European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Clare Ferguson.

With a substantial agenda for the first session to be held this October, Members gather in plenary to debate – among other things – European Union growth and prosperity, the EU’s response to Russian violations of EU countries’ airspace, the situation in Gaza and rising antisemitism, and two motions of censure against the European Commission. Members are also scheduled to attend a ‘This is Europe‘ debate with the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Luc Frieden on Tuesday, and. the Prime Minister of Greenland, Jens-Frederik Nielsen is due to make a formal address on Wednesday.

Following a debate on the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) on Tuesday, Members are expected to vote on amending the current rules on payments to farmers. The proposal aims at cutting red tape, one of the farming community’s key demands. Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development proposes the CAP simplification include more flexibility on environmental rules, easier access to crisis payments and increased support for small and medium-sized farms. The vote will set Parliament’s position for its negotiations with the Council.

On Wednesday, Members are set to vote on draft amending budget No 2/2025, updating the revenue side of the current year’s EU budget. A report from Parliament’s Committee on Budgets endorses the Council position on the Commission proposal to take revised revenue forecasts into account and notes the need for increased gross national income contributions from the Member States. The committee also reiterates that the EU must endeavour to find fresh funding streams for new EU policy priorities.

Many non-EU nationals can visit the Schengen area for 90 days without having to apply for a visa. To protect the system from abuse, the visa suspension mechanism allows the EU to temporarily end the visa exemption for citizens of certain countries for security reasons. A proposal to strengthen the EU visa suspension mechanism has been on the table since 2023, and Members are expected to return to the debate on Monday evening. Parliament is set to vote on a text agreed between Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Council which emphasises the links between the EU’s external relations and the need to revise the visa suspension mechanism to cover, for instance, cases of state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants, investor citizenship schemes and human rights violations.

The Council and Commission are  scheduled to make statements on Tuesday afternoon on a recent joint communication, laying out the path for negotiations on a new strategic EU-India agenda, set for adoption at a bilateral summit in 2026. The debate is expected to cover progress on a free trade agreement, financial supervision arrangements – and not least in view of today’s difficult geopolitics – security and defence ties.

Members are scheduled to debate a provisional agreement reached by Parliament’s negotiators on a revision of the European Works Councils Directive on Wednesday. European Works Councils represent workers employed by multinationals operating in at least two EU countries. The revision of the legislation aims at strengthening the enforcement of transnational information and consultation rights, excluding trivial issues and including stronger provisions on gender balance. Parliament has succeeded in including rules to ensure penalties will be dissuasive, effective and proportionate.

The EU aims at reducing CO2 emissions from heavy-duty vehicles by 43 % by 2030, with higher targets to follow. However, as zero-emission heavy-duty vehicles remain expensive, EU law allows governments to encourage their use by granting reductions or exemptions to road charges for such vehicles. On Tuesday morning, Members are due to vote on extending the derogation for heavy-duty vehicles with zero emissions, to June 2031, under the procedure used for urgent matters.

On Tuesday morning, Members are set to debate a proposed revision to the legislation ensuring safety and environmental protection on the EU’s inland waterways. Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism has reached an agreement with Council that the revision should establish a single digital information platform, ensure harmonised reporting, introduce a feedback mechanism and update privacy and security requirements. The committee would, however, prefer that the scope of the revision of harmonised river information services apply to waterways and ports that are part of a cross-border network.

Following a recommendation from Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries, Members are set to vote on Wednesday on granting Parliament’s consent for the conclusion of a new protocol covering the EU’s fisheries agreement with the Côte d’Ivoire. The protocol sets opportunities for EU vessels from Spain, France and Portugal to fish for tuna in Côte d’Ivoire’s waters, in exchange for a financial contribution to the country’s sustainable fisheries sector.

Quick links to all our publications for this plenary session:

• CAP simplification
• Draft amending budget No 2/2025
• Revision of the visa suspension mechanism
• A new strategic EU-India agenda
• European Works Councils and enforcement of transnational information and consultation rights
• Extension of the derogation for heavy-duty vehicles with zero emissions
• Revision of the Harmonised River Information Services Directive
• EU-Côte d’Ivoire fisheries agreement

Written by Pieter Baert.

Taxing the digital economy raises complex challenges, as traditional tax rules struggle to keep pace with new business models and technologies. The Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) will organise an Inter-parliamentary Committee Meeting (ICM) on digital taxation on 18 October 2025, bringing together counterparts from national parliaments across the EU.

Scale without mass: The challenge of taxing digital value creation

Designing effective tax policies for the digital economy is particularly challenging, given its rapid evolution and the rise of diverse activities such as streaming, e-commerce, online gaming, and cloud computing. Each of these areas may carry distinct tax implications that traditional tax frameworks may struggle to address. At the same time, the wider economy is becoming increasingly digitalised, blurring the boundaries between digital and non-digital sectors.

One of the most fundamental challenges stems from the difficulty (national and international) tax systems have in capturing the phenomenon often described as ‘scale without mass’. Since the 1920s, international corporate taxation has been built around the principle of physical presence: once a company is deemed to have a sufficient level of physical presence in a country, that country gains the right to tax the profits attributable to that company. This model fitted well into the 20th-century ‘bricks and mortar’ economy, where business growth in a country was strongly tied to greater physical presence (such as offices, employees, and machinery). However, the digital economy disrupted this logic, allowing companies to reach vast foreign markets with minimal physical infrastructure.

Another distinct feature is how digital companies leverage user-generated value to varying extents, with user data shaping sales and marketing strategies. Users may contribute passively (e.g. by browsing) or actively (e.g. by uploading content), which is crucial for algorithms and network effects-driven models, such as social media or online marketplaces. By providing data and content in return, users are seen as playing an unprecedented role in companies’ value-creation process.

