European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Under Vladimir Putin’s watch, Russia hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Other authoritarian regimes, such as China’s and Qatar’s, have engaged in similar ‘sports-washing’ activities to gain international credibility and divert attention from their troublesome human rights records. However, Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine put an end to sport’s neutrality. In the past few weeks, multiple sports governing bodies and international federations have moved to exclude Russia from major sporting events, thus depriving its regime of a precious soft power.

The end of sport’s neutrality

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, a year after the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had awarded the 2014 Winter Olympic Games to Sochi. Six years later, on the day of the games’ closing ceremony, Russia invaded and subsequently annexed Crimea. Notwithstanding Russia’s continuing occupation of the region, FIFA – the international football governing body – decided to hold the men’s World Cup in Russia in 2018.

Liaisons dangereuses
Sponsorship is a handy tool for regimes seeking to cleanse their reputation, and Russia has used it to this end while also promoting its business interests. The way Russian state-owned gas producer Gazprom has invested in some European national leagues often speaks of these business interests.
Gazprom was the main sponsor of Schalke 04 – a football club based in one of Germany’s coal-producing districts – since 2007, when Germany was shifting away from coal to natural gas and when the Nord Stream 1 pipeline – owned and operated by Gazprom – was entering its final design stage. On 28 February, Schalke 04 announced that it had terminated its partnership with Gazprom.
Similarly, in 2010, Gazprom became the main sponsor of FC Red Star Belgrade, just when the Serbian government was considering signing agreements for the construction of the South Stream pipeline. The club has resisted pressure to distance itself from Gazprom, with UEFA arguing ‘it is a matter for individual clubs’.

Fast forward to 24 February 2022: Russia’s military assault on Ukraine provoked a somewhat different response, which put an end to sport’s neutrality. Indeed, the IOC condemned Russia’s breach of the Olympic Truce adopted by the UN General Assembly and, after initial hesitation, on 28 February it called on individual federations to ban Russian athletes from participating in any international events until further notice. The International Paralympic Committee followed suit on 3 March: in a reversal, citing threats by several federations to boycott the 2022 Winter Paralympics, it banned Russian (and Belarussian) athletes from competing in the games.

Similarly, in a joint statement of 28 February, FIFA and UEFA (the Union of European Football Associations) announced their decision to suspend ‘all Russian teams, whether national representative teams or club teams … from participation in both FIFA and UEFA competitions until further notice’. In recent history, only South Africa faced similar sanctions during the apartheid era. The Russian Football Union unsuccessfully appealed the ban to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which upheld the sanctions.

FIFA and UEFA’s decision came after they came under intense pressure from individual countries to go further in their sanctions, with FIFA initially having stated that Russia could compete as the ‘Football Union of Russia’ and play matches outside the country. Indeed, Poland, Sweden and Czechia refused to play World Cup play-off games against Russia. England, Scotland and Wales quickly followed suit. UEFA also decided to strip Putin’s hometown, St Petersburg, of the Champions League final, the most important club football event of the year. Similarly, UEFA terminated a deal worth €40 million a season with energy company Gazprom (see box), a major sponsor of the Champions League since 2012.

Experts argue that the IOC’s, FIFA’s and UEFA’s latest reactions have been opportunistic: seemingly, the bodies remained neutral for a long time to preserve their commercial ambitions and only reacted when they felt the need to move in line with global opinion.

In parallel, almost 40 sports and culture ministers from around the world – including from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK, which together with the US make up the G7 club of most developed economies – published a statement calling on international sports federations to cut ties with Russia and ‘show solidarity with the people of Ukraine’.

Spurred on by the overwhelming global public outrage against the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the spirit of solidarity with the Ukrainian people, dozens of international sports federations severed their ties with Russia and banned its national teams from participation in international competitions.

The Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) relocated the 2022 St Petersburg Open to Kazakhstan. The International Tennis Federation (ITF) cancelled all events in Russia, excluded its team from international events and suspended the Russian Tennis Federation’s membership. However, the ATP and the World Tennis Association (WTA) refused to yield to international pressure and allowed individual players to continue taking part in competitions, but not under the Russian national flag. The ATP, the WTA, the ITF and the four Grand Slam tournaments donated US$700 000 in support of the Tennis Plays for Peace campaign, which aims to provide humanitarian relief to Ukraine, and to the Ukraine Tennis Federation.

Three of Russia’s most popular winter sports – ice hockey, biathlon and figure skating – were also impacted. The International Ice Hockey Federation, the International Biathlon Union and the International Skating Union banned all athletes from Russia from events until further notice.

The International Volleyball Federation suspended all Russian national teams, clubs and officials; stripped Russia of the right to host the 2022 Volleyball Men’s World Championship in August 2022; and will relocate games that were to take place in Russia in June and July. The European Volleyball Confederation announced a similar ban. The International Basketball Federation and the International Gymnastics Federation followed suit.

EU and sports movement’s response

On 4 April, under the French Presidency of the Council, the EU ministers for sport backed initiatives to help Ukrainian athletes continue their activities. The French Minister for Sport, Roxana Maracineanu, praised in particular sports clubs from EU countries for receiving Ukrainian sportsmen and women, providing them with the necessary infrastructure and equipment, and integrating Ukrainian athletes into clubs and teams.

Initiatives undertaken by the sports movement
The Hungarian Swimming Association has helped host Ukraine’s junior national swimming team to enable athletes to continue their training. The Italian Swimming Federation has offered a training camp to 12 elite swimmers and four coaches from Ukraine. Italy has also hosted Ukraine’s national artistic swimming team and 30 young Ukrainian volleyball players. Similarly, a semi-professional female soccer team that fled the war in Ukraine has found shelter and a new training ground at the German Bundesliga club 1.FC Cologne. National canoe federations across Europe have also offered joint support to Ukrainian athletes affected by the ongoing conflict. The International Canoe Federation is coordinating assistance provided to over 120 people, including 51 senior athletes, 51 juniors and 25 paracanoe athletes. Senior athletes have been offered accommodation in Romania and Bulgaria, while junior ones have been welcomed at various sites in Poland, Hungary, France, Germany and Estonia.

EU ministers also watched a video testimony from their Ukrainian counterpart, Vadym Huttsait, who called for more sanctions against Russian and Belarussian athletes.

Spyros Capralos, president of the European Olympic Committees, recalled the collaboration with national Olympic committees from Poland, Finland, Estonia, Romania, Austria and Italy in offering accommodation and sports equipment to Ukrainian athletes.

Assistance from the Olympic Movement
The wider Olympic Movement has also provided humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian sports community. Olympic champion and IOC Member Sergii Bubka, in his capacity as president of the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine, has been tasked by the IOC with coordinating the various projects. The IOC has already released an initial US$200 000 to address the most pressing issues and is prepared to help coordinate all humanitarian action in the long term through the Olympic Refuge Foundation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Impact on athletes and sports competitions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Frederik Scholaert.

The Russian war against Ukraine has a significant impact on the EU seafood sector. Increased prices for energy and raw materials have led to high operating costs for fishermen, aquaculture farmers and fish-processing companies. The European Commission has responded with emergency measures, adapting State aid rules and activating exceptional support from the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF).

Impact

The EU fisheries and aquaculture sector was affected by rising energy prices in the course of 2021, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a further escalation in energy costs. Marine gasoil prices are reaching peaks that are more than double compared to early 2021 (see Figure 1). Prices are exceeding €1 per litre in many EU countries, while, according to the sector, EU vessel operations are only profitable up to €0.60 per litre. Many EU fishermen are mooring their boats and warning of a shortage of fresh fish. Black Sea fisheries face direct impacts from the war, in particular for Romanian vessels that used to fish close to Ukrainian waters and are now advised to stay away from the conflict zone. Aquaculture and fish processing companies are also affected by increased energy costs, as well as by high logistic costs and trade disruption. Although import bans do not cover seafood from Russia (apart from caviar and shellfish products added in the fifth round of sanctions), trade flows are severely hampered, particularly affecting EU fish-processing companies that rely heavily on supplies of whitefish from Russia.

Average monthly marine gas oil prices for the three main EU fishing countries (Jan 2016-Mar 2022). Emergency measures

An exchange of views took place in Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries on 16 March 2022, with Members calling for support for operating costs, to prevent a complete closure of the sector. A joint statement by 13 Member States, submitted ahead of the Agriculture and Fisheries Council on 21 March 2022, urged the European Commission to come up with specific proposals. Parliament’s resolution on food security, adopted on 24 March 2022, called for broad emergency measures for the seafood sector, including compensation for income lost, support for temporary cessation of activities and storage aid.

On 23 March 2022, the Commission adopted a temporary State aid framework to support the economy in the context of Russia’s invasion. It allows Member States to grant fishery and aquaculture companies up to €35 000, to provide liquidity support in the form of state guarantees and subsidised loans, and to provide aid to compensate for high energy prices. Measures under the framework can be combined with aid under permanent State aid rules and are valid retroactively from 1 February until the end of 2022.

On 25 March 2022, the Commission triggered the EMFAF Regulation crisis mechanism (Article 26(2)), by declaring the occurrence of an exceptional event causing significant disruption to markets. This allows Member States to compensate operators for lost income or additional costs, as well as producer organisations that store fishery products. Member States can define specific measures in their operational programmes and the support will be available from 24 February 2022 until the end of the year. In addition, a possible upcoming amendment to the fund for the previous programming period, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), could free up remaining unused budget from that fund to help the sector.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Support for the fishing, aquaculture and fish-processing sectors‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Beatrix Immenkamp with Simona Tarpova.

Outraged by Moscow’s illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine, the EU Member States have adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions against Russia, in cooperation with the US, Canada, the UK and other G7 countries, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) members, and others. Below is a timeline of the sanctions adopted in response to Russia’s decision, announced on 21 February 2022, to recognise the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in Ukraine as independent entities, and Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The timeline does not include EU sanctions adopted in 2014 in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

For further information, see:

• Western sanctions and Russia: What are they? Do they work?, EPRS, February 2022.
• Russia’s war on Ukraine: New EU sanctions, EPRS, March 2022, and update of April 2022.
• Council of the European Union and the European Commission websites.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU sanctions in 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen.

The impact on EU food markets of Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to be multi-faceted, with many companies already struggling with shortages of food ingredients and packaging materials. Using alternative ingredients requires altering labels, but this could mean months of testing recipes and waiting for new packaging with accurate labels. EU and global food prices are rising, but so are production costs, and transport and energy prices.

Feared impacts in food sector

The impact of Russia’s aggression on EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine trade in agri-food products has been immediate. Ukraine normally supplies almost half of the cereals (52 % of EU maize imports) and vegetable/rapeseed oils (23 % and 72 % of EU imports respectively) and a quarter of the poultry meat imported to Europe, and Russia is a major global exporter of fertilisers, vegetable oils, wheat and barley. The two countries together account for more than 30 % of world wheat exports and nearly 30 % of barley exports. Russia is also a major exporter of white fish (40 % of global production), and supplies 16 % of the Alaskan Pollock used in the fish processing industry. Since the Russian invasion, prices on wheat futures markets have increased by 70 %. EU food prices are 5.6 % higher than they were last February. Grain and oilseed prices are rising to record highs, as it is difficult to predict how long the disruptions in supplies will last and how severe they will be. It is not certain if Ukrainian farmers will be able to harvest or plant their crops in the coming months or years.

EU countries are in very different positions regarding their dependency on Russian and Ukrainian imports. For example, Russia’s share of Finland’s wheat imports is more than 80 %, whereas for Greece it is only 20 %. For fertilisers, Finland and Estonia both import more than 70 % from Russia, whereas the Netherlands and Sweden import less than 15 %.

