7 %, 2 MEPs, Renew (↓)
• Conservative People’s Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti): 8.8 %, 1 MEP, EPP (=)
• Denmark Democrats (Danmarksdemokraterne – Inger Støjberg): 7.4 %, 1 MEP, NA (newcomer)
• Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre): 7.1 %, 1 MEP, Renew (↓)
• Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne): 7 %, 1 MEP, The Left (=)
• Liberal Alliance: 7 %, 1 MEP, EPP (newcomer)
• Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti): 6.4 %, 1 MEP, ID (=)
• Moderates (Moderaterne): 6 %, 1 MEP, Renew (newcomer)

State-of-play

Climate change and the environment feature high in the Danish public consciousness and on the political agenda, as also demonstrated by the results of the latest standard Eurobarometer survey. Danes think these should be among the most important issues of EU concerns, right after EU defence and security. Some 91 % of the population thinks Denmark has benefited from belonging to the European Union.

Both politicians and social partners are protective of the unique Danish labour market model, and are determined to protect it from EU regulation, including by going to court over the EU’s minimum wage directive.

Due to its opt-out from justice and home affairs, Denmark does not take part in EU migration and asylum policy, with the exception of the Dublin and Eurodac Regulations. Denmark also has an opt-out from the euro and uses the krone as its currency. It also used to have a defence opt-out, until June 2022 when a national referendum abolished it.

Greenland

Beyond metropolitan Denmark, the Kingdom of Denmark comprises two autonomous constituent countries in the Atlantic, neither of which are EU members: the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Greenland has Overseas Countries and Territories status. In addition, it has a number of agreements with the EU, such as the Fisheries Agreement, and it receives support under the current multiannual financial framework, and from the European Investment Bank and EU programmes, among others.

‘Preserving the territorial integrity in the Kingdom of Denmark, its sovereignty and inviolability of its borders is essential for all Member States. The European Union fully supports the Kingdom of Denmark’, said European Council President António Costa, in reaction to US President Donald Trump’s interest in the island.

Political priorities of the Danish Presidency

Under the slogan ‘A Strong Europe in a changing world’, the Danish Presidency has two overarching priorities: a secure Europe and a competitive and green Europe. The two goals appear in most of its sectoral priorities.

Defence. Denmark will work on improving the EU’s ability to defend itself and its democracies ‘by 2030 at the latest’. With a focus on European security, Denmark prioritises tasks such as curbing irregular migration, reinforcing external borders, strengthening EU resilience and deterrence, upholding European values and reducing risks to the economy.

Ukraine. As part of its security goals, Denmark seeks to ensure the EU’s political, economic, civilian, and military support to Ukraine. It proposes integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the European one, to strengthen both. In addition, it wishes to support Ukraine in EU sectoral policies such as trade and transport. In parallel, the Presidency will work to maintain the toughest possible sanctions against Russia.

Enlargement. Denmark strives for significant progress in enlargement, especially with Ukraine, but also with Moldova and the Western Balkans.

Climate. The green transition can and should drive economic growth, and climate and energy policies should be closely linked to competitiveness policies, states the Danish Presidency, bringing the green transition onto an equal footing with competitiveness. With this in mind, it seeks to increase the share of, and improve access to, green energy.

Denmark has pledged to work to reach political agreement on an EU 2040 climate target (proposed in the Climate Law, out on 2 July) and derive from it the EU’s 2035 nationally determined contribution well before COP30 (10-21 November 2025), at an extraordinary Environment Council meeting on 18 September.

Economy. The Presidency aims to safeguard the effective implementation of EU fiscal rules and foster reforms in Member States, create the financial circumstances for European defence readiness, secure progress in the area of the single market, the savings and investment union as well as the capital markets union, and contribute to job creation.

Trade. Denmark will work to expand the EU’s network of trade agreements, and ratify the Mercosur and Mexico deals.

Budget. Given the annual institutional cycle, the draft general budget for 2026 will be negotiated between the Danish Presidency and the Parliament. In addition, the Presidency considers it a priority to start work on the next European long-term budget (to be presented in two parts on 16 July and 17 September) which it wishes to see focused, simple and effective in service of the evolving policy priorities of the EU. It will start negotiations on all the upcoming MFF-related sectoral legislative proposals and aims to deliver a first draft negotiating box to guide future negotiations. It, however, has not set itself the goal of reaching agreement in Council on own resources.

Legislative work

To strengthen Europe’s defence technological and industrial base, negotiations will continue on the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) when Denmark assumes the rotating presidency. As far as financing of ReArm Europe is concerned, both Parliament and Council still have to work on their initial positions.

Linking defence with energy, Denmark intends to arrive at a common position within the Council, then at an agreement with Parliament on the proposal to phase out Russian natural gas imports.

Addressing foreign interference, the Presidency is going to work on its stance on files in the defence of democracy package (including interest representation on behalf of third countries), in parallel with work in Parliament

In the area of trade, the Presidency seeks to conclude talks with Parliament on the generalised scheme of tariff preferences, agreement on which proved elusive under the Polish Presidency, and the screening of foreign investments.

Denmark has been advocating a stricter stance on migration while keeping channels open to recruit international labour in occupations with shortages. The Presidency will focus on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum while exploring how to break incentive structures behind irregular migration. It will work to find a Council position on the concept of safe third countries and on the Returns Directive. It will also start work on three files related to migrant smuggling by finding a Council position on the transport aspect, which has not moved in the Council since 2021; starting trilogues on preventing unauthorised entries, once Parliament is ready; and, finally, continuing trilogues on Europol’s role in migrant smuggling-related investigations.

The Council wants to press ahead with work on its side on the EU Digital Travel application, in parallel with Parliament’s work on its own position. It will continue trilogues on the EU Talent Pool and try to revive talks on the status of long-term residents.

To fight serious cross-border and organised crime, the Presidency will continue trilogue negotiations on combatting corruption and on the protection of victims of crime, both unresolved under the Polish Presidency. In the area of technology, the Presidency considers establishing the Council position on the regulation on the removal of child sexual abuse material from the Internet and continuing trilogues on the related directive on child sexual abuse to be among its priorities. The Commission is expected to present its proposal on the Firearms Trafficking Directive during the second half of 2025, therefore the Danish Presidency will take up the initial steps of establishing a general approach.

To ensure cooperation and protection in civil matters, the Presidency wants to start trilogues on harmonising insolvency law and on the protection of adults (both negotiating mandates subject to agreement of Parliament during the July plenary session).