Together, these shifts raise the question of whether current tax rules align with the realities of where value is created in the digital economy, fuelling debate on how to reform international taxation.

The rise of digital services taxes

To address these challenges, several countries have introduced a digital services tax (DST). Although there is no universally agreed definition, DSTs are generally understood as taxes on turnover – rather than profit – with revenues allocated to the jurisdiction in which customers or users are located, rather than where the company is established. These measures generally target large multinational enterprises and primarily apply to revenues derived from activities closely linked to user participation, such as the sale/monetisation of user data, targeted online advertising, and providing digital intermediation services (i.e. online platforms that connect users, such as social media), though the precise scope and definitions may differ between countries. Several countries have already implemented DSTs with revenues steadily increasing over time, showcasing the continuous growth of the digital economy. The United States (US) administration has strongly criticised DSTs and their use in Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK).

Table 1 – Revenue of DSTs (€ million), 2019-2023

Revenue (€ million)20192020202120222023Spain  166295323France277375474621668Italy 233303394434

Data source: Data on Taxation Trends – European Commission (latest data updated in March 2025).

Three EU countries apply a 3 % DST on revenue from online advertising, user data sales and providing digital platforms, with a €750 million global revenue threshold and varying domestic thresholds: €3 million (Spain), €25 million (France), and €5.5 million (Italy; lowered to €0 in 2025) – see Table 1.

Although categories such as social media, online search engines, and online marketplaces may appear conceptually straightforward – and are often associated with well-known global firms – the task of formulating clear and robust legal definitions for these activities in a fast-evolving digital landscape is considerably more complex, with legislation often leaving some leeway for the ‘facts and circumstances’ of each service. Countries may issue technical guidance on in-scope services, and the calculation of taxable revenues, etc. (see, for example, France, Italy, Spain and the UK).

For instance, defining what counts as a ‘social media service’ is not straightforward. Authorities may distinguish whether a service’s main purpose is to promote interaction between users (or with user-generated content), or whether such interaction is incidental. But terms like ‘interaction’ may be left undefined, and it can be difficult to tell apart services that truly promote interaction and those that simply enable it in the background. For multinational enterprises, the challenge can be compounded by subtle differences in guidance and interpretation across countries with DSTs, creating uncertainty and disputes.

Similarly, identifying in-scope revenues can be difficult when companies have revenues from both in-scope and out-of-scope activities, requiring them to separate and attribute revenues accordingly. Moreover, companies need to include those revenues that are related to a taxable digital service and that are related to a user in the jurisdiction introducing a DST. However, an online advert on a search engine or social media platform may normally be shown to multiple users. This means the revenues could be related to both users from a DST jurisdiction and a non-DST jurisdiction. In such cases, companies would need to apportion those revenues correctly.

‘Pillar One’ – A new approach to international taxation?

In October 2021, nearly 140 countries from around the world rallied behind a historic overhaul of international corporate tax rules to modernise taxation for the digital era through a ‘two-pillar’ solution. Pillar One puts in place a new tax regime that would allocate taxing rights over a portion of the profits to countries in which companies’ products are consumed (known as ‘market jurisdictions’), regardless of whether the company has a physical presence in those market jurisdictions. Pillar One exclusively targets the world’s largest and most profitable (digital and non-digital) companies.

Pillar One has yet to be enforced, pending the stalled signing of a Multilateral Convention. The US administration has repeatedly criticised Pillar One, arguing that it disproportionately targets US firms.

During the September 2025 European Parliament plenary session, in response to questions from Members of the European Parliament on the state of play of Pillar One and the prospects for a European DST, the European Commission acknowledged that Pillar One discussions were ‘on hold’ but could resume later this year. To give the OECD-led process space and time to deliver, the Commission stated that it does not intend to table a new proposal for a DST at this stage.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Taxing the digital economy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alina-Alexandra Georgescu.

Access to culture is a fundamental human right according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: cultural rights are indispensable for the dignity and the free development of the personality, and ‘everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, [and] to enjoy the arts’. Despite this legal underpinning, not everyone in the EU has equal access to culture. People with disabilities, and people living in rural, remote and disadvantaged areas, face a complex set of barriers to participation in cultural life: financial, physical, digital, legal and psychological.

Culture plays a vital role in fostering a European sense of belonging and social cohesion. It enhances Europe’s resilience for safeguarding democracy, particularly in today’s increasingly polarised societies. Therefore, barriers to participation in culture should be eliminated. Various studies have identified barriers to accessing culture for people with disabilities and those living in rural, remote and disadvantaged areas, and made recommendations on how such barriers can be removed. The EU has taken various measures to promote participation in culture, together with funding programmes for people with disabilities and people living in rural, remote and disadvantaged areas.

The ambitious framework placing culture at the centre of EU policies, the new Culture Compass for Europe, should ensure that culture becomes more accessible. The European Parliament has played a crucial role in advancing discussions on equal and obstacle-free access to cultural participation for all EU citizens. It has pointed out that any kind of barriers to full participation by individuals and communities in culture impede the development of truly democratic and inclusive societies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Access to culture for people with disabilities and people living in rural, remote and disadvantaged areas‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Stefano De Luca and Clément Evroux.

Satellite services play a key role across our economies – from enabling Earth observation to ensuring the resilience of several sectors such as mobility, finance and defence – thanks to navigation, timing and positioning systems. In the future, they are expected increasingly to provide connectivity services, including coverage in remote areas and secure connectivity for public authorities.

