European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union (EU) is doing to handle future epidemics of illnesses transmitted from animals to humans. Over the past decades, a number of diseases transmitted from animals to humans – known as zoonotic diseases – have resulted in various epidemics and pandemics. The coronavirus pandemic is the most notable, but previous examples include SARS, Ebola, avian influenza (‘bird flu’), and HIV/AIDS.

In the health policy area, the European Union’s role is limited to supporting and coordinating the policies of EU countries. Within these limited powers, the EU has taken action to reduce the risk of future epidemics, and to be better prepared to deal with large outbreaks.

Preventing future epidemics

One of the risk factors that can lead to diseases being transmitted from animals to humans is a sharp decline in biodiversity. The loss of habitat can force wild animals closer to livestock and inhabited areas, increasing the chance of infection. In addition, less biodiversity can sometimes lead to more animals carrying diseases that could potentially infect humans, or carrying parasites that could do so (known as vector species).

As a result, the EU has taken steps to protect biodiversity and prevent deforestation, in particular as part of the Green Deal. A core part of the Green Deal is the biodiversity strategy. Additionally, the farm to fork strategy for sustainable agriculture aims to lessen the chances of another epidemic by promoting genetic diversity on farms.

The European Parliament welcomed these efforts in an October 2021 resolution. It also explicitly recognised the link between biodiversity loss and the spread of disease in another resolution on protecting biodiversity in October 2021. In this resolution, Parliament called for the EU to address the root cause of biodiversity loss. It also called on the European Commission to submit a proposal to ensure that EU consumption does not lead to deforestation, and to promote a diversity in agricultural crops and seeds.

Some diseases can be transferred from livestock to humans through the contamination of food. As a result, the EU is taking action to combat disease in livestock and to reduce the risk of contamination. This includes routinely vaccinating farm animals and reducing the use of antibiotics.

Improving epidemic preparedness

Through the Horizon 2020 programme, the EU has invested heavily in research on infectious diseases. In particular, it has invested in developing vaccines, including novel technologies such as mRNA vaccines, which have been instrumental in combatting coronavirus.

The European Parliament calls for greater cooperation between EU countries on healthcare. Most notably, in a July 2020 resolution, Parliament demanded the establishment of a European Health Union, to promote cooperation in healthcare, by sharing information and supplies, and by improving coordination.

In response to the Parliament’s demands, as well as to the coronavirus pandemic, the European Commission established the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) to:

• detect and evaluate health threats
• promote research into safe, effective, and affordable medical countermeasures
• procure, stockpile, and distribute medical supplies
• share knowledge and best practices
• coordinate EU countries and other stakeholders during (potential) health crises
• contribute to global preparedness to epidemics, for example through training, sharing knowledge, and improving the supply chains for medical equipment and medicine

The aim is that HERA will be fully operational by early 2022.

The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) also plays an important role in monitoring the spread of disease, providing important data and advice, and promoting the sharing of knowledge and best practices.

Further reading

• The link between biodiversity loss and the spread of zoonotic diseases, European Parliament Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, December 2020
• Foodborne zoonotic diseases, European Food Safety Authority, 2021
• Eradication, control and monitoring programmes to contain animal diseases, European Court of Auditors special report, 2016

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

A landmark UNHRC resolution has recognised the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, endorsing the broad recognition of the link between human rights and the environment. The right to a healthy environment is already enshrined in numerous national and regional instruments. Although non-binding, the resolution can spur change, with the Council of Europe already taking the first steps in this regard.

Legal recognition of the right to a healthy and sustainable environment

In a resolution of 8 October 2021, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) recognised, with 43 votes in favour and 4 abstentions, that access to a healthy and sustainable environment is a universal right. Although non-binding, this resolution could be a first step towards filling a significant gap in international law.

Legal recognition in the UN treaties

International human rights law does not guarantee the right to a clean and safe environment. UN human rights treaties – most of which were adopted before environmental protection came under the focus of international attention – do not explicitly endorse this right, but some make indirect references to it. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides in its Article 12 for the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and calls on states parties to take steps to improve all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that states parties shall take appropriate measures to combat disease and malnutrition through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution (Article 24). UN human rights treaty bodies, through their case law or other declarations, have driven a ‘greening’ of human rights by arguing that many human rights, such as the right to life, private life, health, water and property, depend on a healthy environment.

Legal recognition in regional human rights and environmental treaties The link between human rights and the environment, including climate change
This important link has been recognised by the UN human rights bodies (e.g. the Human Rights Council) and the treaty bodies, and has been embedded in the UN special procedures. This link works in two directions: 1) environmental protection is instrumental to the enjoyment of a number of human rights (as explained above), and 2) the exercise of human rights (particularly procedural rights such as access to information, public participation and access to effective judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy) is vital for effective environmental protection – an approach upheld most staunchly by the Aarhus Convention. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the human environment was the first international document to recognise the link between human rights and the environment. The Paris Climate Agreement (2015) is the first binding multilateral environmental agreement to include an explicit human rights reference. Its preamble acknowledges that states ‘should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights’. The Glasgow Climate Pact adopted at COP26 reaffirms these obligations.

Recognition under international regional treaties is stronger but remains unequal. In total, over 120 states are parties to at least one binding regional treaty proclaiming the right to a healthy environment. Among these, the Aarhus Convention in Europe stands out through its focus on procedural rights (rights of access to information, public participation, and access to justice with respect to the environment). The European Convention on Human Rights does not contain any provisions referring to a right to a healthy environment, but on 29 September 2021, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended the drafting of an additional protocol in this respect. Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that a high level of environmental protection must be integrated in EU policies, but does not recognise an individual right to a healthy environment.

Table 1 – Relevant international regional agreements

Regional conventionsAarhus Convention (1998)African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1991)Arab Charter of Human Rights (2004)Protocol of San Salvador (1969)States parties46 (plus the EU)541616Relevant provisionsPreamble: ‘every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being’Article 24: ‘all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development’Article 38: ‘every person has the right […] to a healthy environment’Article 11: ‘everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment’ In national constitutions and law

According to a 2019 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, ‘There are 110 States where this right enjoys constitutional protection…[and] 101 States where this right has been incorporated into national legislation…In total, more than 80 percent of States Members of the United Nations (156 out of 193) [including those bound by a treaty] legally recognize the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment’. Moreover, 19 out of 27 EU countries have enshrined this right in their constitutions (some only implicitly) and 17 in their national law. Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden have done neither, but are parties to the Aarhus Convention.

The landmark UNHRC resolution on the right to a healthy environment

The October 2021 resolution was the result of a years-long campaign by numerous civil society organisations and other stakeholders. The process was also driven by a 2018 joint report by the former and current UN Special Rapporteurs for Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox (2012-2018) and David Boyd (2018-) respectively, which made the case for the UN ‘to formally recognize the human right to a healthy environment’. The resolution asks states to adopt policies for the enjoyment of such a right, including with respect to biodiversity and ecosystems, and lists climate change in its recitals as one of the major obstacles to the enjoyment of a healthy and sustainable environment. The central provision ‘recognizes the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a human right that is important for the enjoyment of human rights’. The resolution also highlights the link with other rights.

Though not legally binding, the resolution signals the UN member states’ strong political commitment to such a right and could be a catalyst for change. It is expected to produce positive environmental results by raising public awareness and improving accountability and enforcement. In particular, it can provide a strong basis for environmental litigation in courts. Across the world, the link between human rights and the environment and climate is increasingly being invoked before the courts. Cases in the EU include the Urgenda case in the Netherlands, Affaire climat in Belgium and L’affaire du siècle in France.

Though the resolution does not provide a definition of the new right, a 2019 UNHRC report identified the ‘vital elements’ that could be part of such a definition: the right to: clean air, clean water and adequate sanitation, healthy and sustainable food, a safe climate, and healthy biodiversity and ecosystems. Who are the new right’s holders and duty bearers? Some argue that the holders of this new right ‘are not only the present generation but also future generations’. States are the primary duty bearers as regards human rights; therefore, they have a positive obligation ‘to mitigate climate change and ensure that all persons have the necessary capacity to adapt to its consequences’, including with respect to populations outside their territories. In line with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, businesses should be accountable for the realisation of such a right too. Experts have warned about the difficulties in codifying such a right into law. European Parliament position

The European Parliament, in its June 2021 resolution on the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, considers that the right to a healthy environment should be recognised in the EU Charter and that the EU should take the lead on the international recognition of such a right.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘A universal right to a healthy environment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

Democracy relies on citizens’ abilities to obtain information on public matters, to understand them and to deliberate about them. Whereas social media provide citizens with new opportunities to access information, express opinions and participate in democratic processes, they can also undermine democracy by distorting information, promoting false stories and facilitating political manipulation. Social media risks to democracy can be classified according to five aspects that generate risks surveillance, personalisation, disinformation, moderation, and microtargeting.

Firstly, social media provide new and more effective ways to monitor people online, which can be used by governments to target politically active citizens and silence dissent (political surveillance). Even in the absence of explicit coercion, citizens who suspect they are the target of online surveillance may suppress their political expression online for fear of retribution. The massive collection of data by social media creates privacy risks to users and may affect their capacity to form and express political opinions (loss of privacy and autonomy). The attention capture model used by social media seeks to exploit human needs and biases in order to increase engagement, but at the same time it undermines individual autonomy. Social media may also contribute to citizens’ decreasing levels of interest in politics, even if they are not directly responsible for this (political disengagement). Certain effects of social media are a by-product of a particular business model focused on engagement at all costs. This indifference of social media to democracy contrasts with the fact that they have a growing impact on democracy.

Secondly, the promotion of personalised content on social media may lock citizens in informational bubbles, thus affecting their capacity to form opinions (narrowed worldviews). Whereas content personalisation can help citizens deal with the problem of information overload, it can also limit the range of information available to them. Moreover, the segmentation of information and engagement may reinforce group boundaries and reduce opportunities for political dialogue (social and political fragmentation). Yet, despite widespread concern, existing empirical evidence suggests that the personalisation and filtering effects of social media are less severe and pervasive than initially feared. Whereas the negative political effects of personalisation seem less severe and widespread, the risk of societal fragmentation and polarisation remains. It must be noted that evaluations of the political effects of social media may also depend on political (ideological) assumptions about the nature and conditions of democratic politics.

Thirdly, the spread of false information on social media can undermine citizens’ capacity to form and express political views (distortion of political views and preferences). Despite growing evidence of people’s significant exposure to political disinformation online, the actual impact of disinformation on their views and preferences is difficult to assess. Although the reach and impact of disinformation seem to have been over-estimated, there is evidence of negative effects in particular contexts and on specific groups. Disinformation can be used to persuade or confuse voters and to mobilise or demobilise citizens to cast a vote, which may, in certain conditions, be a determinant of election outcomes (distortion of electoral outcomes). Importantly, widespread disinformation and acute public perception thereof (amplified by lack of research and inadequate reporting) may undermine trust in (all) online information and democratic institutions. Despite recent media attention being focused primarily on disinformation disseminated by foreign actors (e.g. foreign governments or intermediaries seeking to influence electoral outcomes in another country), disinformation is also spread by domestic actors (e.g. political parties and politicians seeking to influence pulblic opinion in their own country). Sometimes, this happens as a result of entrepreneurs promoting highly engaging content to make profits from selling ads. Moreover, automated accounts and algorithms contribute to the spread of disinformation on social media (automated disinformation). However, effective disinformation campaigns are a result of a complex interaction between humans and algorithms. For example, automated tools for spreading false information exploit human biases and predispositions, such as human confirmation bias, inclination to believe repeated stories, and attraction to novel content.