It is the Danish Presidency’s ambition to close negotiations with Parliament on the simplification omnibus proposals on sustainability reporting and small mid-caps, and it will make steps forward with the rest of the legislative simplification files: relating to InvestEU, the common agricultural policy, defence, chemicals (to be presented on 2 July) and digital (towards the end of the year). The Council is ready to negotiate on sustainability and InvestEU, on which Parliament should establish its positions in October and July, respectively. Depending on the plenary’s adoption of amendments in July, the Danish Presidency might also need to negotiate with Parliament on the postponement of application of batteries due diligence.

As part of their drive for a more competitive Europe with a better functioning single market and capital markets union, the Danes will work to establish Council negotiating positions on the securitisation framework, the Capital Requirements Regulation, and on the files on the introduction of digital euro. The Presidency also wants to arrive at a Coucil position on the intellectual property-related files on supplementary protection certificates for medicianal and plant products on which Parliament has also not made progress. The Danes want to continue trilogues on the package to strengthen the protection of retail investors (RIS) and the future framework for financial data sharing (FiDA). The Presidency aims for agreement with Parliament on the Union Customs Code, long stalled in the Council before a last-minute agreement on a partial position reached during the Polish Presidency. Negotiations can now also kick off on the two files of the payment services package after an agreement in Council at the end of the Polish Presidency, as well as on the digital declaration on the posting of workers, once Parliament is ready. Finally, Denmark expects to work on the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation and the European Business Wallet proposals, to be presented during its tenure.

In the area of employment and social policy, the Presidency will start negotiations on the traineeship directive when Parliament is ready. If the Commission leaves the Equal Treatment Directive on the table 17 years after its introduction, the Presidency will seek the necessary unanimity in Council to adopt it.

Focusing on decreasing risk due to shortage of supply on the internal market, Denmark will work towards a Council general approach on critical medicinal products as Parliament establishes its own position. The Presidency considers finalising interinstitutional negotiations on the pharma package among its main tasks, too, and is ready to start work on a Tobacco Taxation Directive, should the Commission table a proposal.

In the field of transport, the Presidency wants to advance the Package Travel Directive and negotiations inside the Council. The Danes will also have to prepare for negotiations with the Parliament on air passenger rights on which the Council decided to adopt a first-reading position under the Polish Presidency, thus triggering negotiation deadlines. They will also start talks with Parliament on the related enforcement of passenger rights file as soon as Parliament is ready, in principle after the July plenary session.

The Danish Presidency will attempt to unblock in the Council the long-stalled file on the definition of maximum weights and dimensions for vehicles. Parliament has long been ready to start talks. The Presidency will work in parallel with Parliament on its positions on files in the Roadworthiness package. Trilogues can immediately start on accounting of greenhouse gas emissions of transport services, and the Presidency aims for an agreement with Parliament on the single European railway area. Importantly for the transport sector, the directive on energy taxation is one of the Danish priorities, on which, however, Parliament is only consulted.

The Presidency will start work onn the recently released EU Space Act.

In agriculture, the Presidency is ready to start talks on upcoming proposals on the post-2027 Common Agricultural Policy and EU Biotech Act. It intends to conclude trilogues on new genomic techniques and open them on forest reproductive materials, unfair cross-border trade practices and amendments to the Common Market Organisation when Parliament is ready. Trilogues can start right away on the welfare of cats and dogs. The Presidency will work on the Council position on plant reproductive materials, animal transport, and the role of farmers in the supply chain.

The Danish Presidency may also kick off interinstitutional talks once Parliament is ready with its position on fishing in the Mediterranean Area.

In environmental policy, the Presidency will focus on strengthening the circular economy by launching trilogues on end-of-life vehicles. It also intends to conclude negotiations with Parliament on forest monitoring, on the directive on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity, once Parliament is ready. It is to take the initial steps in the Council on the upcoming proposals for the revision of the REACH Regulation and the Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act.

In the digital arena, besides digital simplification, the Danish Presidency will start initial work inside the Council once the digital package, including the revision of the Cybersecurity Act is presented in the last quarter of the year. It is also ready to work towards a Council position on the Digital Networks Act, expected in December.

Other ongoing legislation

In addition to the files explicitly among Danish priorities, the Presidency might also work on a host of legislation on which trilogues are already under way under its fellow trio member Poland.

Denmark inherits ongoing trilogues on the list of substances in surface waters, and the coordination of social security systems. The fate of the Green Claims proposal is still unclear: the Polish Presidency cancelled trilogues saying that the situation no longer warrants negotiations after the Commission’s announcement to withdraw the proposal, then backtracked.

Talks may start on new rules for the wine sector and the passenger mobility package as soon as Parliament is ready, and, unless the July plenary session adopts these texts unchanged, the review of cohesion funds and on the European Social Fund+.

Denmark did not signal its ambition to continue with earlier unsuccessful efforts of Poland to make progress on files such as the Late Payment Directive, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the Combined Transport Directive or the CO2 emissions of heavy-duty vehicles on which neither institutions have positions, or seasonal changes of time on which only Parliament is ready.

Programming of legislative priorities: Joint Declaration

Following the presentation of the Commission work programme for 2026, the Danish Presidency plans to reach an agreement with the Parliament on the shared legislative priorities for that year. The Joint Declaration 2026 would then be signed by the Presidents of the three institutions in December 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the Danish EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.

Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with a representative parliamentary system. According to the Constitutional Act (section 3), the monarch and the Parliament jointly constitute the legislative authority, the monarch exercises executive authority, and the courts of justice represent the judicial authority. The monarch, however, mainly has a ceremonial role and appoints the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers, who are responsible for governing the country.

This briefing is part of an EPRS series on national parliaments and EU affairs. It offers an overview of the way the EU Member States’ national parliaments are structured and how they process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also refers to relevant publications by national parliaments.

The government is formed through the system of ‘negative parliamentarism’, meaning that the government must not be opposed by a majority in the Parliament. The government and its ministers are accountable to the Parliament. General elections must be held at least every four years, while the Prime Minister can dissolve the Parliament and call for new elections. Powers are separated, but a close link exists between the Parliament and the government due to parliamentarism, with political parties playing a key role. Most of the ministers are usually members of parliament, even if this is not a requirement.

The Folketing is the unicameral Parliament of the Kingdom of Denmark. It is composed of 179 members elected by general and direct ballot for a period of four years: 135 members are elected through party-list proportional representation in ten constituencies; 40 seats are allocated to ensure proportionality at national level; and, as part of the Danish Realm, Greenland and the Faroe Islands each elect two members.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Danish Parliament and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by David De Groot.

