European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act moved close to final adoption when the European Parliament voted in favour of the text on 13 March. It will become law after the final endorsement of the Council of the European Union, making the Union the first major world power to adopt horizontal legislation governing AI.

The act defines the rules for using and selling artificial intelligence systems in the EU, and regulates general-purpose AI tools such as ChatGPT and AI-based biometric surveillance. It also requires much more transparency than up to now in high-risk AI systems, and delineates unacceptable risks of AI.

This note offers links to recent reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on artificial intelligence. More publications on the topic can be found in a previous edition of What think tanks are thinking.

Charting the geopolitics and European governance of Artificial Intelligence
Carnegie Europe, March 2024

The EU’s AI Act creates regulatory complexity for open-source AI
Center for Data Innovation, March 2024

What to expect from the Digital Markets Act
Centre for European Reform, March 2024

Quantum computing: A blessing and a threat to our digital world
Friends of Europe, March 2024

Artificial intelligence, diplomacy and democracy: from divergence to convergence
Friends of Europe, March 2024

Is the EU missing another tech wave with AI?
Atlantic Council, February 2024

Should the UN govern global AI?
Brookings Institution, February 2024

Fairness in machine learning: Regulation or standards?
Brookings Institution, February 2024

Licensing AI is not the answer, but it contains the answers
Brookings Institution, February 2024

Tech firms’ promise to fight election fakes is a good start, but only a start
Bruegel, February 2024

Intellectual monopolization on steroids: Big Tech in the AI age
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February 2024

The AI election year: How to counter the impact of Artificial Intelligence
German Council on Foreign Relations, February 2024

Quel rôle pour le groupe aéronaval à l’heure de la guerre en réseau?
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2024

Artificial Intelligence and democracy
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies,

Why artificial general intelligence lies beyond deep learning
Rand Corporation, February 2024

The dark side of urban Artificial Intelligence: addressing the environmental and social impact of algorithms
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, January 2024

The impact of generative AI in a global election year
Brookings Institution, January 2024

Effective AI regulation requires understanding general-purpose AI
Brookings Institution, January 2024

The implications of the AI boom for non-state armed actors
Brookings Institution, January 2024

How the EU can navigate the geopolitics of AI
Carnegie Europe, January 2024

Rethinking concerns about AI’s energy use
Center for Data Innovation, January 2024

The New York Times’ copyright lawsuit against OpenAI threatens the future of AI and fair use
Center for Data Innovation, January 2024

The long-termist fear of a future malevolent superintelligence is hindering our progress today
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2024

Envisioning Africa’s AI governance landscape in 2024
European Centre for Development Policy Management, January 2024

Nuclear arms control policies and safety in artificial intelligence: Transferable lessons or false equivalence?
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, January 2024

Algorithms by and for the workers
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, January 2024

Rethinking concerns about AI’s energy use
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, January 2024

Pour une Autorité française de l’IA
Institut Montaigne, January 2024

The promise and peril of AI in the power grid
Rand Corporation, January 2024

AI poses risks to both authoritarian and democratic politics
Wilson Center, January 2024

A cluster analysis of national AI strategies
Brookings Institution, December 2023

New technologies in the workplace: A round-up of project research
Bruegel, December 2023

Skills or a degree? The rise of skills-based hiring for AI and green jobs
Bruegel, December 2023

The competitive relationship between cloud computing and generative AI
Bruegel, December 2023

Artificial intelligence and energy consumption
Bruegel, December 2023

Policymakers should use the SETI model to prepare for AI doomsday scenarios
Center for Data Innovation, December 2023

What Is Artificial Intelligence (AI)?
Council on Foreign Affairs, December 2023

Artificial Intelligence and the clustering of human capital: The risks for Europe
European Centre for International Political Economy, December 2023

Après le ravage des écrans, l’école doit-elle vraiment sauter dans le train de l’intelligence artificielle?
Institut Thomas More, December 2023

Philosophical debates about AI risks are a distraction
Rand Corporation, December 2023

The EU AI Act is a cautionary tale in open-source AI regulation
Center for Data Innovation, December 2023

Generative AI: Global governance and the risk-based approach
Centre on Regulation in Europe, November 2023

AI won’t be safe until we rein in Big Tech
European Policy Studies, November 2023

The drama at OpenAI shows that AI governance remains in the hands of a select few
Chatham House, November 2023

The global race for Artificial Intelligence regulation
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2023

Awareness of artificial intelligence: Diffusion of information about AI versus ChatGPT in the United States
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, November 2023

The geopolitics of Generative AI: international implications and the role of the European Union
Real Institute Elcano, November 2024

Read this briefing on ‘Artificial intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anja Radjenovic (1st edition).

In November 2023, the Commission proposed a directive to modernise and strengthen the legal framework on the fight against migrant smuggling. The proposal addresses the steady rise in irregular arrivals in the EU and the rise in smuggling on all main EU entry routes. The current directive defining the offence of facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence in the EU, and the framework decision on strengthening of the penal framework have both been widely criticised for their failure to provide legal certainty and uniformity of implementation. Parliament has been the main critic of these legal acts since their adoption in 2002. Many human rights players have also warned that the overly broad definition of migrant smuggling has resulted in the investigation and prosecution of innocent people, be they smuggled migrants or individuals providing humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants.

To clearly define and effectively sanction migrant smuggling, the Commission would replace the existing rules with others focused on criminal offences, penalties for natural persons, liability of and sanctions for legal persons, but also on jurisdiction, prevention, investigation and data collection.

In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the LIBE committee, with Birgit Sippel (S&D, Germany) as rapporteur. The next expected step is the publication of a draft report.

Complete version

• March 2024: ‘Preventing and countering the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the EU‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHACommittee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2023) 755
28.11.2023Rapporteur:Birgit Sippel (S&D, Germany)2023/0439(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Lena Düpont (EPP, Germany)
Fabienne Keller (Renew, France)
Erik Marquardt (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Jorge Buxadé Villalba (ECR, Spain)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Eszter Fay with Niklas Dreier.

In the fast-evolving landscape of scientific research, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) Academic Freedom Roundtable ‘Research Integrity in Open Science for Europe’ brought together researchers and European policymakers to discuss the challenges and opportunities presented by Open Science. Amidst insightful discussions on Open Science’s challenges and ethical dimensions, the event, held on 21 February 2024, invited us to question who truly benefits from Open Science’s promise of transparency and societal impact? How does Open Science reshape our understanding of research excellence?

Open Science as a policy priority for the European Union

As we navigate a time where scepticism toward science is prevalent, STOA Vice-Chair Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia) underscored the need to increase transparency and trustworthiness in scientific endeavours by facilitating Open Science. EU Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education, and Youth Iliana Ivanova reaffirmed the EU’s policy commitment to promoting Open Science. Yet, in this very endeavour, Commissioner Ivanova emphasised the importance of developing assessment methods that measure research excellence beyond traditional measures such as citations. The evaluative focus, she noted, should be on rewarding and fostering research with a positive societal impact. These introductory remarks thus raised the question: Who benefits from Open Science research?

Open Science for and by whom?

Professor Frank Miedema, from the University of Utrecht, stressed in his keynote on ‘Science in Transition’ the need to question why and for whom we should pursue Open Science. He advocated for a shift from ‘science for science’ to ‘science for society’, echoing Commissioner Ivanova’s position. While advocating for more data accessibility, Professor Miedema also highlighted the importance of considering scenarios where withholding research data might be pertinent. Likewise, Marcel Bogers, Professor of Open & Collaborative Innovation at Eindhoven University of Technology, cautioned against excessive data openness, drawing parallels between Open Science and his expertise in open innovation. Referring to a recent open innovation study, he demonstrated that beyond an optimal threshold, excessive openness may detrimentally affect performance. Professor Bogers asserted that advancing Open Science would require a reassessment of how research is incentivised, alluding to challenges linked to fostering and evaluating the excellence of Open Science research.

Assessing research quality: Challenges to Open Science

The subsequent panel discussed the challenges hindering the transition to Open Science. Dr Elizabeth Gadd, Head of Research Culture & Assessment at Loughborough University, underscored the need to revamp the incentive and assessment system for research. Dr Gadd introduced the INORMS SCOPE Framework as a solution to assess research quality beyond traditional citation metrics, thereby also mitigating global inequalities in scientific output assessment. The SCOPE framework, an acronym for START, CONTEXT, OPTIONS, PROBE, and EVALUATE, offers a comprehensive five-stage model for responsible research evaluation, guiding evaluators in planning and assessing research endeavours. This framework is based on three principles advocating a discerning and strategic approach to evaluation. First, evaluating only where necessary, stressing the importance of considering alternative strategies. Second, evaluating with the evaluated, emphasising collaboration and inclusivity by involving the communities or individuals under evaluation. Third, drawing on evaluation expertise, underscoring the necessity for a thorough and informed evaluation process aligned with academic research standards to ensure validity, reliability and comprehensive understanding.

Signe Mezinska, Associate Professor at the University of Latvia, emphasised the social disparities within the scientific community and across countries, especially regarding the economic costs associated with publishing according to Open Science principles. Elaborating on these inequalities, Henriikka Mustajoki, Head of Development, Open Science, Finland, grounded the justification for the Open Science movement in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While advocating for data accessibility to all, she acknowledged the potential systemic pressures that widespread openness might pose to Open Science researchers’ academic freedom and freedom of speech. Kadri Simm, Chair of Practical Philosophy at the University of Tartu, and Olivier Le Gall, Chair of the French Advisory Board on Research Integrity, further identified potential challenges arising from emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, particularly regarding confidentiality in handling diverse data sources. To address these challenges, the experts on the panel delved into the ethical dimensions of Open Science and discussed the Responsible Open Science in Europe (ROSiE) guidelines as a potential solution to ethical conflicts.

An ethical framework for Open Science: Responsible Open Science in Europe (ROpen ScienceiE) general guidelines and academic freedom

Professor Rose Bernabe from the University of Oslo presented the ROSiE guidelines project and advocated for their inclusion in the European definition of academic freedom. Funded by the EU’s research and innovation programme Horizon 2020, the project aims to collaboratively develop and foster foundational tools that facilitate responsible Open Science and research integrity. As Dr Simm noted that specific approaches to Open Science conflict with each other, she also emphasised that the ROpen ScienceiE guidelines represent a promising initial move towards establishing a comprehensive ethical framework for Open Science.

The STOA Academic Freedom Roundtable highlighted the complexity and urgency of navigating the Open Science landscape. The event not only underscored the benefits of Open Science but also called attention to the challenges, which demand collaborative solutions. As we chart a course towards Open Science, embracing diverse perspectives and establishing responsible guidelines will be crucial to ensuring a future where research serves society while preserving academic freedom and ethical integrity.

