European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

This year’s International Women’s Day will, once again, be held in the shadow of the coronavirus pandemic, which has exposed and exacerbated existing gender inequalities. To mark the occasion, Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) is hosting a meeting with national parliaments on 3 March 2022, to explore the potential of gender-sensitive recovery policies, spotlighting inter-related issues around unpaid care work, teleworking and wellbeing.

Impacts of the coronavirus pandemic on gender equality

Before the pandemic, gender equality was advancing in most of the areas measured by the EU’s gender equality index, and the less gender-equal Member States were catching up with the most gender-equal ones. The pandemic has put these advances at risk. Issues brought into sharp focus include the gender dimensions of the increase in unpaid care work, the accelerated shift to remote working and the impacts of both these developments on wellbeing and mental health.

Unpaid care work

The gap in time spent doing unpaid care work was already one of the widest and most persistent of the gender gaps measured in the gender equality index. The pandemic has led to an unprecedented shift of this work to the private sphere, due to the extra time family members are spending at home, and closures of, or irregular access to, nurseries, schools and support services. Surveys conducted by Eurofound show that men’s contribution has increased, but women have shouldered the lion’s share of the additional housework, childcare and schooling, even when they are in paid work. The gender care gap is one of the key reasons why women are more likely than men to be in part-time, low-paid and precarious jobs, or out of the labour market altogether. This has undermined their financial security during the Covid‑19 crisis, particularly as these jobs have been more likely to be terminated or furloughed. Research shows that the additional unpaid care work is adding pressures on women – especially working mothers with school-age or younger children – to reduce their working hours or disengage from the labour market.

Teleworking

The pandemic has accelerated the shift to remote working. At EU level, the share of employed people working from home doubled from 5.4 % to 12 % between 2019 and 2020. There is a gender divide, with shares of 5.7 % for women and 5.2 % for men in 2019, rising to 13 % and 11.2 % in 2020. Teleworking is often seen as a way of introducing more flexible working patterns that can contribute to work-life balance and help parents, especially mothers, to stay in or re-enter paid employment. However, the experience of teleworking during the pandemic has also highlighted its potential limitations. The blurring of boundaries between work and home life can lead to more rather than less conflict between work and home, particularly if teleworking is seen a way of resolving childcare issues. There is also a risk that if the gender care gap is not addressed, normalisation of teleworking will open up a further gap between men going back to working on-site and women working at home to meet care responsibilities, with implications for their training opportunities, career advancement and pay.

Wellbeing

Both the increase in unpaid care work and the shift to teleworking have implications for wellbeing. Eurofound and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) find that the additional unpaid care work has had significant impacts on women’s work-life balance and mental health, increasing rates of anxiety and depression. Teleworking can also have adverse effects on mental health, since it can be associated with longer working hours and greater work intensity, resulting in work-related stress and sleep disorders, which are reported to be higher in women.

Avenues for an ambitious gender-sensitive recovery

From the outset of the coronavirus pandemic, there have been calls to ensure that policy responses contribute to gender equality and the EU’s resilience to future shocks. One key recommendation is to ensure systematic gender mainstreaming in all policies intended to address the immediate economic and social damage and the move to a more sustainable and digital society. There are also recommendations for more targeted policies:

• Closing the gender care gap: The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) is calling for a two-pronged approach of promoting more equal sharing of unpaid care work between women and men and ensuring access to affordable provision of formal care. Concrete measures could include extending parental leave and incentivising fathers to take it; and investing in the care sector, including improvements to pay, career prospects and working conditions for care workers.
• Establishing a gender-sensitive framework for teleworking: The International Labour Organization (ILO), the Council of the European Union and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) recommend that teleworking policies should be developed in conjunction with other policies to ensure work-life balance, equal training and career opportunities, address the gender gap in digital skills and prevent violence and harassment. To avoid teleworking cementing the gender care gap, companies could set mandatory telework days.
• Making use of recovery funding to invest in a care-led recovery: Unlike in the case of the 2008 economic and financial crisis, recovery from the Covid‑19 pandemic is expected to be supported by expanding public investment. Economists have demonstrated that switching recovery investment from the traditional focus on construction and manufacturing to the care sector would create more jobs for both women and men and provide a better economic stimulus. A study for the European Parliament recommends that at least 30 % of the EU funding provided through the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) should go to investment in the care economy, to put it on an even footing with the allocations of 37 % and 30 % for the green and digital transitions.

Action at EU level

EU legislation aimed at addressing the gender gap in unpaid care and facilitating work-life balance by establishing new rights to parental and carers’ leave, is due to be transposed into national law in 2022. The European Commission also intends to propose a new European care strategy, which is expected to include revised EU targets on childcare provision, and recommendations on long-term care. The European Pillar of Social Rights and the related action plan adopted in 2021 already establish parents’ right to access care services as a key principle. The EU gender equality strategy for 2020-2025 identifies closing gender gaps in caring roles as a priority and urges the Member States to invest in childcare. There is scope for them to do so using EU recovery and structural funding, this being a specific objective of the ESF+ programme.

European Parliament positions

In January 2021, Parliament adopted a resolution on the gender perspective in the Covid‑19 crisis and post-crisis period, addressing the harmful gendered and intersectional impacts of the pandemic and setting out recommendations for overcoming them. Parliament is clear that current and future challenges will require ‘a gender-sensitive approach, with gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting principles reflected in all aspects of the pandemic response’. Parliament has consistently called for better provision of affordable childcare, drawing attention to its role in improving outcomes for children, enabling parents – particularly mothers – to enter, stay in or return to employment, and achieving gender equality. Parliament has called on Member States to use EU funding programmes, including recovery funding, to invest in childcare services. It has also called specifically for investment in the care sector and for a new care deal for Europe. Parliament has highlighted the urgent need to consider the risks posed by the increase of teleworking during the pandemic for people with caring responsibilities, particularly women, and called for gender aspects to be addressed in the context of the right to disconnect. Parliament has made recommendations for addressing the gender dimension of mental health in connection with the gender care gap and work-life balance.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Beyond the pandemic: The potential of ambitious gender equality policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak.

The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, providing the European Union (EU) with exclusive competence in the area of ‘direct investment’, as part of the common commercial policy. This covers the conclusion of international investment agreements (IIAs), which typically aim to protect and/or liberalise foreign direct investment. Since then, the EU has ratified protection IIAs (or provisions in trade agreements) with Canada, Singapore and Vietnam.

Early on, concerns were raised as to the specific EU competence. Opinions requested from the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) established that the EU had neither exclusive competence in portfolio international investments (which, unlike direct investments, provide limited control over a firm) nor in the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism – two domains covered by EU protection IIAs. EU Member State approval on these provisions was therefore needed. Moreover, to tackle stakeholders’ general misgivings about the ISDS system – currently based on arbitral tribunals and perceived by some as insufficiently transparent and predictable – the EU is actively contributing to the multilateral talks to reform the current system, the objective being to establish a fully fledged ‘multilateral investment court’ with an appeal tribunal and its own judges.

Furthermore, EU Member States have protection IIAs with other Member States in place (intra-EU IIAs), which envisage arbitral ISDS mechanisms. However, the CJEU ruled in 2018 that arbitral decisions between Member States are incompatible with EU law, and most Member States have agreed to terminate their intra-EU IIAs, raising major stakeholder concerns; the European Commission has launched an initiative to address these with a proposal for a regulation.

Finally, for security reasons, the EU has also implemented EU- and domestic-level mechanisms to screen, coordinate and exchange information about direct investment entering the EU.

The European Parliament is preparing an own-initiative report on EU international investment policy.

Read this briefing on ‘EU international investment policy: Looking ahead‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

ISDS decisions initiated since 2000 with decisions in favour of investors; total awards (in current billion US dollars, left scale) and number of cases (right scale) EU Member States’ IIAs with third countries that have been signed (and entered in force) since 2009

Written by Anna Caprile.

In July 2021, the European Commission adopted its communication on the new EU forest strategy for 2030, pursuing the biodiversity and climate neutrality objectives enshrined in the European Green Deal and the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030. The strategy aims to improve the quantity and quality of EU multi-functional forests, by reversing negative trends and increasing their resilience against the high uncertainty brought about by climate change. The strategy has sparked heated debate amongst various stakeholders and policy-makers.

A new strategy for EU forests EU Forests – Key facts
· In 2020, forests covered 38 % of total EU land area (159 million hectare (ha)), representing approximately 5 % of the world’s forests.
· Forest coverage ranges from 66 % in Finland to 1.5 % in Malta.
· Forest area of the EU has been increasing since 2010, at a pace of 0.3 million ha per year (2010‑2015) and then 0.2 million ha per year (2015‑2020).
· The 2020 State of Europe’s Forests report concluded that, on average, the condition of European forests is deteriorating.
· There are 16 million private and public EU forest owners: 60 % of the forest area is privately owned, and 40 % publicly owned.
Source: European Commission.

The work on a new strategy to replace the previous 2013 EU forest strategy began in October 2020 with a roadmap consultation, followed by an open public consultation, which ended in April 2021, incorporating meetings with stakeholders and evidence from the impact evaluation of the previous strategy.