Fourthly, efforts by social media platforms to tackle disinformation and other forms of deception online may undermine users’ freedom of expression and enable control over public opinion (political censorship). Whereas all moderation measures are risky, content removal is particularly problematic when targeted content is not explicitly illegal. Deleting and labelling content can be counterproductive, as it may reinforce perceptions about unfair and unjustified censorship of particular views and groups. Whereas automation can alleviate some burdens of human moderation, it can also amplify errors and automate pre-existing bias (algorithmic bias). Increased pressure on social media to tackle problematic content may push platforms to rely even more strongly on automated tools, which leads to more censorship and bias. Despite efforts to make moderation more transparent and systematic, moderation measures adopted by social media remain largely unclear, arbitrary, and inconsistently applied. The risk is that social media platforms take decisions with significant consequences for individuals and democracy without proper accountability (lack of accountability).

Fifthly, social media platforms rely on a variety of user data to profile people and sell targeted advertising (microtargeting). Whereas political microtargeting can serve to re-engage citizens in politics, it can also be used to manipulate citizens’ views and expectations (political manipulation). The covert or hidden nature of microtargeting increases the risk of manipulation and thus undercuts citizens’ capacity to form and make political choices. Political microtargeting also challenges existing electoral rules concerning transparency, campaigning and political funding, and can distort elections (distortion of the electoral process). Whereas evidence about the widespread use of political microtargeting is growing, its actual impact remains uncertain. Given the nature of political competition, it is possible that political microtargeting campaigns can determine the outcome of elections, in particular in winner-takes-all electoral systems. Even if microtargeting cannot be blamed for tipping recent elections, the risks it creates are likely to increase, given the high political and economic interests at stake and future technological advances.

The EU already has laws and policies in place to tackle many of the social media risks to democracy (for example, strong data protection rules) and is spearheading efforts to counteract new challenges (such as new legislative proposals on digital services). There are seven key approaches to tackling social media risks to democracy.

EU competition measures can be used to further combat abuses of market dominance, for example, by controlling social media platforms’ ability to integrate behavioural data from various services and advertising networks and by promoting data portability and interoperability solutions to reduce the cost of switching between platforms. Further clarification and stricter enforcement of EU data protection and digital privacy rules can help to prevent abuses of personal data and provide safeguards for fair and democratic elections. Amid widespread calls for increasing social media responsibility for promoted content, there is an ongoing reflection on the need to review and clarify EU content liability rules on online content. Special attention has also been given to increasing transparency and accountability of online platforms for filtering and moderating content, including for the use of algorithms. The EU is gradually moving towards a co-regulatory approach that would require social media platforms to assume stricter transparency and accountability obligations. Specific rules are also forthcoming to prevent abuse and manipulation through targeted political advertising. Lastly,addressing the social media risks to democracy cannot succeed without empowering citizens to understand and fend off online risks, for example, by improving digital literacy, promoting citizen-centred approaches to tackling online challenges, and supporting public-oriented institutions such as independent media.

Read this ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Key social media risks to democracy: Risks from surveillance, personalisation, disinformation, moderation and microtargeting‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Liselotte Jensen (1st edition).

To align regulations and policies with the legally binding goals – delivering, by 2030, a 55 % net greenhouse gas emissions reduction compared to 1990, and reaching climate neutrality in Europe by 2050 – on 14 July the European Commission presented its first proposals under the ‘fit for 55’ package. One of these proposals involves amending Regulation (EU) 2018/841 on emissions and removals from land use, land-use change and forestry (the LULUCF Regulation). Among the main changes envisaged are to merge, as of 2030, the LULUCF sector with the non-CO2 agricultural sector in a new climate pillar, which would have to achieve climate neutrality by 2035. Moreover, by 2030, LULUCF carbon removals would have to increase to 310 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e). For the post-2025 period, the Commission would set individual targets for each Member State.

The proposal has been referred to the European Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which appointed Ville Niinistö (Greens/EFA, Finland) as rapporteur.

Versions

• December 2021: Revision of the LULUCF Regulation: Strengthening the role of the land use, land-use change and forestry sector in climate action (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2018/841 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 554
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Ville Niinistö (Greens/EFA, Finland)2021/0201(COD)Next steps expected:Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (EPP, Romania)
Delara Burkhardt (S&D, Germany)
Martin Hojsík (Renew, Slovakia)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Manuel Bompard (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Joanna Apap with Paulien Van de Velde-Van Rumst

On Tuesday 16 November 2021, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), the European University Institute (EUI) and the EP’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union (IPOL) jointly organised an online policy roundtable on ‘The political science of Next Generation EU’. The roundtable explored the potential impacts of Next Generation EU (NGEU), with the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) at its heart, and resulted in a fruitful exchange of views between parliamentarians, high-level academics and policy analysts. From the outset, the introductory remarks highlighted the innovative nature of the new recovery fund – both in terms of its scope and means of financing – and its great symbolic and institutional implications. Three subsequent panels discussed these implications and the potential of NGEU as a model for the future.

The potential impact of NGEU on EU institutional dynamics and balance

A first panel delved into NGEU’s impact on EU institutional dynamics and on EU-Member State relations. The speakers identified clear shifts in the role of the EU institutions, as well as more positive politicisation and a more cooperative dynamic between the institutions, compared with during the Eurozone crisis. The NGEU’s anchoring in the EU budget was generally welcomed in light of the European Parliament’s scrutiny role. Further institutional gains for the Parliament include the Recovery and Resilience dialogue with the European Commission and the agreement that future measures based on Article 122 TFEU will be adopted after a structured dialogue with the Commission and the Council, even though this arrangement is not formally provided for in the Treaties. The RRF, however, relies greatly on national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) and thus on projects generated by the Member States. The oversight of these plans lies with the Commission, in addition to its responsibility for the borrowing operation required for NGEU. The Commission’s role has thus been reinforced, whilst the final say on the NRRPs remains with the Council, which entrusted the Commission with the operation of all the programmes.

In parallel, the more ‘bottom-up’ exercise with the Member States to come up with NRRPs is an innovative aspect, introducing a decentralisation and democratisation of economic governance. Such ‘bottom-up’ involvement could help to repurpose the European Semester and lead to the creation of a permanent fund that could be combined with the establishment of an industrial policy dialogue with all stakeholders.

Last but not least, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) is a key player in scrutiny because of its mandate to audit NGEU. The NGEU’s clear objectives of funding the green and digital transition and of addressing social inequality might make it appear easier to assess Member States’ compliance and results. Nonetheless, several challenges were mentioned in this regard: How will a partial achievement be considered? How can one assess whether reforms have actually resulted in the intended structural changes? Considering the Member States’ financial and administrative absorption capacity, how much additional public investment will the RRF actually generate? The ECA has in any case put a comprehensive audit strategy in place with a robust method to assess compliance and a sequence of performance audits for selected aspects.

The first panel agreed that implementation of NGEU by the different EU institutions will prove to be key and that citizens must be at the heart of considerations: value for money and visibility of the objectives of NGEU funding are vital.

The potential impact of NGEU in shaping public perceptions of the EU

A second panel assessed the potential impact of NGEU to shape public perceptions of the EU. As Member States implement the NGEU programmes, public perception of the EU is dependent on national administrations. To bridge this gap, the EU plays an important role in scrutinising the NRRPs. The Flash Eurobarometer on NGEU showed that the public position aligns with the Parliament’s: the rule of law conditionality enjoys great support and there is a call for transparency and effective control of NGEU. The public is also in favour of consultation with regional governments, municipalities and civil society on how the funding is spent. The successful implementation of NGEU could therefore have a considerable impact on the elections to the European Parliament in 2024. For NGEU to influence public perceptions of the EU, it must be salient to citizens. If the recovery and the green and digital transitions are successful, all spending will appear national. ‘The NGEU’s repayment and potential decision to make it permanent will also be significant to public opinion’. Linking up these targets and conditionality with the EU’s long-term budget would also be desirable – even more so, considering the findings of the ‘Green Wedge’ study. Public attention to spending could be drawn by two very different types of dissent: young activists are judging all government-bodies on how fast and effectively they are taking climate action, while anti-climate populism is growing. Should there be an intention to make NGEU programmes more permanent, progress on real own resources could be the way to escape the debate on net contributors versus net beneficiaries of the EU budget. The new own resources are moreover imperative to be able to speak of a ‘Next Generation’ EU. An issue that came up regularly in discussion in the third panel.

How to ensure effective democratic control and parliamentary oversight of NGEU?

The third and final panel addressed democratic oversight of NGEU and accountability at the European and national level. As discussed in the second panel, the public has clear priorities on a number of issues touched upon by NGEU. To fulfil these expectations and to make NGEU a success, democratic input and parliamentary oversight are of crucial importance. It was pointed out that NGEU brings along a huge consideration of distributional fairness. Such fairness cannot be established without representation. Citizen representation should not only take place within the EU institutions: national scrutiny is more important than ever. However, parliamentary scrutiny is rather limited in this respect. National parliaments scrutinised ex-ante their general budget priorities linked to the NRRPs. National control and auditing systems, that have the backing of the ECA, had to be put in place. Moreover, there is considerable variation between Member States in levels of transparency, debate, and the inclusion of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations and social partners. Consequently, there is a need for a democratic panopticon around the NGEU that would ensure citizens have access to information on how and where the money is spent. To enhance the European Parliament’s role in this context, the panellists from academia made a couple of suggestions. As the Commission largely designed and is managing NGEU, the European Parliament could focus its energies on providing itself with a similar level of expertise. In doing so, it will gain a respected reputation on its pronouncements on the fiscal impact of decisions, independent of the executive and the Member States. The creation of a European Parliament Budgetary Office, which could provide non-partisan and reliable expertise, could be an option in this regard. We could also rethink the role of the European Parliament as a debating chamber whose role is to provide a forum in which citizens’ representatives find ways to reach out to other stakeholders in the European polity. Lastly, an electoral campaign intended to dictate the agenda for the executive, could allow citizens to express their opinion on this agenda.

To date, the European Parliament has managed to live up to its ambitions and is in a position to exert pressure on the other institutions involved. It acquired several tools for scrutiny over the course of the NGEU negotiations. The Parliament has a right to full access to information on an equal footing with the Council, there is the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue, and the Parliament will review the reports the Commission has to deliver for the evaluation of NGEU. In parallel, an internal working group in the Parliament will perform its own evaluation and provide input to the Commission. Moreover, to look after the ‘Next Generation’, the Parliament has pushed for an interinstitutional agreement, including a roadmap, to create the new own resources for the EU that need to be sufficient for repayment of the NGEU debt.

Nonetheless, the Members of Parliament taking part in the panel identified a number of challenges. Firstly, national parliament participation should be improved, as only a few of them have actually voted on their respective NRRPs. Secondly, one Member of Parliament denounced the Council’s refusal to allow the creation of a digital platform listing all beneficiaries of funding. Such a platform could have provided the start of a democratic panopticon. Thirdly, ongoing scrutiny of the payment requests under NGEU is indispensable. Instead of a mere transfer of funds into national budgets, NGEU established European priorities and the control of issues such as greenwashing, fraud, the effectiveness of projects, should therefore be upheld within the European Parliament. Finally, how NGEU could become a permanent structure should be discussed. Such a permanent structure would be part of a new economic governance model and could restore the principle and credibility of the European Semester. The six pillars of the NGEU (green transition; digital transformation; economic cohesion, productivity and competitiveness; social and territorial cohesion; health, economic, social and institutional  resilience; policies for the next generation), should also be maintained and inserted in other programmes.

In sum, the whole chain of democracy and accountability has to come together: how the money is spent will depend on the citizens, stakeholders, partners and governments at national level. Nevertheless, what happens at the national level needs to be empowered and enabled by what happens in Brussels. In this respect, it is also of great importance to communicate to citizens and to help them understand the considerable role that the European Parliament has played and continues to play in NGEU.

Conclusion

The NGEU provides an opportunity for the institutions to connect and reconnect with citizens. We can no longer imagine a world without NGEU, but it is important to keep in mind the significant strain it puts on the institutions and other EU initiatives, such as cohesion policy. The numerous accountability mechanisms could possibly work at cross-purpose and complicate the works on an already crowded institutional agenda, both nationally and at European level. The most recent budget negotiations are nonetheless a hopeful sign: they are conducted with the NGEU repayments in mind, to ensure a budget for the next generation.

