European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Martina Prpic.

Trafficking in human beings is a serious crime and a violation of human rights. When it happens to children, it disrupts their childhood and exposes them to horrific exploitation and abuse, and a precarious future. Even though the true number of victims of human trafficking is not known, recent data reveal that the number of child victims has been on the increase. Awareness of children as victims of human trafficking has increased as well.

Just like adult victims, child victims can be trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced labour, forced criminality or organ removal. Recently, the EU has officially recognised new forms of exploitation, including surrogacy, forced marriage and illegal adoption. There are geographical differences in the recruitment of victims, with the vast majority of child victims originating from northern, southern and western Europe being girls (82.9 %) and 55.1 % of child victims from Africa and 77.6 % of child victims from southern Asia being boys. Female child victims are more likely to report sexual exploitation, while male child victims are more likely to be exploited through child labour. Forced criminality in the EU, although comparatively lower as a share of the total number of victims, is steadily increasing, with boys of migration background being the main targets.

The EU’s anti-trafficking legislation was amended last year, resulting in legislation that identifies children as especially vulnerable to trafficking. The amendments also expanded the list of forms of exploitation to include those that particularly affect children and emphasised the importance of a victim-centred approach and prevention. Member States are therefore asked, inter alia, to promote and provide regular and specialised training for professionals who are likely to come into contact with such children. Another relevant directive, on victims’ rights, is currently being revised to provide even more rights to victims, including child victims. The existing directive already prioritises the best interests of children when applying its provisions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Trafficking in children‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The second May plenary session in 2025 opened with Nataša Pirc Musar, President of the Republic of Slovenia, addressing Parliament in a formal sitting. Following her call for European solidarity, Members then debated the EU’s response to the Israeli government’s plan to seize the Gaza Strip, the urgent need for humanitarian support and for all hostages to be freed. Members also debated the Hungarian government’s drift to Russia-style repression, including threats to freedom of expression and democratic participation, and approved new tariffs on agricultural goods from Russia and Belarus. Members also debated and voted on a report on the Committee on Petitions’ activities in 2023.

Simplifying and strengthening CBAM

Tackling climate change remains an urgent priority and the EU has set stringent rules on greenhouse gas emissions. As the rules make carbon-intensive activities more costly, this leads to a risk that some companies try to increase their profits by moving their carbon-heavy activity outside the EU. To level the playing field for businesses, the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) ensures prices fairly reflect the carbon emitted during production of imported goods such as cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers and electricity. Before it comes into full operation in 2026, the European Commission is proposing to simplify CBAM. Members debated and adopted a report from Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety that largely endorses the Commission proposal to simplify and strengthen CBAM, pending clarifications on electricity generation and embedded emissions. The report sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council on the proposal.

Single market strategy

Continued single market fragmentation constrains EU companies’ ability to compete internationally, and many of the issues remain the same as they were 20 years ago. Members debated the Commission’s newly adopted strategy to bring new impetus to the single market. While reaffirming Parliament’s role in the process, Parliament has emphasised that Member States must implement and enforce existing single market legislation. It also demanded renewed commitment from Member States and other EU institutions to strengthen and further develop the single market, particularly in the services, digital and energy sectors.

Choose Europe for science

Academic freedom is increasingly under attack in many parts of the world. Following Council and Commission statements on attracting scientists, researchers and academics to Europe, particularly to contribute to the development of new, cutting-edge technologies, Members held a debate on the Commission’s ‘Choose Europe for Science‘ initiative. Parliament already called for increased Horizon Europe funding for researchers in its resolution on the 2026 budget guidelines.

Russian energy phase-out, Nord Stream and EU energy sovereignty

Following Council and Commission statements on ending Europe’s dependency on Russian energy by phasing out imports, Members debated plans to increase the EU’s energy sovereignty. The Commission’s recent roadmap – addressing the security and economic risks of continued reliance on Russian energy – is expected to provide an answer to Parliament’s repeated calls for measures to provide alternatives to imported Russian energy, to abandon Nord Stream 1 and 2, and to secure a reliable supply of medical radioisotopes.

Improving mental health at work

Members debated EU initiatives to improve mental health at work. Mental health issues have a considerable impact on society and the economy, and Parliament strongly supports the promotion of good mental health and its inclusion in EU policymaking. Parliament has called for an EU strategy for mental health and legislation on the use of artificial intelligence at work. Parliament also urged the Commission to propose minimum requirements for telework; legislation on psychosocial risks and wellbeing at work; and a ‘long-term, comprehensive and integrated European mental health strategy’.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, was announced, from the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) on a proposal for a regulation on securities settlement in the EU and central securities depositories (CSDs): shorter settlement cycle in the Union.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – May II 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig.

Since April 2025, the United States (US) and Iran have been engaging in talks over a new nuclear deal. The current multilateral agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear programme is considered defunct by most analysts, after the US withdrew in 2018 and Iran started breaching its provisions as of 2019.

Background

Iran has been under multilateral sanctions for its nuclear proliferation activities since 2006. On 14 July 2015, Iran and the E3/EU+3 (or P5+1) – China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, with the EU High Representative – concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council (UNSC), to limit Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. The JCPOA caps at 3.67 % Iran’s uranium enrichment (the weapons-grade threshold is 90 %), and at 300 kg its stockpile of enriched uranium; limits the number of Iran’s centrifuges and its nuclear R&D programme; and allows extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran also committed never to seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons. In exchange, the UNSC gradually lifted its sanctions against Iran, while the EU and US ceased to apply some of their own. In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA, re-imposed all lifted sanctions and applied new ones, as part of a ‘maximum pressure‘ campaign against Iran. The EU remains bound by the deal, but maintains proliferation-related sanctions, alongside non-nuclear related ones. Although still party to the agreement, Iran started exceeding JCPOA limits in 2019, and fully stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments in 2021. Iran currently has a 275 kg stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 %. In October 2025, UNSC sanctions are set to expire, unless the JCPOA ‘snapback mechanism‘ to re-impose them is triggered.

Recent US-Iran diplomatic re-engagement

In a March 2025 letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader, President Trump reportedly set a two-month deadline to reach a nuclear deal, threatening Iran with (military) consequences otherwise. After an initial harsh reaction from Ayatollah Khamenei, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian left open the ‘path for indirect negotiations’. The first round of US-Iran talks took place on 12 April 2025; a fourth concluded on 11 May 2025. The Oman-mediated talks (the highest level since 2018) are indirect, although reports mention some direct exchanges between US and Iranian negotiators. The former Biden US administration sought to revive the JCPOA, but indirect talks with Iran stalled in the summer of 2022. A year later, secret indirect discussions aimed for an ‘informal’ pact to prevent further escalation between the US and Iran.

The US objectives in the talks are surrounded by some uncertainty. President Trump initially stated the objective of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. The US position then shifted, with Trump stating the goal of ‘full dismantlement’ of Iran’s nuclear programme, while likely accepting a civilian nuclear programme. The US Secretary of State has called for a complete halt to uranium enrichment (with a potential Iranian civilian programme based on imported enriched uranium), to its production of long-range missiles and to its support for terrorist groups and the Houthis. However, other administration voices suggest that the US agree to some uranium enrichment in order to get a deal and avoid a military strike that could lead to war. Iranian officials have condemned the ‘contradictory and conflicting’ US positions. Stressing its right to maintain a ‘complete nuclear fuel cycle’, as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has rejected the prospect of dismantling its nuclear programme and renouncing uranium enrichment, but would discuss concerns regarding ‘potential militarisation’. Iran has also rejected any discussion of its defence and missile capabilities, but suggested it would not build a nuclear-capable missile. At the same time, Iran has framed a deal as a win-win for both sides, inviting the US to invest in its nuclear energy programme.

Signs of progress …

Iranian officials have described as ‘very serious and productive’ the current discussions covering technical issues, such as the monitoring of Iran’s nuclear facilities and what would happen to its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. Iran aims to secure the effective lifting of sanctions and ironclad guarantees from the US that it would not renege on a potential deal. The IAEA has pressed for a role in the talks, as the agency would be required to verify implementation of any agreement. Initial reports indicated that US negotiators suggested capping Iran’s uranium enrichment at a low level needed to produce fuel for energy, as well as monitoring, just as Iranian officials indicated willingness to have a 3.67 % limit, as set by the JCPOA. A senior adviser to Khamenei stated that Iran, in exchange for lifting all sanctions, was prepared to sign a deal that allows it to enrich only to the lower levels needed for civilian uses and requires it to give up its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, with inspectors verifying compliance. Iran also reportedly floated the idea of selling enriched uranium to the US. After the fourth round of talks, the President Trump hinted that the parties were close to a deal, which would seemingly include zero uranium enrichment for up to three years to build trust, after which Iran would be allowed to enrich at civilian levels (likely the 3.67 % limit set by the JCPOA). In the meantime, Russia could provide Iran with uranium for its civil nuclear programme. Nevertheless, reports point to continued disagreements over the issue of zero uranium enrichment, and over the timing and location of the transfer of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile.