The 16 July 2021 new EU forest strategy, a flagship element of the European Green Deal and a key action under the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, is seen as a strategic component to achieve the EU’s biodiversity objectives, as well as its greenhouse gas emission reduction target of at least 55 % by 2030 and subsequent climate neutrality by 2050. The strategy aims to improve the quantity and quality of EU forests, reversing negative trends and adapting EU forests to the new conditions, weather extremes and high uncertainty brought about by climate change. The strategy includes a set of regulatory, financial and voluntary measures for 2021‑2030, with the multi-functional role of forests at its core.

The measures proposed in the strategy, to be reviewed in 2025, include:

• promoting sustainable forest management (SFM), including by encouraging the sustainable use of wood-based resources;
• providing financial incentives for forest owners and managers to adopt environmentally friendly practices, such as those linked to carbon storage and sequestration;
• improving the size and biodiversity of forests, including by planting 3 billion new trees by 2030;
• promoting alternative forest industries, such as ecotourism, as well as non-wood products, such as cork, honey and medicinal plants;
• encouraging the take-up of financial support under the common agricultural policy (CAP), which can help forests and forest-based industries mitigate against climate change;
• providing education and training for people working in forest-based industries and making these industries more attractive to young people;
• establishing a legally binding instrument for ecosystem restoration, and a new legislative proposal on EU forest observation, reporting and collection;
• protecting the EU’s remaining primary and old-growth forests.

Council conclusions

In November 2021, the Council adopted conclusions on the strategy, after several rounds of deliberations. Member States welcomed the publication of the strategy and ‘its increased ambition for the contribution of forest through their multifunctional role to the European Green Deal and … 2030 Agenda’ They nevertheless stressed the need to strike a balance between the environmental, social and economic aspects of sustainable forest management, as well as the importance of maintaining the diversity of forests and forest management practices in different Member States and regions, respecting their competences in the area. Moreover, the Member States expressed doubts about the added value of developing national strategic plans for forestry, as envisaged in the Commission’s communication, and encouraged the use of existing international monitoring and reporting processes. Finally, ministers recommended that the existing Standing Forestry Committee (SFC) remain the main forum for discussion, reinforcing its role in the implementation of the strategy.

Advisory Committees

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) adopted its opinion on the new EU forest strategy in December 2021 (rapporteur Simo Tiainen, Diversity Europe-Group III, Finland). While the Committee acknowledged that the forest strategy addresses economic and social opportunities, it stressed that a more comprehensive approach is necessary, including concrete proposals on how to remunerate the non-commercial ecosystems services provided by forests. The EESC emphasised the need to avoid one-size-fits-all solutions and the importance of making decisions at the right level, in accordance with competences and the principle of subsidiarity. The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) is preparing an opinion on the strategy, after undertaking a written stakeholder consultation.

Stakeholder positions

The European Forest Owners and Managers, in an October 2021 statement, expressed concern about a strategy it considered not sustained by the realities on the ground, and lacking due consideration of the great diversity of EU forests. They pointed out that ‘conserving biodiversity, restoring ecosystems and increasing carbon sinks are the dominant elements within the strategy …, resulting in lack of coherence with climate and growth objectives’. Furthermore, they noted that, under the new strategy, the European Commission takes responsibility for a number of areas so far managed by Member States, and regretted the fact that forest owners and managers had not been involved in the development of payments for ecosystems services.

Fern, an organisation dedicated to EU forest protection, welcomed several aspects of the new strategy, such as a new legislative proposal for EU forest monitoring and data collection and a reinforced EU forest governance mechanism. However, when analysing its impact in the context of the whole ‘fit for 55’ package, Fern concluded that the pressure on forests will likely increase over time. Other environmental non-governmental organisations, such as the World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF), welcomed the adoption of the strategy and its overall goals, while regretting that some components appear to be weakened in the final version compared to previous drafts, shifting towards voluntary measures and lacking clear safeguards to prevent intensified forest management and harvesting.

Parliament position

In its 2020 resolution on the ‘European forest strategy – the way forward’, the European Parliament set out its priorities for a revised post-2020 strategy. The Parliament called for an ambitious, independent and self-standing EU forest strategy, aligned with the European Green Deal and the biodiversity strategy for 2030. It stressed the need to give full political support to the forestry sector, acknowledging the multifunctional role played by forests and ensuring adequate financial instruments combining EU, national and private funding, where the EU strategy should act as a bridge between national policies and broad EU objectives and programmes. The EP called for recognition of the role of forestry, agro-forestry and forest-based industries in the post-2020 CAP, and in the implementation of the European Green Deal. These principles were further reflected in the Parliament’s resolution on the ‘EU biodiversity strategy for 2030‘, as well as in its position during the negotiations on the post-2022 CAP, on which EU legislators reached a deal in 2021.

The European Parliament has decided to draw up an own-initiative report on the new EU forest strategy. For further information, see the EP Legislative Train Schedule page on The New EU Forest Strategy 2030.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘New EU forest strategy for 2030‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask how the European Union (EU) helps provide opportunities for citizens to study and learn abroad. Erasmus+ is the EU’s integrated education programme. Aiming to improve people’s skills and employability, it is open to people of all ages and occupations. The programme follows-up on many prior initiatives, which it combined and integrated.

Erasmus+: content and beneficiaries

Erasmus+ provides opportunities for students, staff, trainees, teachers, volunteers and others. Its benefits are available to all EU citizens, as well as non-EU citizens depending on their location. A distinction is made between programme countries (all EU countries as well as some others such as Iceland and Norway) who can take part in the whole Erasmus+ programme, and partner countries (non-EU countries such as Russia and China) who are only eligible for some parts of the programme, which are subject to specific conditions.

Both individuals and organisations can apply to take part in Erasmus+, although individuals most often apply and take part through an organisation such as their school or university.

Erasmus+ is built on three key actions:

• Individual mobility: this includes activities such as studying abroad for a certain amount of time during university studies, or volunteering in another participating country;
• Cooperation for innovation and the exchange of best practices: this provides funding for organisations to work together and improve their practices, for example through meetings between educational institutions in different countries;
• Policy development: this funds and can promote organisations in line with EU policies – international youth organisations promoting cooperation, for example.

Erasmus+ 2021-2027

The 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme, adopted in May 2021, doubles the funding of the previous programme, bringing it to over €26 billion. It is expected to contribute to establishing a European Education Area by 2025.

Additionally, the new programme is more sustainable and more inclusive, with improved access for people who had fewer opportunities in previous programmes. This includes people with disabilities, or those with financial difficulties in accessing educational opportunities. The programme also simplifies administrative procedures for small-sized organisations, and promotes the learning of digital skills.

The EU is aware that European programmes dedicated to young people are still inaccessible to those with fewer opportunities. To address this, the European Commission adopted measures to increase the inclusiveness and diversity of Erasmus+ in October 2021. Measures to support participants include preparatory visits, language support, enhanced mentoring or personalised coaching.

Following its exit from the EU, the United Kingdom has chosen not to take part in the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme. While some projects with multi-annual funding in which the UK takes part are still being phased out, the UK now has non-associated third country status. This means that only limited opportunities with worldwide eligibility will be available to UK citizens and organisations.

European Year of Youth 2022

In December 2021, the EU decided to make 2022 the European Year of Youth. The year will focus on re-establishing a positive outlook for young Europeans negatively affected by the Covid‑19 pandemic, by organising youth-focused and youth-centric activities and initiatives across all EU countries in 2022.

The European Year of Youth will include conferences, initiatives promoting youth participation in policy-making, and awareness-raising campaigns on a more inclusive, green and digital EU, as well as research into the situation of young Europeans. Further information is available in the Parliament and Commission press releases.

Further information

• Erasmus +, European Parliament
• Education and Vocational Training, European Parliament, Factsheet
• Erasmus 2021-2027: The Union programme for education, training, youth and sport, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, July 2021
• Impact of the Erasmus+ programme, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, April 2020
• Erasmus+: More than just mobility, European Parliamentary Research Service, At A Glance, September 2019

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Luisa Antunes with Laia Delgado Callico.

Artificial intelligence (AI) was at the core of the response to the Covid‑19 pandemic, which in turn contributed to accelerating the development of AI. These technological advances carry benefits, risks, ethical issues and societal implications, which must be addressed when discussing policy options in AI governance.

On 12 February 2022, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) organised an event entitled ‘Ethical issues in the Covid‑19 pandemic: The case of digital health applications’. This online workshop included a presentation of an STOA study on AI in healthcare, followed by a discussion panel on the related ethical, regulatory and policy challenges.

European Parliament Vice-President and STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) opened the event, highlighting STOA’s commitment to technology as a fundamental means for ensuring EU citizens’ wellbeing.

Presentation of the STOA study ‘Artificial intelligence in healthcare: Applications, risks, ethical and societal impacts’

Karim Lekadir, Researcher, Director of the AI in Medicine Lab at the University of Barcelona (Spain) and principal author of the study, presented the main healthcare benefits of AI, including improvement of diagnosis and triage prediction, enhanced risk prediction and disease prevention, personalised treatment, optimisation of surgical intervention outcomes and self-care management.

Professor Lekadir provided guiding principles and policy options for the trustworthy application of AI in healthcare. The use of AI requires a holistic multi-criteria approach, based on principles of accuracy, robustness, fairness, usability, explainability, durability and traceability. The risks and biases can only be identified and minimised in a systematic manner, with a merged stakeholder approach, involving more research and education, where clinicians are kept at the centre of decision-making, using AI as a support, rather than a replacement tool, and ensuring a feedback loop for AI to learn from its mistakes.

