European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

The European Union strongly condemned Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Now, more than two years later, the war has already claimed over 10 000 civilian lives, and generated at least 3.5 million internal refugees and 6.3 million Ukrainians have fled the country. The ongoing attack has reverberated beyond Ukraine’s borders, affecting food security, energy prices and inflation both in the EU and beyond. The European Parliament labelled Russia’s war ‘the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945’. The EU’s response has been structured along three axes: political, economic and military support for Ukraine; isolation and containment of Russia; and enhancement of EU and EU neighbourhood resilience.

Parliament’s extraordinary meeting of 1 March 2022, where it adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning Russia’s aggression and setting the direction for the EU response, was one of the first international gatherings Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy attended. Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, was the first EU leader to visit Kyiv, on 1 April 2022.

Since then, Parliament has dealt with more than 40 legislative files of paramount importance for Ukraine and adopted over 30 non-legislative resolutions on aspects of EU support for Ukraine, including: several rounds of macro-financial assistance; the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP); and the Ukraine Facility, earmarking €50 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Parliament has also unwaveringly supported Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, advocating successfully in June 2022 for Ukraine to be granted candidate country status, and in December 2023 for Member States to start accession negotiations. During EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee meetings, Members have discussed parliamentary follow-up to Ukraine’s official accession request with their Ukrainian counterparts, as well as EU military and humanitarian support, sanctions, accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes, and preparations for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Moreover, Parliament has used its powers to advocate a tougher policy of containment towards Russia. It supports economic sanctions (including a November 2023 resolution making specific recommendations on sanctions enforcement, monitoring and circumvention), and urges the EU to explore ways to confiscate frozen Russian assets and use them for Ukraine’s reconstruction. In May 2024, the Council approved a plan to use €3 billion of the profits from these frozen assets to support Ukraine. The EU recently adopted a 14th comprehensive package of sanctions, cracking down on circumvention and adopting energy measures, as well as listing additional individuals and entities for sanction.

Other initiatives Parliament champions include the ‘Generators of Hope’ campaign to supply Ukraine with energy equipment for the winter. In December 2022, the European Parliament awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize to the brave people of Ukraine. 

Parliament is therefore employing its budgetary, agenda-setting, external action and law-making powers to mobilise solid EU support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s aggression, and to ensure that the EU honours its pledges. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Martin Höflmayr and Giulio Sabbati, with David Kläffling.

The European Union’s economic outlook for 2024 reflects cautious optimism, with gross domestic product (GDP) growth estimated at 1.0 % for the EU and 0.8 % for the euro area. As inflation is projected to continue declining towards the European Central Bank’s 2 % target by 2025, a soft landing is within reach. Near-term growth is mainly driven by real wages and private consumption, while high interest rates keep private investment sluggish. This marks a slight improvement from the previous forecast for the EU, while the euro area forecast remains unchanged. Economic expansion in southern EU countries continues to outpace that of those in the north and west, promoting convergence. Unemployment rates continued to fall in the Member States with the highest rates, leading to a further reduction in disparities across the EU. Overall, the EU unemployment rate at the beginning of 2024 stood at a record low of 6.0 %. This positive momentum coincides with the 20th anniversary of the EU’s enlargement to 10 additional Member States, highlighting the single market’s beneficial integration effects.

Launched as a response to the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Next Generation EU (NGEU) and its Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) have also supported recovery and economic convergence in the EU. Against the backdrop of new EU fiscal rules, in place as of this year, NGEU and the RRF are expected to continue playing a significant role in financing strategic investment and reform up to 2026. In that context, this publication aims to track the state of the EU economy. It builds on a well-established EPRS series, ‘Monitoring the EU’s economic outlook’, becoming quarterly.

Read this infographic on ‘Economic Outlook Quarterly: A soft landing within reach‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

RRF payments so far, % committed resources Composition of NGEU and RRF resources Next Generation EU (NGEU) EU inflation
Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) monthly data, % HICP in the EU
EU inflation, share of HICP items by change in annual inflation rate, % Unemployment rate by gender in the EU Member States
Q1-2024, % of the labour force Total unemployment rate in the EU General government balance, European Commission spring forecast, % of GDP Government consolidated gross debt, change Q4-2019 vs Q4-2023, percentage points of GDP Quarterly GDP growth in the EU Member States
% change, Q4-2019 and Q1-2024 GDP growth in the EU
Quarterly, % change compared to same period in previous year

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

To allocate seats in collegiate bodies, such as parliaments, a method is needed to translate votes proportionally into whole seats. The d’Hondt method is a mathematical formula that is used widely in proportional representation systems, although it leads to less proportional results than other seat allocation systems, such as the Hare-Niemeyer or Sainte-Laguë/Schepers methods. Moreover, the d’Hondt method tends to favour the electoral lists that win the most votes, to the detriment of those with fewer votes. However, it is effective in facilitating majority formation and therefore in securing parliamentary operability.

The d’Hondt method is used by 15 EU Member States for elections to the European Parliament. It is also used within Parliament as the formula for distributing the chairs of the parliamentary committees and delegations among the political groups, and among the national delegations within some political groups. This proportional distribution of leadership positions within Parliament prevents the dominance of political life by just one or two large political groups, ensuring that smaller political groups also have a say in setting the political agenda. Some argue, however, that this approach limits the impact of election results on the political direction of decision-making within Parliament; they would call instead for a ‘winner-takes-all’ strategy.

Many national parliaments in the EU also distribute committee chairs and other posts proportionally among political groups, either using the d’Hondt method or through more informal means. Others apply a ‘winner-takes-more’ approach, reserving only certain committee chair posts with particular relevance to government scrutiny for opposition groups. In the US House of Representatives, all committee chairs are selected from the majority party.

This updates a 2019 briefing, which itself updated a 2016 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the d’Hondt method: Allocation of parliamentary seats and leadership positions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava with Hugo Carmona Bas (1st edition).

In March 2023, the European Commission presented a proposal for a directive to expand the use of digital tools and processes in EU company law. The directive would seek to facilitate companies’ cross-border activities by reducing bureaucracy and administrative burdens (such as when setting up subsidiaries and branches in another Member State), increase transparency and boost trust in the business environment across the EU. The proposal is expected to contribute to the creation of a more integrated and digitalised single market, reducing administrative costs for companies by up to €437 million per year.

The proposal falls under the ordinary procedure, where Parliament and the Council act as co‑legislators. In April 2024, Parliament adopted its position on first reading. The directive is subject to the corrigendum procedure and Parliament must approve the final text before formal adoption by the Council and publication in the Official Journal.

Complete version

• July 2024: Enhanced digital tools and processes in company law (1st edition)

Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2009/102/EC and (EU)
2017/1132 as regards further expanding and upgrading the use of digital tools and processes in company lawCommittee responsible:Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2023) 0177
20.3.2023Rapporteur:Emil Radev (EPP, Bulgaria)2023/0089(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal)
Angel Dzhambazki (ECR, Bulgaria)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Committee for opinion:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)Next steps expected: Final adoption

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.

Introduction to Hungary’s parliamentary system

Hungary is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral parliament, the Országgyűlés (National Assembly). The structure and functioning of Hungary’s political system are determined by the Fundamental Law of 25 April 2011, which has been amended 12 times since its entry into force in 2012.

The National Assembly elects the President of the Republic (head of state), whose role is primarily representative but entails some complementary and controlling competences vis-à-vis the legislative, executive and judicial powers. The executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister, proposed by the President and elected by the National Assembly. The Prime Minister chooses the ministers, who together with him/her, compose the government. The Prime Minister also defines the government’s general policy. Ministers are accountable for their actions to both the National Assembly and the Prime Minister. Only the Prime Minister can dismiss them, and the government’s mandate is linked to that of the Prime Minister.

This briefing is part of an EPRS series on national parliaments and EU affairs. It offers an overview of the way the EU Member States’ national parliaments are structured and how they process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also refers to relevant publications by national parliaments.

The National Assembly is Hungary’s supreme organ of popular representation. It is in charge of adopting and amending the Fundamental Law, adopting legislative acts, and scrutinising the government’s activities. The members of the National Assembly are elected every 4 years by universal, equal, direct and secret vote. The Act CCIII of 2011 on the election of members of the National Assembly reformed the electoral system by establishing a single-round election with 106 members elected in individual voting districts and 93 members elected through national-level lists. The reform allowed Hungarian citizens living abroad to participate in the ballot (although they can only vote for national party lists), and national minorities to elect national minorities members.