For more details, you can watch the event recording.

Read the ESMH interview with Teodora Konach from the ROSiE project on ‘Paving the way towards responsible open science‘.

Your opinion matters to us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu and follow us on X at @EP_ScienceTech.

Written by Marc Jüttten.

The multidimensional crisis and spiralling violence in Haiti has reached its peak, with criminal gangs in control of 80 % of the capital Port-au-Prince. On 11 March 2024, Prime Minister Ariel Henry announced his resignation. Hopes lie with a transitional governance arrangement that was agreed at a meeting in Jamaica between Haitian stakeholders, CARICOM and representatives from the international community. The installation of the Transitional Presidential Council is a precondition set by Kenya to lead the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in October 2023.

Haiti’s multidimensional crisis

Since the 7 July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, insecurity has spiked and gang control of the country has expanded continuously. According to the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, in January and February 2023, 1 193 people have been killed by gang violence. Homicides rose from 1 141 in 2019 to 2 183 in 2022 and more than 4 700 in 2023, representing an increase of 400 % within five years. Currently, 80 % of the capital Port-au-Prince is under the control of criminal gangs. On 3 March 2024, the government declared a three-day state of emergency and a night-time curfew after armed gangs stormed the country’s two biggest jails, allowing more than 4 000 criminals to escape back onto the streets.

The explosion of violence in Haiti does not come as a surprise. In fact, the multidimensional crises have been looming for years and are characterised by the intertwining of politics and criminal business, political deadlock, extreme violence, and dire humanitarian conditions. Some experts also blame the international community for their failure to contribute to a long-term solution. Since the assassination of President Moïse, the country has lacked an elected president, legislature, and mayors. Backed by the international community, Ariel Henry has acted as Haiti’s prime minister since 20 July 2021, following the resignation of Claude Joseph as interim Prime Minister. However, a political stalemate has persisted over whether Henry or a transitional government should govern until elections can be convened and an elected government is in place. According to observers, the vacuum of democratically accountable political authority has created space for the gangs to expand their influence. The dramatic escalation in violence and protests, including roadblocks, has led to food and fuel shortages and thousands fleeing their homes. The World Food Programme estimates that 4.4 million people, representing 44 % of Haiti’s population, are facing acute food insecurity. This includes 1.4 million living in an emergency situation and about 276 000 children aged between six months and six years. Currently, more than 360 000 people have been internally displaced. In addition, the health system is on the brink of collapse, with many health facilities having been forced to shut down.

International community response

In October 2023, the UNSC (in response to the 2022 request by the Haitian authorities for an international specialised armed police force to address the insecurity resulting from criminal action by armed gangs) authorised the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti; it will be headed by Kenya, which agreed to deploy 1 000 police officers. Other countries such as Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, and Jamaica have also pledged to contribute. Despite its authorisation by the UNSC, the mission is not a UN peacekeeping operation but a multinational operation conducted by an ad hoc coalition tasked with supporting the Haitian National Police in re-establishing security and building security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections.

Given the recent dramatic security deterioration, on 11 March 2024 the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) convened Haitian stakeholders and representatives from Brazil, Canada, France, Mexico, UN and the United States to discuss the multidimensional crisis in Haiti. Following the meeting in Jamaica, CARICOM issued an outcome declaration on a transitional governance arrangement. Participants agreed on the establishment of a Transitional Presidential Council comprised of seven voting and two observer members that should swiftly select and appoint an interim Prime Minister. The Transitional Presidential Council will, together with the Interim Prime Minister, appoint an inclusive Council of Ministers. Individuals who have been sanctioned by the UN, individuals intending to compete in the next election, and individuals who oppose UNSC Resolution 2699 authorising the Multinational Security Support Mission are excluded from the council. Ariel Henry has committed to resigning immediately upon the installation of the council. The installation of the Transitional Presidential Council (which at the time of writing is still in the making) is a precondition set by Kenya to lead the security mission.

United States (US) Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced on 11 March 2024 an additional US$100 million to fund the deployment of the security support mission, bringing total US support for this effort to US$300 million. He also announced an additional US$33 million in humanitarian aid.

However, Jimmy Cherizier – one of Haiti’s most powerful gang leaders, known as ‘Barbecue’, who is under UN and European Union (EU) sanctions – has said that his coalition of armed groups, known as the ‘G9 Family and Allies’, will continue the fight for Haiti’s liberation, painting himself as a revolutionary and threatening political leaders who are set to take part in the Transitional Presidential Council.

European Union support for Haiti

The EU has allocated more than €200 million in bilateral assistance to the country since 2021, with the focus on enabling the continuity of basic public services for the Haitian population. Overall, since 1994, the EU has supported Haiti with €500 million, which makes Haiti the largest recipient of EU humanitarian aid in Latin America and the Caribbean. The EU’s support for Haiti is twofold: on the one hand, to strengthen institutional capacity, and on the other to facilitate the population’s access to basic public services in the very insecure and volatile context. Given the recent developments, the European Commission allocated an additional €20 million in emergency humanitarian aid to Haiti on 13 March 2024 to help humanitarian partners address the most urgent needs of the population, in terms of protection, food assistance, nutrition, water and sanitation, and healthcare.

On 21 October 2022, the UN Security Council adopted a sanctions regime against members of the Haitian political and economic elite who support armed gangs. On 28 July 2023, the EU set up an autonomous framework allowing the EU to impose sanctions on individuals (such as the above-mentioned Jimmy Cherizier) and entities responsible for threatening the peace, security or stability of Haiti, or for undermining democracy or the rule of law in Haiti. On 15 January, the EU added four more people to the list of those sanctioned in connection with the situation in Haiti. HR/VP Borrell said that the EU would support the broader objectives of the Multinational Security Support Mission, once it is deployed, through the EU’s cooperation instruments.

Views

While international actors including the US and the EU welcomed the outcome of the Jamaica meeting, an expert from Medico International criticised the agreement as another short-term technocratic solution from the outside with the principal objective of avoiding a refugee and migration wave that would affect the region. It would not provide for a sustainable solution to build a democratic state in Haiti. Jake Johnston, Haiti expert at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, criticises the fact that the US and other foreign powers have pushed Haiti into a pact that will face legitimacy concerns and is unlikely to lead to a solution to the current crisis by itself.

European Parliament position

In October 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on human rights breaches in Haiti and called for a durable, time-bound and commonly accepted solution to allow for fair legislative and presidential elections. Moreover, Parliament encouraged the EU and international financial institutions to increase their financial support for Haiti. On 5 February 2024, during their plenary session, MEPs exchanged views with the European Commission on the situation in Haiti on the eve of the deployment of the United Nations Multinational Security Support Mission.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Haiti in a spiral of violence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition).

European Works Councils (EWCs) are bodies that should guarantee employees the right to be consulted on important issues in large multinational companies active in multiple EU countries. The possibility to set up EWCs was introduced 30 years ago and the rules were revised in 2009. However, with limited rights to information and little influence, EWCs have been criticised for being ineffective, on account of unclear definitions, non-dissuasive sanctions and ineffective access to justice.

In February 2023, the European Parliament called for legislative action to address the shortcomings identified and strengthen the functioning of EWCs. In response, the European Commission consulted European social partners and put forward a proposal in January 2024 to revise the 2009 directive.

The European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs is preparing a report, with a view to securing a mandate for interinstitutional negotiations in the next legislative term.

Complete version

• March 2024: ‘Revision of the European Works Councils Directive: Stronger social dialogue in a multinational context‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/38/EC as regards the establishment and functioning of European Works Councils and the effective enforcement of transnational information and consultation rightsCommittee responsible:Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)COM(2024) 14
24.1.2024Rapporteur:Dennis Radtke (EPP, Germany)2024/0006(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Brando Benifei (S&D, Italy)
Jozef Mihál (Renew, Slovakia)
Rosa D’Amato (Greens/EFA, Italy)
Elżbieta Rafalska (ECR, Poland)
Elena Lizzi (ID, Italy)
Eugenia Rodríguez Palop (The Left, Spain)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Committee vote

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Rebecca Torpey.

At the 21-22 March European Council meeting, discussions will focus on Ukraine, security and defence, the Middle East and enlargement. Concerning security and defence, EU leaders will consider the new European defence industrial strategy presented by the European Commission. On Ukraine, they are expected to reiterate their commitment to supporting the country, and welcome the establishment of a Ukraine Assistance Fund regarding military aid as well as the 13th package of sanctions against Russia. The leaders may also discuss anew the use of revenues from frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine. As the Middle East remains a delicate topic, with differing positions, concrete conclusions with clear positions are unlikely. On enlargement, EU leaders will probably welcome the Commission’s recommendation to open negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. As is usual in the spring, EU leaders will endorse the policy priorities of the annual sustainable growth survey, and meet in an inclusive Euro Summit format.

1.     General

Following the customary opening address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, the Prime Minister of Belgium, Alexander De Croo, as leader of the country currently holding the six-month presidency of the Council of the EU, is expected to provide an overview of progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions.

Following recent national elections in Portugal, this will probably be the last time that long-time European Council member Antonio Costa represents Portugal at a regular European Council meeting. As regards Bulgaria, it is not yet clear who will represent the country: after Nikolai Denkov’s resignation as prime minister on 6 March 2024, Mariya Gabriel is expected to become the next prime minister in accordance with the power-sharing agreement between the political parties in the Bulgarian government. If Gabriel is sworn in on time, she will attend the European Council; if not, according to the Bulgarian Constitution, it would be the President, Rumen Radev, attending.

EU leaders will also have a lunch with UN Secretary-General António Guterres and meet with their counterparts of the countries in the European Economic Area, namely Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, to mark the 30th anniversary of their relationship.

2.     European Council meeting Ukraine

Ukraine remains top of the agenda at the European Council more than two years after Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine, and ten years since the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. The European Council will reiterate its willingness to support Ukraine for as long as it takes, while condemning the actions of Russia and those who support its war. In line with this, EU leaders will welcome the adoption of the 13th package of sanctions, and most likely also restate their support for ongoing efforts to prosecute the Russian leadership for their crimes. Back in February, the European Council had welcomed the agreement reached on the Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning revenues from frozen Russian assets. Recently, however, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed using the profits to buy much needed military equipment for Ukraine. This idea has received pushback from some Member States, as the general agreement was that the money would be used to help to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. After the 12 March meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council, the Belgian finance minister stated that there should be a proposal by the end of that week on the mobilisation of profits from frozen Russian assets. Therefore, it is likely that the March European Council will review progress and define the next steps on the use of these profits to support Ukraine.