To watch this event online, please click here.

You can find the next coming EPRS online events here

Relevant links for further information on this theme:

• Green Wedge? Mapping Dissent Against Climate Policy in Europe – Counterpoint: https://counterpoint.uk.com/mapping-dissent-against-climate-policy-in-europe/
• The Flash Eurobarometer on the State of the European Union: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2021/soteu-flash-survey/soteu-2021-report-en.pdf
• Recovery plan for Europe: State of play, September 2021, EPRS Briefing, September 2021
• Topical Digest 2021-2027 MFF and NGEU,  EPRS, May 2021

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg.

The last regular European Council meeting of 2021, on 16 December, will discuss a broad range of topics, notably the coronavirus pandemic, crisis management and resilience, energy prices, security and defence, migration, and external relations. In the context of the worsening epidemiological situation and the emergence of the Omicron variant, EU leaders will address progress in vaccination across the EU and the impact of new restrictions on the single market. They will also discuss international solidarity and ways of ensuring global vaccine coverage. Their debate on security and defence will probably focus on two intertwined outstanding issues, the Strategic Compass and the forthcoming cooperation declaration with NATO. On migration, EU leaders are expected to review the follow-up to their previous commitments and address the migration situation in the English Channel. In the external relations field, they will most likely discuss the situation in Ukraine and at the Belarus border, the developments in Ethiopia as well as preparations for the EU-African Union summit. As the European Council meeting will take place back to back with the Eastern Partnership Summit, EU leaders could take stock of the outcome of the latter. The Euro Summit directly after the European Council meeting will focus on the Covid recovery and review progress on the Banking and Capital Markets Unions.

1. European Council agenda points

The indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2021-22, adopted in June 2021, had already outlined coronavirus, crisis management and resilience, and Africa as topics for the regular December meeting. While the former two feature prominently on the draft agenda, the latter issue is not specifically mentioned as a discrete agenda point (although the General Affairs Council of 23 November noted that the European Council will prepare the EU-African Union summit of 17-18 February 2022). The European Council will also come back again to energy prices as well as security and defence, as stated in previous European Council conclusions.

Policy area Previous commitment Occasion on which commitment was made Coronavirus The European Council will return to this issue regularly. 1-2 October 2020 Security and defence Keep under regular review 26 February 2021 Energy prices Review the issue at future meetings 21-22 October 2021

While the December meeting will be the last under Slovenian Council Presidency, it will be the first European Council meeting for four new members: the new Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, the recently elected Prime Minister of Sweden, Magdalena Andersson, the new Prime Minister of Czechia, Petr Fiala, and the new Chancellor of Austria, Karl Nehammer.

2. European Council meeting Covid-19

This meeting will mark the 20th discussion of Covid-19 in the European Council, with nine of those being by video-conference. The European Council is likely to discuss the Omicron variant, which was first detected on 11 November 2021 in Botswana and on 14 November 2021 in South Africa. On 26 November, it was designated a variant of concern by the World Health Organization (WHO), and there are a growing number of Omicron cases detected in the EU. However, EU leaders are expected to adopt a broader approach to Covid-19 calling for the roll-out of vaccination to all, the deployment of booster doses, following a joint statement by the European Medical Agency and ECDC advocating their usefulness, as well as for measures to tackle the risk of variants.  

EU leaders may also discuss ways of combating vaccine hesitancy and disinformation, as wide divergences in the rate of fully vaccinated adults still exist between Member States. Omicron is a strong reminder that in order to reduce the potential of the virus mutating, its circulation in the population needs to be reduced. The European Council may call for greater coordination efforts to avoid the varying restrictions introduced by Member States in response to Omicron impairing the Single Market and having too strong an impact on travel within the Union.

The European Council may welcome an agreement by WHO member countries to start negotiations on an international treaty on pandemic preparedness, prevention and response. On previous occasions, EU leaders had called for such a treaty, and recently, Charles Michel, President of the European Council, spoke at the special session of the WHO on the need for better preparedness for a future pandemic. The European Council will mostly likely reiterate its commitment to contribute to the global response to Covid-19, particularly ensuring access to vaccines. This has been repeated by the European Council in nine of its meetings since the outbreak of the pandemic.  

Crisis management and resilience

EU leaders are expected to follow up on their discussions from the June European Council, when they addressed the initial lessons from the pandemic and invited the Slovenian Presidency to take work forward in the Council to enhance the EU’s collective preparedness, response capability and resilience to future crises as well as to protect the functioning of the internal market. They are expected to endorse the Council conclusions of 23 November 2021 on resilience and crisis response. These conclusions take a horizontal approach to resilience and crisis response, as they address different elements from various policy areas, notably the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements, the European Health Union and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), the fight against disinformation, a possible revision of the Schengen Borders Code, avoiding disruptions to global supply chains and upholding the functioning of the single market, as well as the EU’s Strategic Compass.

Energy prices

For the third meeting in a row, EU leaders will address the spike in energy prices. The debate promises to be heated once again as Member States continue to diverge on the transitory versus long-lasting effects of the current increase in energy prices and, hence, on the EU’s long-term response. France and Germany reportedly support different positions on a key issue, the overhaul of the energy and carbon market. The European Commission will most likely present the results of the preliminary assessments made, at the request of the European Council, by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and by the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA). ACER concluded that ‘no obvious wholesale market manipulation’ had occurred on the energy market, whilst ESMA outlined that the ‘increase in the number of market participants by itself cannot be taken as proof for any patterns of disorderly trading or abusive behaviour present in the carbon market’. More in-depth reports are expected by April 2022.

EU leaders could also take stock of progress made in implementing the short-term measures agreed by the European Council and the Council in October 2021. This includes the European Commission’s toolbox, which offers Member States a wide range of instruments to counter the growing risk of energy poverty, which affects the most vulnerable European households in particular.

Security and defence

On 15 November 2021, the High Representative, Josep Borrell, presented a first draft of the Strategic Compass in the Council. The document is intended to provide ‘political-strategic guidance on the EU approach to security and defence in the next 5 to 10 years’. Some of its aspects, most notably the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, a flexible modular force of up to 5 000 troops, have already raised mixed reactions from the Member States. Most of the concerns expressed so far question the rationale of ‘adding more new tools, while not using the potential of existing ones’, such as the EU Battlegroups, which had been declared operational in 2007 but have never been used.

The European Council is expected to focus on ‘fine tuning’ and building political consensus on the Strategic Compass. Addressing the European Defence Agency’s recent annual conference, Charles Michel announced that ‘the European Council will provide further guidance in December’, and that EU leaders ‘hope to endorse’ the Strategic Compass at their meeting in March 2022. He has also recalled the EU’s Strategic Agenda commitment to increase the EU’s ‘capacity to act autonomously’, with the aim of becoming a more robust international actor, ‘exerting greater influence’, defending its values and interests, and being able to choose to cooperate with partners or act alone whenever necessary. He has also stressed that the EU should use not only defence-related instruments, but all other instruments at its disposal, ‘in a more coordinated manner’.

External relations

EU leaders will most probably consider Russia’s military build-up at its border with Ukraine, which remains a matter of deep concern for European security. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, might inform their colleagues of the state of play of the Normandy Format talks, which are in need of new impetus. Consequently, in the absence of full implementation of the Minsk agreements, EU leaders will most probably greenlight the extension of the current economic sanctions, which are due to expire in January 2022, by a further six months.

Recently France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US reaffirmed the centrality of the Normandy Format talks to conflict resolution in eastern Ukraine, and called for a ‘coordinated and comprehensive approach’ of NATO allies and EU partners. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned that, in case of further escalation in Ukraine or of any other malicious activities originating from Russia, the EU was prepared to set, in close coordination with ‘like-minded partners’, expanded as well as additional sanctions. In July 2021, during bilateral talks with US, which covered the highly sensitive question of Nord Stream 2, Germany had committed to ‘take actions at the national level and press for effective measures at the European level, including sanctions, to limit Russian export capabilities in the energy sector’, should Russia use energy as a weapon against Ukraine.

The European Council will take place back to back with the Eastern Partnership Summit being held on 15 December, and EU leaders might take stock of the outcome of the summit.

Migration

After a long absence from the agenda, migration returned to the European Council at both its June and October 2021 meetings. While the December European Council is again expected to concentrate mainly on the external aspects of migration, there are still a number of issues to be dealt with, notably the situation of migrants at the border with Belarus, the death of migrants in the English Channel, and increasing cooperation with countries of origin and transit.

At the October European Council meeting, EU leaders called for changes to the EU’s legal framework in order to address the instrumentalisation of migrants for political purposes. On 1 December, the European Commission followed up on this and proposed temporary legal and practical measures to address the emergency situation at the EU’s external border with Belarus. EU leaders might discuss this proposal and reiterate their condemnation of all hybrid attacks at the EU’s borders.

Regarding the migration challenges in the Channel and southern North Sea, Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands issued a joint declaration on 28 November. Their recommendations include strengthened cooperation between the Member States against smuggling networks, as well as enhanced collaboration with the UK. They called specifically for Frontex to deploy more resources in the region, including aerial surveillance.

EU leaders are also likely to review the Commission’s follow-up activities to their June and October conclusions regarding the launch of action plans for priority countries of origin and transit as well as the use of 10 % of the NDICI financial envelope for actions related to migration. It is also likely that the European Council will refer to secondary migration, and express its support to the conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 9-10 December.

3. Euro Summit

The statement issued after the 25 June 2021 Euro Summit specified that the focus of the December 2021 Euro Summit meeting would be on the Covid recovery, as well as on progress made in the fields of Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union. In the Covid context, the Euro Summit might take stock of economic recovery and of the fiscal support measures in light of the European Semester autumn package from the Commission.

EU leaders are likely to reiterate their commitment to the completion of Banking Union, with notable progress achieved on risk reduction in the banking system, as Eurogroup President Paschal Donohoe concluded after the Eurogroup’s November meeting, while cautioning continued vigilance due to the pandemic. A further development since the summer is the new banking package, proposed by the Commission on 27 October, which includes a review of EU banking rules in the shape of the Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive, aimed at strengthening resilience in the banking sector and finalising the implementation of the Basel III agreement in the EU. As regards the Capital Markets Union, EU leaders could take note of the legislative package proposed by the Commission on 25 November – including reviews of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), the European Long-term Investment Funds (ELTIF) Regulation, and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR), and creation the European single access point (ESAP) – whilst reiterating their call for its adoption in the near term.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Members of the European Parliament meet again in hybrid format for the last plenary session of the year, with expectations that Parliament will finalise its position on several important files on the agenda, including the digital markets act and measures to combat gender-based cyber-violence. As every December, the accent is on human rights and the rule of law, with the Sakharov Prize ceremony taking place on Wednesday. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo‑Addo, President of Ghana will make a formal address to Parliament on Tuesday.

Parliament is expected to adopt its position on an Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) report on the proposed digital markets act (DMA), which seeks to regulate big digital platforms in the EU on Tuesday morning. Once approved, the text would form Parliament’s position for the DMA negotiations with EU governments. The committee’s report proposes to extend the scope of the DMA to include web browsers, virtual assistants and connected televisions, and to increase the threshold for a company to be considered a ‘gatekeeper’. The committee also seeks stronger obligations on companies that act as internet gatekeepers, to ensure messaging and social media is interoperable and to make it easier to unsubscribe, as well as strengthening the rules on advertising and fair access. If Parliament and the other institutions agree, the European Commission will enforce the terms of the DMA, with fines for non-compliance ranging from 4‑20 % of a company’s total worldwide turnover.