The European Parliament and the European Commission have repeatedly raised concerns about the current functioning of Hungary’s constitutional and electoral system. According to the most recent resolution adopted by the European Parliament, the Hungarian government is responsible for the ‘persistent systemic and deliberate breach of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary’.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Hungarian Parliament and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Whatever kind of paid work you do, you want a fair wage. In recent years, wage inequality has grown in many European Union countries, and more employed people have become at risk of poverty. In 2017, the EU institutions announced non‑binding guidelines for policy action – the European Pillar of Social Rights. This affirmed workers’ rights to fair pay that provides a decent standard of living in the EU. Minimum wages set in the EU therefore seek to protect those who work, while minimum income schemes target people who do not get sufficient income from work. Both policy measures are the responsibility of national governments, but the EU supports and complements their action.

The European Parliament has long advocated EU guidelines on minimum wages to prevent poverty. In 2019, it called on the European Commission to put forward a legal instrument to ensure fair minimum wages for workers across the EU. In response, in her 2020 State of the Union speech, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen spoke out against ‘social dumping’ and announced a first EU legislative initiative. A month later, the Commission proposed a directive on adequate minimum wages. These rules sought to ensure workers have access to minimum wage protection set at adequate levels, and, to strengthen collective bargaining as the main instrument for ensuring fair pay.

After much negotiation, the Council and Parliament reached an agreement on the new rules in June 2022. They agreed on a framework to promote collective bargaining on wage setting, as well as adequate statutory minimum wage levels, while also improving effective access to minimum wage protection for all workers. Parliament wanted to oblige EU countries to develop action plans, and to ensure full respect for workers’ rights to join a union and to bargain collectively, but the Council opposed this. EU countries have until 15 November 2024 to implement the new rules.

The Commission then proposed to recommend that EU countries update their minimum income schemes, as existing schemes play varying roles in national social protection systems, with a wide range of design, generosity and accessibility. While the Council adopted the slightly modified recommendation in January 2023, two months later Parliament called on the Commission to consider a stronger legal instrument (a directive) to address the cost of living crisis. However, the Commission responded that no legal basis allowed it to propose a directive.

By ensuring wage inequality stays on the agenda, and by helping shape EU law, Parliament is keeping the pressure up in the debate around minimum wage and minimum income. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Marc Jütten (Members’ Research Service) with Kadri Paris (Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance Unit, DG for External Policies).

G7 leaders gathered under the Italian presidency from 13 to 15 June 2024 in Apulia, Italy, for the 50th G7 Summit. The summit was a demonstration of the G7’s unity and determination in the face of intense challenges to the rules-based multilateral order and international peace and security: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the war in Gaza. In the presence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the leaders agreed to provide US$50 billion in additional funding to Ukraine from frozen Russian sovereign assets. The leaders also backed the comprehensive deal on Gaza outlined by United States (US) President Joe Biden. The Italian presidency put special focus on energy cooperation with Africa as a priority for the G7.

Background

On 1 January 2024, Italy took over the G7 presidency from Japan (Canada will follow in 2025). While the Italian presidency did not present a ‘roadmap’, its guiding priorities were: artificial intelligence (AI), Ukraine, Gaza, migration and Africa. Whereas the Japanese presidency had focused primarily on the economic security agenda and related policies, Italy identified Africa as a new priority topic for its presidency. This initiative is in line with the Mattei plan for Africa, which seeks to position Italy as an energy hub between Africa and Europe, investing in gas and hydrogen pipelines between the two continents.

In addition, the Italian presidency placed the focus on AI, carrying forward the Hiroshima AI process launched by the G7 last year. As was the case with the two previous G7 summits, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine overshadowed the gathering and put the focus on G7 support for Ukraine. This year, another conflict in the EU’s neighbourhood, in Gaza, was added to the agenda.

The Group of Seven (G7)
The G7 Speakers’ Meeting provides an opportunity for the presidents of the parliaments of the G7 countries and of the European Parliament to meet annually to discuss parliamentary responses to international issues. The next meeting will take place in from 5 to 7 September 2024, in Verona, Italy.
The group meets annually to discuss issues such as global economic governance, international security, and, most recently, artificial intelligence (AI).
The aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) of G7 member states represents about 30 per cent of the global economy.
The G7 is home to over 776 million people.
The G7 Speakers’ Meeting provides an opportunity for the presidents of the parliaments of the G7 countries and of the European Parliament to meet annually to discuss parliamentary responses to international issues. The next meeting will take place in from 5 to 7 September 2024, in Verona, Italy.

The EU was represented at the summit by Charles Michel, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. Ahead of the summit, Michel published an article entitled ‘Forging a new era of cooperation‘ in which he outlined three key areas on which the G7 should focus: (i) partnering more closely with Africa; (ii) tackling food insecurity and strengthening global food systems; and (iii) strengthening health systems across Africa.

In line with previous G7 presidencies, the Italian presidency had invited representatives of other states and international organisations to take part in some working sessions, illustrating the G7 ambition to foster alliances with countries from the ‘Global South’. Overall, the leaders of eleven countries and five international organisations participated, including: Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil – holder of this year’s G20 presidency; Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India; Javier Milei, President of Argentina; Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, President of Mauritania, in his capacity as Chair of the African Union (AU); and Pope Francis, who addressed the leaders in a session on AI.

Outcome of the summit

During the summit, G7 leaders held six working sessions:

• Africa, climate change and development
• The ongoing situation in the Middle East
• Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine
• Migration
• Indo-Pacific / Economic security
• Artificial intelligence and energy / Africa and the Mediterranean region

On 14 June, the G7 leaders adopted a 36-page communiqué. The document starts with a preamble in which the G7 stresses various commitments ‘to meet global challenges at a crucial moment in history’. It states that the G7 stands ready to support Ukraine’s fight for freedom and its reconstruction, for as long as it takes, and commits to taking concrete steps to address the triple crisis of climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss. The communiqué then addresses a wide range of topics, including: the conflict in Gaza; freedom of navigation in the Red Sea; Iran; fostering partnerships with African countries; sustainable development and food security; the Indo-Pacific region; and AI. China is a recurring theme, with the summit’s final communiqué referencing the country 29 times. It expresses concern about China’s trading practices – including its harmful overcapacity and market distortions – and calls on China to cease the transfer of dual-use materials to Russia.

However, media attention was drawn first and foremost to the G7 leaders’ commitment to provide US$50 billion in additional funding to Ukraine from Russia’s frozen state assets (despite complex legal challenges). The details of the financing arrangement will be spelt out in the coming months, and the loan will be issued by the end of the year. On the margins of the summit, Ukraine signed bilateral security agreements with the US and Japan.

The second key message from Apulia concerned the war in Gaza. G7 leaders stood united behind the comprehensive deal outlined by the US government, involving a three-step approach that could lead to an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages, and a credible pathway towards peace under a two-state solution. Leaders also called for a significant and sustained increase in humanitarian assistance.

On the Italian presidency’s key priority, the G7 leaders (including the EU) and African partners adopted a joint statement on energy for growth in Africa. The initiative is about helping to develop clean energy projects, attract private capital and concessional finance, and overcome barriers to investment in clean energy across Africa. The G7 also introduced the Apulia food systems initiative, designed to strengthen global food security.

Marking a reversal compared with the Hiroshima communiqué, this year’s outcome document made no reference to ‘access to safe and legal abortion’, but it kept the call to guarantee comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services and rights for all.

In addition to the summit declarations, the G7 leaders and ministerial actors adopted a number of statements and documents prior to the summit, such as the G7 leaders’ statement on synthetic drugs threats and the G7 leaders’ statement on Iran’s attack against Israel.

Observers’ views

According to experts, the Apulia Summit gave a strong performance on its key issues, producing at least 469 commitments. Oxfam welcomed the fact that for the first time in their 50-year history, G7 leaders had all agreed to increase taxes on the richest people. On a more general note, some observers repeated their call to institutionalise the G7 with permanent staff and a secretariat, and to expand membership to include Australia and the Republic of Korea.

Looking ahead, the Apulia Summit took place in a climate of uncertainty for the future unity of the group, not least with the possibility of a second Trump term and the rise of alternative institutions, such as the G20 and BRICS+.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the 50th G7 Summit, held in Apulia, Italy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by David de Groot with Titouan Faucheux (1st edition).

Employers in the EU face labour shortages in many sectors of the economy, a situation that could further deteriorate in the coming decades. In the context of a global race for talent, facilitating international recruitment is a priority for the EU.