The European Council may welcome the Council decision to establish the Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF), as part of the ongoing reform of the European Peace Facility (EPF). High Representative (HR/VP) Josep Borrell initially proposed the creation of the fund, which would be part of the EPF, but dedicated solely to Ukraine. The €5 billion fund will be used to refund Member States for their military donations to Ukraine. There have been disagreements among Member States regarding the specifics of the scheme. France has demanded a ‘buy European’ clause – some of the biggest players in the EU defence industry are French companies. Meanwhile, Germany has asked for bilateral aid to be taken into consideration when determining how much each Member State should contribute to the fund – Germany is the largest European military donor to Ukraine. Nevertheless, Coreper managed to reach a compromise whereby around 50 % of bilateral aid would be taken into account when considering contributions, and there would initially be flexibility on the ‘buy European’ aspect.

The EU failed to reach its target of sending a million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine in 2023, this – combined with a lack of agreement on US military funding – has left Ukraine without vital military support as it continues defend against Russia’s war machine. However, EU leaders may welcome a recent Czech-led initiative that has been launched to obtain 800 000 units of ammunition that could be delivered within weeks. The European Council may also support the bilateral agreements providing security commitments that Ukraine has concluded with several Member States.

The European Council will most likely also condemn the illegal ‘elections’ held by Russia in occupied Ukrainian territories (Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzia and Kherson). Following the death of Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most high-profile political prisoner, EU Heads of State or Government may also criticise the mistreatment of political prisoners in Russia.

Security and defence

The war in Ukraine has lent new impetus to discussions on EU security and defence. The European Council may reiterate its commitment to increasing defence expenditure and to boosting EU defence industry competitiveness, in line with the Strategic Compass and the Versailles Declaration. The Strategic Compass 2024 annual report is due to be presented in the course of the spring. If released before the European Council meeting (as was last year’s annual report), then EU leaders may review the findings and discuss implementation of the Strategic Compass.

At the December 2023 meeting, the European Council had asked the HR/VP and the Commission to present the European defence industrial strategy as soon as possible, including a proposal for a European defence investment programme (EDIP). EU leaders are likely to welcome the strategy, which was presented on 5 March, and invite the Council to take work forward. The EDIP will give access to €1.5 billion in funds over three years to support the defence industry. However, European Commissioner Thierry Breton has stated that the industry could need closer to €100 billion. Estonia, France and Poland have also called for increased funds for the EU’s defence industry. In that context, French President Emmanuel Macron and Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, then followed by the Belgian prime minister, have suggested issuing joint debt to support the weapons industry. However, Germany, the Netherlands, and other ‘frugal’ Member States, are against the use of common bonds. Ways of finding extra funding for defence investment may be a discussion point during the meeting.

Middle East

The European Council did not manage to agree on extensive conclusions on the Middle East at its two most recent meetings (December 2023 and February 2024). The topic remains extremely sensitive, with Member States holding differing views on many aspects. However, the topic has been put on the agenda, which shows a willingness to address recent developments at the upcoming meeting. EU leaders are likely to reiterate: i) their condemnation of Hamas; ii) their call for the return of all hostages; iii) their support for the two-state solution – as the best foundation for lasting peace; and iv) Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international humanitarian law.

Since the 7 October attack by Hamas, over 31 000 Palestinians have reportedly been killed by Israeli forces. This has led to accusations that Israel is not doing enough to protect civilian lives as it carries out its war on Hamas. On 14 February, the Irish Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, and Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, sent a letter to the Commission requesting an ‘urgent review’ to determine whether Israel was complying with the obligations (respect for human rights and democratic principles) included in the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The Taoiseach stated that he believed the EU-Israel Association Agreement would be discussed at the March European Council meeting.

Concerns are mounting regarding a potential Israeli military operation in Rafah, where 1.5 million displaced Palestinians are thought to be sheltering. On 16 February, the HR/VP released a statement calling on the Israeli government not to launch a military operation in Rafah. After the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 19 February, Borrell confirmed that all but one of the Member States supported the statement. The lone Member State against the statement is thought to be Hungary.

With famine said to be ‘imminent’ in Gaza, EU leaders may welcome the aid that, on 12 March, began making its way to Gaza through the Cyprus-Gaza humanitarian corridor. The mission involves several international partners including the United Arab Emirates and United States.

A key point in the discussion at the European Council’s October 2023 meeting was whether or not it should call for (a) humanitarian pause(s). The wording has now evolved, with some, including von der Leyen, calling for ‘an immediate humanitarian pause leading to a sustainable ceasefire’. However, it is still to be seen whether all Member States will agree to such a wording. In December 2023, a number of EU countries voted against or abstained in a UN General Assembly vote calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza.

EU leaders may also condemn the violence carried out by Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Yet there is no unity among Member States on this matter. The HR/VP has confirmed that, after suggesting imposing sanctions on violent settlers at the Munich Security Conference, not all Member States were in agreement with this proposal. The Council has been working on sanctions against extremist Israeli settlers who are breaking international law through the illegal expansion of Israeli settlements beyond pre-1967 borders, but Hungary and Czechia have opposed these sanctions, further demonstrating the divisions between Member states. Some countries, such as France, have already unilaterally placed sanctions on extremist settlers.

Enlargement

On 12 March, during the European Parliament’s plenary debate ahead of the European Council meeting, von der Leyen announced that the Commission had decided to recommend that the Council open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Member States such as Slovenia, Croatia, and Italy have supported BiH’s membership prospects; others, including Austria, have called for the membership process of Ukraine and Moldova to also include BiH. The Member States will officially decide whether or not to open negotiations. As requested by the European Council, the Commission has put forward proposals for draft negotiating frameworks for Ukraine and Moldova. These may also be included in discussions on enlargement in the European Council.

Other items Migration

EU leaders will discuss migration, following up on the discussion held in December 2023, during which they underlined the need to pursue a strategic and comprehensive approach in this area. The leaders will take stock of progress on orientations given at previous meetings.

Agriculture

In response to widespread farmers’ protests, the European Council discussed the challenges facing the agriculture sector at its 1 February meeting, committing to keep the issue under review. Twenty‑two EU agriculture ministers (all except Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden) have called on the Commission to ‘propose concrete steps forward and precise solutions’ to the issues outlined at the 26 February meeting of agriculture and fisheries ministers. In response, on 15 March, the Commission put forward legislative proposals to simplify certain elements of the common agricultural policy, and a document on the food supply chain. EU leaders will probably discuss the issues facing the sector and the Commission’s proposals.

Strategic Agenda 2024-2029

The indicative leaders’ agenda for 2024 announced a debate on the ‘strategic agenda and internal reforms’. European Council President Charles Michel will probably take stock of reflections so far in the process of setting the new long-term priorities for the EU, the strategic agenda 2024-2029. He will also update EU-leaders on the second series of meetings, each with a small number of EU leaders, representing a mix of geographical regions, political party affiliations and opinions. Possible dates for these meetings are 1-2 April and 11-12 April, ahead of the 16-17 April European Council meeting, which is expected to discuss a first draft. The European Council is scheduled to adopt the strategic agenda 2024-2029 at the end of June.

European Semester

As part of the European Semester process, EU leaders are expected to endorse policy priorities for the 2024 annual sustainable growth survey and the Council recommendation on euro-area economic policy. The discussion on the high-level report written by Enrico Letta on the future of single market, requested by EU leaders for the March meeting, may be postponed owing to the packed agenda. Meanwhile, in a non-paper, 15 Member States, led by Finland, have proposed ideas for further developing the EU’s single market.

3.     Euro Summit

The Euro Summit will convene on Friday 22 March to discuss the economic situation and policy coordination. It will take stock of Eurogroup work on capital markets union, since well‑functioning capital markets are viewed as essential to ensure EU competitiveness.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 21-22 March 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Present-day European children have been through a lot: a global pandemic, a global financial crisis and wars in the EU’s neighbouring regions. In just a few years, once they become adults, they will have to face the consequences of the decisions taken today. Therefore whether these decisions have to do with the protection of the environment, public health policies or demographics, governments should seek to ensure that children are sufficiently empowered to contribute to responsible choices for their generation’s future.

According to EU and international instruments, children have the right to be heard and to have a say in all decisions that may affect them and their well-being, whether in their home, community, school, or in legal and administrative matters. Ensuring children’s right to express their views on matters relevant to them is a key objective of the European Union. Children’s participation can take many forms, in ways that are adapted to their age and maturity; for instance they can express their views through writing and speech but also through painting and drawing. The upcoming European elections in June 2024 further highlight the importance of engaging children in the EU’s democratic processes. Four Member States (Belgium, Germany, Malta and Austria) allow their 16-year-old citizens to vote.

Stakeholders call for more extensive consultations with children while stressing the need to make policy and decision making in areas concerning children both accessible and child-friendly. An open and inclusive consultation would provide children with the opportunity to contribute to the definition of new policy priorities and to the evaluation and revision of existing measures.

This briefing looks at the international and EU policy framework relevant to children’s participation in democratic life. It also gives practical examples of how this participation is enabled through local youth parliaments, municipal children’s councils and ad hoc consultations.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Children’s participation in the democratic life of the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

On 7 March 2024, the President of the United States (US), Joe Biden, used his State of the Union (SOTU) address to a joint session of the 118th US Congress (2023‑2024) to start his re‑election campaign in earnest. Biden has been trailing Donald Trump, his only remaining Republican challenger in the presidential race, in polls in six swing states that Biden won in 2020 and where several thousand voters are expected to decide the outcome of the US elections on 5 November 2024. The SOTU was an opportunity for the President to tout his achievements and set out his vision for a second term in stark contrast to that of Trump, whom he referred to as his ‘predecessor’ rather than by name. With his age seen by many as a liability, Biden’s performance seemed more relevant than the substance of his speech, and was widely perceived as a forceful demonstration of his readiness to fight.

Background

President Biden delivered his 2024 SOTU address against the backdrop of severe global security challenges and a domestic audience that is deeply and increasingly divided over both domestic and foreign policy priorities. Throughout 2023, Republicans in the House of Representatives were engulfed in infighting, ousting former Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R‑California) and replacing him with Mike Johnson (R‑Louisiana), but passing only a scant number of bills. The 118th Congress therefore risks becoming the most unproductive in modern history. Reagan‑era Republicans who believe in the benefits of US leadership in the world and of supporting Ukraine against Russia have largely been side‑lined by Trump‑era Republicans eager to divert US funds away from Europe and towards the Indo‑Pacific or towards bolstering security at home.

