European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Isabelle Gaudeul-Ehrhart.

EP Vice-President Victor Negrescu welcomed the audience, drawing their attention to the moral and ethical crisis going on in the world. Values as core to our European societies as truth and democracy are no more a given. He announced that he will be coordinating the reflection group on the future of the institution that Parliament’s Bureau recently decided to set up.

MEP David McAllister, Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs – and rapporteur for the 2025 annual report on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy, scheduled for Parliament’s January 2026 plenary – walked the audience through a broad panorama, calling successively at: the price of peace – Russia and the European security order, China – the long game, the transatlantic relationship under pressure, global trade in a fragmented world (“signing new trade agreements is not optional, it is a strategic imperative”), and the new frontier: technology – who controls Europe’s growingly technological future? He concluded with a question: with these developments being more than the sum of their parts, how do we respond as the EU?

Judith Arnal (Centre for European Policy Studies – CEPS and Elcano Royal Institute) explained that in 2026, she will pay special attention to independent authorities’ credibility, transatlantic sanctions over digital regulation, and how the EU’s trade defence instruments deliver.

Rosa Balfour (Carnegie Europe) announced that she would be very direct: to her, 2026 may be the hardest year for the EU. The EU strategy should be to combine short-term tactics with long-term strategy, and make sure that these issues reach citizens – here the European Parliament has a specific role and responsibility.

Joris Teer (EU Institute for Security Studies – EUISS) focused on China’s role in global trade and industry as well as security issues, and explained why more attention should be given to this key actor.

The roundtable was followed by a question-and-answer session and drew an online audience of more than 150 viewers.

Watch the event here.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament. The publication is available in English, French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish

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Written by Branislav Stanicek.

In the context of the wars in Ukraine and other parts of the world, the increasingly global effects – material and political – of war make it more important than ever to measure the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world. The Normandy Index has presented an annual measurement of these threats since the 2019 Normandy Peace Forum. The results of the 2025 exercise suggest the level of threats to peace is at its highest since the index began, confirming declining trends in global security resulting from conflict, geopolitical rivalry, growing militarisation and hybrid threats. The findings of the 2025 exercise draw on data compiled in 2024 and 2025 to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country’s performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. Derived from the Index, 63 individual country case studies provide a picture of the state of peace in the world today.

Read the complete study on ‘Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide: Normandy Index 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen.

European Commission proposal

On 12 November 2025, the Commission and the High Representative published a joint communication on the ‘European Democratic Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies’ (EDS), in line with the July 2024 political guidelines. The EDS aims to protect democracy against increasingly complex threats, including ‘interference and distortions in the information space’ as well as hybrid threats, aimed at impacting elections and eroding trust in democratic processes.

In parallel and linked to the EDS, the Commission also launched a strategy for civil society. Actions, to be rolled out by 2027, fall under four key pillars:

1. a new European Centre for Democratic Resilience;
2. safeguarding the integrity of the information space;
3. strengthening our institutions, fair and free elections, and free and independent media;
4. boosting societal resilience and citizens’ engagement.

The EDS further builds on the EU’s whole-of-society approach, including its evolving regulatory framework to threats against democracy. A key dimension is digital regulation, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Artificial Intelligence Act. The 2023 defence of democracy package, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising (TTPA), the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) and the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) are other core pieces of legislation. The framework for restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising actions was broadened in May 2025 to enable the suspension of Kremlin-controlled broadcasters. Other steps include the EU’s hybrid toolbox and FIMI toolbox. In May 2025, the Commission announced €5 million in funding for a European network of fact-checkers, expanding work by the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN). As part of the new multiannual financial framework (MFF), the Commission proposes a number of programmes to support the EDS. AgoraEU aims to promote shared values, including democracy, and support the European audiovisual and creative sectors, media freedom and civil society. Other programmes include Horizon Europe, Erasmus+ and the Global Europe Instrument, and possibly defence spending.

A new European Centre for Democratic Resilience

The proposed European Centre for Democratic Resilience is the most visible innovation in the EDS. The Centre would bring together expertise and capacities across Member States, EU candidate countries and potential candidates, and EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Centre would be developed progressively, based on Member States’ voluntary participation, and their input and needs for support and cooperation. In coordination with the EEAS-led Rapid Alert System, the Centre will link existing networks and structures. It will host a stakeholder platform for dialogue with civil society, researchers and academia, media providers, and a new European network of fact-checkers. The Centre would support operational cooperation to counter common threats, particularly FIMI and disinformation, and aim to increase situational awareness and the capacity to detect and anticipate threats, develop a strong early warning system and support rapid response capacity.

Safeguarding the integrity of the information space

Proposed actions to support information integrity complement the existing measures listed above, with implementation and enforcement of the digital legislation as key priorities. Together with the European Board for Digital Services, the Commission will prepare a DSA incidents and crisis protocol in response to large-scale, transnational information operations. The Commission will work with signatories of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation to increase transparency of recommender systems, demonetise disinformation, and explore further measures, including improving the detection and labelling of AI-generated and manipulated content circulating on social media services. Based on the FIMI Toolbox, a Blueprint for countering FIMI and Disinformation will be prepared. The independent European network of fact-checkers will help counter online manipulation, and EDMO’s extended mandate will support situational awareness around elections or crises. A common research support framework will enhance monitoring of information manipulation and disinformation. Moreover, the European Board for Media Services will develop common criteria for media regulators to act against rogue non-EU media operators presenting risks to public security.

Stronger democratic institutions, free and fair elections and free and independent media

In the face of internal and external challenges and attacks on European democracies and electoral processes, a series of proposed measures include stronger cooperation with Member States under the European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE) to enhance electoral integrity; guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes; updating of the Digital Services Act Elections Toolkit; and setting up a voluntary EU network of influencers. A proposed new pan-European platform is to make real- time news and information from professional media outlets available to wider audiences in multiple languages. Actions to support and revitalise free, plural and independent media and journalism include reviewing the AVMSD; increasing transparency of online advertising; assessing the fitness of State aid rules for public service broadcasting in the evaluation of the 2009 broadcasting communication; reinforcing measures for the safety of journalists and combating abusive litigation (SLAPPs); and supporting quality independent media and journalism beyond EU borders. Moreover, the Commission will support common work with the Member States on the transparency and integrity of funding in politics, looking at issues of common interest such as anonymous donations and cryptocurrency.

Boosting societal resilience and citizens’ engagement

Actions to empower citizens and boost societal resilience include the 2026 basic skills support scheme for schools, including citizenship and digital skills; and a media resilience programme for all age groups across rural and urban areas. In addition, the communication envisages an EU democracy guide for citizens, to promote citizens’ awareness of their democratic rights, and a European Citizens’ Panel on democratic resilience. Other whole-of-society actions include a high-level event on democracy and an annual award for democratic innovation, and support for voluntary commitments by the private sector to build a business coalition for democracy. To safeguard evidence-based decision-making, the Commission will issue a recommendation on supporting scientific evidence and its use in public policymaking; enshrine the freedom of scientific research in EU law under the European Research Area Act; and assess options for setting up a European Centre of Expertise on Research Security. In addition, the Commission will explore future pathways for the EU’s tech environment, with an initial focus on future social networking/social media platforms, supporting EU digital sovereignty.