This situation comes with a set of threats and challenges. While the number of satellites in orbit is growing exponentially, to more than 10 000 in 2024, the congestion of orbits increases the risk of disruption through collision. In addition, geopolitical tensions are materialising in space, highlighting countries’ satellite sovereign capabilities and cybersecurity risks there. On the one hand, the weaponisation of the space domain adds further pressure to the risks of space congestion. On the other hand, space systems also face challenges on Earth, as they are underpinned by a complex supply chain, which requires sourcing of both raw materials and several technological components – from chips to launchers.

Against this backdrop, the EU is harnessing its space policy to develop, deploy and curate its space assets to deliver key services: positioning navigation and timing (Galileo), Earth observation (Copernicus), and secure connectivity (IRIS²). The EU’s space policy also relies on the single market and EU industrial policy to ensure a resilient space supply chain, as well as space industry competitiveness. The proposed EU space act is an important step in this regard.   

This briefing outlines the basics of satellite functioning and functionalities, presents the main challenges the EU space sector faces and the main EU space initiatives, and identifies possible related EU policy developments.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Satellites: State of play and challenges for the EU’ Initiative‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

The world produces enough food to feed everyone, and yet over 700 million people faced hunger in 2023. Worryingly, at least one billion meals are being wasted in households worldwide every day, thus exacerbating the problem by reducing the amount of food available for consumption.  This is the equivalent of 1.3 meals served every day to every single person in the world suffering from hunger. Importantly, when food is discarded, all the embedded energy and resources and their environmental consequences, such as greenhouse gas emissions, that accumulate along the food chain still materialise with no benefit for human nutrition.

In the European Union (EU), nearly 60 million tonnes of food – representing 132 kilogrammes per person – were wasted in 2022, of which over half (54 %) was in households. The environmental impact of this amount of food waste accounts for 254 million tonnes of CO2 and 342 billion cubic meters of water, used in the production process.  

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly designated 29 September as the International Day of Awareness of Food Loss and Waste. Committed to reaching the UN Sustainable Development Goal target to halve per capita food waste by 2030, Parliament and Council agreed on binding reduction targets of 10 % in food processing and manufacturing and 30 % per capita in retail, catering, food services and households, by the end of 2030 compared to the annual average generated between 2021 and 2023. 

In the EU, priority is given to preventing waste and encouraging the donation or redistribution of food for human consumption over animal feed and other uses. A 2023 analysis of 332 food waste prevention actions carried out in the 27 EU countries shows that 93 % of actions are targeted at the highest level of the ‘food use hierarchy’, thus witnessing the countries’ ongoing efforts to fight food waste. However, efforts are mainly focused on awareness-raising and education (62%), while market-based measures (4%) and regulatory interventions (1%) remain limited.

Read this infographic on ‘International Day of Awareness of Food Loss and Waste 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

International Safe Abortion Day, observed annually on 28 September, draws attention to global disparities in access to safe and legal abortion. It also provides an occasion to examine the legal and policy framework within the European Union. While competence in public health lies primarily with the Member States, EU institutions – most notably the European Parliament – have increasingly engaged with sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR).

International Safe Abortion Day

Abortion remains a global public health issue, with an estimated 73 million induced abortions taking place each year – equivalent to approximately 29 % of all pregnancies worldwide (World Health Organization – WHO). Nearly 45 % of these procedures are considered unsafe, predominantly occurring in countries with restrictive legal frameworks, and contribute to between 4.7 % and 13.2 % of all maternal deaths globally. Conversely, it is reported that, where abortion is legal, most procedures – nearly 90 % in high-income countries – are conducted safely (Guttmacher Institute).

International Safe Abortion Day has emerged as a recognised occasion for raising awareness of these global disparities and advocating for access to safe abortion. First established in 1990 by feminist networks in Latin America and the Caribbean as a regional day of action for the decriminalisation of abortion, it was adopted globally by the Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights (WGNRR) in 2011. It is now acknowledged by the WHO and numerous civil society organisations as an opportunity to affirm that access to safe abortion is a component of SRHR. The 28 September 2025 edition addresses the growing international opposition to abortion rights and related human rights movements, such as LGBTQI and feminist advocacy. It highlights the need for collaboration across generations and communities to counter misinformation, legal restrictions, and attacks on those providing or supporting reproductive healthcare.

Access to safe abortion in the European Union

The EU’s limited legislative competence in public health matters means that abortion remains primarily a national prerogative, governed by Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union).

Many Member States have progressively liberalised their abortion legislation, aligning more closely with international health recommendations, including those issued by the WHO and the Council of Europe. Still, some countries maintain restrictive or prohibitive legal regimes.

Legal frameworks across the EU vary significantly. While countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark provide abortion on request and have comprehensive reproductive health policies, others –including Malta and Poland – retain more restrictive laws. In Malta, abortion is only allowed in cases where the woman’s life is at risk, and in Poland access is limited to cases involving serious threats to the pregnant woman’s life or pregnancy resulting from sexual violence.

Beyond legal access, many Member States impose additional barriers that hinder timely and equitable access to abortion care. These include mandatory waiting periods, compulsory counselling, gestational limits, and the use of conscientious objection by healthcare providers. Twelve EU countries require a waiting period – ranging from three days (Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) to seven days (Italy) – between the initial request and the procedure. Twelve Member States mandate counselling, which in some cases, such as Hungary and Germany, is framed in prescriptive terms. The majority of Member States also require third-party authorisation for minors, further limiting their reproductive rights.

The use of the conscience clause by medical professionals, while grounded in international protections for freedom of belief, can also severely restrict access to abortion. In Italy, for instance, it is estimated that up to 70 % of healthcare providers invoke conscientious objection, resulting in limited availability of services even where abortion is legal. Similar patterns have been observed in Croatia and Romania. The cumulative effect of these barriers is particularly pronounced for women in marginalised or vulnerable situations, such as those with disabilities, migrants, and young women.

