European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia continues to strengthen its military presence around the Ukrainian border, despite intensive diplomatic activity to ward off a feared armed conflict between the countries. Russia has amassed more than 100 000 troops, as well as ships, aircraft, rocket launchers and other heavy weaponry near Ukraine, prompting some politicians and analysts to say that war may be imminent. Others believe Russian President Vladimir Putin is still playing a diplomatic game, aimed, among other goals, at bringing Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence. The United States, the European Union and other countries have threatened severe sanctions against Russia should it start new hostilities, following its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the destabilisation of some eastern Ukrainian provinces.

This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the crisis and its implications for neighbouring countries, the European Union and global geopolitics. More reports on the issue can be found in a previous item from the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Friendly arguments: Biden’s and Zelensky’s disagreement on the threat from Russia
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Why the war in Ukraine could reshape the European nuclear order
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

How the Russia-Ukraine crisis could change Sweden’s security policy
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Putin knows exactly what he wants in eastern Europe, unlike the West
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Russia’s choices and the prospect of war in Ukraine
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2022

Russia’s ‘military-technical solution’ for Ukraine
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2022

Belarus seeks to amend its constitution to host Russian nuclear weapons
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2022

Russia’s assault on Ukraine and the international order: Assessing and bolstering the Western response
Brookings Institution, February 2022

How the demise of an arms control treaty foreshadowed Russia’s aggression against Ukraine
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 2022

For Biden, wreaking havoc on Russia’s economy is the least bad option
Atlantic Council, February 2022

Russia crisis military assessment: What would a ground offensive against Ukraine look like?
Atlantic Council, February 2022

With Putin poised to invade, Zelensky must prioritize Ukrainian unity
Atlantic Council, February 2022

How the Ukraine crisis could become a disaster for Russia
Heritage Foundation, February 2022

The return of US leadership in Europe: Biden and the Russia crisis
Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2022

Is Putin winning, or is he trying not to lose?
Egmont, February 2020

What Ukraine reveals about NATO and the EU
Carnegie Europe, February 2022

Rewinding the clock? US-Russia relations in the Biden era
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2022

Will tough US sanctions deter Russian aggression in Ukraine?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2022

Russia’s shifting foreign and security policy in Northern Europe: The new geopolitical meaning of ‘good neighbourliness’
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022

Kontraproduktive Drohpolitik: Russland drängt Finnland und Schweden näher an die Nato
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2022

Die Ukraine unter Präsident Selenskyj: Entwicklung hin zum ‚populistischen Autoritarismus‘?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2022

Ukraine conflict: An escalation within limits
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2022

How do the militaries of Russia and Ukraine stack up?
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

The Russia-Ukraine crisis could determine the future of sovereignty
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Putin’s Ukraine quagmire
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Russia and the West: A new Cold War?
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Russia-Ukraine: Diplomacy is the best hope for heading off a deeper crisis
International Crisis Group, February 2022

The Ukraine crisis: There is still room for diplomacy
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, February 2022

Ukraine: Germany is not to be relied upon?
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, February 2022

Murky waters: The Black Sea region and European security
Friends of Europe, January 2022

Western diplomacy on Russia must serve deterrence
International Institute for Strategic Studies, January 2022

What does Putin want with Ukraine and how does he plan to get it?
German Marshall Fund, January 2022

What it’s like in Ukraine as the Russia crisis unfolds
German Marshall Fund, January 2022

What next for diplomacy between the West and Russia?
German Marshall Fund, January 2022

Russia’s energy role in Europe: What’s at stake with the Ukraine crisis
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Why NATO has become a flash point with Russia in Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Guide to the chess game at the United Nations on Ukraine crisis
International Crisis Group, January 2022

In the shadow of war: Ukraine and the limits of a ‘geopolitical’ EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

Is Germany damaging Europe’s position on Ukraine?
Carnegie Europe, January 2022

The Russia-NATO crisis tests Turkey’s balancing policy
Carnegie Europe, January 2022

Europe faces tough choices on Nord Stream 2 if Russia invades Ukraine
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2022

Ukraine: The price of stability
Egmont, January 2022

A proposal for a new Western policy on the Russia-Ukraine conflict: Re-position to de-escalate
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, January 2022

Is a Russia-Ukraine war imminent?
Chatham House, January 2022

Why Putin’s gamble does not have to be lose-lose
Chatham House, January 2022

The future of European security: What does Russia want?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, January 2022

Can Europe survive painlessly without Russian gas?
Bruegel, January 2022

Once in a hole, stop digging: Russia, Ukraine, the West and the imperative of diplomacy
Clingendael, January 2022

The power of keeping calm: Ukraine in the face of Russia’s potential aggression
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2022

Russia demonstrates its power in Belarus and on the oceans worldwide
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2022

NATO member states on arms deliveries to Ukraine
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2022

Does Russia want a new Berlin Wall?
Foreign Policy Centre, January 2022

Why do we think we can read Putin’s mind on Ukraine?
The Hill, January 2022

If Russia invades, sanction its oil and gas
Brookings Institution, January 2022

Why Europe has no say in the Russia-Ukraine crisis
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Bonfire of sovereignty: Russian tanks in Belarus
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Moldovan lessons for the Ukraine conflict
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Kazakh lessons for authoritarian leaders: How Putin and Lukashenka could fail the test
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

The EU’s unforgivable failure
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

War in Ukraine: Erdogan’s greatest challenge yet
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Free-rider on the storm: How Russia makes use of crises in its regional environment
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Russia’s threat to invade Ukraine and Europe’s soft power
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022

How serious is Europe’s natural gas storage shortfall?
Bruegel, December 2021

A winter of Russian discontent?
Clingendael, December 2021

Read this briefing on ‘The Ukrainian crisis: Military threats and diplomacy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

On 17 November 2021, the European Commission tabled a legislative proposal aimed at curbing deforestation and forest degradation driven by the expansion of agricultural land used to produce specific commodities, namely cattle, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, soya and wood. Following up on a 2020 European Parliament resolution, which called for regulatory action to tackle EU-driven global deforestation, the proposal would impose due diligence obligations on operators placing these commodities and some derived products on the EU market, or exporting them from the EU. Member States would be responsible for enforcement, and for setting penalties in case of non-compliance. To facilitate due diligence and control, a benchmarking system would identify countries as presenting a low, standard or high risk of producing non-compliant commodities or products. Obligations for operators and national authorities would vary according to the level of risk assigned to the country of production.

While generally supporting the proposal, stakeholders have raised some issues, regarding for instance the commodities covered, the protection of human rights, the impacts of the country benchmarking on trade relationships, and the role of third-party certification.

In the Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. In the Council, work on the file is ongoing at working party level.

Versions

• February 2022: Towards deforestation-free commodities and products in the EU (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the making available on the Union market as well as export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 706
17.11.2021Rapporteur:Christophe Hansen (EPP, Luxembourg)2021/0366(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Delara Burkhardt (S&D, Germany)
Chrysoula Zacharopoulou (Renew, France)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Angelos Delivorias.

On 8 February 2022, participants in this online roundtable assessed the current economic and budgetary state of the European Union and its potential evolution in the coming years. Anthony Teasdale, Director‑General of EPRS, welcomed a panel of distinguished guests: Pedro Silva Pereira, Vice-President of the European Parliament, Karlo Ressler, Rapporteur on the 2022 EU Budget for the European Parliament Committee on Budgets (via video), Isabel Vansteenkiste, Director General for International and European Relations at the European Central Bank (ECB); Alfred Kammer, Director of the European Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); Maria Demertzis, Deputy Director of the Bruegel think tank, Director of the EPRS Members Research Service, Etienne Bassot, and Alessandro D’Alfonso, head of the EPRS Next Generation EU (NGEU) monitoring service. The event was moderated by Lasse Boehm, head of the EPRS Economic Policies Unit.

‘How strong is Europe’s economic recovery?’ The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) put this very topical question to participants during this event promoting the sixth edition of its flagship publication, the EPRS ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for 2022‘.

Anthony Teasdale, Director-General of EPRS, welcomed a prestigious panel of participants: Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D, Portugal), Vice-President of the European Parliament, Karlo Ressler (EPP, Croatia), Rapporteur on the 2022 EU Budget for the European Parliament Committee on Budgets, Isabel Vansteenkiste, Director General for International and European Relations at the European Central Bank (ECB); Alfred Kammer, Director of the European Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Maria Demertzis, Deputy Director of the Bruegel think tank, Director of the EPRS Members Research Service, Etienne Bassot, and Alessandro D’Alfonso, head of the EPRS NGEU monitoring service.