Announced on 27 April 2022, the European Commission launched an EU talent pool pilot initiative specifically addressed towards workers fleeing the war in Ukraine to facilitate their access to the EU labour market.

On 15 November 2023, as part of the talent mobility package, the Commission subsequently published a legislative proposal for a regulation to establish an EU talent pool available to third-country nationals residing in third countries.

In the European Parliament (ninth legislative term), the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) was responsible for the file. On 6 February 2024, the LIBE committee’s rapporteur presented her draft report. The Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), Culture and Education (CULT) and Development (DEVE) committees published their opinions on 19 February and 8 and 11 April 2024 respectively. Work will continue during the 10th legislative term.

The Council agreed its general approach on 13 June 2024.

Complete version

• July 2024: Proposal establishing an EU talent pool (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an EU Talent Pool Committee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2023) 716
15.11.2023Rapporteur:Abir Al-Sahlani (Renew, Sweden)2023/0404(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:To be appointedOrdinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Committee vote on draft report

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Rebecca Torpey.

The European Council took two important decisions on 27 June for the new institutional cycle: one on the EU’s institutional leadership, the other on the EU’s political priorities for the next five years. EU leaders elected António Costa as the next European Council President, proposed Ursula von der Leyen as the candidate for Commission President, and nominated Kaja Kallas as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They also adopted conclusions on Ukraine, the Middle East, security and defence, and competitiveness. Other topics addressed were migration, the Black Sea, Moldova, Georgia, hybrid threats, and the fight against antisemitism, racism and xenophobia. The European Council also agreed on a roadmap for future work on internal reforms.

General

As has become the practice, the European Council held an exchange of views with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and the European Union’s support for Ukraine and its people; this time, Zelenskyy attended the meeting in person.

Addressing EU leaders at the start of the meeting, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, discussed how to turn the messages deriving from the recent European elections into a political programme for Parliament. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez was not able to attend and was represented by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

European Council meeting Next institutional cycle

The European Council took two crucial decisions for the new institutional cycle, one on the EU’s institutional leadership, the other on the EU’s political priorities for the next five years.

High-level appointments

EU leaders agreed on the EU’s next institutional leadership. As widely anticipated ahead of the meeting, the package the European Council agreed upon includes: Ursula von der Leyen (Germany) for European Commission President; António Costa (Portugal) for European Council President; and Kaja Kallas (Estonia) for High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). In contrast to 2019, the agreement on the package was taken very swiftly.

As was the case for past European Council decisions on top jobs (e.g. in 2014 for the nomination of the Commission President, and in 2017 for the re-election of the European Council President), the candidates were not supported by all EU leaders. As announced, and as in 2014, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán did not support the package, nor did Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who abstained due to the selection process excluding her political family.

Following the practice to date, the new European Council President was also elected by the Heads of State or Government of the euro-area Member States as President of the Euro Summit for the same term. Thus, António Costa will be President of the Euro Summit from 1 December 2024 to 31 May 2027. He indicated that his main priority as European Council President would be to build unity between the Member States in order to put the new Strategic Agenda on track.

Source: EPRS.

The newly composed European Parliament will complete the appointment process of the EU’s institutional leadership by electing its own President during its first session on 16-19 July. It is also expected to vote on the Commission President during that session, and then vote on the entire College of Commissioners in the autumn.

Main messages of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola recalled that the Parliament remained firmly behind the lead candidate process. She informed the European Council that the leaders of the Parliament’s political groups would invite the nominee for President of the European Commission to discuss, on 2 July, a political programme reflecting the voters’ messages, and also ways of building the necessary majority in Parliament.

Strategic Agenda 2024-2029

In line with its Treaty-based role, which is to set the EU’s political priorities, the European Council adopted the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. As flagged up by EPRS and outlined by the European Council President, Charles Michel, the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 is built on three pillars: 1) ‘A free and democratic Europe’; 2) ‘A strong and secure Europe’; and 3) ‘A prosperous and competitive Europe’.

The Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 constitutes, on the one hand, an important shift in the European Union’s political priorities, but on the other shows a high degree of continuity in the topics included. The most obvious changes are the increased significance of security and defence, the addition of new elements on EU competitiveness and the salience of democracy, which is, for the first time, a headline priority. At the same time, many policy issues have been kept from the Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 (a detailed EPRS comparison of the old and new Strategic Agendas is forthcoming).

President von der Leyen stressed that the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 provided an important input for the development of the next Commission’s political guidelines, which she will present to the European Parliament ahead of its vote on her candidacy for European Commission President.

Roadmap for future work on internal reforms

EU leaders set a roadmap for work on the reforms required to achieve the Union’s long-term objectives. They stressed that ‘this work should advance in parallel with the enlargement process, as both the Union and future Member States must be ready at the time of accession’. It envisages:

• an in-depth policy review by the Commission on i) values, ii) policies, iii) budget, and iv) governance, to be presented by spring 2025;
• the next Council presidencies taking the work of recent presidencies on the matter forward and presenting a follow-up report by June 2025;
• the European Council reviewing progress and giving further guidance in June 2025.

When discussing future internal reforms, the European Council did not refer to the results of the Conference on the Future of Europe, nor did it address the European Parliament’s formal request of 22 November 2023 calling for a Convention on the revision of the Treaties.

Ukraine

EU leaders’ discussions on Ukraine covered four main aspects. Following the significant increase in attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure, support for Ukrainian society was the first focal point. EU leaders urged increased support for Ukraine’s energy system, tasking the HR/VP and the Council to accelerate preparations for the winter. The European Council also welcomed the outcome of the recovery conference and – after the Council’s positive assessment of the Ukraine Plan – the distribution of €1.89 billion in pre-financing for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction. EU leaders also welcomed initiatives towards the return of unlawfully deported Ukrainian children and civilians.

The second point was military support for Ukraine. EU leaders welcomed recent positive steps, notably the signing of joint security commitments between Ukraine and the EU as well as bilateral agreements with Member States and partners. As discussed at the G7 summit, Ukraine’s reconstruction as well as military support is to be financed in the form of loans paid by the revenue obtained from frozen Russia assets, and disbursed through the Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF). The first tranche of €1.4 billion is to be released in the summer, followed by another billion euro by the end of the year. The European Council invited the Council, the Commission and the HR/VP to take work forward on this. Hungary has reportedly been blocking the funds, but the Council legal service argued that Hungary could not do so as it had abstained in the vote on the creation of the UAF.

Third, the European Council welcomed recent steps along Ukraine’s EU path, with the first intergovernmental conference (IGC) on its accession held on 25 June. This followed a European Council decision of December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, and the approval of the negotiating framework by the Council on 21 June 2024. EU leaders also welcomed the outcome of the peace summit, and committed to increasing the EU’s push for broader international support for peace in Ukraine based on the UN Charter, international law and Ukraine’s peace formula. Lastly, the European Council welcomed the 14th package of sanctions against Russia, as well as progress on efforts to see Russia and its leadership held accountable for their war of aggression.

Middle East

The European Council reiterated its condemnation of the Hamas attack and restated Israel’s right to defend itself, while stressing the need to do so in compliance with international law. It also reminded Israel of the legally binding nature of the order of the International Court of Justice of 24 May 2024, urging it to halt military operations in Rafah and expressing deep concern about the consequences on civilians of the ground operation in Rafah. Given the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the European Council reiterated calls for aid to reach Palestinians rapidly and unhindered. It condemned strikes on the International Committee of the Red Cross in Gaza, and attempts to label the UN Relief and Works Agency as a terrorist organisation. EU leaders reiterated their condemnation of extremist settler violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, inviting the Council to take forward work against perpetrators. Furthermore, they condemned Israeli government decisions to further expand illegal settlements across the occupied West Bank, and urged Israel to reverse these decisions.

The European Council welcomed the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution proposing a three-phase ceasefire deal, and called for its full and swift implementation. EU leaders also reiterated their commitment to sustainable peace based on a two-state solution; in that context, they called on Israel to stop actions that weaken the Palestinian Authority and to release withheld clearance funds. Meanwhile, following the escalating attacks on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border (due to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict), the European Council invited the Commission, the Council and the HR/VP to strengthen EU support to Lebanon, its armed forces and the UN force in Lebanon.