… albeit fragile

Besides their respective red lines in the talks, the high level of distrust between the US and Iran and a potential escalation in the region may prevent them reaching a deal. To build pressure on Iran, the US has increased its military deployments to the Middle East and stepped up the enforcement of sanctions. Moreover, President Trump may fail to deter, or may even consider supporting, an Israeli (or even a joint Israeli-US) strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In turn, Iran has threatened ‘a strong reciprocal blow’ in the event of a US military attack, including against the tens of thousands of American troops stationed at bases across the region or against Israeli troops – threats reiterated recently as it unveiled a new solid-fuelled medium-range ballistic missile. Iran has also stated that the US would be held responsible for any Israeli attacks on Iranian soil, and has condemned the US for expanding its sanctions campaign against Iran’s trade partners, notably China. At the same time, Iran has continued purportedly to foment instability in the region, through support to the Houthis and backing acts of sabotage in Jordan, a steadfast US ally.

Role of regional players

Israel regards any emerging deal with strong concern, particularly if it will not fully remove Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium. Emboldened by recent military successes against Iranian proxies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and the demise of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Israel continues to push for targeted strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Conversely, the Gulf States, already on a course of rapprochement with Iran, are supportive of a nuclear deal, unlike in 2015. For them, a US-Iran compromise on the nuclear issue is necessary for Middle East stability and for achieving their economic visions. China and Russia have also expressed support for the talks. Moscow advocates a fair US-Iran deal, insisting on Iran’s legitimate right to develop its own civil nuclear energy programme. Russia has even offered to mediate the talks and to store Iranian enriched uranium. China, increasingly targeted by US sanctions over the purchase of Iranian crude oil, has backed Iran in the talks, also arguing in favour of respecting Iran’s right to use nuclear energy peacefully. After China-Russia-Iran trilateral discussions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry in March 2025 issued a five-point proposition on the Iranian nuclear issue, which states that the JCPOA framework should remain the basis for new consensus, and cautions against initiating the snapback mechanism.

European Union

EU-Iran relations have been at a low since 2022. However, the EU has a lot to lose from escalation in the Middle East and the collapse of nuclear diplomacy, and has called on Iran repeatedly to respect its commitments under the JCPOA. In November 2024, the E3 and the US censured Iran at the IAEA for lack of cooperation with the agency. Iran and the E3 then held several rounds of nuclear talks, most recently on 16 May 2025. While the EU is de facto excluded from current US-Iran talks, the EU High Representative hailed the talks as a ‘step in the right direction because we do not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon’, stressing the importance of a unified approach with the US on the matter. In late April, France, Germany and the UK announced they would trigger the snapback mechanism by August if talks with the US fail to reach an accord; they have rejected any military option.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Recent US-Iran talks on a new nuclear deal‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Between 2021 and 2023, at least 51 433 unaccompanied minors were reported as missing across Europe, averaging nearly 47 children a day. Over 18 000 migrant and refugee children were reported as missing across Europe between 2018 and 2020. It is feared that many of these children may have been exploited and abused for sexual or labour purposes. The European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the need to address this issue.

Background

The number of migrant children has been growing, both globally and in the European Union (EU). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), around 40 % of the world’s displaced people are children. Lost in Europe, an investigative journalism project, has reported that 51 433 migrant children have disappeared after arriving in European countries between 2021 and 2023. This investigation builds on research published in 2021, showing that more than 18 000 migrant and refugee children went missing in Europe between 2018 and 2020. Overall, the reasons for children’s disappearance include: poor reception conditions; lack of child-friendly information; inefficient family reunification and guardian-appointment procedures; fear of detention or deportation; the desire to join family or friends in another country; and violence and abuse, including illegal adoption and trafficking.

EU Member States do not have a common definition for the concepts and terminologies related to the rights and protection of children. For instance, there is no consensus on how to define a ‘missing child’. According to Missing Children Europe, migrant children are considered missing ‘when they are registered with state authorities and go missing from the reception/accommodation centres provided for them’. While most missing migrant children are understood to be unaccompanied minors (UAMs), separated children and children that were travelling with family are also included in this group.

In 2023, 170 children lost in migration were never found. According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the issue of UAMs going missing from first reception facilities is a significant concern in many EU Member States. However, regular data collection and sharing is fragmented, making it difficult to fully grasp the picture; a single contact point would arguably facilitate finding information about such children at a cross-national level. In fact, registration is particularly relevant in the case of children, as it lessens the risk of them going missing while also helping families reunite. For instance, reports by EU police forces warn about the exploitation and trafficking of African children by organised crime groups, such as drug trafficking networks, mainly based in western Europe.

European action to protect children in migration

In recent years, the EU has adopted a set of policies on children in migration. Under EU law, the European Commission has launched a hotline number (116000) for missing children, including UAMs of third-country origin, which is now active in 32 countries. The enforced disappearance of children is addressed under Article 8 of the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR). In a communication from 2017, the Commission laid out a list of priority actions aimed at contributing to the protection of children in migration. Moreover, in its 2020 communication on a new pact on migration and asylum, the Commission stressed that ‘the reform of EU rules on asylum and return is an opportunity to strengthen safeguards and protection standards under EU law for migrant children’. It furthermore identified children’s rights as a priority that is part of a broader range of initiatives, such as those set out in the 2020 action plan on integration and inclusion 2021-2027 and the 2021 EU strategy on voluntary return and reintegration.

The 2021 EU strategy on the rights of the child stressed the vulnerability of migrant children, who are often deeply traumatised by what they have had to endure in their country of origin or on a migratory route. The strategy notes that migrant children are more likely to be victims of abuse and violence, and that the risk of going missing increases ‘when children travel unaccompanied or are obliged to share overcrowded facilities with adult strangers’. The pact on migration and asylum, adopted in 2024, introduced several provisions regarding children and UAMs with the goal of protecting them and preventing the risk of them going missing or falling victim to criminal networks. For instance, the Eurodac Regulation calls for the collection of biometric data from children to be able to identify them, while introducing additional safeguards for minors who will be registered under it. Recital 42 of the Reception Conditions Directive calls for the early appointment of representatives for UAMs, and Recital 23 of the Anti-Trafficking Directive touches upon the exploitation of children by criminal groups. In 2020, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) called on EU Member States to do ‘whatever is necessary and required in the best interests of the child’ to prevent the disappearance of child refugees and migrants globally. In April 2025, PACE organised the parliamentary conference on ‘Envisioning effective public policy to prevent and address cases of missing migrants’ as a follow-up to PACE Resolution 2569 on missing migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers. Additionally, a toolkit for parliamentarians to take action on this issue will be released by the end of 2025.

In focus: The situation of missing Ukrainian children
More than half of Ukraine’s children are believed to have been displaced as a result of the war. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Magnolia has recorded more than 2 100 children as kidnapped, abducted, forcibly disappeared or simply missing inside Ukraine. Similarly, NGOs and public authorities have been warning about the risk of violence and trafficking facing children outside Ukraine, stressing the importance of proper registration, and there have been reports of children disappearing after arriving in EU countries from Ukraine. The Council of Europe’s group of experts on action against trafficking in human beings (GRETA) has also warned of the danger faced by people fleeing Ukraine of falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. In March 2022, the Commission presented a 10-point plan for stronger EU coordination on welcoming people fleeing the war, with a focus on strengthening children’s protection. The plan includes: ‘standard operating procedures and uniform guidance for the reception and support of children; specific procedures for the transfer of UAMs’; and measures on recording and exchanging of information. The plan also supports the development of an anti-trafficking plan and the ‘Safe Homes’ initiative. Finally, the Bring Kids Back UA action plan unites the efforts of Ukrainian government agencies, partner countries and international organisations aiming to trace and bring back home the forcefully deported children of Ukraine.