In terms of cost and public coverage, provision also varies. France remains the only EU Member State where abortion is entirely free of charge for all women. Other countries restrict public funding to residents, or limit coverage to medically indicated abortions, excluding on-request procedures. In many Member States, non-resident, undocumented, or migrant women may not be eligible for publicly funded abortion care.

Freedom to choose abortion enshrined in the French constitution

Almost 50 years after the legalisation of abortion in France, the freedom to choose to have an abortion (‘liberté garantie … d’avoir recours à une interruption volontaire de grossesse’) was officially enshrined in the French constitution on 8 March 2024. Taking the form of a one-line addition to Article 34 (the list of matters upon which Parliament may legislate), the amendment received final approval in the Congrès du Parlement (National Assembly and Senate) on 4 March 2024. President Emmanuel Macron signed the result of the overwhelming 780-72 vote in favour (which received a standing ovation) on 8 March (International Women’s Day). This amendment to the 1958 constitution designates a ‘guaranteed freedom’ to choose to terminate a pregnancy.

Since its legalisation in 1975 through a law supported by then Minister for Health Simone Veil (later the European Parliament’s first female president, and the first president of the directly elected Parliament), the right to choose to terminate a pregnancy has consistently gathered support from the political community, civil society and public opinion in France. The law has been updated nine times – on each occasion with the aim of extending access to abortion. The right to choose abortion has evolved from a public health measure, which motivated its decriminalisation, to a fundamental right. France is the first country in the world to make access to abortion an explicit constitutional right. Similar initiatives have been considered in other Member States, such as Sweden, while Member States such as Spain have reformed the law to improve access to safe and legal abortion.

European Parliament position

During the ninth legislative term, the European Parliament has consistently advocated the decriminalisation of abortion and the removal of legal, financial, social and practical barriers to access. In various resolutions adopted between 2021 and 2024, Parliament called for the inclusion of abortion rights in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and condemned restrictive measures in EU Member States, such as Poland, and in the US. On 11 April 2024, Parliament adopted a resolution on including the right to choose an abortion in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The resolution affirmed that access to SRHR, including safe and legal abortion, is a fundamental right. Parliament called on the European Council to revise the Treaties to include these rights in the EU Charter. It urged Member States to fully decriminalise abortion in line with WHO guidelines and to remove legal and practical barriers, specifically calling on Poland and Malta to repeal restrictive laws. MEPs also condemned the denial of abortion based on the conscience clause, especially when it endangers patients’ health or lives.

Read the complete briefing on ‘International Safe Abortion Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig.

For more than four decades, Iran has faced various international sanctions designed to modify its regime’s conduct across multiple areas of concern. These areas include nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and proliferation, support for terrorism, regional destabilisation and human rights abuses. Since 1979, the United States’ (US) sanctions on Iran have evolved into a complex and comprehensive regime. Between 2006 and 2010, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed multilateral sanctions specifically targeting Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation activities. The European Union (EU) has implemented the UNSC measures and, since 2010, has developed its own restrictive measures on Iran. The EU’s sanctions extend beyond non-proliferation concerns to encompass measures for Iran’s human rights violations, support for terrorism and assistance to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) established an agreement between Iran, the five permanent members of the UNSC, plus Germany and the EU’s High Representative. This agreement provided for the gradual lifting of sanctions against Iran in exchange for limitations on its nuclear programme. Following the US’s withdrawal from the deal in 2018 and the subsequent re-imposition of previously lifted US sanctions, Iran began violating its JCPOA commitments. On 28 August 2025, the three European parties to the JCPOA – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – triggered the procedure to restore all UNSC sanctions on Iran, which were originally set to definitively expire on 18 October 2025. Although diplomatic efforts were complicated by Israeli and US military strikes against Iran in June 2025, and despite the UNSC’s rejection on 19 September of a draft resolution to extend the lifting of sanctions, dialogue between Iran and the European powers continues in search of a diplomatic solution to prevent the re-imposition of comprehensive UNSC sanctions scheduled for 28 September 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘International sanctions on Iran: Overview of the main regimes and recent events‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

Maternity leave and voting procedures for Members of parliaments differ widely across the European Union (EU). Maternity-related absences are considered justified for Members of the European Parliament, but the current rules do not permit remote voting, proxy voting or temporary substitution. Maternity leave for parliamentarians is generally permitted across the EU’s Member States, although legal frameworks and practical arrangements differ. Some national parliaments only allow for temporary substitution in committee work, while others rely on informal agreements. Only a small number of countries, including Spain, Greece and Luxembourg, have formal provisions enabling Members on maternity leave to vote in absentia.

While several parliaments temporarily expanded remote participation during the COVID‑19 pandemic, such measures were typically limited in scope and duration. In most cases, voting in plenary continues to require physical presence in the chamber.

Discussions are ongoing at both European and national level to explore ways of supporting Members in reconciling their parliamentary duties with family responsibilities. Most recently, President Roberta Metsola proposed revisions to the European Electoral Act and the Parliament’s implementing measures, including the potential introduction of proxy voting for Members on maternity leave, aimed at aligning parliamentary rules more closely with evolving expectations around work-life balance. This briefing focuses exclusively on maternity leave and does not cover other types of family-related absence, such as paternity or parental leave.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Maternity leave and voting procedures in the European Parliament and EU national parliaments‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Martin Höflmayr with Falk Vambrie.