Security and defence

The European Council discussed urgent and medium-term European defence needs and defence initiatives, inviting the Council, Member States, the Commission and the HR/VP to take work forward on mobilising funds for defence initiatives. Several areas were highlighted: i) addressing critical capability gaps based on the capability development plan; ii) the European defence industry strategy; and iii) the European defence industry programme proposal (aiming for adoption by mid-2025). The Commission President reportedly presented three options to raise defence funding: i) increasing national contributions; ii) raising taxes; iii) EU borrowing/’eurobonds’. Chancellor Scholz (and The Netherlands) opposed the use of eurobonds and the refinancing of national defence budgets from the EU budget. In contrast, EU leaders welcomed the European Investment Bank’s security and defence action plan, calling for its swift adoption.

Competitiveness

Following its April conclusions calling for a new European competitiveness deal, the European Council stressed that ‘swift and decisive progress on all strands’ of the new deal was expected by the end of the year. Since April, the Council has adopted conclusions on the future of industrial policy and the future of the EU single market. However, the eagerly awaited report on EU competitiveness by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi has not been released (it will probably now be published in July).

Other items

As anticipated, the European Council invited the Commission and the HR/VP to prepare a joint communication on building an EU strategic approach to the Black Sea. In light of the challenges posed by Russia’s war against Ukraine and destabilising activities in the region, EU leaders reiterated their support for Moldova, and welcomed the first IGC, on 25 June, on the country’s accession to the EU. In parallel, the European Council discussed recent developments in Georgia, notably the transparency of the foreign influence law and the increasingly difficult situation for civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists and journalists in Georgia. It urged Georgia to reverse its current course of action, and to ensure that the elections in the autumn are free and fair.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council meeting of 27 June 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Leading the European Union’s institutions, agencies and bodies is a high-profile position of great responsibility, with nominees called upon to represent all EU citizens. A broader renewal of the leadership of all the European Union’s main institutions follows the June 2024 European elections, in which both Parliament and the Council play a major role. The European Parliament has the power to nominate, vet and appoint people to these senior positions, although its exact role varies from case to case. Even where Parliament’s opinions are not legally binding, Parliament can closely scrutinise candidates to ensure they are qualified for the job. The publicity that often surrounds hearings and the questionnaires candidates answer provides Parliament with a further opportunity to exercise political leverage.

During the ninth legislative term, Parliament used its powers to nominate and appoint holders of senior positions in EU institutions and other EU bodies. Examples include the hearing process that led to the appointment of the von der Leyen Commission, the replacement of Commissioners mid-mandate, and the appointment of the first ever European Chief Prosecutor.

The appointment process for the college of Commissioners has evolved over the years and influenced the relationships and exercise of power between the institutions concerned. Parliament’s committees have expressed doubt as to candidates’ specific expertise and probed more deeply where needed. In 2019, Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs examined all candidate commissioners’ declarations of financial interests, to assess possible conflicts of interest prior to their hearings. Two candidates withdrew from the process after the committee hearings, and Parliament addressed additional written questions to four other candidates. The committee decided one candidate was unqualified to be a member of the college and her candidacy was withdrawn.

Parliament has also been actively involved in replacing individual commissioners during their mandates. For example, after he responded to written follow-up questions, Parliament voted in favour of Wopke Hoekstra as Frans Timmermans’ successor.

Parliament and the Council appoint the European Chief Prosecutor by common accord. In 2019, the selection process saw a long power struggle between the two institutions. The deadlock was finally broken following a public hearing organised by Parliament’s Committees on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and on Budgetary Control. The successful candidate, Laura Codruţa Kövesi, had the Parliament’s backing.

Parliament thus ensures EU leaders are qualified for their position, by exercising its influence on constitutional issues and closely scrutinising candidates. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens about how the EU regulates social media and protects its users.

The European Union (EU) has adopted a series of rules to protect the rights of social media users. These intend to provide a safer online environment for users and set clear standards on how the tech companies operate whilst promoting digitalisation.

Protection of personal data and privacy

Your right to protection of your personal data is enshrined in the EU charter of fundamental rights. In 2016, the EU adopted the General Data Protection Regulation – often referred to as ‘GDPR rules’. The regulation applies to all companies that process their users’ data within the EU. Under the GDPR, social media companies must obtain explicit consent from their users to access and process their data. It establishes a series of rights for citizens including the rights to:

• access, correct and erase personal data held by companies (‘right to be forgotten’)
• receive your personal data collected by a company and to have it transmitted to another company (‘data portability’)
• receive notification of a personal data breach.

Individual data protection authorities in the 27 EU countries enforce the GDPR. They have the power to investigate complaints and impose fines for breaches. They are independent from government and work together to ensure consistent application of the rules across the EU through the European Data Protection Board. In 2023, the Irish Data Protection Commission imposed the largest fine so far – €1.2 billion – on Facebook’s parent company in Ireland, Meta Platforms. Meta’s export to and storage in the United States of EU Facebook users’ personal data (based on standard contractual clauses) was deemed to have breached GDPR rules. Meta has announced plans to appeal.

Under the 2002 EU e-privacy rules, social media platforms and messaging services like WhatsApp are banned from enabling the surveillance of their users, unless the user has consented, or if the surveillance is carried out by a legally authorised person, such as the police. In 2017, the European Commission proposed new rules to enhance the security and confidentiality of communications and set clearer rules on tracking technologies such as cookies. Parliament has adopted its position, but the procedure is awaiting agreement among the governments of EU countries.

The new EU digital rulebook

One of the priorities of the von der Leyen Commission was to make Europe ‘fit for the digital age’. In 2022, Parliament and EU governments brought in two major new laws to create a fairer and safer online world: the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. Broadly, the idea is that ‘what is illegal offline should be illegal online’.

The Digital Markets Act – limiting the power of big digital companies

The Digital Markets Act creates a level-playing field for all digital companies, enabling smaller firms and start-ups to compete more easily with the industry giants.

The act sets clear rules for large platforms (‘gatekeepers’) to stop them imposing unfair conditions on businesses and consumers. The European Commission has so far designated six gatekeepers: Alphabet (Google, YouTube), Amazon, Apple, ByteDance (TikTok), Meta (Facebook, Instagram) and Microsoft.

These platforms will no longer be able to favour their own services and products over those offered by third parties on their platform. They will be required to give users the option to remove any pre-installed software or applications, making it easier for users to switch between platforms and apps.

The act will also enhance compatibility between different messaging platforms. This means that whether they are on a small or large platform, users will be able to send messages, share files, and make video calls across different messaging applications.

Non-compliance risks significant fines: up to 10 % of the company’s total worldwide annual turnover, or up to 20 % in the event of repeated infringements. In March 2024, the Commission opened investigations into certain uncompetitive practices that might breach the act. This includes Alphabet (for giving preference to its own services on Google Search); Apple (for preventing users from being able to choose services on iPhones); and Meta (for obliging customers to consent to their data being used for targeted advertising if they do not agree to pay a monthly fee – the ‘pay or OK model’).

The Digital Services Act – ensuring a safe online environment

The Digital Services Act is a ground-breaking new law. From 17 February 2024, it applies to any digital platform, including social media, that acts as an intermediary to connect users with goods, services, and content. It applies to all digital organisations providing services in the EU, including those established outside the EU. It applies to both large and small operators, but very large online platforms or search engines are subject to additional rules. The European Commission has designated 19 platforms as such, including social media and networking channels such as Facebook, Instagram, TikTok or X (previously Twitter), and the Google and Bing search engines.

The act will hold these platforms legally liable for their users’ unlawful behaviour if they are aware of illegal content. Such ‘content’ includes child sexual abuse material, terrorist content, illegal hate speech or illegal goods and services.
The new rules focus on:

• Countering illegal content and dangerous and counterfeit goods, by making it easier for users to report them and for authorities to enforce action against them;
• Tackling online harassment and cyber bullying, by making sure any non-consensual private images and other abusive content can be quickly flagged by users and removed;
• Protecting children, by requiring platforms to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security of minors on their services;
• Banning targeted advertising online based on profiling children or on sensitive data like sexuality, religion or race;
• Banning ‘dark patterns’ or ‘nudging’ techniques that might manipulate users into making choices they do not intend to make.

National authorities and the European Commission can enforce the act through a set of investigative and sanctioning measures. Companies who do not comply face hefty fines (up to hundreds of millions of euro) and an EU-wide ban. On 19 February 2024, the Commission announced formal proceedings to assess whether TikTok has breached the Digital Services Act in relation to the protection of minors, advertising transparency, data access for researchers, and the risk management of addictive design and harmful content.