The award of the annual Sakharov Prize, which honours the work of brave human rights defenders in the name of Soviet-era dissident Andrey Sakharov, is a key annual highlight in the European Parliament’s regular defence of human rights. This year, Parliament will award the prize to Alexey Navalny, in a ceremony on Wednesday at noon (although the Russian opposition activist is expected to be represented by his daughter, Daria Navalnaya, as he is currently imprisoned in Russia). The EU responded to the attempt to assassinate Navalny by adopting chemical weapons sanctions against Russian officials, and Parliament has repeatedly expressed concern about Navalny’s situation, calling for his immediate release. With this prize, Parliament underlines its position on Russia’s systematic silencing of dissident voices and its failure to uphold its international commitments to human rights.

The rule of law is also a major focus of EU enlargement policy and Parliament is due to debate an own-initiative report on cooperation in the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans on Tuesday afternoon. The Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) stresses that criminal activities, such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling, carried out by transnational organised crime groups in the Western Balkans are detrimental to victims, citizens of the region and the EU alike. Although cooperation with the EU and its agencies is already under way, the committee underlines that accelerating reforms in the fight against transnational organised crime in the region, in line with the demands of the EU integration process, would greatly improve the situation, as well as trust in democracy in the region.

Turning to democracy closer to home – in our workplaces – on Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to consider an own-initiative report prepared by the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee proposing to revise the framework of EU laws that supports EU countries’ efforts to promote democracy at work. While the current EU laws to promote employee participation and representation rights have proved somewhat contradictory, new social, economic and pandemic-related challenges for workers mean that it is more important than ever that employees themselves have a say in the changes to come. The EMPL committee therefore underlines the need for a new EU framework on information, consultation and board-level employee representation, including revamped European works councils, to reinforce employees’ rights.

The coronavirus pandemic has also had terrible consequences for young people, with their lives and education completely disrupted by successive lock-downs. The European Commission has therefore proposed to concentrate efforts to improve their situation, by making 2022 the European Year of Youth. Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) has called for additional efforts to include disadvantaged young people, and successfully negotiated an additional €8 million funding for the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes. Parliament is expected to consider an agreement reached between the co-legislators on the proposals on Tuesday morning, so that the arrangements can be put in place in time for 1 January 2022.

The successful and swift roll-out of coronavirus vaccine programmes in Europe have underlined the benefits of swifter assessment of innovative health solutions. On Monday evening, Parliament will debate a provisional agreement on the proposal for stronger EU cooperation on health technology assessment. While EU countries are responsible for their healthcare policies, the EU could help make it swifter and easier to introduce new medicines and medical devices, by introducing EU-wide cooperation on research to assess the value of new health technologies. Parliament has insisted that there is full transparency in the way the proposed coordination groups would work, to ensure that there is no conflict of interest in their consultations with experts, patient representatives and industry stakeholders.

The issue of cyber-violence has grown increasingly critical with the rise in the use of the internet and social media, exacerbated by the anonymity available to perpetrators. The effects of such violence are considerable, with 92 % of respondents to an Economist Intelligence Unit survey reporting that the violence they had experienced or witnessed had harmed their wellbeing. As no EU legislation currently specifically addresses gender-based violence, including cyber-violence, Parliament is keen to see these issues tackled in the European Commission’s proposal, expected early in 2022, on combating online violence. On Monday evening, in advance of this proposal, Members will consider a legislative-initiative report tabled by Parliament’s committees on Women’s Rights & Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs (LIBE), on combating gender-based cyber-violence. The committees would like to see the new legislation include measures that set out a legal definition of gender-based cyber-violence, EU-wide sanctions and improved support for victims.

Finally, with some 274 million people expected to need humanitarian aid in 2022, Parliament has called for action to follow up on the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which sets out why, how and when the EU acts in response to humanitarian crises. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to debate a Committee on Development (DEVE) own-initiative report on the European Commission’s proposed new guidelines for EU humanitarian action. Together, the EU and its Member States already contribute more than one third of global humanitarian assistance, but the DEVE committee would like to see swift action supported by more predictable and flexible funding, as well as sanctions for those who commit violations of international humanitarian law.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The current crisis on the Poland–Belarus border and renewed attempts by migrants to cross the Channel from France to the United Kingdom have put a new spotlight on the dilemma of how the European Union should deal with refugees escaping repression and poverty in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, and some parts of Africa. In Belarus, authorities have allowed migrants to take flights into the country to purposely transfer them to their borders with the neighbouring EU Member States of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Meanwhile, London and Paris are discussing ways to clamp down on migrants’ attempts to cross the Channel. The Turkish and Mediterranean migration routes from Africa to Italy and Spain also remain active.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on migration in Europe and on debates on how to reform its rules.

Migration crisis on the EU Eastern border: How the EU can protect borders and human rights
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

No quiet on the eastern front: The migration crisis engineered by Belarus
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2021

When security in Europe conflicts with democracy in Poland
Brookings Institution, November 2021

Britain and France should stand together
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Poland’s many problems and how to solve them
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Lukashenka is the problem, not the migrants
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Lukashenko uses migrants to exploit Europe’s vulnerability
Carnegie Europe, November 2021

Libya’s migrants and crimes against humanity
Brookings Institution, November 2021

Cities and their networks in EU‑Africa migration policy
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2021

The politicization and framing of migration in West Africa: Transition to democracy as a game changer?
Brussels School of Governance, November 2021

Lithuania’s reactions to the escalating migration crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2021

Support for Lukashenka: Russia’s response to the migration crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2021

Young people’s priorities on climate migration
Chatham House, November 2021

From debunking to prebunking: How to get ahead of disinformation on migration in the EU
European Foundation for Progressive Studies, November 2021

Migration, borders, and the EU’s capacity to act
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2021

Migration as coercion
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, November 2021

Philanthropy and migration in Europe: What role for foundations?
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2021

Statelessness is a big problem, so let’s revive ‘Nansen’ passports
Friends of Europe, October 2021

Europe’s new walls
Carnegie Europe, October 2021

Philanthropy and migration in Europe: What role for foundations?
French Institute of International Relations, October 2021

Can the new European Pact on Immigration and Asylum respond to the next migration challenges?
Fondation Robert Schuman, October 2021

Back to Geneva: Reinterpreting Asylum in the EU
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, October 2021

Vital yet vulnerable: Europe’s intra-EU migrant caregivers
European Foundation for Progressive Studies, October 2021

Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum
Chatham House, October 2021

Global migration: Working together
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, October 2021

How we talk about migration: The link between migration narratives, policy, and power
Migration Policy Institute, October 2021

Updating the global refugee regime
Carnegie Europe, September 2021

Bringing border cities into the center of migration governance
German Marshall Fund, September 2021

How half-hearted sanctions put the future of Belarus at risk
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2021

European added value of EU legal migration policy and law
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2021

The European Commission’s legislative proposals in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2021

EU sanctions on Belarus as an effective policy tool
Centre for Social and Economic Research, September 2021

Support for Lukashenka: Russia’s response to the migration crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, September 2021

‘Diversifying’ social investment: European welfare states and immigrant integration
Migration Policy Institute, September 2021

Healing the gap: Building inclusive public-health and migrant integration systems in Europe
Migration Policy Institute, September 2021

Pushed to the limit? Italian and Spanish lessons from the migration crises
International Centre for Defence and Security, September 2021

The legacy of state socialism on attitudes toward immigration
Zentrum für europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, September 2021

A ‘new’ pact on migration and asylum? The European migration policy path-dependency
Europeum, September 2021

Humanitarians’ migration conundrum
Clingendael, August 2021

Dependent on the ‘kindness of strangers’: Britain’s post-Brexit border reality
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2021

Europe and asylum: From a protection area to a protected area
Jacques Delors Institut, August 2021

Migration: Portraits from a world that is on the move
Chatham House, August 2021

Grand redesigns: Explainer on the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum
Irish Institute of International and European Affairs, August 2021

Structured approach: How the EU can prepare itself for the next wave of migration
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2021

A new migration crisis may be brewing
Centre for European Reform, July 2021

Future scenarios for global mobility in the shadow of pandemic
Migration Policy Institute, July 2021

‘When Mayors Make Migration Policy’: The future of city diplomacy
European Policy Centre, June 2021

The women, peace and security agenda in EU border management
Österreichische Institut für internationale Politik, June 2021

Read this briefing on ‘Migration: Latest challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

The European Union has an ambitious climate strategy and is looking for ways to boost technologies that will make it possible. Could hydrogen and the deployment of related technology and infrastructure become a decisive factor in decarbonising specific industry sectors?

The European strategies for energy system integration and for hydrogen have been in the limelight in recent months, and a related resolution was adopted during the European Parliament’s plenary session in May 2021. Furthermore, in mid-July 2021, the European Commission adopted its ‘Fit for 55‘ package of legislative proposals to make the EU’s climate, energy, land use, transport and taxation policies fit for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels.

Achieving these emission reductions in the next decade is crucial for Europe to become the world’s first climate-neutral continent by 2050, and for the European Green Deal to become a reality. The European Commission has set out a vision for a digitalised, integrated and circular energy system, driven by electrification, powered by renewables and relying on energy efficiency. Following a political agreement reached between the co-legislators and the Parliament’s adoption of its position at first reading on 24 June 2021, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Regulation on a European Climate Law earlier this year.

Potential impacts and developments

The European hydrogen strategy envisages a path towards a European hydrogen ecosystem, with upscaling in the next five years followed by further interconnections across Europe and finally large-scale diffusion after 2030. This implies an increase in renewable hydrogen production, driving down the costs and boosting demand in hard-to-abate sectors, to make Europe the global hydrogen powerhouse, with a set of ambitious targets: 6 gigawatt (GW) of electrolysers installed by 2024, and 40 GW by 2030. Key policy initiatives in this field also include the EU Climate Law, the EU climate target plan, the EU Clean Hydrogen Alliance and the forthcoming hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package. Transforming the EU’s energy system to take full advantage of the potential of hydrogen is perceived to provide benefits in terms of job creation, economic growth, innovation and reduced air pollution.

Hydrogen technologies cover the entire chain from hydrogen generation to its distribution and storage, and to its final utilisation in sectors including mobility, energy storage scale and industrial use. Here, the EU acts in a context of international partners and competitors that strive for similar goals and hold traditionally strong positions in the field of hydrogen technologies.

The opinion presented in June 2021 by the European Commission’s Group of Chief Scientific Advisors and Science Advice for Policy by European Academies (SAPEA), as well as a recent study by STOA, provide an update on the state of play of hydrogen use in the EU economy. They also determine current policies and gaps, and propose policy options to fill these gaps to enable replacement of fossil fuels, particularly in energy-intensive industries and long-distance transport. In the past decade, almost a third of all transnational patents covering electrolytical hydrogen generation were generated by actors based within the EU. This strength not only creates an opportunity, but also a responsibility towards promoting cost-effective supply on a global scale. The EU has the potential to become the global leader in the field, followed by the USA and Japan.

Anticipatory policy-making

Sustainable use and production of hydrogen should be focused on hard-to-decarbonise sectors, and begin by contemplating its use predominantly in applications where there are no cheaper alternatives. However, clear guidelines and a hierarchy of such priority uses are lacking, while there is a need for support schemes to foster diffusion in sectors that need hydrogen. There is currently no significant hydrogen infrastructure or regulation, which may lead to uncertainty for market participants and potential grid operators. It is therefore important to clarify the rules for future markets. Furthermore, trading in hydrogen requires exact specification of the products, particularly renewable (green H2), but also low-carbon hydrogen, as a way to scale up production (mainly blue H2, produced from natural gas using carbon capture and storage, CCS). Despite ongoing work on certification schemes, specific criteria have not yet been agreed upon.

With regard to actors, regions and the international perspective, there is a lot of mobilisation in certain sectors for both hydrogen production and use, but civil society has not yet been addressed to a sufficient extent. Moreover, the role of hydrogen in the Just Transition Mechanism is yet to be defined. Future policies will need to foster a sustainable approach to international hydrogen partnerships, as, while there will be production of green hydrogen in the EU, imports will still be needed. International cooperation must be fostered while ensuring compatibility with partner countries’ development strategies, such as acceptance of selected production and infrastructure sites, environmental impact of expanding renewable energy use and associated material flows (e.g. water), and socio-economic impacts and end-user costs.