Anthony Teasdale opened the event and introduced the EPRS flagship annual publication, the ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook‘, now in its sixth year and the focus for this event. The publication offers an overview of the economic and budgetary situation in the EU and beyond, and summarises the main economic indicators in the EU and euro area and their two-year trends. In addition, it analyses the EU annual budget and its headings for 2022, all within the wider budgetary context of the EU’s post-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery fund. A ‘focus’ chapter highlights some aspects of the ongoing economic recovery –fiscal and monetary matters, labour issues and environmental choices – and aims to give a flavour of the discussion expected in the coming months.

Post-pandemic outlook

Vice-President Silva Pereira noted that the figures for 2021 were good, and going forward, are expected to be positive, although growth is projected to slow. However, he pointed out that, just like a year ago, while projections may be optimistic, emerging events such as new coronavirus variants (such as Delta and Omicron in 2021) could have an impact. The Vice-President’s first point therefore was that the pandemic must be monitored, as the outlook depends on its development. Vice-President Silva Pereira also noted that the EU currently also faces other crucial challenges, such as inflation generally – and high energy prices specifically – as well as supply chain issues. He also welcomed the optimistic signs on the employment front with positive figures in evidence, in many cases thanks to the measures taken by the Member States and the EU. In this context, he warned against the early withdrawal of important supporting instruments currently in place.

At the same time, Vice-President Silva Pereira stressed, it is important to acknowledge that the current recovery is uneven across sectors and Member States and that the EU needs to take this into account, as inequalities could constitute a major challenge going forward. There is also the question of the health of public finances, where deficit and debt have significantly increased in countering the pandemic, and may challenge the transition to ‘normalcy’ (end of the general escape clause) in the short-to-medium term. Some advocate a return to prudent fiscal policies, and inflation leads the ECB to think about moving towards a less expansionary monetary policy. In this context, it is important to get both the fiscal and monetary timing and their mix right. Moreover, investment is crucial for the recovery, and if countries with better economic and fiscal situation invest, the spill over effects might help everyone. Another challenge comes from the budgetary front and the own resources decision, where an effective implementation of own resources must be ensured. A proposal is on the table, but there is a long way to go between proposal and adoption.

Concluding, Vice-President Silva Pereira spoke about the ongoing debate on the economic governance review, where several proposals have been made by various stakeholders on what kind of revisions to perform, and whether to conclude the review before or after the general escape clause ends. In this context, he noted that, while the euro is still a work in progress and necessitates rules, attention must also be paid to completing the architecture of the economic and monetary union (EMU).

European Parliament priorities in financing the post-pandemic recovery

The floor was then passed to Karlo Ressler, Rapporteur for the 2022 EU budget. Although not available to attend in person, Mr Ressler provided a pre-recorded video made for and played during the event.

In his message, Mr Ressler shared insights into the challenges of the recent budgetary negotiations. The circumstances caused by the pandemic were not favourable. Mr Ressler explained that the European Parliament clearly stated its priorities from the beginning of the process. Its aim was to support recovery from the pandemic, boost green and digital investment, support young people in education and student mobility, and strengthen Europe’s capacity to face global challenges, beyond the existing EU goals. Negotiations with the Council were difficult and lengthy, as positions diverged regarding the budget allocations and the interpretation of the own resources decision concerning the repayment of NGEU interests. Parliament succeeded in reaching a satisfactory agreement on the 2022 budget, reinforcing the areas where there is greatest added value for EU citizens. The budget increased by almost €500 million, beyond the Commission’s proposals for priority programmes (Erasmus+, Horizon Europe, Asylum, migration and integration fund, single market and others). The 2022 EU budget was also significantly reinforced by NGEU funds.

European Central Bank perspective

Following Mr Ressler’s intervention, moderator Lasse Boehm, head of the EPRS Economic Policies Unit invited ECB Director General Isabel Vansteenkiste to set the scene from the ECB perspective.

Isabel Vansteenkiste first spoke about the current conjuncture and then adopted a broader perspective. According to her, the developments are positive – the economy bounced back swiftly – however, the recovery is not yet complete. Indeed, if we extrapolate the trend in GDP growth since 2014, a gap remains to be covered. Moreover, sectors have recovered unevenly: the manufacturing sector reached its pre-pandemic levels (although supply constraints persist), but the service sector still has some way to go, partly due to the slowdown in activity due to the Omicron variant.

Turning to inflation, Isabel Vansteenkiste noted that surprise increases continue, as the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) has reached over 5 % in the euro area. In this context, she noted that these surprises relate both to sectors where prices increased, as well as to the speed of that increase. Isabel Vansteenkiste noted that energy price inflation is an important factor in overall inflation, but even when excluded, HICP has risen due to a variety of other factors, including the pandemic (e.g. air fares, where ticket prices were very low at the onset of the pandemic, and are now significantly higher), and imported elements, such as supply chain bottlenecks. She noted that the ECB expects inflation to fall by the end of the year, but underlined the important role of energy prices, which in turn depend on geopolitics.

Looking back, the ECB Director General noted that there were some positive indications, given that some fears have not materialised. One of these was in the corporate sector, where significant bankruptcies were expected. This did not happen – to the contrary, the number of bankruptcies is lower than normal, due to the policy measures introduced to fight the pandemic. At the same time, she noted that the high debt accumulated by companies may stifle investment and constitute a break in the necessary digital and climate transitions going forward. Another threat that did not materialise to the extent expected, was labour market scarring. Labour markets recovered much faster than expected, in large part due to the job retention schemes put in place during the pandemic. Nonetheless, she noted that there are signs of mismatch in the labour markets (Beveridge curve), which could create challenges, and therefore need to be monitored.

Going forward, the ECB Director General noted the importance of long-term reform, such as reducing the tax bias against equity finance for example. She further noted that the twin (digital and climate) transition may need further sectoral reskilling and reallocation. Focusing on the green transition, she noted that the investment needs in this area are significant, and not yet met, and she was of the view that if fighting climate change is a public good, the discussion of the economic governance report should take this into consideration. There should be a discussion about pooling resources at EU level (e.g., a climate fund) to meet those needs.

International Monetary Fund perspective

Based on new data published recently by the IMF, as well as feedback from a consultation, IMF Director Alfred Kammer noted that the EU has recovered rapidly, thanks to forceful policies supporting disposable incomes, maintaining worker-firm links, preventing mass bankruptcy and ensuring credit flow. In this context, the euro area should exceed its pre-crisis output by 2025. At the same time, the recovery remains uneven: it has been slower in Member States with a high labour percentage in contact-intensive service sectors. This could lead to GDP growth divergence between EU countries, as well as increase inequalities. In this context, he praised the role the NGEU could play in preventing further divergences.

Alfred Kammer went on to note that while fiscal policy is still supportive, fiscal support becomes more and more targeted. Once the expansion is more firmly entrenched (possibly by the end of 2022), the Member States should start consolidating their finances, while remaining flexible regarding the possibility for more accommodation in case of further adverse impacts to their economies.

Regarding the labour market, Alfred Kammer underlined that, while the labour market has tightened, slack remains. Moreover, the large labour reallocation needs going forward call for bold policies (reskilling and upskilling workers), and for the protection of vulnerable groups (enhanced safety nets). With regards to the EU architecture, there is a need to reform EU fiscal rules and complete the financial single market (i.e. the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union (CMU)). Lastly, with regards to climate change, the NGEU is an important step towards ‘Fit for 55’, but more is needed (as the necessary investment amounts to 1 % of GDP per year, while for the moment Member States are expected (in their plans) to invest around 0.2 %). A central investment fund in this context is meaningful, as is private investment. For the latter, Alfred Kammer stressed the importance of carbon pricing and environment, social and corporate governance (ESG) indicators.

The think tank view

Deputy Director of the Bruegel think tank, Maria Demertzis first focused on inflation, noting that we have forgotten how to think about inflation, since the last time inflation risks were important was 20 years ago. Inflation in 2021 was mainly driven by supply-side factors, which central banks cannot do much about. As a result, and while this may not help the average consumer facing higher prices, she is of the view that, for the moment, central banks should not react. At the same time, she noted that there are indications of second round effects (supply side problems become demand side problems, e.g. wage inflation), and here, central banks cando something. However, Maria Demertzis remarked that even that is not without problems: increasing interest rates will have effects on Member State borrowing capacity, which can lead to financial fragmentation. While preventing financial fragmentation is not the ECB’s primary objective, she noted that it nevertheless cannot remain indifferent to this problem.