Media Freedom Act

The European Media Freedom Act, adopted in April 2024, protects EU journalists and media from political or economic interference. It introduces a mechanism to prevent very big online platforms, such as X (formerly Twitter), Facebook or Instagram, from arbitrarily restricting or deleting independent media content.

Parliament calls for more protection for social media users

In December 2023, Parliament urged the Commission to propose new legislation against addictive design features such as automatic play and infinite scrolling, which affect children and young people in particular, and can lead to behavioural patterns and internet use that mirror addiction. It also asked the Commission to put forward a digital ‘right not to be disturbed’ allowing consumers to turn off attention-seeking features.

Following a petition regarding the impossibility of accessing basic banking services without a mobile phone, Parliament acknowledged that a divide exists between people who are able to use a digital means of payment, or to access public services, and others who cannot or are reluctant to use them. Parliament stressed that companies providing everyday services should offer a non-digital solution. It called on the Commission to consider the risks of discrimination against older people and other vulnerable groups when assessing payment services, and to ensure that digitisation is ‘human-centric’.

Further information

• Digital Markets Act, overview, European Commission
• Digital Services Act overview, European Commission
• Q & A on Digital Services Act, European Commission
• Implications of the Digital Transformation on Different Social Groups, Study, European Parliament

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with Paweł Bącal.

Resolutions are an essential way for the European Parliament to express its views on political processes, EU policies and developments in the world. Parliament also uses them to scrutinise other EU institutions, including the European Council. The need for accountability and increased scrutiny of the European Council has been a constant theme in the European Parliament’s resolutions throughout the 2019-2024 legislative term. The increased need to scrutinise the European Council also results from the changing role of the institution over recent years.

Based on an analysis of Parliament’s resolutions, this briefing will present the need for democratic oversight of the European Council and outline the different tools at Parliament’s disposal to do so. It provides a unique overview of the content of Parliament’s resolutions addressing the European Council and the messages it sends to EU leaders. Finally, the briefing identifies potential ways of further strengthening Parliament’s scrutiny of the European Council.

The European Council and the need for scrutiny

It is necessary to correct institutional imbalances that have arisen over time and to increase the accountability of the executive toward the legislature, in particular to grant Parliament scrutiny powers over the European Council.

European Parliament, 14 September 2023.

The European Council – a formal EU institution since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon – consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. The European Council’s core role is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)). Over the last decade, and notably fuelled by the various crises the EU has had to face, the European Council has expanded its influence over policymaking, which some consider to be ‘legislative trespassing’, and has de facto assumed executive powers. This development has been pointed out by Parliament:

under the pressure of the crisis, the European Council has considerably aggrandised its role, increasing the number of extraordinary meetings and raising to European Council level matters normally dealt with at Council of Ministers level; whereas in this respect the European Council has gone beyond the crucial Treaty injunction that it has no legislative functions.

Parliament has repeatedly criticised the growing institutional imbalance and, during both the ninth and eighth legislative terms, called for the situation to be remedied. In 2019, for example, it stated that the ‘European Council has, against the spirit and the letter of the Treaties, taken a number of important political decisions outside of the Treaty framework, thereby de facto excluding those decisions from the oversight of Parliament and undermining the democratic accountability which is essential with regard to such European policies’.

Accountability is one of the central principles of democracy. This principle also applies to the European Union: Article 10 TEU explicitly provides that ‘the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy’. Therefore, all the institutions shall be accountable either to the citizens directly, or to their representatives.

As Parliament underlined following the entry into force of the TEU, notably in its December 2013 resolution, members of the European Council, while being accountable individually to their own national parliaments, collectively are accountable only to themselves. Academics have argued that, in the EU’s architecture, the European Parliament is the only institution that might be able to provide a forum for democratic oversight over the European Council as a collective entity.

Parliament has been given a general political oversight function over the executive in the Treaties (Article 14(1) TEU). In an EU framework described by many observers as having a ‘dual executive’ split between the European Commission and the European Council – with respective responsibilities differing according to policy area – the Treaties provide the European Parliament with a number of instruments to hold the European Commission and its President accountable (e.g. censuring the Commission). However, they do not provide Parliament with similar instruments to hold the European Council and its President to account.

This rise in influence of the European Council has not been accompanied by the necessary increase in its accountability. On the contrary, it has even been argued that, in the context of the negotiations on the multiannual financial framework (MFF), ‘the European Council’s dominance distorted the institutional balance laid down in the Treaties … and undermined the transparency and democratic accountability of the decision-making process … the role played by the EUCO is difficult to reconcile with the wording and spirit of the [Lisbon Treaty]’. Therefore, as the role of the European Council has increased, so has the need for the scrutiny.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Parliament’s scrutiny of the European Council: The use of Parliament resolutions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides an insight into the economic performance of Indonesia compared to the EU and looks at the trade dynamics between them. Indonesia’s economy managed to maintain sustained growth after the 2020 economic recession. The EU’s GDP growth, on the other hand, faced a slowdown starting in 2022. Divergent trends are also found in the foreign direct investment and remittance net inflows. For the former, Indonesia presents a more stable time series; for the latter, the EU remittances net inflow is more stable. The EU’s trade with Indonesia has shown a generally upward trend, with a sharp increase after the 2020 global economic slowdown. EU’s main exports are mechanical appliances and electrical equipment, while Indonesia’s primary export is agri-food.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘Indonesia: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Indonesia’s business environment and socio-economic indicators EU imports of services from Indonesia (2022) EU exports of services to Indonesia (2022) EU imports of goods from Indonesia (2023) EU exports of goods to Indonesia (2023) Top EU partners (2023)
Trade in goods Main trade partners (2023)
Trade in goods, exports plus imports EU trade with Indonesia FDI and remittances Public finances, monetary and financial data GDP growth
(annual change, %) Female labour force participation rate
(% of female population aged 15+) Total unemployment rate(% of total labour force) Indonesia GDP per capita

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The European Council consists of the 27 Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States, who are voting members, together with the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, who have no vote (Article 15(2) Treaty on European Union). The chart shows the current members, the national office they hold, their most recent European political affiliation, and the year their membership began.

Recent developments

The duration of an individual Head of State or Government’s membership of the European Council is not laid down in the EU Treaties but is, rather, directly linked to changes in the composition of national governments within the EU Member States. There are thus significant variations between Member States, reflecting varying electoral cycles and frequency in leadership changes in these countries. As a result, some individual Heads of State or Government may be participating in their very first meeting of the European Council, while others might have participated for 10 years or more. In the period since February 2015, there have been changes in membership on average every two months. Since the previous edition of this publication, in April 2024, national and European political developments have led to a number of changes in the European Council’s membership, as set out below.

Changes in members and their status Members’ changes in status

Following the national elections in Belgium, which were held simultaneously with the elections to the European Parliament on 9 June, Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced his resignation due to the substantial losses his political party (Open VLD) suffered. He will continue as caretaker until a new government is formed, which, based on past experience, could take a significant time.

As Robert Fico, the Slovak Prime Minister who usually represents the country in the European Council, is still recovering from the injuries he suffered in an attempted assassination, the country’s President, Peter Pellegrini, will attend European Council meetings until Fico is sufficiently recovered.

Expected changes

Following the parliamentary election in the Netherlands on 22 November 2023, a government agreement was reached between the Party for Freedom (PVV), the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB) and New Social Contract (NSC). Dick Schoof has been proposed as the next prime minister, replacing long-term European Council member Mark Rutte (VVD). Schoof is not affiliated to any party at national level. If the parliamentary hearings are completed on time, he is expected to be sworn in on 2 July 2024.

Ongoing developments

On 9 June, alongside the elections to the European Parliament, Bulgaria held its sixth national elections in three years, with a record low turnout of about 30 %. The political coalition GERB–SDS, led by former Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, with 25 %, received the biggest share of seats in the Bulgarian Parliament. Explorative coalition negotiations between GERB–SDS and other political parties have been taking place, but Borisov has stated that ‘to date, forming a government is not possible’. Until a new government is formed the current interim Prime Minister Dimitar Glavchev will represent his country in the European Council. Another national election later this year is seen as likely.

Changes in the balance between political party affiliations

The upcoming change in the Netherlands from Mark Rutte to Dick Schoof will add one additional independent or non-affiliated member and reduce by one the Renew/ALDE members in the European Council. As a result of these changes, the European Council will then include 11 members from the European People’s Party (EPP), four from Renew Europe/ALDE, four from the Party of European Socialists (S&D/PES), two from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), and six independent or non-affiliated members.