Role of the European Parliament

Over the past two legislatures, Parliament has used a mix of tools – non-legislative resolutions, hearings, and its budgetary power – to address challenges to democracies, including from information manipulation and interference. On 18 December 2024, Parliament voted to set up a special committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS), which was constituted on 3 February 2025. EUDS further builds on work by two previous special committees on foreign interference (INGE and ING2). In resolutions adopted in March 2022 and June 2023 respectively, Members called for the creation of a European centre for information integrity to facilitate exchange between Member States and EU institutions and agencies. This idea was further developed in the April 2025 EUDS working document. The EUDS is set to propose further solutions to protect democracy in a forthcoming own-initiative report.

Read this ‘At a Glance note’ on ‘The European Democracy Shield: An overview‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

The 28th regime is a proposed EU-level legal framework that would allow innovative companies to operate across the EU under a single set of rules. Companies would not have to deal with differing regulations across Member States, which would help boost the single market. On Monday, Parliament is set to debate a  legislative-initiative report on the 28th regime from the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI). The report suggests national limited liability companies be able to register as ‘Societas Europaea Unificata’ (S.EU), which would be automatically recognised in all Member States. It recommends a harmonised EU legal framework for corporate law to align national rules across all Member States, while ensuring safeguards for national laws to avoid undermining labour and social laws. It proposes a common digital direct entry point allowing entrepreneurs to establish companies within 48 hours, and harmonised rules on employee financial participation schemes.

On Monday, Parliament is expected to debate a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) proposing a new directive to protect workers who may become unemployed in the move towards a greener and more digital society. The report calls on the European Commission to create a comprehensive framework to ensure EU countries create jobs in regions where jobs are most likely to disappear. This framework should ensure the development of viable economic alternatives and attract the necessary investment. The report also calls to set certain workplace conditions, including the right to training during working hours, health and safety measures, the right to worker consultation and collective bargaining and stronger protections against unfair dismissal. It also calls for increased support for a just transition in the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF). Lastly, the proposed directive would require Member States to develop national strategies and business support programmes for small and medium-sized businesses.

Critical medicine shortages and the EU’s growing reliance on external suppliers for critical ingredients pose a threat to EU public health. The proposed ‘critical medicines act’ aims to improve the availability and security of supply of critical medicines in the EU by decreasing dependency on single suppliers and non-EU countries, such as India and China, and improving pharmaceutical manufacturing in the EU. On Monday, Members are scheduled to debate a report from the Committee on Public Health (SANT) regarding the proposed regulation, and set Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations. The report expands the definition of a ‘strategic project’ to improve EU manufacturing capacity and calls for the creation of a critical medicines security fund within the 2028-2034 MFF and an EU coordination mechanism for national stockpiles and contingency stocks of critical medicines.

Proposed reform of EU air passenger rights to address issues such as delays, cancellations, weak enforcement and unclear rules had been stalled in the Council for over a decade due to disagreements on compensation, extraordinary circumstances and enforcement. Members are now scheduled to consider the reform on Tuesday with a debate on the recommendation from the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) on second reading. The report rejects the Council’s position in favour of higher delay thresholds and reduced compensation, and supports distance-based compensation of €300-€600, a closed list of exemptions, and stronger passenger protections, such as free hand luggage, bans on unfair fees and longer claim deadlines.

On Tuesday, Members are scheduled to consider the 2025 annual implementation reports on common security and defence policy from the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) and on common foreign and security policy from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET). Both reports identify Russia’s war against Ukraine as a primary threat to the EU and Member States, and call for stronger support for Ukraine to protect European security. They both acknowledge the importance of EU relations with the United States in securing peace in Ukraine, with the SEDE report noting the risks of isolationist US foreign policy and expressing concern at the US government’s threats against Greenland’s sovereignty. The AFET report highlights the current global geopolitical instability and accelerated erosion of democratic norms, stating that the EU’s credibility depends on its ability to act coherently and decisively. It calls for a gradual transition to qualified majority voting for common foreign and security policy decisions without military or defence implications, while encouraging greater use of constructive abstention.

On Tuesday, Members are set to consider a resolution on the AFET committee’s annual report on human rights and democracy in the world. The report aims at informing a post-2027 EU action plan for human rights and democracy, and reiterates Parliament’s call for a stronger plan based on a full review of the current framework, with clear benchmarks, indicators and timelines. It highlights growing threats to human rights and the international system, proposes improvements to EU tools such as human rights dialogues, support for human rights defenders, conditionality in EU trade and international agreements and human rights sanctions. It also stresses the need for earmarked funding for human rights and democracy support in the next MFF, notably through the proposed Global Europe instrument.

The EU is facing a rising drone threat linked to Russian provocations and is boosting drone and counter-drone capabilities. On Thursday, Parliament is scheduled to debate an own-initiative report from the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) setting out a comprehensive strategy to prepare the EU for drone-enabled conflict, calling for the rapid integration of drone and counter-drone capabilities across EU defence planning and stronger protection of civilian infrastructure. It stresses the need to build a robust, autonomous European drone industry, reduce reliance on non-EU suppliers and shift from a primarily regulatory approach to a security model focused on operational capabilities and strategic autonomy.

Quick links to all our publications for this plenary session:

• Outcome of the European Council of 17-18 December 2015: Post-European Council Briefing
• The Parliament of Cyprus and EU affairs
• Priority dossiers under the Cyprus EU Council Presidency
• 40th anniversary of Spain’s EU accession
• 40th anniversary of Portugal’s EU accession
• The 28th regime: A new legal framework for innovative companies
• Just transition directive in the world of work: Creating jobs and revitalising local economies
• Proposal for a critical medicines act: Addressing shortages, building a more resilient supply chain
• Air passenger rights
• Implementation of the common security and defence policy – Annual report 2025
• Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – Annual report 2025
• Human rights and democracy in the world: Annual report 2025
• Drones and new systems of warfare: Adapting the EU to today’s security challenges

Written by Eszter Balázs.

INTRODUCTION

The country takes over from Denmark and will hand the baton on to Ireland. Cyprus is the last member of the presidency trio with Poland and Denmark.

State and government

The Republic of Cyprus is a presidential democracy. The president is the head of state and the head of government; there is no prime minister. This full presidential system is unique among the EU Member States.

According to the Constitution, executive power is exercised jointly by a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of the Republic, through a Council of Ministers appointed by them (seven and three ministers, respectively).

In 1963, the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and the three Turkish Cypriot ministers withdrew from government, and since then the government has been functioning by necessity only with Greek Cypriots in all ministries, the number of which was subsequently raised to 11. Moreover, the President of the Republic, according to the provisions of the relevant national legislation, has appointed five Deputy Ministers. The post of Vice-President remains vacant.

The post of Deputy Minister for European Affairs has been created especially for the Presidency. It will cease after Cyprus’s term concludes.

The President convenes and sets the agenda of the Council of Ministers. In foreign affairs, defence and security, the President has veto powers over both the legislative branch and the Council of Ministers.

The current President of the Republic is Nikos Christodoulides, in office since 1 March 2023, following presidential elections in February 2023. His term of office, as is also that of the Council of Ministers, is five years, with the next presidential elections scheduled for February 2028. President Christodoulides is independent, supported by the nationalist-centrist Democratic Party (DIKO – S&D), the social-democratic Movement for Social Democracy – Citizes’ Alliance (EDEK – S&D), and the centrist Democratic Alignment (DIPA – Renew).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the Cyprus EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sarah Sheil.