European Parliament position

The need to tackle the disappearance of migrant children has been highlighted in several Parliament resolutions. In a November 2014 resolution, Parliament stressed that many UAMs had disappeared or absconded after arriving in the EU, and called for full respect of migrant children’s rights across the EU. In two December 2016 resolutions, Parliament urged the Commission to take preventive measures against the disappearance of UAMs and to develop a strategy for that purpose and for locating missing children. Parliament also recommended reinforcing the existing tools for finding missing children. In May 2018, Parliament called on the Member States to place all children and families with children in non-custodial, community-based accommodation while processing their immigration status. It also stressed the need to host UAMs in separate facilities from adults to prevent any risk of violence or sexual abuse. In November 2019, Parliament called on the Member States to improve the situation of children in migration and reiterated the significance of child protection as a fundamental principle for the EU.

In March 2021, Parliament underscored that the EU strategy on the rights of the child needed to include measures to improve the situation of children in migration and safeguard their interests throughout every stage of asylum procedures. In April 2022, Parliament adopted a resolution on the protection of children and young people fleeing the war in Ukraine. Most recently, Parliament also raised concerns about the risk of Ukrainian children falling victim to human trafficking. In April 2024, the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) conducted a joint exchange of views on the feasibility of establishing a European centre for missing persons, including children. Additionally, ‘Lost in Europe’ was awarded the 2024 Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism for its investigation into the disappearance of unaccompanied child migrants. Finally, the European Parliament’s Vice-President, Ewa Kopacz, who is also Parliament’s Coordinator on Children’s Rights, collaborates with various organisations working on the issue of missing children, such as the Amber Alert Foundation and Missing Children Europe, and consistently expresses concerns over forcibly displaced Ukrainian children.

This updates an ‘At a glance’ note by Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou published in May 2023.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Disappearance of migrant children in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

The recent cost-of-living crisis has exacerbated a longstanding problem with housing affordability in the EU. Higher building costs and mortgage rates, together with a related decrease in housing construction, have made access to home ownership more difficult. At the same time, investors use housing as a vehicle for investment. Growing numbers of people are struggling to access affordable housing, whether to rent or to buy, particularly in cities. Across Europe, homelessness is rising.

In addition, many residential buildings need to be made energy-efficient and decarbonised in order to achieve the EU’s energy and climate goals, lower energy consumption and reduce energy bills.

While the EU has no direct competence in the area of housing and only a limited scope of action to address social issues, it provides relevant guidance and funding, and has carried out several initiatives to support housing. Furthermore, certain EU rules have a indirect impact on housing provision, starting with the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. In parallel, many sources of EU funding are available for various housing-related purposes in the current financing period.

In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the lack of adequate and affordable housing, and the need to address it at EU level, emerged as a concern across the whole of the EU and the entire political spectrum. The new European Commission) is giving housing policy visibility and weight by proposing a coordinated approach. For the first time, housing has become a distinct part of a commissioner’s portfolio. Dan Jørgensen, the new Commissioner for Energy and Housing, is responsible for dealing with several complex issues relating to housing.

In 2024, the spotlight was on affordable housing, while 2025 is seeing a scaling-up of housing-related policy developments across the EU institutions, including discussions, consultations and funding initiatives.

This updates a briefing published in January 2025.

Read the complete brifeing on ‘A coordinated EU approach to housing‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

Menstrual poverty, defined as insufficient access to menstrual hygiene products and facilities, affects an estimated 10 % of the half of the EU population who menstruate, with a higher prevalence among people with a low income, refugees, young people, and people with disabilities. Studies from Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain highlight the economic burden menstruation imposes, particularly on vulnerable persons. The COVID‑19 pandemic exacerbated this issue by disrupting supply chains and intensifying financial strains.

To address menstrual poverty, the European Union has facilitated access to menstrual hygiene products primarily through fiscal reform. The revision of the EU VAT Directive introduced greater flexibility for Member States to apply reduced or zero VAT rates to female sanitary products, shifting their classification from luxury to essential goods. Practices remain quite divergent, with some Member States, such as Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, adopting a zero rate, while others, such as Hungary, Sweden and Denmark, maintain standard rates.

EU funding programmes such as Erasmus+ and ESF+ have indirectly supported menstrual health initiatives through education, social inclusion, and material assistance projects. Partnerships with non-governmental organisations, such as the Red Cross, have helped distribute products to marginalised groups. Likewise, numerous local initiatives in Member States increasingly provide free menstrual products in schools, universities, and public spaces.

The European Parliament recognises menstrual poverty as a gender equality issue and calls for greater access to free menstrual products. Members continue to urge Member States and the European Commission to introduce concrete initiatives to combat period poverty.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Addressing menstrual poverty in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Olga Dunderberg.

Members participate in the second plenary session of May this week, with an agenda featuring a number of the current hot topics in Europe, including Council and European Commission statements on the situation in Gaza. The session opens on Wednesday, with Nataša Pirc Musar, President of the Republic of Slovenia, to address Parliament in a formal sitting.

Continued single market fragmentation constrains EU companies’ ability to scale up and compete internationally, and many of the issues remain the same as they were 20 years ago. Following a Commission statement on Wednesday, Members are due to debate the new strategy, which should bring new impetus to the single market. While reaffirming Parliament’s role in the process, Parliament has emphasised Member States must play their part in implementing and enforcing existing single market legislation. It also demands renewed commitment from Member States and other EU institutions to strengthen and further develop the single market, particularly in the services, digital and energy sectors.

As tackling climate change remains an urgent priority, the EU has set stringent rules on greenhouse gas emissions. As the rules make carbon-intensive activities more costly, this leads to a risk that some companies try to increase their profits by moving their carbon-heavy activity outside the EU. To level the playing field for businesses, the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) ensures prices fairly reflect the carbon emitted during production of imported goods such as cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers and electricity. Before it comes into full operation in 2026, the Commission is proposing to simplify the CBAM. On Wednesday, Members are set to debate a report from Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety that largely endorses the Commission proposal to simplify and strengthen the CBAM, pending clarifications on electricity generation and embedded emissions. If approved, the vote will set Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council on the proposal.

Following Council and Commission statements on Wednesday on ending Europe’s dependency on Russian energy by phasing out imports, Members are due to debate plans to increase the EU’s energy sovereignty. The Commission’s recent roadmap – addressing the security and economic risks of continued reliance on Russian energy – is expected to provide an answer to Parliament’s repeated calls for measures to provide alternatives to imported Russian energy, to abandon Nord Stream 1 and 2, and to secure a reliable supply of medical radioisotopes.

Academic freedom is increasingly coming under attack in many parts of the world. Following Council and Commission statements on attracting scientists, researchers and academics to Europe, particularly to contribute to the development of new, cutting-edge technologies, Members are set to debate the Commission’s ‘Choose Europe for Science‘ initiative on Thursday. Parliament already called for increased Horizon Europe funding for researchers in its resolution on the 2026 budget guidelines

With estimates suggesting that more than 84 million people struggle with mental health problems, mental health issues have a considerable impact on society and the economy across the EU. Parliament strongly supports the promotion of good mental health and its inclusion in EU policymaking. It has called for an EU strategy for mental health and legislation on the use of artificial intelligence at work. Parliament also urged the Commission to propose minimum requirements for telework; legislation on psychosocial risks and wellbeing at work; and a ‘long-term, comprehensive and integrated European mental health strategy’.  On Wednesday afternoon, Members are due to debate EU initiatives to improve mental health at work.

• European Parliament Plenary Session agenda
• Single market strategy
• Russian energy phase-out, Nord Stream and EU energy sovereignty
• Simplifying and strengthening CBAM
• Improving mental health at work
• Choose Europe for Science

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Pollination is a fundamental process for the survival of our ecosystems and ultimately, of our planet. Nearly 90 % of the world’s wild flowering plant species depend on pollination, along with more than 75 % of the world’s food crops and 35 % of global agricultural land. Without pollination, many interconnected species and processes functioning within the ecosystem would collapse. Not only do pollinators contribute directly to food security, but they are key to conserving biodiversity. There are different pollinator species – such as bees, birds and bats. Most of the over 20 000 species of bees are pollinators, and together with moths, flies, wasps, beetles, and butterflies, they make up the majority of pollinating species. However, close to 35 % of invertebrate pollinators, such as bees and butterflies, face extinction globally. If this trend continues, staple crops like rice, corn and potatoes will increasingly be substituted for nutritious crops, such as fruits, nuts and vegetables, eventually resulting in an imbalanced diet.