Shortages of sunflower oil, wheat and corn

FoodDrinkEurope, which represents the European food industry, cautions that stocks of some critical raw materials are already running low and prices are rising steeply. Using alternatives means changing the list of ingredients on the package – but the waiting time for new packaging material is several months. Changing and testing a new recipe normally takes a year; now it must be done in a few weeks. Product reformulation and ingredient label adaptation will add to costs, which are likely to be passed onto consumers. FoodDrinkEurope calls for temporary flexibility on food labelling and official controls across the EU to help companies deal with the rapidly changing availability of ingredients. In some countries, inspection departments have already been asked to show leniency if alternative ingredients do not immediately show on product labels.

FEDIOL, representing the EU vegetable oil industry, warns that the EU sunflower oil supply is critical. The European and global food industry is competing for the supplies and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to replace the approximately 200 000 tonnes per month normally imported to EU from Ukraine at short notice. Sunflower seed oil that was destined for biodiesel is now being redirected back to the food market. The latest warning comes from the confectionery industry, which is running out of sunflower lecithin – an emulsifier that is crucial in their products. The restaurant and food service industries also often rely on sunflower oil for cooking and frying meals. Uncertainty over sunflower oil supplies is also boosting prices for its alternatives, such as rapeseed, palm and soy oil.

The World Food Programme warns that the war could prompt an extremely serious global food crisis. Ukraine and Russia account for more than half of the cereal imports of North Africa and the Middle East. (See EPRS paper on the war’s impact on food security.) Exports from other countries are likely to be limited, as governments will try to ensure domestic supply. Both Russia and Ukraine have already suspended exports or introduced export licences for their key agricultural commodities (cereals, corn, sunflower oil, and also poultry and eggs), to protect their own food security. The closure of Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the lack of an operational railway system to compensate may aggravate the situation, as warned by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

The EU imports 52 % of its maize from Ukraine. Maize is an important ingredient in animal feed, and supply disruptions could affect in particular pig and chicken farms across Europe. In a meeting in March 2022, the European Commission noted that a number of Member States had signalled critical shortages of animal feed in the coming weeks, or may have supply issues in the mid- to long-term following the war in Ukraine. Ukraine is a major source of imported cereals in several Member States, with maize, grains, sunflower seeds, rapeseed, flaxseed and soybean mentioned as the commodities worst affected. To address possible shortages, traders could try to secure imports from other non-EU countries, but strict maximum residue levels (MRLs) set for pesticides in products imported to the EU can pose a problem. The Commission therefore suggested that Member States facing acute shortages could make use of an article in the MRL Regulation enabling them to set temporary national MRLs very quickly. National MRLs must, however, be limited in time, and the products concerned are not to be traded with other countries. Spain and Portugal were the first countries to make use of this possibility.

Fertilisers, energy and other concerns

Russia is the world’s biggest supplier of fertilisers, and second largest exporter of potash, a key ingredient in fertilisers. The recently adopted sanctions will oblige the EU to replace the import share of Russia and Belarus, respectively 60 % for potash and 35 % for phosphates. In the EU, some fertiliser producers have temporarily halted production, as energy costs were too high and some companies have even ceased to accept further orders as prices and availability are very unclear for the rest of spring 2022.

In the first days of the war, energy prices spiked and further impacted on the production costs of, for example, vegetables grown in heated greenhouses; in animal farming, electricity is needed for ventilation, lighting and other electric equipment, such as milking machines. High fuel prices have also increased transport costs. These simultaneous disruptions to harvests and global fertiliser production are likely to cause merging crises in global food markets, which were already strained by the Covid‑19 pandemic.

As Western brands withdraw from Russia to express condemnation of the country’s invasion of Ukraine, food companies operating in Russia are facing a moral dilemma because of the role they play in access to nutrition. Some groups have suspended the sale of some of their brands, while continuing to supply essential goods such as basic foods, dairy products and infant nutrition. Some brands worry about consumer boycotts if they continue their business as usual.

The FAO also warns of other risks associated with the invasion, such as Ukraine’s ability to control animal diseases, like African swine fever, which has already been reported in the region in pigs and wild boars.

Immediate EU food policy action

On 23 March 2022, the Commission adopted a communication on safeguarding EU food security and reinforcing the resilience of food systems. Agriculture commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski has emphasised that, in the light of the Russia’s war in Ukraine, ‘agriculture has become a crucial security policy’. While there is no immediate threat to food availability in the EU at present, to keep food affordable, the Commission will allow EU countries to use reduced value added tax (VAT) rates on food and temporarily allow farmers to use areas that were to be left fallow for biodiversity for food and feed production. In addition, the Commission adopted a temporary crisis framework to enable EU Member States to support affected companies, and has set up an expert group within the European food security crisis preparedness and response mechanism (EFSCM), as part of its food crisis contingency plan. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on 24 March 2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan.

The Commission’s last-minute decision in March to delay two highly anticipated Green Deal proposals (on the sustainable use of pesticides and nature restoration) was fiercely criticised by environmentalist non-governmental organisations. Speaking at the meeting of Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on 31 March 2022, Food Safety Commissioner Stella Kyriakides assured Members that the EU would continue to move towards a system that was more shock resilient. The delayed proposals should still be published before summer 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU food policy implications‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Caprile.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, a country known as the ‘breadbasket of Europe’, is raising fears of a global food crisis, further exacerbating existing food security challenges worldwide. Much depends on the response of the international community, including the EU, to a number of rapidly evolving scenarios.

Impact on global food supplies and food security

There is widespread international concern that Russia’s war will provoke a global food crisis similar to, or worse than, that faced in 2007 and 2008. The war comes at a time when the global food system was already struggling to feed its growing population in a sustainable way, under the pressure caused by climate change and the Covid‑19 pandemic.

Percentage share of global exports in 2021 CommodityUkraineRussiaRussia and UkraineWheat10 %24 %34 %Maize15 %2 %17 %Barley13 %14 %27 %Sunflower oil31 %24 %55 %Sunflower cake61 %20 %81 %Vegetable oils__10 %White fish (Alaska Pollock)_16 %_Fertiliser mineral intermediates* 13 % Finished fertilisers 16 % Food calories traded globally6 %5.8 %11.8 %

Russia and Ukraine are key agricultural players, together exporting nearly 12 % of food calories traded globally. They are major providers of basic agro-commodities, including wheat, maize and sunflower oil, and Russia is the world’s top exporter of fertilisers.

Several regions are highly dependent on imports from these two countries for their basic food supply. Russia and Ukraine, combined, supply over 50 % of cereal imports in North Africa and the Middle East, while Eastern African countries import 72 % of their cereals from Russia and 18 % from Ukraine.

The war’s impact on global food supply will depend on its duration and the evolution of various scenarios, centred on three factors:

• a significant reduction in exports and production of essential commodities from both countries, caused by the war and not the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, which, intentionally, did not target the agricultural sector. Overall, the European Commission estimates that ‘up to 25 million tonnes of wheat would need to be substituted to meet worldwide food needs in the current and the next season’;
• a global spike in prices of food supplies and inputs needed for agri-food production (fertilisers and energy), which were already at record levels before the war;
• the international response to the above, which could either amplify the effects of the crisis (mainly by uncoordinated export bans or speculative measures) or mitigate them (applying lessons learnt from the 2007‑2008 food crisis). A number of countries, other than Russia and Ukraine, have already imposed or announced their intention to impose some control over exports of essential agricultural commodities, including Egypt, Argentina, Indonesia, Serbia, Turkey and, in the EU, Hungary.

Expected impact on EU food security

Food availability is not currently at stake in the EU. The block is largely self-sufficient in key agricultural products, as well as in most animal products. However, the EU is a considerable net importer of specific products that may be difficult to substitute in the short term, such as sunflower oil and seafood. Moreover, the crisis has exposed the dependency of EU agricultural production on a number of key imported inputs: energy, animal feed and feed additives, and also agricultural fertilisers. The EU’s vulnerability to market distortions in fertiliser trade might be particularly acute, since fertilisers represent 18 % of input costs for arable crops. The EU relies on Belarus and Russia for 59 % of its potassium fertiliser imports, while 31 % of EU nitrogen fertiliser imports (for which the natural gas price is the main factor) come from Russia. Furthermore, food affordability for low-income households, already affected by the pandemic, will be further jeopardised. Already in 2020, 8.6 % of the overall EU population were unable to afford a meal with meat, fish or a vegetarian equivalent every second day.

Expected impact on global food security

According to FAO estimates, in addition to the 720 to 811 million people already facing chronic hunger in 2020, Russia’s war in Ukraine risks raising – by 7.6 to 13.1 million – the number of undernourished people in 2022 and 2023. Jordan, Yemen, Israel and Lebanon are among the countries most at risk, as they rely heavily on basic commodities imports, with significant shares from Russia and Ukraine. African countries will also have difficulties facing market disruptions and rising prices. Meanwhile, the higher prices and shortages will have a serious impact on food assistance for fragile countries. In Ukraine itself, the United Nations World Food Programme estimates that 45 % of the population are already ‘worried about finding enough to eat’.

Food security at the top of the EU political agenda: Swift EU responses

The EU leaders’ 10‑11 March Versailles declaration urged the Commission to present options to address the rising food and input prices and enhance global food security in the light of Russia’s war. Drawing on lessons learned from the pandemic, the Commission swiftly presented a package of measures. These were set out in a 23 March communication ‘Safeguarding food security and reinforcing the resilience of food systems’, including short-term and medium-term proposals, at both EU and Member State level. Most measures can be implemented within existing instruments, mainly through the common agricultural policy (CAP). In parallel, the Commission announced the postponement of two highly-anticipated Green Deal legislative proposals: on the sustainable use of pesticides and nature restoration targets in the EU.

On 24 March 2022, the European Parliament adopted a comprehensive resolution calling for an ‘urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine’, supporting many actions proposed in the Commission’s package. Members emphasised the need to maintain security of food supplies, in both the EU and vulnerable countries, when analysing the objectives set in the biodiversity and ‘farm to fork’ strategies. Parliament also called for safe food corridors to and from Ukraine to deliver aid and goods.

Safeguarding food security and reinforcing food system resilience: Immediate EU response
– €500 million support package for EU farmers most affected by the crisis (up to €1.5 billion if complemented by Member States’ national envelopes);
– Market safety net measures to support specific markets (e.g. the pigmeat sector) and increased levels of direct payment advances, later in 2022;
– New self standing Temporary Crisis Framework for State aid;
– Possibility for Member States to derogate from certain greening obligations in 2022 to bring additional agricultural land into production (i.e. cultivation of fallow land under the ecological focus areas);
– Preservation of the EU single market, avoiding export restrictions and bans;
– Support through the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD): complementing Member States’ action to provide those most deprived with food and/or basic material assistance;
– Possibility for Member States to apply reduced rates of value added tax and encourage economic operators to contain retail prices;
– Use the new CAP strategic plans to prioritise investments that reduce dependency on gas and fuel and inputs such as pesticides and fertilisers;
– €330 million EU emergency support programme for Ukraine.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Impact on food security and EU response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

The war in Ukraine led the agenda of the April 2022 plenary session in Strasbourg. Members held two important debates: on EU protection for children and young people fleeing the war, and on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24‑25 March 2022, which covered the latest developments and EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation. Parliament also debated a number of Council and Commission statements on: the outcome of the EU-China summit of 1 April 2022, the ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding respect for EU values in Poland and Hungary, violations of the right to seek asylum and non-refoulement in the EU Member States, the Sixth Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the urgent need to adopt the minimum tax directive, the situation of marginalised Roma communities in the EU, and mental health. In an adjustment to the structure of the plenary agenda, question time with the Commission has been reintroduced. Members questioned President Ursula von der Leyen on progress on the Commission’s political priorities over the past two years. Members then questioned Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), on the EU’s security and Strategic Compass. Another debate with the HR/VP focused on the situation in Afghanistan, in particular the women’s rights situation. Several debates and votes on legislative files also took place, including on the Schengen evaluation mechanism.

Revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system

In line with the EU’s climate ambitions, the European Commission’s ‘Fit for 55’ proposals seek to revise the entire EU 2030 climate and energy framework. Members debated the first legislative proposal from the package – a proposed revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system (ETS). The world’s first and largest carbon market, the ETS aims at reducing greenhouse gas emissions by capping the volume of emissions permitted and encouraging trading of unused allowances. However, a surplus of emissions allowances has built up due to recent economic crises. The proposed revision of the market stability reserve aims to correct this, by maintaining the already doubled intake rate (24 %) and minimum number of allowances placed in the reserve (200 million) to December 2030. Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) agreed with the proposal, stressing that it will avoid further increases in the surplus. Members adopted the committee’s report as Parliament’s first-reading position, allowing interinstitutional negotiations to begin.

Data governance act

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached between Parliament and the Council on the first of the Commission’s proposals on an EU data strategy. The data governance act should set the rules for sharing or trading data for legitimate uses – such as medical research or combating climate change – whilst preserving data rights. The co-legislators reached a compromise on re-use of publicly held data, limiting public authorities’ ability to grant rights to data and ensuring they seek consent. Parliament also succeeded in tightening the rules for ‘data brokers’. Organisations wishing to share data for the common good will have to register as ‘altruism organisations’ and follow a Commission rulebook. Parliament also insisted on strengthening aspects of the composition and tasks of the proposed European data innovation board, which will enforce the act.

Trans-European energy infrastructure

Well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) had insisted that the proposed revision of the rules on trans-European energy infrastructure projects should require energy projects to be more environmentally sustainable and exclude fossil fuel infrastructure. Major energy infrastructure projects benefit EU citizens by boosting the single market and securing EU supplies, and such projects of common interest are therefore sometimes eligible for EU funding. The committee argued for a wider role for the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), and for a new stakeholder committee to ensure projects can call on good expertise. The committee’s report also called for a transitional period to 2029, as well as for the regulation to cover CO2 storage, and for a derogation for already-included natural gas projects. Members debated and adopted the agreed text reached during interinstitutional negotiations on the rules governing funding of major energy projects.

Use of vehicles hired without drivers for the carriage of goods by road

Parliament debated goods vehicle hire rules, in its second reading of a proposal to loosen restrictions on transport operators. The European Commission’s proposal to grant haulage companies the same right to hire vehicles without a driver in another Member State as in their own Member State originally aimed at harmonising the rules across the EU. However, Parliament and Council wished to preserve Member States’ ability to protect their national vehicle tax bases from market distortion. Members approved the proposed draft agreement reached by the Council and Parliament that allows countries to restrict their own haulage companies from hiring vehicles without drivers in other EU Member States, but prevents them from restricting goods vehicle hire outright, if all the rules are observed.

Amending budget 1/2022: Adjustment of the multiannual financial framework

Following delays in launching certain programmes, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) reiterated its concern regarding the effect of such payment delays on the Union’s recovery. To prevent payment crises, the committee called on the Commission to present any proposals for payment increases immediately in future. Members approved the Council position, thereby definitively adopting draft amending budget 1/2022 which seeks to strengthen the 2022 EU budget by transferring €12 billion in commitments from 2021. Further transfers will be made to the budgets of subsequent years of the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework.

Guidelines for the 2023 budget – Section III

Parliament’s guidelines for the 2023 EU budget (Section III – European Commission) launch the annual budgetary debate. Underlining the need for a just transition to a greener economy, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) highlighted the importance of economic, social and territorial cohesion. The BUDG committee’s report adopted by Parliament lists a number of budgetary priorities, including a stronger health union, the green and digital transitions, fundamental rights and the rule of law. The report also underlined the need to spread payments evenly throughout the period of the current multiannual financial framework. The guidelines provide the basis for Parliament’s trilogue negotiations on the 2023 budget, ahead of the European Commission’s proposed draft budget.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without a vote, a mandate for negotiation from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committees on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets.

Members also approved, with votes, a mandate for negotiation from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee on the proposal for a directive on corporate sustainability reporting, and from the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) and Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) Committees on the proposal for a directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – April 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Christiaan Van Lierop.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shocked the world and caused devastation in the country. As millions flee the war-torn nation, Europe is currently witnessing its largest movement of refugees since World War II. With cohesion policy having proved effective in mobilising emergency support during the coronavirus crisis, the European Commission has put forward two proposals that seek to adapt cohesion policy rules to facilitate the rapid rollout of funding to help Member States host Ukrainian refugees.

Background

Within the cohesion policy framework, Member States can already draw on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) to help them fund measures to address the challenges of migration. These resources may be used to fund infrastructure, equipment, products and services in areas such as health, education, employment and social inclusion, and to support investment in reception centres. The Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU) initiative under Next Generation EU also funds measures in these areas. In addition, food and basic material assistance may also be provided from the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD). The scale and urgency of the situation, however, arguably calls for the introduction of new measures that allow the swift delivery of funding to help people where it is needed most.

Against the background of the coronavirus crisis, the Parliament and Council adopted two regulations in 2020 to make spending under the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund (CF) more flexible, not least by allowing Member States to apply a co-financing rate of 100 % for programmes supported by these three funds in the 2020‑2021 accounting year. The success of these two packages, the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative and Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus, highlighted the ease with which cohesion policy funds may be adapted to support emergency measures in EU countries. However, while Europe is still recovering from the impact of the Covid‑19 pandemic, many Member States now face an even more pressing emergency, as they welcome unprecedented numbers of people escaping Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Help for refugees in Europe (CARE)

Published on 8 March 2022, the Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE) proposal aims at allowing Member States to provide emergency support for people who have fled Ukraine following Russia’s invasion, by increasing the flexibility of cohesion policy funding rules. Amending the Common Provisions Regulation governing the rules on the use of the 2014‑2020 European structural and investment funds and the Regulation on the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, the CARE proposal puts forward four changes to cohesion policy rules to speed up and simplify the delivery of EU funding to help countries hosting Ukrainian refugees. Firstly, CARE extends the application of the 100 % co-financing rate for cohesion policy programmes to the 2021‑2022 accounting year, easing the burden for Member States. Secondly, it allows Member States and regions to transfer resources between programmes under the ESF and the ERDF to fund projects helping people fleeing Ukraine, which means that projects not usually eligible under a given fund can receive support. Thirdly, Member State expenditure on operations to support Ukrainian refugees will be eligible for EU support as of 24 February 2022, the date of Russia’s invasion. Lastly, the proposal simplifies reporting and makes it easier to modify programmes supported by the FEAD, removing the need for a Commission decision.

Following the Council’s 16 March 2022 decision to endorse the text without amendment, Parliament adopted the CARE proposal on 24 March 2022, under the urgent procedure and without amendment. Council adopted the legislative act unanimously on 31 March 2022. The final act was signed on 6 April 2022.

Types of emergency support
CARE can provide Member States with emergency funding to help them cater to refugees’ basic needs, such as ensuring access to temporary accommodation, food or medical care. It can strengthen Member States’ capacity to support refugees by funding infrastructure or staff working with refugees and support refugees’ long-term integration by financing housing, employment, social inclusion and education. CARE Plus, increased pre-financing from REACT-EU resources

With significant numbers of people continuing to flee Ukraine in the weeks following Russia’s invasion, the need to provide an increasing number of new arrivals with housing, material assistance and social services has placed an additional strain on the public finances of many Member States, particularly those that share a border with Ukraine. While the CARE proposal already provided Member States with easier access to funding to help support their efforts in this area, the EU recognised the need to relieve the pressure on national budgets by speeding up the rollout of funding. On 23 March 2022, the Commission published a proposal for a regulation, which sets out plans to provide additional pre-financing for 2014‑2020 programmes supported by cohesion policy funds and the FEAD, to be paid under REACT-EU. Specifically, the Commission proposes to increase pre-financing from 11 % to 15 % in all Member States. This percentage rises to 45 % for Member States where arrivals from Ukraine between 24 February 2022 and 23 March 2022 number over 1 % of their national population. Amending the Common Provisions Regulation and the FEAD Regulation, the proposal is expected to deliver total pre-financing of around €3.4 billion.

Following the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24‑25 March 2022, which called on the Commission to work on additional proposals to strengthen the rapid disbursement of EU funding for refugees and their hosts, the Commission modified its original proposal of 23 March 2022, publishing an amended proposal on 31 March 2022. Noting that one of the best methods of making EU funding available is to use simplified cost options – which allow easier and faster spending of cohesion policy funds and cut red tape – the proposal establishes a new unit cost, which Member States can use to facilitate financing of basic needs and support for refugees. Under the proposal, the unit cost will be €40 per person per week, to be paid for each full week or partial week that the person is in the Member State concerned, for a maximum of 13 weeks following the person’s arrival in the EU. Like the CARE proposal, Parliament adopted the CARE Plus proposal under the urgent procedure, without amendment, on 7 April 2022. In line with its note of 1 April 2022, Council is expected to adopt the Commission proposal rapidly, without amendment.

European Parliament’s position

During the plenary debate of 7 March 2022 on the implementation of 2021‑2027 cohesion policy, Members expressed their unwavering solidarity with Ukraine and its neighbours. Noting that Europe and its cohesion policy must respond and provide additional support, Members confirmed that the Parliament’s Regional Development (REGI) Committee stood ready to amend the cohesion regulations to facilitate and enable the provision of immediate support for cities and regions hosting Ukrainian refugees.

The CARE proposal was presented during the REGI committee meeting of 15 March 2022. Committee Members were unequivocal in their support for the Commission’s proposal, noting that, as the Covid‑19 pandemic had demonstrated, cohesion policy is the way in which the people of Europe express solidarity with one another. However, Members highlighted the need to consider the impact that these migratory flows were likely to have on cohesion policy in the future, noting that it would undoubtedly be necessary to provide additional funding for Member States and for the regions. In this context, Members emphasised that the emergency measures currently being taken and that would need to be introduced must not be seen as restricting the overall aims of cohesion policy in any way.