Public funding and schemes such as carbon contracts for difference (CCfDs) are key to achieving a far larger scale of hydrogen technology deployment and for its production to become decarbonised, while private investment must also be fostered by providing certainty about the future pathway and political framework. Such a supportive framework is required in the case of infrastructure regulation, to lay down overarching rules and define elements that will allow future EU-wide local trade interconnectivity, while still providing leeway for regional experimentation, for example with respect to the refinancing of infrastructure. There is also a need to promote research and innovation in hydrogen technologies, e.g. through dedicated European Innovation Council (EIC) Fund calls and important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs).

The security of supply is crucial, with production and storage capacities having to match demand across Europe. It will be necessary to interconnect different users and producers, so that production scales up in line with consumption, and hydrogen infrastructure is initially deployed in regional clusters, before a broader roll-out after 2030. Hydrogen can be blended with natural gas for transport at limited percentages of 5 %‑20 %, while higher shares of up to 30 % are being investigated. This, together with the possibility of repurposing infrastructure already in place, constitutes a good starting point to further develop the concept of hydrogen valleys and foster hydrogen networks.

While perspectives for using alternatives such as hydrogen are growing, gas of fossil origin presently constitutes 95 % of gaseous fuels consumed in the EU, and accounts for about 22 % of total EU energy consumption, 20 % of EU electricity production and 39 % of heat production. Hydrogen can be produced from almost all energy resources, although today’s use of hydrogen in oil refining and chemical production is mostly covered by hydrogen from fossil fuels, with significant associated CO2 emissions. However, as we look for solutions to decarbonise European industry, the share of hydrogen in the energy mix could rise significantly, as it can increasingly be produced from renewable energy. Through the uptake of new technologies still under development, especially those related to hydrogen, gaseous fuels are in any case expected to continue to account for a very significant part of total EU energy consumption in 2050, while also ensuring resilience.

Fighting climate change is a key global trend and the first of the six policy priorities set out by the von der Leyen Commission. The EU has the potential to become a leader in pilot technologies, with a high decarbonisation potential including in hydrogen production, storage, transport and use.

Read the complete briefing on ‘What if hydrogen could help decarbonise European industry?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if hydrogen could help decarbonise European industry?’ on YouTube.

Written by Martin Russell.

Human rights sanctions are nothing new, but the death in 2009 of Russian whistle-blower Sergei Magnitsky in detention resulted in calls for more vigorous action to counter continuing abuses in many countries. Adopted by the US in 2016, the Global Magnitsky Act was the first of a new generation of human rights sanctions programmes, which, in contrast to traditional sanctions targeted at individual countries, can be flexibly applied to perpetrators from all over the world, regardless of their geographical location.

This briefing compares four such programmes: the US Global Magnitsky Act, Canada’s Sergei Magnitsky Law, the UK’s Global Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Regulations, and the EU’s restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses, the most recent of the four to be adopted. All of these are inspired by the ambition to tackle serious human rights crimes from around the world, but there are also significant differences, for example, in terms of the threshold for human rights offences, the inclusion or not of corruption-related offences, and the role played by parliaments and civil society.

In terms of practical application, Global Magnitsky is by far the most active of the four programmes for the time being, targeting over 300 individuals and entities from 40 countries. Traditional geographical sanctions still predominate in all four jurisdictions; nevertheless, restrictive measures applied under global programmes to Chinese, Russian and Saudi officials highlight the role that such sanctions can play in furthering Western cooperation on human rights.

This briefing has been written as part of a collaborative project between the European Parliament’s Research Service and Directorate-General for External Policies on mapping best practices in global human rights sanctions regimes.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Global human rights sanctions – Mapping Magnitsky laws: The US, Canadian, UK and EU approach‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Global human rights sanctions – Mapping Magnitsky laws: The US, Canadian, UK and EU approach‘ on YouTube.

Written by Luisa Antunes with Laia Delgado Callico.

Substance-based medical devices (SBMD) are health products with physicochemical properties and without a pharmacological, immunological or metabolic mode of action – such as nasal and eye sprays, cough syrups, hand and vaginal creams, and toothpaste. To ensure these devices are safe to use, they were recently placed under new classification rules by the EU Medical Devices Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2017/745), which applies from May 2021.

To discuss this new regulatory framework and present current research on non-pharmacological health products, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) organised a hybrid workshop ‘Medical devices made of substances: Opportunities and challenges‘, which took place on 16 November 2021.

Member of the European Parliament and STOA Panel member Patrizia Toia (S&D, Italy), opened the workshop, highlighting the importance of understanding the definition of SBMD and how to differentiate them from pharmacological products, as well as discussing ‘orphan devices’ – those which do not fall under any legislation. Paul Piscoi, Policy Officer with the Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) at the European Commission moderated the event.

Panel 1 – The science of substance-based medical devices

Three presentations discussed the science of SBMD. Marco Racchi, Professor of Pharmacology at the University of Pavia (Italy), focused on the importance of carefully defining the concept of non-pharmacological modes of action, and its distinction from therapeutic effect. A substance with a therapeutic effect is either a medicinal product or a medical device, depending on its mechanism of action. However, SBMD often have more than one mechanism of action concurring to the claimed therapeutic effect. Natural substances are composed of a very high number of molecules acting in synchrony and are best represented by the concept of ‘system’, something that is more than the sum of its components.

Annamaria Staiano, Professor of Pediatrics at the University Federico II, Napoli (Italy), highlighted the role of natural complex substances in paediatrics. Both structural and functional interactions can occur between the many natural substances contained in a therapeutic product. Professor Staiano presented the results of a clinical study using a medical device made of 100 % natural substances. It demonstrated a safe and effective clinical response, comparable to the standard of care and with at least equally high benefit-to-risk ratio.

Peter Malfertheiner, Professor of Medicine at the University Hospital Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU) in Munich (Germany), discussed SBMD in the management of patients with gastrointestinal diseases. Professor Malfertheiner provided two examples of how natural substances can treat gastroesophageal reflux disease and metabolic syndrome. Current pharmacological management of patients with metabolic dysfunctions does not offer alternatives to the administration of as many drugs as the number of different metabolic disorders. Here, SBMD are a highly effective therapeutic option, a valid alternative to synthetic drugs, and complementary in certain conditions to conventional pharmacological therapies.

Panel 2 – Regulatory aspects of substance-based medical devices

The second panel focused on the regulatory aspects of SBMD. Olga Tkachenko, Policy Officer with DG SANTE at the European Commission, gave an overview of the new rules for SBMD defined by the Medical Devices Regulation. The new regulatory framework provides higher standards of evidence, more transparency and traceability, and greater alignment among actors, whilst also considering technological progress, such as cybersecurity and sales over the internet. Furthermore, the new rules serve to ensure the safety and performance of these devices, through appropriate risk classification and assessment procedures. The guidance documents issued by the Medical Device Coordination Group and guidance on therapeutics which are positioned on the borderline with medicines, which is currently under revision, will assist in the aligned application of these new rules.

Oliver Hartmann, Legal and Regulatory Affairs Manager at the Association of the European Self-Care Industry (AESGP), discussed the industry perspectives on a fit-for-purpose regulatory framework for SBMD. The first step in the assessment of an SBMD, as a borderline product, is to confirm its regulatory status and risk classification, by using proportionality and a case-by-case assessment. Clear and workable definitions of pharmacological, immunological and metabolic means are required: to apply the SBMD regulation; to distinguish SBMD from medicinal products; and to avoid an indirect, extended scope of the definitions, rendering a product category ineffective. Regulators require expertise in assessing the physical or mechanical mode of action together with knowledge of classification criteria and different legal definitions.

Emiliano Giovagnoni, Innovation and Medical Science Director at Aboca (Italy), focused on the opportunities for innovation in healthcare offered by SBMD. The new regulation increases the level of evidence needed to demonstrate the safety and the efficacy of SBMD following an evidence-based medical approach. The therapeutic properties of SBMD can be identified by describing their mechanisms of action in a scientific, but non-pharmacological, approach using biological sciences. Strengthening the post-marketing surveillance introduced by the regulation allows real-world evidence data to be collected to ensure a continuous reassessment of the efficacy and safety of products, even after placement on the market. The major challenge of implementation is defining pharmacological means and borderline products, particularly herbal products. While Chapter 1.2.4.4. of MEDDEV 2.1/3 Rev. 3 is dedicated to setting classification criteria for products containing ‘medicinal plants’, the criteria proposed to distinguish between a drug or a medical device do not follow a case-by-case approach. A revision of the framework for traditional herbal medicinal products is therefore required.

Member of the European Parliament Simona Bonafè (S&D, Italy) closed the workshop, noting that the approval of the regulation was a major step forward for the European health system and demonstrated the European political will to recognise the important role that SBMD play in the prevention and treatment of diseases. Within the Green Deal framework, Simona Bonafè emphasised that natural complex substances have a lower impact on the environment since they are 100 % biodegradable.

The full recording of the workshop is available here.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Andrés García with Laia Delgado Callico.

The scope for European Union (EU) action to respond to current challenges to academic freedom is not always clear. Members of the European Parliament addressed this question at a recent STOA conference, which looked for ways of building on several European initiatives focusing on academic freedom (such as Article 13 of the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights, the Bonn Declaration on Freedom of Scientific Research, and the League of European Research Universities (LERU) advice paper ‘Academic freedom as a fundamental right‘.

The event, held online on 9 November 2021, was organised by STOA with the support of the European University Association (EUA). It served to clarify the definition of academic freedom and frame the challenges in the EU context while aiming at identifying options for addressing them. In addition to the conference, an official STOA mission to Budapest took place on 3‑5 November 2021, led by STOA Second Vice-Chair Ivars Ijabs (Renew, LT) and included visits to the Central European University (CEU) and other institutions, to acquire first-hand experience of their current operating conditions and activities in the context of discussions on academic freedom.

The conference was opened by STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), who highlighted that academic freedom is closely linked to institutional autonomy, which refers to the capacity of higher-education and/or research organisations to independently govern research and education without state or other interference. Professor Klavdija Kutnar, President of the Council for Higher Education of the Republic of Slovenia and Rector of the University of Primorska, welcomed the participants on behalf of the Slovenian EU Presidency. She emphasised that society continues to place hope in science, sometimes treating it as a beacon that guides society towards a distant, but more sustainable and just future. Academic freedom creates the right environment for science to turn all these hopes into reality.

This was followed by introductory remarks from the conference chair, First STOA Vice-Chair Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany). He underlined that academic freedom is part of the enlightenment tradition that shaped Europe and is shared in the EU research area (ERA). While academic freedom has been a democratic norm in the EU for decades, this norm has recently started to erode. This event should be the starting point to a serious debate within the EU on academic freedom and how to protect it; as well as a call for action. Christian Ehler insisted that monitoring and non-committal statements are not enough to stop the decline of academic freedom in Europe – we need effective action that results in real world changes. The European Parliament will drive this conversation and push for the action needed to protect academic freedom in Europe. Institutional autonomy is fundamental, and universities are susceptible to interference through the control of their funding schemes. However, universities, in their turn, have to support academic freedom themselves. For Christian Ehler, it is therefore everyone’s responsibility to protect and ensure academic freedom in the EU.

Panel 1: Scene setting

The first panel served to set the scene by identifying and distinguishing different elements of the debate in Europe today, notably the progress made, challenges faced, and the particular role of institutional autonomy. The panel started with a talk by Kurt Deketelaere, Professor of Law at KU Leuven, who presented the LERU advice paper. He referred to academic freedom as a core, almost sacrosanct, aspect of modern universities, which is legally recognised in a broad variety of hard and soft law instruments, but is nonetheless under pressure worldwide. He pointed out that academic freedom has three different dimensions: as an individual right, as an institutional right, and as a state obligation.