The European defence industry is highly fragmented, with limited collaborative investment and procurement, divergent national regulations, and protectionist tendencies that undermine efficiency, interoperability and competitiveness. The Letta report makes the case for a concerted effort to advance towards the development of a ‘Common Market for the Security and Defence Industry’, which focuses on regulatory simplification, pooled procurement, and cross-border industrial integration. While the Draghi report puts its finger on the EU defence sector’s fragmentation, under-investment, and external dependencies, it urges coordinated action to strengthen the industrial base, boost joint innovation, and align national efforts through common policies and incentives. According to the White Paper for European Defence, a truly integrated EU defence market would be among the largest globally, strengthening competitiveness, readiness and industrial scale. It would enable firms from the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to expand across the Union and stimulate cross-border cooperation, mergers and new ventures, increasing the availability of EU-made defence products.

The new Defence Readiness Omnibus aims to remove procedural bottlenecks and facilitate up to €800 billion in defence investment under the Rearm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan, combining streamlined procurement rules, simplified intra-EU transfers, and revised financial instruments. Achieving readiness and autonomy requires predictable joint planning, harmonised standards, and public-private coordination. Without genuine market reform, Europe’s rising defence spending risks being absorbed by inefficiencies rather than delivering real capability gains. A functioning common defence market is therefore essential not only for competitiveness, but also for deterrence, resilience and strategic sovereignty in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.

The European Parliament advocates a fully integrated internal market for defence to overcome fragmentation, urging regulatory reform, joint procurement, and cross-border industrial cooperation as essential steps towards greater efficiency, competitiveness, and strategic autonomy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Building a common market for European defence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU members of NATO: Composition of defence spending

Written by Maria Niestadt.

As the global race to harness the power of artificial intelligence (AI) accelerates, the European Union has set the objective of becoming a leading AI continent. The adoption of the Artificial Intelligence Act in 2024 was a milestone in establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework for AI in the EU, but regulation alone cannot make the EU a technological leader. In April 2025, the European Commission published an AI continent action plan, a communication that attempts to look beyond rules and combine regulatory oversight with investment, infrastructure and skills development. It also aims to increase the use of AI in both the private and public sector. The plan illustrates the Commission’s growing attention to competitiveness, moving away from its previous focus on setting usage rules

Despite progress in some areas, the EU is still far from being a global leader in AI, in terms of scale, investment, and uptake of AI. Structural weaknesses such as a fragmented single market, limited private investment, and reliance on foreign cloud and semiconductor technology continue to hinder progress. Stakeholders are divided on the road to follow. While industry representatives call for simplifying regulation to boost innovation, civil society warns against sacrificing democratic safeguards.

The EU’s prospects of becoming an AI continent depend not only on its ability to implement the AI continent action plan but also on its decisiveness in acting on other fronts such as making progress on the Savings and Investments Union, and its progress in reducing reliance on foreign technologies. The European Parliament will play a central role in scrutinising the Commission’s activities and shaping legislation such as the forthcoming Cloud and AI Development Act.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Making Europe an AI continent‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clément Evroux.

CONTEXT

On 25 June 2025, the Commission published a proposal for a regulation on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the European Union (EU) (‘the EU space act’). A majority of Member States have already adopted or are considering adopting legislation on space activities. The regulation’s relevance was highlighted by Mario Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness, which explained the role of space systems and services in supporting the EU’s sovereignty and economy.

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU (internal market) is the legal basis of the proposed regulation. It aims to create a single market for space activities, grounded on common safety, sustainability and resilience rules, which should apply in principle to any space operator providing space services in the EU. The proposal is expected to lay down rules on: the authorisation, registration and supervision of space activities and services carried out by space service providers; orbit traffic management; and the establishment of an EU space label. On resilience, the proposed regulation is expected to complement Directive (EU)2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the EU, and Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities. In the Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which has appointed Elena Donazzan (ECR, Italy) as rapporteur. In the Council, the working party on space has started examining the proposal.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0335(COD) – Proposal for a regulation on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the Union – COM(2025) 335, 25 June 2025

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0335(COD) EU space law

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU space act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman.

Although euthanasia and assisted dying remain highly controversial in large parts of the globe, an increasing number of countries have legislation on it in place or are considering doing so. This is due to changing attitudes, advancements in medical technology and an ageing population.

Several EU countries are at the forefront of these legal changes; at the same time, each of them has come up with its own solutions for addressing challenges such as how to avoid abuse.

Neither EU law nor the European Convention on Human Rights contain provisions precluding EU countries from legislating on euthanasia. In response to questions from Members of the European Parliament, the European Commission has made it clear the EU is not competent to deal with the issue in any way.

Four EU countries – Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – have legislation in force that allows euthanasia to be administered by a physician. Germany, Italy and Austria allow assisted suicide only.

The Netherlands and Belgium, the two EU countries that were the first to allow euthanasia, have seen an increasing number of people apply for euthanasia over the years, with studies showing no sign of the legislation leading to any abuse.

In addition, several EU countries are working on legislation on euthanasia or assisted dying. These include: Ireland, France, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia. The Portuguese parliament adopted relevant legislation back in 2023; however, owing to vetoes by the Portuguese president and rulings by the country’s constitutional court, it has still not entered into force.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Euthanasia legislation in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

G7 statement

On 28 June 2025, the G7 issued a statement expressing a ‘shared understanding’ that the domestic and foreign profits of US-parented multinational groups would be excluded from the scope of Pillar Two, the OECD-G20 global minimum corporate tax framework. Instead, the G7 signalled readiness to work on a ‘side-by-side’ approach in which the US GILTI regime, its current minimum tax on foreign earnings of US parented groups – would co-exist with Pillar Two. The statement allowed for the withdrawal of proposed US retaliatory measures (‘section 899’) that had been included in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA).