First reading without committee report (Rule 163): 2022/0075(COD); Committee responsible: REGI.
First reading without committee report (Rule 163): 2022/0096(COD); Committee responsible: REGI.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU cohesion policy support for refugees‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has boosted the already high prices of oil and gas in the European Union, posing a question mark over sustainable deliveries of energy to the bloc. The EU is heavily dependent on Russia for its oil and gas. In 2021, two-fifths of the gas Europeans burned came from Russia. More than a quarter of the EU’s imported crude oil came from the country. The European Commission has announced plans to cut the EU’s dependence on Russian gas by two-thirds this year. Meanwhile, Russia has demanded that it is paid for its gas in roubles, rather than in euros or dollars, as stated in the contracts. The G-7 industrialised countries have dismissed the plan. EU Member States are divided over including a ban on energy imports from Russia among sanctions imposed on Moscow. Such an embargo would put a squeeze on European households, probably leading to gas rationing. However, it would cut Russia off from a major source of the hard currency that it uses in part to finance the war.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from international think tanks on the impact of the war on global and European energy markets. Analyses on the Ukraine war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Removing Russia from the European gas balance: A major role for Caspian gas
Atlantic Council, March 2022

DeRussification of European natural gas imports by 55 bcm in 5 years: A three-pronged strategy to reduce, reroute, and reserve supplies
Atlantic Council, March 2022

Can Europe manage if Russian oil and coal are cut off?
Bruegel, March 2022

How to wean Europe off Russian gas as swiftly as possible
Bruegel, March 2022

The Kremlin’s gas wars
Bruegel, February 2022

The EU gas market and policy and the war in Ukraine
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

How the war is affecting the Russian gas sector
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

A dangerous dependence on Russia: Germany and the gas crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

The US embargo on Russian energy resources: The consequences for Russia
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

When the taps are turned off: How to get Europe through the next winter without Russian gas
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

Europe must stop paying for Russia’s war
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

The EU must triple down on green investment
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Phasing out Russian gas, UK-EU relations and Hungary’s response to the war
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

High energy prices threaten the EU emissions trading system
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

EU can stop Russian gas imports by 2025
E3G, March 2022

The need and opportunity for Europe’s energy independence
Friends of Europe, March 2022

Same shock, different effects EU member states’ exposure to the economic consequences of Putin’s war
Hertie School, Jacques Delors Centre, March 2022

Economic consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
IfO, March 2022

Russian energy exports and the conflict in Ukraine: What options for Italy and the EU?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Can the EU do without Russian gas?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2022

Could the Ukraine crisis accelerate a longer-term policy shift away from fossil fuels?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

Higher oil prices stemming from Russia-Ukraine war may be temporary
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Russia’s energy role in Europe: What’s at stake with the Ukraine crisis
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Die Bedeutung russischer Gaslieferungen für die deutsche Energieversorgung
IW Köln, February 2022

The ‘do no significant harm’ principle: Two possible interpretations
LUISS School for European Political Economy, February 2022

A (E)U-turn from Nord Stream 2 towards a European Strategic Gas Reserve
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

What does the gas crisis reveal about European energy security?
Free Network, January 2022

Russia-Europe tensions threaten co-dependent gas markets
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2022

If Russia invades, sanction its oil and gas
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2022

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Ukraine war and energy supply‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou with Simona Dimitrova Tarpova.

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) organised a roundtable on 23 March 2022, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Anthony Teasdale, Director-General of EPRS, opened the event, welcoming practitioners and policy analysts’ expert views on the war’s implications for security and defence, refugees, energy, food and arms supply. The discussion, moderated by Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service at EPRS, assessed the change in the European Union’s position and strategic agenda to fit the new geopolitical realities.

In a keynote speech, David McAllister, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, summarised the EU response to military aggression and the likely impact on EU policies. He applauded the EU and its allies’ immediate, determined and united response, as well as the unprecedented nature of the sanction packages adopted. Sanctions are aimed at inflicting high costs on Russia’s financial, defence, energy, transport and technology sectors, but other EU frameworks and measures also support Ukraine: the European Peace Facility (providing €1 billion for the purchase and delivery of weapons); the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; and the Temporary Protection Directive (ensuring assistance to Ukrainian citizens and their government). David McAllister also emphasised the need to maintain an operational supply chain and assist Member States in managing the inflow of refugees.

Focusing on the EU’s long-term security and defence strategy, David McAllister recognised Russia’s war on Ukraine as a defining event for the bloc’s future policies. Referring to the Versailles Declaration, he noted that bolstering defence capabilities, reducing energy dependencies and building a robust and sustainable economic base should be a central priority. Regarding defence, he suggested that the EU could provide added value to existing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) capabilities (via cybersecurity, for example), while using the European Defence Fund and working towards establishing a European defence union. David McAllister concluded by encouraging effective implementation of EU strategies, the reduction of strategic dependencies (i.e., on technologies, medicines and food) and a united and decisive approach.

Richard Tibbels, Head of the Eastern Partnership Bilateral-Relations Division of the European External Action Service (EEAS), provided additional details on the EU response from the EEAS perspective. He highlighted three dimensions of the Union’s reaction to Russia’s non-compliance with international norms – sanctions, diplomatic endeavours and support for Ukraine. He also noted that the EU is ready to adopt further sanction packages to underline the message that violations of international law are unacceptable. The April EU-China Summit is one example of such diplomatic efforts. In terms of providing support to Ukraine, Richard Tibbels noted that the EU is contributing to the country’s resilience by providing defence equipment, funding for cybersecurity, emergency and humanitarian assistance and has synchronised Ukraine’s electricity grids with the Continental European Grid. The next steps are enshrined in the Versailles Declaration, which he described as ‘the road map to the future’. The declaration covers Ukraine’s reconstruction and EU accession application, as well as Europe’s energy security, economic independence and enhanced security and defence. However, he noted the EU needs to address the impact of the war on third countries’ food security, the collection of evidence of war crimes and the spread of disinformation.

In response to Etienne Bassot, who highlighted the fundamental shift in Germany’s defence and energy policies, Daniela Schwarzer, Executive Director for Europe and Eurasia at the Open Society Foundations, explained the reasons behind these developments. Although Germany’s former strategy was to engage Russia, a new understanding of the security threats to the EU and especially Eastern Europe requires taking a different political direction. Discussing Germany’s decision to suspend the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline plans and to provide military equipment to Ukraine, she raised the question of whether energy can be utilised as a sanctions strategy in the short term. Daniela Schwarzer stressed that it is crucial to consider the cost of sanctions and the degree of public support across the EU. Specifically, she suggested that Germany should initiate the implementation of solidarity mechanisms and refugee inflow management in a manner sustainable to European society.

Suzana Anghel, Policy Analyst with the European Council Oversight Unit at EPRS, compared the European Council’s reactions to crises and noted that the Council had anticipated the war and agreed on an initial response in advance. She emphasised the role of the Versailles Declaration and Strategic Compass in shaping the EU’s long-term defence strategy. Now that leaders have acknowledged the dependencies, it is crucial to ensure the coordinated and cost-effective implementation of measures to counter vulnerabilities. The broad political consensus on the need to reduce energy dependency, along with energy prices, provide a good example.

In view of the Commission’s proposal on obligatory gas storage with an 80 % target for 2022 and 90 % for 2023, Lasse Boehm, Head of the Economic Policies Unit at EPRS, warned that even full capacity gas storage would only deliver 30 % of demand in winter 2022‑2023. This is due to unevenly distributed liquid natural gas (LNG) infrastructure and gas storage capacity in the EU. Consequently, other solutions will be necessary, such as reducing energy consumption, increasing the percentage of renewable energy, coordinating mechanisms and setting clear targets. He suggested the situation requires a swift and calculated approach that considers the significance of energy security for the economy and the impact on the public and environment.

Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels, addressed four invasion-related topics: relations with China, US President Biden’s visit to Brussels, the EU strategic decisions and the fiscal implications of sanctions. He indicated that sanctions adopted by the EU and the G7 signal to China that violation of international norms is unacceptable. He warned, however, that SWIFT restrictions are incomplete and have allowed Russia to strengthen the rouble and avoid hyperinflation. To deter China from challenging international rules and invading Taiwan, the EU should demonstrate resolve regarding the costs of sanctions – as economic independence and a strong geopolitical stance can be expensive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine nevertheless provides an opportunity for the Biden Administration to improve the transatlantic relationship vis-à-vis Russia and China.

Acting Head of the External Policies Unit in the Members’ Research Service at EPRS, Elena Lazarou reviewed the EU’s overall response to geopolitical trends and its development of security and defence policies. She noted that the move to boost defence spending has been linked to Russia’s actions in the past and that EU public support for defence and related expenditure increased following the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. She identified two outcomes of the ongoing war: the return of ‘great power’ politics and the role of multilateralism. The war has also highlighted emerging trends, such as the use of conventional warfare in combination with digital technology, the growing battle of influence between democratic and authoritarian states, and challenges to international norms. Finally, Elena Lazarou pointed to the potential of the recently endorsed Strategic Compass, which presents guidelines on advancing EU security and defence.

Written by Fearghas O’Beara.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 drew attention to the close relationship between Vladimir Putin’s regime and the Russian Orthodox Church. The latter has strongly backed Putin’s war and has long provided theological and ideological justifications for his domestic and international actions. The Church’s overtly political approach has contributed to deep divisions within the wider Orthodox world, including a formal split with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and significant tensions with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The role of religion in Putin’s regime

One unexpected consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), which had ruthlessly oppressed religion, was a huge resurgence in church membership, religious belief and practice in many of the successor states. A recent Pew Forum survey found that 71 % of Russians identified as Orthodox, along with 78 % of Ukrainians, 73 % of Belarusians and 92 % of Moldovans. A newly confident Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) viewed itself as a repository of Russian national identity, and Moscow as the ‘third Rome’ with primacy over the Orthodox Churches in those countries and beyond. At home, Putin has passed laws targeting ‘non-traditional’ religious minorities with fines, detention and criminal charges.

The ROC quickly aligned itself with the Putin regime, a process accelerated since the election of Kirill as ‘Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia’ in 2009. Claiming canonical jurisdiction over much of the former USSR territory, the current ‘Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church’ permanent membership includes, inter alia, metropolitans (bishops) of ‘All Ukraine’, ‘All Belarus’, ‘All Moldova’, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The key doctrine elaborated by the Church, in tandem with the regime, over the past decades is the Russkiy Mir or ‘Russian world’, (however ‘mir‘ also translates as peace). This ideology envisages a quasi-messianic role for Russia in saving Christian civilisation from the decadent West through the spreading of Russian language, culture and values, by re-dominating countries formerly within the USSR, and exerting influence throughout the wider Orthodox and Western world. In 2007, Putin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation, which de facto spreads this ideology around the world, working in close cooperation with the ROC.

Thus, various experts have suggested that Russia’s war on Ukraine has a religious dimension, and that Putin’s desire to conquer Kyiv is part of a ‘spiritual quest’. Putin himself laid out his Greater Russia vision in a long article in July 2021, entitled ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’. In it, he claims that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are the same people whose ‘common baptismal font’ is Kyiv with the conversion to Christianity of Prince Volodymir (Vladimir in Russian) in 988. The narrative makes clear that Russia’s enemies are located to the west. These, especially at the end of the 16th century, were ‘Polonising and Latinising’ Russian lands and ‘ousting Orthodoxy’. Putin compares the creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to those past events, clearly omitting the Ukrainian perspective. For Putin, Ukrainian identity or statehood have ‘no historical basis’ and are a geo-political tool to weaken Russia. The current Ukrainian leadership are characterised as ‘radicals and neo-Nazis’, and Putin leaves no doubt that his intention is to create ‘a single large nation, a triune nation’.

Division within eastern Orthodox Christianity

Long before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the close alignment between the ROC and the Putin regime had contributed to splits within Orthodoxy. The ROC suspended its own membership of the Conference of European Churches in 2008. Ever since Ukrainian independence in 1991, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had been seeking autonomy, culminating in the recognition of its independent status by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I in 2019, a goal on which former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko was personally engaged. Already, in 2016, when the Ecumenical Patriarch attempted to hold the first global Council of the Orthodox Church in Crete, it was boycotted by the ROC, but also by the Bulgarian and Georgian Orthodox Churches, both under strong Moscow influence.

The invasion has accelerated these divisions. Within Ukraine, a significant part of the church had remained faithful to Moscow, as a filial entitled the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Nevertheless, its leader, Metropolitan Onufriy, has appealed to Putin for an ‘immediate end to the fratricidal war’, referring unambiguously to Russia’s ‘military action against Ukraine’. Russia’s war has also been condemned by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, as well as leaders of the Orthodox Churches of Romania, Greece, and even Georgia, which had aligned itself with Moscow in the past. Another initiative was taken by a group of Orthodox theologians, who issued a ‘Declaration on the Russian World (Russkii Mir) Teaching’, condemning the ‘fundamentalist, totalitarian’ character of the doctrine promoted by the ROC under Kirill, which had ultimately led to ‘Putin’s unconscionable and horrendously destructive invasion of Ukraine’. Divisions have also emerged within Russia itself; on 2 March a group of 233 ROC priests launched an appeal for peace, urging Russian soldiers be brought home, and stating that Ukrainians should be allowed to decide their own destiny.