Read this infographic on ‘World Bee Day 2025: We all depend on pollinators‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Stéphanie Pradier.

The Congress is the legislative branch of the United States (US) system of government. It is divided into two chambers: the House of Representatives (the lower chamber) and the Senate (the upper chamber). The formal powers of Congress are set out in Article I of the US Constitution, and include making laws, collecting revenue, borrowing and spending money, declaring war, making treaties with foreign nations, and overseeing the executive branch. Elections to the US Congress occur every second November, with the Congress convening the following January. Additionally, every four years, these elections coincide with the presidential election. The current, 119th Congress was elected in November 2024, and convened in January 2025. The US has a long-standing two-party system, which means that nearly all members of Congress belong to either the Republican or Democratic parties. Independent members, if any, generally align or caucus with one of the two main parties. In the most recent US Presidential and Congressional elections, held in November 2024, the Republican party won the White House. They also retained control of the House with a five-seat margin – the smallest in modern history – and won back the Senate with a six-seat majority, taking account of two independents who caucus with the Democrats. This gave the Republicans a governing trifecta, with control of the presidency and both chambers of Congress. This EPRS briefing provides key facts and figures about the US Congress as an institution, including relevant comparisons with the European Parliament (EP).

Read the complete briefing on ‘United States Congress: Facts and Figures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by David de Groot.

The prohibition of discrimination and the protection of human rights are important elements of the EU legal order. Nevertheless, discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people persists throughout the EU and takes various forms, including verbal abuse and physical violence.

Sexual orientation is now recognised in EU law as grounds of discrimination. However, the scope of the provisions dealing with this issue is limited and does not cover social protection, health care, education or access to goods and services, leaving LGBTI people particularly vulnerable in these areas.

Moreover, EU competence does not extend to recognition of marital or family status. In this area, national regulations vary, with some Member States offering same-sex couples the right to marry, some allowing alternative forms of registration, and others not providing any legal status for same-sex couples. Same-sex couples may or may not have the right to adopt children and to access assisted reproduction. These divergent legal statuses have implications, for instance, for partners from two Member States with different standards who want to formalise/legalise their relationship, and for same-sex couples and their families wishing to move to another Member State.

Combating discrimination has become part of EU internal and external policies, and is the subject of numerous resolutions of the European Parliament. However, action in this area remains problematic when it touches on issues pertaining to areas traditionally the preserve of Member States, such as marital status and family law.

This is a further updated version of a briefing first published in 2010, the previous edition of which was published in June 2024.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The rights of LGBTI people in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

Over the last ten years, the EU has taken several key measures to combat aggressive corporate tax planning, aiming to curb the billions in revenue losses suffered by Member States. However, the variety and breadth of the measures introduced have raised concern about their administrative complexity and overall effectiveness. The Subcommittee on Tax Matters will hold a public hearing on this topic on 15 May 2025.

From post-crisis reforms to simplification initiatives

Following the Great Recession and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, and fuelled by publication of various ‘tax leaks’, the EU set out an ambitious range of initiatives to counter corporate tax avoidance. Numerous laws were put into place to close tax loopholes and increase transparency on the tax practices of (large, multinational) companies, including the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) and the directives on Administrative Cooperation (DAC) and Public Country-by-Country Reporting (Public CbCR). In 2021, a historic global agreement paved the way for the introduction of a minimum effective corporate tax of 15 % for multinationals in the EU, which entered into force in 2024.

Following the 2024 European elections, the European Commission embarked on an overall strategy to cut red tape and simplify EU legislation. In March 2025, the Council called on the Commission to present a road map before the end of Q3 2025 to reduce the reporting burdens for both tax administrations and taxpayers, eliminate outdated and overlapping tax rules, increase the clarity of tax legislation and streamline the application of tax rules, procedures and reporting requirements. This work should cover both direct and indirect taxation, and should ‘preserve the successful achievements’ the EU has made in this area.

Commission evaluations of the ATAD and DAC are already ongoing, and may lead to legislative changes.

Anti-tax Avoidance Directive

The Anti-tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) set out five key provisions – four specific, one general – to close loopholes that were often abused for aggressive tax avoidance purposes. The ATAD rules entered into force between 2019 and 2022.

Table 1 – ATAD overview

Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal marketArt. 4Interest limitation ruleDiscourages debt arrangements designed to minimise taxation, limiting the deductibility of taxpayers’ excess borrowing costsArt. 5Exit taxation rulePrevents companies from avoiding tax when relocating assetsArt. 6General anti-abuse rule (GAAR)Counters aggressive tax planning when other rules do not applyArt. 7-8Controlled foreign company (CFC) ruleDeters profit shifting to a dependent company in a low-tax country to reduce taxable profitsArt. 9Hybrid mismatch rulePrevents companies from exploiting national mismatches to avoid taxation

The provisions of the ATAD function as ‘minimum standards’, allowing Member States to introduce stricter provisions, if they choose to. This flexibility has led to some divergence in the application of these standards, resulting in legal complexity. Additionally, the directive includes several options for Member States, often to exclude certain entities from the scope of a particular anti-avoidance rule. Some stakeholder feedback on the ATAD encouraged the Commission to seek more harmonisation in this area. A study conducted for the Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) similarly noted that reducing the number of available options ‘should be considered for a more homogenous anti-avoidance landscape’.

Discussions are also ongoing about the continued relevance of certain ATAD provisions – such as the CFC rules – in the context of the broader global minimum corporate tax framework. While ATAD is designed to target specific tax avoidance loopholes, the EU Minimum Tax Directive focuses on a minimum level of effective taxation, irrespective of any tax planning strategies employed.

Directive on Administrative Cooperation

As its name implies, the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC) does not govern the imposition or payment of taxes directly. Instead, it facilitates the collection and, increasingly, the automatic exchange of tax-related information between Member States concerning individuals and companies. Benefiting from increasingly efficient digital tools, Member States can track and cross check income streams, swiftly detect evasion or avoidance practices and impose taxes where required according to national legislation. The DAC has undergone eight revisions (DAC1-DAC9) over the past ten years. This has progressively widened the scope of taxpayers and reportable data.

Table 2 – DAC overview

DACInformation being reported and exchangedDACInformation being reported and exchangedDAC1Income from employment, pension, director fees, income and assets from immovable property and life insuranceDAC6Potentially aggressive tax planning schemes of intermediariesDAC2Financial account data (account balances, gross amount of interest and dividends received …)DAC7Income earned by sellers on digital sales platformsDAC3Advance cross-border tax rulings and advance pricing arrangements of companiesDAC8Income earned by crypto-asset tradersDAC4Country-by-country reports on multinationals (data on revenue, profits, tax paid …)DAC9Top-up tax information returns for the purposes of the Minimum Tax DirectiveDAC5Beneficial ownership and due diligence information as collected through the anti-money laundering legal framework. 

Stakeholder responses to the public consultation on DAC indicated that many would welcome greater transparency on how, and to what extent, tax authorities use the data reported. The European Court of Auditors raised a similar concern, noting Member States ‘generally underused’ the data reported under DAC1 to DAC5, which were subject to limited data quality checks.

Stakeholders have been particularly critical of DAC6, which obliges intermediaries – such as tax advisors and accountants – to report information on potentially aggressive cross-border tax arrangements to the tax authorities. Stakeholders regarded the criteria for identifying such arrangements, known as ‘hallmarks’, as overly broad or difficult to apply in practice. This concern was echoed in a study commissioned by the FISC Subcommittee, which also warned about the additional administrative costs for tax authorities: ‘Tax authorities will also be heavily impacted due to the [… expected] volume of disclosed information they will receive. The danger of over-reporting due to the over-inclusion and multiplicity of hallmarks (…) is a real one, and may cause tax authorities [to miss …] some red flags’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘The future of EU anti-tax avoidance rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) brought together Members of the European Parliament, the European Commission and researchers on 29 April 2025, to discuss the opportunities and challenges of the use of AI in science, at a workshop entitled ‘Generative AI and scientific development’.

STOA Vice‑Chair Lina Gálvez (S&D, Spain) opened the event, and called for a fruitful debate on all angles of the use of AI in scientific development – from the undeniable advantages, to the risks associated with an extensive deployment of AI and ways to counter them.