What are the challenges and issues that the European Union will have to take on in 2026? For ten years now, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) has asked its policy analysts to identify ten issues to watch in the year to come. While not exhaustive, the annual outlook produced by the Members’ Research Service seeks to explore some major political debates as well as put the spotlight on issues that are not so well known. Over a challenging and defining decade, the series has tackled themes across the European Parliament’s various fields of competence, from citizens’ policies and structural policies to the economy, digital and climate issues, to budget and international affairs.

Such periodic analysis enables us to better understand today’s opportunities and challenges. When reflecting on issues that have affected the European Union in the past decade, dramatic changes immediately come to mind: the COVID-19 pandemic, the war on Ukraine, and the shift in global power balances. But this annual exercise has also covered long-standing, recurrent issues: addressing climate change, shaping the long-term budget for Europe, monitoring the Union’s weight in global trade, and analysing the changing dynamics of the transatlantic relationship.

This tenth edition comes at a highly turbulent time in geopolitics. The balance of power in the world is shifting, and the rules-based international order now faces greater and more frequent challenges than ever before. The selection of issues for 2026 reflects this heightened focus on external policies. The publication addresses three directly affecting the EU: Ukraine’s integration into the EU, European defence capability gaps, and EU-China relations. These issues interact with other trends and developments with geopolitical consequences, such as the impact on the web of artificial intelligence (AI), the potential of Europe’s startup companies, the tougher stances on irregular migration being taken around the world, including in Europe, and challenges on climate policy and ocean protection – all covered below. All these issues, as well as the ‘normal business’ that is not highlighted in this paper but is the European Union’s daily work in delivering for its citizens, require financial means and governance. So this paper also covers the discussions on shaping Europe’s long-term budget, or multiannual financial framework, for the coming years, as well as lessons drawn from implementing the post-COVID-19 Recovery and Resilience Facility.

EPRS provides independent, objective and authoritative information to Members of the European Parliament. As with all EPRS publications, this paper is based on research, robust facts and figures, and informed analysis, with the aim of providing Members with the elements they need to do their work. Readers will find links to the previous editions of this publication listed under the ‘Further reading’ section. Analysis on countless other topics and issues requiring closer, more regular monitoring can be found in the thousands of publications that EPRS has issued over the years, enriching Parliament’s knowledge environment. We hope that this tenth edition of ‘Ten issues to watch’ will provide you with material for reflection as we enter 2026.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© EPRS 2026

Written by Anna Flynn.

The European Parliament is fully committed to ensuring an ambitious European Union budget that meets the Union’s many challenges in the years to come. The European Commission presented its proposals for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF) on 16 July 2025. The Commission proposes a budget amounting to a total of almost €1.8 trillion in commitments over seven years (in constant 2025 prices). The MFF constitutes the EU’s long-term budgetary plan, setting a maximum level of spending (‘ceilings’) for each major category of expenditure (‘heading’) in accordance with Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

The proposed 2028-2034 budget corresponds to 1.26 % of the EU’s GNI. This includes 0.11 % of EU gross national income (GNI) for the repayment of the debt created by Next Generation EU (NGEU) grants. Excluding the NGEU repayment, the proposed post-2027 MFF reflects, in nominal terms, an increase of €367.2 billion (+29 %). However, in real terms, the increase is only 0.02 percentage points of GNI.

The national and regional partnership plans (NRPPs) proposed by the European Commission have proven particularly controversial throughout the European Parliament. They are seen as a risk of ‘renationalising’ the EU budget, as each Member State would agree their own plan with the Commission, within the constraints of allocated funding that is conditional on meeting EU priorities This raises questions about Parliament’s capacity for oversight and scrutiny. Moreover, the NRPPs merge many funds that were previously separate, such as the common agricultural policy, cohesion policy, and the common fisheries policy. Parliament’s four pro-European groups (S&D, Greens/EFA, Renew Europe, and the EPP) threatened to reject the Commission’s draft regulation on the NRPPs if it does not substantially amend its proposal.

On 9 November 2025, the Commission proposed some possible reforms to the NRPPs, such as the introduction of a 10 % spending target for agriculture, and a strengthened role for regional authorities in decision-making. However, these revisions do not address all of Parliament’s concerns. Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) continues its work on the interim report on the MFF proposals, with opinions awaited from many of the standing committees before the BUDG report goes to plenary in May 2026.

An overview of the main components of the proposed 2028-2034 MFF and an initial comparison with the 2021-2027 budget framework illustrates the Commission’s proposed division of €1.763 trillion in commitments, which Parliament’s BUDG committee finds lacks ambition.

Academia, think tanks, other EU institutions and bodies, and a variety of stakeholders are publishing a wealth of analysis and commentary on the proposed 2028-2034 MFF as it proceeds through negotiations (see our monthly digest).

Links to EPRS publications:

• ERDF – Cohesion Fund and conditions for EU support to regional policy
• Background information on the post-2027 MFF – December 2025
• Regulation on the common agricultural policy for the period 2028 to 2034
• EU budget 2028-2034: Overview of the Commission’s proposal

Other links

• The European Parliament rejects the National and Regional Partnership Plans proposal as it stands and demands an amended proposal to start negotiations (30 October 2025)
• MEPS brand von der Leyen’s EU budget ‘re-nationalisation’ (9 September 2025)

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.

Introduction to Cyprus’s parliamentary system

Cyprus is a presidential democracy with a President directly elected by universal suffrage in a secret ballot. The President is both Head of State and Head of Government as he or she appoints the ministers and exercises executive power together with them. The President is formally invested by the Parliament, but the executive, legislative, and judicial powers are strictly separated.

The President and ministers are scrutinised by the Parliament, but they are not accountable to it. Reciprocally, the executive cannot dissolve the Parliament; only an absolute majority of the Parliament can decide to do so (Article 67 of the Constitution). The President and ministers cannot be members of the Parliament.

Legislative power is exercised by the House of Representatives, the unicameral parliament of the Republic of Cyprus. It is elected by universal and secret suffrage every five years through a system of simple proportional representation in six electoral districts. Both the President and the members of parliament are elected for five-year terms but in different years. The President does not necessarily have the support of a parliamentary majority and can govern without it.

The Constitution sets the number of members of the House of Representatives at 50 (two thirds Greek Cypriots, and one third Turkish Cypriots), but this number may be altered by the House of Representatives. Since 1985, the number of seats has been set at 80, keeping the same proportions between the two communities (Law 124/85): 56 Members come from the Greek Cypriot community, and 24 seats are reserved for Members coming from the Turkish Cypriot community – currently vacant due to the de facto division of the island. In addition, the minority religious groups of Armenians, Maronites and Latins each elect a representative who can express views but not vote.

The main role of the House of Representatives is to examine and adopt legislation, including on the state’s budget. Both the executive and the Parliament can make legislative proposals, but in practice, most are proposed by the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, this right is constrained for the Parliament, as bills it proposes should not result in any increase in budgetary expenditure.

The House of Representatives has the right to amend the Constitution, with the exception of the articles determining its form of government, the separation of powers and the bicommunal character of the state.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Parliament of Cyprus and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Flynn.

The EU and China account for nearly 30 % of global trade. The EU has defined China as a ‘partner, competitor, and systemic rival.’