Peace initiatives of religious actors

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been described by some as a 21st century ‘religious war’, the EU has increasingly engaged with religious actors in pursuing its foreign policy goals, including tapping into their potential for conflict resolution and peace-building. In the current context of a split within Orthodoxy, some quiet religious diplomacy by Western Christian church leaders has taken place. Notably, Russian Patriarch Kirill took part in two distinct on-line meetings on 16 March, with the Archbishop of Canterbury, head of the worldwide Anglican Church, and with Pope Francis, head of the Roman Catholic Church.

The Pope’s Nuncio (ambassador) to Ukraine – a Lithuanian archbishop who previously served at the nunciature in Moscow – has remained in place in Kyiv and continues to liaise with Ukrainian political and church authorities. On 8 March he received a letter from the Mayor of Kyiv, Vitaliy Klitschko, inviting Pope Francis to visit the city, as a means of ‘paving the path to peace in our city, country and beyond’. While the Pope has not ruled out such a visit, given the view of Patriarch Kirill that Ukraine is part of his ‘canonical territory’, it could be counter-productive. Francis and Kirill have only met once, in Havana in 2016, so an alternative démarche could be a meeting on ‘neutral ground’. Vatican insiders have speculated that one possibility would be Jerusalem, as Francis could stop off on his forthcoming visit to Lebanon, which he announced on 21 March.

In parallel to contacts at the highest level, there have been exchanges between the Russian Orthodox and Catholic Churches at the level of their respective international and EU affairs arms. The Commission of Catholic Bishops’ Conferences of the EU (COMECE) called upon Patriarch Kirill to ‘appeal to Russian authorities to immediately stop the hostilities against the Ukrainian people’, stressing his influence among Russian people. However, in his reply, Metropolitan Hilarion, Chair of the ROC’s Department for External Church Relations, posited the war as a crisis ‘between the West and Russia’, referred to the ‘long-suffering land of Ukraine’ and reiterated their view that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is part of the Moscow Patriarchate. All these positions align closely with the official narrative of the Kremlin. Hilarion also suggested that COMECE should work with the EU ‘in order to prevent further escalation’, an indication of where the ROC considers fault for the war lies.

Meanwhile, the World Council of Churches (WCC), of which the Russian Orthodox Church has been a member since 1961, wrote to Kirill on 2 March asking for his mediation ‘so that the war can be stopped’. The (Romanian Orthodox) Acting General-Secretary of the WCC called on the Patriarch of Moscow to ‘raise up your voice on behalf of the suffering brothers and sisters, most of whom are also faithful members of our Orthodox Church’. In his response on 10 March, Kirill again used Kremlin rhetoric, viewing the war as a confrontation ‘between the West and Russia’, stating that Western ‘political forces’ had conspired to use Ukraine to ‘make brotherly peoples enemies’, and that all Western efforts to integrate Ukraine were founded upon a ‘geopolitical strategy aimed at weakening Russia’.

The reply also laid the blame on the Ecumenical Patriarch for the schism in Orthodoxy, by recognising an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 2019. This could limit the scope of Bartholomew to mediate towards a peaceful solution, a potential role suggested by European Commission Vice-President Margaritis Schinas following his exchange with the Ecumenical Patriarch on 19 March.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The religious dimension‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte.

On 24 February 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine threw the international status quo into disarray by violating the country’s sovereignty and integrity. Since then, over 1 000 civilian casualties have been reported and over 3.8 million people have been forced to flee the country. Many others are displaced within Ukraine’s borders, while civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, roads and buildings, is being targeted by Russian military action. The shelling of civilians and the alleged use of chemical and/or biological weapons by Russian military forces have spurred the international community to accuse Russia of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

Against this backdrop, Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been addressing parliaments around the world to plead the cause of the Ukrainian people and ask for both military and humanitarian help. He began by addressing the European Parliament, before continuing with many others, both in Europe and further afield. The latest in a line of historical leaders mobilising rhetoric in times of war, Zelenskyy’s speeches have each been tailor-made to their specific audience and have been consistent in reminding policy-makers around the world of the humanitarian tragedy unfolding as a result of the war and of the Ukrainian people’s military needs.

Taking a look at speeches given by Zelenskyy to the European Parliament and several national parliaments between 1 and 24 March 2022, in the month after Russia invaded Ukraine, this briefing summarises the Ukrainian president’s main messages and offers some thoughts about the narrative used by Zelenskyy to keep Russia’s war on Ukraine at the top of national and international agendas.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Speeches by Ukraine’s President to the European Parliament and national parliaments‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Irina Popescu and Frederik Scholaert.

Brexit has reshaped fisheries relations in the North-east Atlantic on an unprecedented scale, with far-reaching consequences for the fishing sector in the region and beyond. This situation is highlighted in the European Parliament’s resolution on the future of fisheries in the Channel, North Sea, Irish Sea and Atlantic Ocean in the light of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU. After Brexit, most of the fish stocks in the region, managed for decades under EU rules, have become shared stocks jointly managed with the UK. Access for EU vessels to UK waters is now subject to licences delivered by UK authorities. Difficulties and delays were experienced however in licencing EU vessels to fish in the 6‑12 mile UK territorial waters and in the waters of Jersey and Guernsey in 2021. Access for EU vessels to UK waters is maintained for an adjustment period lasting until 30 June 2026, but the conditions after this date remain uncertain. More restrictive rules in the UK and the Falkland Islands are expected to affect UK-flagged vessels owned by EU fishing companies. More generally, relations between coastal states in the region have become less predictable, as seen in the unilateral decisions of Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands to increase their mackerel quotas in 2021, for example.

One of the most significant changes, fiercely contested until the final hours of the Brexit negotiations, concerns the transfer of EU fishing quotas to the UK. The total transfer is considered to represent 25 % of the value of the EU landings from UK waters. The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) gradually reduces the EU fishing opportunities for 55 shared stocks from 2021 to 2025, specifying how the EU and UK shares change each year for each stock. Most of the quota transfer occurs in 2021 (60 %), with the remainder phased-in over the following years, to reach 70 % in 2022, 80 % in 2023, 92 % in 2024 and 100 % in 2025. For 2021, the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) estimated the quota reduction due to the TCA at 73 697 tonnes.

An EPRS analysis focused on the impact of the TCA changes on 16 of the most affected stocks, which together represented a quota transfer of 62 211 tonnes in 2021 (around 84 % of the total amount calculated by the STECF), with a value estimated at €103 million.[1]

The quota reduction mainly affects France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Sweden, Poland, Portugal, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are affected to a lesser extent. France, Ireland and the Netherlands take the brunt of the 2021 transfer by value for the analysed stocks.

volume of the Brexit quota transfert (tonnes) value of the Brexit quota transfert (€ millions)

Western mackerel is by far the stock with the highest Brexit transfer (almost 30 % of the value of the analysed stocks), and as such it is an illustrative example. The EU share decreased from 41.68 % in 2020 (pre-Brexit) to 35.15 % in 2021 (post-Brexit), leading to a transfer of 24 021 tonnes, with a value estimated at €30.08 million. More than half of this amount is provided by Ireland, with the Netherlands, Germany and France sharing most of the remainder. In practice, the effect of the Brexit transfer due to the TCA cumulates with the effect of the change in total allowable catches (TAC) from 2020 to 2021, resulting in a net quota change. The TAC trend has a major impact on the net quota change: if the TAC decreases, as was the case for Western mackerel in 2021, the impact of the quota reduction from the Brexit transfer is amplified, from 24 021 tonnes to 33 812 for the EU total, and accordingly for each Member State (shown below in light shades).

Quota changes for the EU and the UK, and by Member State (tonnes)

An updated EPRS analysis of the Brexit quota transfer in 2022 is currently in progress.

[1] The stocks covered by the EPRS analysis are Mackerel (Western), Herring (North Sea), Blue whiting (Northern), Norway pout (North Sea), Mackerel (North Sea), Sole (North Sea), Norway lobster (zone 7), Anglerfish (zone 7), Hake (Western), Saithe (North Sea), Anglerfish (North Sea), Anglerfish (West of Scotland), Pollack (zone 7), Megrims (zone 7), Cod (North Sea) and Hake (North Sea). The net quota change is the difference between a Member State’s quotas for a given stock for two successive years. We used the initial fishing opportunities for 2020 and 2021, as indicated in Regulations 2020/123 and 2021/1239. The Brexit transfer for a Member State in a given year is calculated by applying the EU share reduction according to the TCA to the quota from the previous year. EU and UK quota shares are from the EU-UK TCA, Annexes 35 and 36. To neutralise unusual pandemic effects, the value is based on 2019 prices from the European Market Observatory for Fisheries and Aquaculture Products (EUMOFA). National sources have been used for German and Irish prices (unavailable in EUMOFA).

Written by Marika Lerch and Ionel Zamfir.

On 16 March 2022, after a fast-track procedure, the International Court of Justice ordered provisional measures in the Ukraine v Russia case. In bringing the case, Ukraine argued that Russia had wrongfully claimed a genocide in Ukraine to justify its invasion. Russia, meanwhile, rejected the Court’s jurisdiction. Given the lack of evidence for Russia’s genocide allegations, and the principle that any action to prevent genocide must be taken in good faith and in line with international law, the Court called on Russia to suspend military operations immediately.

The case at the International Court of Justice

On 26 February 2022, the Ukrainian Government lodged a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), regarding ‘Allegations of Genocide under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v Russian Federation)’ and requested that the Court order provisional measures, including an immediate suspension of the military operations. The Court fast-tracked the procedure and, on Wednesday 16 March 2022, announced its decision to order the following provisional measures:

1. Russia must suspend the military operations launched in Ukraine on 24 February immediately;
2. Russia must ensure that any military or irregular armed units directed or supported by it, and any organisations and persons under its control take no steps to advance the military operations;
3. Both parties must ‘refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve’.

The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (UN), instituted by Articles 92 to 96 of the UN Charter. The Court is competent to settle disputes submitted by States that have accepted its jurisdiction, in accordance with international law, through judgments that are binding and without appeal for the parties concerned. Neither Ukraine nor Russia have made a declaration accepting the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 of the ICJ’s statute. Therefore, the ICJ’s competence in the Ukraine case derives solely from the Genocide Convention, which both Russia and Ukraine have ratified. It obliges state parties to prevent and punish genocide and gives the Court jurisdiction over disputes between parties relating to ‘interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the Convention.

Ukraine’s main claim before the ICJ is that Russia has falsely accused it of attempting a genocide in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine as a pretext for recognising Luhansk and Donetsk as independent republics and engaging in a military invasion. Ukraine’s application does not claim that Russia has committed the crime of genocide, but it hints that it may be ‘planning acts of genocide in Ukraine’ (para. 24). The question of whether abuse of the Genocide Convention as an argument for military intervention provides sufficient jurisdictional grounds for the ICJ to decide is apparently not straightforward. Ukraine’s argumentation has been described by academics as taking a creative approach.

Russia did not take part in the first Court hearing, held on 7 March 2022. In a letter to the Court, of 5 March 2022, Russia argues that the ICJ has no jurisdiction, basing its argument on two points: i) the Genocide Convention governs neither the use of force between States nor the recognition of States, so the subject of Ukraine’s claim and request falls outside the Convention; and ii) the ‘military operation’ was not legally based on the Genocide Convention, but on Article 51 of the UN Charter – on exercising the right of self-defence in the event of armed attack – and customary international law. Russia argues that references to acts of genocide in the President’s statement announcing the military intervention do not provide a sufficient basis to claim that there was invocation of the Convention or the existence of a dispute under it.