Concluding, Bruegel’s Deputy Director remarked that, to sustain the recovery and avoid introducing risks, the fiscal side must play a central role. In this context, it is very important to rethink the fiscal rules and to pool resources. In this latter case, the NGEU is of primary importance, but the EU should also consider other initiatives, such as the climate-related funds already mentioned.

Inflation perspectives

In the lively discussion that followed, Alfred Kammer pointed out that the data show that inflation is currently provoked by an exogenous shock (energy), but that second round effects can be dangerous. In contrast to the EU situation, US consumer price inflation is driven by durable goods and is very broad based (including automobile price inflation).

Isabel Vansteenkiste reminded participants that inflation was not a worry up to last year, but is indeed a concern today. She also noted the importance of inflation expectations, which are closely monitored. With regards to Maria Demertzis’ reference in non-industrial goods inflation, she noted that this is also closely monitored. With regards to wage growth, the ECB Director General noted that further wage growth should be expected, but, at the same time, those numbers must be adjusted for productivity.

Medium- to long-term outlook

Regarding the medium-to long-term outlook, Maria Demertzis’ view is that the main problem going forward is striking a balance between the investment demands necessary for the twin transition and debt sustainability, which ought to be at the core of EU policies. In this context, she noted the important role played by the NGEU as well as of joint pooling for the twin transition. On this point, Alfred Kammer highlighted that the NGEU is scheduled to end around 2025, while EU countries should continue to invest until at least 2030. In this context, he reiterated that it is very important to create a ‘central capacity’ at EU level for public investment, as climate is a public good. He also noted, however, that the public sector cannot bear the burden of climate adaptation alone – the private sector should help. He is of the view that incentives must be provided, and noted the importance of carbon pricing and the ESG disclosure standards in this context. Isabel Vansteenkiste agreed, and noted that, whether we want it or not, climate change is happening – it is our choice whether we suffer the costs of its impact, or counter it through the policies we adopt – and economics points towards adopting policies.

Next Generation EU and the Recovery and Resilience Fund

The discussion then turned to the NGEU and the RRF. The moderator passed the floor to Alessandro D’Alfonso, head of the newly-created NGEU monitoring service (NEXT) at EPRS. Alessandro D’Alfonso noted that 2022 was the first year of deployment of the RRF. Most plans are up and running and it is now time to deliver. The milestones and targets to be met average 20 per week. While not all results will be immediately visible due to the multiannual nature of many measures, it is important to make sure that they are followed through, to ensure the results. In his view, NGEU can be summarised in three key words:

• investment: (major challenges in the areas of the green and digital transitions and inclusion that require significant investments). The 2008‑2009 global financial crisis and the ensuing EU economic and sovereign debt crises triggered an investment gap in the EU, which persisted for a long time. A repeat of that situation should be avoided, given the challenges to address. He also noted that, during the current crisis, the level of public investment in the EU has increased, including with the contribution of the NGEU recovery instrument;
• impact: while the EU budget is relatively small, it is nevertheless an investment budget. Moreover, NGEU doubles its size in 2022 and in the following years. In addition, to maximise their potential, NGEU combines those investments with structural reforms and aims to trigger additional private investment through InvestEU; and
• income: from 2028, or possibly earlier, the EU budget will have to repay the NGEU resources borrowed on the markets. This could reduce the future capacity of the EU to use its budget to invest in key priorities. To avoid that risk, the European Parliament has underlined that new own resources must finance the EU budget. Proposals are currently on the table, and these are crucial files in the context of a broader debate on the financing of European public goods.

The head of the EPRS NEXT service concluded by noting that NGEU is an important lever that can help EU towards meeting the many challenges of the digital and climate transitions and crisis resilience.

When asked by Lasse Boehm whether they think that the RRF is enough and whether more needs to be done about its governance, Maria Demertzis argued that much more is needed going forward. She agreed about the importance of structural reforms directed towards growth and climate adaptation and mitigation. Similarly, she noted the importance of future-proof fiscal rules and private investments. In this context, she was of the view that completion of the CMU is of central importance (given that more developed capital markets can attract greater public and private funding for transition), as is the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies. She also underlined the importance of own resources going forward, and argued that the European Parliament must involve citizens in the discussion, as own resources imply more taxes on citizens.

Isabel Vansteenkiste noted the importance of fiscal efforts, especially given that the natural rate of interest is still very low. She also noted that the lessons from NGEU should be taken into account when discussing the role of the European Semester and that the RRF could be a great blueprint. Alfred Kammer agreed on the importance of fiscal efforts, as fiscal policy can and should play a role in macroeconomic stabilisation. He also highlighted that the IMF has advocated in favour of a central fiscal capacity for the EU.

Regarding fiscal policy coordination, Maria Demertzis noted that, in the short term, managing fiscal policy needs to be coordinated in order to be counter-cyclical (i.e. being prudent in good times to create a buffer for bad times), and not pro-cyclical as was previously the case.

Closing the event, Director of the EPRS Members Research Service, Etienne Bassot, thanked the participants, and reminded the audience that the EPRS Economic and Budgetary Outlook, as well as a new EPRS series that analyses individual national recovery plans, are available to the public.

To watch the event, please click here.

Written by Clément Evroux.

Over the past decade, space has gained increasing importance as an economic sector offering opportunities for established and emerging markets.

Space policies and their applications have also gained in political relevance due to their capacity to tackle global challenges, such as the climate and biodiversity crises, but also due to the growing reliance of the EU economy and society on space infrastructure, services and data.

Pursuant to Article 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), space is a shared competence of the EU and its Member States.

EU space policy has two overarching goals: on the one hand, promoting scientific and industrial competitiveness with a view to nurturing EU spatial ecosystems and ensuring EU autonomy in space; on the other, increasingly harnessing space investments and services to address key EU political priorities such as the European Green Deal and the Digital Decade.

This briefing focuses on the state of play in regard to the EU’s space economy, while also examining the EU’s reliance on space services. Specifically, it highlights the relevance of the EU in the global space market and looks at the ways the EU could boost its use of space data and services to deliver on its main political priorities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU space policy: Boosting EU competitiveness and accelerating the twin ecological and digital transition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Kiss (1st edition).

Platform work is an umbrella concept covering a heterogeneous group of economic activities completed through a digital platform. As platform workers’ rights are not enshrined in EU labour law, this increasingly leads to problems related to various aspects of their work (working conditions, healthcare, unemployment, pensions) and human development (education, training, recognition of skills). To remedy this situation, the European Commission has submitted a proposal for a directive aimed at improving the working conditions of platform workers, clarifying their employment status and supporting the sustainable growth of digital labour platforms in the EU.

Versions

• February 2022: Improving the working conditions of platform workers (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving working conditions in platform work Committee responsible:Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)COM(2021) 762
09.12.2021.Rapporteur:Elisabetta Gualmini (S&D, Italy)2021/0414(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Dennis Radtke (EPP, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

Some five years after the conclusion of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the political, economic, health and general situation in the country remains fragile, with a divided society, drugs-fuelled conflicts and weak governance. 2022 will be a key electoral year, while economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic remains a challenge. The President of Colombia, Iván Duque Márquez, is set to address the European Parliament during the February plenary session.

Political and economic situation

The year 2022 will be crucial for Colombia, with legislative elections scheduled for 13 March and the first round of presidential elections set for 29 May. Inequality, the economy, state capacity, violence and the handling of the pandemic are key issues for voters, and protests flared up during 2021. Polls point to a lead for Gustavo Petro, a left-wing candidate and former guerrilla, while analysts concur it is too early for robust predictions. Colombia, Latin America’s fourth-largest economy, is burdened by low trade openness and a commodity-dependent export base that leaves it vulnerable to price shocks; efforts to foster diversification have fallen short. The pandemic has led to the country’s most severe economic recession in over a century, aggravating unemployment, currently estimated at 13.8 % for 2021. However, gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have recovered to pre-pandemic levels by end-2021. About 64 % of Colombians are fully vaccinated against Covid-19, which is just about the average for the region. From 3 January 2020 to 8 February 2022, Colombia reported 5 966 706 confirmed Covid-19 cases, with 135 757 deaths, to the World Health Organization (WHO).