On 18 March 2025, a law was adopted in Hungary restricting the freedom of assembly, by connecting it to a previous controversial law from 2021 that prohibited the public portrayal to children of ‘divergence from self-identity corresponding to sex at birth, sex change or homosexuality’. An amendment to the Hungarian Constitution adopted on 14 April 2025 further reinforced this.

On the basis of this law, Budapest police decided to ban Budapest Pride. While at first some of the police’s decisions were annulled by the Hungarian Supreme Court on procedural grounds and required new decisions, the Supreme Court later upheld these decisions and refused to check the law against the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Supreme Court considered that this case is not within the CJEU’s jurisdiction.

The mayor of Budapest announced that Budapest Pride will be held as a municipal event, but the Budapest police have issued a decision prohibiting this.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Hungary’s Pride ban‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Hendrik Mildebrath with Bente Daale.

While Europeans are adopting TikTok at a remarkable pace, recent headlines on addictive design, data protection violations, election interference, incendiary content and child sexual exploitation incidents are casting a shadow over its success. This briefing maps the key issues associated with the platform and outlines the European Union’s (EU) legal framework to facilitate parliamentary discussions on recent developments, inform debates on future legislation such as the digital fairness act, and support the European Parliament’s scrutiny of regulatory enforcement.

EU investigations into TikTok are ongoing, yet few final decisions are available, and reliable information is sparse. A review of incidents and initiatives in the United States and the United Kingdom provides relevant insights on topical issues relating to TikTok. For instance, hearings and lawsuits linked to the US divest-or-ban law reveal possible national security risks arising from TikTok granting Chinese affiliates access to user data. Lawsuits from at least 16 US attorneys general demonstrate TikTok’s potentially addictive features. Parliament will review the results and formulate its position once EU enforcement actions and regulatory preparations conclude.

More than 10 EU laws regulate social media operations and services. For instance, rules in the Artificial Intelligence Act, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation on non-manipulation can be invoked to mitigate risks like addictive design. However, precise legal applications remain unclear without established case law. This creates broad enforcement possibilities, but it also suggests a need for clearer guidelines or additional regulation. While enforcement actions may escalate geopolitical tensions with China, these issues could be eased through collaboration on shared priorities such as child protection, enhancing strategic and operational interdependence, and exploring privacy-enhancing middleware solutions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘TikTok and EU regulation: Legal challenges and cross-jurisdictional insights‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tim Peters and Jakub Przetacznik with Ana Luisa Melo Almeida.

In response to Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, which started in February 2022, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have provided unprecedented financial, military and humanitarian support to Ukraine. According to European Commission figures, Team Europe, consisting of the EU and its Member States, has made available around €150 billion in support to Ukraine. This support encompasses macro-financial assistance, financial support through the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from Member States and the European Peace Facility, as well as support to Ukrainian refugees in the EU.

The overall support of Team Europe for Ukraine is now greater than the support provided by the United States (US), except in terms of military support allocation. However, Team Europe has provided 83 % of the tanks and 76 % of the air defence systems given to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale war.

The disbursement of EU payments under the Ukraine Facility is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine Plan – an ambitious reform and investment plan drafted by Ukraine’s government and endorsed by the EU. The Commission and the Ukrainian government publish updates on the progress of the reforms and on the disbursal of payments.

In addition to the Ukraine Facility, the G7 have agreed upon a further €45 billion loan, with €18.1 billion to be financed by the EU. For this purpose, a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism has been established, which uses extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states to repay loans and associated interest costs. The rights, responsibilities and obligations provided for under the Ukraine Facility will apply to the G7 loan to ensure seamless management of both. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for confiscating the immobilised Russian sovereign assets to finance further support for Ukraine and the country’s reconstruction, instead of just relying on extraordinary revenues. International financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, play a key role in addressing external financing needs and supporting the country’s macroeconomic stability.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State of Play: EU support to Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU Member States’ total bilateral and EU budget contributions to Ukraine, 2022–2025, in € billion and as a % of GNI Team Europe financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, February 2022 to May 2025, in € billion

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Martin Höflmayr and Giulio Sabbati.

The EU’s trade-dependent economy faces uncertainty from global trade policy shifts, prompting calls to strengthen domestic demand. Economic growth forecasts for the years ahead have been downgraded, reflecting this uncertainty. Anticipatory trade to avoid US tariffs peaked in March 2025, as EU exports to the US rose by 59 % in the first quarter of 2025, but has subsided since. The final phase of the Next Generation EU recovery instrument is expected to support public investment and economic activity, but EU countries must step up efforts – in some cases significantly – to ensure full implementation of their national recovery and resilience plans by 31 August 2026.

Read this infographic on ‘Economic Outlook Quarterly: Fragmented trade, untapped potential at home‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

RRF milestones and targets still to be assessed GDP growth in the EU
Quarterly, % change compared to same period in previous year EU-27 goods exports to the US
€ billion Cumulative growth prospects 2025-26
2024 = 100 Fiscal balance, % of GDP Government consolidated gross debt
Change Q4-2019 vs Q2-2024, percentage points of GDP EU inflation
Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) monthly data, annual rate of change % Total unemployment rate in the EU EU/US economic and domestic demand growth
2010Q4 = 100, 4-quarter moving average Average annual contribution to economic growth
Contribution to real GDP, percentage points Next Generation EU (NGEU) Proposed 2025 CSRs on the RRF

Written by Rebecca Zamponi and Annastiina Papunen.

The European Council meeting on 26-27 June has a full agenda. One year into the new institutional cycle, global affairs have grown tense and unpredictable. Although a discussion on the Middle East was not originally envisaged for the June European Council meeting, the rapidly developing situation in the region will require the EU leaders’ attention. EU leaders are also expected to discuss Ukraine, European defence and security, the EU in the world, competitiveness, migration, Moldova, the Western Balkans, internal security and EU preparedness. Some further items, such as the rules-based international order, may also feature on the agenda.

The discussion on internal reforms in the context of enlargement, envisaged in the Leaders’ Agenda for June, seems to have been postponed to a later date. Despite a full agenda, in his invitation letter European Council President António Costa stressed his intention to keep the meeting to one day.

General

The meeting will start with the customary opening address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, followed by an exchange of views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. With Poland’s six-month EU Council presidency coming to an end, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is likely to provide an overview of its results. Denmark will assume Council leadership on 1 July for six months.