Contradicting Russia’s assertion, the Court’s decision of 16 March 2022, adopted with a sound majority of 13 votes to 2, considers that there is sufficient evidence for Ukraine to invoke the compromissory clause in Article IX of the Convention, which attributes jurisdiction to the ICJ for disputes arising under the Convention. Some noteworthy arguments of the Court to support its preliminary decision are as follows: in discharging its duty to prevent genocide, every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law; the Court ‘is not in possession of evidence substantiating the genocide allegations of the Russian Federation’; the Court is ‘doubtful’ that the Convention authorises unilateral use of force in the territory of another State.

The judges from China and Russia voted against the first two provisional measures directed at the Russian Federation. In their declaration, annexed to the Court’s conclusions, they essentially support the Russian interpretation that the ICJ does not have jurisdiction since the issue of concern is one of state recognition and use of force in international law, which do not fall within the scope of the Genocide Convention. Both voted in favour of the third measure, however. Three other judges made declarations and another presented a separate opinion. Two of these opposed the application of the third measure to Ukraine.

As expected, the Russian government – through Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov – stated on 17 March that Russia could not ‘take this [preliminary] decision into account’. As the ICJ has no mechanisms to enforce its ruling, UN State Parties can take the case to the Security Council, where Russia’s veto power would block any enforcement measures. The United States (US) acted in a similar way in 1986, when it refused to implement the ICJ ruling in Nicaragua v the United States on financing of military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, and voted against a Security Council resolution calling for full and immediate compliance.

Another case, moved by Ukraine in 2017, is pending before the ICJ, alleging Russia’s violation since 2014 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism through its support for separatist forces in eastern Ukraine, and of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Crimea through suppression of the rights of Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians. Other judicial avenues are currently being activated or considered as means to hold the Russian leadership accountable for war-related crimes, namely the International Criminal Court and the establishment of a special tribunal on the crime of aggression.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen welcomed the ICJ order in a tweet, insisting that Putin heed the clear message from the international community. The High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, referred to the ICJ’s 16 March ruling to underscore his call for an immediate halt to military actions.

Broader implications of the decision

The court decision is considered a ‘near total’ victory for Ukraine, while non-respect of the decision is expected to cause further reputational harm to Russia. Although the decision does not rebut all Russia’s stated grounds for invasion, it marks an important step towards proving the illegality of the war under international law. The blocking by Russia of the UN Security Council’s attempt to condemn the invasion, meanwhile reveals the limitations of the UN system and the need for it to be revisited.

It is argued that Russia’s genocide-related war justification is based on an abusive interpretation of the concept of humanitarian intervention. Central to this is the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) doctrine, which was developed in response to the atrocities committed in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. At the 2005 high-level UN World Summit, UN member states committed to the principle of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity through the use of appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, and should these fail, through collective action endorsed by the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was in line with ICJ jurisprudence. In Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia (2007), the ICJ stated that ‘every State may only act [to prevent genocide] within the limits permitted by international law’. However, some states, in particular the US and the United Kingdom, and civil society organisations, have indicated support for humanitarian intervention in extremis without UN consent, when the Security Council proves dysfunctional because of the veto of a permanent member. In contradiction to the R2P, Russia did not use the diplomatic means at its disposal before the war, such as referring its allegations of genocide to UN bodies. The principle of genuine respect for international law appears all the more important, since the use of baseless genocide allegations in the world has been widespread and is ‘as old as the Genocide Convention itself’. An important implication of the ICJ ruling is that there is ‘no rule in international law automatically giving one state a right to invade another state to stop a genocide’. Condoning such justification for war would pose a terrible danger.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘International Court of Justice preliminary decision in Ukraine v Russia (2022)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot.

This edition of EPRS’s six-monthly assessment of the delivery of the six policy priorities of the current European Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen, comes as the Commission approaches the middle of its five-year term. On the eve of taking office in November 2019, then-President elect Ursula von der Leyen stated that ‘Europe urgently needs’ a ‘geopolitical Commission’. Russia’s war on Ukraine, unfolding as this publication was being written, confirms the relevance of this challenge beyond what most experts had envisaged at the time. The pressing need for the Union to develop its ‘strategic autonomy’, brought into focus by the various barriers thrown up during the initial coronavirus lockdowns, has become even starker, and not just in the field of security and defence policy – with war on the EU’s borders – but also in fields such as energy and food, where dependence on external suppliers risks compromising the Union’s stability.

Published on the eve of the 2021 State of the Union address, the previous issue of this publication was drafted as the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops were withdrawing from, and the Taliban taking over, Kabul. This issue comes as war has returned to Europe and millions of refugees are fleeing Ukraine to the European Union. This is a stark reminder to European citizens, as well as their leaders and representatives, that peace and democracy, which are at the heart of the European project, cannot be taken for granted.

Among its many effects, this most dramatic crisis has strengthened unity among the 27 Member States. It has pushed security and defence higher on the European Union agenda, a subject that was already a priority for the French Presidency of the Council of the EU. This is evidenced first in the Versailles Declaration following the 10‑11 March 2022 informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government, which analysed Russia’s war on Ukraine as ‘a tectonic shift in European history’. It is also seen in the decision to take more responsibility for the EU’s security and bolster its defence capabilities, and later in the endorsement of a reinforced, updated Strategic Compass by the European Council on 24‑25 March (see Section 4).

It is no longer the pandemic, but the war on Ukraine and its numerous consequences, that define the European agenda. As the cover photograph of this publication illustrates: on 1 March 2022, the European Parliament, chaired by its new President, Roberta Metsola, held an extraordinary plenary session on the situation in Ukraine at which the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, was welcomed with a standing ovation.

The predominance of Putin’s war on Ukraine in the media and our conversations – reaching unprecedented levels of coverage and spread due to the extent of social media use in Ukraine, Europe and worldwide – should not divert our attention from other major ongoing challenges: the policy priorities of the European Commission. On climate change, this Commission’s first priority and an area where President von der Leyen wants Europe to lead globally, the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, released on 28 February 2022 raises the alarm on ‘increasing climate risks’ (see Section 1). Helping the EU recover from the coronavirus crisis (see Section 3), turning the EU into a digital continent (see Section 2), promoting the European way of life (see Section 5), and the new push for European democracy, notably with the Conference on the Future of Europe (see Section 6), are all high on this Commission’s agenda.

This paper monitors all six of these priorities. It combines a two-page presentation of each priority and an infographic illustrating in a single page (page 3), the degree of progress– both overall and under each of the six priorities.

Our assessment is that, of the almost 500 initiatives foreshadowed (504), more than half (57 %) have already been submitted (288). It is worth noting that almost one in five of the Commission’s initiatives are non-legislative in character, such as strategies, action plans and other communications. Among these 266, almost half (47 %) have already been adopted (135), while the great majority of the remainder are either proceeding normally through the legislative process (113, or 74 %) or close to adoption (11, or 7 %). Conversely, a certain number are proceeding very slowly or are currently blocked (29, or 19 %).

These numbers reflect the state of play as the Commission reaches the mid-point of this five-year EU political cycle, during which the executive continues to come forward with new proposals, whilst simultaneously the twin branches of the legislature (the European Parliament and the Council of the EU) are fully engaged in considering and (very often) amending them. The ranking and proportionate progress have remained stable compared with the previous assessment, which is all the more remarkable as the Commission has returned to a more ‘business-as-usual’ mode after more than one year in pandemic mode.

With a focus on each of the six policy priorities, our assessment shows how the European Commission is performing at the different stages of announcing and tabling proposals, followed by the three institutions’ progress in negotiating and finally adopting legislation. The European Green Deal ranks highest in the number of initiatives planned (125) but the executive has tabled less than half of them (or 45 %), leading to only one-fifth being adopted by the co-legislators so far (20 %). The third priority, ‘An economy that works for people’, comes next (101), but this time with more initiatives tabled (68 %) and the highest number of initiatives adopted (32 %). The urgent need to recover from the economic consequences of the pandemic explains this result and why the third priority has overtaken the lead expected for the second ‘twin transition’ – digital – in terms of initiatives planned, tabled and adopted. This latter totals 84 initiatives planned, half of which are already submitted (44), and 14 already adopted (17 %). For ‘A stronger Europe in the world’, an area with relatively few legislative initiatives, by definition and by contrast with the majority of the Commission’s priorities, over three in four (78 %) initiatives have already been tabled (see Section 4), but a fair amount of work remains to be done for the other priorities (38 % of the proposals remain to be submitted for ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’, 39 % for ‘Promoting our European way of life’ and 49 % for ‘A new push for democracy’ (see Sections 2, 5 and 6). This latter priority comes lowest in terms of number of initiatives announced (55), as neither the Conference on the Future of Europe, which is expected to come to a close this spring, nor (however important), upholding EU values, especially fundamental rights and the rule of law, require such proposals to proceed.

The next edition of this biannual paper will monitor the situation in September 2022, on the eve of the 2022 State of the Union address. The coming months will be crucial for this Commission to deliver on its commitments and on the ‘main elements guiding the preparation of the Commission work programme’ for 2023. The Commission is expected to set out its plans in writing to the Parliament, under the 2010 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission.

In the face of the latest events and their ‘tectonic’ magnitude, this publication and the next will continue to monitor this Commission’s ambition to become a ‘geopolitical Commission’.

For more information on how the von der Leyen Commission’s agenda is proceeding, a proposal-by-proposal assessment is available on the European Parliament’s ‘Legislative Train Schedule’ website, also developed by EPRS, at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/.

Read the complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘The six policy priorities of the von der Leyen Commission: State of play as the Commission approaches mid-term‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

As Members gather in Strasbourg once again for the April 2022 plenary session, the key debates on the agenda return to the subject of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Members are expected to hear Council and Commission statements on EU protection of children and young people fleeing the war against Ukraine on Tuesday morning. They will then hear statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24‑25 March 2022 on Wednesday, also with the newly re-elected President of the European Council, Charles Michel. The EU leaders’ meeting focused on Ukraine and the issue of energy security, sanctions and economic issues such as commodity imports. In the Parliament’s first ‘Question Time‘ sessions for nine years on Tuesday afternoon, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will spend an hour taking Members’ questions on implementation of the current Commission’s political priorities. Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is then scheduled to answer questions on EU security and the recently adopted Strategic Compass.

Well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) had insisted that the proposed revision of the rules on trans-European energy infrastructure projects should require energy projects to be more environmentally sustainable and exclude fossil fuel infrastructure. Major energy infrastructure projects benefit EU citizens by boosting the single market and securing EU supplies and such projects of common interest are therefore sometimes eligible for EU funding. The committee argues for a wider role for the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), and for a new stakeholder committee to ensure projects can call on good expertise. The committee’s report also calls for a transitional period to 2029, as well as for the regulation to cover CO2 storage, and for a derogation for already-included natural gas projects. Members are expected to debate and vote on an agreed text reached between the EU co-legislators on the rules governing funding of major energy projects on Tuesday afternoon.

In line with the EU’s climate ambitions, the European Commission’s ‘Fit for 55’ proposals seek to revise the entire EU 2030 climate and energy framework. The first legislative proposal from the package is expected to come to plenary on Monday evening, when Members are scheduled to debate a proposed revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system (ETS). The world’s first and largest carbon market, the ETS aims at reducing greenhouse gas emissions by capping the volume of emissions permitted and encouraging trading of unused allowances. However, a surplus of emission allowances has built up due to recent economic crises. The proposed revision of the market stability reserve aims to correct this, by maintaining the already doubled intake rate (24 %) and minimum number of allowances placed in the reserve (200 million) to December 2030. Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) agrees with the proposal, stressing that it will avoid further increases in the surplus. The committee’s report would form the position for trilogue negotiations with the Council, subject to any amendments voted in plenary.