Security and human rights

In 2017, Colombia became a partner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the first in Latin America. It also signed a framework participation agreement to take part in EU-led Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions (entry into force in 2020). However, the country struggles significantly with security issues. With 177 killings in 2020, Colombia remains the world’s most lethal country for human rights defenders. The year 2020 saw a rise in the number of murders of social leaders, human rights defenders and former FARC members, the highest since 2011. Illicit cocaine cultivation and production are increasing. Colombia remains the primary source of origin for cocaine transported to the United States. Cocaine from Latin American producer countries (mainly Colombia) is the second most seized illicit drug in the EU.

EU-Colombia relations and EU support for the Colombian peace process

The EU has supported the Colombian peace process from the beginning – through diplomacy, international cooperation and development, humanitarian aid and civil protection, and investment and trade. This includes the EU-Colombia Trust Fund (€96.4 million); the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE); and, potentially, the European Peace Facility. The EU also finances United Nations projects to reintegrate ex-combatants. The EU is Colombia’s largest foreign direct investor and its third trading partner. Colombia is part of the trade agreement between the EU, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, in force since 2013. In October 2016, Colombia and Europol signed an agreement to improve the fight against criminal activities, in particular drug trafficking and money laundering. The Parliament, in its April 2021resolution on the peace agreement in Colombia, reiterated its readiness to continue providing all political and financial assistance to support the agreement’s implementation. The EU will deploy an EU election observation mission (EU EOM) to Colombia’s legislative and presidential elections; High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell recently appointed Javi López, MEP (S&D, Spain) as EU EOM Chief Observer.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Situation in Colombia ahead of crucial elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gregor Erbach (1st edition).

On 14 July 2021, as part of the ‘fit for 55’ package, the Commission presented a legislative proposal for a revision of the Regulation setting CO2 emission performance standards for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (vans). To raise the contribution of the road transport sector to the EU’s climate targets, the proposal sets more ambitious 2030 targets for reducing the CO2 emissions of new cars and vans and allows only zero-emission vehicles from 2035.

In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). Jan Huitema (Renew, the Netherlands), who was appointed as rapporteur, presented his draft report on 8 December 2021.

Versions

• February 2022: CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans: ‘Fit for 55’ package (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 556 final
14.07.2021Rapporteur:Jan Huitema (Renew, the Netherlands)2021/0197(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jens Gieseke (EPP, Germany)
Sara Cerdas (S&D, Portugal)
Bas Eickhout (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)
Sylvia Limmer (ID, Germany)
Pietro Fiocchi (ECR, Italy)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote

Written by Clare Ferguson.

As is traditional early in the year, Members are expected to debate a number of points on the agenda in Strasbourg that highlight the Parliament’s position on the European Union’s place in the world, not least in the light of recent geopolitical tensions. The session also marks the 20th anniversary of the euro. Returning to the custom of inviting heads of state and dignitaries to Parliament, the President of Colombia, Iván Duque Márquez, is expected to address Parliament in a formal sitting on Tuesday, with his country shortly to hold elections.

Later on Tuesday, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, will make a statement on EU-Africa relations, ahead of the (delayed) EU-Africa Summit, now scheduled for 17‑18 February 2022. Parliament is very much in favour of renewed EU partnership with the continent’s leaders, to strengthen links and tackle issues such as climate change and governance. However, it has underlined that this should not compromise democratic values in Africa. Democracy and human rights are Parliament’s first priorities in all its activities, and Members are expected to adopt a resolution on the EU’s 2021 annual report on human rights and democracy later on Tuesday afternoon, following consideration of the Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee’s own report. The AFET report calls for firm opposition to the decline in democracy and rising authoritarianism worldwide, exacerbated during the pandemic. It particularly highlights the need for better, results-oriented multilateral coordination to counter democratic erosion and to uphold human rights. In particular, the committee calls for support for the United Nations and respect for human rights in migration situations. It stresses the need to protect a number of individual rights and freedoms, to counter the effect of the pandemic on women, and to promote fair access to vaccines, among other things. The AFET report on human rights and democracy in the world also underlines the continuing fight against corruption and disinformation in elections, as well as the need to ensure human rights, particularly those of the most vulnerable in society, are upheld through trade and development agreements.

The HR/VP is also scheduled to make a statement on European security and Russia’s military threat against Ukraine on Wednesday, not least in the face of renewed US-Russia tensions. The EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) sets the framework for EU action outside the Union, including promotion of the EU values highlighted in the 2021 human rights report. In a joint debate on Tuesday afternoon, Members will discuss implementation of both the CFSP and the EU common security and defence policy (CSDP), in light of the 2021 AFET committee annual reports. Noting the need to strengthen multilateral partnerships, the CFSP report calls for development of the EU’s role in peace mediation, and better use of the existing sanctions provisions. While there is a strong focus on the EU neighbourhood, the AFET report welcomes the opportunities to advance multilateral and bilateral agreements through partnerships with strategic players, such as the USA. Climate change is considered a particular threat, and the report supports measures to further European strategic sovereignty in key enabling technologies in view of the green and digital transitions. The report highlights the geopolitical challenges posed by the actions of countries such as Russia and China, and applauds progress on the Strategic Compass. As the CSDP structures Member State cooperation on the EU response to crisis and conflict, the AFET committee’s 2021 annual report focuses on the EU’s security and defence doctrine, including the Strategic Compass, CSDP missions and operations, crisis management, resilience, capabilities, partnerships and parliamentary oversight. While the Strategic Compass represents a step towards a common EU defence union, the report underlines the need for greater support for CSDP missions, better crisis coordination, and the need to increase EU sea, cyber-, space and air capabilities. The report also calls for reflection on the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and for greater input from citizens on defence, notably in the framework of the Conference on the Future of Europe.

As climate change exacerbates crisis and conflict, steps to limit damage to the environment continue in line with the EU’s climate ambition. On Monday afternoon, Parliament is expected to consider a Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) own-initiative report on the EU offshore renewable energy strategy, an important element of the European Green Deal. The report calls for increased EU production of renewable energy, underlining that greater infrastructure investment is needed, including through EU funding, as well as further research and development and greater cooperation between EU countries. The report proposes that the scope of the offshore renewables market is widened to all EU sea basins, with streamlined permits and maritime spatial plans, and a more effective market design. To encourage the reduction of CO2 emissions and alleviate congestion, the EU proposes to change and extend the long-standing rules on charging heavy goods vehicles for using infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, to focus on distance travelled, rather than time taken. While national governments decide the charges on vehicles, the ‘Eurovignette’ system ensures there is no discrimination or market distortion. Members are scheduled to return to the issue on Wednesday afternoon, following negotiation between the co-legislators. Parliament is expected to consider the agreement, reached in trilogue, to extend the directive to cover charges for lighter vehicles, including passenger cars, and to progressively differentiate charges based on CO2 emissions and reductions for low emission vehicles. The draft agreement confirms Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) demands that Member States report regularly on the charges they levy and on the use of the revenue.

On Tuesday morning, Members are due to debate the final report concluding the work of Parliament’s Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA) – strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer – which makes recommendations aimed at combating the second most common cause of death in the EU. These include stronger EU action on cancer risk factors, such as alcohol and tobacco consumption, and wider screening. To ensure that access to cancer treatment is fair and accessible, the report advocates facilitating access to clinical trials and innovative treatment, better management of medicine shortages, and transparency on fair pricing and affordability of pharmaceuticals. The BECA committee also underlines the need for more funding for cancer research. On Thursday morning, Members are also scheduled to debate formal adoption of a provisional agreement reached during interinstitutional negotiations on the fourth update of the legislation protecting workers from carcinogens and other harmful substances that may cause health issues such as infertility. The agreed text sets stricter occupational exposure limits for hazardous substances, where Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) negotiators have succeeded in including a requirement for the European Commission to present an action plan to set limits for at least 25 substances by the end of 2022. When it comes to protecting children, the EU already has some of the world’s strictest requirements on toys, particularly concerning hazardous chemicals. On Tuesday afternoon, in advance of an update to the legislation, Members are expected to debate an own-initiative report from the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), examining implementation of, and proposing improvements to, the Toy Safety Directive. The IMCO committee sees a need for even greater precaution regarding chemicals, particularly endocrine disruptors, in toys, and calls for stricter surveillance and enforcement. The report also proposes to update the legislation to cover ‘connected toys’ and to ensure that non-compliant toys are removed from online marketplaces.