Reminder: Pillar Two applies a 15 % global minimum effective tax rate using a hierarchical rule order to ensure large multinational enterprises are taxed appropriately in each jurisdiction:

• 1. The Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax (QDMTT) – Gives the local jurisdiction first claim to top up low-taxed domestic profits.
• 2. The Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) – The ultimate parent’s jurisdiction imposes a top-up tax on the local parent entity to make up for any remaining low-taxed profits of foreign entities.
• 3. The Undertaxed Profits Rule (UTPR) – If the IIR is not applied by the ultimate parent’s jurisdiction, the UTPR steps in as a backstop, with lower-tier jurisdictions imposing top-up taxes on local entities to make up for any remaining low-taxed profits in the parent jurisdiction or any other third jurisdiction.

Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523 introduced Pillar Two’s minimum tax rules in the EU.

Given the broad nature of the G7 statement, which speaks of ‘accepted principles’, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions at this stage. Based on its wording, a side-by-side approach – if endorsed by the OECD Inclusive Framework – could imply that non-US jurisdictions would not apply the UTPR to local entities of US-parented groups in respect of low-taxed profits arising in the US or in another jurisdiction that does not apply the QDMTT or the IIR. However, the statement does not explicitly clarify the specific terms of the exemption. For instance, it does not address how US intermediary parent entities within non-US multinational groups would be treated for minimum tax purposes, the potential creditability of the GILTI tax in relation to a jurisdiction’s QDMTT, or how the side-by-side approach would be defined in legislation.

NCTI and Pillar Two

As Pillar Two and the US’ GILTI (now called ‘NCTI’ under the OBBBA) operate on different principles and design features, it is difficult to assess to what extent the side-by-side approach could raise concerns about a level playing field or lead to base erosion and profit shifting among the multinational companies subject to each regime. Potential competitive disadvantages arise not only from differences in direct tax liabilities but also from the variations in the administrative and legal complexity of the respective regimes.

The OBBBA, signed into law in July 2025, introduced several adjustments allowing NCTI to more accurately reflect the real outcomes of Pillar Two. It increased the effective tax rate to 14 % (up from 13.125 %) and removed the carve-out for the Qualified Business Asset Investment (QBAI), thereby broadening the taxable base.

However, a key difference between the two systems remains: the ‘blending’ of income. Pillar Two requires corporate groups to meet a minimum level of tax in each jurisdiction where they operate (‘jurisdictional blending’), while the US’ NCTI allows income and foreign taxes to be blended across all foreign countries (‘global blending’). This way, low-taxed income can be offset with high-taxed income elsewhere and profits in some jurisdictions can be reduced by losses in others.

Table 1 – Key comparisons between OECD G20 Pillar Two and US NCTI

 OECD-G20 – Pillar TwoUS – NCTITax rate15 %14 %Tax baseBased on accounting incomeBased on US taxable incomeBlendingJurisdictional blendingGlobal blendingCarve-outsBased on payroll and tangible assets (SBIE)Payroll or tangible assets do not qualify for a carve-out

Note: The effective 14 % floor of NCTI results from the interaction of the 21 % US statutory corporate tax rate, the 60% inclusion of NCTI taxable income and the 90 % foreign tax credit limitation ((21 % * 60 %)/90 % = 14 %).

Additionally, the OBBA introduced broader corporate tax changes, such as permanent expensing for domestic R&D investments and a higher interest deductibility cap, to enhance US competitiveness.

Pillar One

The G7’s statement noted that the delivery of the side-by-side system ‘will facilitate further progress to stabilize the international tax system, including a constructive dialogue on the taxation of the digital economy’, referencing the negotiations on Pillar One. During the September 2025 plenary session, in response to questions from Members of the European Parliament on Pillar One and the prospects for a European digital services tax (DST), the European Commission acknowledged that Pillar One discussions were ‘on hold’ but could resume once a Pillar Two solution is reached. To give the OECD-led process space and time to deliver, the Commission stated that it does not intend to table a new proposal for a DST at this stage.

Several countries have already implemented or announced digital services taxes (DSTs), with revenues steadily increasing over time, showcasing the continuous growth of the digital economy. In 2023, Spain, Italy and France collectively generated €1.4 billion from their DSTs. However, estimating the revenue potential of an EU-wide DST would heavily depend on key design parameters, such as the definition of in-scope activities (the types of digital services or business activities that would fall under the tax), the applicable tax rate, and the revenue thresholds.

Table 2 – Revenue of DSTs, € million, 2019-2023

Revenue (€ million)20192020202120222023Spain  €166€295€323France€277€375€474€621€668Italy €233€303€394€434

Data source: Data on Taxation Trends – European Commission. All three countries apply a 3 % DST on turnover from online advertising, user data sales and digital platforms, with a €750 million global revenue threshold and varying domestic thresholds: €3 million (Spain), €25 million (France), and €5.5 million (Italy; lowered to €0 in 2025).

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Side by side? The future of Pillar Two minimum corporate tax rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

The importance of the EU’s trade defence arsenal is underscored, among other factors, by persistent global overcapacity in a range of sectors, which has significant distorting effects on international markets, and by the weaponisation of trade, including through economic coercion amid growing geopolitical tensions.

The arsenal can be divided into two categories. First, the EU’s traditional trade defensive instruments (TDIs), which are based on multilateral trade agreements going back to Codes developed under the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; and second, the EU’s more recent autonomous trade instruments, most of which were enacted between 2019 and 2024.