On Wednesday lunchtime, Members are expected to hold a debate on a provisional agreement reached between Parliament and the Council on the first of the Commission’s proposals on an EU data strategy. The data governance act should set the rules for sharing or trading data for legitimate uses – such as medical research or combating climate change – whilst preserving data rights. The co-legislators reached a compromise on re-use of publicly held data, limiting public authorities’ ability to grant rights to data and ensuring they seek consent. Parliament also succeeded in tightening the rules for ‘data brokers’. Organisations wishing to share data for the common good will have to register as ‘altruism organisations’ and follow a Commission rulebook. Parliament also insisted on strengthening aspects of the composition and tasks of the proposed European data innovation board, which will enforce the act.

The economic uncertainty resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the recent pandemic has underlined the need to strengthen the EU’s economic and competitive resilience. Against this background, Parliament considers two budget-related files during this plenary session. Parliament’s guidelines for the 2023 EU budget (Section III – European Commission) launch the annual budgetary debate on Tuesday lunchtime. Underlining the need for a just transition to a greener economy, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) highlights the importance of economic, social and territorial cohesion. The BUDG committee’s report lists a number of budgetary priorities, including stronger health union, the green and digital transitions, fundamental rights and the rule of law. The report also underlines the need to spread payments evenly throughout the period of the current multiannual financial framework. The guidelines provide the basis for Parliament’s trilogue negotiations on the 2023 budget ahead of the European Commission’s proposal of the draft budget.

Following delays in launching certain programmes, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) reiterates its concern regarding the effect of such payment delays on the Union’s recovery. To prevent payment crises, the committee calls on the Commission to present proposals for payment increases immediately in future. Members are scheduled to consider draft amending budget 1/2022 on Tuesday lunchtime. The amendments seek to strengthen the 2022 EU budget by transferring €12 billion in commitments from 2021. Further transfers will be made to the budgets of subsequent years of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework.

Parliament returns to goods vehicle hire rules on Monday evening, in its second reading of a proposal to loosen restrictions on transport operators. The European Commission’s proposal to grant haulage companies the same right to hire vehicles without a driver in another Member State as in their own Member State originally aimed at harmonising the rules across the EU. However, Parliament and Council wished to preserve Member States’ ability to protect their national vehicle tax bases from market distortion. The draft agreement reached by Council and Parliament would allow countries to restrict their own haulage companies from hiring vehicles without drivers in other EU Member States, but prevents them from restricting goods vehicle hire outright, if all the rules are observed.

• Trans-European energy infrastructure
• Revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system
• Use of vehicles hired without drivers for the carriage of goods by road
• Data governance act
• Amending budget 1/2022: Adjustment of the multiannual financial framework
• Parliament’s guidelines for the 2023 EU budget: Section III – European Commission

Written by Ulrich Jochheim.

Hours before the Beijing Winter Olympics officially opened on 4 February 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping had a long meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the joint statement issued after the meeting, the Chinese leader for the first time voiced his country’s outright opposition to NATO enlargement and support for Russia’s ‘proposals to create long-term legally binding security guarantees’ in Europe. This stance might be seen as the culmination of a relationship, formed in 1992, between the newly proclaimed Russian Federation and a China that had just started emerging from the stupor following the Tiananmen Square massacre.

This relationship has seen major shifts since 1992. At the outset, China’s population was greater than Russia’s and both countries had a very similar level of GDP. Nowadays, thanks to China’s exceptional growth performance, its economy is more than eight times bigger than Russia’s. Similarly, trade with Russia is not of major importance to China in terms of value. However, the high share of raw materials (including food) in Russian exports and the transfer of Russian military technology are of strategic importance to China in these relations.

Since 2012, the relationship has evolved into an informal alliance in the face of what both countries consider a rising threat from the West to their regimes. At present, China’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine seems to be more favourable to Russia than it was in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea. China has been critical of NATO’s enlargement to central and eastern Europe, and less insistent about respect for the territorial integrity of nations – something that it has traditionally upheld in light of the ‘open Taiwan question’. On 30 March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in China to discuss the bilateral relationship.

Experts posit that China is likely to support the kind of solution to the Ukraine war that would be the least likely to challenge the power monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party.

Read the complete briefing on ‘China-Russia relations: A quantum leap?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Mineral fuel trade between Russia and China Trends in Chinese and Russian GDP growth since 1989 (constant US$ million)

Written by Elena Lazarou.

Cooperation with third countries is embedded in several dimensions of EU security and defence policy. The Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022, dedicates one of its main sections to the role of partnerships.

Background

Third countries (i.e. non-EU countries) can take part in EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) in various ways. These range from contributing to CSDP missions, financial investment and joint training, to taking part in dialogue and defence industrial initiatives. In its section on partnering, the Strategic Compass, approved by the Council in March 2022, calls for stronger tailored bilateral partnerships with like-minded partners, such as the US, Norway, Japan, the UK and Canada, multilateral organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN) and regional organisations. It also stresses the importance of partnerships with the eastern and southern neighbourhood, the western Balkans, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, emphasising participation in CSDP missions and operations and support for capacity-building. It also envisages an EU security and defence partnership forum.

Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO)

Established in 2017, PESCO is designed to deepen defence cooperation among the 25 participating EU Member States. There are now 60 PESCO projects addressing a range of domains: training (9), land (8), maritime (8), air (10), cyber (10), space (4), and joint services (11). In 2020, the Council set out conditions ‘exceptionally’ permitting third countries to take part in PESCO, providing the countries added ‘substantial added value’ and shared the EU’s founding values, and no external dependencies resulted. Countries must submit their requests to participate to the project’s lead country, and all participating Member States must agree unanimously. The Council and the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission must be notified, with the Council giving formal approval. In May 2021, EU defence ministers agreed to invite the US, Canada and Norway – three key NATO allies – to join the PESCO military mobility project. The focus is on facilitating cross-border troop and equipment movement and harmonising transportation rules; a goal also shared by NATO. The EU has also acknowledged Ukraine‘s wish to join PESCO projects, so as to deepen EU-Ukraine defence cooperation. Third-country-controlled entities can participate as of 31 December 2025.

European Defence Agency (EDA)

To help Member States with their capabilities development, the EDA can sign administrative agreements (AAs) with third countries, to allow their participation in military-technological programmes, providing there is reciprocal transparency and they adopt EU intellectual property rights legislation. The EDA has AAs with four non-EU countries: Norway, Switzerland, Serbia and Ukraine; and two organisations: the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation and the European Space Agency. In November 2021, the EDA was mandated to conclude an AA with the US, to outline a future framework for cooperation. In principle, an AA between a third country and the EDA is considered a pre-requisite for that country’s participation in a PESCO project.

European Defence Fund (EDF) and European defence industrial policy

The EDF supports research and development in EU defence capabilities, by co-financing measures that contribute to competitiveness, innovation and strategic autonomy and to a stronger defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB). The Fund has been endowed with €8 billion for the 2021-2027 period, of which €2.65 billion for research and innovation, and €5.3 billion for capabilities. The EDF regulation stipulates that, apart from non-EU countries that are members of the European Economic Area, only entities established in the EU or associated countries – and that are not subject to control by third countries or third-country entities – are eligible for EDF grant schemes. In cases of derogation from this rule, ‘there shall be no unauthorised access by a non-associated third country or non-associated third-country entity to classified information regarding action supported by the Fund’. In June 2020, the Commission announced a list of projects funded through the preparatory action on defence research and the European defence industrial development programme (precursors of the EDF), four of which involved the US, Canada and Japan.

Space

The 2016 space strategy promotes synergies between the civil and defence sectors. Geopolitical competition extends to outer space, and autonomous space capabilities enhance situational awareness, not least through the European global navigation satellite system (Galileo), Copernicus, and the European geostationary navigation overlay service (EGNOS). The EU earmarked €13.2 billion for space activities in the 2021-2027 period, managed by DG DEFIS. In 2004, the EU and US agreed on cooperation between Galileo and the global positioning system (GPS), while the EU signed agreements with Norway (2010) and with Switzerland (2013) on cooperation on satellite navigation and Galileo-related classified information exchange. According to the EU’s negotiating directives, the UK can access Galileo’s public regulated service (PRS), but third parties cannot take part in encrypting the PRS system. The UK is participating in Copernicus as a third country in the 2021-2027 period. This allows it to apply for EU Copernicus tenders.

The Commission’s space-based secure communication system, part of its space package, secures uninterrupted access to satellite communications and improved connectivity. Here, dialogues with third countries are expected on space traffic management while third countries may participate in the 2023-2027 ‘Union secure connectivity programme’. Similarly, the Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence notes that in order to reduce strategic dependence, the EU needs to coordinate with like-minded partners such as NATO, the US, Canada, Norway and Japan. Transatlantic coordination on critical technologies also takes place within the EU-US Trade and Technology Council.

CSDP missions and operations The Strategic Compass includes the creation by 2025 of the EU rapid deployment capacity, a modular force of up to 5 000, including substantially modified EU battlegroups. Operational since 2007, but yet to be deployed, the battlegroups are of a rotating nature and can involve non-EU countries. For example, the Nordic battlegroup includes Norway; and Ukraine and Serbia took part in the Greek-led Balkan battlegroup. Ukraine was invited to join the Visegrad battlegroup in 2016.

The Council has highlighted EU support for regular dialogue with third countries, while facilitating partners’ participation in CSDP missions. The EU currently has seven military and 11 civilian missions under CSDP, while the 20 framework cooperation agreements (FPA) currently in force provide the political and legal basis for third-country participation in missions. These also clarify that this contribution should be without prejudice to operational planning and EU decision-making autonomy. The EU’s counter-piracy mission EUNAVFOR Atalanta has, for instance, involved Colombia, South Korea, Montenegro, Ukraine and others, while Turkey contributes to the EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new EUTM Mozambique mission is also open to third-country involvement. In all, more than 45 third countries have contributed to CSDP missions so far. In January 2021, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) recommended developing criteria for non-EU country participation in CSDP missions, and creating a CSDP ‘partners consultative mechanism’ to be chaired by the EEAS. According to the EUMC recommendation, the basic conditions for a third country to become a ‘CSDP partner’ would be an FPA, a security of information agreement (SIA), good neighbourly relations with the EU, shared EU values and principles, and respect for international law. Also in 2021, the EU enhanced the modalities for participation of third countries in CSDP missions and operations by ensuring a greater level of information-sharing. Partner countries have also taken part in CSDP exercises. For example, in 2020, the US, Canada and Norway joined in the EEAS EU Integrated Revolve 2020 exercise to improve crisis management.