One of the key, current challenges is that, following the announcement of United States’ tariffs, China announced new export controls on their rare earth elements in April and October 2025. A second package was suspended until November 2026.

At the 25th EU-China Summit in Beijing, marking 50 years of diplomatic relations, the partners discussed trade, climate change, and Russia, against an ongoing backdrop of huge geopolitical shifts.

During the July 2025 summit, the EU urged China to lift its restrictions. China’s rare earth elements are difficult to source elsewhere, and simultaneously play an imperative role in the EU’s digital, defence, and green industries. According to the European Central Bank, 80 % of European firms are three intermediaries away from rare earth element producers; highlighting the value of these materials to the EU economy.

The EU’s plan to address this vulnerable, yet vital supply, is the Critical Raw Materials Act. The aim of this regulation (among other things) is to diversify the EU’s imports, support strategic projects, and strengthen EU monitoring of supply risks.

In July 2025, Parliament adopted a resolution urging the Commission to speed up the process of implementing the Critical Raw Materials Act, condemning China’s actions as unjustified and coercive.

Moreover, The EU’s trade deficit with China (€308.4 billion in 2024), is expected to rise.

Meanwhile, China’s relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is growing, in direct competition with the EU’s objective to diversify critical raw material sources. Latin America produces large amounts of lithium and copper. By 2030, the EU’s demand for lithium is expected to increase 12-fold. Chinese companies have purchased half of the world’s largest lithium mines, and China is Latin America’s second largest trading partner today.

Nevertheless, in a joint statement following the EU-China summit, both parties reiterated that major economies should bolster climate efforts. They agreed to cooperate and lead a green transition.  

A couple of months afterwards, ahead of COP30, China submitted its nationally determined contribution (NDC), or climate targets, for 2035. China’s share of global emissions increased from 9 % in 1990 to 17 % in 2024, and this is the first time that it has agreed to an absolute greenhouse gas emissions reduction.

An additional source of contention is China’s involvement with Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. At the summit, the EU stressed China’s responsibility to uphold world order and to refrain from supporting Russia’s military agenda. At the end of October 2025, the EU’s 19th package of sanctions was adopted against Russia, including sanctions on 12 entities located in China that are supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex.

This bilateral relationship will continue to carry far-reaching importance.

Links to EPRS publications

• China’s rare-earth export restrictions
• China’s 2035 climate pledge
• Economic Outlook Quarterly Final year of implementation for the recovery plans
• The third generation of national climate plans Analysis of major economies’ nationally determined contributions ahead of COP30
• China’s increasing presence in Latin America: Implications for the European Union
• EU-China relations

Housing is becoming an urgent issue in many European Union (EU) countries, as rents and property prices are currently increasing faster than inflation.

While housing is generally the responsibility of EU countries, the EU supports national and local authorities through partnerships and social housing funding programmes. At the same time, the European Parliament is urging broader EU action to promote decent and affordable housing for all.

Housing as a European Union priority

Ahead of her re-election, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised to make housing an EU priority, with a new Commissioner responsible for housing and a European affordable housing plan.

In its 2024-2029 political guidelines, the European Commission pledged to enable EU countries to double the investments in affordable housing planned under the EU’s cohesion policy, which aims to reduce differences between EU regions.

The EU funds housing projects in several ways, including by providing over €100 billion for energy-efficiency renovations up to 2030. EU financing comes from many sources, and is designed to complement other public funding at national or regional level.

The Commission is also collaborating with the European Investment Bank (EIB) to provide the financing and expertise needed to build more innovative, energy-efficient and affordable homes.

Additionally, the Commission and the EIB are working with the EU’s national promotional banks and international financial institutions to develop new financing opportunities for affordable and sustainable housing across Europe.

The European Parliament’s position

In two March 2025 resolutions on employment and social priorities and on the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), Parliament stressed that the EU’s budget must align with social priorities like affordable housing, and called for more resources to support people in vulnerable situations.

Parliament called on the Commission and EU Member States to make it easier to build, convert and renovate accessible and energy-efficient housing that is affordable for people at risk of poverty and those wanting to buy a property.

It underlined that the ESF+ can be instrumental in this, and called for a stronger ESF+ in the next EU seven‑year budget (beyond 2027) to focus on homelessness and access to housing, including social housing and affordable rental schemes.

In September 2025, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on using cohesion funds to resolve the housing crisis. It asked the authorities managing EU funds to address housing challenges in all regions, especially remote areas and islands, by using the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes as an opportunity to increase housing-related investments.

The Parliament’s resolution also suggested broadening the scope of several EU funds to include innovative approaches for affordable housing. It asked EU countries and regions to develop strategies on affordable and sustainable housing for middle and low-income households in urban and rural areas.

Special Parliamentary committee on housing in the EU

In December 2024, Parliament set up a special committee to propose practical ways for the EU to tackle housing issues.

The Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU is investigating the root causes of the housing crisis through a series of hearings, and will report its findings at the end of its mandate in early 2026.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We will reply in the EU language in which you write to us.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of China compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was recorded at 5%, while the EU experienced a growth rate of 1.1%. Chinese inflation rates remain stable at 0.2%. The exchange rate of the renminbi-yuan continues to rise, reaching 7.8 units per euro in 2024. Trade in goods and services between the EU and China has remained relatively stable, with a slight increase from the previous year. The EU is China’s largest trade partner in goods, accounting for 12.7% of China’s total imports and exports. Conversely, China is the EU’s second-largest trade partner, representing 14.6% of the EU’s trade, while the United States ranks first at 17.3%.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘China: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU imports of services from China (2024)

Written by Polona Car.

The Cybersecurity Act (CSA) came into force in 2019 as part of the EU’s efforts to build strong cybersecurity. Since its introduction, the EU cybersecurity regulatory framework has become more complex in response to the rise in cyber-attacks. New EU rules, as well as changes in the geopolitical context, have impacted the CSA, and the regulation is currently under review. Although stakeholders are aligned on most issues, significant differences remain, notably in addressing non-technical risks relating to the security of the information and communications technology (ICT) supply chain.

The Cybersecurity Act in short

Regulation (EU) 2019/881 (the CSA) formalised the role of the European Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA), giving it a permanent mandate, resources and tasks, including operational ones. It also established a voluntary EU cybersecurity certification framework (ECCF) for ICT products, services and processes. The ECCF aims to set up and maintain specific certification schemes, allowing companies operating in the EU to use the certificates recognised across all Member States. In January 2025, a targeted amendment to the CSA was adopted, to enable the future adoption of European certification schemes for ‘managed security services’ covering areas such as incident response, penetration testing, security audits and consultancy. The CSA requires an evaluation and review every five years. Postponed several times, this is now expected on 14 January 2026.

Evolving context

Since the CSA entered into force, cyber-attacks have been on the rise. This has prompted new EU cybersecurity laws to address the growing number and complexity of cyber threats. As a result, ENISA’s roles and responsibilities have expanded. For example, ENISA supports implementation of the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2) by providing technical guidelines, facilitating information sharing, and enhancing coordination between Member States. Similarly, ENISA supports implementation and enforcement of the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) by providing technical expertise, developing a single reporting platform for vulnerability and incident reporting, and supporting cybersecurity certification schemes.