Panel discussion on digital health tools: Governance and practice

STOA Panel member Anna Michelle Asimakopoulou (EPP, Greece) introduced the panellists and moderated the discussion.

Effy Vayena, Professor of Bioethics at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich and Chair of the Hellenic Commission for Bioethics and Technoethics, addressed the use of digital health applications in Covid‑19 contact tracing and their low adoption rate among citizens. In her view, the transparency and lack of public accountability of the companies behind these apps are an issue, making governance essential to ensure their acceptance and their success with the public.

Alessandro Blasimme, Senior Scientist, Health Ethics and Policy Lab, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich, discussed the development of AI during the Covid‑19 pandemic and associated ethical issues, including prioritisation of healthcare access. Although there are already EU regulatory instruments and operational standards in place, they still do not operate coherently. He argued that regulation alone is insufficient to safeguard and promote responsible innovation in healthcare, which would benefit from an ‘ethics-by-design’ and principle-based approach.

Timo Minssen, Professor of Law and Founding Director of the Centre for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law at the University of Copenhagen, stressed the importance of incorporating ‘lessons learnt’ from the current pandemic in the guidelines for preparedness for the prevention and management of future pandemics. This will require healthcare applications that are efficient and globally accessible and deployable. Nevertheless, geopolitical context and competitive interests complicate the regulation of these applications.

Elettra Ronchi, Senior Policy Consultant in Digital Health and Data Governance with the World Health Organization (Europe office), highlighted the key role that timely and reliable data collection played in the Covid‑19 response. An effective public health response depends on data governance that addresses privacy and data protection measures, as well as health information system gaps. To inspire public trust, the collection and sharing of personal data should be evidence-based, proportionate to the risks, limited in time and implemented with full transparency.

During the Q&A session, Professor Lekadir stressed that validation and evaluation of health applications should run in parallel with their development to ensure accuracy of AI decisions. Patient engagement is essential in this process in order to gain public trust. Dr Ronchi remarked how legislation is still not fully adapted to the digital era and raised the importance of ‘regulatory sandboxes’ to keep up with AI development. In addition, public trust is linked to disinformation and the current ‘infodemic’ has undermined the global response to the pandemic. Professor Minssen stressed the importance of multidisciplinary discussions between regulatory, social and technical experts, while also highlighting the importance of technology sustainability. Dr Blassime reflected on the importance of open and pluralistic discussions of ethical risks to accompany the regulatory framework. Professor Vayena called for transparency in the use of technology and a procedure to translate consensus into processes and mechanisms to act upon these values and ethical principles.

Anna Michelle Asimakopoulou concluded the event, reiterating that public trust in these technologies is key. The full recording of the event is available here.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Marie Lecerf (1st edition).

Equal pay for equal work is one of the European Union’s founding principles, enshrined in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, the implementation and enforcement of this principle remain a challenge. Due to a lack of pay transparency, pay discrimination often goes undetected and victims face difficulties in making a claim for redress.

On 4 March 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal on binding pay transparency measures. The proposed directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms focuses on measures to ensure pay transparency, and better access to justice for victims of pay discrimination. The Council agreed its approach on the proposal on 6 December 2021. On 7 September 2021, the co-rapporteurs from the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), jointly responsible for the file, presented their draft report. On 15 November 2021, the joint committee took stock of the 1 090 amendments tabled. A negotiating position will be agreed after the joint committee vote on the draft report, expected in March 2022.

Versions

• February 2022: Equal pay for equal work between men and women: Pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms (1st edition)

Equal pay for equal work between men and women (pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms) Committees responsible:Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)COM(2021) 0093Co-rapporteurs:Rafaela Samira (Renew Europe, the Netherlands)
Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Greens/EFA, Denmark)2021/0050(COD)Next steps expected:Vote on the draft report in committeeOrdinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The February 2022 plenary session in Strasbourg took place at a time of considerable international tension. Members debated statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell (HR/VP), on EU-Russia relations, European security and Russia’s military threat against Ukraine. Parliament debated Council and Commission statements on the cyber-surveillance of politicians, prosecutors, lawyers and journalists, and others in EU Member States. Members also debated the HR/VPs statement on EU-Africa relations, and in a formal sitting, heard an address by Iván Duque Márquez, President of Colombia. A debate was held on the consequences of the European Court of Justice ruling on rule of law conditionality. Parliament celebrated the 20th anniversary of the euro, in the presence of Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank.

Charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures

To reduce CO2 emissions and alleviate congestion, the EU proposes to change and extend the long-standing rules on charging heavy goods vehicles for using infrastructure such as roads and bridges. While national governments set vehicle charges, the ‘Eurovignette’ system aims to ensure no discrimination or market distortion. Members approved at second reading the Council’s position, following the agreement between the co-legislators, to focus charges on distance travelled, rather than time taken. Charges will be extended to lighter vehicles, with reductions to encourage use of low-emission vehicles. The approval confirms Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) demands for transparency, with Member States required to report regularly on the charges they levy and on the use of the revenue.

Protection of workers from risks related to exposure to carcinogens at work

Members debated and adopted the provisional agreement reached during interinstitutional negotiations on the fourth update of the legislation protecting workers from carcinogens, mutagens and other harmful substances that may cause health issues, such as infertility (reprotoxins). The agreed text sets stricter occupational exposure limits for hazardous substances, where Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) negotiators have succeeded in including a requirement for the European Commission to present an action plan to set limits for at least 25 substances by the end of 2022.

Strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer

Members debated the report concluding the work of Parliament’s Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA) – strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer – making recommendations aimed at combating the second most common cause of death in the EU. These include stronger EU action on risk factors, such as alcohol and tobacco consumption, wider screening, and more funding for research. To ensure that access to cancer treatment is fair and accessible, the report advocates facilitating access to clinical trials and innovative treatment, better management of medicine shortages, and transparency on pharmaceutical pricing. Parliament also calls for better protection of patients’ rights through a Europe-wide ‘right to be forgotten’.

Common foreign and security policy and common security and defence policy

The EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) sets the framework for EU action outside the Union. In a joint debate, Members discussed implementation of both the CFSP and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), discussing the Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee’s 2021 annual reports. Noting the need to strengthen multilateral partnerships, AFET calls for an enhanced EU role in peace mediation, and better use of the existing sanctions provisions. While focused on the EU neighbourhood, the report welcomes opportunities to advance multilateral and bilateral agreements through partnerships with strategic players, such as the USA. Climate change is considered a particular threat, and the report supports measures to further European strategic sovereignty in key enabling technologies, in view of the green and digital transitions. The report highlights the geopolitical challenges of Russian and Chinese actions, and applauds progress on the Strategic Compass. The AFET report on CSDP focuses on the EU’s security and defence doctrine. It urges a more action-oriented policy, a stronger EU defence sector, and underlines the need for greater Parliamentary scrutiny of CSDP action.

Human rights and democracy in the world

Democracy and human rights are Parliament’s first priorities in all its activities, and Members debated and adopted the 2021 AFET annual report on human rights and democracy. The report calls for firm opposition to the decline in democracy and rising authoritarianism worldwide, exacerbated during the pandemic. It highlights the need for better, results-oriented multilateral coordination to counter democratic erosion and to uphold human rights. In particular, the committee calls for support for the United Nations and respect for human rights in migration situations. It stresses the need to protect rights and freedoms, to counter the effect of the pandemic on women, and to promote fair access to vaccines, among other things. The AFET report also underlines the continuing fight against corruption and disinformation in elections, as well as the need to ensure trade and development agreements uphold human rights.

A statute for European cross-border associations and non-profit organisations

Mutual societies, associations, foundations and social enterprises often face multiple legal and administrative challenges when operating across EU borders. Parliament debated and adopted a legislative-initiative resolution from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee, calling on the Commission to propose legislation on minimum EU standards for cross-border associations and non-profit organisations. Enabling these organisations to obtain legal personality should help them face challenges, such as national legal provisions that leave them open to discriminatory and unjustified restrictions on access to resources.

A European strategy for offshore renewable energy

As climate change exacerbates crisis and conflict, steps to limit damage to the environment continue in line with the EU’s climate ambition. Parliament debated a Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) own-initiative report on the EU offshore renewable energy strategy, an important element of the European Green Deal. The report calls for the EU to increase production of renewable energy, underlining that greater infrastructure investment, research and development is needed, as well as more cooperation between EU countries. The report proposes that the scope of the offshore renewables market is widened to all EU sea basins, with streamlined permits and maritime spatial plans, and a more effective market design.

Implementation report on on-farm animal welfare

Parliament has long echoed citizens’ concerns about animal welfare, demanding action to ensure that the high standards demanded by EU laws are respected in all EU countries. Members debated a Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) own-initiative implementation report on farm animal welfare calling for updated rules based on scientific data, impact assessments and a species-by-species approach that covers all species. The committee warns that implementation should be uniform, and urges extension of the legislation to cover issues such as battery-caged hens.

Implementation of the Toy Safety Directive

Members debated a Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) own-initiative report, examining implementation of, and proposing improvements to, the Toy Safety Directive. The IMCO committee sees a need for even greater precaution regarding chemicals, particularly endocrine disruptors, in toys, and calls for stricter surveillance and enforcement. The report also calls for legislation to cover ‘connected toys’ and to ensure that non-compliant toys are removed from online marketplaces.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, a mandate for negotiation from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee on the proposal for a regulation ensuring financial stability in the banking system (on the prudential treatment of global systematically important institutions).