TDIs enable the EU to deter and combat unfair trade practices from companies and public authorities of third countries, shield EU industries and jobs from these practices, and restore a level playing field for EU companies in the internal market. TDIs are mainly applied in the form of additional duties on imports of dumped and/or subsidised goods, or on goods whose imports have surged suddenly and unexpectedly and have caused serious injury to EU industry – or threaten to do so.

The EU’s autonomous trade instruments seek to fill regulatory gaps in international trade law in areas such as public procurement and foreign subsidies, with a view to levelling the playing field between EU companies and non-EU companies and to safeguarding the EU’s economic interests, including its economic security.

Against the backdrop of the United States’ recent unilateral tariff policies, which are likely to lead to a diversion of trade flows to other markets, including the EU, and to a further increase in the global use of trade defence measures, the relevance of the EU’s trade defence toolbox is set to grow in the future.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the EU trade defence toolbox‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

A persisting gender pay gap

The ‘gender pay gap’ is a measurable indicator of inequality between women and men. It generally refers to the average difference between the remuneration of employed female and male workers.

Although the gender pay gap is measured by different methods and indicators, data clearly show that women around the world still earn less than men. Across OECD countries, on average, the unadjusted gender pay gap stands at 11.9 % – meaning that the median full-time working woman earns about 88 cents to every dollar or euro earned by the median full-time working man. This rate has barely moved in recent decades. Despite the increase in women’s educational attainment and participation in the labour market over the years, the gender pay gap remains a persistent and multi-dimensional issue in all countries and across all economic sectors. For women with children, women of colour, migrant women, and women with disabilities, the discrepancy is even larger. In 2023, women’s gross hourly earnings were, on average, 12.0 % below those of men in the European Union (Eurostat, EU-27). Across Member States, the gender pay gap varied widely, ranging from -0.7 % in Luxembourg to 19.0 % in Latvia.

International Equal Pay Day The United Nations’ commitment

Mainstreaming the gender perspective is key to the implementation of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Since 2015, the ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ principle has been recognised as one of the priority areas of the United Nations sustainable development goals (UNSDGs), as mentioned in target 8.5: ‘By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value’. In 2017, under the leadership of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the UN entity for gender equality and the empowerment of women (UN Women) and the Gender Initiative of the OECD, and together with governments, labour organisations (e.g. ITUC), employers’ organisations (e.g. IOE) and other dedicated agencies, the Equal Pay International Coalition (EPIC) was launched for the effective and swift achievement of the principle. On 15 November 2019, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution proclaiming 18 September as International Equal Pay Day. The resolution was introduced by the Equal Pay International Coalition with the support of Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Panama, South Africa and Switzerland. The day is intended to promote further action towards the achievement of equal pay for work of equal value.

The first International Equal Pay Day – 18 September 2020

On 18 September 2020, the first International Equal Pay Day, international leaders committed to taking affirmative action to narrow the gender pay gap. EPIC called on participants to put pay equity  at the heart of  COVID-19 recovery efforts by introducing integrated policy responses aimed at mitigating job and income losses resulting from the pandemic and ensuring that women do not end up disproportionately shouldering these job losses and reductions in incomes.

The 2025 Equal Pay Day

For EPIC, the focus this year will be (1) ‘Achieving Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value in the Beijing+30 Era’ for the members-only annual Technical Meeting and (2) an Equal Pay Day event featuring a friendly debate between senior representatives of workers’ and employers’ organisations, underscoring the complementarity of a multi-stakeholder approach and measures being taken.

European Union initiatives

Equal pay for equal work is one of the EU’s founding principles, enshrined in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Since then, there have been initiatives to address the gender pay gap at both EU and Member State levels. While some progress has been achieved, the gender pay gap remains a persistent feature of European labour markets. In response, as embedded in the EU gender equality strategy 2020-2025, the EU has complemented its soft measures by introducing binding legislation.

The Pay Transparency Directive (Directive (EU) 2023/970), adopted in May 2023 and in force since 6 June 2023, marks a recent step in the EU’s efforts to address pay transparency. It mandates salary transparency in job postings, bans the use of pay history, and grants employees the right to access information on pay levels by gender. Employers with at least 150 employees are required to report regularly on pay gaps. Where unexplained gaps of 5 % or more are identified, joint pay assessments must be conducted in cooperation with workers’ representatives. The directive also strengthens enforcement through a shift in the burden of proof, the right to compensation for victims of pay discrimination, and financial penalties for non-compliance. Member States must transpose the directive by 7 June 2026.

Other relevant legislation includes the Women on Boards Directive (2022), which requires listed companies to meet gender balance targets on corporate boards by mid‑2026, and the Work-Life Balance Directive (in force since 2022), which promotes equal sharing of care responsibilities by introducing new rights to paternity leave, parental leave, and flexible working.

In March 2025, the European Commission unveiled the roadmap for women’s rights to advance gender equality across all sectors of society, including a renewed push to reduce the gender pay gap.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has long called for binding legislation to advance pay equity. In a series of resolutions since 2015, Parliament has urged the Commission to address persistent gender-based inequalities through stronger enforcement and transparency tools.

Parliament’s resolution of 30 January 2020 on the Gender pay gap urged the Commission to ensure that the forthcoming pay transparency legislation applies to both the public and private sectors, promotes the role of the social partners and collective bargaining, and includes strong enforcement policies for those failing to comply. Parliament’s resolution of 21 January 2021 on the new EU gender equality strategy stressed that binding measures are necessary to close the gender pay gap. In its 15 December 2021 resolution on Equality between women and men, Parliament called on Member States to develop an action plan with clear objectives to tackle the gender pay and pension gaps.

Members’ efforts have been key to shaping the final content of the Pay Transparency Directive and ensuring a strong implementation framework across the Union.

Read the complete briefing on ‘International Equal Pay Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman.

