European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Katrien Luyten.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, over 3.4 million people have already been forced to seek refuge, mostly in neighbouring countries. The European Commission estimates that Russia aggression may have displaced up to 6.5 million people. In response, the European Union swiftly decided to grant EU-wide temporary protection to people arriving from Ukraine.

The EU Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) enables EU Member States to move rapidly to offer protection and rights to people in need of immediate protection and to avoid overwhelming national asylum systems in cases of mass arrivals of displaced persons. Although invoked several times in the past, the directive has never been activated before. Russia’s military aggression prompted a unanimous decision in the Council to grant temporary protection (for an initial period of one year) to people fleeing the war in Ukraine. This temporary protection may be extended automatically by two six-monthly periods, for a maximum of another year.

The EU’s decision to grant temporary protection has been widely welcomed and the directive is considered the most appropriate instrument under the current exceptional circumstances. There are, however, still many open questions as to its practical implementation in the EU Member States. The scale of the arrivals entails many immediate as well as longer-term challenges. On the other hand, and in spite of accusations of double standards in favour of ‘white’ or ethnic European refugees, the demonstrations of EU-wide solidarity with the Ukrainian people raise hopes for concrete progress on overall reform of the EU’s migration and asylum rules. At the time of writing, the conflict has already caused civilian casualties and the destruction of hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure, creating a humanitarian catastrophe both within Ukraine and beyond its borders.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Temporary protection directive‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Temporary protection directive‘ on YouTube.

Written by Tarja Laaninen.

The European Commission is planning to establish ‘nutrient profiles’, that is, maximum amounts for nutrients such as fat, sugar and/or salt in foods, above which the use of nutrition or health claims would be restricted or forbidden. For example, breakfast cereals exceeding a sugar limit could no longer advertise their fibre or vitamin content.

The Commission was already tasked with setting nutrient profiles to restrict the promotion of food high in fat, sugar and/or salt under the Nutrition and Health Claims Regulation (‘Claims Regulation’) adopted in 2006. Now, in accordance with the action plan accompanying the EU’s ‘farm to fork’ strategy, the Commission will submit a proposal on nutrient profiles by the end of 2022. The proposal will form part of a wider package revising EU legislation on food information supplied to consumers, together with proposals on front-of-pack nutrition labelling, origin labelling, date marking, and labelling of alcoholic beverages.

In the same package, the Commission also intends to solve a problem that has long been puzzling manufacturers and consumers in the herbal and plant products market, namely, that the same product can be classified both as a herbal medicine and as a food, depending on the Member State in which it is sold.

While most consumer organisations and health advocates strongly support the idea of introducing nutrient profiles, opponents caution against overly simplistic labels that punish certain food groups and lead health-conscious individuals to avoid them. The European Parliament has stressed that food information is a potent tool for empowering consumers.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Nutrient profiles: A ‘farm to fork’ strategy initiative takes shape‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava (1st edition).

In December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code, which lays down the rules governing controls at the EU internal and external borders. While debates on the reform of Schengen have been going on for a while, recent challenges related to the coronavirus pandemic on the one hand, and attempts to instrumentalise migrants as a way to put pressure on the EU’s external borders, on the other, have created new momentum for reform.

The Commission’s proposal aims to improve the Schengen system’s resilience to serious threats, and to adapt it to new challenges. It introduces a new coordination mechanism to deal with health threats at the external borders and a new Schengen safeguard mechanism to provide a common response at the internal borders in situations of threats affecting Member States, including the possibility to directly transfer irregular migrants apprehended at the internal borders back to the competent authorities in the EU country from which it is assumed they just came, without undergoing an individual assessment.

The proposal, which falls under the ordinary legislative procedure, is at the initial stage of the legislative process. In the European Parliament, the proposal has been assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). Preliminary discussions have also taken place in the Council.

Versions

• April 2022: Revision of the Schengen Borders Code (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders Committee responsible:Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2021) 891
14.12.2021Rapporteur:Sylvie Guillaume (S&D, France)2021/0428(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Sara Skyttedal (EPP, Sweden)
Malik Azmani (Renew, Netherlands)
Erik Marquardt (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Patryk Jaki (ECR, Poland)
Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left, Spain)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by David de Groot.