This was followed by Liviu Matei, Professor of Higher Education Policy and Provost of CEU, speaking on the state of and prospects for academic freedom in Europe. He insisted on the multidimensional aspect, which requires support from multiple actors. While the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and EU higher education frameworks have institutional support at European level to uphold academic freedom, the existing instruments may not be enough. Any conceptual reference for academic freedom must be centred on the core function of the university, which is the production, transmission, dissemination, and curation of knowledge as a public good.

Panel 2: What can be done?

Building upon these insights, the second panel served to explore the measures that can be taken in response to challenges to academic freedom in Europe, with particular reference to matters of institutional autonomy. It took the format of a roundtable discussion with Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) Sabine Verheyen (EPP, Germany); Ivars Ijabs; Viviane Hoffmann, Deputy Director-General, Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC) at the European Commission; Anna Panagopoulou, Director, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation at the European Commission (DG RTD); and Amanda Crowfoot, Secretary-General of EUA. During his intervention, Ivars Ijabs reported on the STOA mission to Budapest and argued that, in his view, a possibility for European research funds to bypass Member States’ central authorities would be advisable, in order to ensure independent funding. Sabine Verheyen highlighted that, at EU level, fundamental academic values are at the core of the Bologna process and referred to the global Academic Freedom Index.

The conference was moderated by Robert‑Jan Smits, President of the Executive Board of Eindhoven University of Technology, and former Director‑General of DG RTD (2010‑2018).

During his closing remarks, Christian Ehler identified academic freedom as a fundamental principle and stressed the need for a mechanism to ensure Member States comply with the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in relation to academic freedom. He concluded with a call for action from the European Commission and for a discussion with the Council, which should result in specific measures, at a time when academic freedom is under threat.

The full recording of the workshop is available here.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Giulio Sabbati.

The economies of most ASEAN countries contracted due to the turmoil caused by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Three of them, however, (Brunei, Myanmar/Burma and Vietnam) still managed to grow in terms of GDP, although at a much slower rate than in previous years. Despite the fact that the value of trade in goods declined by 10 % to €189 billion, the ASEAN countries remain an important partner for the EU, collectively representing 5 % of the EU’s overall trade in 2020, ranking in sixth place after China, USA, APEC members (other than ASEAN), the UK and Switzerland. At the same time the EU is the fourth biggest trade partner of the ASEAN group after China, other APEC members and the USA. Mechanical appliances, electrical equipment and agri-food make up half of the trade in goods between the two blocs, both for exports and on the import side.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘ASEAN: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Business environment and socio-economic indicators in ASEAN countries EU exports and imports of services_ASEAN EU exports of goods to ASEAN EU imports of goods from ASEAN EU trade with ASEAN and Top EU partners GDP growth and GDP per capita of ASEAN countries Main trading partners of the EU and of ASEAN Unemployment in ASEAN countries

Written by Magdalena Sapała.

If you are you looking for a comprehensive source of information, analysis and infographics explaining the recovery package for Europe, you are in the right place. This blog post will lead you through a collection of EPRS publications, financial data, legal acts and other interesting sources of information and analysis on the topic.

Content:

Section 1 – What is the recovery package for Europe?

Section 2 – How is the recovery package implemented?

Section 3 – How is the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) implemented?

Section 4 – How are the other programmes financed under the Next Generation EU implemented?

Section 5 – Key EPRS publications and infographics

Section 6 – Other interesting sources of information

(1) What is the recovery package for Europe?

In December 2020, the European Union (EU) agreed the recovery package for Europe: the seven-year budget, known as the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), and a special instrument aiming at helping the EU economy to recover in the aftermath of the Covid‑19 crisis – the European Recovery Instrument ‘Next Generation EU’ (Figure 1). While the MFF ensures financial means for the functioning of the European Union, for the investments and implementation of various EU policies, Next Generation EU provides an extraordinary, temporary instrument, created to address the exceptional consequences of and challenges posed by the Covid‑19 pandemic. Both elements of the financial package differ in their sources of financing. The MFF is financed from the EU’s own resources. Most of these (70 %) comes from direct payments from the Member States’ national budgets, calculated on the basis of gross national income (GNI). The rest comes from customs duties, contributions based on value added tax (VAT) collected by the Member States, and since 2021, from a national contribution based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste. The Next Generation EU recovery instrument, however, is financed from money borrowed by the Commission on behalf of the EU on the international capital markets (the first borrowing operations began in June 2021). Then, by 2058 at the latest, Next Generation EU should be repaid from the EU’s own resources. The EU budget will repay the grants and their borrowing costs, while the Member States that have taken loans will be responsible for their repayment. To help repay the borrowing, new sources of revenue for the EU should be in place by that time.

See this image in 24 languages on Flickr. Links to useful legal documents

• 2021-2027 MFF – Council regulation 2020/2093
• Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary matters and own resources – 16 December 2020
• 2021-2027 MFF adjusted for 2022 (technical adjustment) – Communication COM(2021) 365 final
• The system of own resources of the EU – Council decision 2020/2053
• European Union Recovery Instrument Next Generation EU – Council regulation 2020/2094
• Recovery and Resilience Facility – Regulation (EU) 2021/241

(2) How is the recovery package implemented?

In December 2020, the approval of the 2021-2027 MFF and Next Generation EU, followed by the completion of the ratification process of the own resources decision in May 2021, opened the way for the implementation of the recovery package for the EU (see the timeline in Figure 4) .

The MFF (€1 210.9 billion in current prices) covers the years 2021 to 2027, and is implemented through more than 40 programmes and funds under seven main EU spending priorities, known as headings (for details about the agreement on the 2021‑2027 MFF see the EPRS blog).

Next Generation EU (€806.9 billion in current prices) is implemented through seven programmes. The bulk of the instrument (90 %) was allocated to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), and the remaining 10 % to the programmes co-financed under the 2021‑2027 MFF, i.e. regional development (React-EU), rural development, Horizon Europe, the Just Transition Fund, Union Civil Protection Mechanism (RescEU), and InvestEU. In other words, up to 2023, these programmes will be partly financed and implemented under the MFF and partly under NGEU. The proportions of both components vary by programme. While the NGEU share in the total allocation on Horizon Europe is 6 %, it is 56 % in the JTF.

Under Next Generation EU, the legal commitments on spending have to be made during 2021‑2023, whereas the payments can be made until the end of 2026. Each year the amount to be used under the instrument will be entered to the EU budget as an external assigned revenue (read more about the external assigned revenue and the EU annual budget in the EPRS publication Economic and Budgetary Outlook 2021).

Most of the Next Generation EU resources have been pre-allocated to the Member States. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of NGEU funding under the RRF, React-EU, JTF and rural development programmes per Member State and capita. Spending under the Horizon Europe, RescEU and Invest EU programmes will be distributed to different projects across the EU on a competitive basis.

Figure 2 – Pre-allocated funds under Next Generation EU

(3) How is the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) implemented?

The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the main building block of Next Generation EU. Its budget amounts to €723.8 billion (current prices) and is divided between non-repayable grants (€338 billion) and loans (€385.8 billion). The Member States’ maximum indicative financial envelopes under the RRF were decided in the RRF regulation (Annex I‑IV) and pre-allocated. However, the actual amounts to be transferred to the Member States (see Figure 3) and the calendar of payments depend on many conditions. They concern two areas in parallel, as presented on each side of the timeline in Figure 4. Legislative and organisational procedures had to be completed before the financing of the NGEU Recovery Instrument, including the RRF, could become operational, as well as the process of drawing up, evaluating and approving the individual countries’ planned reform and investment to be implemented using the borrowed resources.

Figure 3 – Distribution of the Recovery Resilience Facility (grants) by Member State.

Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) grants by Member State and per capita (current prices)

Figure 4 – Timeline of the main events in the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility.(grants) by Member State.

National Recovery and Resilience Plans

Any Member State wishing to use the RRF must submit a national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP). This document should outline the national reform and investment package, referring to the areas specified under the six pillars (See Article 18 and Annex V of the RRF Regulation) and to the challenges identified in the European Semester Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs). The preparation of the plans by the Member States, their positive assessment by the Commission, and approval by Council (implementing decision adopted by qualified majority), are the key preconditions for the first transfers from the RRF. Only once these are in place can the Commission conclude an agreement with each Member State on a legal commitment authorising the financial contribution and begin the pre-financing phase (Table 1).

Summary of progress (as of 21 October 2021):

• 26 NRRPs have been submitted to the Commission (the submission deadline has been postponed for the Netherlands, where recent elections and negotiations on the formation of a new government have delayed the preparation of the plan);
• 22 NRRPs positively assessed by the Commission (the plans from Bulgaria – submitted on 15 October 2021, Hungary, Poland and Sweden are still in the assessment procedure);
• 22 NRRPs approved by the Council.

Table 1 – Implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans: state of play as of 28 October 2021 (€ billion, current prices)

Member State Submission dateRequested amountsMaximum amountsAmounts in Implementing Decision  grantloangrantloangrantloan Belgium (BE)01/05/20215.9 5.932.85.9 13/07/2021Bulgaria (BG)15/10/20216.6 6.34.2   Czechia (CZ)02/06/20217.1 7.114.37 06/09/2021Denmark (DK)30/04/20211.6 1.621.91.6 13/07/2021Germany (DE)28/04/202127.9 25.6240.925.6 13/07/2021Estonia (EE)18/06/20211 11.91 28/10/2021Ireland (IE)28/05/20211 118.71 06/09/2021Greece (EL)28/04/202117.812.717.812.517.812.713/07/2021Spain (ES)30/04/202169.5 69.584.869.5 13/07/2021France (FR)29/04/202140.9 39.4168.439.4 13/07/2021Croatia (HR)15/05/20216.4 6.33.76.3 26/07/2021Italy (IT)01/05/202168.9122.668.9122.768.9122.613/07/2021Cyprus (CY)17/05/202110.211.510.226/07/2021Latvia (LV)30/04/20211.8 221.8 13/07/2021Lithuania (LT)15/05/20212.2 2.23.22.2 26/07/2021Luxembourg (LU)30/04/20210.1 0.12.80.1 13/07/2021Hungary (HU)12/05/20217.2 7.29.7Undergoing assessment  Malta (MT)13/07/20210.3 0.30.80.3 05/10/2021Netherlands (NL)Postponed  655.3   Austria (AT)01/05/20214.5 3.527.23.5 13/07/2021Poland (PL)03/05/202123.912.123.934.8Undergoing assessment  Portugal (PT)22/04/202113.92.713.914.213.92.713/07/2021Romania (RO)31/05/202114.31514.21514.21528/10/2021Slovenia (SI)01/05/20211.80.71.83.21.80.726/07/2021Slovakia (SK)29/04/20216.6 6.36.36.3 13/07/2021Finland (FI)27/05/20212.1 2.116.42.1 28/10/2021Sweden (SE)28/05/20213.2 3.332.2Undergoing assessment   Payments

Pre-financing should take place within two months of the adoption of the agreement and is set at a maximum 13 % of the financial contribution (grants) and 13 % of the loan. The Member States will implement their NRRPs and send the Commission requests for payment twice a year. The disbursements will be made once the relevant milestones and targets set out in the implementing decision have been reached. All payments must be made by 31 December 2026. Table 2 includes detailed information about the progress of payments.