The European Parliament has welcomed third-country involvement in CSDP missions and third-party involvement in the EDA, noting that participation in PESCO should be based on ‘established and effective reciprocity’. Parliament has also asked to be ‘fully involved’ in the process of opening PESCO to third countries. Parliament’s 2020 annual report on common foreign and security policy (CFSP) meanwhile, acknowledged the contribution of Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries to CSDP, and called for deeper EU-EaP cooperation in EU-related defence policies. On the EDF, Parliament has recognised the need to regulate access to companies controlled by third countries and noted that while third countries may offer ‘technological and operational added value’, this must not weaken the EU’s strategic security interests or undermine EDF objectives. Parliament has also stressed the need to be ‘creative’ regarding EU-UK cooperation on CFSP and CSDP.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Third-country participation in EU defence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

EU officials say that the 23rd summit between the European Union and China on Friday 1 April will focus on Russia’s war on Ukraine, the engagement of the international community to support Ukraine, the dramatic humanitarian crisis created by the conflict, its destabilising nature for the international order and its inherent global impact. The meeting, to be conducted by video-conference, is also expected to discuss bilateral issues and areas of shared interest, such as climate change, biodiversity and health, as well as ways to ensure a more balanced and reciprocal trade relationship. The EU is also likely to urge China to end its trade ban on imports from Lithuania, which followed the country’s decision to open a de facto Taiwan embassy in its capital. In recent years, China has become more of a rival for the EU than a declared strategic partner.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on EU-China relations, the country’s attitude to the war on Ukraine and its policies on other issues. Analyses on the war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

China’s ‘enlightened authoritarianism’ as an alternative to liberal democracy
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, March 2022

China can see the limits of bailing out Russia’s economy
Bruegel, March 2022

Six reasons why backstopping Russia is an increasingly unattractive option for China
Bruegel, March 2022

China offers Russia respite but not a solution
Bruegel, March 2022

Can China bail out Putin?
Bruegel, March 2022

China and Russia are joining forces to spread disinformation
Brookings Institution, March 2022

China’s choices and the fate of the post-post-Cold War era
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Ukraine presents opportunity to test China’s strategic outlook
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Caught between Russia and the West? China’s struggle for a position on Ukraine
Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 2022

The war in Ukraine: Troubling lessons for Taiwan
American Enterprise Institute, March 2022

Putin is creating the multipolar world he (thought he) wanted
Egmont, March 2022

Mapping China’s rise in the Western Balkans
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Let a thousand contacts bloom: How China competes for influence in Bulgaria
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

The war in Ukraine: China walking amid the shrapnel
European Policy Centre, March 2022

Could China be a partner for the West in managing the Ukraine crisis?
Foreign Policy Centre, March 2022

Amid the turbulent international landscape, China and Europe must reinforce trust
Friends of Europe, March 2022

Keeping China out of the Ukraine conflict
Friends of Europe, March 2022

The China factor in Russia’s war: Implications for Europe
German Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

China faces the consequences of supporting Russia
German Marshall Fund, March 2022

Watching China in Europe: March 2022
German Marshall Fund, March 2022

War in Ukraine: Asia takes sides
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2022

What is China’s position in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict?
Institut français des relations internationales, March 2022

China signals desire to improve ties with India, but is that what New Delhi wants?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

The rise of China and NATO’s new Strategic Concept
NATO Defence College, March 2022

China is too tied to the global economy to risk helping Russia
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

New technology restrictions against Russia could also target China
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

China bought none of the extra $200 billion of US exports in Trump’s trade deal
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Great power rivalry in a changing international order: Concepts and theories
Rand Corporation, March 2022

The dependence of China of Spain’s supply chains
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2022

China’s economic support for Russia is not a panacea
Bruegel, February 2022

How China’s investment in Middle East is evolving
Bruegel, February 2022

Learning the right lessons from Ukraine for Taiwan
Brookings Institution, February 2022

Germany and the trade conflict between Lithuania and China
Centre for Eastern Studies, February 2022

Ukraine is severe test of China’s new axis with Russia
Chatham House, February 2022

Russia’s escalation in Ukraine: Views from Asia
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Games changer: How China is rewriting global rules and Russia is playing along
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Europe’s role in promoting US-China arms control cooperation
Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, February 2022

The continued downturn of US-China relations and Beijing’s approach to the Ukraine crisis
Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2022

Convaincre et contraindre Les interférences américaines dans les échanges technologiques entre leurs alliés et la Chine
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2022

China’s path to geopolitics: Case study on China’s Iran policy at the intersection of regional interests and global power rivalry
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2022

Chinas nukleare Aufrüstung betrifft auch Europa
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2022

In the electric vehicle race, China coming first
Bruegel, January 2022

How Chinese competition helps western conglomerates
Bruegel, January 2022

China’s bullying of Lithuania spurs European unity
Carnegie Europe, January 2022

Coercion with Chinese characteristics: How Europe should respond to interference in its internal trade
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

How to counter Chinese interference: Keeping an eye on the geopolitical ball
Friends of Europe, January 2022

Lithuania, China and EU lawfare to counter economic coercion
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2021

China’s approach to global economic governance
Chatham House, December 2021

China’s new military base in Africa: What it means for Europe and America
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2021

Read this briefing on ‘EU-China ties and Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

Automated decision-making by systems that use machine learning to dynamically improve performance are still seen as lacking the ‘human perspective’ and flexibility to adapt to the particular nuances of specific cases. But perhaps, as they lack the ‘cunning’ to hide their biases, automated systems actually make fairer decisions than do humans, when these decisions are based on data that have been properly curated.

Machine learning systems can perform tasks for which they were not initially developed. While it is usually possible – and very effective – to develop specific algorithms to solve well-defined problems, this is not always the case when confronting more complex situations. In these instances, it may be more efficient to explore ways in which the machine can develop or adjust its own decision-making algorithms, rather than for human programmers to try and specify every step, taking all possible nuances into account.

Machine learning (ML) is a form of artificial intelligence (AI) in which computers develop their own decision-making processes for situations that cannot be directly and satisfactorily addressed by available algorithms. The process is adjusted through the exploration of existing data on previous similar situations that include the solutions found at the time. The system trains itself to come to a decision-making process whose solutions would match those of the training examples, when confronted with the corresponding initial data. The assumption is that new problems arising in similar situations can interpolate between those examples and, therefore, the appropriate solutions will follow similar lines.

The task of programmers is no longer to identify the specific steps constituting the right algorithm to solve the problem, but to find the right data or set of examples that will lead the ML system to adjust its decision-making process properly. The risks of this method are obvious, as it cannot be guaranteed that the resulting system will extrapolate situations in a meaningful way when the problem deviates significantly from the original learning data. The advantages are also evident, as this method facilitates solutions for very difficult problems in a dynamic, self-adjusting and autonomous way.

Potential impacts and developments

Machine learning systems do not rely on a direct expression of knowledge, but on implicit information emanating from a wealth of data. The broader and more balanced the dataset is, the better the chances will be of obtaining a valid result; but there is no a priori way of knowing whether the available data will suffice to collect all aspects of the problem at hand. The outputs of systems based on AI can be biased owing to imbalances in the training data, or if the data source is itself biased with respect to ethnicity, sex or other factors. A typical example is the poor results some facial recognition systems present when identifying black women, because not enough images of that specific population were used in the learning process. This leads to biases related to the sampling of data and results in pernicious decisions and discrimination. Although these biases are bad enough, they are not the only ones possible; biases can already be present in the data that reflect previous decisions, which are not guaranteed to be correct. This potential discrimination against minorities and other population groups leads to major ethical concerns. Machine learning systems therefore act as a mirror of society and replicate previous biases that become assimilated as a result.

A further problem relates to complicated accountability in AI, because so many actors and different applications are involved. When AI misbehaves, or the output is incorrect, who is responsible for the error? The user that benefits from the system, its owner, the manufacturer or the developers? The situation is currently unclear and that is why transparency and traceability are so important in AI – to provide complete and continuous information on how the AI tool is designed, developed, validated and used in day-to-day practice. ‘Blaming the machine’ has become the new way to designate a scapegoat, but someone has to be clearly accountable if we want actions to be taken towards correcting malfunction and possible biases. This leads to a problem of acceptance and trust. Both the party affected by the decision and the one that will be accountable for it need to rely on the system and accept its outputs. Even if the performance of an AI system is high, reliable, secure and unbiased, it may still be rejected, because the parties affected do not understand or trust the technology. In this respect, improving education on AI, as well as involving different stakeholders throughout the whole development process might increase AI acceptability and applicability.

Finally, there are privacy and security concerns, both in normal circumstances and in case of cyberattacks that can affect results or compromise data protection. It is therefore important to build more robust and reliable systems, as well as to increase the layers of protection in AI tools.

Anticipatory policy-making

Researchers are currently working on solutions to detect and compensate for biases in the data used for training ML systems and to obtain AI tools capable of ensuring a fair and safe use independently of sex, gender, age or ethnicity. There is always a trade-off between limiting access to some information on grounds of confidentiality to mitigate bias and reducing the accuracy of the AI mechanism. Additionally, data can be anonymised and access to it can be allowed solely on grounds of legitimate interest. However, both these solutions present important safety risks and it is not always clear what can be defined as legitimate interest. Furthermore, the different availability of data depending on population can also affect the process.

Having access to all the information seems always to be the best way to ensure a good result. Although AI systems may appear to be black boxes, it is possible to introduce mitigating measures, such as the tracking and explainability of the decisions taken using methods like SHAP or LIME. These methods allow checks on the reasoning followed in a specific decision-making process, by highlighting the conditions and data used and their effect on making a final choice. The user or supervisor can thus decide whether the result is sufficiently justified depending on the context at a more personal level. This leads to the question of who that supervisor should be, as well as the need for auditing depending on the level of risk for different applications.

Artificial intelligence has become a sector with huge economic potential and Europe cannot lag behind on innovation as a result of over-regulation. Regulatory sandboxes set up temporary reprieves from regulation to allow technology and the related legislation to evolve together. Rather than increasing regulation, it is crucial to ensure that existing rules, such as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), cover all new aspects that may appear as the technology evolves. European legislation such as the proposed AI act (together with the data act proposal and the data governance act) may apply not only to algorithms but also to datasets, thereby enforcing the explainability of decisions obtained through systems based on ML.

The idea of setting up AI ethics committees to assess and provide certification for the systems or datasets used in ML is also proposed by organisations such as International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CEN). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) follows similar lines in its recommendations on AI. While setting up standards and certification procedures seems a good way to progress, it may also lead to a false impression of safety, as the ML systems and the datasets they use are dynamic and continue to learn from new data. A dynamic follow-up process would therefore also be required to guarantee that rules are respected following the FAIR principles of data management and stewardship (FAIR: Findability, Accessibility, Interoperability and Reusability). The European Parliament’s Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (AIDA) presented a Working Paper on AI and Bias last November, paying special attention to data quality. It refers to the need to avoid ‘training data that promotes discriminatory behaviour or results in underrepresentation of certain groups, and keeping a close eye on how feedback loops may promote bias’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if machines made fairer decisions than humans?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if machines made fairer decisions than humans?’ on YouTube.

Written by Stefano Spinaci.

The EU’s commitment to the objectives of the Paris Agreement, and the ambitious European Green Deal, require significant investment. It is estimated that hundreds of billions of euros are needed in the current decade to reach the carbon reduction targets.

The EU taxonomy is a classification system that aims to channel public and private investment into environmentally sustainable economic activities in order to achieve environmental objectives, such as those in the fight against climate change.

It establishes a dynamic list of economic activities considered to be environmentally sustainable, provided they contribute substantially to at least one environmental objective and do not significantly harm any other. The European Commission claims that such a common understanding of what constitutes environmentally sustainable investment can facilitate the funding of the transition to a more sustainable economy by bringing clarity to investors, avoiding market fragmentation and reducing the risk of greenwashing.

While the basic legal act for the taxonomy is already in force, the process of establishing detailed criteria on how to classify activities as green is ongoing. A first delegated act on reporting obligations of companies was adopted on 6 July 2021.

The focus of this briefing is the two delegated acts determining which activities should be considered as sustainable and contributing to the fight against climate change, and be reported as such. The first climate delegated act came into force on 1 January 2022, establishing criteria for activities helping to mitigate or adapt to climate change. Activities in the nuclear and gas sectors are the subject of a complementary delegated act proposed by the European Commission on 2 February 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU taxonomy: Delegated acts on climate, and nuclear and gas‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU taxonomy: Delegated acts on climate, and nuclear and gas‘ on YouTube.