NB

Under the Romanian constitution, the country’s president should not be a member of any political party. However, Klaus Iohannis, previously a member of an EPP-affiliated party, still regularly attends EPP pre-European Council meetings.

As Fico’s Smer-SD party, and also Pellegrini’s Hlas, have been suspended from membership of the Party of European Socialists as well as the S&D group in the European Parliament, Slovakia will be considered for the time being as represented by a non-attached member of the European Council.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Current membership of the European Council‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Rebecca Torpey.

The European Council meeting on 27–28 June 2024 has a full agenda. As the current EU institutional cycle draws to a close, it marks a critical moment in launching the new cycle. EU leaders will discuss, and likely agree on, high-level appointments to EU institutions, including on the proposed candidate for European Commission President. They are also set to adopt the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, outlining the EU’s political priorities for the coming five years. They will also discuss Ukraine, security and defence, Middle East, competitiveness, migration and Georgia.

General

The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola will make the customary opening address. As leader of the country currently holding the six-month EU Council presidency, the Belgian Prime Minister, Alexander De Croo, is expected to provide an overview of the results of the Belgian Presidency. This could be the last European Council meeting for long-time Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, whose successor, Dick Schoof, is expected to be sworn in on 2 July 2024.

European Council meeting Next institutional cycle

Following initial discussions at their informal meeting of 17 June, EU leaders will seek to reach two crucial agreements at their meeting on 27–28 June 2024. The first on high-level appointments to EU institutions, and the second on the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. These agreements will mark the start of the new EU institutional cycle.

High-level appointments

The aim is to find political agreement on the candidate for the next European Commission President, on the nominee for High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Commission Vice-President (HR/VP), with the agreement of the candidate for Commission President, and on the European Council President.

Most European Council decisions, including on its conclusions, are taken by consensus, as specified in its rules of procedure. However, this is not the case for decisions on high-level appointments. If a vote on the candidate for Commission President, for other posts, or on the whole package, is necessary, a ‘reinforced’ qualified majority’ would be required. According to Article 238(3)b TFEU, the candidate would need the support of at least 72 % of the Member States, representing 65 % of the EU population. A vote took place for previous European Council decisions on top jobs, such as the election of Jean‑Claude Juncker as Commission President and the re-election of Donald Tusk as European Council President, with some Heads of State or Government voting against the decision.

Since the informal dinner, European Council President Charles Michel has consulted Member States and met the leadership of the European Parliament, while the European political parties have also discussed the appointments within and between each other.

Based on the party political balance in the European Council and the European Parliament, it is expected that the high-level positions will be shared between the European People’s Party, the Party of European Socialists and the liberal family (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)/Renew Europe). While last-minute changes cannot be excluded, it is thought Ursula von der Leyen will be proposed for a second mandate as European Commission President; the former Portuguese prime minister, António Costa, will be elected as next European Council President and the current Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, nominated as HR/VP.

2024–2029 strategic agenda

EU leaders are also expected to adopt the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, setting the political priorities for the EU’s next institutional cycle. The main priorities are likely to be: 1) ‘A free and democratic Europe’, 2) ‘A strong and secure Europe’, and 3) ‘A prosperous and competitive Europe’. A noteworthy development is the shift of the ‘free and democratic Europe’ priority, placed last in previous drafts, to the number-one priority.

The European Council is also expected to adopt conclusions on a roadmap for future work on internal EU reform.

Ukraine

The European Council is set to highlight its previous conclusions in support of Ukraine and Moldova. The main focus regarding Ukraine will be on ways to support its right to self-defence in Russia’s war, which has included attacks against civilian and energy infrastructure (with arms imported from Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). EU leaders may also: 1) discuss acting against those providing direct military support to Russia; 2) demand effective enforcement of sanctions and anti-circumvention measures; and 3) welcome the 14th package of sanctions. The 14th package includes a ban on the re-export of Russian liquefied natural gas. The package was reportedly delayed due to reservations from some Member States, such as Germany and Hungary, regarding different aspects of the package.

Moreover, the European Council is scheduled to welcome the agreement on utilising extraordinary revenues from frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s self-defence and reconstruction. It is also set to welcome bilateral security agreements between Ukraine and a number of Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) and with partners Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom. In addition, EU leaders may welcome the Ukraine Plan (Ukraine’s comprehensive reform and investment strategy for the next four years) and discuss the outcome of the June Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin.

The meeting is expected to take stock of the military support provided by the Ukraine Assistance Fund and Member State initiatives to supply ammunition, missiles, fighter jets, air defence and training.

An important point for discussion concerns restrictions on Ukraine’s use of weapons delivered by EU countries to strike targets inside Russian territory. The Member States hold varying stances on the issue. According to the Latvian President, Edgars Rinkēvičs, this restriction should be removed in July at the NATO Summit in Washington. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that French weapons sent to Ukraine, including long-range missiles, could be used to target bases inside Russia. Conversely, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said any weapons supplied by Italy should not be used on Russian territory. EU leaders are also set to discuss the outcome of the Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland in June, which resulted in a majority of the attending states signing a communiqué on a Peace Framework. Reportedly, a second summit, hosted by Saudi Arabia, may take place.

With a busy agenda, EU leaders may not have time to hold a full discussion on the European path for Ukraine and Moldova. However, important developments have taken place since EU leaders’ last discussion. In June, the Commission announced that Ukraine and Moldova had met the criteria required to begin accession negotiations. On 14 June, EU ambassadors agreed in principle to the negotiating frameworks for accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. On 25 June, the Belgian Presidency called the first Intergovernmental Conferences with Ukraine and Moldova.

Security and defence

EU security and defence is a recurring agenda point since February 2022. At this meeting, EU leaders are expected to focus more specifically on ways to fund the EU defence industry. Put forward in March 2024, the European Defence Industry Programme is intended to support the EU defence industry, by providing €1.5 billion over three years. It is likely that EU leaders will reiterate their demand for work on the proposal to continue. In March, EU leaders requested that the Council and Commission present a report examining all options for mobilising funds for the EU defence industry; this report is due to be presented at this European Council meeting. Ahead of the March European Council meeting, 14 Member States had written to the European Investment Bank (EIB) calling for a policy change on defence investment. The 21–22 March 2024 European Council conclusions invited the EIB to adapt its lending policy to the defence industry. It can be expected that EU leaders may reiterate their demands for the EIB to improve defence industry access to finance.

Middle East

EU leaders have clearly signalled their support for a lasting peace based on a two-state solution in the Middle East, and are likely to restate this. This is also the first formal European Council meeting since US mediators tabled the three-phase peace proposal. Some aspects of the plan reflect previous European Council conclusions, such as the calls for: 1) ceasefire; 2) release of hostages; 3) provision of humanitarian aid for Gaza; and 4) reconstruction of Gaza. EU leaders are likely to reiterate these demands.

Since the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023, EU leaders have been consistently keen to prevent further escalation in the region. Nevertheless, strikes between Hezbollah and Israel across the Israel-Lebanon border are ongoing. On 18 June, in response to threats against Haifa, the Israeli Foreign Minister warned that the state of Israel was very close to a decision on a war with Hezbollah: ‘In an all-out war, Hezbollah will be destroyed and Lebanon will be severely hit’. On 19 June, the leader of Hezbollah issued a warning to Cyprus, stating that if Cypriot airfields and bases were used by Israel to target Lebanon, this would be considered an act of war and be treated as such. The Cypriot President responded by stating that Cyprus is not involved in the conflict. The Commission’s spokesperson said that ‘any threat against one of our Member States is a threat against the European Union’. As the situation remains tense, EU leaders will again warn against the ignition of a broader regional conflict.

Competitiveness

This part of the meeting is expected mainly to follow up on the April meeting, which discussed a new European competitiveness deal. Discussion may centre on deepening the capital markets union and mobilising private funding to support EU priority investments, with EU leaders likely to review progress since April and to announce ‘additional steps’.

Former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi is currently preparing a report on EU competitiveness. Despite expectation that the final text would be presented at this meeting, this has not been confirmed, and publication in July seems to be more likely. Draghi outlined some of his ideas in speeches in Belgium on 16 April and Spain on 14 June, calling for an industrial strategy for Europe and for ‘radical change’ more generally. At the April European Council meeting, at which former Italian prime minister Enrico Letta’s report on the future of the single market was presented, EU leaders said they ‘look forward to the presentation of the upcoming report on Europe’s competitiveness’.