As regards certification, implementation of the ECCF has been challenging. So far, only one EU certification scheme has been adopted – the European cybersecurity scheme on common criteria (EUCC), dedicated to certifying ICT products. All other schemes (cloud services – EUCS, 5G, digital identity wallets and managed security services) are still under development. Additionally, there are concerns whether the ECCF effectively addresses non-technical supply-chain cybersecurity risks such as geopolitical dependencies. Questions have also been raised about how voluntary certification frameworks will align with the CRA, which establishes a presumption of conformity (in Article 27) for products certified under a recognised European scheme such as the EUCC.

The proposal for a revised CSA therefore aims to address both ENISA’s growing responsibilities and ECCF implementation. During the consultation, the Commission also gathered views on ICT supply chain security challenges and the simplification of cybersecurity rules, such as how to streamline reporting obligations.

CSA review: Points of convergence among stakeholders

The replies to the call for evidence for the CSA review have shown broad agreement that the CSA should be revised on the following issues: (i) streamline cybersecurity measures; (ii) enhance cyber resilience; and (iii) simplify the EU regulatory landscape. The review is seen as an opportunity to reduce administrative burden and compliance costs. A significant convergence point is the need to harmonise definitions and reporting requirements across major EU acts – such as NIS2, CRA and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – and establish a single EU incident notification platform. Such a platform has now been put forward in the proposal for a ‘digital omnibus’ regulation.

There is consensus that ENISA’s mandate should be clarified and strengthened to reflect the agency’s growing operational responsibilities under new EU rules such as NIS2 and CRA. Stakeholders note that this expansion should be matched by adequate financial resources and staffing in order to ensure the agency’s effectiveness. The view is that ENISA should serve as a central technical coordinator, to promote consistency and harmonise implementation of EU cybersecurity laws across the Member States, thereby reducing regulatory divergence. This echoes the Council conclusions of December 2024 on a stronger EU Agency for Cybersecurity. Poland went as far as calling for a separate law for ENISA, to separate this item from potential controversy around the EUCS discussions.

Stakeholders widely acknowledge that the process for developing and adopting certification schemes is too slow and opaque. They highlight that a more agile, transparent and inclusive process with clearer timelines is urgently needed. Furthermore, stakeholders underline that certification schemes should be based on and align with international standards in order to ensure global interoperability, maximise acceptance, and reduce compliance costs for companies operating internationally. The prevailing view is that certification schemes should also be leveraged as a recognised means of demonstrating conformity or compliance with security requirements stemming from other major EU legislative acts, including NIS2, CRA and the AI Act.

Potential challenges

Disagreements revolve around the specific content and scope of certification schemes, particularly regarding sovereignty and the legal limits of ENISA’s influence. The most contentious point is the inclusion of sovereignty requirements in certification schemes such as the EUCS. This issue divides stakeholders into those advocating measures to protect European digital autonomy (e.g. both data localisation and corporate headquarters based in the EU) and those prioritising open markets and technical neutrality. Pro‑sovereignty advocates, and stakeholders supporting ‘cloud by Europe‘ models (i.e. entirely EU-based cloud service providers, not controlled by non-EU stakeholders), argue that these measures are crucial to protecting sensitive data and reinforcing EU strategic autonomy. By contrast, major tech companies, such as Microsoft, Amazon and Google, argue that non-technical criteria are subjective and do not improve cybersecurity outcomes, potentially restricting market access and innovation. At Member State level, too, positions are divided, with some countries expressing concern over sovereignty requirements, and others advocating in their favour.

On the nature of certification, the majority view is that it should remain mostly voluntary, to maintain flexibility and innovation. However, mandatory certification in critical sectors where high-security assurance is essential was also proposed. In addition, ENISA’s regulatory power has sparked debate. Some stakeholders, including Amazon, oppose granting ENISA the authority to issue binding opinions or regulatory guidance, arguing that its role should remain technical and advisory.

It remains to be seen to what extent the Commission will consider stakeholders’ views. The CSA review will also need to fit into the simplification of cybersecurity-related incident reporting obligations, which are part of the ‘digital omnibus’ proposal published on 19 November 2025.

Read this ‘At a Glance note’ on ‘Cybersecurity Act review: What to expect‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Flynn.

Start-ups are important in boosting competitiveness, which is a key priority during the EU’s 2024-2029 legislative term.

So, the EU is taking steps to foster its strategic innovation agenda, both financially and through policy measures. Evidence shows that the EU is falling behind competitors here (especially the US and China) – notably in the sectors of AI, biotech, clean tech, and defence tech.

The need for reform was highlighted by two 2024 papers – the Letta and Draghi reports, which set out recommendations to strengthen the EU’s single market and competitiveness, respectively.

Building on these reports, in January 2025, the Commission adopted the competitiveness compass. The compass is an economic framework that outlines three ‘imperatives’ – closing the innovation gap, decarbonising the economy, and reducing foreign dependencies.

Following this, the Commission launched the start-up and scale-up strategy (SSS) in May 2025. The aim is to make Europe an attractive place to set up and grow innovative companies. The SSS is linked to other initiatives such as the savings and investments union, the single market strategy, and the union of skills. In addition, the SSS will also encompass a 28th regime, with a focus on supporting startups.

The 28th regime is a long-standing concept. It would be a separate initiative that creates a single set of rules for businesses in the EU. The objective is to simplify laws and mitigate the fact that there are varying national regulations that create barriers for companies. The Letta report states that this ‘would be a transformative step towards a more unified single market’. The 28th regime would replace national law where the EU has exclusive competence, and it would supplement national legislation in other cases. It would also address relevant laws such as insolvency, labour, and tax rules. The Commission has indicated that the legislative proposal for this is scheduled for the first quarter of 2026.

ERPS has identified four challenges relevant to the 28th regime; to help the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) prepare a legislative-initiative report supporting the proposal’s development. The four issues are that:

• the European financing ecosystem has a low appetite for risk and cross-border investment;
• Member States and innovative European companies struggle to attract skilled, entrepreneurial workers;
• the high cost of failure and restructuring for innovative European companies;
• high geographical variation in legal frameworks and innovation across the EU.

EPRS studies have corroborated that a transnational, pro-innovation perspective would bring economic benefit to the EU: a coordinated approach at EU level, instead of Member States acting alone, could add 0.9 % (or, with a more ambitious integrated approach, 2.6 %) to GDP by 2035.

Amid Parliament’s preparatory work, during a plenary debate on 7 October 2025, some MEPs noted that the 28th regime could consolidate the single market, while others expressed reservations about the potential impact on national laws.

JURI’s legislative-initiative report is expected to be voted in plenary during the January 2026 session.

Links

• The 28th regime
• Savings and investments union: Overview and state of play
• Scaling up European innovation – What is the potential European added value of a 28th regime?
• Single market strategy
• Union of skills
• A competitive compass for the EU
• Cost of non-Europe in strategic innovation
• Deepening the single market in the light of the Letta and Draghi reports

Written by Anna Flynn.

Years later, we are all still experiencing the consequences of COVID‑19, with EU countries yet to fully recover from the severe economic downturn that followed the 2020 coronavirus outbreak. As a response, the Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument was established. It has a strong focus on the green and digital transitions – key priorities backed by the European Parliament. The total budget is €806.9 billion, financed through EU borrowing, the Emissions Trading System (ETS), and the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR). 