Ahead of the meeting, several key gatherings have taken place: the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Kananaskis, Canada on 16-17 June, the EU-Canada Summit in Brussels on 23 June, and the NATO Summit in The Hague on 24-25 June. The reflections and conclusions are likely to feed into the European Council discussions.

European Council meeting Ukraine

At the two most recent European Council meetings (6 March 2025 and 20 March 2025), EU leaders failed to reach a unanimous agreement on Ukraine. Hungary blocked the conclusions, which resulted in the other EU leaders releasing conclusions on Ukraine, agreed to by 26 of the 27 EU Member States. Sanctions is one aspect that the Hungarian Prime Minister has regularly threatened to veto. On 10 June 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the High Representative Kaja Kallas proposed an 18th package of sanctions against Russia. The package will notably target the oil price cap, the Russian shadow fleet, the banking sector and Nord Stream 1 and 2. As with previous rounds of sanctions against Russia, the European Council is likely to welcome the 18th package if it receives approval from ministers in the Council before the EU leaders meet.

At their meeting, EU leaders are likely to reiterate their condemnation of Russia’s continued attacks against civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and those who support Russia’s war – following reports from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Russia was using ballistic missiles made by North Korea. At the May 2025 Council meeting, foreign affairs ministers discussed possible EU security guarantees and military support to Ukraine, namely the initiative by the High Representative to provide Ukraine with 2 million rounds of large calibre ammunition in 2025. It is likely that EU leaders will discuss the military support needs of Ukraine, and maybe also debate possible security guarantees. In March 2025, MEPs adopted a resolution stating that the EU must ‘contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine’. In addition, EU leaders may also restate their support for Ukraine’s European path.

Middle East

The European Council is expected to discuss developments between Israel and Iran. Tensions reignited on 13 June 2025, when Israel launched an attack targeting Iran’s nuclear programme and military targets. Since then, both parties have exchanged attacks – despite calls for restraint. On 22 June, the United States launched strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities. EU foreign ministers and President Costa called for diplomacy and negotiation.

The European Council will discuss the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza and reiterate some of their previous calls for rapid, safe and unhindered distribution of aid, the unconditional release of all hostages, and a return to the ceasefire, leading to a just and lasting peace based on a two-state solution. EU leaders may welcome the outcome of the Paris Peace Forum, where civil society organisations promoted a two-state solution and peace and security in the region. Moreover, EU leaders may react to the interception by Israeli naval forces of a vessel bringing aid to Gaza. MEP Rima Hassan was onboard, and President Metsola was in contact with Israeli authorities to ensure the safety of Hassan and others on the boat. The Left group, of which Hassan is a member, has called for the immediate release of those who were on the intercepted boat, the immediate suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and an arms embargo on Israel. Back in February 2024, the leaders of Ireland and Spain had sent a letter to the Commission calling for an urgent review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. On 7 May 2025, a formal request by the Netherlands, supported by 17 Member States, requested a review of Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. EU foreign affairs ministers met and discussed developments in the Middle East on 23 June. The outcome of those discussions and the review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement may feed into the European Council discussion on the Middle East.

EU leaders may again discuss the situation in Syria, reiterating previous calls for a ‘peaceful and inclusive transition’ in Syria. They may also welcome the agreement reached in the Council on the lifting of economic sanctions and the introduction of restrictive measures against human rights violators and those driving instability in Syria.

European security and defence

At the European Council meeting on 20 March 2025, EU leaders committed to discussing all strands of work on the issue of European security and defence at this June meeting. In March, they also invited the Commission and the High Representative to report regularly on progress made in implementing European Council conclusions on defence. Therefore, EU leaders are likely to discuss the implementation of conclusions thus far and give further input where needed.

The four main aspects on security and defence addressed at recent European Council meetings were i) mobilising funding, ii) identifying and addressing capability gaps, iii) strengthening the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, and iv) partnerships. EU leaders are likely to discuss any further developments in these areas. Ahead of the European Council meeting, NATO members met in The Hague. Commitments on defence spending were set to be a key aspect of the meeting; with 23 of the 27 EU Member States also being members of NATO, it is quite likely that discussions in The Hague may feed into the European Council’s security and defence discussions.

EU in the world

The European Council may discuss other high-level international summits that have taken place in recent days, such as the G7 summit in Canada – the first G7 summit for Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. EU leaders may also discuss upcoming summits and conferences such as the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, to be held in Seville from 30 June to 3 July 2025 and the Ukraine recovery conference in Rome in July. EU leaders will consider their relations with partners across the globe and reiterate their commitment to effective multilateralism and to the rules-based international order with the United Nations at its core. In addition, President Costa will brief EU leaders on his recent visits to Western Balkan countries, which took place in the lead-up to the most recent European Political Community meeting in Albania. Moreover, the European Council is likely to welcome the Commission and the High Representative’s presentation of the joint communication on the European Union’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region, and is expected to reiterate its support for Moldova in connection with the accession process. An EU-Moldova summit will take place in early July 2025. Finally, EU leaders may also discuss developments in Libya and the Sahel region.

Competitiveness

EU leaders are expected to discuss the latest economic developments and their impact on EU competitiveness. The spring economic forecast predicts moderate growth in times of global economic uncertainty: 1.1 % GDP growth in the EU and 0.9 % in the euro area in 2025 – figures similar to 2024. EU leaders are likely also to discuss the strengthening of the international role of the euro. ECB President Christine Lagarde argued recently that this is ‘Europe’s global euro moment’, meaning that the euro could gain greater international prominence. In addition, EU leaders are expected to endorse the Commission’s proposal on Bulgaria adopting the euro on 1 January 2026.

In April 2024, the European Council asked for ‘a new horizontal strategy for a modernised single market’ by June 2025 and reiterated this request in the Budapest Declaration with more specific wording. The strategy, published in May, builds on the Letta and Draghi reports’ recommendations. In this context, EU leaders may also mention the EU startup and scaleup strategy. Furthermore, to strengthen the EU single market in a strategic and quickly developing area, space, ahead of the European Council meeting the Commission is expected to publish an EU space act proposal and a strategy on the space economy. Back in April 2024, the European Council defined space as a sensitive sector in which dependencies should be reduced.

EU leaders are expected to mention simplification and better regulation as means to strengthen competitiveness. Furthermore, securing the supply of affordable and clean energy, also discussed at the March meeting, is essential to making Europe more competitive.