Since 2014, the European Parliament and European Commission have been calling on Member States not to grant citizenship in return for investment in the country concerned. Following the invasion of Ukraine by Russian military forces, these calls have intensified, with Member States now being urged to withdraw such citizenship when it has been granted to Russian or Belarusian nationals who are on the sanctions list or support the invasion.

Russian nationals and citizenship or residence by investment schemes

Three Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta) currently offer schemes granting nationality on the basis of a financial investment (citizenship by investment (CBI) schemes – or ‘golden passports’). Twelve Member States (Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and Portugal) offer schemes granting residence permits on the basis of investments (residence by investment (RBI) schemes – or ‘golden visas’).

An October 2021 EPRS study estimated that, between 2011 and 2019, over 132 000 people secured residence or citizenship in EU Member States by means of CBI or RBI schemes. However, for many schemes it is unclear who the beneficiaries are. While Russian nationals are not the biggest group on the global citizenship market, this is different in Cyprus and Malta, where they account for over 50 and 40 %, respectively, of naturalisations granted on the basis of CBI schemes.

In contrast to the above, in the EU – as far as information is available – there has generally been little take-up of RBI schemes by Russian nationals. The exception is Latvia, where the vast majority of approvals originate from Russia. This particular programme has, however, seen a steep decline in admissions since 2014. Most RBI scheme approvals nowadays occur in Greece, Portugal and Spain, where the percentages of Russian applications are lower.

Rethinking policy on golden passports and visas

In a joint statement of 26 February 2022, the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, committed, not least, to take ‘measures to limit the sale of citizenship – so called golden passports – that let wealthy Russians connected to the Russian government become citizens of our countries and gain access to our financial systems’.

On 2 March 2022, Malta announced that it had suspended, until further notice, the processing of applications from nationals of the Russian Federation and Belarus. Similarly on 24 March 2022, the Bulgarian Parliament adopted amendments to the Bulgarian Citizenship Act, abolishing the citizenship by investment scheme and requiring a review of previous naturalisations granted.

In a resolution of 9 March 2022, calling on the Commission to make specific legislative proposals on citizenship and residence by investment schemes (2021/2026(INL)), the European Parliament welcomed the commitment announced by the Member States to take measures to limit the sale of citizenship to Russian nationals connected to the Russian government. Nevertheless, Parliament called upon all Member States to stop operating their CBI and RBI schemes for all Russian applicants with immediate effect. It also urged Member States to: reassess all applications from Russian nationals approved over the past few years; exploit all possibilities under national and EU law to ensure that no Russian individual with financial, business or other links to the Putin regime retains their citizenship and residency rights; and temporarily block such individuals from exercising those rights. Parliament also called on the Commission to verify any such reassessments carried out by Member States and to present, as a matter of urgency, a legislative proposal to ban CBI schemes completely and to ban RBI schemes for Russian nationals who are subject to targeted measures.

On 28 March 2022, the European Commission issued a recommendation urging Member States to immediately repeal any existing investor citizenship schemes and to ensure strong checks are in place to address the risks posed by investor residence schemes.

The Commission also recommended that where a person concerned:

• is or becomes subject to EU restrictive measures, or
• where it is otherwise determined that the person concerned significantly supports, by any means, the war in Ukraine or other related activities of the Russian government or the Lukashenko regime that breach international law,

the Member State concerned should immediately assess, in accordance with the principles resulting from the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (C-135/08 Rottmann, C-221/17 Tjebbes), including the principle of proportionality and the protection of fundamental rights, whether naturalisation should be withdrawn from these individuals.

Equally, where such a person had acquired a residence permit on the basis of an RBI scheme, the Commission recommended that such a residence permit should be withdrawn or not renewed.

Member States were also asked to report on the implementation of the recommendation by the end of May, and to keep the Commission informed on a regular basis from May onwards.

On 6 April 2022, the European Commission sent a reasoned opinion to Malta (INFR(2020)2301) regarding its investor citizenship scheme. This is the final stage before the infringement procedure would be referred to the Court of Justice. The Commission considered that the granting of EU citizenship in return for pre-determined payments or investments, without any ‘genuine link’ to the Member State concerned, was in breach of EU law.