While the Council established the NGEU, Parliament co-legislated the rules for its implementation, adopting the regulation on the NGEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in February 2021. The RRF distributes 90 % of the NGEU funds to Member States, financing reforms and investments specified in separate national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). Parliament has called for ensuring that the RRF is managed transparently, that it stimulates progress in the green, digital and energy sectors, and supports children, young people and women. Parliament demands that respect for the rule of law is among the key prerequisites for receiving funding.

Implementation of the RRF enters its final year in 2026, with the deadline for payment execution in December 2026. In June 2025, the Commission underlined that Member States should streamline the NRRPs (for example, through removing targets that won’t be met) and subsequently redirecting the funds.

The European Commission is required to update Parliament on the state of play of the RRF and present regular reports. In the latest annual report (for 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025), the Commission outlined that, although the application of RRF projects needs to accelerate; significant progress was made during this period. The Commission noted that 37 % of the 6 985 milestones and targets agreed in the NRRPs had been met (at the time of the report).

To ensure it receives timely and detailed information, and to enable an exchange of views with other institutions, Parliament insisted on a bi-monthly meeting between Members of its Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Budgets, and appropriate Commission representatives. In addition, Parliament set up a special RRF working group, to discuss the quality of NRRP measures and maintain oversight of overall progress.

Since 2022, Members have looked very closely at RRF expenditure through the annual budgetary discharge procedure. RRF-related issues (which are generally prominent in the work of Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT)) were included in the report granting budgetary discharge to the European Commission in May 2025. In the adopted report, the CONT committee outlined its concern about outstanding debt from borrowing. This was only projected to increase through continued borrowing – some of which would be for the RRF. Notably, the discharge procedure applies only to RRF grants, as the RRF loans do not come under the jurisdiction of parliamentary scrutiny.

In July 2025, the Commission unveiled its proposal for the EU’s long-term budget for the 2028-2034 period. Within this, there is €149.3  billion (0.11 % of the EU’s GNI) set aside to repay the debt from NGEU grants.

Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting.

Links

• Recovery and Resilience Facility: Annual Report 2025
• Economic Outlook Quarterly: final year for the implementation for the recovery plans
• EU Budget 2028-2034: Overview of the Commission’s proposal
• The European Parliament’s oversight powers: Tools to scrutinise the European Commission
• Discharge for 2023 budget: European Commission
• RRF under way: Cybersecurity measures

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

Extreme heat, flooding and drought are no longer distant warnings of climate change. They are becoming part of everyday life. Across Europe, measures to cut emissions, from electric vehicles to renewable energy, are already visible on our streets and in our homes. Many of these initiatives are driven and funded by the European Union, but they represent only part of a much broader effort. The European Parliament is helping shape EU climate action for the benefit of citizens, the economy and the environment.

Parliament is focused on ensuring that EU climate objectives are translated into effective action. A central element of this work has been Parliament’s role in negotiations to amend the European Climate Law to include a binding intermediate greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for 2040. By shaping this amendment, Parliament has sought to strengthen the legal pathway between the 2030 target and climate neutrality by 2050, while ensuring that the target remains grounded in scientific evidence and accompanied by clear monitoring and review mechanisms.

Parliament has also called for the energy union to be aligned with developments in EU climate and energy policy, underlining the need to boost energy infrastructure, particularly cross-border interconnections.

Since 2022, Russia’s war on Ukraine has had a massive impact on the EU energy landscape. Parliament approved the REPowerEU plan, seeking to improve EU energy security, end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and make further advances in tackling the climate emergency. This initiative raised key ‘fit for 55’ targets set in the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) and the Renewable Energy Directive (RED).

The ‘fit for 55‘ package is a set of laws aligning existing climate rules with the European Climate Law objectives. In its role as co-legislator, Parliament has played an important role in shaping these laws. It supported vulnerable citizens and companies through the Social Climate Fund while approving an update to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) reducing the amount of emission allowances. Parliament has also played a role in strengthening and simplifying the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) Regulation and addressing CO2 emission standards for cars and vans. Mindful of the need to provide alternatives to traditional transport fuels, Members successfully pushed for an earlier roll-out of electric charging and hydrogen refuelling infrastructure on EU roads. Parliament also negotiated more ambitious targets on renewables, carbon sinks and deforestation and land use.

The European Green Deal, approved by Parliament in 2020, seeks to tackle the challenges of climate change and environmental degradation by cutting emissions and achieving climate neutrality by 2050.

Only a year after the approval of the Green Deal, it became clear that the existing policy framework was not sufficient to reach its goals. As co-legislator, Parliament therefore contributed to raising the 2030 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction target from 40 % to a net 55 % compared with 1990 levels. Although this increase was not as high as Parliament wanted, Parliament succeeded in including the ambition of delivering negative emissions after 2050 and establishing an independent, inter-disciplinary scientific advisory panel. The Parliament and Council reached an agreement on the European Climate Law at the end of June 2021.

These actions illustrate how the European Parliament continues to shape and strengthen EU climate legislation, moving from setting targets to ensuring their effective implementation for the benefit of citizens, the economy and the environment.

Further reading:

• Amending the European Climate Law: Setting an emissions reduction target for 2040
• Future of the energy union
• EU energy infrastructure: Boosting energy security
• Revised Energy Efficiency Directive
• Renewable Energy Directive
• Fit for 55 package
• Review of the EU ETS: ‘Fit for 55’ package
• Social climate fund: ‘Fit for 55’ package
• Simplifying and strengthening CBAM
• CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans: ‘Fit for 55’ package
• Revision of the LULUCF Regulation: Strengthening the role of the land use, land-use change and forestry sector in climate action
• The European Parliament declares climate emergency
• European climate law

Written by Mar Negreiro.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is changing the way we look for information online. Search engines increasingly offer AI-generated answers that keep users on their platforms instead of redirecting them to external websites, and many are now using generative AI tools as search engines. This convergence has intensified competition between traditional search engines and generative AI platforms. At the same time, experts warn that such reliance may lead to informational dependency and a decline in users’ cognitive skills.

AI is shifting online search results

The transformation from traditional web search to an AI-driven model is becoming mainstream. Google, which accounts for about 90 % of the online search engines market, has added an ‘AI Overviews’ feature – an automated search-summary tool – to its search engine. The overview uses Google’s Gemini AI models to answer users’ queries based on sources selected by Google. According to a market analysis, about 60 % of informational search queries in Google now trigger the overview as the top search result. Google’s AI Overview competes against AI platforms like ChatGPT and Perplexity, as users increasingly use AI chatbots to search for information. Similarly, Microsoft has introduced its Copilot generative AI to its search engine, Bing. However, Microsoft Bing accounts for just around 4 % of the online search engine market.

According to experts, users are less likely to click on links when Google’s AI summary is provided. They also believe that users are now structuring search queries differently and are increasingly using natural language in voice commands. AI answers are the latest feature of search engines, after voice and image queries.

Main emerging challenges Lower traffic and less revenues to publishers

Trade associations representing publishers’ interests claim that AI overviews cause a drop of up to 25 % in publishers’ traffic, or even up to 50 % according to a digital marketing company. A network of digital marketing companies reports that 58 % of Google searches now end without the user visiting a single link. Reduced traffic translates into fewer ad impressions and a subsequent loss of revenue for content creators. In response, a coalition of publishers has filed a formal antitrust complaint with the European Commission against Google, accusing its ‘AI Overviews’ of diverting traffic and revenue from them. An alliance of German media and digital industry NGOs, associations and organisations has filed a formal complaint in Germany. A third case launched in the UK confirms Google has strategic market status in search services, including AI overviews and AI mode, the latter being its AI chatbot launched to compete against other chatbots.