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – February 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s military build-up around Ukraine, as well as fears of an armed conflict between the two countries, have highlighted the importance of the on-going debate about how to strengthen the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). On 17 February, the European Parliament adopted resolutions calling for a more ambitious CSDP, to counter threats such as terrorism, cyber-attacks, exploitation of migration for political purposes, and foreign interference. The Parliament has also welcomed the work of governments on the Strategic Compass, a long-term plan for the EU to become a better provider of security, to act faster and more decisively to protect EU values and interests, and to contribute to international peace. The adoption of the Compass would also help the EU to achieve a stronger degree of strategic autonomy.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on European defence and security. Recent reports on the Ukrainian crisis can be found in a previous item from the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

Could EU-endorsed ‘coalitions of the willing’ strengthen EU security policy?
Centre for European Reform, February 2022

The EU’s Strategic Compass is a defining moment for European defense
Atlantic Council, February 2022

Hybrid warfare is not synonymous with cyber: The threat of influence operations
Egmont, February 2022

The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Elevating the EU’s added value as a security provider
Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, January 2022

EU strategic autonomy: A perennial pipe dream?
European Policy Centre, January 2022

Strategic autonomy: Not without integration
Egmont, Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, January 2022

Uncharted and uncomfortable in European defence
Clingendael, January 2022

Multi-layered actions? Sustaining partnerships in the EU integrated approach to conflicts and crises
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

In the shadow of war: Ukraine and the limits of a ‘geopolitical’ EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

Where next for EU security policy in the Asia-Pacific?
International Institute for Security Studies, January 2022

Never-ending divorce: The role of UK-EU security cooperation after Brexit
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Multipolarity and EU Foreign and Security Policy: Divergent approaches to conflict and crisis response
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2021

Construire l’autonomie stratégique de l’Europe face à la Chine
Institut Jacques Delors, December 2021

The EU’s defence ambitions: Understanding the emergence of a European defence technological and industrial complex
Carnegie Europe, December 2021

Is the EU about to build its own military capacity? Thanks to Germany, the jury’s still out
Atlantic Council, December 2021

The EU as a global actor in the Indo-Pacific
Atlantic Council, December 2021

The future of European strategy in a changing geopolitical environment
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, December 2021

EU defence projects: Balancing member states, money and management
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2021

Russia’s threat to invade Ukraine and Europe’s soft power
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2021

Dealing with the neighbours: The case for an affiliate membership of the European Union and a new Security Council
European Policy Centre, December 2021

Strategic Compass: New bearings for EU security and defence?
European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2021

Strategic Autonomy: Views from the North
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, December 2021

Is the European peace facility really about peace?
Centre for European Reform, December 2021

Autonome EU-Finanzsanktionen: Wege zum wirkungsvollen Einsatz
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2021

The need for cooperative security In Europe
Brussels Schools of Governance, December 2021

An architecture fit for strategic autonomy
Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, November 2021

Unpacking open strategic autonomy
Clingendael, November 2021

Regional fragmentation and EU Foreign and Security Policy
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2021

Not yet fit for the world: Piecemeal build-up of EU military, cyber and intelligence assets
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2021

Europe’s high-end military challenges: The future of European capabilities and missions
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, November 2021

Britain and France should stand together
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Bridging the Channel: The UK’s nuclear deterrent and its role in European security
Centre for European Reform, November 2021

Kill the battlegroups
Egmont, November 2021

Seven steps to European defence, Transatlantic equilibrium, and global Europe
Egmont, October 2021

The European Army: The future of Europe’s defence or an economic windfall in disguise?
József Knowledge Centre, October 2021

On defence, the ball is in Europe’s court
Centre for European Reform, October 2021

L’autonomie stratégique, cet obscur objet du désir
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2021

Countering hybrid threats
Clingendael, October 2021

Bridging the Channel: How Europeans and the UK can work together on defence capability development
Centre for European Reform, October 2021

After Afghanistan and AUKUS: What next for European defence?
Centre for European Reform, October 2021

Building European strategic autonomy vs. Turkish strategic depth: Macron’s diplomatic gamble
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2021

The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass
Europeum, József Knowledge Centre, Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Slovak Security Policy Institute, October 2021

The EU’s security and defence policy: In search of a compass
Centre for Eastern Studies, September 2021

Sharing the burden, sharing the secrets: The future of European intelligence cooperation
Clingendael, September 2021

Emerging challenges for European security and defence
International Institute for Security Studies, September 2022

AUKUS and the EU: A snub for the bloc?
Egmont, September 2021

The AUKUS agreement: What repercussions for the European Union?
Fondation Robert Schuman, September 2021

Read this briefing on ‘European defence and security‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell.

Russia has become increasingly problematic for the EU. The 2008 war against Georgia only resulted in a temporary cooling of relations, but after Moscow’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea, there was no return to business as usual. The EU adopted its first sanctions against Russia in response to violations of Ukrainian sovereignty, and these have stayed in place ever since. With fears of renewed aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the EU is considering additional measures. Russia’s actions in other areas also challenge international norms – illegal use of chemical weapons, cyber-attacks aimed at undermining Western democracies, and human rights abuses: these too have met with EU sanctions.

For maximum effect, the EU coordinates its restrictive measures with the US and other countries such as Canada. EU and US sanctions focus on similar targets, but there are also significant differences in approach, which sometimes cause frictions between the trans-Atlantic partners.

While most Western sanctions target Russian individuals and organisations rather than the country as a whole, Ukraine-related sectoral sanctions have a much broader economic impact. These measures, adopted by both the EU and the US, are directed at three strategic sectors of the Russian economy: defence, energy, and finance.

Defence sector sanctions include an arms embargo, restrictions on exports of dual-use (civilian-military) goods, and (from the US side) secondary sanctions against third countries purchasing Russian weapons. Overall, sanctions have not stopped Russia from pursuing its military modernisation programme, but may have hampered production of certain types of weapons and helped to curb arms exports. With regard to energy, restrictions on cooperation led to the cancellation of some oil projects; in spite of this, Russia’s oil and gas sector continues to flourish. In the financial sector, banks were initially hard-hit by the loss of access to Western financing, but are now more resilient than in 2014.

The overall impact on Russia’s economy is hard to measure; estimates put the cost of sanctions at between 0.2 % and 2 % of GDP a year, but there is consensus that oil price volatility and deep-seated structural factors rather than sanctions are the main constraints on Russia’s economic growth, which has averaged less than 1 % since 2014.

The political impact of sanctions is unclear. There is no evidence that they have persuaded Russia to modify its behaviour, nor have they created any visible pressure for change within Russia itself. Arguably, they have deterred further aggression in eastern Europe, although their effectiveness in this respect is now being put to the test by Russia’s threatening military manoeuvres on the Ukrainian border.

Read the complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Western sanctions and Russia: What are they? Do they work?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Foreign direct investment in Russia (FDI stocks, US$ million) Russian GDP growth Russia, external corporate debt US$ billion Russian oil, gas production, exports In tonnes (oil)/cubic metres (gas); 2013 = 100 Russian arms exports Estimated value: US$ billion Sanctions timeline Sanctions and Russian public opinion, 2014-2021

Written by Eric Pichon.

Africa has been put at the core of the Commission’s geopolitical work programme and of the French Presidency of the Council of the EU. In February 2022, a summit between EU and African Heads of State and Government will discuss ways to build a new and comprehensive partnership, based on five pillars put forward by the EU: green transition and energy access, digital transformation, sustainable growth and jobs, peace and governance, and migration and mobility. Although the proposal mainly builds on existing frameworks, its high profile and clear commitment to the African Union (AU) make it an important milestone in an effort for a deeper relationship and strengthened partnership in multilateral fora, initiated several years ago.

In order to preserve its own economic and security interests in the face of increased geopolitical competition, the EU intends to continue to be an important player on the African continent. The EU and the AU have converging interests in a number of areas, such as the fight against climate change and the promotion of a sustainable, job-creating African economy. However, they still have to find common ground on migration, security management, and fundamental values.

The comprehensiveness of the proposed strategy is challenged by the gaps and overlaps of the current variable-geometry partnerships. The coronavirus outbreak delayed the adoption of a common strategy. At the same time, it clearly highlighted the need to strengthen the links between the two continents in order to tackle the most urgent global issues. Measures to fight the current pandemic and to prevent future ones have reframed the priorities and will give new impetus to partnerships in areas such as health, the fight against climate change, and promoting the digital transformation.

This briefing updates ‘Towards a new EU strategy with Africa’, published in June 2020.

Read this briefing on ‘Understanding the EU’s approach to a new partnership with Africa‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia continues to strengthen its military presence around the Ukrainian border, despite intensive diplomatic activity to ward off a feared armed conflict between the countries. Russia has amassed more than 100 000 troops, as well as ships, aircraft, rocket launchers and other heavy weaponry near Ukraine, prompting some politicians and analysts to say that war may be imminent. Others believe Russian President Vladimir Putin is still playing a diplomatic game, aimed, among other goals, at bringing Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence. The United States, the European Union and other countries have threatened severe sanctions against Russia should it start new hostilities, following its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the destabilisation of some eastern Ukrainian provinces.