A first panel focused on the technologies involved in using AI to help foster scientific research in the EU. Serge Belongie (University of Copenhagen) set the scene with a keynote speech about the challenges and opportunities of AI. Maria Cristina Russo, Director of Prosperity at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, then commented on the Commission’s efforts to mobilise €200 billion for investment in AI, including €20 million to develop gigafactories devoted to high-performance cloud storage (HPC), as well as the political priorities of the Competitiveness Compass. She also commented on the AI continent action plan, the AI in science initiative, the communication on a European strategy for AI in science, and the creation of the resource for AI science in Europe (RAISE), as well as on the ‘Choose EU‘ initiative to attract researchers. Francesca Campolongo, Director for Digital Transformation and Data at the Joint Research Centre (JRC), highlighted that the EU is at the forefront of AI research and development, but that this does not translate well enough into innovation. She mentioned the GPT@JRC platform as an example of JRC’s commitment to help unlock the full potential of AI in science. Ana García Robles, of the Big Data Value Association, focused on competitiveness and emphasised the need to consider both small and medium-sized enterprises and big companies. Wijnand Ijsselsteijn (Eindhoven University of Technology) highlighted the relation between data science, AI and psychology.

The second panel focused on how AI affects scientific dialogue and gave an overview of the use and the abuse of AI in science. Oxford University Professor Sonia Contera’s keynote speech framed the way AI affects the exchange of information that is essential in science. Lex Bouter of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam insisted on the need to focus on the concept of research integrity. Anita De Waard, of Elsevier underlined the need for collaboration among academic and industry partners to improve trust and reproducibility, as well as research integrity. Commenting on these issues, Sebastián Ventura Soto from the University of Córdoba noted how new developments in AI can also be used to tackle them. Finally, Elizabeth Gadd of the Coalition for Advancing Research Assessment highlighted the need for responsible research evaluation and for improved metrics for evaluating research. During the Q&A session which followed, Ana Vasconcelos, (EPP, Portugal) discussed the idea of ‘fake’ scientific publications and the reliability of assessing AI manipulation while insisting on the need for trustworthy scientific communication.

STOA Vice-Chair Lina Gálvez closed the event, underlining the need to reap the full benefits of the development and uptake of AI in science, as promoted by the Commission and the JRC, while avoiding drawbacks such as interfering with a necessary and productive scientific dialogue. She ended by announcing that, since the Commission and JRC are already doing excellent work in promoting the deployment of AI with their different programmes, STOA will complement this effort by launching a study analysing the status of open science and the effects of generative AI in scientific exchange.

Prior to the event, the European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) published an article featuring interviews with the keynote speakers. A web-stream recording of the event, a video and photos, are available on our website.

Your opinion matters to us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu and follow us on X at @EP_ScienceTech.

Written by Marc Jütten.

President Donald Trump threatens that the US will take back the Panama Canal, a strategic maritime route for global trade, because of perceived Chinese influence in the Canal Zone. In fact, a Hong Kong-based private company owns two of the canal’s five port terminals at strategically important points. The Panama Canal is a key maritime trade route that handles about 40 % of US container traffic and approximately 5 % of world trade.

Background

From 1904 to 1914, the US completed the building of the Panama Canal. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian military leader Omar Torrijos signed the Neutrality Treaty and the Panama Canal Treaty, referred to as the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, which ended decades of US control over the canal. The agreement guaranteed the canal’s neutrality and passed full sovereignty over the canal to Panama by 31 December 1999. Since then, the Panama Canal has been managed and operated by the Panama Canal Authority (PCA), an agency of the Panamanian government. Over time, various expansion programmes have increased the canal’s traffic handling. The completion of a major expansion in 2016 significantly increased Panama’s revenues and global trade influence, with the works involving a consortium of companies from Spain, Italy and Belgium. In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB) provided US$500 million, representing 10 % of the project costs and marking the EIB’s largest operation so far in Latin America.

Figure 1 – The Panama Canal © Peter Hermes Furian/Adobe Stock. A global trading hub

The Panama Canal is an artificial 82-kilometre (51-mile) waterway that connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific Ocean (see Figure 1), making it an important trade and logistics hub. By allowing vessels to bypass the southernmost tip of South America, the canal significantly reduces transit times, distances and logistics costs, and is the fastest route for trade between the US east coast and Asia. Overall, the canal connects 180 maritime routes and 1 920 ports worldwide. It generates roughly 4 % of Panama’s GDP, through the tolls paid by vessels using the canal. According to the PCA, the canal handles approximately 5 % of world trade; 40 % of all US container traffic traverses it annually, and more than 70 % of the cargo that goes through the canal originates in or is destined for the US, making the Panama Canal vital to US supply chains. The canal is also a crucial component of US naval strategy, allowing the US Navy to swiftly transfer vessels between the Atlantic and Pacific. China accounted for 21.4 % of the cargo volume transiting the canal, making it the second largest user after the US. Other major users of the waterway include Japan, South Korea and Chile (see Figure 2). From an EU perspective, the third most important trade route, which the Panama Canal connects, is from South America’s west coast to Europe.

The Panama Canal relies on freshwater, which makes it dependent on climate change. In recent years, unprecedented droughts (the El Niño weather phenomenon) have been affecting the water supply from nearby lakes, leading authorities to impose surcharges and weight limits on ships traversing the canal. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), drought reduced the Panama flows by 5 % in 2023, with economic damage estimated at around 0.5 % of Panama’s GDP for 2024.

Figure 2 – Top countries shipping cargo through the Panama Canal Data source: Panama Canal Statistics. China’s presence in the Panama Canal Zone

A company controlled by CK Hutchison Holdings, a Hong Kong-based private multinational conglomerate corporation, has operated two of the canal’s five port terminals since it won the tender in 1997; their contract was renewed for another 25 years in 2021. The company operates one container terminal at the port of Balboa (on the Pacific side) and another at Cristóbal (on the Atlantic side), which provide access to the Panama Canal Railway. The railway has become increasingly important over the years, among other reasons because of the canal’s chronic lack of water. Because of low water, many large container ships have to offload cargo and transport it by rail to the other end of the canal. The Chinese government lacks any direct institutional channels to influence CK Hutchison’s decision-making. However, experts point out that, if Hutchison were to give preferential treatment to the cargo of Chinese ships, it might have an impact on the supply of goods to the US. According to an announcement made on 4 March 2025, CK Hutchison agreed to sell most of its global ports business, including those on the Panama Canal, to US-led group BlackRock. CK Hutchison stressed that the transaction was purely commercial in nature and unrelated to recent political events. However, in the meantime it has been reported that China’s market regulator said it would carry out an antitrust review of the Panama port deal in accordance with a law to protect fair competition and safeguard the public interest. Consequently, the deal was not signed on 2 April as expected. In addition to the two container terminals, there are other undertakings around the Panama Canal operated by Chinese state-owned companies. In 2024, a new cruise ship terminal was inaugurated, built by a consortium led by China Harbour Engineering Company. The latest project is the construction of the fourth bridge over the Panama Canal, involving a consortium comprising state-owned China Communications Construction Company and China Harbour Engineering Company.

Panama’s sovereign rights under threat?

President Trump’s allegations regarding the Panama Canal are two-sided. He accused Panama of charging US ships exorbitant rates to transit the canal and urged free transit for American commercial and military ships. In fact, the PCA charges fees based on the size and type of ships that are using the waterway; rates are uniform, impartial, and non-discriminatory. Panama’s President, Jose Raul Mulino, added that US government vessels, including navy vessels, paid US$6 million a year for the right of passage. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties only granted preferential treatment to vessels from Costa Rica and Colombia. Secondly, Trump claimed that the US would take back the Panama Canal because of Chinese influence in the Canal Zone, which poses a threat and represents a violation of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. In fact, the Treaties envisage the US having primary responsibility for protecting and defending the canal against armed attacks or other actions which threaten the canal’s security. While Panama rejected US claims threatening Panama’s sovereign rights over the canal, the government has made some concessions, including on migration, the fight against organised crime and security cooperation. Following a visit by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in February 2025, President Mulino confirmed that Panama would withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In addition, Mulino and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, during his visit to Panama, issued a joint statement on 8 April that included information about the signature of a memorandum of understanding on enhanced security cooperation. Moreover, Panama and the US would work on a mechanism to compensate for the payment of tolls and charges. However, while the Spanish-language version of the statement, released by Panama, said ‘Hegseth recognised Panama’s leadership and inalienable sovereignty over the Panama Canal’, that line did not appear in the English version released by the Pentagon.