The current global trading situation might also be discussed, as the tariffs by the new US administration are causing disturbance on the markets. The EU is currently negotiating with the US with the aim of reaching ‘zero-for-zero’ tariffs before the 9 July deadline; on that date, the 50 % tariffs which US President Trump has threatened to impose – already postponed from their initial starting date of 1 June – would take effect. However, according to reports, there seems to be no appetite for zero tariffs on the US side, which is considering a 10 % tariff as the baseline for US trading partners. Recently, there has also been a dispute between the US and China concerning rare earth minerals and magnets, which are essential for sectors such as cars, defence and electronics.

In the Budapest Declaration, EU leaders asked the Commission to submit, by June 2025, proposals on ways of strengthening the EU’s technological capabilities and of accelerating the digital transformation, among other things. Some related proposals have been published, such as the AI continent action plan in April, and some are upcoming, such as the EU quantum strategy due in July, the Data Union Strategy in Q3 and the Digital Networks Act in Q4 of 2025. Furthermore, the Commission and the High Representative have published their new joint EU international digital strategy, requested by the European Council at its April 2024 special meeting. The strategy aims to boost both EU competitiveness on key technologies and support EU partners globally in their digital transition.

The European Semester spring package, which provides EU Member States with tailored recommendations to improve their economic performance, was published on 4 June. The European Council usually discusses the country-specific recommendations at its June meeting, to allow the conclusion of the European Semester.

Migration

EU leaders are expected to take stock of progress in implementing its previous conclusions on migration. An important development in this field is the fall in irregular EU border crossings by 20 % in the first five months of 2025, to 63 700, as announced by Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Despite this, EU leaders are likely to encourage intensification of work on migration. Following the discussions at the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 13 June, the European Council is expected to invite the co-legislators to work on the Commission’s proposal on returns, on the establishment at Union level of a list of safe countries of origin, and on the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept.

As has been the case on previous occasions, President von der Leyen’s letter on migration will inform the discussion. In addition, the European Commission’s progress report on the state of play on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, published on 11 June, will also feed into the EU leaders’ debate. Nevertheless, despite progress, migration remains a divisive topic at European and national level, as illustrated by the recent collapse of the Dutch coalition government over a disagreement on migration policy.

Internal security

For the first time since 2021, internal security – which includes the fight against serious and organised crime, terrorism, radicalisation and violent extremism, as well as hybrid threats by state and non-state actors – will be discussed as an own agenda point by EU leaders. On 1 April 2025, the Commission published a new multiannual strategy, ProtectEU, for this policy area. The European Council is expected to call upon EU institutions and Member States to take further action, notably regarding the strengthening of law enforcement and judicial cooperation.

Preparedness

Following the publication of the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, on 26 March 2025, EU leaders will return to the issue. In line with previous conclusions, EU leaders will encourage further work to enhance the EU’s and its Member States’ resilience, preparedness, and crisis prevention.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting on 26-27 June 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Current Membership European Council-June 2025

Written by Katrien Luyten.

The EU’s temporary protection regime has provided predictability and legal certainty to both displaced people from Ukraine and the EU Member States. The situation in Ukraine, as a result of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, still requires a common European response. The EU has therefore decided to extend temporary protection for a fifth year, until 4 March 2027. Moreover, the European Commission has proposed a coordinated approach to a smooth transition out of temporary protection, when the circumstances allow.

Background

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, over 5.6 million people have been forced to seek refuge, mostly in the EU and its neighbouring countries. Reacting swiftly when the invasion began, the EU decided to grant Union-wide protection to people arriving from Ukraine by triggering – for the first time ever – the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC, TPD). The TDP allowed EU Member States swiftly to offer protection and rights to people in urgent need of assistance, while also preventing national asylum systems from becoming overwhelmed during mass arrivals of displaced people. As of April 2025, over 4.26 million displaced people from Ukraine benefit from temporary protection in the EU, of which 27.9 % are in Germany, 23.2 % in Poland and 8.7 % in Czechia. Compared with the population of each EU country, the highest ratios of beneficiaries of temporary protection (BTPs) are seen in Czechia (34.0 per 100 000 inhabitants), Poland (26.9) and Estonia (24.7), while the EU level is 9.5. Since the start of the war, the EU has allocated around €15 billion to support Member States hosting displaced people from Ukraine, and an additional €4 billion are being made available from the EU’s Home Affairs funds.

Temporary protection was initially granted for one year and later extended twice, until March 2025, reaching the duration of three years, as laid down in the TPD. However, given the continued Russian attacks on civil and critical infrastructure across Ukraine, the temporary protection regime for displaced people from Ukraine was extended for another year, until March 2026. This was done on the basis of Article 4(2) TPD, according to which the Council of the EU, acting by qualified majority and on a proposal from the Commission, can extend temporary protection by up to one year where reasons for temporary protection persist. The Commission argued that safe and durable conditions for the return of displaced people to Ukraine were not in place. It referred to the ongoing uncertainty and volatility in Ukraine to show the need to continue protecting BTPs. Despite the emergence of divergent practices and policies owing to different interpretations of the TPD – such as scope and eligibility, reception support, access to rights, freedom of movement in the EU, and how to deal with circular movements to and from Ukraine –implementation of the directive has been assessed positively overall.

Extension of temporary protection until March 2027

With no end in sight to the war in Ukraine and the reasons for temporary protection persisting, the Commission proposed extending temporary protection for a fifth year, until 4 March 2027. According to the Commission, it is still not possible to return to Ukraine in safe and durable conditions. Moreover, further arrivals at scale cannot be excluded, owing to the difficult humanitarian conditions, broader volatility and the uncertainty of the situation in Ukraine. At the same, the risk to the efficient operation of the national asylum systems remains. The EU’s Home Affairs ministers unanimously agreed to the extension on 13 June, pending final adoption of the implementing decision by the Council.

The extension does not change the terms of the March 2022 decision as regards the categories of individuals to whom the temporary protection applies or the rights they enjoy. However, the Commission insisted on the need to ensure balanced responsibility-sharing among Member States, acknowledging that some Member States have been more impacted than others by the need to continue providing protection, particularly in terms of the numbers of BTPs hosted, often combined with large numbers of applicants for international protection or with housing shortages. Referring to the ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-753/23 – Krasiliva of 27 February 2025, the new Council implementing decision states that Member States should now reject an application for temporary protection when it is apparent that the person concerned already benefits from temporary protection in another Member State. The extension – again based on Article 4(2) TPD – provides clarity to BTPs and allows Member States to undertake the necessary administrative and legal steps at national level, such as the renewal of BTPs’ residence permits. If there were to be a sustainable ceasefire before March 2027, which would make a safe and durable return of BTPs to Ukraine possible, the Commission could submit a proposal to the Council to bring temporary protection to an end.