The plaintiffs believe AI overviews are increasingly monetised through integrated advertisements, while Google extracts content from third-party websites without offering direct compensation or opt-out options, and without obtaining prior consent. They claim this has implications for media diversity, freedom of opinion and democratic discourse. Representatives of publishers’ interests claim they cannot opt out from appearing in the overviews without also being suppressed from the regular search listing.

Difficulties in the training of AI models

Tools like Google’s AI Overviews rely on two components: a large-language model (LLM) and a system able to retrieve information. Both need data, the first to learn to use human language and the second to retrieve documented information to answer users’ requests. Users and businesses may have grown accustomed to their data being collected and used for search results or targeted advertising, but the same may not be true for AI training. Complaints in the United States (US) point to an update of Google’s privacy policy, adding that the company may use publicly accessible information to train its AI tools. In fact, training LLMs with data publicly available on the web may raise copyright issues. Similarly, there is a case against Meta for not respecting the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) when collecting data to train their model, as users were not asked for prior consent to their data being collected for this purpose. However, recently proposed amendments to the GDPR might clarify that processing personal data for AI training may be permissible. Stakeholders are challenging Google. For instance, Cloudfare, a global platform and network of data centres that maintain websites and applications, is supporting a consortium of publishers to collectively block AI crawlers from collecting content for training unless companies pay for the content.

Threat to the open web

Until recently, Google drove online traffic in the open web, the public, interconnected network of websites and online services used for browsing, shopping and consuming news. Thus, Google has helped users find information by crawling and indexing web pages and ranking them based on a number of criteria. This is changing now, as users are offered generative AI-based responses and conversations and increasingly stop clicking and driving online traffic. Google has admitted that the open web is in rapid decline, referring to open-web display advertising. However, many believe this decline is much broader, as AI-driven search poses an unprecedented threat to the open web. In addition, users are increasingly using chatbots to conduct online searches, further reducing the number of users who access websites from search engines.

Risks for information quality, critical thinking and digital inclusion

AI-generated searches may include incorrect or biased information. Research suggests that AI could produce ‘chat chambers‘ that reinforce the misinformation it hallucinates. Thus, 27 % of US adults do not trust AI-generated search results. Concerns around AI-generated misinformation are high, with the likelihood of chatbots repeating false information nearly doubling from 18 % in August 2024 to 35 % in August 2025. In addition, higher confidence in generative AI is associated with less critical thinking, according to research. It could also widen the digital divide, as young users are more AI-literate than older ones, but young students are increasingly dependent on AI use in classwork, risking lower creative thinking.

Next steps

Google’s AI Overviews are already available in over 200 countries worldwide. However, within the EU, rollout has been slower. In early 2025, the feature launched in only a few Member States; by October 2025 it was available in all except France. The delay was due to regulatory reasons. It is to be seen if Google is fully complying with key EU level legislation, including the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), EU copyright rules and the AI Act. The Commission is currently assessing Google’s use of AI summaries at the top of its search results, given their potential to significantly disrupt the relationship between Google and the open web by reducing traffic to external websites. Moreover, AI integration now goes far beyond overviews and chatbots. AI tools are increasingly embedded in operating systems, core apps and hardware ecosystems. As a result, AI has become a driving force for digital services, with further automation expected through the integration of Agentic AI or virtual assistants – systems designed to make decisions with minimal human oversight. Google, alongside other big tech companies, such as OpenAI, Microsoft and NVIDIA, is developing such systems as the next step towards automated online search, without any human involvement and replacing online search engines like Google Search. There is also a risk that AI agents could themselves become ‘gatekeepers’, as defined by the DMA, acting independently and creating new questions around oversight and accountability.

Read the complete ‘At a Glance note’ on ‘Search engines in times of Artificial Intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Flynn.

On 18 December 2025, International Migrants Day was marked, honouring the contribution and value of migrants.

This commemoration follows a year of notable reforms.

For example, in November 2025, the Commission adopted the EU’s first annual Asylum and Migration Report. The report outlined that there has been a 35 % reduction in illegal border crossings between July 2024 and June 2025 – but challenges remain.

In parallel, the Council agreed on the proposed Annual Solidarity Pool for migration. The pool ensures that Member States that are under migratory pressure may be assisted by other Member States, for example, through financial aid and facilitating relocation. This will be evaluated based on population size and GDP. Parliament has no formal role in its implementation, but has nevertheless supported the scheme.

In the same month, Parliament voted in favour of a law establishing the European Centre Against Migrant Smuggling within the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). This will protect victims by increasing information sharing and providing a range of support to Member States.

Underpinning all of this is the new pact for migration and asylum – this became law at the end of 2024, and will apply in full from June 2026. The pact has 10 separate but interconnected legislative acts.

Some of the Commission’s proposals that complement the pact have been criticised.

In April 2025, the first, formal EU list outlining safe countries of origin was announced. This means that asylum applicants from countries that are deemed safe (according to this list) will generally not be considered eligible for international protection. It is mandatory for Member States to abide by this list, but they are also permitted to keep or create their own national lists.

Various human rights organisations, civil society, and other stakeholders condemn this. There are questions about the transparency of how these lists are compiled, as well as the repercussions for individuals who are migrating from a safe country of origin but do need protection. However, Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee endorsed this list on 3 December 2025 as a way to better manage migration.

In March 2025, to further build upon the migration and asylum pact, the Commission proposed a common approach to returns for citizens illegally residing in a Member State. Part of this is the creation of return hubs – centres in safe non-EU countries that people may be sent to if they cannot legally reside in the EU. A mutual recognition of returns is also proposed, allowing Member States to recognise and apply return decisions made by another Member State.

The Council’s position on the regulation was finalised on 8 December 2025, so this will now be negotiated with Parliament.

Looking ahead, 2025 marked the start of decisions on how the pact will be financed over the coming years. In July, the Commission’s unveiled its proposal for the EU’s long-term budget for 2028-2034. This included information on how migration policies are to be financed during this period.

A proposed €12 billion (in 2025 prices) is to be allocated for migration policy. This is similar to the current budget for 2021-2027, where around €12.6 billion in 2025 prices has been dedicated to this.

One aspect that differs, however, is that this money will be allocated through national plans crafted by each Member State. Members of the European Parliament have highlighted their concern about how this will impact their capacity for oversight and scrutiny in this area.

Overall, the current and future budgets reflect the increasing importance of migration as a political issue.

Links to EPRS publications

• International Migrants Day: 18 December 2025
• Union support for asylum, migration and integration
• Stronger role for Europol to fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking
• European Parliament Plenary Session November I 2025
• The first annual Asylum and Migration Report and the Annual Solidarity Pool
• ‘Safe country of origin’ concept in EU asylum law
• Planned revision of the EU Return Directive
• Implementation of the EU pact on migration and asylum

Written by Anna Flynn.

Parliament has, on many occasions, supported the EU’s active role in ocean governance. the Commission adopted the European Ocean Pact in June 2025. It serves as a non-legislative framework for all ocean-related policies, covering a wide range of issues such as research, maritime security, ocean health, coastal communities, and more.