State of the Union address
The SOTU address is mandated by the US Constitution, which in Article II dictates that the President ‘shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient’. From 1790 to 1946, the speech was referred to as the ‘Annual Message’, and since 1947, it has been known as the SOTU address. Over time, both its content and form have changed, with some presidents choosing to present the address in writing.

This ideological shift has recently also reverberated in the Senate. In response to President Biden’s 2023 emergency supplemental funding request for key national security priorities in 2024, which included appropriations for Israel, Taiwan, Ukraine, border security and humanitarian aid for Gaza and Ukraine, the Senate negotiated a bipartisan border security and immigration package that ultimately failed to pass because of election politics. Speaker Johnson stated that the bill would be ‘dead on arrival‘ in the House. However, on 13 February 2024, the Senate passed (70-29) the National Security Act (H.R. 815), which includes US$60 billion for Ukraine but is devoid of border security provisions. Speaker Johnson has not brought the amended bill to the House floor, calling it a ‘status quo‘ bill that lacks the provisions of the House Republican‑spearheaded Secure Our Border Act (H.R. 2). (NB: five days after the SOTU, House Democrats launched a rare ‘discharge petition‘ which, if it receives enough signatures, would force the Speaker to bring the bill to the floor. Its outcome remains uncertain.) Amid Trump’s tightening grip on the Republican Party, the longest‑serving Republican Senate leader, Mitch McConnell (R‑Kentucky), who has been a strong advocate of US support for Ukraine, announced that he would step down from his position in November. As Biden gave his address, Ukraine funding continued to be blocked in the House, with border security becoming a politically charged campaign topic, Republican support for Ukraine steadily diminishing, and new conflicts (Gaza) and other flash‑points (Taiwan Strait) capturing Americans’ attention.

Foreign policy: Ukraine, Gaza, Red Sea and China

Whereas US foreign policy played a marginal role in the 2023 SOTU, Biden’s 2024 SOTU featured prominent references to the need for the US to support Ukraine, the US response to the Hamas‑Israel conflict and the Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea, and US policy on China. In a departure from the traditional SOTU structure, Biden began by addressing foreign policy, comparing the current reality with the ‘unprecedented moment’ in US history that President Franklin Roosevelt faced when he delivered his 1941 ‘Four Freedoms Speech‘ to Congress as war raged in Europe. Biden framed his SOTU as a similar effort to ‘wake up the Congress and alert the American people’ that ‘freedom and democracy are under attack, both at home and overseas’. In a swipe at Trump, he made an energetic and passionate case for US leadership in the world, continued US support for Ukraine, and for speaking the truth and burying the lies about the ‘stolen’ 2020 elections and the 6 January 2021 attack on the US Capitol. He reminded Congress that ‘history is watching’ and urged it to pass the bipartisan National Security Bill, pledging that he would not bow down to Russia, unlike his predecessor who, Biden highlighted, said he would encourage Russia to do ‘whatever the hell they want‘ to NATO members that do not spend 2 % of their gross domestic product (GDP) on national defence. Biden welcomed Sweden to NATO and greeted Sweden’s Prime Minister, who was present in the Chamber as one of the President’s private SOTU guests.

Biden’s references to the Hamas‑Israel conflict were a delicate balancing act between affirming Israel’s right to pursue Hamas and reminding Israel that humanitarian assistance ‘cannot be a secondary consideration or a bargaining chip’ and that ‘protecting and saving innocent lives has to be a priority’. The President has drawn heavy criticism for his strong backing of Israel after the October 2023 massacre and hostage‑taking by Hamas and for failing to obtain a ceasefire to ease the suffering of innocent Palestinians in Gaza. Many Arab and Muslim Americans and young progressive voters in key swing states voted ‘uncommitted‘ in recent primaries, rather than for Biden. Biden, while not able to announce a ceasefire, stated that he would be directing the US military ‘to lead an emergency mission to establish a temporary pier in the Mediterranean on the Gaza coast that can receive large ships carrying food, water, medicine and temporary shelters’. The pier would complement ongoing US airdrops of humanitarian aid packages. The day after the SOTU, the activation of the Cyprus maritime corridor – a joint effort of the EU, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the US – was endorsed.

Regarding the Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea, Biden stated that he had ‘built a coalition of more than a dozen countries (Operation Prosperity Guardian) to defend international shipping and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea’ and had ‘ordered strikes to degrade Houthi capabilities and defend U.S. forces in the region’. With China, Biden emphasised that the US seeks competition, not conflict, underscoring that his China policy has been more successful than that of his predecessor. Countering assertions that the US is falling behind China, he stressed the strong US GDP, the US trade deficit with China being at its lowest point in over 10 years, US measures taken against China’s unfair economic practices and to prevent the most advanced US technologies being used in Chinese weapons, US promotion of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and the bolstered US partnerships and alliances in the Indo‑Pacific.

Domestic policy: Health, education, tax fairness and voting and labour rights

Biden showcased his accomplishments in terms of numbers of jobs and infrastructure projects created and the volume of private investments in manufacturing and research. As many Americans believe they were better off under Trump, Biden touted the strong economic recovery from COVID‑19, GDP growth, declining inflation and lower prescription drug costs seen during his administration. He set out a laundry list of initiatives for a second term, each time needling Republicans over positions he believes are backwards rather than future-oriented. Notably, he bolstered his case for fixing the immigration system by calling out Trump’s demonising statement that immigrants ‘poison the blood of our country‘. His plans address extremely divisive subjects such as defending reproductive freedom (including abortion rights and in vitro fertilisation, topics set to once again play a major role in mobilising the electoral power of women), extending caps on prescription drug costs and making tax credits for healthcare premiums permanent. He announced plans to use tax credits to lower mortgage rates, to build and renovate affordable homes, to provide access to pre‑school for three and four year‑olds, to make college more affordable, to restore the child tax credit, to raise the corporate minimum tax from 15 % to at least 21 % and to introduce a minimum tax of 25 % for billionaires now paying 8.2 %. He called on Congress to pass a bill to transform women’s health research, to pass the Shrinkflation Prevention Act to crack down on price gouging and deceptive pricing, and to finally pass the Freedom to Vote Act, the John Lewis Voting Rights Act, the Equality Act, the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act and a ban on assault weapons. Commentators noted the SOTU’s ‘far feistier tone‘ designed ‘to prove his doubters wrong by flashing his combative side’, and how he at times went off‑script to respond to hecklers and jokingly tackled concerns about his age. Fact checking of his figures revealed most of them to be accurate, although some claims were found to lack context.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘President Biden’s 2024 State of the Union address‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marc Jütten with Dorothee Falkenberg.

On 1 January 2024, BRICS – the intergovernmental organisation comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – admitted four new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The group’s decision to open the door to new members was taken at its Johannesburg summit in August 2023, sparking a debate about its growing international influence.

According to estimates, BRICS+, as the organisation has been informally called since its expansion, now accounts for 37.3 % of world GDP, or more than half as much as the EU (14.5 %). However, besides an increase in economic power the new members could bring potential conflicts (Saudi Arabia/Iran or Egypt/Ethiopia) into the group, making the reaching of consensus on common political positions more difficult.

Since the new members would only contribute roughly 4 % to the group’s cumulative GDP, the significance of the expansion should be seen beyond the purely economic effect, in the form of greater influence for the group and for developing countries as a whole within international organisations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods institutions.

The EU engages with BRICS+ countries individually. For instance, it has strategic partnerships with Brazil, India and South Africa, and is negotiating a free trade agreement with India. On the other hand, current conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza show the divergent approaches to security taken by the EU and BRICS+.

The European Parliament has stressed that further political dialogue with the BRICS countries is needed, including on an individual basis. In an exchange of views with European Commission representatives in October 2023, Members of the Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) underlined the need to keep an eye on the group’s expansion, especially considering the effect of a potential BRICS+ currency and the consequences for EU trade policy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Expansion of BRICS: A quest for greater global influence?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

‘This is Europe’ – an initiative proposed by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola – consists of a series of debates with EU leaders to discuss their visions for the future of the European Union. The trilogy of resilience, competitiveness and security was at the centre of the vision of Europe that the Prime Minister of Finland, Petteri Orpo, shared with the European Parliament on 13 March 2024. Regarding competitiveness, he mentioned the single market, State aid, trade and economic governance. On security, he argued that the concept not only included security and defence, but also border protection and preparedness to make the EU more resilient. Orpo also emphasised that, for Finland, ‘the EU is the most important political and economic frame of reference and community of values’, and stressed that EU leaders had to ‘fight against any pessimism and show an example and leadership’.

We now find ourselves at a key moment in history, one that calls for our courage, unity, and determination.  

Petteri Orpo Background

Roberta Metsola launched the ‘This is Europe’ initiative shortly after her election as President of the European Parliament in January 2022. Petteri Orpo is the 13th EU leader to have addressed the Parliament since its Conference of Presidents endorsed the initiative on 28 April 2022. A similar Parliament initiative, ahead of the 2019 European elections, saw 20 EU leaders speak in Parliament’s plenary sessions about their views on the future of Europe. A 2019 EPRS analysis of the future of Europe debates pinpointed the similarities and differences in EU leaders’ views.

Figure 1 – Time devoted by Petteri Orpo to various topics in his speech. Source: EPRS.

The ‘This is Europe’ initiative is particularly relevant in the context of the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), and the preparations for the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. The CoFoE produced 49 proposals on the EU’s future policies and functioning (see the EPRS overview), including more than 300 measures by which they might be achieved. Research by EPRS has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council, as expressed in the latter’s Strategic Agenda 2019 2024 and its conclusions.

On the initiative of European Council President Charles Michel, EU leaders have started the reflection process on the priorities for the next institutional cycle, which will lead to the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. The first step in the reflection process was a discussion at the informal European Council meeting in Granada on 5‑6 October 2023. The second step entailed a series of meetings, each with a small number of EU leaders representing a mix of geographical regions in the EU, political party affiliations and diversity of opinion. Four meetings have taken place to date, on 13 November in Berlin, 14 November in Copenhagen, 16 November in Zagreb, and 29 November in Paris. Another series of small group meetings will take place in early April, ahead of the special European Council meeting on 17-18 April.

Main focus of Petteri Orpo’s speech

Orpo covered a number of topics in his speech to Parliament (see Figure 1), devoting most attention to i) security and defence, ii) the war in Ukraine, iii) EU resilience, and iv) climate.

Security and defence

In Orpo’s view, ‘we are living in a time where practically all policy fields are linked to our security, and without security, we cannot ensure a prosperous future for Europe’. Security and defence is an important pillar of ‘European comprehensive security’, and the Finnish Prime Minister sees the strengthening of the EU’s defence industry as ‘priority number one’. He called on Member States to pool their resources.