In 2012, the EU and Panama signed the EU-Central America Association Agreement, which establishes a free trade area between the EU and Central America, consisting of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. In April 2024, the Council adopted a decision to conclude the agreement; this is the final step of the ratification process, which allows for the full implementation of the agreement. The European Parliament gave its consent to the agreement on 11 December 2012. Panama has also established partnerships with the EU under the Global Gateway Investment Agenda.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘The Panama Canal: Panama’s sovereign rights under threat?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Isabelle Ioannides.

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), which entered into force in May 2021, governs the EU’s relationship with the UK, following its withdrawal from the EU. In addition to the European Commission evaluating the implementation of the TCA on an annual basis, Article 776 of the TCA provides for a joint review of the deal’s implementation five years after its entry into force, in 2026.

On 20 November 2024, the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents approved a joint request from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on International Trade (INTA) to draw up an implementation report in response to the European Commission’s 21 March 2024 report on the implementation and application of the EU-UK TCA.

This briefing seeks to inform the drafting of the joint AFET–INTA implementation report. The briefing provides an analysis of the data on trade flows between the EU and the UK in the last two years (2023 and 2024), in the context of the implementation of the TCA. It should be read in tandem with the European Implementation Assessment on the EU-UK TCA, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) in December 2023, which analyses EU-UK trade flows in the first two years of the TCA’s implementation. That EPRS study was requested by AFET and INTA to inform their 2023 joint implementation report on the same subject.

Similar to the 2023 EPRS study, this briefing concludes that the TCA continues to have a stronger impact on the UK than on the EU in the trade relationship. Trade between the EU and the UK continues to be more complex and challenging compared to when the UK was an EU Member State, even if the implementation of the TCA in the last four years has been generally smooth, with some exceptions. The UK has managed to bounce back from COVID and Brexit less successfully than the EU and has, like the EU-27, been affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine and inflation. EU-UK trade in goods decreased slightly in 2023 and 2024, and it is still below pre-Brexit levels. EU-UK trade in services (the TCA does not cover financial services), continues to be less disrupted, and surpassed pre-COVID‑19 levels as of 2023. At a time of uncertainty on the future direction of trade policy, geopolitical upheaval, and the United States administration’s (potential) new tariffs on imports from its trading partners (including the UK and the EU), the TCA offers an opportunity to deepen EU-UK trade relations.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-UK trade flows: Continuities, changes and trends‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU-UK trade in the agri-food sector EU services imports from the UK EU services exports to the UK EU goods imports from the UK EU goods exports to the UK UK share in EU total trade EU-UK trade in goods and services (2010-2024 for goods, 2010-2023 for services) The UK’s top 10 Member State partners in terms of trade in goods (imports and exports) Main EU-27 and UK global partners in terms of trade in goods (exports and imports) Trends in EU-UK total trade versus trade between the EU and the rest of the world (trade in goods and services, imports and exports)

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

On 26 February 2025, the European Commission presented the Clean Industrial Deal, a new EU plan to support competitiveness and decarbonisation of EU industry. The Deal focuses mainly on energy-intensive industries and clean technologies (clean tech). Both sectors face high energy prices, intense global competition and complex regulations.

The Clean Industrial Deal includes several solutions to address this situation. It aims to bring energy costs down, boost demand for clean products, reduce EU dependency on raw materials, improve circularity and restore domestic manufacturing. Planned legislative initiatives in the energy field include a new electricity grids package, revisions of the energy security framework and Energy Union governance, as well as an Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act and a delegated act on low-carbon hydrogen. Recommendations and guidance documents are also planned, for instance on network charges, energy taxation and the design of long-term instruments for electricity supply.

In the short term, the Clean Industrial Deal aims to mobilise over €100 billion through boosting EU-level funding, leveraging private investments and enhancing State aid. The key EU funding sources will be the Innovation Fund, Horizon Europe, InvestEU and a new Industrial Decarbonisation Bank. In the next long-term EU budget, the Competitiveness Fund will support EU investments in research and innovation, industrial deployment and scale-up, manufacturing, clean tech and industrial decarbonisation. The European Parliament is currently working on a resolution on the Clean Industrial Deal. The vote in the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is expected in June 2025, while the plenary vote is planned for July 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Energy dimension of the Clean Industrial Deal‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Barbara Nicoletti

Both genetic and environmental factors contribute to the risks of developing chronic diseases. However, scientists acknowledge that 70 to 90 % of disease risks are linked to environmental exposure. The scientific field of exposomics has developed from the recognition that people are rarely exposed to single environmental factors in isolation, rather they are subject to simultaneous exposures that accumulate over time and interact within specific social and biological contexts. A new STOA study contributes to a better understanding of the environmental factors shaping human health and the options available to policymakers to support human exposome research and connected interventions in public health policies.

Human exposome research

Recent advances in technology, methodologies, and substantial investment have brought significant progress in genetic research. The same cannot be said for environmental health research, which often looks at one environmental factor at a time to assess how it affects human health (i.e., air pollution, noise, chemicals in water and food). By integrating data from a variety of interdisciplinary methodologies and streams, exposomics investigates the effects of the complex interactions between physical, chemical, biological, and psychosocial environmental exposures on an individual, from conception to death, and how those exposures affect that person’s biology and health.

Exposome research can help more accurate and targeted identification of risk factors – including previously unknown factors – that contribute to the development of certain diseases, such as cancers, neurological disorders, respiratory disorders, cardiovascular diseases and obesity. Identifying these factors improves our understanding of diseases’ cause, development, prevention and treatment and offers new lenses through which to study sensitive population groups or critical life periods such as childhood.

Potential impacts and developments

With EU healthcare systems under growing pressure (with average per capita healthcare expenditure in 2022 increased by 38.6 % since 2014) and rising disease rates that cannot be fully explained by an ageing population (i.e. the global rise in early-onset cancers), a shift from a curative to a preventive model is urgently needed. Exposomics plays a key role in supporting this transition, by providing the scientific knowledge needed to understand how environmental factors shape human health and how we can mitigate risks before they translate into disease.

Initiatives such as the European Human Exposome Network (EHEN), the environmental exposure assessment in Europe research infrastructure (EIRENE) and the International Human Exposome Network (IHEN) have placed the European Union in a leading position in exposomics research. However, significant challenges remain, including the need for improved comprehensive exposure assessment, progress on measurement of bodily responses, and integration of fragmented health research ‘silos’. A critical step forward would be the development of large-scale population studies, to provide the statistical power and population diversity required to investigate environmental determinants of health across the life course. This would enable more robust evidence to inform policies in key areas, such as urban planning, chemical safety, climate adaptation, child and occupational health.

The STOA study

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) recently published ‘Human exposome research: Potential, limitations and public policy implications’. This study aims to contribute by highlighting the connection between environmental exposure and disease risks and understanding the role of exposomics in generating valuable knowledge that can inform policy decisions, guide public health interventions, and empower individuals to make informed choices about their health.

This study provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of human exposome research, its relevance for addressing pressing environmental health challenges and policy contexts in Europe, and the scientific and technological advances needed to drive progress in this rapidly evolving field. It concludes by identifying operational scenarios to further develop exposomics research and programmes. It also enumerates policy considerations to use exposomics’ comprehensive and discovery-driven approach in implementing EU policy commitments across selected key areas, such as cities, chemicals, climate, child health, career, clinical practice, and citizens’ engagement.

Read the full STOA study to find out more. The study was presented to the STOA Panel on 13 March 2025, followed by a European Science-Media Hub interview with Roel Vermuelen, Professor of Environmental Epidemiology and Exposome Science at Utrecht University and the University Medical Center Utrecht, author of the study.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Highlights of the May I 2025 plenary session included the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, and Parliament statements on freedom, democracy and security as Europe’s heritage. Parliament also observed a minute of silence in memory of the late Pope Francis.

Members held several debates on Council and Commission statements: on European Union support for a just, sustainable and comprehensive peace in Ukraine; a unified EU response to unjustified US trade measures; and preparation of the EU-UK summit. Debates also followed statements by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, on protecting Greenland’s right to decide its own future and maintain the rules-based world order, and an urgent assessment of the applicability of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba. A debate also took place on President Erdoğan’s illegal visit to the occupied areas of Cyprus.

Members also debated Council and Commission statements on the resilience and interconnection of energy grid infrastructure in the EU; high retail food prices; Malta’s ‘golden passport’ scheme; the fine against TikTok and citizens’ rights on social media platforms; EU action on treating and preventing diseases such as cancer, cardiovascular neurological diseases and measles.