Parliament has long echoed citizens’ concerns about animal welfare, in calling for action to ensure that the high standards demanded by EU laws are respected in all EU countries. Members will consider a Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) own-initiative implementation report on farm animal welfare on Monday afternoon. The committee calls for updated rules based on scientific data, impact assessments and a species-by-species approach that covers all species, as well as for uniform implementation. The committee urges that the legislation cover issues such as keeping hens in battery cages, docking pigs’ tails and castrating piglets. The report also advocates a common framework for voluntary animal welfare labelling, with the possibility of a mandatory system in the future. While farmers’ stakeholders welcomed the report, which they consider takes their competitiveness into account, it has been criticised by animal welfare organisations.

Mutual societies, associations, foundations and social enterprises often face multiple legal and administrative challenges when operating across EU borders. On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is due to consider a legislative-initiative report calling on the Commission to propose legislation on minimum EU standards for cross-border associations and non-profit organisations. Enabling these organisations to obtain a legal personality would help them face the challenges identified in a Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee report, which stresses that national legal provisions for such organisations hamper the formation of a real pan-European civil society, leaving them open to discriminatory and unjustified restrictions, including regarding access to resources and free movement of capital.

• Situation in Colombia ahead of crucial elections
• Implementation report on on-farm animal welfare
• A European strategy for offshore renewable energy
• Strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer
• Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2021
• Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2021
• Human rights and democracy in the world – annual report 2021
• Implementation of the Toy Safety Directive
• A statute for European cross-border associations and non-profit organisations
• Charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures
• Protection of workers from the risks relating to exposure to carcinogens, mutagens and reprotoxins at work

Written by Jakub Przetacznik with Linda Tothova.

The media situation in Belarus has never been easy. With Aliaksandr Lukashenka being elected president of the country for the first time in 1994, the necessary reforms to provide media freedom have never materialised. Instead, over the years various laws have lessened the rights of independent journalists and imposed limits on both traditional and electronic media.

Following the August 2020 presidential election, which ignited a brutal crackdown against the democratic opposition, the situation has worsened. Harassment, a hijacking, and politically motivated jail terms, both short and long, intimidate Belarusians who want to exchange ideas, report wrongdoing or fight for freedom of expression and freedom for the country. In January 2022, the Belarusian Association of Journalists confirmed the presence of at least 32 journalists in Belarusian jails. On the positive side, new electronic media cannot be banned effectively and absolutely. While the regime slowly expands its presence on the internet, Belarusians trust independent media more and use it more eagerly. However, society’s distancing of itself from traditional state-controlled media is increasingly met with an angry reaction from the state apparatus, which in turn further tightens related laws.

The European Union, and the European Parliament in particular, actively support independent media and civil society in Belarus, and the Council of the EU and the Parliament both address the challenges to media freedom in the country. Financial help is also provided to Belarus and was even increased at the end of 2021, with priority areas of support including ‘systematically repressed’ independent media.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Media environment in Belarus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Audiences of the six biggest independent and six biggest pro-regime media internet outlets in June 2021 Registrations under law on mass media by media and ownership type Main sources of information

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition).

In July 2021, the European Commission put forward the ‘fit for 55’ package of legislative proposals, aimed at ensuring the success of the European Green Deal. The FuelEU Maritime regulation is one of these proposals and, together with four other proposals, it seeks to steer the EU maritime sector towards decarbonisation.

To support the uptake of sustainable maritime fuels, the Commission proposes to limit the carbon intensity of the energy used on board ships. Accordingly, the proposal sets up a fuel standard for ships and introduces a requirement for the most polluting ship types to use onshore electricity when at berth. It puts the responsibility for compliance on the shipping company.

The legislative outcome of this proposal will be closely linked to the simultaneously proposed rules on including the maritime sector in the EU emissions trading system, as well as those on alternative fuels infrastructure, energy taxation and renewable energy. Moreover, some of the proposed rules do not concern EU shipping only but have wider implications for international maritime shipping, which is regulated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Versions

• November 2011: Sustainable maritime fuels – ‘Fit for 55’ package: the FuelEU Maritime proposal (1st edition).

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of renewable and low-carbon fuels in maritime transport and amending Directive 2009/16/EC Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2021) 0562
14.07.2021Rapporteur:Jörgen Warborn (EPP, Sweden)2021/0210(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Vera Tax (S&D, The Netherlands)
Elsi Katainen (Renew, Finland)
Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Marco Campomenosi (ID, Italy)
Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium)
João Pimenta Lopes (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Maria Díaz Crego and Györgyi Mácsai.

The number of migrant children has been rising globally since the turn of the century. According to estimates by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, in 2020, 35.5million children were living outside their country of birth, 11.5 million more than in 2000. Child migration takes many forms, from regular family reunification to forced and traumatic migration. This infographic focuses exclusively on forced and irregular movements of migrant children to the EU.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Child migrants: Irregular entry and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gianluca Quaglio with Virginia Mahieu.

While killing all microorganisms in our bodies may seem tempting to some germaphobes, scientific evidence indicates that beneficial microorganisms (that live in nearly ubiquitous communities called microbiota) are an essential component of human health, and could form a new frontier for personalised medicine to fight non-communicable diseases and improve human health.

It is possible to raise animals completely free of microorganisms (i.e. bacteria, viruses, fungi and parasites). These ‘germ-free’ animals can survive (with supplementation of vitamins), but show marked differences in health and development, such as abnormal digestion, metabolism, respiration and circulation, as well as behavioural and neurological dysfunction.

These models make it possible to study the interplay between human microbiome (all microbiota in the body) and host, revealing some interesting and perhaps unexpected links.

The microbiome is essential to human life in many ways, including not only digestion, but also hormone regulation and the immune system, and even mental health. Humans and our microbiomes are an example of a symbiotic relationship: we provide them with shelter and food, and they provide us with many ‘services’ in return.

The microbiota in our gut feed on prebiotics (a group of nutrients that are degraded by gut microbiota) such as dietary fibre – a substance commonly found in cereals, vegetables and nuts – that we cannot digest. In return, they break down essential nutrients and they help keep infections at bay. In addition, the microbiota have been shown to be a key regulator of the gut-brain axis, and thus the microbiota-gut-brain axis has been proposed.

Probiotics (foods and supplements containing specific microorganisms that can contribute to health such as yogurt, miso and kefir) are gaining increasing popularity, not only for increasing general wellbeing, but also for treating a number of medical conditions.

Potential impacts and developments

Diet, physical activity, medical treatments and environmental factors can all affect our microbiome. There is indication that the human microbiome could be detrimentally impacted by societal changes of the past few decades, especially in terms of nutrition, lifestyle and the use of antibiotics. It is increasingly plausible that a substantial rise in a large host of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) could be at least partially attributed to changes in our gut microbiome. As NCDs currently represent over 70 % of global deaths, these place an enormous burden on healthcare systems and economies.

At least partly responsible for this rise in NCDs may be a shift in the consumption of fresh versus processed food, and an increased use of food additives such as emulsifiers and artificial sweeteners. In the USA, a country with one of the highest rates of obesity in the world, healthier food is markedly more expensive and often less readily available.

Some doctors are now prescribing probiotics as medical treatment for gastrointestinal conditions and allergies, but their full health potential is not yet widely demonstrated or recognised by the medical community. In fact, pending a deeper biological understanding and wide-scale clinical trials, probiotics could have the potential to treat other conditions such as obesity, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, rheumatoid arthritis, respiratory tract infections, and several other pathologic conditions. Perhaps most intriguingly, gut microbiota can influence brain physiology and pathology via the ‘gut-brain axis‘ and treating dysbiosis could in some cases influence anxiety and depression, as well as multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases. Probiotics are even being suggested as an alternative to chemical disinfectants in hospitals.

Antibiotics, though effective at killing pathogens, can also kill some of the ‘good bacteria’ in our gut. The balance of the microbiome is delicate, and shifts in that balance can leave space for flare-ups of certain types of bacteria that, while helpful in small quantities, may not be good in larger quantities. Misuse and abuse of antibiotics can therefore have several potential side-effects.