War in Ukraine

Prime Minister Orpo stressed that the war in Ukraine threatened the very principles on which the European Union was built. He reiterated that agreeing unanimously on the EU’s Ukraine Facility had been crucial, and called on Member States to strengthen the support for Ukraine so that it can win this war, while at the same time enhancing the EU’s own defence capabilities. The next step is to deliver swiftly on ammunition production and to agree on additional funding for the European Peace Facility and Ukraine Assistance Fund.

EU resilience

For Orpo, the EU and its Member States must be better prepared for a growing number of increasingly complex crises. Therefore, he proposed that the Commission should develop an EU strategy for a ‘Preparedness Union’. This strategy should be based on a whole-of-society approach, in which the needs and contributions of all policy sectors are taken into account.

Climate

Orpo stressed that the EU should combat climate change and support biodiversity in a way that acknowledges the diverse circumstances across the Member States. In his view, a technology-neutral, cost-effective clean transition will pave the way for sustainable growth. He called for the EU’s climate policy to be recalibrated in the next institutional cycle, moving away from overly detailed regulation to fostering innovation.

Specific proposals and positions

Prime Minister Orpo used the opportunity to present his views on how the European Union should advance in specific areas, summarised below.

Policy issuePriority action and proposals (quotes)Economic governance‘We must also utilise existing instruments more effectively. This means reforming the next MFF and seeking more financial resources from the markets, for example through the EIB and by developing the Capital Markets Union.’State aid‘It is crucial that we restore the normal State aid rules. A healthy single market benefits all European citizens and businesses – today and in the long term.’Trade policy‘If we want to be globally relevant, we need a better ability to conclude, ratify and implement trade deals, not a better ability to bring them down.’Competitiveness‘We must build our competitiveness by developing our strengths, and through market-based solutions, with a fully functioning internal market at the core.’Innovation and research‘We must foster innovation and skills, strengthen our internal market, and ensure significant funding for innovation and research.’Table 1 – Specific proposals made by Petteri Orpo, by policy area

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Petteri Orpo, Prime Minister of Finland, 13 March 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Colin Murphy.

Cybercrime is a major threat to society that generates billions of euros for its perpetrators. It is a form of crime that is continuing to grow, with criminals showing increasing sophistication and resourcefulness. These criminal activities occur at all levels of society and take many forms, from investment fraud to phishing and the creation of bogus entities, including fake charities.

The rise in the use of digital solutions for everyday activities in business and public services is matched by the number of digital devices being used by citizens. People are now connecting to numerous digital accounts and are spending more time online than ever before. Coupled with this, cyberattacks and digital scams are on the rise. Not only is the number of incidents growing, but the complexity and the subsequent negative impact is also increasing.

Cybercrime can be relatively simple in appearance, such as spurious emails and text messages, or complex, involving a number of actors spreading malicious content through entire business or public service systems in order to block access for ransom purposes or to disable critical entities for ideological reasons.

The EU is active in tackling cybersecurity and cybercrime, as demonstrated by its cybersecurity strategy. It has a number of pieces of legislation in place or in the pipeline to tackle vulnerabilities, increase the resilience of essential services and address associated cybersecurity risks. Likewise, EU agencies are proactively dealing with the threat posed by cybercrime by supporting Member States and stakeholders in addressing emerging threats and strengthening resilience.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding cybercrime‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

Is the EU facing a migration crisis? Are the EU’s borders on the brink of collapse because of increased irregular migration? Would border fences help to stop or reduce irregular migration? How many of the world’s refugees and asylum seekers are headed towards the EU? Are the protection claims of asylum seekers genuine, or is subterfuge used to gain access to the EU? And what happened with the Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war into the EU? These are among the most common and important questions shaping the current discussion around migration and borders in the EU.

This briefing provides an overview of key trends and figures on migration, borders and asylum in the EU. The analysis critically situates these topics in the broader global and historical context, providing a synthetic, data‑rich and accessible presentation of major issues.

The analysis leads to several interesting findings that may challenge common perceptions about migration and borders in the EU, including the following.

• The majority of migrants enter the EU through legitimate legal channels.
• Most irregular migrants do not cross the EU’s external borders irregularly.
• There are significantly more legal migrants than irregular migrants in the EU.
• Building fences at the EU’s external borders does not seem to reduce irregular entries.
• The view of a dramatic increase in the number of migrants and refugees is contested.
• The EU’s share of the world’s refugees and asylum seekers remains limited.
• Reducing or stopping immigration would worsen the EU’s demographic challenges.
• The EU’s temporary protection scheme showed the Union’s capacity to provide protection swiftly to a significant number of people in need.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU migration and borders: Key facts and figures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Global refugee population Refugees as a share of population (in %) The EU’s refugee population The EU’s share of world’s refugees (in %) Protection status and EU citizenship acquisitions by Syrian nationals (in thousands) Applications for international protection submitted in the EU Asylum applications and recognition rates in the Member States – 2013 2022 Beneficiaries of temporary protection in the EU (in millions) Fences at the EU’s external borders (in km) Border fences and irregular entries at the EU’s external land borders Dead and missing at the EU’s sea borders International migrants Stock of international migrants by main region of origin (in millions) Stock of international migrants by main region of destination (in millions) EU citizens and non EU citizens living in the EU (in millions) Lawful immigrants and detections of irregular entries (in millions) EU population projections (in millions) Visa access to the EU EU visas issued at Member States’ consulates (in millions) Visa verifications in the VIS and detections of irregular entries (in millions) Irregular entries in the EU and the US (in millions) Detections of irregular entries and refused entries at EU borders (in millions) Third country nationals found to be illegally present in the EU (in millions)

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Among the highlights of the March 2024 plenary session were the debates on preparation of the European Council meeting on 21 and 22 March 2024; the need to address urgent concerns regarding Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia, and the need to ensure the stability of EU agricultural production and impose sanctions on imports of Russian and Belarussian food and agricultural products to the EU. Members also debated the return of Romanian national treasure illegally appropriated by Russia.

Other important debates took place, inter alia, on: deteriorating living conditions in the EU; a healthy lifestyle and active ageing; the inclusion of the right to abortion in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, rising anti-LGBTIQ rhetoric and violence; and EU climate risk assessment. Members also discussed the annual designation of European capitals for children, and the Commission’s treatment of requests for public access to documents.

Representatives of the world cup-winning Spanish women’s national football team participated in Parliament’s official celebration to mark International Women’s Day. The last ‘This is Europe’ debate for this term followed a speech by Petteri Orpo, Prime Minister of Finland.

Revising financial rules, and guidelines for the 2025 EU budget

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on changes to the EU’s financial rules. The new rules are needed to align with changes in the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), aimed at ensuring more transparent, digital and value-based EU funding. Members also debated and adopted Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget, which the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) insists should be people-centred, prioritising investment that improves people’s lives and EU competitiveness. The adopted guidelines set Parliament’s position ahead of the Commission’s adoption of the draft 2025 budget, which will be debated in Parliament in the new term.

Protecting our environment Green claims

Parliament debated and voted a report at first reading on a proposal to regulate ‘green claims‘. The report from the Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) sets a timescale for verification of environmental claims and labelling schemes, which must be tailored to the complexity of the claim and company size.

Waste Framework Directive

Members adopted at first reading a proposal aimed at accelerating the fight against food waste and pushing textile producers to act to reduce clothing waste, by amending the Waste Framework Directive. The ENVI committee report on the proposal seeks to raise binding reduction targets in food processing and manufacturing to 20 % by 2030, and to 40 % per capita in retail, catering, food services and households.

Industrial pollution

The Industrial Emissions Directive sets rules on industrial pollution in the EU, including from industrial farming. Members adopted a provisional political agreement to update these rules. The ENVI committee succeeded in substantially amending the proposal, to include mining and battery production, placing ‘best available technique’ principles at the heart of granting permits, and setting binding environmental performance limit values for water. However, to lighten the administrative burden, governments must put e-permitting in place by 2035. ENVI Members also successfully introduced a 2026 deadline to reassess the need to address cattle farm emissions (currently excluded), and those from imported agricultural products.

Protecting EU businesses and consumers Compulsory licensing of patents

Members voted at first reading on a proposal to clarify rules on the compulsory licensing of patents. The Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) report proposes a number of changes, including that voluntary agreements should have greater priority than compulsory licensing, and licensees, not the rights-holder, should be responsible for any liability linked to a product. The Commission should have to identify all rights-holders, who would be paid for compulsory licences used within a set timeframe. When necessary, the Commission should compel rights-holders to disclose (against remuneration) trade secrets and know-how.

Toy safety

The EU Toy Directive helps to ensure toys sold in the EU are safe for our children. Members voted on an IMCO committee first-reading report that seeks to reduce the number of unsafe toys still sold in the EU. IMCO wishes to see digital product passports available for 10 years, for example, and linked to the Safety Gate Portal – allowing us all to report risks. The committee also proposes that the Commission provide small businesses with assistance to comply with the stricter toy safety rules.

EU customs

A central EU customs authority could offer traders lower compliance costs and ensure a more efficient, fraud-proof customs union. Members voted at first reading on proposals to establish an EU customs data hub and an EU customs authority. While the IMCO report on the file is generally supportive of the proposal, it would like to see a swifter process and a platform allowing everyone to report non-compliant goods.

Product design

Members adopted a provisional agreement on two files seeking stronger protection for product design against counterfeiting. Endorsed by the JURI committee, the agreement should future-proof design protection, protect registered designs for five years, renewable to a maximum 25 years (for a fee), liberalise the spare parts market, and give EU governments three years to transpose the EU rules into national law.

Protecting our democracy and the rule of law Media freedom act

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on a regulation setting the first-ever EU rules on media freedom, pluralism and protecting journalists – the European media freedom act. Under the new rules, governments must respect editorial freedom and exempt journalists from identifying their sources. Media companies will have to make their ownership structures public, and EU countries will investigate cases where media outlets become too concentrated. To protect journalists from government spying, Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) succeeded in eliminating ‘protecting national security’ as grounds for surveillance and ensured that all public authorities have to publish information about their annual advertising expenditure, including online.

Penalties for violating EU sanctions

Parliament adopted a political agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for violating EU sanctions, such as arms embargoes. The agreed text envisages criminalising the commission of certain crimes involving serious negligence and maintains fines proposed by the Council at 1 % or 5 % of companies’ total worldwide turnover (or €8 million or €40 million respectively), a choice left to Member States.