Long-term budget for the Union in a changing world

The EU’s current long-term budget, or multiannual financial framework (MFF), is set to end in 2027. The time has therefore come to start setting the boundaries for EU spending for the following seven years. Members considered and adopted a report from the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) proposing to revamp the MFF to prepare the EU to face the challenges ahead. The report lists competitiveness; security, defence and preparedness; global peace, security and prosperity; and promotion of fundamental rights, EU values and the rule of law as the priorities for EU spending to 2034. It also calls on the Council to adopt new own resources to cover increased spending needs, and for a simpler, more transparent design for the next MFF.

Discharge 2023

As every year, Members held a debate on granting discharge for the implementation of the annual EU budget, for the year 2023. Members considered and followed all the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommendations on discharge for the EU’s 2023 accounts. The first CONT recommendation was to grant discharge for the Commission, six executive agencies and for the Recovery and Resilience Facility grants, plus separate decisions for the European Development Funds, representing over 95 % of the EU budget. However, the CONT committee highlighted the need to reduce the rising error rate, speed up disbursement of a record number of outstanding commitments, and effect stricter controls. The committee also recommended granting discharge for eight other EU institutions and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, suggesting improvements in transparency and human resources. However, CONT once again recommended postponing the decision on granting discharge to the European Council and the Council of the EU, as the Council’s continued refusal to cooperate prevents CONT from fulfilling its oversight role on behalf of EU citizens. Finally, CONT recommended granting discharge for 32 EU decentralised agencies and 11 joint undertakings, welcoming their improvement on the previous year’s results. The CONT committee proposed to postpone the decision on granting discharge to the European Union Asylum Agency, due to serious issues identified by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and a continued lack of transparency.

European water resilience strategy

Access to water is essential for everyone, yet growing demand; climate change and pollution are putting severe pressure on water resources in the EU. Ahead of a planned EU water resilience strategy, Members debated and adopted a Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) report, which calls for all new legislation to consider impacts on water resources. The report specifically highlights the need for better monitoring, phasing out PFAS chemicals and better shared management of river basins.

2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye

Countries applying to join the EU must respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights. Members debated and adopted a report from the Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) noting that Türkiye, despite its reiterated commitment to EU accession in the long term, is moving further from aligning with the EU. The committee nevertheless recognises Türkiye‘s support for Ukraine in the context of the war and that the EU is exploring an updated framework for EU-Türkiye relations.

Democratic legitimacy of the GMO authorisation procedure

To uphold EU law ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, Parliament has consistently objected to proposals to authorise use of genetically modified organisms in agriculture. The European Commission has nevertheless continued to authorise such GMOs, in the face of deadlock amongst Member States. Members held a debate on the democratic legitimacy of the Commission’s decisions to override Parliament’s objections.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Three decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from the committees on: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on an Entry/Exit System; Fisheries (PECH) on conservation of fish stocks: measures in relation to countries allowing non-sustainable fishing; and Security and Defence (SEDE)/Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) jointly on a European Defence Industry Programme and framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (‘EDIP’); were all approved without vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – May I 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Aiming to secure peace in Europe after the horrors of the Second World War, the Schuman Declaration proposed cooperation among European countries in two key economic areas central to rearmament and warfare: coal and steel. As an institutional framework for this cooperation, the Schuman Declaration proposed the creation of the first supranational organisation in Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Established in 1952, the ECSC laid the foundations for today’s European Union (EU). The Schuman Declaration is therefore seen as the EU’s founding act. Presented by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, on 9 May 1950, the anniversary of this key date in European integration is marked on 9 May each year in the EU.

Europe in the mid-20th century

In the middle of the last century, coal and steel played a significant political and economic role in Europe. As essential elements in national defence industries, in the potential to wage war, and in economic growth, they were seen as indicators of state power. After the Second World War, however, coal, one of the most important energy sources for steel production, was a scarce resource. American and British intentions to lift production limits for the German steel industry from mid-May 1950 therefore put pressure on France to find a swift solution to the ‘German issue’. In other words, France had to define a strategy to safeguard itself against potential German aggression and to make sure to benefit in political and economic terms from the German economic resurgence. From the end of the war, France had followed a policy aimed at preventing Germany from getting back on its feet, through territorial fragmentation and disarmament. From 1949 on, however, French foreign policy on the ‘German issue’ became increasingly shaped by moves towards Western European integration. Similarly, in Germany, plans for Western European integration were also discussed, as a way to abolish the Occupation Statute and to obtain sovereignty for the Federal Republic founded in 1949. The Schuman Declaration provided a simple but convincing answer as to how to secure peace in Europe by combining the difficult ‘German issue’ with thinking on the new political architecture of post-war Europe.

Schuman Declaration: Monnet’s supranational innovation

Jean Monnet, guiding light of the Schuman Declaration and first President of the ECSC High Authority, alerted Schuman and French Prime Minister George Bidault to the possible consequences for the French economy of an unimpeded German economic recovery, in an urgent appeal in early May 1950. At that time, Monnet was Head of the French Planning Committee and familiar with contemporary thinking on transnational cooperation in the coal and steel sectors. He worked from mid-April 1950 on the text, which later became the Schuman Declaration. There are a total of nine recognised versions of the text. Its main objectives were to ensure peace, security, European unification, modernisation of the French economy, and improvement of industrial production conditions, especially for steel production. This was to be achieved by the establishment of a common market for coal and steel, and equivalent production conditions for France and Germany. The really innovative element of the Schuman Declaration, however, was the institutional creation of a new European political organisation. This encompassed a supranational design in the form of the High Authority (today’s European Commission), equipped with real competence and independent of any direct influence from the participating Member States.

Monnet could not convince Bidault to agree to his plan. Schuman, in contrast, saw it as an opportunity for French foreign policy. Having obtained agreement in principle from German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Schuman presented the Declaration in a press conference at the Quai d’Orsay on 9 May 1950. As the text, marking a turning point in European history, was read out by Schuman, it was thereafter known as the Schuman Declaration.

Objective: Peace in Europe

To find a way to secure peace in Europe in the post-war era was a difficult task. Nevertheless, it was precisely this task to which the Schuman Declaration attempted to find an answer. The declaration’s first two sentences made this absolutely clear. They read: ‘World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations.’ It is thus safe to say that the Schuman Declaration was, in essence, a peace project. This was furthermore underlined by the day chosen to present the declaration, 9 May 1950, exactly one day after the fifth anniversary of the capitulation of Nazi Germany. Without the establishment of a common market for coal and steel, the creation of a strong supranational institution and the possibility for mutual monitoring, it is possible that European countries might have sleepwalked into another war. The 1951 Paris Treaty founding the ECSC adopted the essence of the Schuman Declaration, putting securing peace in Europe first and foremost.

Negotiating the European Coal and Steel Community

On 3 June 1950, the six participating countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – announced the launch of an intergovernmental conference to flesh out the Schuman Declaration. The countries’ agreement to start negotiations was due to both political and economic reasons. Politically, no country wanted to remain outside the newly developing Europe represented by the ECSC. Economically, Italy and the Benelux countries especially sought solutions to energy issues due to the lack of coal and emerging globalisation, which put European energy sectors under pressure from cheaper energy sources coming from non-European countries. 

Intensive negotiations started in June 1950 in Paris and took almost one year. For example, various changes to the ECSC’s institutional form were made during the negotiations. While Monnet had designed the High Authority as a small, completely independent and highly powerful body, the Benelux countries in particular demanded the creation of various control bodies. Therefore, further entities were added to the institutional set-up, including the Court of Justice, a special Council of Ministers (equivalent to today’s Council of the European Union), and the ECSC Common Assembly, the forerunner of the European Parliament. The High Authority’s competences softened, the Paris Treaty establishing the ECSC is not therefore identical to the institutional framework envisaged by Monnet when preparing the Schuman Declaration. Signed on 18 April 1951, the Paris Treaty entered into force after ratification on 23 July 1952. (Concluded for a fixed period of 50 years, the Treaty expired in July 2002, although its provisions had by then largely been subsumed into the EU Treaties.)