Transition out of the temporary protection regime

In parallel with the need for continued protection of displaced people, the Commission seeks to pave the way for a smooth transition out of temporary protection. The idea is to ensure long-term and sustainable solutions for BTPs, take Ukraine’s capacity and reconstruction needs into account, and continue to avoid risks to the Member States’ national asylum systems. Those currently enjoying temporary protection need time to transition to other legal statuses that better represent their actual situation, and those who want to return to Ukraine – when the situation allows – need support. To help BTPs make informed decisions about their future, the Commission has therefore proposed a Council recommendation on a coordinated exit strategy and adopted a communication on a predictable and common European path for the future of the Ukrainians present today in the EU.

The Commission recommends, in particular, that Member States allow BTPs to transition towards national legal residence statuses, particularly those relating to employment, education, research or family reasons, or a long-term resident status where applicable. Moreover, it encourages them to enable BTPs who do not have access to national legal statuses to apply for a legal migration status governed by EU law, if they qualify for it. More specifically, the Commission refers to the EU Blue Card Directive, the Single Permit Directive and the Students and Researchers Directive. Although the proposal for a recommendation does not mention the possibility for BTPs to apply for asylum, the TPD provides for this possibility (Article 17), stating that the general laws on protection and aliens in the Member States apply when temporary protection ends (Article 20).

For those who are eligible and choose to stay in the EU, it is in the interest of both the BTPs and the Member States that inclusion and integration happen in the best way possible, as access to the labour market and to education brings benefits to those who wish to stay and to those who will return to Ukraine. The Commission therefore commits to continued funding and to the establishment of ‘unity hubs’ in the Member States, where BTPs can get information, referrals and advice. A Special Envoy for Ukrainians in the EU – former Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson – will support the setting-up of the hubs. Further funding and technical assistance, in addition to what has already been provided, will support the reintegration of both those returning home and those who decided to stay in Ukraine. Moreover, the Commission recommends that the Member States prepare for gradual and orderly return and reintegration, as Ukraine needs its people back to rebuild the country. Furthermore, the possibility of exploratory visits to Ukraine should be offered, in order for BTPs to check on their families, homes, or the situation in their communities, before deciding to return. Voluntary return programmes – with a limited and fixed duration of possibly up to one year – should be crafted to help people go back home safely and with dignity, without them ending up in a legal limbo once temporary protection ends. Rather than being individualised benefit packages, these voluntary return programmes should maintain social cohesion in Ukraine and bring benefits to the local community. In addition, options for vulnerable people, such as those undergoing medical treatment, and children who need to complete their education, should be devised. Finally, for all this to work, according to the proposal, it is important to have an accurate picture of the evolving situation.Member States are therefore encouraged to update their temporary protection data regularly and in a timely manner, and to exchange information with the other Member States and the Ukrainian authorities. The proposal still needs to be adopted by the Council; the European Parliament does not have a formal co-decision power for recommendations.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Transitioning out of temporary protection for displaced people from Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Barbara Nicoletti.

The Ispra site of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) is European Commission’s third-largest site. Originally established for nuclear research, it has evolved into one of Europe’s leading research campuses today, with cutting-edge laboratories and unique research infrastructure. The site provides science-based responses to policy challenges related to sustainable resources and transport, space, security, energy efficiency and climate change, as well as nuclear safeguards and security.

The STOA Panel and the JRC have a unique partnership that enhances the crucial role of evidence-informed policy-making at EU level. Interaction includes regular exchanges of views, co-organised events and visits, through which the STOA Panel and the JRC cooperate to share knowledge between the institutions, providing opportunities for debate, and supporting evidence-based EU policymaking.

The visit began with a welcome address by Bernard Magenhann, JRC Director-General, and an introductory presentation on the JRC’s mission, organisation, and activities at the JRC Europa Science Experience, an interactive entry point to the research site.

JRC experts provided specific examples of JRC’s scientific work in support of policymaking by presenting the JRC activities related to the circular and bio-based economy, from raw materials, to products and waste, and the ‘Sevilla Process‘, through which the European Commission leads the science-based co-creation of environmental norms for and with European industry.

The visit continued with a tour of the Nanobiotechnology Laboratory, where interdisciplinary studies are conducted on nanomaterials, nanomedicines and therapies, as well as health surveillance technologies, advanced materials, and micro(nano)plastics. The delegation also visited the European Interoperability Centre for Electric Vehicles and Smart Grids, which combines four laboratories gathering knowledge and test facilities on energy efficiency, hybrid exhaust emissions, electromagnetic compatibility, smart grids and battery testing.

The afternoon programme included visits to additional cutting-edge laboratories. At the Microwave Signature Laboratory, the delegation learned about the JRC’s research into space, connectivity and quantum. The visit to the European Crisis Management Laboratory provided direct experience of the monitoring, modelling, analysis and estimation work done by the JRC to enhance crisis responses to various types of emergencies, including security issues, natural and man-made hazards, or health crises.

These visits gave the STOA members the opportunity to witness the innovative research shaping EU policies and address questions directly to JRC experts. Inspiring discussion took place in a cooperative and informal setting about some of the most pressing challenges facing the EU, helping to explore ways in which research and technology can help address these issues.

The STOA delegation greatly appreciated JRC’s warm welcome, confirmed the importance of the visit in deepening the longstanding STOA-JRC cooperation, and emphasised the relevance of independent scientific advice in informing EU policymaking.

Participants: European Parliament

• Christian Ehler, Chair of STOA Panel
• Lina Galvez, Vice-Chair of STOA Panel
• Pierfrancesco Maran, STOA member – EMPL
• Brando Benifei, STOA member – INTA
• Barbara Nicoletti, STOA Unit

Joint Research Centre

• Bernard Magenhann, Director-General
• Matthias Oel, Deputy Director-General
• Sabine Henzler, Director for Strategy and Impact:
• Alessandra Zampieri, Director for Sustainable Resources
• Ciaran Nicholl, Director Health and Food
• Francesca Campolongo, Director for Digital Transformation and Data

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

The cooperation between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has deepened significantly in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has reshaped Europe’s security environment and highlighted the complementary roles of both organisations. NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence, backed by United States (US) capabilities, while the EU has emerged as a key actor in financial aid, military assistance and sanctions. Both institutions have formalised their partnership through joint declarations and strategic documents, including NATO’s Strategic Concept, the EU’s Strategic Compass and White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030.