Freezing and confiscation of criminal money

Europol estimates the proceeds from organised crime in Europe at around €139 billion per year. Little of this money is confiscated. Members adopted a provisional agreement, reached after three rounds of trilogue negotiations with the Council, on a directive covering freezing and confiscation of criminal money. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) proposed a wider scope for the directive and to use confiscated property in the public interest.

Protecting our freedom of movement Cross-border associations

Parliament has long called for EU rules to help non-profit organisations to operate freely across borders. Members debated and voted at first reading on a JURI committee report, which although largely in favour of the Commission’s proposal, highlights the need for stricter definitions in regulating cross-border associations, and for such associations to be treated in the same way as other non-profits. LIBE Members propose that a minimum of three people should sit on their boards, and that such organisations should also pledge respect for European values, with funding blocked for those who breach them.

European Maritime Safety Agency

Members considered and voted at first reading on a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report on a proposal to revise the framework of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), assigning it new roles on safety and sustainability and providing the means to carry out these revised objectives. The TRAN committee wants to see EMSA supervise European coast guard cooperation, support inspection training, monitor suspicious behaviour around pipelines and carry out other new functions.

Question time – EU governments’ preparedness to combat foreign interference, including from Russia

Věra Jourová (Vice-President of the Commission) answered Members’ questions on the EU preparedness to combat foreign interference, an increasing phenomenon, particularly in the light of Russia’s attempts to undermine support for Ukraine, as well as cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns in the run-up to the European elections.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from the Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Budgets (BUDG) committees, on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, was approved without vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – March 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Claudia Vinci (1st edition).

In December 2023, the Commission presented a proposal on the protection of animals during transport, with a view to replacing and updating Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005.

This proposal, along with another on welfare and traceability of dogs and cats, is part of a legislative package to reform the current EU rules on animal welfare. The reform was announced in 2020 with the launch of the ‘farm to fork’ strategy, which aims to create a fairer, healthier and more environmentally friendly food system.

The proposed text introduces stricter rules regarding travel times, the minimum space between animals, transport conditions for vulnerable animals, transportation in extreme temperatures, safeguarding of animals transported to third countries, the utilisation of technological systems and the protection of cats and dogs in commercial transport.

In the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) and to the Committee of Transport and Tourism (TRAN), with Daniel Buda (EPP, Romania) and Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg (Greens/EFA, Germany) as co-rapporteurs.

Complete version

• March 2024: ‘Review of the rules on the protection of animals during transport‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of animals during transport and related operations, amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005Committee responsible:Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI)
Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2023)770
7/12/2023Rapporteur:Daniel Buda (EPP, Romania)
Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg (Greens/EFA, Germany)2023/0448(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Benoît Lutgen (EPP, Belgium)
Marianne Vind (S&D, Denmark)
Elsi Katainen (Renew, Finland)
Rosanna Conte (ID, Italy)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Antonio Albaladejo, Laurence Amand-Eeckhout, Pieter Baert, Anna Caprile, Polona Car, Micaela Del Monte, Clément Evroux, Liselotte Jensen, Monika Kiss, Silvia Kotanidis, Tarja Laaninen, Katrien Luyten, Rafal Manko, Hendrik Mildebrath, Maria Niestadt, Marketa Pape, Marianna Pari, Jakub Przetacznik, Magdalena Sapala, Rosamund Shreeves and Jaan Soone.

As the only European Union (EU) institution elected directly, the European Parliament is at the heart of representative democracy, the foundation upon which the EU is built. As the current – 2019 to 2024 – term wraps up, this paper from EPRS looks at a selection of the many achievements of the Parliament over the past five years in seeking to improve the European Union for its citizens. This term has not lacked for challenges, with an unprecedented pandemic closely followed by war on the EU’s eastern border, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Union, with Parliament frequently in the lead, has developed strong responses to these extraordinary challenges.

Parliament’s power and influence have evolved significantly over the years, and it is now a fully fledged legislative body whose influence is felt in virtually all areas of EU activity. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law‑making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. In recent months, the European Parliament has engaged in a process of reform, seeking to enable it to use these various powers more effectively and efficiently.

Parliament has been influential in shaping a range of new laws this term, including the Digital Services Act and the IRIS2 Regulation. Agricultural policy has seen reform, and major environmental legislation has been adopted, in the shape of the European Climate Law and the ‘fit for 55’ package. Responding to the pandemic, Parliament has focused on health. In the context of promoting democratic values, meanwhile, Parliament was able to shape key aspects of the Media Freedom Act and the directive addressing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

Since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Parliament has played a key role in the EU’s response, including: several rounds of macro-financial assistance, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, and the Ukraine Facility. In external relations, however, Parliament’s real power often lies more in the area of agenda-setting.

Another important set of European Parliament prerogatives concerns the scrutiny and control of the executive, in particular the European Commission. Prominent examples of scrutiny work over the last five years have been the committee of inquiry on the Pegasus spyware scandal, successive special committees on tax scandals, culminating in creation of the new subcommittee on tax matters (FISC), and the working group scrutinising the activities of Frontex, the Border and Coast Guard Agency.

Since Parliament gave its consent in 2020 to the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021 to 2027, the Union has had to respond to huge challenges, including the economic fall-out from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine. Parliament has pushed for reforms, and has focused on the implementation of the Next Generation EU recovery instrument.

In the constitutional field, Parliament has sought to use its powers to uphold the EU’s values, for instance triggering a preventive mechanism in respect of the serious breach of EU values with regard to Hungary. The 2020 Conference on the Future of Europe meanwhile offered citizens the opportunity to help Parliament fine-tune recommendations for Treaty change.

Lastly, the power to set the EU agenda is a thread that runs through all Parliament’s work as a forum for debate and engagement. Stand-out examples during this term include the Parliament’s work on the forthcoming artificial intelligence act, and in the area of a minimum wage and minimum income. Parliament’s constitutional powers include appointments of people to certain senior positions in other EU institutions. Even when its opinions are not legally binding they allow it to exercise political leverage. This point was proved with the appointment in 2019 of the first European Chief Prosecutor.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024 – Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

Written by Gisela Grieger.

The EU adheres to a one-China policy that recognises the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legitimate government of China. It does not therefore maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The EU nonetheless shares with Taiwan common interests and values, including democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The general elections held in Taiwan in January 2024 once again testified to the maturity of the island’s democracy. The EU engages Taiwan in a number of policy areas, notably on trade and investment. In its resolutions, the European Parliament has, among other things, called repeatedly for closer cooperation with Taiwan, notably for the negotiation of agreements on supply chain resilience and bilateral investment relations.

Outcome of the January 2024 general elections in Taiwan

On 13 January 2024, the Taiwanese elected a new president from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for a third consecutive term, with robust voter turnout of almost 72 %. The DPP presidential candidate, Lai Ching-te, who has pledged to continue his predecessor’s non-confrontational approach to mainland China and has argued that Taiwan already enjoys de facto independence, will take over from his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, in whose cabinet he has served as Vice-President. He will be sworn in on 20 May 2024. Lai secured 40 % of the votes, down from the 57 % that marked Tsai’s 2020 landslide re-election victory, in a three-way race against opposition candidates Hou Yu-ih from the Kuomintang (KMT) and Ko Wen-je from the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who garnered 33 % and 26 % of the votes respectively after their failed joint ticket.

Seat distribution changes in the Legislative Yuan (2016-2024)

In the 2024 legislative elections, for the first time since 2004 no party has obtained the absolute majority, as the DPP lost its previous absolute majority of 61 seats in the unicameral Legislative Yuan, which has 113 seats (Figure 1). With 51 seats, it is now only the second-largest party. By contrast, the KMT increased its seats from 38 to 52, becoming the largest party. The TPP now holds eight seats and KMT-leaning Independents two seats. It is also worth noting that all other small parties have lost their seats. For now, the resulting hung parliament has turned the TPP, who gained a mere three seats, into a kingmaker and vital coalition partner for the DPP or the KMT to avoid legislative gridlock and to help shape cross-strait relations and thereby US-China relations, around one of the world’s major geopolitical flash points. On 1 February 2024, when Taiwan’s new legislative term began, Han Kuo-yu from the KMT was elected president of the Legislative Yuan.

EU policy towards Taiwan and EU-Taiwan cooperation

The EU pursues a one-China policy, which means that it recognises the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China and does not have official ties with Taiwan. The 2021 EU Indo-Pacific strategy references Taiwan with respect to the impact of the growing geopolitical tensions in the Taiwan Strait for the EU’s security and prosperity, to existing cooperation on data protection and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and to new opportunities on trade and investment and semiconductors to tackle supply chain vulnerabilities. The EU is represented in Taiwan through its European Economic and Trade Office, which reports annually on bilateral activities. The EU holds annual human rights consultations with Taiwan. In 2021, the bilateral trade consultations were upgraded to a trade and investment dialogue that oversees bilateral sectoral working groups on investment, intellectual property rights, sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures, technical barriers to trade and pharmaceuticals/cosmetics. The dialogue provides a forum to discuss renewable energy, digital trade facilitation, research and innovation and other topics of common interest.

EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations EU-Taiwan trade in goods and services, in € billion

According to Eurostat data (Figure 2), bilateral trade in goods decreased from €84.3 billion in 2022 to €77.6 billion in 2023 amid contracting global trade. EU imports from Taiwan shrunk from €49.2 billion to €47.1 billion and EU exports to Taiwan from €35.1 billion to €30.5 billion. In 2023, the EU ran a trade in goods deficit with Taiwan of €16.6 billion, up from €14.1 billion in 2022. In 2022, major Taiwanese export items to the EU were integrated circuits and electronic components (23 %), transport equipment (10.7 %) and electronic data processing and office equipment (10.6 %). The main EU export items to Taiwan were non-electrical machinery (32.7 %), transport equipment (15.5 %) and chemicals (15.4 %). According to Eurostat service trade data as of February 2024, in 2022 the EU and Taiwan traded services worth €18 billion, up from €13.9 billion in 2021.

EU-Taiwan FDI, stocks, outward and inward, in € billion

In 2022, EU foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks in Taiwan stood at €28.4 billion after steady growth from €6.8 billion back in 2013 (Figure 3). Taiwan’s FDI stocks in the EU remained at a low level between 2013 and 2019, ranging from €0.9 billion to €2.4 billion, but leapt in 2020 to €12 billion and again in 2022 to €20.7 billion. Recent examples of Taiwanese investment projects in the EU include a €3.5 billion investment in a semiconductor foundry in Dresden (Germany) by the world’s largest contract chipmaker, TSMC, and the investment of more than €5 billion in a battery plant in Dunkirk (France) by Prologium, the world’s only successful commercial manufacturer of solid-state electric vehicle batteries.