Furthermore, persistent and excessive prescription of antibiotics can lead to antimicrobial resistance (AMR), meaning that we increasingly have to resort to more potent broad-spectrum antibiotics. Deaths from multi-drug resistant (MDR) bacteria accounted for more than 33 000 deaths in Europe in 2015. Recent research suggests that the future combat against AMR may involve probiotic-based approaches.

In short, killing infectious bacteria is important, but it can damage the balance of the human microbiome. If this is not prevented or managed it can ultimately lead to health problems in itself. There is evidence that taking probiotics can mitigate some of the side effects of antibiotics. Furthermore, probiotics could become part of a more personalised form of medicine in which treatments for a range of conditions are adapted based on the composition of the patient’s microbiome. They could open a path for preventing certain NCDs, and they could reduce the need for antibiotics in healthcare (both as medical treatment and as disinfectant).

Anticipatory policy-making

To safeguard the future of public health, we need to respect the ‘invisible’ microorganisms that live with us and are currently largely ignored or even unknowingly harmed. Though their role is becoming increasingly evident, there is currently no EU guidance, legislation or regulation on microbiomes in the context of human health.

Furthermore, EU food law does not yet contain any provisions for evaluating the safety or composition of probiotics in food, or how our food processing or intake can affect the human microbiome. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is currently investigating the scientific evidence on microbiomes and working to integrate it into regulatory assessments.

There are major limiting factors for research into the potential applications of probiotics in healthcare and general wellbeing, so many health claims are currently associated with a lack of a clear causal pathway. Probiotic products can be subject to fad marketing and hype, so without proper governance they can lack credibility and quality control.

In addition, there is a need for new microbiome-oriented diagnostic tools in medical care. For the potential benefits of targeting the microbiome to reach society, the EU should consider standardisation, protocols, and a regulatory framework to support research and innovation. This research is essential to further understanding the processes that underlie the human microbiome and how to treat it.

The health of the microorganisms in our bodies and our food goes hand in hand with the health of the planet. A better understanding of the role of microorganisms in soil and in the ocean could also contribute to sustainable agriculture and plant protection by improving crop yields and reducing the need for pesticides. They could also contribute to a circular economy through improved waste degradation, helping to mitigate pollution and closing gaps in the production chain. As such, they could contribute to the successful achievement of several of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as well as the EU circular economy action plan, and the European Green Deal.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we killed all microorganisms in our bodies?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if we killed all microorganisms in our bodies?’ on YouTube.

Written by Nikolina Šajn.

The European Commission has announced the establishment of a ‘right to repair’, with a view of saving costs for consumers and facilitating the development of a circular economy. The right to repair may refer to different issues and situations: repair during the legal guarantee, the right to repair after the legal guarantee has expired, and the right for consumers to repair products themselves.

Rates of repair depend on the type of a product, with the cost of repair being the most important reason consumers avoid repair. Research shows that consumers favour products that are easily repaired, but their willingness to pay for such products depends on the type of product and the way information on the reparability is presented to them.

Currently, EU contract laws give consumers a right to have faulty products repaired during the legal guarantee, while the new generation of ecodesign rules require the availability of spare parts for a certain time, at least for some products. Repair-related requirements are also present in the rules on the EU Ecolabel. The Commission is now planning a number of initiatives to improve reparability of products, including legislation on the right to repair, on empowering consumers for the green transition, a sustainable products initiative, design requirements for electronics, and measures making the broader economic context more favourable to repair.

The European Parliament has been in favour of improving consumers’ right to repair for over a decade, and has in this parliamentary term adopted two resolutions that contain a number of concrete proposals to make repairs systematic, cost-efficient and attractive. Consumer organisations and associations advocating for easier repair have called for rules to facilitate repair for non-professionals, and to guarantee consumers access to spare parts and repair manuals. Business organisations favour professional repairs, and have warned that any information requirements should not infringe on companies’ intellectual property.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Right to repair‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Right to repair‘ on YouTube.

Written by Luisa Antunes with Laia Delgado Callico

Enforced collective social isolation during the coronavirus crisis has led to unprecedented societal changes. Each of us has dealt with stress factors resulting from social distancing, reduced interpersonal connections, and work and study challenges. At the same time, we have retained a sense of connectivity and belonging through the use of technology. This new unique set of circumstances has yielded unprecedented impacts on our psychological makeup and our interaction with the collective. What psychosocial and mental health factors affected us during the pandemic? Which stressors contributed to the development of mental health issues? Which protective factors can strengthen resilience and mental health?

To answer these questions and to discuss policy options for strengthening the EU’s common response to the coronavirus outbreak, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) organised an online ‘STOA Meets Experts’ event ‘Coping with the pandemic: Psychosocial consequences of the corona crisis‘, which took place on 25 January 2022.

European Parliament Vice-President and STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) opened the event stressing STOA’s commitment to science as a fundamental means for ensuring European citizens’ wellbeing. She mentioned that the European Parliament approved a resolution in July 2020, recognising mental health as a fundamental human right and calling for a 2021‑2027 EU action plan on mental health.

Presentation of the STOA study ‘How are we coping with the pandemic? Mental health and resilience amid the COVID-19 pandemic in the EU’

Dr Angela Kunzler, research associate at the Leibniz Institute for Resilience Research (Germany), presented the first EU-exclusive review study addressing the mental health impact of the pandemic and the impact of containment measures and policies centred on health, work and financial support. The study, commissioned by STOA, compared data before and during the pandemic from observational studies performed across population groups and Member States.

A consistent increase was observed in anxiety, depression and general distress during the first wave of the pandemic, followed by adaptation in a further early phase. This adaptation can be interpreted as resilience, i.e. the maintenance or fast recovery of mental health during or after exposure to a stressful event. The individuals most affected were women, people of lower socioeconomic background and those affected with feelings of loneliness and fear of Covid‑19. Protective factors identified included the existence of social support systems, financial stability and the exercise of physical/recreational activities. No conclusions could be drawn regarding the impact of containment measures or of specific support policies in different Member States.

Four possible policy options were identified:

(i) to monitor mental health in the general EU population over a period of at least five years;

(ii) to raise public and policy-maker awareness;

(iii) to conduct an EU-wide study of the impact of Covid‑19 on mental health services, and

(iv) to initiate a mental health preparedness and response strategy focused on psychosocial and mental support.

Expert reflexions

Dr Eleni Andreouli, director of research at the School of Psychology & Counselling at The Open University (United Kingdom), focused on what helps us as a society to better cope with the pandemic, highlighting social solidarity and opportunities for collective resilience.

A recent study showed how the polarisation of opinions increased during the pandemic, leading to a decline in trust in national governments and in the EU. The pandemic exacerbated already-existing tensions in the social contract. It increased social and health inequalities, altered social interactions and work-life balance, and brought new norms in our identities as citizens in the public space.

However, the shared traumatic experience can also be a positive opportunity for the design of a new social contract built around solidarity and care. This will depend on the ability for authority figures, such as political and scientific, to show leadership in addressing social and health inequalities and in harnessing concrete policies and practices centred on inclusion and common identity.

Discussion

Member of the European Parliament, Peter Liese (EPP, Germany) focused on the impact of the pandemic – school closures – on the mental health of children. ‘Long-Covid’ poses challenges to our mental health and the neurological effects of the virus should not be understated. In this regard, daylight and physical activity were fundamental tools to improve our mental health during Covid‑19. In addition, targeted support should be provided to people suffering from severe mental health issues.

Vice-President Kaili reminded participants of the importance of stress resilience. More research is needed on mental health protective factors and on the long-term effects of Covid‑19. An EU-wide research study should be developed to compare the response of national healthcare systems to the mental health impact of the pandemic. The results could then be used to develop an EU emergency preparedness plan to counteract the negative mental health consequences of pandemics in general.

The full recording of the event is available here. Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Ann Neville.

Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimated total number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had no criminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands of criminals or terrorists.

Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. They can be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in the EU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicit firearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons also frequently appearing.

Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engage in firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threat precisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminal connections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy to convert weapons.

The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative and policy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking. The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN) in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN’s global firearms programme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed as source or transit countries for illicit firearms.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU policy on firearms trafficking‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

The European Peace Facility (EPF) has been operational since 1 July 2021. This off-EU budget instrument finances operations with military implications (previously financed by the Athena mechanism and the African Peace Facility), and provides support to the EU partner countries’ armies with infrastructure, training and equipment, including with lethal weapons. So far, it has funded operations in places as diverse as the Western Balkans, the Eastern Neighbourhood, in particular Ukraine, and sub-Saharan Africa. As stated in the Strategic Compass process, the EU aims to strengthen its crisis management role, with the EPF playing a crucial role in this process.