On 7 April 2022, after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had addressed the Cypriot Parliament calling for an end to the sale of citizenship to Russian nationals, the Cypriot President, Nicos Anastasiades, told reporters that instructions had been given for the revocation of four passports of Russians on the EU’s sanctions list.

Rules applicable to the withdrawal of nationality

According to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, when a Member State withdraws its nationality from a person, and as a result EU citizenship, it must make an individual assessment as to the consequences of this loss and the proportionality of the measure. Furthermore, such a withdrawal must – in principle – not lead to statelessness. This rule is laid down in international conventions, for instance under Article 7 of the European Convention on Nationality.

The same Article 7 also sets out the cases in which nationality may be withdrawn, by operation of law or at the initiative of a state party. These include:

‘b) acquisition of the nationality of the State Party by means of fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact attributable to the applicant;

c) voluntary service in a foreign military force;

d) conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State Party;’

These same grounds have been invoked in recent years for the withdrawal of nationality from terrorists, where the requirement of preventing statelessness resulted in the provisions targeting dual nationals, making the citizenship of dual citizens less secure than that of single-nationality citizens and raising questions about citizenship equality. Similarly, distinguishing between naturalised citizens and native citizens for the purpose of citizenship deprivation leads to the creation of different classes of citizens.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Reassessing ‘citizenship by investment’ schemes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

NATO has condemned Russia’s war on Ukraine in the strongest possible terms, and calls it ‘the biggest security threat in a generation’. The Alliance calls on Russia to cease hostilities immediately, withdraw all its forces from Ukraine and work towards a peaceful diplomatic solution. To avoid direct confrontation with Russia, NATO has made clear that it will not deploy forces to Ukraine, which is not a NATO member, nor will it enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine. The delivery of weapons and equipment to Ukraine (by individual NATO Allies) and the imposition of unprecedented sanctions are being organised predominantly outside the NATO framework. In order to deter further Russian aggression and reassure its Allies, NATO has substantially enhanced its own deterrence posture, with large deployments of troops and equipment to the eastern flank of the Alliance’s territory.

NATO response to Russia’s war on Ukraine

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO held three extraordinary meetings within a few weeks: meetings of defence ministers, and foreign ministers – both with the participation of partners – and an extraordinary NATO summit. NATO leaders called the Russian war on Ukraine the ’gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades’ and condemned the invasion in the strongest possible terms. They stressed that Russia must immediately stop the invasion and withdraw its forces from Ukraine. Allies reiterated their resolve in countering Russia’s attempts to destroy the foundations of international security and stability, and to defend its 30 Allies and ‘every inch of Allied territory’. NATO reiterated that it is united and resolute in opposing Russian aggression, and underlined its iron-clad commitment to Article 5, the Alliance’s collective defence clause. The Alliance also condemned Russia’s decision to recognise the separatist regions of eastern Ukraine, and emphasised that it stands with the people of Ukraine and its legitimate, democratically elected president, parliament and government. Allies called on Russia to engage constructively in credible negotiations. NATO also reaffirmed its commitment to NATO’s open door policy. In December 2021, Moscow had issued demands in the form of draft security pacts to the United States and NATO, demanding NATO pull back troops from eastern Europe and cease its open door policy for future members, including Ukraine, which the US and NATO rejected.