Due to the new economic governance framework, 2024 is a transitional year in EU fiscal policy coordination. The European Semester spring package was published on 19 June. The European Council usually discusses the country-specific recommendations in June, to allow the conclusion of the European Semester. However, this year it is likely the topic will be postponed to a later meeting. According to Hungary’s newly published EU Council Presidency programme, an informal European Council meeting will take place on 8 November in Budapest, focused on competitiveness, which the Hungarian Presidency expects to result in a ‘Budapest Declaration’.

Other items Migration

While no detailed discussion is anticipated, the European Council could adopt conclusions outlining the state of play on migration. EU leaders might take note of the Council’s negotiating mandate for a regulation strengthening Europol’s role in supporting Member States in their fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Agreeing on joint conclusions on migration is no small achievement, as in the recent past, EU leaders have failed several times to agree conclusions or statements on the issue. An individual leader might express their dissatisfaction with other European Council decisions, notably the high-level appointments, by blocking migration-specific conclusions.

Georgia

In response to the adoption of the law on transparency of foreign influence in the Georgian Parliament, EU leaders are set to discuss the situation in Georgia. The law is a step backwards on Georgia’s European path, according to Charles Michel and the Foreign Affairs Council. Large-scale protests against the law have recently taken place in the country.

Leaders are expected to invite the Commission and the High Representative to prepare a communication aimed at developing an EU strategic approach for the Black Sea. The EU’s current approach to the Black Sea is based on the Black Sea Synergy initiative, launched in 2007. The United States developed its own Black Sea security strategy in late 2023.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting on 27‑28 June 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marin Mileusnic.

The European Union’s research and innovation (R&I) policy has become central in the attempt to safeguard the EU’s technological sovereignty, ensure prosperity, and advance social, economic and environmental sustainability. Various challenges persist nevertheless, from ageing populations and health hazards to (economic) security and the climate crisis. In addition, underinvestment in R&I is a shared concern across Member States, although to varying degrees.

To reach the EU’s spending target for R&I of 3 % of the EU’s annual gross domestic product, the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument and its main spending tool, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), could play a vital role in providing additional funding to Member States. To emerge stronger from the COVID-19 crisis and benefit from these resources (channelled partly into R&I ecosystems), countries have drawn up individual national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). As a funding condition, Member States needed to address at least a significant subset of the European Semester’s country-specific recommendations and foster the green and digital transitions, by achieving the milestones and targets linked to the measures agreed in their NRRPs. The RRF is financing over €47 billion worth of R&I measures in the NRRPs, but the focus on R&I investment differs across the plans.

In this briefing, six case studies (either investment or reform measures) in R&I from individual recovery plans have been analysed. These measures range from investing in sustainable agriculture (Portugal), to reforming and integrating research, development and innovation organisations in the European Research Area (Romania). Each of the assessed case studies has been linked to one of the six R&I policy guidelines developed by the European Commission.

The briefing also touches on other financing opportunities for R&I under the traditional multiannual financial framework. Experts point out that NGEU might contribute to closing the innovation and underinvestment gap between Member States and the EU’s 3 % target. The European Parliament supports an ambitious EU-wide R&I policy, and continues to ensure transparency and democratic scrutiny in the implementation of the NGEU recovery instrument.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Research and innovation in the national recovery and resilience plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

According to United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef) estimates, the number of migrant children increased from 24 million in the 1990–2000 period to 36 million in 2020. In 2022 alone, some 35 200 children arrived in southern European countries. Of them, some 23 500 (67 %) were unaccompanied or had been separated from family members during the journey. A child may be unaccompanied or get separated for various reasons, including persecution of the child or parents; international conflict and civil war; human trafficking and smuggling, including sale by parents; accidental separation from parents during the journey; and a search for better economic opportunities.

There is a comprehensive international legal framework on children’s rights and their protection in place, yet irregular migrant children, especially those unaccompanied or separated from their parents during their journey, face numerous obstacles and challenges during and after migration. These include a heightened risk of sexual exploitation and abuse, military recruitment, child labour (including for foster families) or detention. In many countries, children are routinely denied entry or detained by border or immigration officials. In other cases, they are admitted but denied access to asylum procedures, or their asylum claims are not handled in an age- or gender-sensitive manner.

The vulnerable situation of unaccompanied and separated children worldwide, and the threats they face, need to be addressed, particularly in view of the constant rise in their numbers. Applying the ‘best interests of the child’ principle, EU asylum law offers special protection to such children, and the EU has adopted numerous instruments and identified key actions for the protection of all children in migration, including those who are unaccompanied or who have been separated from their parents.

This is an update of a 2021 briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Vulnerability of unaccompanied and separated
child migrants‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Age structure of of migrants across the world (in millions) Child migrants and young migrants as a share of the migrant population in host regions in 2020 Asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied children (EU-27 countries)

Written by Rafał Mańko.

The roles of the EU institutions in negotiating and concluding international agreements, and the procedural steps, are set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The European Parliament’s role corresponds to its law-making competences under the Treaties. If an international agreement falls exclusively within common and foreign security policy (CFSP), Parliament has no active role, but must still be informed at all stages by the Council, the European Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. If an international agreement does not fall exclusively within the CFSP, Parliament’s specific powers depend on whether the agreement’s substantive legal basis corresponds to an area of competence covered by the ordinary legislative procedure or special legislative procedure (SLP) with consent; if so, Parliament has the power to give or refuse consent to the conclusion of the agreement. If the agreement falls within the scope of an SLP where Parliament does not need to give consent, its role is limited to giving an opinion. Parliament is also entitled to call on the Court of Justice to verify ex ante whether an envisaged agreement is compatible with the EU Treaties.

The 2010 framework agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission was a key step in developing Parliament’s role in the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. The agreement provides for Parliament to be informed from an early stage of negotiations on an international agreement, and for Members of Parliament to participate as observers in negotiations. The Commission undertook to keep Parliament informed on the entire negotiation process, with particular emphasis on agreements that fall within Parliament’s power of consent. Parliament’s Rules of Procedure lay down detailed procedural arrangements for the exercise of Parliament’s competences in concluding international agreements, in particular for verification of the legal basis of an envisaged agreement that impacts Parliament’s powers.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Parliament’s role in concluding international agreements‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic.

Exposure to ‘forever chemicals’, air pollution, stress and many other factors depends on where a person lives and their lifestyle choices. These exposures combine over the course of a lifetime, affecting human biology and health. The ‘exposome’ concept offers a framework for understanding and analysing this complex reality, and ultimately for informing the shaping of evidence-based policy on chemicals, food and the workplace, as well as on pollution, public health and the environment more generally.

Many chronic diseases result from the complex interplay between a person’s genetic predisposition for developing a disease and ‘outside’ factors linked to lifestyle and/or the environment. The totality of environmental exposures that a person experiences over their lifetime, the interaction between those exposures, and the way these relate to health can be referred to as the ‘exposome‘. Chemicals – whether naturally occurring or anthropogenic – are an obvious example of problematic exposure, from sources such as polluted air or water, diet, lifestyle and the workplace.

However, the exposome is more than that. It comprises numerous very diverse factors that can be categorised into three interlinked clusters. ‘Internal’ factors include, for example, metabolic processes, inflammation, endogenous hormones, oxidative stress and gut microflora. ‘Specific external exposures’ include infectious agents, chemicals and other environmental contaminants, diet and lifestyle factors. A ‘general external category’ includes socioeconomic and psychological influences.

Exposome science is about understanding the effects of the complex interactions between environmental exposures and genetics on a person from conception to death, and how those exposures affect that person’s biology and health. It is closely related to exposure science, which studies ‘the contact between stressors and receptors, and the associated sources, pathways and processes potentially leading to impacts on human health and the natural and built environment’. Exposome-based thinking, supported by innovative data collection and analysis, biomonitoring tools, high-throughput ‘omics‘ technologies and enhanced computational and analytical capacities, allows for more comprehensive and faster data collection and analysis of exposures and their associated biological responses. This improves understanding of diseases’ cause, development, prevention and treatment. The huge potential that artificial intelligence and advanced analytics offer when it comes to untangling the vast amount of exposome-related data has given rise to the term ‘exposome intelligence‘.

Potential impacts and developments

Understanding the exposome is important for advancing scientific research to address the challenges posed by environmental and other exposures on human health. It can provide a valuable framework for informing risk assessment and regulation, and for developing effective intervention strategies to promote health, ensuring they are based on comprehensive data on exposure and health outcomes.