EPF: A budget of nearly €6 billion and a key role in EU security

The EPF was set up by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (the EPF Decision) of 22 March 2021, and entered into force on the same day. The EPF has a financial ceiling of €5.692 billion (in current prices) for 2021-2027, with an annual ceiling that will gradually increase from €420 million in 2021 to €1.132 billion in 2027. Member States make yearly contributions to the facility in proportion to their GNI. Denmark opted out of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) on military matters (by a formal declaration made under Article 31(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The EPF has two financing pillars, brought together in an effort to simplify decision-making and make EU actions more coherent. The operations pillar finances the common costs of CSDP missions and operations that have military or defence implications. The assistance measures pillar finances EU actions for third states and regional or international organisations, aimed at strengthening military and defence capacities and supporting military aspects of peace support operations (PSOs). The facility has two secretariats: one for CSDP operations, hosted by the Council, and another for assistance measures, hosted by the European Commission’s Foreign Policy Instruments Service.

Emerging external actors pose challenges to the EU’s CSDP missions and operations. It is hoped that the EPF, which for the first time allows the EU to train and equip, including with lethal weapons, the armies of its partner countries, will help counter these challenges. In a rapidly evolving security context, the Strategic Compass, expected to be formally adopted at the European Council meeting on 24-25 March 2022, will seek to strengthen the EU’s role in crisis management, with the help of both civilian experts and military forces. It will also aim to make full use of the EPF, without any geographical limitations, to make the EU partners more resilient against hybrid threats. The compass suggests forging closer links between CSDP missions and operations, on the one hand, and European-led ad-hoc coalitions, on the other, notably in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Strait of Hormuz; it also suggests that EPF-funded activities might help these ad-hoc coalitions.

A farewell to the African Peace Facility, but not to funding for military activities

The African Peace Facility (APF), which was created in 2003, is still de facto in force, but will no longer receive new funding. Through the APF, EU Member States have funded military activities in Africa, namely African Union (AU)-led or AU-supported PSOs, in places like South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Somalia, the Sahel, Gambia, and the Lake Chad Basin. The EPF has now taken the place of the APF to finance the military components of AU-led or AU-supported PSOs, while the Neighbourhood, Development and International Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) is used to finance the civilian components of those PSOs.

On 22 July 2021, the Council adopted an assistance measure under the EPF in the form of a general programme for support to the AU. With a budget of €130 million, the assistance measure will provide support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali national army. It will also help to finance: the military component of the G5 Sahel Force (covering Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger); the PSO in Gambia (ECOMIG); and the Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (which supports the fight against Boko Haram in Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger).

Common costs of CSDP military missions and operations: Not a farewell to Athena

Observing the ban imposed by Article 41(2) TEU on paying operating expenditure arising from CSDP operations having military or defence implications from the EU budget, but using the possibility offered by this article to charge Member States for such expenditure, the Council established the Athena mechanism in 2004. This mechanism has financed the ‘common costs’ of CSDP operations, covering 5-10 % of the total cost of an operation. The EPF has maintained the Athena cost-sharing mechanism and its governance system, and currently contributes to the common costs of the seven active CSDP operations and missions.

EPF-funded assistance measures

In December 2021, the Council adopted a €24 million EPF-funded assistance measure for Mali, for a period of 30 months. Jointly with the EU Training Mission in Mali, this measure will help strengthen the capacities of the Malian armed forces to conduct military operations aimed at restoring Malian territorial integrity and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups. The Malian minister for foreign affairs has requested that the EU training mission evolve, possibly with the EPF, into both a more efficient training component (with ‘train the trainers’ programmes) and more combative components (with directly deployable equipment, lethal weapons, vehicles, aircraft and means of communications). On 2 February 2022, the HR/VP deeply regretted the expulsion of the French Ambassador to Mali by the country’s transitional government.

On 12 July 2021, the Council set up a military training mission to Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique). Officially launched on 15 October, the mission seeks to help address the crisis in Cabo Delgado province, by providing the Mozambican army – more specifically the military units that will be part of a future quick reaction force – with training and capacity-building. The common costs of the mission are funded by the EPF, which also supports assistance measures to the mission. On 30 July 2021, the Council approved a concept note for a €4 million assistance measure under the EPF for the most urgently required equipment; on 19 November 2021, the Council decided to complement the former measure with a €40 million assistance measure, to enable the units trained by EUTM Mozambique to conduct security operations in Cabo Delgado province. EUTM Mozambique, which mainly consists of Portuguese special forces, will train a total of 11 companies of the Mozambican army and navy. The EU is providing these units with individual and collective equipment, ground mobility assets, technical tools and a field hospital. Moreover, a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission, the SAMIM, was deployed on 15 July 2021 to join forces with the Mozambican national army and other (South African but also Zimbabwean and Rwandan) foreign troops in combating the Islamic terrorists; the SADC decided on 12 January 2022 to extend the SAMIM mandate for three months. For comparison, the extension will cost almost €26 million for the SADC.
The EU is likely to respond favourably to possible requests from Rwanda (although it is not a SADC member state), Mozambique or the AU, to fund, through the EPF, the deployment of African troops in Mozambique.

On 4 November 2021, the Council adopted an assistance measure of €10 million to support the capacity building of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and to finance the delivery of 68 medical and transport vehicles and 150 metal detectors to the BiH humanitarian demining battalion, with the aim of helping the country become mine-free by 2027. EPF funds also support EUFOR Althea, which has, with around 600 troops, an executive mandate to maintain a stable and secure environment in BiH.

On 2 December 2021, the Council adopted assistance measures to Georgia (€12.75 million) Moldova (€7 million) and Ukraine (€31 million), all for a period of three years and aimed at strengthening the capacities of the beneficiary countries in military and defence matters, as well as promoting domestic resilience and peace. The measure for Ukraine finances military medical units (including field hospitals), engineering units (including demining), mobility and logistics units, and support for cyber-defence. It is worth noting that, against the backdrop of renewed Russian threats on the Ukrainian border, a cyber-attack was launched against the Ukrainian government’s websites on 14 January 2022. The HR/VP intends to propose establishing an EU Military Advisory and Training Mission in Ukraine; the costs of such a mission, its possible participants, the Ukrainian needs and the modalities of EU help have already been evaluated; pending Member States’ agreement, the preparatory work to deploy the mission is ongoing at an accelerated speed. On 24 January, the Council stressed that the EU is defining arrangements for support to Ukraine in the area of professional military education. So far, none of the EPF-funded active assistance measures that the Council has approved at the request of the countries concerned allows for the controversial supply of equipment designed to deliver lethal force.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘The European Peace Facility: A new tool in action‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik with Linda Tothova.

Since the beginning of 2021, Ukraine has struggled with Russia’s attempts to further destabilise the country and intensify tensions in Europe’s east, including through repetitive military build-ups along Ukraine’s borders. Russia’s most recent threatening troop manoeuvres, together with its unsupportable security demands, met with a united response from Western countries, making it clear that a very high price will be paid if Russia attacks Ukraine. The EU and its institutions, including the European Parliament, have been clear in their response to Russia’s aggression on Ukrainian territory. The EU does not recognise the illegal annexation of Crimea and regularly calls on Russia to de-escalate and withdraw its forces, and urges Moscow and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine to adhere to the ceasefire agreement. Currently the situation remains very volatile.

Relations between the European Union and Ukraine continue to be shaped by the 2014 Association Agreement, which includes the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. The long-term relationship between the EU and Ukraine covers a broad range of areas including trade, providing assistance to the country’s health sector, support for the country’s reform agenda, and support for the fight against hybrid attacks against Ukraine that have been perpetrated by Russia ever since Ukraine made its firm pro-European choice in 2014.