NATO support measures for Ukraine following the Russian war on Ukraine

The delivery of weapons and military equipment, as well as the imposition of sanctions, is taking place outside the NATO framework. NATO has repeatedly emphasised its role as a defensive alliance, and that it is not seeking a war with Russia. It has ruled out enforcing a no-fly zone over Ukraine, which would risk the crisis escalating and spilling over into a wider European conflict involving NATO Allies, or even potentially leading to World War III, although experts believe that the latter is unlikely. NATO has also reiterated that it will not deploy forces to Ukraine. At the same time, NATO has warned Russia that it must stop its ‘nuclear sabre-rattling’ and that any use of chemical weapons will have far-reaching consequences. NATO’s strategy has thus been ‘a careful balancing of its defensive mission, its credibility and the need to avoid escalation’. NATO says that it is assisting in the coordination of requests for assistance and supporting Allies in the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid, however details on this are unclear. NATO has also repeatedly expressed support for the delivery of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine by individual NATO Allies. Allies such as the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and EU Member States have provided Ukraine with weapons and equipment. Following a tasking from NATO leaders, at the meeting of foreign ministers on 6-7 April, NATO agreed to further strengthen and sustain support to Ukraine. Allies agreed to do more when it comes to weapons and military support. NATO committed to enhancing practical support to regional partners, including Georgia (e.g. on cyber and situational awareness) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (new defence capacity-building package), but also to increase practical and political cooperation with Asia-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand) on issues such as countering disinformation and cyber-threats. Ministers agreed that NATO’s next Strategic Concept (adoption of which is planned at the Madrid Summit in June 2022) must set guidelines for NATO’s future relationship with Russia and provide a roadmap for the Alliance’s adaptation to a more volatile and competitive world.

NATO relations with Ukraine
Ukraine is not a NATO member. While NATO had assured Ukraine in 2008 that it would one day join NATO, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently acknowledged that Ukraine will not seek NATO membership, a fact that has been ‘implicitly true’ for a long time, due to opposition from several NATO Allies stemming from a fear of escalating tensions with Russia. In fact, Ukraine was never offered a Membership Action Plan, a key step in the NATO accession process. Despite this, NATO maintains its open-door policy, as any reversal on the matter would breach its founding treaty (Article 10), violate the principles of the European security order and assign blame to NATO enlargement for escalating tensions. Relations with Ukraine date back to 1991, when it joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994, Ukraine joined Partnership for Peace, a practical bilateral cooperation programme with NATO. In 1997, the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) was established, to oversee Ukraine’s ‘Euro-Atlantic integration process’. Under its direction, areas of cooperation include, inter alia, building capabilities, including cyber, interoperability measures, training, security and defence reform and exercise participation, with the aim of enhancing Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. Ukraine actively contributes to NATO-led operations and missions: most recently Ukrainian special forces were commended for their role in evacuating 96 Ukrainians and Afghans at high risk from Kabul. In recognition of its strong commitment to NATO, Ukraine became one of six Enhanced Opportunities Partners (alongside Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden) in 2020, granting it enhanced access to interoperability programmes, exercises and information-sharing. NATO deterrence measures within the Alliance

NATO has significantly enhanced its defence and deterrence measures in response to Russia’s war on Ukraine, through the deployment of elements of the NATO Response Force, a multinational rapid-response force. As a result of substantial reinforcement by NATO Allies, there are currently 40 000 troops under direct NATO command stationed on the eastern flank of the Alliance. Additionally, 130 allied fighter jets and 140 allied ships are in the region, as well as national deployments of troops and weapons by Allies, including the UK, the US, Canada and European allies. Most significantly, US deployments of troops and equipment, such as Patriot missiles, to Europe have been stepped up, with 15 000 more US soldiers since February 2022, bringing the number of US troops stationed in Europe (including western Europe) to a total of 100 000. At the extraordinary NATO Summit on 24 March, leaders agreed to form four further multinational battlegroups, in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, bringing the total to eight. This deployment constitutes the ‘biggest reinforcement of Alliance collective defence in a generation’. NATO’s rapid reinforcement strategy ensures that these can be strengthened quickly. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently announced that NATO is working to transform the Alliance’s presence in the east to a large, permanent military presence. NATO had already decided in 2014 to enhance its deterrence posture in the east, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. And at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, it decided to increase NATO’s forward presence on its eastern flank, an important component of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture and reassurance measure. In 2017 the first four multinational battlegroups were deployed to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