Exposome research can help identify risk factors – including previously unknown factors – that contribute to the development of certain diseases, such as cancers, neurological disorders, respiratory disorders, cardiovascular diseases and obesity. These factors also offer new lenses through which to study sensitive population groups or critical life periods such as childhood. Research can explore the link between the exposome, epigenetic changes (i.e. reversible changes in gene expression that do not involve modifying the DNA sequence) and individuals’ biological adaptive capacity. Exposome research can detect soft outcomes such as environmental exposures resulting in detectable molecular changes in a body that could be linked to a disease onset later in life. It can also lead to an understanding of time sequence in a disease onset, or of complex, multiple or simultaneous exposures. This knowledge can lead to better disease prevention, and to strategies – both targeted ones and strategies aimed at the general population – to reduce harmful exposures and promote healthier living and working conditions. It can provide evidence for the regulation of environmental pollutants and toxins, influencing policies relating to air and water quality, chemicals, pollution, the safety of products such as toys, and occupational health and safety.

There are also considerable limitations and challenges.The human exposome is incredibly complex, which makes it challenging to quantify and analyse all exposures comprehensively, despite advanced technological capabilities. Problems relate to data quality, consistency and the lack of established standards for exposome research. This includes the identification and interpretation of the most relevant biomarkers for specific health outcomes, which can lead to varying approaches and hinder comparability between studies. The exposome approach may also struggle to account for variability between individuals and its impact on health outcomes: unique individual patterns of environmental exposures (including historical ones) based on factors such as occupation, lifestyle and geography can make it difficult to isolate the direct effects of individual exposures. Furthermore, the collection and use of extensive personal environmental and health data raise ethical and privacy concerns.

Conducting exposome research requires significant resources, including funding, expertise and infrastructure for data collection, analysis and interpretation. Translating research findings into actionable interventions and strategies is not straightforward, given the complexity of exposures and their interactions. Addressing these challenges will be crucial to further advancing exposome research and realising its potential to inform public policies and personalised healthcare interventions.

Anticipatory policymaking

In both public policy and research, the interactions between the environment and health are increasingly recognised as a critical area of focus. On a global level, seeking to protect health, address challenges such as the emergence of infectious diseases, antimicrobial resistance and food safety, and promote the health and integrity of ecosystems, the One Health initiative acknowledges that the health of humans, animals, plants and the wider environment are intertwined. The EU has developed a comprehensive framework of thematic programmes, strategic objectives and regulatory actions relating to the environment and health, such as those for chemicals (including endocrine disruptors), pollution (including microplastics) and health and safety at work. However, the legislation is often focused on individual factors of concern.

For exposome science to deliver on its ambitious potential to inform evidence-based policies, a dedicated scientific capacity is needed to advance the research and produce conclusive evidence. This means creating educational opportunities such as degree programmes, earmarking funding for exposome research and setting up calls for research projects. Examples include the EU-funded Human Exposome Network (EHEN), the world’s largest network of projects studying the impact of environmental exposure on human health, and the International Human Exposome Network (IHEN), which aims to put in place longer-term, multi-sectoral collaboration to improve global research and cooperation on the exposome.

The development of standards for producing strong evidence is crucial. This relates to methods, techniques and practices for data collection, analysis and reporting. The research results need to be translated to policy by, for example, linking them to existing institutional structures and encouraging interdisciplinarity in policy development. Ultimately, exposome-informed policies could include new ‘protective’ legislation to prevent harm to the environment, human health and safety, to update standards or to change monitoring practices.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘What if focusing on the system, not just the symptoms, were key to health?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if focusing on the system, not just the symptoms, were key to health?‘ on YouTube.

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Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

On 17 June, the European Council members met for an informal dinner to discuss the results of the 2024 European Parliament elections and possible candidates for the leadership positions in the coming EU institutional cycle. The Heads of State or Government did not come to any decision on the appointments, and indeed they were not due to take any formal decision at this stage in the procedure. High-level discussions will now take place between the European Council and the European Parliament, as well as between the political families. The EU leaders are expected to agree on the package of high-level EU posts, and on the political priorities for the next 5 years, at the formal European Council meeting on 27‑28 June 2024.

Start of the meeting

As usual at the start of the meeting, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, addressed the members of the European Council. While emphasising that the 2024 European elections had seen the ‘highest voter turnout in over 30 years’, she stressed that the main takeaway from the elections was that ‘the constructive pro-European centre holds’. This view was supported by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, ahead of the meeting, who underlined that the elections had brought a stable majority of the political forces that had traditionally worked closely together in the European Parliament (the European People’s Party – EPP, the Socialists and Democrats – S&D, and the Liberal family – Renew Europe). Moreover, Metsola informed the EU leaders that the majority of political groups in Parliament supported the ‘lead candidate’ process and, in view of the results of the elections, agreed that the EPP was once again the largest political group in the European Parliament. Metsola’s address was followed by a statement by Ursula von der Leyen, the current European Commission President and EPP lead candidate for the post in the coming term. She presented her views on the future of the European Union.

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, the purpose of this meeting was not to take a decision. This point was also stressed by some Heads of State or Government before the meeting, notably the Irish Taoiseach, Simon Harris, and reiterated by the European Council President, Charles Michel, after the meeting. The objective was to reflect on the election results and begin discussions on possible candidates for the EU top jobs ahead of the formal European Council meeting on 27-28 June.

Senior EU institutional posts to be filled

In 2024, the appointments to be made include three high-level EU positions: the presidents of the European Commission and of the European Council, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Commission Vice-President (HR/VP). Several EU leaders, notably Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, stressed that the decisions on these positions would be taken as a ‘package’. Harris called for ‘a balanced package reflecting the results of the European elections, geography and size of Member States’.

Another high-level post – that of European Parliament President – must also be filled at the start of the new institutional cycle. The European Council has no legal involvement in this case, as underlined by Metsola. However, Parliament does not make this choice in a vacuum and has to consider the wider context, notably the election results and the other high-level appointments. On 17 June, Metsola put forward her own candidacy to continue in the post of European Parliament President.

Party political balance in the EU institutions when filling senior posts

The allocation of high-level EU positions has a strong political party dimension (see EPRS briefing on European political parties and the European Council). Michel confirmed this when stating that ‘the political parties are playing a role and that is natural in such a political moment’; he also indicated that the European political families had made proposals for the EU institutional leadership posts.

NB Figure 1 represents the party political balance on 18 June 2024. For Parliament, this is based on preliminary election results. The membership of the European Council changes on average every 2 months and could be different at the next meeting.

As Figure 1 shows, in June 2024 the party political balance, in both the European Council and the European Parliament, differs from the situation after the 2019 elections. While the share of EPP-affiliated members in the European Council increased from 29 to 41 per cent from 2019 to 2024, the Liberal members’ share shrank from 29 to 19 per cent. Similarly, Socialist family leaders now account for only 15 per cent of European Council members compared with 25 per cent in 2019. This shift is also seen in the European Parliament.

Next steps: The formal European Council meeting of 27-28 June

Charles Michel stressed that it was important to have a transparent decision-making process, with all EU leaders having the same level of information; for him, the dinner on 17 June served that purpose.

The President of the European Council will now continue his consultations, notably with the European Parliament – the two institutions being ‘jointly responsible for the smooth running of the process leading to the election of the President of the European Commission’ (Declaration 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). In that context, Metsola pointed out that Michel had been invited to attend Parliament’s Conference of Presidents, to discuss with the political group leaders, on 20 June, and again on 26 June.

At the same time, the European political parties will continue their internal discussions and their talks with other political families. The ‘negotiators‘ for the political families, who met initially ahead of the informal dinner, are: Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis for the EPP, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez for the PES, and French President Emmanuel Macron and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte for ALDE/Renew Europe. An important point in the discussions will be whether there is again an understanding that the person appointed European Council President should see their 2.5-year mandate automatically renewed for the second half of the institutional cycle or whether another person from a different political family could take over at that point.

As various Heads of State or Government, such as Macron and Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, have mentioned, the European Council is expected to reach a political agreement on the EU’s new leadership positions at its next formal meeting, on 27-28 June. Michel also noted that another important decision was to be taken at that meeting: the adoption of the new political priorities for the European Union, in the form of the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. Both of these decisions will then shape the coming EU institutional cycle (see EPRS briefing, The European Council’s role at the start of the new EU institutional cycle). In that context, Michel expressed the view that it was the European Council’s collective responsibility to take a decision on both these matters by the end of June.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Outcome of the informal dinner of EU leaders of 17 June 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.