Historical significance

By creating the ECSC, for the first time in European history, participating states voluntarily gave up part of their sovereignty to an organisation at European level. The Schuman Declaration thereby allowed the establishment of the present-day EU by preparing its historical institutional framework. This included, as one of the most important Schuman Declaration achievements, the breakthrough in Franco-German reconciliation. Clearly its most important legacy, however, is that the supranational institutions for which the declaration paved the way have contributed a great deal to guaranteeing the peaceful co-existence of European Union Member States for many decades. It is therefore fitting to call the Schuman Declaration an innovative and visionary peace treaty.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Schuman Declaration, May 1950‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has been a wake-up call for many EU Member States’ defence budgets. Rising from €218 billion in 2021 to €326 billion in 2024, a further increase of at least €100 billion is projected by 2027. Despite these significant increases, most experts note that current geopolitical developments will require much more.

Defence budget definition
The EU uses the Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG) definition of defence spending, which includes ‘Military defence; civil defence; foreign military aid, R&D related to defence; defence not elsewhere classified’. NATO’s definition of defence spending is broader, as it includes military pensions, military healthcare (COFOG includes salaries but not healthcare) and, in some cases, spending on forces such as police or coast guards, but excludes civil defence, which COFOG includes. Moreover, discrepancies may arise from the timing of expenditure recording, particularly for military equipment, since NATO reporting does not adhere to national accounts rules on when such expenditure is recorded. Significant differences exist at national level: for example, NATO member Spain wants to include investment in cyber security, counterterrorism and curbing climate change in its defence spending definition.

EU Member States’ defence budgets

The 23 EU Member States that are also NATO members (now Sweden and Finland have joined NATO) have long been guided by NATO’s 2 % of GDP defence spending commitment formalised at the 2014 Wales Summit. Allies agreed to ‘move towards’ the 2 % ‘guideline within a decade’, but in 2021 only 7 of the 21 Member States that were also NATO members spent 2 % of GDP on defence. EU Member States participating in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO – all except Malta) also agreed to ‘regularly increase defence budgets in real terms’ under their PESCO commitments.

While defence budgets have increased in real terms since 2018/2019 (previously they had not even reached pre-2008 financial crisis levels), this follows years of chronic underinvestment in defence in most Member States. In 2021, their combined defence budgets stood at €218 billion. Meanwhile, strategic rivals such as Russia and China increased their defence budgets by 300 % and 600 % respectively over the last decade, compared to a collective 20 % increase in EU countries (to 2022). The European Commission notes that, if all Member States had spent 2 % of GDP on defence from 2006 to 2020, this would have amounted to an extra €1.1 trillion for defence spending.

The Russian war on Ukraine was a wake-up call for the EU. At the March 2022 Versailles Summit, EU leaders agreed to spend ‘more and better’ on defence. The Strategic Compass, a concrete plan of action for EU security and defence to 2030, reaffirmed this. At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, NATO leaders adopted a new Defence Investment Pledge, committing to allocate a minimum of 2 % of GDP annually to defence on a lasting basis. They also acknowledged that, in many cases, spending above the 2 % threshold will be necessary to address current capability gaps and meet current security demands. Significantly, the second von der Leyen Commission (2024-2029) has made defence a key EU priority. The first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space was appointed and the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence was elevated to a full Standing Committee. The Commission also pledged to advance the European Defence Union, launched significant initiatives to boost the European defence industry (such as the first-ever European defence industrial strategy), and proposed a defence industry programme. The EU also legislated to boost ammunition production and incentivise joint procurement of urgent defence equipment.

On 4 March 2025, Commission President von der Leyen presented the ReArm Europe plan/Readiness 2030. This aims to leverage €800 billion in defence spending to 2029, including €150 billion in proposed EU-backed loans through a new Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and measures to encourage national defence spending by activating the National Escape Clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for an additional 1.5 % of GDP spending on defence, redeployment of EU cohesion funds, European Investment Bank support and private capital mobilisation. So far, 16 Member States have requested activation of the escape clause. On 19 March 2025, the Commission presented its white paper for European defence, outlining a strategic plan to close critical capability gaps, strengthen the defence industry and readiness, support Ukraine, and boost innovation and partnerships to ensure the continent’s long-term security.

Defence spending increases EU Member State defence expenditure, 2024, in % of GDP

In 2022, collective annual EU defence budgets had already increased to €240 billion, of which €58 billion (+24.2 % compared to 2021) was for defence investment (defence R&D and defence procurement), a real increase of more than 6 % compared to 2021. In 2023, Member States reached a combined €279 billion (1.6 % of GDP) and €326 billion in 2024 (1.9 % of GDP). Defence spending increased by over 30 % in real terms from 2021 to 2024. Additional spending of more than €100 billion is projected in real terms by 2027. The defence expenditure of the 23 EU countries that are also NATO members amounted to 1.99 % of their combined GDP in 2024, with a forecasted rise to 2.04 % in 2025. Of NATO’s 32 members, 23 were expected to meet the 2 % benchmark in 2024 (16 of which are also in the EU). However, there are significant regional differences in the EU; while growth has been steady and has gained momentum in most of Europe, it has remained more subdued in southern European countries.

Given the size of its economy, Germany is the top spender in Europe in absolute terms, spending €90.6 billion (2.12 % of GDP) in 2024, driven more by expanded allocations from the €100 billion Sondervermögen (special fund for defence) than a core budget rise. In March 2025, German lawmakers approved a historic shift to exempt defence and security spending beyond 1 % of GDP from debt limits, enabling a €500 billion fund for defence and infrastructure. France also continued to raise defence spending, to €59.6 billion (2.06 % of GDP) in the 2024 defence budget. President Macron intends to increase French defence spending to 3.5 % of GDP, but has not given a timeframe. In Poland, spending has skyrocketed since 2022 (up 52.3 % in 2023 and 16.9 % in 2024), bringing the budget to PLN151 billion (€34 billion, or 4.12 % of GDP). Poland has thus become NATO’s top defence spender by GDP, with plans to reach 4.7 % in 2025. The largest southern European economies, Italy and Spain, have not followed the trend. Spain’s defence budget remained flat for over a decade, with 2022 spending matching 2008 levels in real terms. Although an 18 % real-terms increase began in 2023, growth stalled again in 2024 when the country failed to pass a new budget, resulting in a real-terms decline. Italy also had a decade of stagnation until moderate growth resumed in 2022, bringing spending back to 2008 levels in real terms. However, Italy plans to double its spending over four years and Spain has also vowed to reach 2 % in 2025.

Meanwhile, Russia and China have continued to raise their defence budgets. Russia spends an estimated 9 % of GDP (up from 6 % in 2023) and is projected to exceed EU Member State defence spending in purchasing power parity terms (PPP) in 2025. China announced a 7.2 % rise in its defence budget to €220 billion for 2025 (an estimated €515 billion in PPP), though experts believe actual spending may be much higher.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned ‘we are going to need a lot more than 2 %’. The United States advocates an increased spending target to 5 % of GDP. The US spent an estimated US$967 billion or 3.38 % of its GDP in 2024. Reports note ongoing talks suggest a potential compromise at around 3 % to 3.5 %, with a final decision expected at the NATO leaders’ summit at the end of June 2025. One study notes that defence spending may need to rise from 2 % to 3.5 % GDP in the short term to deter Russia without the US.

European Parliament position

Parliament has consistently called for an increase in defence spending and its 2024 Common Security and Defence Policy implementation report welcomed Member States’ increased defence spending. It urged all EU countries to boost their defence budgets beyond NATO’s 2 % of GDP benchmark and to significantly increase defence collaboration.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU Member States’ defence budgets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

In 1958, Robert Schuman was elected president of the European Parliamentary Assembly, predecessor to the European Parliament. This French politician, who was particularly sensitive to the tensions between France and Germany, is regarded as one of the ‘founding fathers’ of what is now the European Union. After the Second World War, he supported the establishment of the Council of Europe and helped to bring many other European projects to fruition.

With his declaration of 9 May 1950, considered the founding act of the European integration process, Robert Schuman assumed political responsibility for a common coal and steel market that would later become the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The declaration underlines the role of France in building a strong, prosperous and peaceful Europe, starting with France and Germany. Going far beyond mere objectives, the declaration also sets out the precise basis upon which the negotiations should begin.

Robert Schuman was president of the European Parliamentary Assembly from 1958 to 1960. This institution was the political institution par excellence of the Communities: at once a democratic organ representing the peoples of Europe, a body invested with the power of executive scrutiny, and a unifying element between the three Communities.

Highly influenced by Christian values, Robert Schuman campaigned to build a strong and united Europe step by step, and to establish institutionalised solidarity between European countries. Robert Schuman’s legacy continues to influence and shape the European Union to this day.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Robert Schuman‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.