Since 2002, Taiwan has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with the status of a customs territory. It has never been the respondent in a WTO case, but has lodged a total of seven complaints against other WTO members, including one (DS377) against the EU in 2008 concerning the EU’s tariff treatment of certain information technology products under its commitments made under the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA). The most recent WTO trade policy review report on Taiwan was drawn up in 2023. Unlike the PRC, Taiwan is a party to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.

Although the EU has never launched a WTO complaint against Taiwan, the European Commission nonetheless lists a total of six trade barriers for Taiwan in its database, including local content requirements in public procurement for transport, localisation requirements for wind energy and several SPS measures pertaining to various animal diseases, including the non-recognition of the regionalisation principle.

In its resolution of 28 February 2024, the European Parliament ‘reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region’. It ‘strongly condemns China’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which endangers regional stability’. It ‘calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs’. It ‘highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law’. It ‘notes that neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other’. It ‘expresses grave concern over China’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance’. It ‘denounces China’s blocking of Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations’. Finally, it ‘welcomes the visits to Taiwan, since 2021, by consecutive official delegations from Parliament committees’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-Taiwan ties after Taiwan’s 2024 elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Parliament to vote against EU political and economic agreements with Chile and Kenya, with many people writing to the President of the European Parliament on this subject in March 2024. These citizens are concerned that the agreements would be detrimental to local populations and environmental protection. They demand that Parliament review the EU’s trade policy.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French):

English

On 29 February 2024, the European Parliament approved EU agreements with Kenya and Chile.

On Parliament’s website, you can find the results of the votes. To display them, click on the + to the left of the headings (points 1, 4 and 5). The votes are sorted into three groups: in favour (+), against (-) and abstentions (0), and are listed by political group. At the top of the page, you can filter the results by political group, country or Member of the European Parliament (MEP).

The European Commission negotiates EU international agreements on the instructions of the Council of the EU (the governments of member countries). At the end of the negotiations, the Council adopts the agreement. Parliament’s role is then limited to approving or rejecting the agreement. It has no power to amend it.

The President of the European Parliament cannot influence Members’ votes. In accordance with Article 2 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, Members exercise their mandate freely and independently.

You may also be interested in some additional information about the two agreements.

Agreements with Chile

In December 2023, the EU and Chile signed agreements to modernise and replace the 2002 Association Agreement that currently governs their relations.

The agreements establish a framework for deeper and broader political and economic cooperation with Chile, for example on foreign affairs and security, climate change, sustainable energy and human rights.

Under the agreements, over 95 % of trade between the EU and Chile will be duty-free. However, trade restrictions will remain in place for the most sensitive agricultural products, notably meat, certain fruit and vegetables, and olive oil. More information is available in this press release.

The European Parliament voted on two separate agreements with Chile: an Interim Trade Agreement, which is ratified at EU-level only, and a broader agreement (Advanced Framework Agreement), which must also be ratified by every EU country. The Interim Trade Agreement will expire when the Advanced Framework Agreement enters into force.

Parliament also adopted a resolution explaining its position on these agreements.

Agreement with Kenya

In December 2023, the EU and Kenya signed an Economic Partnership Agreement, with the aim of boosting bilateral trade, increasing investment, contributing to sustainable economic growth and working towards a green transition away from fossil fuel use. The agreement focuses on climate and environmental protection, workers’ rights and gender equality.

This agreement will further open the European market to Kenyan products and encourage European investment in Kenya. It aims to strengthen the EU’s relations with Africa.

French

Le 29 février dernier, le Parlement européen a approuvé les accords UE-Kenya et UE-Chili.

Sur le site du Parlement, vous pouvez trouver les résultats des votes, en cliquant sur le + à gauche des titres (points 1, 4 et 5). Les voix sont classées en trois catégories : pour (+), contre (-) et abstention (0), et sont listés par groupe politique. En haut de la page, vous avez la possibilité de filtrer les résultats par groupe politique, par pays ou par député.

Les accords internationaux sont négociés par la Commission européenne sur instruction du Conseil de l’UE (gouvernements des pays membres). À l’issue des négociations, le Conseil adopte l’accord. Le rôle du Parlement se limite alors à approuver ou rejeter l’accord. Il n’a pas le pouvoir de le modifier.

Nous tenons à préciser que la Présidente du Parlement européen ne peut pas influencer le vote des députés européens. Conformément à l’article 2 du règlement intérieur du Parlement, les députés européens exercent leur mandat de façon libre et indépendante.

Par ailleurs, quelques informations supplémentaires par rapport aux deux accords pourraient vous intéresser.

Accords avec le Chili

En décembre 2023, l’UE et le Chili ont signé des accords en vue de moderniser et de remplacer l’accord d’association de 2002 qui régit actuellement leurs relations.

Les accords établissent le cadre d’une coopération politique et économique plus approfondie et plus étendue avec le Chili, par exemple dans les domaines des affaires étrangères et de la sécurité, du changement climatique, de l’énergie durable et des droits humains.

Plus de 95 % des échanges commerciaux entre l’UE et le Chili seront exemptées de droits de douane. Cependant, des restrictions commerciales demeureront en place pour les produits agricoles les plus sensibles, notamment la viande, certains fruits et légumes, et l’huile d’olive. Plus d’information est disponible dans ce communiqué de presse.

Le Parlement européen a voté sur deux accords distincts avec le Chili : un accord commercial intérimaire, qui doit être ratifié uniquement au niveau de l’UE, et un accord plus large (accord-cadre avancé), qui doit être également ratifié par chacun des pays de l’UE. L’accord commercial intérimaire expirera lorsque l’accord-cadre avancé entrera en vigueur.

Par ailleurs, le Parlement a adopté une résolution expliquant sa position sur les accords.

Accord avec le Kenya

En décembre 2023, l’UE et le Kenya ont signé un accord de partenariat économique, avec pour objectifs de stimuler le commerce bilatéral, augmenter les investissements, contribuer à une croissance économique durable, et œuvrer à la transition écologique. L’accord met l’accent sur la protection du climat et de l’environnement, les droits des travailleurs et l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.

Cet accord ouvrira davantage le marché européen aux produits kényans et encouragera les investissements européens au Kenya. Il vise à renforcer les relations de l’UE avec l’Afrique.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Parliament is set to mark International Women’s Day in Strasbourg this year, with a debate on the Council decision inviting EU countries to ratify the 2019 International Labour Organization’s Violence and Harassment Convention on Tuesday. A European Commission statement is expected on its communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews due for adoption that same day. There will also be a Question Time session at which the Commission is called to answer Members’ questions regarding EU governments’ action to combat foreign interference, including from Russia. On Tuesday morning, Members are set to hear Council and Commission statements on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 21 and 22 March 2024. The following day, Members are due to hold a ‘This is Europe’ debate – the last of this term – with the Prime Minister of Finland, Petteri Orpo.

In a debate expected on Tuesday afternoon, Members are set to consider a provisional agreement on changes to the EU’s financial rules. The new rules are needed to align with changes introduced by the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), aimed at ensuring more transparent, digital and value-based EU funding. Members will then debate Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget, which the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report insists should be people-centred, prioritising investment to improve people’s lives and EU competitiveness. The guidelines adopted will set out Parliament’s position ahead of the Commission’s adoption of the draft 2025 budget.

Protecting our environment

Most people today want to contribute to a more sustainable way of life, but the European Commission finds that unscrupulous firms take advantage of consumers. Fully 53 % of the environmental claims the Commission looked at in the EU were vague, misleading or unfounded, and 40 % were unsubstantiated. To counter this fraud, on Monday evening Parliament is due to debate a report on a proposal to regulate ‘green claims‘. The report from the Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) sets a timescale for verification of environmental claims and labelling schemes, which must be tailored to the complexity of the claim and company size. The committees consider the verification system should be simpler.

Despite our efforts, we still waste nearly 60 million tonnes of food a year in the EU – more than half of it at home. On Wednesday, Members are expected to vote on a proposal to accelerate the fight against food waste and push textile producers to act to reduce clothing waste, by amending the Waste Framework Directive. The ENVI committee report on the proposal would raise binding reduction targets to 20 % by 2030, in food processing and manufacturing, and to 40 % per capita in retail, catering, food services and households.

The Industrial Emissions Directive sets rules on industrial pollution in the EU, including from industrial farming. On Tuesday, Members are set to vote on a provisional political agreement to update the rules. The ENVI committee succeeded in substantially amending the proposal, to include mining and battery production, placing ‘best available technique’ principles at the heart of granting permits, and setting binding environmental performance limit values for water. However, to lighten the administrative burden, governments must put e-permitting in place by 2035. ENVI Members also successfully introduced a 2026 deadline to reassess the need to address cattle farm emissions (currently excluded), and those from imported agricultural products.

Protecting EU businesses and consumers

The EU Toy Directive helps to ensure toys sold in the EU are safe for our children. However, to improve this protection and reduce the number of unsafe toys still sold in the EU, the legislation is now up for revision. Members are set to consider an IMCO committee report on Wednesday afternoon, which seeks to make digital product passports available for 10 years, for example, and link them to the Safety Gate Portal – allowing us all to report risks. The committee also proposes that the Commission provide small businesses with assistance to comply with the stricter toy safety rules.

A central EU customs authority could offer traders lower compliance costs and ensure a more efficient, fraud-proof customs union. In a vote scheduled for Wednesday evening, Members are due to vote at first reading on proposals to establish an EU customs data hub and an EU customs authority. While the IMCO report on the file is generally supportive of the proposal, it would like to see a faster process and a platform allowing people to report non-compliant goods.

A vote on a political agreement, reached in trilogue negotiations with the Council on an EU design package, is scheduled for Thursday morning. The two files seek stronger protection for product design against counterfeiting in the EU. Endorsed by the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), the agreement should future-proof design protection, protect registered designs for five years, renewable to a maximum 25 years (for a fee), liberalise the spare parts market, and give EU governments three years to transpose the EU rules into national law.

In crises like the recent pandemic, it is particularly useful to help companies obtain licences to produce products subject to patents – for new technologies, for example. Members are set to vote on Wednesday at first reading on a proposal clarifying rules for the compulsory licensing of patents. A JURI committee report proposes a number of changes. Voluntary agreements should have greater priority than compulsory licensing, and licensees, not the rights-holder, should be responsible for any liability linked to the product. The Commission should have to identify all rights-holders, who would be paid for compulsory licences used within a set timeframe. When necessary, the JURI Members consider the Commission should compel rights-holders to disclose (against remuneration) trade secrets and know-how.