This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the crisis and its implications for neighbouring countries, the European Union and global geopolitics. More reports on the issue can be found in a previous item from the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Friendly arguments: Biden’s and Zelensky’s disagreement on the threat from Russia
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Why the war in Ukraine could reshape the European nuclear order
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

How the Russia-Ukraine crisis could change Sweden’s security policy
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Putin knows exactly what he wants in eastern Europe, unlike the West
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Russia’s choices and the prospect of war in Ukraine
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2022

Russia’s ‘military-technical solution’ for Ukraine
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2022

Belarus seeks to amend its constitution to host Russian nuclear weapons
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2022

Russia’s assault on Ukraine and the international order: Assessing and bolstering the Western response
Brookings Institution, February 2022

How the demise of an arms control treaty foreshadowed Russia’s aggression against Ukraine
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 2022

For Biden, wreaking havoc on Russia’s economy is the least bad option
Atlantic Council, February 2022

Russia crisis military assessment: What would a ground offensive against Ukraine look like?
Atlantic Council, February 2022

With Putin poised to invade, Zelensky must prioritize Ukrainian unity
Atlantic Council, February 2022

How the Ukraine crisis could become a disaster for Russia
Heritage Foundation, February 2022

The return of US leadership in Europe: Biden and the Russia crisis
Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2022

Is Putin winning, or is he trying not to lose?
Egmont, February 2020

What Ukraine reveals about NATO and the EU
Carnegie Europe, February 2022

Rewinding the clock? US-Russia relations in the Biden era
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2022

Will tough US sanctions deter Russian aggression in Ukraine?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2022

Russia’s shifting foreign and security policy in Northern Europe: The new geopolitical meaning of ‘good neighbourliness’
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, February 2022

Kontraproduktive Drohpolitik: Russland drängt Finnland und Schweden näher an die Nato
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2022

Die Ukraine unter Präsident Selenskyj: Entwicklung hin zum ‚populistischen Autoritarismus‘?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2022

Ukraine conflict: An escalation within limits
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2022

How do the militaries of Russia and Ukraine stack up?
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

The Russia-Ukraine crisis could determine the future of sovereignty
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Putin’s Ukraine quagmire
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Russia and the West: A new Cold War?
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Russia-Ukraine: Diplomacy is the best hope for heading off a deeper crisis
International Crisis Group, February 2022

The Ukraine crisis: There is still room for diplomacy
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, February 2022

Ukraine: Germany is not to be relied upon?
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, February 2022

Murky waters: The Black Sea region and European security
Friends of Europe, January 2022

Western diplomacy on Russia must serve deterrence
International Institute for Strategic Studies, January 2022

What does Putin want with Ukraine and how does he plan to get it?
German Marshall Fund, January 2022

What it’s like in Ukraine as the Russia crisis unfolds
German Marshall Fund, January 2022

What next for diplomacy between the West and Russia?
German Marshall Fund, January 2022

Russia’s energy role in Europe: What’s at stake with the Ukraine crisis
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Why NATO has become a flash point with Russia in Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Guide to the chess game at the United Nations on Ukraine crisis
International Crisis Group, January 2022

In the shadow of war: Ukraine and the limits of a ‘geopolitical’ EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

Is Germany damaging Europe’s position on Ukraine?
Carnegie Europe, January 2022

The Russia-NATO crisis tests Turkey’s balancing policy
Carnegie Europe, January 2022

Europe faces tough choices on Nord Stream 2 if Russia invades Ukraine
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2022

Ukraine: The price of stability
Egmont, January 2022

A proposal for a new Western policy on the Russia-Ukraine conflict: Re-position to de-escalate
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, January 2022

Is a Russia-Ukraine war imminent?
Chatham House, January 2022

Why Putin’s gamble does not have to be lose-lose
Chatham House, January 2022

The future of European security: What does Russia want?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, January 2022

Can Europe survive painlessly without Russian gas?
Bruegel, January 2022

Once in a hole, stop digging: Russia, Ukraine, the West and the imperative of diplomacy
Clingendael, January 2022

The power of keeping calm: Ukraine in the face of Russia’s potential aggression
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2022

Russia demonstrates its power in Belarus and on the oceans worldwide
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2022

NATO member states on arms deliveries to Ukraine
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2022

Does Russia want a new Berlin Wall?
Foreign Policy Centre, January 2022

Why do we think we can read Putin’s mind on Ukraine?
The Hill, January 2022

If Russia invades, sanction its oil and gas
Brookings Institution, January 2022

Why Europe has no say in the Russia-Ukraine crisis
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Bonfire of sovereignty: Russian tanks in Belarus
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Moldovan lessons for the Ukraine conflict
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Kazakh lessons for authoritarian leaders: How Putin and Lukashenka could fail the test
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

The EU’s unforgivable failure
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

War in Ukraine: Erdogan’s greatest challenge yet
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Free-rider on the storm: How Russia makes use of crises in its regional environment
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2022

Russia’s threat to invade Ukraine and Europe’s soft power
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022

How serious is Europe’s natural gas storage shortfall?
Bruegel, December 2021

A winter of Russian discontent?
Clingendael, December 2021

Read this briefing on ‘The Ukrainian crisis: Military threats and diplomacy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

On 17 November 2021, the European Commission tabled a legislative proposal aimed at curbing deforestation and forest degradation driven by the expansion of agricultural land used to produce specific commodities, namely cattle, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, soya and wood. Following up on a 2020 European Parliament resolution, which called for regulatory action to tackle EU-driven global deforestation, the proposal would impose due diligence obligations on operators placing these commodities and some derived products on the EU market, or exporting them from the EU. Member States would be responsible for enforcement, and for setting penalties in case of non-compliance. To facilitate due diligence and control, a benchmarking system would identify countries as presenting a low, standard or high risk of producing non-compliant commodities or products. Obligations for operators and national authorities would vary according to the level of risk assigned to the country of production.

While generally supporting the proposal, stakeholders have raised some issues, regarding for instance the commodities covered, the protection of human rights, the impacts of the country benchmarking on trade relationships, and the role of third-party certification.

In the Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. In the Council, work on the file is ongoing at working party level.

Versions

• February 2022: Towards deforestation-free commodities and products in the EU (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the making available on the Union market as well as export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 706
17.11.2021Rapporteur:Christophe Hansen (EPP, Luxembourg)2021/0366(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Delara Burkhardt (S&D, Germany)
Chrysoula Zacharopoulou (Renew, France)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Angelos Delivorias.

On 8 February 2022, participants in this online roundtable assessed the current economic and budgetary state of the European Union and its potential evolution in the coming years. Anthony Teasdale, Director‑General of EPRS, welcomed a panel of distinguished guests: Pedro Silva Pereira, Vice-President of the European Parliament, Karlo Ressler, Rapporteur on the 2022 EU Budget for the European Parliament Committee on Budgets (via video), Isabel Vansteenkiste, Director General for International and European Relations at the European Central Bank (ECB); Alfred Kammer, Director of the European Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); Maria Demertzis, Deputy Director of the Bruegel think tank, Director of the EPRS Members Research Service, Etienne Bassot, and Alessandro D’Alfonso, head of the EPRS Next Generation EU (NGEU) monitoring service. The event was moderated by Lasse Boehm, head of the EPRS Economic Policies Unit.

‘How strong is Europe’s economic recovery?’ The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) put this very topical question to participants during this event promoting the sixth edition of its flagship publication, the EPRS ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for 2022‘.

Anthony Teasdale, Director-General of EPRS, welcomed a prestigious panel of participants: Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D, Portugal), Vice-President of the European Parliament, Karlo Ressler (EPP, Croatia), Rapporteur on the 2022 EU Budget for the European Parliament Committee on Budgets, Isabel Vansteenkiste, Director General for International and European Relations at the European Central Bank (ECB); Alfred Kammer, Director of the European Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Maria Demertzis, Deputy Director of the Bruegel think tank, Director of the EPRS Members Research Service, Etienne Bassot, and Alessandro D’Alfonso, head of the EPRS NGEU monitoring service.

Anthony Teasdale opened the event and introduced the EPRS flagship annual publication, the ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook‘, now in its sixth year and the focus for this event. The publication offers an overview of the economic and budgetary situation in the EU and beyond, and summarises the main economic indicators in the EU and euro area and their two-year trends. In addition, it analyses the EU annual budget and its headings for 2022, all within the wider budgetary context of the EU’s post-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery fund. A ‘focus’ chapter highlights some aspects of the ongoing economic recovery –fiscal and monetary matters, labour issues and environmental choices – and aims to give a flavour of the discussion expected in the coming months.

Post-pandemic outlook

Vice-President Silva Pereira noted that the figures for 2021 were good, and going forward, are expected to be positive, although growth is projected to slow. However, he pointed out that, just like a year ago, while projections may be optimistic, emerging events such as new coronavirus variants (such as Delta and Omicron in 2021) could have an impact. The Vice-President’s first point therefore was that the pandemic must be monitored, as the outlook depends on its development. Vice-President Silva Pereira also noted that the EU currently also faces other crucial challenges, such as inflation generally – and high energy prices specifically – as well as supply chain issues. He also welcomed the optimistic signs on the employment front with positive figures in evidence, in many cases thanks to the measures taken by the Member States and the EU. In this context, he warned against the early withdrawal of important supporting instruments currently in place.