Russia decided to respond aggressively to the Revolution of Dignity – a revolution whose main aim was the signature of the Association Agreement – and immediately after the change of power in Ukraine in 2014 it annexed Crimea and moved to actively support Donbas separatists. Intensive fighting in Donbas in 2014 and early 2015 led to the Minsk agreements, but limited progress in implementing the agreements on the Russian side have led to the prolongation of Western sanctions against Russia. Russia continues its bullying policy towards Ukraine with a wide range of instruments, including disinformation, blackmail and cyber-attacks.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-Ukraine relations and the security situation in the country‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

The European Union (EU) is committed to working collectively to eradicate female genital mutilation (FGM), as part of broader efforts to combat all forms of violence against women and girls, and to supporting the efforts of its Member States in this field. The European Commission has undertaken to assess EU efforts to combat FGM every year, on or around 6 February – the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation.

Facts and figures

Female genital mutilation (FGM) includes all procedures that intentionally alter or cause injury to the female genital organs for non-medical purposes. FGM is carried out for cultural, religious and/or social reasons, mostly on young girls between infancy and the age of 15. It has no health benefits and can have serious immediate and long-term effects on health and wellbeing.

The exact number of girls and women affected by FGM is not known, but the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that, worldwide, at least 200 million women and girls have been cut, while around 4 million girls are at risk of undergoing FGM every year. The practice, which is most common in 28 African countries, is also prevalent in parts of the Middle East and Asia, and has been reported to a lesser extent elsewhere. Assessments issued by the United Nations Secretary-General and UNICEF-UNFPA, find that prevalence has been reduced in some regions, but progress could be cancelled out as a result of population growth, girls undergoing FGM at a younger age and further spread of the practice as a result of population movement. The coronavirus pandemic has been a further obstacle to progress, putting more girls at risk of FGM and disrupting prevention efforts and support services. Medicalisation of FGM is a growing problem.

Although official EU data on the prevalence of FGM in Europe are lacking, four studies to map FGM, conducted by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) between 2012 and 2020, found that there are victims (or potential victims) in at least 16 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Around 20 000 women and girls from FGM-practising countries seek asylum in the EU every year, with an estimated 1 000 asylum claims relating directly to FGM. This number has grown steadily since 2008.

Commitments and action to combat FGM

FGM constitutes a form of child abuse and gender-based violence, and is recognised internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls and women. The practice also violates a person’s rights to health, security and physical integrity; the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and the right to life in cases where the procedure results in death. Measures have been adopted at international, EU and national level to prevent FGM and to protect FGM victims.

Instruments and action at international level

At international level, United Nations (UN) and Council of Europe standards are benchmarks for work to combat FGM. Key treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Geneva Convention, all cover FGM indirectly, with specific guidance on protection and asylum for victims. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (‘Istanbul Convention’), is the first treaty to recognise that FGM exists in Europe (Article 38), and sets out specific obligations on preventing and combating the practice, and providing support for victims and those at risk.

The UN’s longstanding efforts to end the practice culminated in its first specific resolution on FGM in 2012, calling for the adoption of national action plans and comprehensive strategies to eliminate it. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies FGM as a harmful practice, to be eliminated by 2030 (Goal 5), a priority reaffirmed by the UN – in a resolution in 2018 and at the International Conference on Population and Development in 2019. Concrete targets were set at the Generation Equality Forum in 2021. The UN also recommended action to tackle FGM in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. The UN has named 6 February the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation, and the European Commission takes stock annually, around that day, of EU efforts to combat FGM.

Legislative and policy framework at EU level

The EU itself currently has no binding instrument designed to protect women from violence, but relevant instruments exist in a number of areas. The principles of gender equality and non-discrimination are affirmed in the Treaties and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which also guarantees the right to dignity and includes provisions on the right to physical and mental integrity. The Directive on Victims’ Rights requires provision of support services for victims of violence, including FGM. The Asylum Reception Conditions Directive specifically mentions victims of FGM as being among vulnerable persons who should receive appropriate healthcare during their asylum procedure, while the recast Qualification Directive includes FGM as grounds to consider when granting asylum. Both directives are under review. The EU signed the Istanbul Convention in 2017 and is currently in the accession process. Parliament has urged those Member States that have not yet done so to ratify and implement this convention.

Combating gender-based violence, including FGM, is one of the priorities of the EU’s external action and its internal strategies on children’s rights and gender equality Proposals for new EU legislation on gender-based violence and a recommendation on measures to prevent harmful practices are planned for 2022. In addition, the approach to eliminating FGM adopted in 2013 will continue, with the aim of ensuring that action to combat FGM is mainstreamed across the fields of justice, police, health, social services, child protection, education, immigration and asylum and external action. Areas where the Commission has promised to act include:

• providing the reliable, comparable EU-level data necessary to establish the prevalence of FGM and provide a solid basis for policy;
• improving victim support by helping Member States to develop support services for victims, and training and awareness-raising for relevant professionals, focusing on empowering communities;
• supporting Member States in prosecuting FGM more effectively;
• ensuring that women at risk are protected more effectively under EU asylum rules through proper transposition and implementation of the EU legislative framework on asylum and victim protection;
• promoting worldwide elimination of FGM, by ensuring that EU external policy addresses FGM.

Funding for tackling FGM is made available through the joint EU-UN Spotlight Initiative and EU funding programmes, notably the longstanding Daphne strand, which is continuing under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme for 2021-2027.

National-level instruments against FGM

Many of the actions needed to end FGM lie within the competences of the Member States. FGM is now a prosecutable offence under national law in all Member States, either as a specific criminal act or as an act of bodily harm or injury. However, very few cases are brought to court. A number of Member States have also developed national action plans on FGM. Continuing issues of concern include barriers to reporting and successful prosecution, victim support, and ways to ensure long-term, sustainable cultural change.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has played an important role in raising awareness and pushing for firm action on FGM, including through the work of its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). Parliament adopted resolutions on FGM in 2001, 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2018, calling on the Commission and Member States to provide the legal and other means required to raise awareness, protect and support victims and ensure that offenders are prosecuted. In 2016, it called for appropriate protection for women and girls seeking asylum on grounds of FGM. In 2020, Parliament set out its own recommendations for an EU strategy to put an end to FGM around the world. It has called for coordination of external and internal programmes and for action to address the increased risks of FGM resulting from the pandemic. Parliament has also welcomed the Commission’s plan for an EU recommendation.

This publication is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note originally published in January 2015.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Zero tolerance for female genital mutilation‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a major revision (recast) of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), as part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package. The latter consists of several legislative proposals to meet the new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. It is a core part of the European Green Deal, which aims to set the EU firmly on the path towards net zero GHG emissions (climate neutrality) by 2050.

The recast EPBD aims to accelerate building renovation rates, reduce GHG emissions and energy consumption, and promote the uptake of renewable energy in buildings. It would introduce a new EU definition of a ‘zero emissions building’, applicable to all new buildings from 2027 and to all renovated buildings from 2030. Zero-emissions buildings would need to factor in their life-cycle global warming potential. The recast EPBD would accelerate energy-efficient renovations in the worst performing 15 % of EU buildings, and would set minimum energy performance standards. In due course, every building would need to achieve at least a Class E on a revised A-G scale of energy performance certificates (EPCs). EPCs would be included in linked national databases. Other provisions introduce building renovation passports and a smart readiness indicator, end subsidies for fossil fuel boilers, and make building automation and control systems more widespread.

The file has been referred to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which will in due course appoint a rapporteur, who will produce a draft report.

Versions

• February 2022: Revision of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive: Fit for 55 package (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the energy performance of buildings (recast) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021) 802 final
15.12.2021Rapporteur:To be appointed2021/0426(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Appointment of rapporteur

Written by Gregor Erbach with Nela Foukalova (1st edition).

As part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package, the Commission presented a legislative proposal to review the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The aim of the review is to align the EU ETS Directive with the EU target set out in the European Climate Law to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 55 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels.

To this end, the amount of emission allowances would be reduced, fewer allowances would be allocated for free, and the ETS would be extended to maritime transport. This would reduce emissions in the ETS sectors by 61 % by 2030, compared to 2005. A separate new emissions trading system would be established for fuel distribution for road transport and buildings. The Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund would be enlarged, and Member States would be obliged to spend all of their ETS revenues on climate action.

In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which has appointed Peter Liese (EPP, Germany) as rapporteur.

Versions

• January 2022: Review of the EU ETS: ‘Fit for 55’ package (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 551
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Peter Liese (EPP, Germany)2021/0211(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jytte Guteland (S&D, Sweden)
Emma Wiesner (Renew, Sweden)
Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Danilo Oscar Lancini (ID, Italy)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Silvia Modig (The Left, Finland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on draft report in committee