Table 2 – Disbursement of pre-financing as of 28 October 2021 (€ billion, current prices)

 DateAmounts disbursed (max 13 % of total allocation)Share of total allocationRemaining amount Austria28/09/20210.4513 %3.05Belgium03/08/20210.7713 %5.15Croatia28/09/20210.8213 %5.48Czech Republic28/09/20210.9213 %6.08Cyprus09/09/20210.1613 %1.05Denmark02/09/20210.213 %1.35France19/08/20215.1213 %34.25Germany26/08/20212.259 %23.36Greece09/08/20213.9613 %26.53Italy13/08/202124.8913 %175.54Latvia10/09/20210.2413 %1.59Luxembourg03/08/20210.0113 %0.08Lithuania17/08/20210.2913 %1.94Portugal03/08/20212.1613 %14.45Slovakia13/10/20210.8213 %5.51Slovenia17/09/20210.2313 %1.57Spain17/08/20219.0413 %60.48Total52.33367.46Source: European Commission, Press releases. European Parliament role in the scrutiny of the RRF

The European Parliament is not directly involved in the assessment of the national plans or adoption of the implementing decisions that authorise the financial contributions to the Member States. Those roles belong to the European Commission and the Council respectively. However, based on the provisions of the RRF Regulation (in particular Articles 25 and 26) and the Interinstitutional Agreement on cooperation on budgetary matters, the Parliament can scrutinise the work of the Commission. Special fora have been set up to assist the European Parliament in the execution of its role.

Interinstitutional cooperation

• Interinstitutional meetings on the implementation of Next Generation EU (based on the Interinstitutional Agreement, Annex I, part H). These meetings include representatives of the Parliament, Council and Commission, and should take place at least three times a year (meetings took place on 29 April, 15 July and 14 October 2021). They are not open to the public.
• Recovery and resilience dialogue with the European Commission (based on Article 26 of the RRF Regulation). These meetings should take place every two months, are open to the public and live-streamed by the European Parliament (three meetings have taken place so far, on 10 May, 14 July and 1 September 2021)

Parliament’s internal cooperation:

• The two main committees dealing with the topic are the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), but many others are involved in the discussions on different aspects of the RRF. Their meetings are open to the public and live-streamed.
• The Standing Working Group (BUDG and ECON) on scrutiny of the RRF (based on the Conference of Presidents decision of 4 March 2021) serves as a preparatory and follow-up forum for the bi-monthly recovery and resilience dialogue. It consists of 27 Members of BUDG, ECON and associated committees, nominated by the political groups. Meetings are not open to the public.

Plenary debates and resolutions

In addition, the Parliament regularly debates the topic during plenary sessions. It has also adopted resolutions concerning the implementation process:

• 11 March 2021 – Plenary debate on respecting the partnership principle in the preparation and implementation of national recovery and resilience plans, and ensuring good governance of the spending.
• 18 May 2021 – Plenary debate on the right of information regarding the ongoing assessment of the national recovery and resilience plans.
• 20 May 2021 – Resolution on the right of information regarding the ongoing assessment of the national recovery and resilience plans.
• 8 June 2021 – Plenary debate on European Parliament’s scrutiny on the ongoing assessment by the Commission and the Council of the national recovery and resilience plans.
• 10 June 2021 – Resolution on the views of the Parliament on the ongoing assessment by the Commission and the Council of the national recovery and resilience plans.
• 6 October 2021 – Plenary debate on state of play on the submitted RRF recovery plans awaiting approval.

(4) How are the other programmes financed under the Next Generation EU implemented? Regional development REACT-EU

Financial planning (commitments, current prices, billion):

 20212022TotalREACT-EU39 79510 82450 620    Source: European Commission, 2021

European Commission website on the implementation of REACT-EU

Rural development

Financial planning (commitments, current prices, € billion):

 20212022TotalRural development2 3885 6388 070    Source: European Commission, 2021

NGEU-rural development pre-allocation per country: see the European Commission data.

Just Transition Fund

Financial planning (commitments, current prices, € billion):

 202120222023TotalJust Transition Fund2 1224 3304 41610 868     Source: European Commission, 2021

NGEU-JTF pre-allocation per country: see the European Commission data.

See also the EPRS animated infographic on the Just Transition Fund

Horizon Europe

Financial planning (commitments, current prices, € billion):

 202120222023TotalHorizon Europe1 8041 7861 8225 412     Source: European Commission, 2021 RescEU

Financial planning (commitments, current prices, € billion):

 202120222023TotalRescEU6866796922 056     Source: European Commission, 2021 InvestEU

Financial planning (commitments, current prices, € billion):

 202120222023TotalInvestEU1 7831 8182 4736 074     Source: European Commission, 2021 (5) Key EPRS publications

• M. Pape, Transport trends in national recovery and resilience plans (October 2021)
• M. Sapała, Gender equality in the Recovery and Resilience Facility (October 2021)
• M. Sapala, N. Thomassen, Recovery plan for Europe – State of play (September 2021)
• M. Sapala, N. Thomassen, Recovery plan for Europe – state of play (June 2021)
• A. D’Alfonso et al: Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2021 (January 2021)
• A. D’Alfonso, Next Generation EU: A European instrument to counter the impact of the coronavirus pandemic (July 2020)
• A. D’Alfonso, National ratification of the Own Resources Decision (June 2021)
• M. Karaboytcheva, Recovery and Resilience Facility (March 2021)
• A. D’Alfonso, InvestEU programme
• A. Wilson, Horizon Europe
• A. Widuto, Just Transition Fund
• V. Margaras, Exceptional coronavirus support measures of benefit to EU regions

Legislative trains

• 2021-2027 MFF
• Own resources
• Recovery and Resilience Facility
• React-EU
• Just Transition Fund
• Horizon Europe
• RescEU
• InvestEU
• Rural development (European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development)

(6) Other sources of information

Useful links on Member States’ national recovery and resilience programmes

 National recovery and resilience planRequested amounts (COM press release)Implementing decision (ID)Commission assessment of the national plan (annex to ID)Commission staff working documents (SWD) – analysis of the national planBelgium (BE)BEBEBEBEBEBulgaria (BG)BG    Czechia (CZ)CZCZCZCZCZDenmark (DK)DKDKDKDKDKGermany (DE)DEDEDEDEDEEstonia (EE)EEEEEEEEEEIreland (IE)IEIEIEIEIEGreece (EL)ELELELELELSpain (ES)ESESESESESFrance (FR)FRFRFRFRFRCroatia (HR)HRHRHRHRHRItaly (IT)ITITITITITCyprus (CY)CYCYCYCYCYLatvia (LV)LVLVLVLVLVLithuania (LT)LTLTLTLTLTLuxembourg (LU)LULULULULUHungary (HU)HUHU   Malta (MT)MTMTMTMTMTNetherlands (NL)     Austria (AT)ATATATATATPoland (PL)PLPL   Portugal (PT)PTPTPTPTPTRomania (RO)ROROROROROSlovenia (SI)SISISISISISlovakia (SK)SKSKSKSKSKFinland (FI)FIFIFIFIFISweden (SE)SESE   

European Commission on Recovery and Resilience Facility

Council of the EU on the recovery plan for Europe

European Commission expert group on the RRF

EUROSTAT European statistical recovery dashboard – Eurostat user-friendly presentation of 23 indicators for monitoring the recovery (updated monthly)

First recovery and resilience dialogue with the European Commission, Economic Governance Support Unit, European Parliament, May 2021.

Examples of recovery trackers:

CEPS – Recovery and Resilience Reflection Group

Algebris Investments

Greenrecoverytracker.org

Bruegel dataset on the recovery and resilience plans

ZOE institute for future-fit economies

Track the recovery – US example

Written by Philippe Perchoc.

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was one of Europe’s leading figures in the generation which came after that of the founding fathers. He was close to Jean Monnet, but he himself said that his main source of inspiration was Robert Schuman. For both Schuman and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, their relationship with Germany was a thread running through their lives.

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was born in Koblenz, Germany, where his father had been posted in the French administration after the First World War. Giscard d’Estaing was involved in the liberation of Paris at a very young age and then in military operations at the end of the Second World War. After studying engineering, he chose a career in public administration, going on to be an economic adviser in various post-war French governments.

He was later elected as an MP in Auvergne, where his family had roots, and was then appointed Secretary of State for Finance at the very young age of 32. He held various ministerial positions in this field, moving in European circles and spending time with colleagues from other European Community Member States. Elected French President in 1974, he favoured a policy of economic and social liberalism. His main accomplishments came in the areas of women’s, young people’s and disabled persons’ rights. At international level, he drew on the support of the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, to develop political and monetary initiatives.

Defeated in the 1981 elections, he continued his political career at regional, national and European level. He carried on working to bring about monetary union and develop the Franco-German partnership, before chairing the Convention on the Future of Europe, which culminated in the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty. Despite his disappointment at the rejection of that treaty, he continued to serve Europe until the end of his life.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Valéry Giscard d’Estaing: The optimist of the European integration process‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

World AIDS Day, proclaimed by the United Nations in 1988, takes place each year on 1 December. It aims at raising awareness, fighting prejudice, encouraging progress in prevention, and improving treatment around the world. Although the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is preventable, significant HIV transmission remains a challenge to EU Member States’ health systems. This year’s theme ‘End inequalities. End AIDS.’ underlines the urgent need to tackle economic, social and cultural inequalities in order to end AIDS by 2030.

Background

Attacking the body’s immune system (the white blood cells or ‘CD4 cells’), HIV weakens its defence against other infections and diseases, including tuberculosis and some types of cancer (such as lymphomas and Kaposi’s sarcoma). The most advanced stage of HIV infection (with a CD4 count below 200) is acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Found in a variety of body fluids, such as blood, semen, vaginal secretions and breast milk, HIV can be transmitted through sex, blood transfusion, the sharing of contaminated needles and between mother and child during pregnancy, delivery and breastfeeding. People who are at high risk of getting HIV can take pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) medicine to reduce the risk of infection. People diagnosed with HIV and treated early can now expect to live a normal lifespan. Infections can be treated to prevent progression to AIDS by decreasing viral load in an infected body (antiretroviral therapy, ‘ART’). However ART does not cure HIV infection and there is no vaccine.

There is some evidence that people living with HIV experience more severe outcomes and have higher comorbidities from Covid‑19. Moreover the coronavirus pandemic had indirect effects as, in some countries, lockdowns or other restrictions disrupted HIV or AIDS testing or treatment services.

The United Nations (UN) Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) is leading the global effort to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030, as part of the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN in 2015 (Goal 3). UNAIDS unites the efforts of 11 UN organisations, including the World Health Organization (WHO).

On World AIDS Day 2021, the WHO’s four main messages to global decision-makers are: re-commit to end HIV, as the challenges posed by the coronavirus pandemic require a renewed effort to address this public health threat by 2030; tackle HIV and Covid‑19 together, by confronting the special challenges presented by the Covid‑19 pandemic for people living with HIV; focus on equality to ensure that everyone, everywhere, has equal access to HIV prevention, testing, treatment and care, including Covid‑19 vaccination; concentrate on those left behind, to include the diverse groups of people being marginalised in each country. Facts and figures

UNAIDS data show that, in 2020, 1.5 million people contracted HIV, 37.7 million people were living with HIV and nearly 700 000 people died of AIDS-related causes.

According to the 2020 report on ‘HIV/AIDS surveillance in Europe’ (2019 data), published jointly by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe, HIV affects more than 2 million people in the European region (as defined by WHO), particularly in the east. In 2019, 25 000 people were diagnosed with HIV in the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA), with more men than women as in previous years. It is estimated that about 120 000 people are living with undiagnosed HIV in the EU/EEA, implying that about one in seven of those living with HIV are not aware of their status. The number of AIDS-related deaths reported in the EU has more than halved in the past decade.

EU action on HIV/AIDS

EU Member States are responsible for their own healthcare policies and systems. However, according to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU complements national policies while also fostering cooperation between Member States. In the EU, HIV/AIDS policy focuses on prevention and on supporting people living with the disease.