European Parliament position

In an extraordinary plenary session, on 1 March, addressed by President Zelenskyy, Parliament adopted a resolution in which it noted that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of the Member States who are NATO allies, and welcomed the unity of the EU and NATO in facing Russian aggression. Parliament encouraged the strengthening of NATO’s enhanced forward presence on the eastern borders, and underlined the need to increase NATO’s collective deterrence posture, preparedness and resilience. Parliament welcomed the activation of NATO’s defence plan as well as the activation of the NATO response forces and their partial deployment in addition to troop deployments from NATO Allies. Parliament encouraged Member States to increase defence budgets, develop more effective capabilities and fully utilise joint EU efforts to strengthen NATO’s European pillar, which increases both NATO and EU security. In 2021, Parliament had adopted a resolution on EU-NATO cooperation, in which it welcomed the intensified cooperation with NATO since the 2016 Warsaw Joint Declaration and 2018 Brussels Joint Declaration, and emphasised that a strong EU-NATO partnership is vital to address the security challenges faced by both organisations. The EP also called on the EU to keep deepening its important partnership with NATO, and noted that, for Member States that are NATO Allies, NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: NATO response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Magdalena Psikowska-Schnass.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine aims to deny the sovereign country its right to a distinct identity. Indiscriminate shelling is seriously damaging Ukraine’s cultural heritage. International law sets rules to limit civilian deaths and destruction of cultural heritage, both are war crimes that the international community will need to address.

War in Ukraine: Saving innocent lives, and cultural heritage as an identity factor

When Russia invaded sovereign Ukraine on 24 February 2022, it claimed spiritual and cultural justification. However, Russia had already invaded eastern parts of the country in 2014, resulting in the illegal annexation of Crimea. Since then, Ukraine has been striving to protect its United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) world cultural heritage site in occupied Crimea, the ancient city of Tauric Chersonese and its 5th century BC Chora. Ukraine’s cultural heritage already suffered huge losses during World War II, when the Nazis carried out looting and destruction.

Cultural heritage in illegally annexed Crimea
The peninsula is rich in cultural heritage and has been subject to politically motivated interventions and russification of its history. There has been unlawful transfer of artefacts to Russia and illegal archaeological excavations, the findings of which have been exported to Russia or sold on the black market. The unique cultural heritage of Crimean Tatars has been destroyed and biased conservation works have obscured its origins. Threat to UNESCO world cultural heritage sites and cultural institutions in Ukraine

For weeks, Russian troops targeted Kyiv, home to UNESCO cultural heritage site Pechersk Lavra and Saint Sophia Cathedral. Besides sites in Kyiv and Crimea, the UNESCO list includes Lviv’s old town and three other sites (see map). Seventeen further sites are candidates for inclusion, featuring on UNESCO’s tentative list. Among them, the historic centre of Chernihiv, Kharkiv’s skyscraper, Derzhprom, the archaeological ‘Stone Tomb’ site, have all been affected by heavy fighting. As the frontline moves, other sites, such as the historic centre of Odesa and the Mykolayiv astronomical observatory, face serious danger of destruction.

Map: UNESCO cultural heritage sites, and cultural losses in Ukraine

However, the destruction of cultural sites across the country provoked by the Russian war has so far spared the western regions. The international press reports UNESCO’s preliminary list of cultural losses by the end of March 2022 included 29 religious sites, 16 historic buildings, 4 museums and 4 monuments. The Holocaust Memorial Centre in Drobitsky near Kharkiv, where the Nazis killed thousands of Jews, is among them. The Ivankiv Historical-Cultural Museum, north of Kyiv, was destroyed on 28 February 2022. The fate of its collection of 25 paintings by Ukrainian folk artist Maria Prymachenko, praised by Picasso and Chagall, is unknown.

International concerns and conventions

Crimes against human life and crimes against culture ‘are simply two different stages in the same violent process of ethnic cleansing and genocide’. The 1954 Hague Convention set rules for the protection of cultural property from destruction and looting during armed conflicts. Russia and Ukraine are both parties to the Convention. The text established a blue shield as an easily identifiable sign of immunity attributed to cultural property. The notion of intentional destruction of cultural property as a war crime is further developed in the 2017 UN Security Council Resolution 2347. This text was a reaction to cultural destruction carried out by Islamic State.

War crimes against cultural property
Armed groups intentionally destroyed the mausoleums at Timbuktu, a UNESCO cultural heritage site, and burned their manuscripts in 2012, during the occupation of northern Mali. Since then, the peacekeeping forces’ mandate also includes the protection of cultural heritage. In 2016, the International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted the perpetrator, who recognised his responsibility, and sentenced him to nine years of imprisonment and €2.7 million in reparations. The EU contributed to the reconstruction of the mausoleums.