At the same time, Vice-President Silva Pereira stressed, it is important to acknowledge that the current recovery is uneven across sectors and Member States and that the EU needs to take this into account, as inequalities could constitute a major challenge going forward. There is also the question of the health of public finances, where deficit and debt have significantly increased in countering the pandemic, and may challenge the transition to ‘normalcy’ (end of the general escape clause) in the short-to-medium term. Some advocate a return to prudent fiscal policies, and inflation leads the ECB to think about moving towards a less expansionary monetary policy. In this context, it is important to get both the fiscal and monetary timing and their mix right. Moreover, investment is crucial for the recovery, and if countries with better economic and fiscal situation invest, the spill over effects might help everyone. Another challenge comes from the budgetary front and the own resources decision, where an effective implementation of own resources must be ensured. A proposal is on the table, but there is a long way to go between proposal and adoption.

Concluding, Vice-President Silva Pereira spoke about the ongoing debate on the economic governance review, where several proposals have been made by various stakeholders on what kind of revisions to perform, and whether to conclude the review before or after the general escape clause ends. In this context, he noted that, while the euro is still a work in progress and necessitates rules, attention must also be paid to completing the architecture of the economic and monetary union (EMU).

European Parliament priorities in financing the post-pandemic recovery

The floor was then passed to Karlo Ressler, Rapporteur for the 2022 EU budget. Although not available to attend in person, Mr Ressler provided a pre-recorded video made for and played during the event.

In his message, Mr Ressler shared insights into the challenges of the recent budgetary negotiations. The circumstances caused by the pandemic were not favourable. Mr Ressler explained that the European Parliament clearly stated its priorities from the beginning of the process. Its aim was to support recovery from the pandemic, boost green and digital investment, support young people in education and student mobility, and strengthen Europe’s capacity to face global challenges, beyond the existing EU goals. Negotiations with the Council were difficult and lengthy, as positions diverged regarding the budget allocations and the interpretation of the own resources decision concerning the repayment of NGEU interests. Parliament succeeded in reaching a satisfactory agreement on the 2022 budget, reinforcing the areas where there is greatest added value for EU citizens. The budget increased by almost €500 million, beyond the Commission’s proposals for priority programmes (Erasmus+, Horizon Europe, Asylum, migration and integration fund, single market and others). The 2022 EU budget was also significantly reinforced by NGEU funds.

European Central Bank perspective

Following Mr Ressler’s intervention, moderator Lasse Boehm, head of the EPRS Economic Policies Unit invited ECB Director General Isabel Vansteenkiste to set the scene from the ECB perspective.

Isabel Vansteenkiste first spoke about the current conjuncture and then adopted a broader perspective. According to her, the developments are positive – the economy bounced back swiftly – however, the recovery is not yet complete. Indeed, if we extrapolate the trend in GDP growth since 2014, a gap remains to be covered. Moreover, sectors have recovered unevenly: the manufacturing sector reached its pre-pandemic levels (although supply constraints persist), but the service sector still has some way to go, partly due to the slowdown in activity due to the Omicron variant.

Turning to inflation, Isabel Vansteenkiste noted that surprise increases continue, as the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) has reached over 5 % in the euro area. In this context, she noted that these surprises relate both to sectors where prices increased, as well as to the speed of that increase. Isabel Vansteenkiste noted that energy price inflation is an important factor in overall inflation, but even when excluded, HICP has risen due to a variety of other factors, including the pandemic (e.g. air fares, where ticket prices were very low at the onset of the pandemic, and are now significantly higher), and imported elements, such as supply chain bottlenecks. She noted that the ECB expects inflation to fall by the end of the year, but underlined the important role of energy prices, which in turn depend on geopolitics.

Looking back, the ECB Director General noted that there were some positive indications, given that some fears have not materialised. One of these was in the corporate sector, where significant bankruptcies were expected. This did not happen – to the contrary, the number of bankruptcies is lower than normal, due to the policy measures introduced to fight the pandemic. At the same time, she noted that the high debt accumulated by companies may stifle investment and constitute a break in the necessary digital and climate transitions going forward. Another threat that did not materialise to the extent expected, was labour market scarring. Labour markets recovered much faster than expected, in large part due to the job retention schemes put in place during the pandemic. Nonetheless, she noted that there are signs of mismatch in the labour markets (Beveridge curve), which could create challenges, and therefore need to be monitored.

Going forward, the ECB Director General noted the importance of long-term reform, such as reducing the tax bias against equity finance for example. She further noted that the twin (digital and climate) transition may need further sectoral reskilling and reallocation. Focusing on the green transition, she noted that the investment needs in this area are significant, and not yet met, and she was of the view that if fighting climate change is a public good, the discussion of the economic governance report should take this into consideration. There should be a discussion about pooling resources at EU level (e.g., a climate fund) to meet those needs.

International Monetary Fund perspective

Based on new data published recently by the IMF, as well as feedback from a consultation, IMF Director Alfred Kammer noted that the EU has recovered rapidly, thanks to forceful policies supporting disposable incomes, maintaining worker-firm links, preventing mass bankruptcy and ensuring credit flow. In this context, the euro area should exceed its pre-crisis output by 2025. At the same time, the recovery remains uneven: it has been slower in Member States with a high labour percentage in contact-intensive service sectors. This could lead to GDP growth divergence between EU countries, as well as increase inequalities. In this context, he praised the role the NGEU could play in preventing further divergences.

Alfred Kammer went on to note that while fiscal policy is still supportive, fiscal support becomes more and more targeted. Once the expansion is more firmly entrenched (possibly by the end of 2022), the Member States should start consolidating their finances, while remaining flexible regarding the possibility for more accommodation in case of further adverse impacts to their economies.

Regarding the labour market, Alfred Kammer underlined that, while the labour market has tightened, slack remains. Moreover, the large labour reallocation needs going forward call for bold policies (reskilling and upskilling workers), and for the protection of vulnerable groups (enhanced safety nets). With regards to the EU architecture, there is a need to reform EU fiscal rules and complete the financial single market (i.e. the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union (CMU)). Lastly, with regards to climate change, the NGEU is an important step towards ‘Fit for 55’, but more is needed (as the necessary investment amounts to 1 % of GDP per year, while for the moment Member States are expected (in their plans) to invest around 0.2 %). A central investment fund in this context is meaningful, as is private investment. For the latter, Alfred Kammer stressed the importance of carbon pricing and environment, social and corporate governance (ESG) indicators.

The think tank view

Deputy Director of the Bruegel think tank, Maria Demertzis first focused on inflation, noting that we have forgotten how to think about inflation, since the last time inflation risks were important was 20 years ago. Inflation in 2021 was mainly driven by supply-side factors, which central banks cannot do much about. As a result, and while this may not help the average consumer facing higher prices, she is of the view that, for the moment, central banks should not react. At the same time, she noted that there are indications of second round effects (supply side problems become demand side problems, e.g. wage inflation), and here, central banks cando something. However, Maria Demertzis remarked that even that is not without problems: increasing interest rates will have effects on Member State borrowing capacity, which can lead to financial fragmentation. While preventing financial fragmentation is not the ECB’s primary objective, she noted that it nevertheless cannot remain indifferent to this problem.

Concluding, Bruegel’s Deputy Director remarked that, to sustain the recovery and avoid introducing risks, the fiscal side must play a central role. In this context, it is very important to rethink the fiscal rules and to pool resources. In this latter case, the NGEU is of primary importance, but the EU should also consider other initiatives, such as the climate-related funds already mentioned.

Inflation perspectives

In the lively discussion that followed, Alfred Kammer pointed out that the data show that inflation is currently provoked by an exogenous shock (energy), but that second round effects can be dangerous. In contrast to the EU situation, US consumer price inflation is driven by durable goods and is very broad based (including automobile price inflation).

Isabel Vansteenkiste reminded participants that inflation was not a worry up to last year, but is indeed a concern today. She also noted the importance of inflation expectations, which are closely monitored. With regards to Maria Demertzis’ reference in non-industrial goods inflation, she noted that this is also closely monitored. With regards to wage growth, the ECB Director General noted that further wage growth should be expected, but, at the same time, those numbers must be adjusted for productivity.

Medium- to long-term outlook

Regarding the medium-to long-term outlook, Maria Demertzis’ view is that the main problem going forward is striking a balance between the investment demands necessary for the twin transition and debt sustainability, which ought to be at the core of EU policies. In this context, she noted the important role played by the NGEU as well as of joint pooling for the twin transition. On this point, Alfred Kammer highlighted that the NGEU is scheduled to end around 2025, while EU countries should continue to invest until at least 2030. In this context, he reiterated that it is very important to create a ‘central capacity’ at EU level for public investment, as climate is a public good. He also noted, however, that the public sector cannot bear the burden of climate adaptation alone – the private sector should help. He is of the view that incentives must be provided, and noted the importance of carbon pricing and the ESG disclosure standards in this context. Isabel Vansteenkiste agreed, and noted that, whether we want it or not, climate change is happening – it is our choice whether we suffer the costs of its impact, or counter it through the policies we adopt – and economics points towards adopting policies.