Protecting our democracy and the rule of law

In a year of elections, ensuring journalists and media services are free from political and economic interference is particularly urgent. On Tuesday, Members are set to debate a provisional agreement on a regulation setting the first-ever EU rules on media freedom, pluralism and protecting journalists – the European media freedom act. Under the new rules, governments must respect editorial freedom and exempt journalists from identifying their sources. Media companies will have to make their ownership structures public and EU countries will investigate cases where media outlets become too concentrated. To protect journalists from government spying, Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) succeeded in eliminating ‘protecting national security’ as grounds for surveillance and ensured that all public authorities have to publish information about their annual advertising expenditure, including online.

Europol estimates the proceeds from organised crime in Europe at around €139 billion per year. Little of this money is confiscated. On Wednesday, Members are set to vote on a provisional agreement, reached after three rounds of trilogue negotiations with the Council, on a directive covering freezing and confiscation of criminal money. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) proposed a wider scope for the directive and using confiscated property in the public interest. LIBE Members proposed Member States help freeze property to facilitate confiscation and that profiting from circumventing EU sanctions be treated as criminal gains. EU countries should also strengthen their asset recovery offices, including to deal with cross-border cases.

Parliament is set to vote on Tuesday on a political agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for violating EU sanctions, such as arms embargoes. The agreement, endorsed by the LIBE committee, envisages criminalising the commission of certain crimes involving serious negligence and maintains fines proposed by the Council at 1 % or 5 % of companies’ total worldwide turnover (or €8 million or €40 million respectively), a choice left to Member States.

Protecting our cross-border freedom

Parliament has long called for EU rules to facilitate non-profit organisations to operate freely across borders. Although largely in favour of the Commission’s proposal, a JURI committee report, set for debate on Tuesday afternoon, highlights the need for stricter definitions in regulating cross-border associations. Such associations should be treated in the same way as other non-profits. LIBE Members propose a minimum of three people should sit on their boards. Such organisations should also pledge respect for European values, with funding blocked for those who breach them.

Finally, on Monday evening, Members are set to consider a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report on a proposal to revise the framework of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), assigning new roles on safety and sustainability and providing the means to carry out these revised objectives. The TRAN committee wants to see EMSA supervise European coast guard cooperation, support inspection training, monitor suspicious behaviour around pipelines and carry out other new functions. The committee demands that EMSA involve Parliament in appointing its executive director and that a Parliament representative sit on the management board.

• European Parliament Plenary Session March 2024
• International Women’s Day: Women in politics in the 2024 election year
• Question time: EU national action to combat foreign interference, including from Russia
• EU’s financial rules (recast)
• Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget: Section III – European Commission
• ‘Green claims’ directive
• Toy safety
• Revised EU rules on industrial pollution
• European media freedom act
• Revised rules on the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)
• Compulsory licensing of patents
• Freezing and confiscation of criminal money
• Harmonisation of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of EU sanctions

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

The European automotive industry is striving to adapt to market changes driven by the dual green and digital transition. Electrification has become the main strategy for reducing CO2 emissions, especially in urban traffic. At the same time, the average size and weight of cars have greatly increased. Big electric cars are the trend, but are they really the solution? Could better planning and optimisation of resources help?

According to Eurostat, average passenger car occupancy for urban mobility is usually less than 1.3 persons. Therefore, it is very common in cities for heavy cars to carry a single person. To transport the weight of that one person (80 kilogrammes for instance) means moving a full 1 800 kg. This could even reach 2 500 kg for big electric or hybrid cars with heavy long-range batteries. No matter the source of power used, this can never lead to efficient and sustainable mobility. Weight rates are usually over 10 times more favourable for the average motorbike or scooter and, of course, even better for lighter vehicles such as electric bicycles or kick-scooters.

Reducing CO2 emissions in transport is a key goal of the European Green Deal. However, specifications for choosing a city car are often based on the rare long trips that would best be made with a rented vehicle. Meanwhile, traditional emissions tests using gas analysers focus on the percentage concentration of pollutants and overlook references to the total quantity. The low speed limits generally established in Europe today also help to reduce emissions. However, efforts to reduce emissions may be counteracted by a trend towards bigger sports utility vehicles (SUVs), which are less agile and efficient but more comfortable and useful for longer drives.

Some people find themselves spending long periods every day in traffic, so they see their cars as a prolongation of their living rooms, with comfortable seats, plenty of space and ‘infotainment’, including big screens. Large vehicles also account for longer traffic jams. When anti-lock braking systems (ABS) were first introduced in premium cars, accidents increased initially for that sector owing to driver over-confidence. The same effect is again being seen with modern driving assist systems. Since large vehicles are especially safe for their occupants at low speeds, this has a pernicious effect on driver attention, consequently increasing casualty figures for other road users. Every year there are fewer victims of car accidents – but not among pedestrians, cyclists and other light vehicle users. This translates into further restrictions on the use of light vehicles, then considered unsafe, to the point of banning e-scooters and restricting the use of motorbikes – while cars are allowed in crowded areas. An alternative way to interpret these casualty figures would be to consider large heavy cars a menace to other users of public thoroughfares.

The EU automotive sector has traditionally excelled at producing vehicles with internal combustion engines (ICEs). The sector accounts for around 8 % of the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) and for 12.9 million direct and indirect jobs. However, the green transition, digitalisation and global competition have fundamentally altered its business model. Electrification has become the main strategy for decarbonising the sector, mostly through the extensive use of critical raw materials such as lithium-ion batteries, which have to be quite large to propel big cars with extended ranges.

Potential impacts and developments

Japan has been restricting car size in crowded areas since 1949, with the popular ‘Kei’ cars representing 40 % of the Japanese car market today. This Japanese regulation began with strict limits that have since evolved to set engine capacity at a maximum of 660 cc, vehicle length at 3.4 metres and total weight at 700 kg. Car ownership in Tokyo is restricted to corresponding parking spaces, following the idea that public thoroughfares are for public use, not for people to use for their exclusive benefit.

The high level of European industry specialisation in producing high quality ICEs accounts for its leading position in the market. However, electric vehicles do not require the same level of know-how, opening the door to other players. China became the top global car exporter in 2023, exporting mostly to Europe and Asia. China also dominates production of almost every raw material, technology and component used to make electric vehicles. Batteries require very polluting production and recycling methods, and they need to be charged.

Given the current electricity mix and the optimistic figures available, the equivalent emissions of a large electric car in Europe are of about 4 litres/100 km – not significantly lower than the emissions from a small ICE car (or Kei car). This figure is an average that results from considering: a total equivalent rising from 84 grammes CO2/km for some (partisan) sources to 125 g CO2/km considering the charging process alone for others; and that petrol produces 2.3 kg of CO2 per litre burned (i.e. divided by 23 to convert gCO2/km to l/100 km). In terms of the efficiency in transporting one person, a simple moped could do far better, not to mention public transport. Battery production process emissions are usually underestimated, considering that China produced the highest CO₂ emissions in 2022, accounting for nearly 31 % of the global total.

Anticipatory policymaking

On 4 October 2023, the European Commission initiated anti-subsidy investigations into EU imports of battery electric vehicles from China and is already considering provisional countervailing tariffs for five years. Although replacing one means of propulsion with another is clearly not enough, modest size electric cars are undoubtedly part of the solution. Even so, most European companies still lag behind in electric vehicle innovation. A smooth transition to alternative propulsion methods should be based on securing access to affordable batteries and semiconductors, improving innovation capacities in new technologies, reducing costs, and adopting a more circular approach – particularly on critical raw materials.

No European compact car qualifies as a ‘Kei’ car. As a result, 40 % of the Japanese car market is closed to competition from European manufacturers, and this share is increasing. The European Union regulation classifying vehicle categories already accounts for light four-wheelers or microcars (L7) and could be extended to include considerations regarding preferential access to urban areas. The various EU emission limits, such as the new Euro 7 regulation, propose values in g/km (not just concentrations) and revise measuring standards. The EU adopted an amendment to the EU light-duty vehicles (LDV) CO2 standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in April 2023, in line with the EU’s increased climate ambition. In July 2023, the European Commission tabled a package of three proposals for the greening of freight transport. These include CountEmissionsEU, a proposal for a single methodology to calculate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, this only refers to transport services. The European Commission also added a proposal for a regulation addressing the whole life cycle of vehicles, from design to end-of-life. With a view to ending the trend towards ever bigger and heavier vehicles, the European Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism is considering a proposal to overhaul the EU’s 2006 agreement standardising driving licence rules between Member States.

Promoting electric cars may lead to market distortions that run counter to European industrial interests. While complementary measures such as those contemplated in the critical raw materials act take effect, and besides the obvious move towards public transport, one way to allow the EU car industry to adapt while still reducing CO2 emissions could be to limit the size, weight and engine capacity of urban vehicles. An improved vehicle-to-passenger weight rate could hugely increase energy efficiency in urban transport.

Since light vehicles are especially suited to electrification – as increased use of bicycles and scooters can attest – and other alternative propulsion methods, it may become appropriate to let the market and European industry adapt at its own pace, with some institutional encouragement and support, to such new conditions of improved mobility efficiency.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if the problem with cars was not their method of propulsion?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if the problem with cars was not their method of propulsion?‘ on YouTube.

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Written by Stefano De Luca.

The European Union needs high-performing digital connectivity infrastructure to give all citizens the best access to digital services and to maintain prosperity. In the relentless pursuit of innovation and connectivity, the development of mobile communications technologies has been a defining force in shaping the way we communicate, work, and live.

As the 2030s approach, the groundwork for the next frontier in mobile communications is being laid – the era of 6G. Building upon the successes and advances of previous mobile generations, 6G promises to revolutionise the connectivity landscape. From ultra-high data rates and low-latency communication to the integration of artificial intelligence, 6G is poised to reshape the way we interact with the digital world.

However, with the promise of unprecedented capabilities comes a host of challenges. Critical aspects that demand attention in the development of 6G networks are privacy and cybersecurity. As 6G aims to push the boundaries of connectivity, enabling innovations such as holographic communication, seamless extended reality, and the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) on a massive scale, the potential risks to privacy and cybersecurity are magnified (e.g. mass data collection). Another critical aspect is its environmental footprint. While 6G aims for energy efficiency, the increasing demand for data and connectivity may still pose challenges related to energy consumption. Balancing technological progress with environmental considerations remains a key objective for the development of 6G.

Countries and companies that lead in 6G development and deployment are expected to gain a competitive edge in terms of technological innovation, economic growth, and influence in shaping global standards. The global race to 6G has already begun.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The path to 6G‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘The path to 6G‘ on YouTube.

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