The European Commission has mobilised measures and instruments across several policy areas in the fight against HIV/AIDS. This includes support to Member States to help them to reach the global objective under target 3 of the UN SDGs, to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030. In that context, the Commission facilitates the exchange of best practices through the Health Security Committee, as well as dedicated networks on the EU Health Policy Platform. The new 2021‑2027 EU4Health programme supports actions to address the consequences for mental health on patients suffering from cancer and other vulnerable situations, including people living with HIV/AIDS. The Commission’s work programme for 2021 encourages the development of community-based services, the setting-up of Union-wide networks and the design of tools/guides for community-based services (notably prevention towards hard-to-reach populations and early diagnosis). Since the early years of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, the EU has significantly invested in HIV/AIDS research. Horizon 2020 and the 2021‑2027 Horizon Europe programme support research ranging from basic research to the development and testing of new treatments, new vaccine and microbicide candidates, and novel diagnostic tools.

On the world stage, the EU supports the Global Fund against AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (in 2019, the EU pledged €550 million for 2020‑2022).

In its May 2021 resolution on accelerating progress and tackling inequalities towards ending AIDS as a public health threat by 2030, the European Parliament calls on the Commission to address AIDS as a global public health crisis, to prioritise health as part of the EU-Africa strategy, to work with Member States and partners to invest in community engagement and community-led responses as key components in the fight against HIV/AIDS-related stigma and discrimination, as well as to integrate HIV prevention and care with other local healthcare service offers, as an entry point for HIV information, education, communication and training. Challenges

Despite the progress made, communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS are examples of epidemics that pose significant public health and economic challenges and require a multi-sectoral approach and multi-level cooperation. Progress needs to be made in terms of diagnosis, which often comes too late. According to ECDC, in Europe, every second HIV diagnosis (53 %) happens at a late stage of infection, when the immune system has already started to fail. Delayed treatment can also lead to the spread of HIV infection to others.

Better prevention tools (awareness-raising, PrEp, needle exchange programmes, promotion of safer sex) are crucial, in particular for people who are reluctant to use health services. The fear of discrimination and stigmatisation can reduce the incentive to take an HIV test (HIV self-testing and community-based HIV testing can help). On 4 November 2021, ECDC announced the launch of a survey to gather information on stigma and discrimination against people living with HIV in Europe and central Asia.

Research and innovative solutions are required to find an effective prophylactic vaccine and therapeutic HIV vaccines or cure, to fight the threat of HIV drug resistance, and to improve the quality of life for those living with the disease, including long-term management of patients.

HIV infection has become a manageable chronic health condition. However many people living with HIV face inequalities. In addition to the prospect of reduced quality of life and poorer health outcomes than the rest of population, many of them are economically disadvantaged, have lower levels of education and do not have rapid access to quality treatment and care. In 2020, 65 % of new adult HIV infections globally were among key affected populations and their partners, including sex workers, people who inject drugs, prisoners, transgender people, gay men and other men who have sex with men (these populations accounted for 96 % of new HIV infections in western and central Europe). These key populations are most at risk but are sometimes more difficult to reach. The UNAIDS 2021‑2026 Global AIDS Strategy underlines the need for a new approach that reduces the inequalities that drive the AIDS epidemic and puts people at its centre, involving communities, and prioritising human rights, respect, and dignity.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘World AIDS Day 2021: 1 December‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Uncertainty is growing over the recovery of the European economy from the recession generated by the Covid-19 pandemic. The European Commission has painted an optimistic growth scenario in its most recent forecast, with the economy expected to expand by 5 per cent and 4.3 per cent in 2021 and 2022 respectively. However, an increasing number of analysts see the potential for growth dampened by new restrictions in the run-up to Christmas this year given a fourth/fifth wave of the pandemic currently gripping Europe, compounded by the discovery of a new variant of the coronavirus. Higher inflation, partly resulting from high energy prices and disrupted supply chains, is also seen as a threat to the economy of the euro area and the wider EU, as are high public debt levels in many countries.

This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the state of the European economy and on debates on how to reform it.

How robust is the EU recovery?
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2021

A transatlantic divide? Transitory inflation in Europe but persistent in the US
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2021

Rethinking EU economic governance: The Stability and Growth Pact
European Policy Centre, November 2021

Why the EU’s recovery fund should be permanent
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Instruments of a strategic foreign economic policy
Bruegel, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, DIW Berlin, November 2021

Including home-ownership costs in the inflation indicator is not just a technical issue
Bruegel, November 2021

Fiscal arithmetic and risk of sovereign insolvency
Bruegel, November 2021

Next Generation EU borrowing: A first assessment
Bruegel, November 2021

The new euro area inflation indicator and target: The right reset?
Bruegel, November 2021

Does money growth tell us anything about inflation?
Bruegel, November 2021

Growth and inflation after the pandemic in the EU
Bruegel, November 2021

Is the risk of stagflation real?
Bruegel, November 2021

Covid-19 financial aid and productivity: Has support been well spent?
Bruegel, November 2021

Zu den Verteilungseffekten der derzeit hohen Inflationsraten
Ifo Berlin, November 2021

Rethinking EU economic governance: The Stability and Growth Pact
European Policy Centre, November 2021

How can the CMU and Banking Union contribute to European sovereignty and economic recovery?
Confrontations Europe, November 2021

Reinventing the European banking sector
Institut Montaigne, November 2021

Supply chain disruptions: The risks and consequences
Rand Corporation, November 2021

How Germany’s coalition negotiations could change the EU’s political landscape
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2021

Keynesian supply shocks and Hayekian secondary deflations
Ludwig von Mises Institute, November 2021

Don’t let up: The EU needs to maintain high standards for its banking sector as the European economy emerges from the Covid-19 pandemic
Bruegel, October 2021

Germany’s post-pandemic current account surplus
Bruegel, October 2021

The European energy price spike: Overcoming the fossil fuel crisis
Jacques Delors Institute, October 2021

Why have Europe’s energy prices spiked and what can the EU do about them?
Centre for European Reform, October 2021

Rising energy prices: What European solutions?
Fondation Robert Schuman, October 2021

The consequences of ‘modern monetary theory’
Confrontations Europe, October 2021

Purchasing power suffers from inflation such as ketchup and toothpaste
Itinera, October 2021

Inflation in the euro area: Factors mostly have only a temporary effect, but risk of prolonged elevated inflation remains
DIW, October 2021

The effects of natural disasters on price stability in the euro area
DIW, October 2021

Fiscal rules in a post-Covid brave new world: No need to sprint
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2021

Climate action and Europe’s fiscal debate: Politics and possibilities
E3G, October 2021

Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2021: Crisis is gradually being overcome – align action with lower growth
Ifo, September 2021

Ifo Economic Forecast Autumn 2021: Supply bottlenecks in manufacturing slow overall economic recovery
Ifo, September 2021

Monetary arithmetic and inflation risk
Bruegel, September 2021

Remote work, EU labour markets and wage inequality
Bruegel, September 2021

The pandemic’s uncertain impact on productivity
Bruegel, September 2021

Brexit and European finance: Prolonged limbo
Bruegel, September 2021

Can climate change be tackled without ditching economic growth?
Bruegel, September 2021

Euroraum im Herbst 2021
Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel, September 2021

Arbeitsintensive Unternehmen sind ein Katalysator für Geldpolitik und ihre Verteilungseffekte
DIW, September 2021

A revised European Semester under centralised management: The risk of overlooking social policy
Egmont, September 2021

EU employment dynamics: The pandemic years and beyond
European Trade Union Institute, September 2021

Options for inclusive post-pandemic labour markets
Migration Policy Institute, September 2021

The rising cost of housing
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2021

Europe shouldn’t worry about inflation
Centre for European Reform, July 2021

Will European Union recovery spending be enough to fill digital investment gaps?
Bruegel, July 2021

Recovery and resilience: A first assessment
Lisbon Council, July 2021

Reforming the European Stability Mechanism: Too much but never enough
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, July 2021

How can a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact foster sound fiscal policies?
Centre for European Policy, June 2021

Read this briefing on ‘Prospects for EU economic recovery‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nora Hahnkamper-Vandenbulcke and Stefano Vettorazzi.

This briefing is intended as a background overview for parliamentary committees (and their respective secretariats) planning their activities in relation to the European Commission work programme for 2022, adopted on 19 October 2021.

Since March 2020, the European Union – and the world – has been significantly affected by the outbreak of the Covid‑19 pandemic. To reinforce public health sectors and mitigate the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, the European Union has adopted a wide range of measures in areas such as health, economy, research, borders and mobility. Moreover, under the Union’s long-term budget for 2021‑2027 and the Next Generation EU instrument, including the Recovery and Resilience Facility, €2 018 trillion has been mobilised to support the recovery.

In the past two years, the Covid‑19 pandemic has had a considerable impact on the Commission’s work programmes. While the original 2020 work programme was published in October 2019, due to the pandemic, the Commission presented an adjusted 2020 programme in May 2020, focusing on protecting the lives and livelihoods of EU citizens. According to the 2021 work programme, more than 800 previously unplanned measures were thus taken in the first months of the pandemic. While the 2021 programme also included action to mitigate the impact of the pandemic, it announced a shift from strategy to delivery, with the aim of delivering on the Commission’s six headline ambitions to accelerate the transition towards a fairer, healthier, greener and more digital society.

The Commission’s 2022 work programme, entitled ‘Making Europe stronger together’, perpetuates the 2021 programme’s twofold ambition (i.e. to recover from the pandemic and to boost the Commission’s transformative agenda). However, in line with its title, special emphasis is placed on helping the Union emerge stronger and more resilient. This should be achieved by implementing the measures agreed over the last year, as well as through additional investment and reform to ‘accelerate the twin green and digital transitions, and build a fairer, more resilient and more cohesive society’. In its 2022 programme, the Commission also wishes to pay particular attention to the younger generation, proposing a ‘European Year of Youth 2022’ and presenting a youth action plan in European Union external action.

Annexes I and II of the 2022 work programme set out 68 legislative and non-legislative initiatives to be presented by the Commission in 2022. Even if the number of legislative initiatives (45) – which are the focus of this briefing – is lower by far than the 82 legislative initiatives envisaged under the 2021 programme, it nevertheless outnumbers the 37 initiatives planned under the original 2020 programme.

Written by Nikolina Šajn (1st edition).

On 23 September 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to amend the 2014 Radio Equipment Directive, as a first step towards mandating a common charger for mobile phones and other small portable devices. Under the proposal, these devices would have to be equipped with a USB Type-C receptacle that can be charged with cables compatible with USB Type‑C, and to incorporate the USB Power Delivery communication protocol. The proposal would go hand in hand with an initiative on the eco-design of external power supplies, so that the receptacle and the communication protocol for both ends of charger cables would be harmonised.

The European Parliament has long been in favour of harmonising chargers for mobile phones and other small portable devices, and has in recent years called on the Commission to act urgently. Associations representing consumers have welcomed the Commission proposal and called for the final act to also include wireless charging, while organisations representing businesses are more likely to favour a voluntary approach, warning that harmonisation would stifle innovation.

Versions

• November 2021: A common charger for electronic devices: Revision of the Radio Equipment Directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/53/EU on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2021) 547
23.9.2021Rapporteur:Alex Agius Saliba (S&D, Malta)2021/0291(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Andrey Kovatchev (EPP, Bulgaria)
Liesje Schreinemacher (Renew, The Netherlands)
Anna Cavazzini (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Marco Campomenosi (ID, Italy)
Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czechia)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages which express concern at a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2019 between the Egyptian government and Euroclear, a financial services company. Citizens first began to write to the European Parliament on this subject in November 2021, often also addressing their complaints to Euroclear. The messages criticised the planned settlement agreement as violating the Egyptian constitution.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English).

Main points made in the reply in English

We understand that you are referring to a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2019 between the Egyptian government and Euroclear Bank, intended to facilitate international investment in Egyptian domestic debt instruments.

We would like to draw your attention to the fact that, despite its name, Euroclear is a Belgium-based financial services company and not an institution of the European Union.

According to European Union (EU) law, the European Parliament is not authorised to intervene in matters that are the responsibility of national authorities of EU countries or of non-EU countries, such as Egypt. For these reasons, please understand that we are not in a position to provide further assistance on this matter.