Next Generation EU and the Recovery and Resilience Fund

The discussion then turned to the NGEU and the RRF. The moderator passed the floor to Alessandro D’Alfonso, head of the newly-created NGEU monitoring service (NEXT) at EPRS. Alessandro D’Alfonso noted that 2022 was the first year of deployment of the RRF. Most plans are up and running and it is now time to deliver. The milestones and targets to be met average 20 per week. While not all results will be immediately visible due to the multiannual nature of many measures, it is important to make sure that they are followed through, to ensure the results. In his view, NGEU can be summarised in three key words:

• investment: (major challenges in the areas of the green and digital transitions and inclusion that require significant investments). The 2008‑2009 global financial crisis and the ensuing EU economic and sovereign debt crises triggered an investment gap in the EU, which persisted for a long time. A repeat of that situation should be avoided, given the challenges to address. He also noted that, during the current crisis, the level of public investment in the EU has increased, including with the contribution of the NGEU recovery instrument;
• impact: while the EU budget is relatively small, it is nevertheless an investment budget. Moreover, NGEU doubles its size in 2022 and in the following years. In addition, to maximise their potential, NGEU combines those investments with structural reforms and aims to trigger additional private investment through InvestEU; and
• income: from 2028, or possibly earlier, the EU budget will have to repay the NGEU resources borrowed on the markets. This could reduce the future capacity of the EU to use its budget to invest in key priorities. To avoid that risk, the European Parliament has underlined that new own resources must finance the EU budget. Proposals are currently on the table, and these are crucial files in the context of a broader debate on the financing of European public goods.

The head of the EPRS NEXT service concluded by noting that NGEU is an important lever that can help EU towards meeting the many challenges of the digital and climate transitions and crisis resilience.

When asked by Lasse Boehm whether they think that the RRF is enough and whether more needs to be done about its governance, Maria Demertzis argued that much more is needed going forward. She agreed about the importance of structural reforms directed towards growth and climate adaptation and mitigation. Similarly, she noted the importance of future-proof fiscal rules and private investments. In this context, she was of the view that completion of the CMU is of central importance (given that more developed capital markets can attract greater public and private funding for transition), as is the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies. She also underlined the importance of own resources going forward, and argued that the European Parliament must involve citizens in the discussion, as own resources imply more taxes on citizens.

Isabel Vansteenkiste noted the importance of fiscal efforts, especially given that the natural rate of interest is still very low. She also noted that the lessons from NGEU should be taken into account when discussing the role of the European Semester and that the RRF could be a great blueprint. Alfred Kammer agreed on the importance of fiscal efforts, as fiscal policy can and should play a role in macroeconomic stabilisation. He also highlighted that the IMF has advocated in favour of a central fiscal capacity for the EU.

Regarding fiscal policy coordination, Maria Demertzis noted that, in the short term, managing fiscal policy needs to be coordinated in order to be counter-cyclical (i.e. being prudent in good times to create a buffer for bad times), and not pro-cyclical as was previously the case.

Closing the event, Director of the EPRS Members Research Service, Etienne Bassot, thanked the participants, and reminded the audience that the EPRS Economic and Budgetary Outlook, as well as a new EPRS series that analyses individual national recovery plans, are available to the public.

To watch the event, please click here.

Written by Clément Evroux.

Over the past decade, space has gained increasing importance as an economic sector offering opportunities for established and emerging markets.

Space policies and their applications have also gained in political relevance due to their capacity to tackle global challenges, such as the climate and biodiversity crises, but also due to the growing reliance of the EU economy and society on space infrastructure, services and data.

Pursuant to Article 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), space is a shared competence of the EU and its Member States.

EU space policy has two overarching goals: on the one hand, promoting scientific and industrial competitiveness with a view to nurturing EU spatial ecosystems and ensuring EU autonomy in space; on the other, increasingly harnessing space investments and services to address key EU political priorities such as the European Green Deal and the Digital Decade.

This briefing focuses on the state of play in regard to the EU’s space economy, while also examining the EU’s reliance on space services. Specifically, it highlights the relevance of the EU in the global space market and looks at the ways the EU could boost its use of space data and services to deliver on its main political priorities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU space policy: Boosting EU competitiveness and accelerating the twin ecological and digital transition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Kiss (1st edition).

Platform work is an umbrella concept covering a heterogeneous group of economic activities completed through a digital platform. As platform workers’ rights are not enshrined in EU labour law, this increasingly leads to problems related to various aspects of their work (working conditions, healthcare, unemployment, pensions) and human development (education, training, recognition of skills). To remedy this situation, the European Commission has submitted a proposal for a directive aimed at improving the working conditions of platform workers, clarifying their employment status and supporting the sustainable growth of digital labour platforms in the EU.

Versions

• February 2022: Improving the working conditions of platform workers (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving working conditions in platform work Committee responsible:Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)COM(2021) 762
09.12.2021.Rapporteur:Elisabetta Gualmini (S&D, Italy)2021/0414(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Dennis Radtke (EPP, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

Some five years after the conclusion of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the political, economic, health and general situation in the country remains fragile, with a divided society, drugs-fuelled conflicts and weak governance. 2022 will be a key electoral year, while economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic remains a challenge. The President of Colombia, Iván Duque Márquez, is set to address the European Parliament during the February plenary session.

Political and economic situation

The year 2022 will be crucial for Colombia, with legislative elections scheduled for 13 March and the first round of presidential elections set for 29 May. Inequality, the economy, state capacity, violence and the handling of the pandemic are key issues for voters, and protests flared up during 2021. Polls point to a lead for Gustavo Petro, a left-wing candidate and former guerrilla, while analysts concur it is too early for robust predictions. Colombia, Latin America’s fourth-largest economy, is burdened by low trade openness and a commodity-dependent export base that leaves it vulnerable to price shocks; efforts to foster diversification have fallen short. The pandemic has led to the country’s most severe economic recession in over a century, aggravating unemployment, currently estimated at 13.8 % for 2021. However, gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have recovered to pre-pandemic levels by end-2021. About 64 % of Colombians are fully vaccinated against Covid-19, which is just about the average for the region. From 3 January 2020 to 8 February 2022, Colombia reported 5 966 706 confirmed Covid-19 cases, with 135 757 deaths, to the World Health Organization (WHO).

Security and human rights

In 2017, Colombia became a partner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the first in Latin America. It also signed a framework participation agreement to take part in EU-led Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions (entry into force in 2020). However, the country struggles significantly with security issues. With 177 killings in 2020, Colombia remains the world’s most lethal country for human rights defenders. The year 2020 saw a rise in the number of murders of social leaders, human rights defenders and former FARC members, the highest since 2011. Illicit cocaine cultivation and production are increasing. Colombia remains the primary source of origin for cocaine transported to the United States. Cocaine from Latin American producer countries (mainly Colombia) is the second most seized illicit drug in the EU.

EU-Colombia relations and EU support for the Colombian peace process

The EU has supported the Colombian peace process from the beginning – through diplomacy, international cooperation and development, humanitarian aid and civil protection, and investment and trade. This includes the EU-Colombia Trust Fund (€96.4 million); the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE); and, potentially, the European Peace Facility. The EU also finances United Nations projects to reintegrate ex-combatants. The EU is Colombia’s largest foreign direct investor and its third trading partner. Colombia is part of the trade agreement between the EU, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, in force since 2013. In October 2016, Colombia and Europol signed an agreement to improve the fight against criminal activities, in particular drug trafficking and money laundering. The Parliament, in its April 2021resolution on the peace agreement in Colombia, reiterated its readiness to continue providing all political and financial assistance to support the agreement’s implementation. The EU will deploy an EU election observation mission (EU EOM) to Colombia’s legislative and presidential elections; High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell recently appointed Javi López, MEP (S&D, Spain) as EU EOM Chief Observer.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Situation in Colombia ahead of crucial elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gregor Erbach (1st edition).

On 14 July 2021, as part of the ‘fit for 55’ package, the Commission presented a legislative proposal for a revision of the Regulation setting CO2 emission performance standards for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (vans). To raise the contribution of the road transport sector to the EU’s climate targets, the proposal sets more ambitious 2030 targets for reducing the CO2 emissions of new cars and vans and allows only zero-emission vehicles from 2035.

In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). Jan Huitema (Renew, the Netherlands), who was appointed as rapporteur, presented his draft report on 8 December 2021.

Versions

• February 2022: CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans: ‘Fit for 55’ package (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 556 final
14.07.2021Rapporteur:Jan Huitema (Renew, the Netherlands)2021/0197(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jens Gieseke (EPP, Germany)
Sara Cerdas (S&D, Portugal)
Bas Eickhout (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)
Sylvia Limmer (ID, Germany)
Pietro Fiocchi (ECR, Italy)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote

Written by Clare Ferguson.

As is traditional early in the year, Members are expected to debate a number of points on the agenda in Strasbourg that highlight the Parliament’s position on the European Union’s place in the world, not least in the light of recent geopolitical tensions. The session also marks the 20th anniversary of the euro. Returning to the custom of inviting heads of state and dignitaries to Parliament, the President of Colombia, Iván Duque Márquez, is expected to address Parliament in a formal sitting on Tuesday, with his country shortly to hold elections.