Migrants contribute about 10 % to the world’s gross domestic product and are likely to gain in importance due to skills shortages and an ageing population in host countries. Labour migration also has a significant impact on the countries of origin, both positive and negative. The overall impact of migrant workers on their countries of origin varies depending on the circumstances. In 2022, there were 167.7 million migrant workers globally, 93 % of whom were employed. Some 90 % of migrants move voluntarily, mostly for economic reasons.

Remittances sent by migrants have become an important source of income for their countries of origin, reaching about US$656 billion in 2023. Additionally, diasporas can serve as a means for countries of origin to exercise more influence beyond their borders. These countries can also reap the benefits of the skills and knowledge acquired by returning migrants. Some countries, such as India and the Philippines, have policies in place to maximise the possible benefits.

On the other hand, the exodus of migrant workers can exacerbate skills shortages in their home countries, particularly in smaller ones. In addition, migrant workers may encounter substandard working conditions and lower wages compared to local workers.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How labour migration affects countries of origin‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Top 20 countries of origin for international migrants in 2024 (in millions) International remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (2000-2024) Top 10 countries receiving international remittances in 2022 (US$ billion)

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of the United States (US) compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate for the US was recorded at 2.8%, while the EU experienced a growth rate of 1.1%. Both inflation rates remain stable and show a declining trend compared to the years following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the start of the war in Ukraine. The inflation rate in the US was slightly higher than that in the EU. Trade between the US and the EU continues to grow, except for EU imports of goods from the US, which have been in a declining phase since 2022.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘US: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Within the Schengen area, European Union (EU) citizens and non-EU nationals legally residing in the EU can move freely without being subject to border controls.

The Schengen area has 29 member countries: 25 EU countries (all except Ireland and Cyprus) and 4 non-EU countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). Ireland chose not to join the Schengen area, although its police and judiciary cooperate fully with other Schengen countries in criminal matters.

As of 31 March 2024, Bulgaria and Romania are part of the Schengen area. On that date, border checks were lifted at internal air and sea borders. In January 2025, checks were also removed at internal land borders.

Common rules for the Schengen area

To ensure safe and controlled entry into the Schengen area, the Schengen Borders Code sets out common rules for checks at external borders. These include rules on identity verification and the duration of stay, as well as the common visa requirements. The Code also sets out the conditions for a temporary reintroduction of controls at internal borders within the Schengen area.

Following a 2024 update:

• EU countries can set up internal border checks for a maximum of two years in the case of a serious threat to internal security or public policy (a terrorist threat, for example).
• EU countries can reduce the number of border crossing points or shorten their opening hours in cases where a non-EU country encourages the movement of migrants towards the EU’s external borders.
• The Council can decide to introduce temporary travel restrictions at the EU’s external borders in the case of a large-scale public health emergency (a pandemic, for example).

Common visa policy

The EU has established a common visa policy for persons travelling through or staying for a short period in the Schengen area.

The Visa Code sets out the rules for obtaining short-stay visas, which are the most common type for people from outside the EU. These visas let you stay in the EU for 90 days within a 180-day period. If a person wants to stay longer than 90 days, they have to follow the national rules of the EU country they wish to stay in.

The EU has a list of countries whose citizens need a visa to enter the EU, and a list of countries whose citizens do not.

Digitalisation of the visa procedure

Under new rules from 2023, applications for Schengen visas will be made through an online EU platform. The system will automatically decide which EU country will handle an application. Digital visas will be issued once the online platform has been put in place, which is expected to take a few years.

Further information

• Free movement of persons, EU Fact Sheets, European Parliament, June 2025
• State of the Schengen area, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, May 2025
• Schengen, European Commission, February 2025
• Revision of the Schengen Borders Code, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, July 2024

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Clément Franzoso.

The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) is an important tool of participatory democracy in the European Union (EU), which gives Europeans a more active role in shaping EU policy. The initiative allows citizens to call on the European Commission to make new proposals for EU legislation if they gather at least one million signatures from at least seven EU Member States. Since its introduction under the Lisbon Treaty, the ECI has promoted political engagement, raised awareness of key issues and strengthened the EU’s democratic legitimacy. However, it faces significant challenges, such as difficulty gathering the required support, low public awareness, bureaucratic hurdles and a lack of binding outcomes.

To be registered, an initiative must meet a set of formal criteria assessed by the Commission. If it does, the Commission registers the initiative, and the organisers can then begin collecting signatures. It is important to note that the Commission is not obliged to act on registered ECIs, which ultimately limits the potential impact of the initiative.

While the ECI promotes cross-border collaboration and increases citizen participation, its potential is hindered by limitations such as the complex administrative process and lack of guaranteed legislative action. The Commission plays a decisive role in both the registration and follow-up stages of an ECI, but its strict interpretation of admissibility requirements has drawn criticism. Examples of successful initiatives include ‘Right2Water’, which advocates for the human right to water and sanitation, and ‘Stop Vivisection’, which calls for an end to animal testing in the EU.

While the ECI has helped raise awareness and foster political participation, its overall effectiveness remains constrained. Improvements in accessibility, awareness, follow-up actions and support are essential to unlock its full potential as a tool for active citizenship in the EU.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Assessing the potential and challenges of the European Citizens’ Initiative‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

If you hold a university degree, you can apply for a Robert Schuman Programme traineeship in the European Parliament. The application period for the traineeship session from 1 March 2026 to 31 July 2026 starts on 1 October 2025 and ends on 31 October 2025. You can apply here.

A paid traineeship will enhance your education and your vocational training and will provide you with an insight into the work of the European Parliament and the EU institutions. Find more info on the application criteria and process here.

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