Practical cooperation now spans a wide range of areas including cyber defence, countering hybrid threats, military mobility, critical infrastructure protection, and joint crisis preparedness. Regular staff-level coordination, shared exercises, and technical arrangements – such as the NATO–EU task force on critical infrastructure – have improved resilience and interoperability. The EU has also significantly ramped up its defence role. It has delivered €50.8 billion in military aid to Ukraine (EU plus Member State contributions). It has introduced industrial policies such as EDIRPA, ASAP, and the ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan to reinforce the European defence industrial base. Despite progress, persistent challenges remain. Political tensions – in particular between Cyprus and Türkiye  – continue to block intelligence sharing and formal joint planning. The EU still relies heavily on NATO, particularly US assets, for operational capabilities. Growing uncertainty over US commitments under the second Trump Presidency has reinforced the EU’s drive to strengthen strategic autonomy and ensure greater burden-sharing within NATO.

The European Parliament supports stronger, complementary EU–NATO ties focused on interoperability, resilience and avoiding duplication, while stressing the need for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security. At the NATO summit on 24-25 June in The Hague (the Netherlands), key challenges include agreeing on higher defence spending targets, maintaining alliance unity, managing the Russia threat, and rapidly scaling up Europe’s defence capabilities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU–NATO cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Meenakshi Fernandes and Lenka Jančová with Maxim Baumgaertel.

The European Union (EU) is seeking to boost its competitiveness to help ensure the well-being of its society in the face of global challenges. Central to this objective is the EU’s innovation ecosystem, which has fallen behind the United States (US) and China. As innovative European companies grow, they struggle to attract the necessary technical and financial support within the continent.

The European Commission plans to put forward a legislative proposal for a 28th regime as part of a programme of measures to boost the EU’s innovation ecosystem. The European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) is preparing a legislative-initiative report to inform the development of this proposal. This briefing, produced at the request of the committee, seeks to support its work on the file.

The research identified four issues that are relevant for EU action: (1) the EU financial system has a low appetite for risk; (2) innovative companies struggle to attract workers (within the EU and beyond) with the relevant skills; (3) innovative companies face a high cost of failure and/or restructuring; and (4) there is high variation in laws affecting companies across the EU.

While the proposed Savings and Investments Union could help to address the immediate and pressing demand for capital from innovative European companies, other measures such as the 28th regime could be complementary and offer European added value. Establishing one common set of EU-wide rules and introducing an EU stock option plan could boost the regime’s attractiveness for innovative European companies. Embedding links to the EU innovation ecosystem and ‘European preference’ incentives could also be beneficial. Levelling the playing field for innovative European companies, particularly by reducing the period of time to establish a company, complete funding rounds and advance through the lifecycle, could help to attract venture capital and boost the number of innovative scale-ups. 

Read the complete briefing on ‘Scaling up European Innovation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Innovation ecosystem of the EU-27 compared with China and the US Innovation hubs in EU Member States The EU is still at the centre of global co-patenting trends There is significant variation in legal frameworks affecting innovative companies across Member States The innovative company lifecycle: Challenges and funding requirements Share of research publication citations on critical technologies Innovation ecosystem of the EU-27 compared with China and the US

Written by Sidonia Mazur, updated on 12 June 2025

On 4 June 2025, Piotr Serafin, Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration, presented the Commission’s draft budget for 2026 to the Members of the Parliament’s Committee on Budgets. The proposal sets the 2026 EU budget commitments at €193.26 billion, complemented by €105.32 billion under NextGenerationEU. The Commission underlined that the ‘next year’s draft budget is designed to support strategic objectives, including support for Ukraine, competitiveness, migration management, security and defence, and strategic investments, while maintaining momentum on green and digital priorities’.

Background – 2026 budget procedure

The European Parliament is one of the two arms of the European Union’s budgetary authority, the Council being the other. The two institutions, assisted by the European Commission, decide on the budget in the annual EU budget procedure, within the limits of the long-term EU budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF). Although it is the Commission’s right and duty to propose a draft budget for the upcoming year, the two arms of the EU budgetary authority, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, play their part in the run-up to its presentation by submitting their views. The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) agreed on its guidelines for the 2026 EU budget on 18 February 2025. The European Parliament adopted its guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III, on 2 April 2025.

Next steps

On 9 July, the Commission plans to formally adopt the 2026 draft budget and publish it in all official languages. More information on performance is presented in the Annual Management and Performance Report published on 17 June.

By mid-July COREPER (the Committee of Permanent Representatives, made up of Member States’ Ambassadors) is expected to come to an agreement on Council’s position on the 2026 draft budget.

Parliament, Council and Commission are then expected to meet for a budgetary trilogue on 17 July.

Further reading

• For key issues in EU budget see the EPRS flagship publication: Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2025
• For key dates see: Timeline for the three key EU budgetary procedures in 2025
• For Parliament’s guidelines for the 2026 budget: Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget; Section III – European Commission
• For more on Parliament’s role in the EU annual budgetary procedure see: Annual EU budgetary procedure: An introduction to the steps in the European Parliament

Written by Pieter Baert.

Financing defence spending

Following Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, defence spending by EU Member States rose sharply, from 1.2 % of GDP to an estimated 1.9 % in 2024. Nevertheless, the protracted war in Ukraine and other security challenges, including evolving US foreign policy priorities, have forced EU Member States to double down on rearmament and the development of a robust defence industrial base. With an elevated defence spending target expected to be agreed upon at the forthcoming NATO summit in June, this task arrives at a challenging time for many EU Member States, marked by muted economic growth, high deficits and competing spending priorities such as an ageing population and the green transition. To respond to this new geopolitical reality, several options are being considered, including issuing joint or national debt, reallocating budget funds (national or EU), or generating additional revenue through (new) taxes. Given the uncertain outlook, such financing will be structural rather than temporary. The EU’s economic governance framework permits a degree of flexibility through the national escape clause, enabling Member States to deviate from fiscal rules under exceptional circumstances beyond their control; in this case, it would be to accommodate increased defence spending while ensuring overall fiscal sustainability.