Later on Tuesday, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, will make a statement on EU-Africa relations, ahead of the (delayed) EU-Africa Summit, now scheduled for 17‑18 February 2022. Parliament is very much in favour of renewed EU partnership with the continent’s leaders, to strengthen links and tackle issues such as climate change and governance. However, it has underlined that this should not compromise democratic values in Africa. Democracy and human rights are Parliament’s first priorities in all its activities, and Members are expected to adopt a resolution on the EU’s 2021 annual report on human rights and democracy later on Tuesday afternoon, following consideration of the Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee’s own report. The AFET report calls for firm opposition to the decline in democracy and rising authoritarianism worldwide, exacerbated during the pandemic. It particularly highlights the need for better, results-oriented multilateral coordination to counter democratic erosion and to uphold human rights. In particular, the committee calls for support for the United Nations and respect for human rights in migration situations. It stresses the need to protect a number of individual rights and freedoms, to counter the effect of the pandemic on women, and to promote fair access to vaccines, among other things. The AFET report on human rights and democracy in the world also underlines the continuing fight against corruption and disinformation in elections, as well as the need to ensure human rights, particularly those of the most vulnerable in society, are upheld through trade and development agreements.

The HR/VP is also scheduled to make a statement on European security and Russia’s military threat against Ukraine on Wednesday, not least in the face of renewed US-Russia tensions. The EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) sets the framework for EU action outside the Union, including promotion of the EU values highlighted in the 2021 human rights report. In a joint debate on Tuesday afternoon, Members will discuss implementation of both the CFSP and the EU common security and defence policy (CSDP), in light of the 2021 AFET committee annual reports. Noting the need to strengthen multilateral partnerships, the CFSP report calls for development of the EU’s role in peace mediation, and better use of the existing sanctions provisions. While there is a strong focus on the EU neighbourhood, the AFET report welcomes the opportunities to advance multilateral and bilateral agreements through partnerships with strategic players, such as the USA. Climate change is considered a particular threat, and the report supports measures to further European strategic sovereignty in key enabling technologies in view of the green and digital transitions. The report highlights the geopolitical challenges posed by the actions of countries such as Russia and China, and applauds progress on the Strategic Compass. As the CSDP structures Member State cooperation on the EU response to crisis and conflict, the AFET committee’s 2021 annual report focuses on the EU’s security and defence doctrine, including the Strategic Compass, CSDP missions and operations, crisis management, resilience, capabilities, partnerships and parliamentary oversight. While the Strategic Compass represents a step towards a common EU defence union, the report underlines the need for greater support for CSDP missions, better crisis coordination, and the need to increase EU sea, cyber-, space and air capabilities. The report also calls for reflection on the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and for greater input from citizens on defence, notably in the framework of the Conference on the Future of Europe.

As climate change exacerbates crisis and conflict, steps to limit damage to the environment continue in line with the EU’s climate ambition. On Monday afternoon, Parliament is expected to consider a Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) own-initiative report on the EU offshore renewable energy strategy, an important element of the European Green Deal. The report calls for increased EU production of renewable energy, underlining that greater infrastructure investment is needed, including through EU funding, as well as further research and development and greater cooperation between EU countries. The report proposes that the scope of the offshore renewables market is widened to all EU sea basins, with streamlined permits and maritime spatial plans, and a more effective market design. To encourage the reduction of CO2 emissions and alleviate congestion, the EU proposes to change and extend the long-standing rules on charging heavy goods vehicles for using infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, to focus on distance travelled, rather than time taken. While national governments decide the charges on vehicles, the ‘Eurovignette’ system ensures there is no discrimination or market distortion. Members are scheduled to return to the issue on Wednesday afternoon, following negotiation between the co-legislators. Parliament is expected to consider the agreement, reached in trilogue, to extend the directive to cover charges for lighter vehicles, including passenger cars, and to progressively differentiate charges based on CO2 emissions and reductions for low emission vehicles. The draft agreement confirms Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) demands that Member States report regularly on the charges they levy and on the use of the revenue.

On Tuesday morning, Members are due to debate the final report concluding the work of Parliament’s Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA) – strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer – which makes recommendations aimed at combating the second most common cause of death in the EU. These include stronger EU action on cancer risk factors, such as alcohol and tobacco consumption, and wider screening. To ensure that access to cancer treatment is fair and accessible, the report advocates facilitating access to clinical trials and innovative treatment, better management of medicine shortages, and transparency on fair pricing and affordability of pharmaceuticals. The BECA committee also underlines the need for more funding for cancer research. On Thursday morning, Members are also scheduled to debate formal adoption of a provisional agreement reached during interinstitutional negotiations on the fourth update of the legislation protecting workers from carcinogens and other harmful substances that may cause health issues such as infertility. The agreed text sets stricter occupational exposure limits for hazardous substances, where Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) negotiators have succeeded in including a requirement for the European Commission to present an action plan to set limits for at least 25 substances by the end of 2022. When it comes to protecting children, the EU already has some of the world’s strictest requirements on toys, particularly concerning hazardous chemicals. On Tuesday afternoon, in advance of an update to the legislation, Members are expected to debate an own-initiative report from the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), examining implementation of, and proposing improvements to, the Toy Safety Directive. The IMCO committee sees a need for even greater precaution regarding chemicals, particularly endocrine disruptors, in toys, and calls for stricter surveillance and enforcement. The report also proposes to update the legislation to cover ‘connected toys’ and to ensure that non-compliant toys are removed from online marketplaces.

Parliament has long echoed citizens’ concerns about animal welfare, in calling for action to ensure that the high standards demanded by EU laws are respected in all EU countries. Members will consider a Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) own-initiative implementation report on farm animal welfare on Monday afternoon. The committee calls for updated rules based on scientific data, impact assessments and a species-by-species approach that covers all species, as well as for uniform implementation. The committee urges that the legislation cover issues such as keeping hens in battery cages, docking pigs’ tails and castrating piglets. The report also advocates a common framework for voluntary animal welfare labelling, with the possibility of a mandatory system in the future. While farmers’ stakeholders welcomed the report, which they consider takes their competitiveness into account, it has been criticised by animal welfare organisations.

Mutual societies, associations, foundations and social enterprises often face multiple legal and administrative challenges when operating across EU borders. On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is due to consider a legislative-initiative report calling on the Commission to propose legislation on minimum EU standards for cross-border associations and non-profit organisations. Enabling these organisations to obtain a legal personality would help them face the challenges identified in a Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee report, which stresses that national legal provisions for such organisations hamper the formation of a real pan-European civil society, leaving them open to discriminatory and unjustified restrictions, including regarding access to resources and free movement of capital.

• Situation in Colombia ahead of crucial elections
• Implementation report on on-farm animal welfare
• A European strategy for offshore renewable energy
• Strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer
• Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2021
• Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2021
• Human rights and democracy in the world – annual report 2021
• Implementation of the Toy Safety Directive
• A statute for European cross-border associations and non-profit organisations
• Charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures
• Protection of workers from the risks relating to exposure to carcinogens, mutagens and reprotoxins at work

Written by Jakub Przetacznik with Linda Tothova.

The media situation in Belarus has never been easy. With Aliaksandr Lukashenka being elected president of the country for the first time in 1994, the necessary reforms to provide media freedom have never materialised. Instead, over the years various laws have lessened the rights of independent journalists and imposed limits on both traditional and electronic media.

Following the August 2020 presidential election, which ignited a brutal crackdown against the democratic opposition, the situation has worsened. Harassment, a hijacking, and politically motivated jail terms, both short and long, intimidate Belarusians who want to exchange ideas, report wrongdoing or fight for freedom of expression and freedom for the country. In January 2022, the Belarusian Association of Journalists confirmed the presence of at least 32 journalists in Belarusian jails. On the positive side, new electronic media cannot be banned effectively and absolutely. While the regime slowly expands its presence on the internet, Belarusians trust independent media more and use it more eagerly. However, society’s distancing of itself from traditional state-controlled media is increasingly met with an angry reaction from the state apparatus, which in turn further tightens related laws.

The European Union, and the European Parliament in particular, actively support independent media and civil society in Belarus, and the Council of the EU and the Parliament both address the challenges to media freedom in the country. Financial help is also provided to Belarus and was even increased at the end of 2021, with priority areas of support including ‘systematically repressed’ independent media.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Media environment in Belarus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Audiences of the six biggest independent and six biggest pro-regime media internet outlets in June 2021 Registrations under law on mass media by media and ownership type Main sources of information

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition).

In July 2021, the European Commission put forward the ‘fit for 55’ package of legislative proposals, aimed at ensuring the success of the European Green Deal. The FuelEU Maritime regulation is one of these proposals and, together with four other proposals, it seeks to steer the EU maritime sector towards decarbonisation.

To support the uptake of sustainable maritime fuels, the Commission proposes to limit the carbon intensity of the energy used on board ships. Accordingly, the proposal sets up a fuel standard for ships and introduces a requirement for the most polluting ship types to use onshore electricity when at berth. It puts the responsibility for compliance on the shipping company.

The legislative outcome of this proposal will be closely linked to the simultaneously proposed rules on including the maritime sector in the EU emissions trading system, as well as those on alternative fuels infrastructure, energy taxation and renewable energy. Moreover, some of the proposed rules do not concern EU shipping only but have wider implications for international maritime shipping, which is regulated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Versions

• November 2011: Sustainable maritime fuels – ‘Fit for 55’ package: the FuelEU Maritime proposal (1st edition).

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of renewable and low-carbon fuels in maritime transport and amending Directive 2009/16/EC Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2021) 0562
14.07.2021Rapporteur:Jörgen Warborn (EPP, Sweden)2021/0210(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Vera Tax (S&D, The Netherlands)
Elsi Katainen (Renew, Finland)
Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Marco Campomenosi (ID, Italy)
Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium)
João Pimenta Lopes (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report