A proposal for an EU ocean act is expected by 2027.

Notably, throughout 2025, Parliament gave its consent to a number of fisheries agreements with third countries. An important example is the protocol with Greenland. Moreover, the approved EU-Côte d’Ivoire agreement is significant for the EU’s tuna fleet.

Since July 2025, citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament to call for higher standards and stronger regulation of EU fishing practices outside the Union. In response, EPRS highlighted that the EU’s agreements with third countries promote local sustainability, conservation and development.

For instance, in the agreement with Guinea-Bissau, €4.5 million is allocated to the country’s fishing sector – namely towards control and surveillance capacities, as well as for communities in the region. Moreover, the agreement with Cabo Verde is viewed by the Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries as balanced; due to the fact that the EU’s financial contributions are higher than the cost of the access rights.

In July 2025, Parliament adopted a text agreed with the Council on improving the EU’s measures tackling third countries’ unsustainable practices concerning shared fish stocks. These are stocks that are not limited to the waters of a single country. This means that there is now clarity on exactly what actions are subject to EU penalties.

Beyond fisheries, in 2025, the Parliament also adopted its position on the Commission’s proposed directive on the high seas.

This directive integrates the UN’s High Seas Treaty into EU legislation. The treaty protects marine biodiversity beyond country’s borders. No nation has jurisdiction over nearly two thirds of the ocean, and the high seas make up a large part of this.

Parliament’s report amends the proposal by suggesting that Member States need to publish their actions in the high seas (related to biodiversity). The objective of this is to improve transparency. However, MEPs also called for greater flexibility in reporting.

In the same week, Parliament also adopted a provisional agreement on expanding the European Maritime Safety Agency’s (EMSA) mandate. The aim of the proposed regulation is to strengthen EMSA’s ability to tackle security risks by broadening its remit. For example. the agreement introduces a flexibility mechanism so that the agency can undertake additional tasks for the Commission and Member States.

Post-2027, there is no separate fund outlined for the common fisheries policy (CFP). Currently, there is a European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) for the 2021-2027 period – but in July 2025, the Commission proposed merging this with other policies, such as agriculture. This means that there would be no specific, allocated sum of money for this sector. The CFP encompasses ‘conservation of marine biological resources’ – one of only five areas in which the EU has exclusive competence.

Links to EPRS publications

• Plenary round-up – November I 2025
• Protecting marine biodiversity in the high seas
• Revision of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) founding regulation
• Conditions for EU support to the CFP (2028-2034 programming period)
• Sustainable fishing outside the European Union – answering citizens’ concerns
• EU-Côte d’Ivoire fisheries agreement
• EU fisheries agreement with Greenland: Conclusion of a new protocol (2025-2030)
• Measures against countries that do not cooperate on shared fish stocks
• The European ocean pact
• EU fisheries agreement with Guinea-Bissau
• EU fisheries agreement with Cabo Verde: Conclusion of a new protocol (2024-2029)

Written by Anna Flynn.

The EU strongly condemned Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022. By July 2025, the civilian death toll in Ukraine had exceeded 13 800, according to the UN. Now, nearly four years later, the EU has provided €187.3 billion in support for Ukraine, and this response marks the Union’s largest civil protection operation to date.

EPRS notes that ‘the ongoing attack has reverberated beyond Ukraine’s borders, affecting food security, energy prices and inflation both in the EU and beyond’. The European Parliament labelled Russia’s war ‘the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945.’ The  EU’s response  has been structured along three axes: political, economic and military support for Ukraine; isolation and containment of Russia; and enhancement of EU and EU neighbours’ resilience.

Parliament’s extraordinary meeting of 1 March 2022, at which it adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning Russia’s aggression and setting the direction for EU action, was one of the first international gatherings that Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, attended. Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, was the first EU leader to visit Kyiv, on 1 April 2022. In September 2025, Metsola officially opened a permanent European Parliament liaison office in Kyiv. 

Since the start of the war, Parliament has dealt with multiple legislative files of paramount importance for Ukraine and adopted numerous non-legislative resolutions on aspects of EU support for the country; including several rounds of macro-financial assistance, the Act in support of ammunition production (ASAP); and the Ukraine Facility, which earmarks €50 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction from 2024 to 2027.

Parliament has also unwaveringly supported Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, advocating successfully in June 2022 for Ukraine to be granted candidate country status, and in December 2023 for Member States to start accession negotiations. During EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee meetings, Members and their Ukrainian counterparts have discussed parliamentary follow-up of Ukraine’s official accession request. Accession negotiations have not properly started due to lack of required unanimity in the Council. However, in April 2025, Parliament called for the acceleration of the screening process that would allow these discussions to begin.

Moreover, Parliament has used its powers to advocate a tougher policy of containment towards Russia. A huge discussion has centred around the possibility of the EU using immobilised Russian assets (of the Central Bank of Russia) to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. This money has been frozen since the war began. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for the assets (amounting to around €300 billion) to be used. However, it is a divisive issue due to potential economic, legal, and reputational consequences. On 12 December 2025, the Council adopted a regulation indefinitely prohibiting the transfer of any of the assets.

On 19 December 2025, the European Council approved a €90 billion loan to support Ukraine in 2026 and 2027. Without this, Ukraine was expected to run out of funds in early 2026. Instead of using Russian assets, this loan is financed through EU borrowing secured on the ‘headroom’ in the EU’s budget.

Parliament also supports the EU’s sanctions against Russia. The Council recently adopted its 19th comprehensive package of sanctions, containing 69 additional listings. This constitutes companies now subject to asset freezes (that will also be ineligible for further disbursement of funds), as well as individuals who now face travel bans.

Parliament is therefore employing its budgetary, agenda-setting, external action and law-making powers to mobilise solid EU support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s aggression, and to ensure that the EU honours its pledges.

Links

• Financing Ukraine in 2026 and 2027
• State of play: EU support to Ukraine
• Ukraine’s future in the EU
• Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024
• Act in support of ammunition production

Written by Maria Niestadt.

Influencer marketing has become a significant part of the digital economy. Influencers allow brands to reach highly targeted audiences, and their endorsements are often perceived as more authentic than direct advertising. Some consumer groups – such as younger consumers and those with lower financial literacy, lower income, or consumers who follow trends closely – are particularly receptive to this type of marketing.

The fast growth of this sector has exposed several problematic practices and regulatory challenges in the EU. Many influencers do not clearly disclose the commercial intent behind their posts, while others manipulate visibility by buying fake followers, likes or plays to inflate their perceived influence and to make more profit. Additional concerns include reinforcing unrealistic beauty standards, promoting harmful or illegal products, accelerating the spread of false and misleading claims, and exploiting kidfluencers for financial gain.

At EU level, laws relevant to influencer marketing exist but are fragmented across consumer protection, digital and audiovisual media regulation. Hidden advertising and misleading commercial practices are already prohibited, yet the responsibilities of different actors in the influencer marketing value chain are not always clear. Some EU Member States, such as France and Spain, have complemented these EU laws with national legislation, and many have issued guidance to help influencers and companies understand their legal obligations.

The European Commission has signalled its intention to address misleading influencer marketing practices in the forthcoming digital fairness act. The European Parliament and Council will play a central role in shaping this legislation once the proposal is published.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Regulating influencer marketing in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.