Against this backdrop, taxation represents a key policy instrument. EU Member States have significant autonomy to adjust their tax systems as they see fit, as taxation is an area of national competence. They can choose to adjust their direct taxes, such as personal and corporate income taxes, or rely on indirect taxes, such as VAT or excise duties, taking into account their own national tax mix, tax burden and policy preferences. Aside from implementing new or elevated taxes, strengthening the fight against tax fraud and avoidance, and improving tax collection efficiency may also significantly bolster tax receipts (for instance, EU Member States lose €89 billion in VAT revenue each year). Naturally, strengthening the EU defence industrial base would also generate additional fiscal and economic effects through tax revenues and overall economic activity.

Some Member States have recently introduced dedicated tax measures, in order to boost financing for military support (see Table 1 below).

Table 1 – Tax measures adopted by selected Member States to support defence spending

Member StateTax measuresEstoniaThe national parliament adopted a Security Tax Act in December 2024, introducing tax increases to finance additional military support: The standard VAT rate will be increased from 22 % to 24 %, effective from July 2025.A 2 % security surcharge will be levied on corporate profits and personal income from January 2026. However, the new Estonian coalition government has announced its intention to abolish this measure.LatviaThe country has imposed a mandatory ‘solidarity contribution‘ requirement on credit institutions to help bolster its defence efforts. The measure covers the period from 2025 to 2027.LithuaniaA defence fund package, agreed upon in June 2024, comprises several tax measures aimed at increasing defence funding. These measures, which have been in force since January 2025, include: raising the corporate income tax rate by one percentage point to 16 % for businesses, and to 6 % for small businessesraising the excise duties on alcohol, tobacco and energy products such as petrol and diesel;extending by one year the application period for a temporary solidarity contribution by credit institutions.

The urgency of these measures also raises the question of how swiftly tax systems can be adjusted to meet sudden increases in revenue requirements. Changes to the income tax framework are typically introduced at the start of a fiscal year to ensure consistency with accounting practices and to avoid political and legal concerns about retroactive taxation. Adjusting VAT rates is somewhat easier to implement at shorter notice, as companies remit VAT on a monthly or quarterly basis. While VAT rate increases carry significant revenue potential, they may also give rise to concerns about their regressive impact. Health or environmental taxes can generate substantial short-term revenue and support broader national objectives, but their long-term reliability may be uncertain due to behavioural changes that result in reduced taxable activities.

However, securing sustainable financing is just one aspect of the challenge at hand. The production of weapons, military technology and related infrastructure will require significant strengthening of the defence industrial base in Europe. In this context, the fiscal needs of the defence sector may align with broader calls from corporate taxpayers in general for a simplified, more efficient tax compliance framework. In March 2025, the Council of the EU called on the European Commission to present a road map by the end of the third quarter of 2025 aimed at reducing reporting burdens for taxpayers, eliminating outdated and overlapping tax provisions, improving the clarity of tax legislation and streamlining the application of tax rules and procedures, and thereby enhancing the business environment across all sectors.

Additionally, given the defence industry’s heavy reliance on research and development (R&D), ensuring that existing R&D tax incentives are both effective and easy to administer will be crucial for supporting innovation capacity within the sector.

VAT provisions

As a general rule, the supply of goods or services to, or the import of goods by defence authorities or their armed forces for their activities is subject to VAT in the EU. However, subject to certain conditions, Article 151(1) of the EU VAT Directive provides for a VAT exemption on supplies made to the armed forces (and the civilian staff accompanying them) of one NATO member state stationed in an EU country that is another NATO member state, whenever these armed forces and civilian staff are participating in a common NATO defence effort. The exemption also applies to the armed forces (and the civilian staff accompanying them) of an EU Member State involved in an activity under the EU common security and defence policy in another Member State. Cooperative defence projects and programmes run in the European Defence Agency are also exempt from VAT, subject to certain conditions. Additionally, the recently adopted Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument – a €150 billion financial tool to boost EU Member States’ defence industrial production – includes provisions for VAT exemption on defence products procured through this instrument.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Tax challenges facing the European defence union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The European Union (EU) aims to reduce, and eventually eradicate poverty. It is the world’s largest donor of development aid. In 2023, the EU and its member countries provided €95.9 billion for official development assistance to support long-term economic, social, environmental and political development around the world.

EU development aid policies

The EU is committed to implementing the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals to eradicate poverty, find sustainable and inclusive development solutions, and ensure everyone’s human rights by 2030.

In 2021, the EU adopted its Global Gateway strategy. It aims to boost smart, clean and secure connections in the digital, energy and transport sectors, and to strengthen health, education and research systems across the world. Up to €300 billion in public and private investment will be mobilised between 2021 and 2027 to achieve these goals. More information is available in the related press release.

EU action follows the principle of policy coherence for development, which means that EU policies should not have negative effects on developing countries. Under this principle, the EU aims to minimise inconsistencies and improve synergies between different EU policies, for instance in trade, agriculture or on climate action.

The EU therefore supports the private sector through public funding and several initiatives aiming to leverage investment in developing countries. For instance, the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) promotes sustainable investment in the EU’s partner countries. It aims at mobilising up to €135 billion of public and private financing to help partner countries achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

To help improve people’s lives and the economy by fighting hunger and protecting natural resources, the EU also engages in international partnerships with countries in need, providing assistance through financial grants, public procurement contracts and budgetary support. In June 2021, the EU adopted the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, which aims to promote stronger partnerships with non-EU countries, including with the European neighbourhood.

European Parliament’s position

In a March 2023 resolution, the European Parliament called to prevent EU policies from negatively impacting poor and vulnerable people in developing countries. Parliament also stressed the need to clarify, strengthen and promote policy coherence for development in line with the Sustainable Development Goals.

In a December 2023 resolution, the European Parliament reaffirmed that everyone has the right to education. It also stressed that, if we are to meet the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, education – notably basic education – must be free, quality, inclusive, and accessible without discrimination.

In a May 2025 resolution about the updated long-term budget for the Union, the European Parliament emphasised that the EU should aim to remain the world’s leading provider of development aid and climate finance. Parliament also noted that the EU and its member countries have jointly pledged to allocate 0.7 % of their gross national income (GNI) to official development assistance, and stressed that reducing poverty must remain the main goal.

Further information

• Understanding the triple nexus: The challenges of creating synergies between humanitarian, development and security policies, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, April 2025
• The EU Aid Strategy: A Gateway to Human Development?, European Parliament External Policies Analysis and Support Unit, Study, March 2025
• Assessing policy coherence for development across internal and external EU policies: A call for action – Ex-post evaluation, European Parliamentary Research Service, Study, November 2024
• Understanding policy coherence for development, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2023
• Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.