UNESCO’s Director-General has stated that Ukraine’s cultural heritage must be safeguarded, ‘as a testimony of the past but also as a catalyst for peace and cohesion for the future, which the international community has a duty to protect and preserve’. Its Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict held an extraordinary meeting on 18 March 2022 to discuss the situation. The Committee granted preliminary financial assistance of US$50 000 for emergency measures, such as in situ protection and the evacuation of cultural property. The committee also envisaged the potential inclusion of some of Ukraine’s cultural heritage property on the International List of Cultural Property under Enhanced Protection, established by the 1999 Second Protocol.

Efforts to duly display a blue shield emblem, identify needs for material and skills support to shield buildings and statues from shelling, protect artefacts from damage and move them to museum cellars or safe havens have intensified. International bodies and specialists in cultural heritage preservation hold regular online meetings to discuss technicalities. As a result, on 9 March 2022, an appeal from the newly established Centre to Rescue Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage in Lviv enumerated material and financial needs.

Many countries and cultural institutions have answered the call for assistance. Nemo, the Network of European Museum Organisations, provides information about available support from across Europe for Ukrainian museums and their professionals. The Committee for Aid to Museums of Ukraine was established by 26 Polish museums, to help secure their collections and provide support. The Nordic Museum in Stockholm has started a fund to provide finance for the National Museum of Ukrainian History in Kyiv. France, the Netherlands and Italy sent tonnes of much needed materials.

The digitisation of collections is a way to preserve cultural works for the future. The Europeana platform issued a statement of support for Ukraine and displays digitised collections of Ukrainian cultural heritage. Saving Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Online (SUCHO), a group of more than 1 300 librarians, archivists, researchers and programmers, are working together to identify and archive at-risk sites, digital content, and data in Ukrainian cultural heritage institutions.

Under the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, culture ministers, deeply concerned about preservation of cultural heritage, unanimously adopted a declaration on the situation in Ukraine on 7 March 2022. In June 2021, the Council recognised the role of cultural heritage for peace and called for its protection during armed conflicts and its integration into the EU toolbox for conflicts and crises.
The European Parliament’s Culture and Education Committee hosted a debate on 15 March 2022 on how Russia’s biased interpretation of history denies Ukrainian identity.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine’s cultural heritage‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon and Martin russell.

While the UN Human Development Index, which assesses progress in the standard of living, health and education, ranks Russia among the ‘very high human development’ countries, other data suggest a more nuanced reality.

Russia has gone from Soviet-era egalitarianism to extremes of wealth and poverty. Economic growth during the first decade under Vladimir Putin’s leadership slightly reduced the gap between rich and poor, but inequality is still higher than in most developed countries. Factors such as corruption and low taxes for the rich exacerbate the income gap. Free public healthcare and a relatively inclusive education system apparently mitigate inequality. However, many hospitals are ill-equipped, and universities struggle to compare with foreign counterparts.

Since 2014 and the invasion of Crimea, Russians’ living conditions have deteriorated. Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions is already placing a burden on the poorest members of Russian society, as prices increase and staple goods begin to run out. The social contract between Russians and Putin, often considered as one in which citizens ceded certain freedoms and civil liberties in exchange for stability and prosperity, is now under strain.

This briefing is partly based on and updates previous EPRS publications on socioeconomic inequality and on the education system.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Human development in Putin’s Russia: What the data tell us‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Russia’s 15-year-olds’ ability to use their knowledge and skills Public spending in Russia, Ukraine and the EU on health, education and the armed forces Official and perceived poverty in Russia: A huge gap Income and wealth inequalities in Russia and Europe in 2021 Income and wealth inequalities in Russia over time Total unemployment: Russia, EU and Ukraine (% of total labour force) Human Development Index scores for EU, Russia, Ukraine and the world GDP per capita and its annual growth in EU, Russia and Ukraine

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass.

The EU institutions engage in regular structured dialogue with representatives of churches, and religious, non-confessional and philosophical organisations, on the basis of Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

This dialogue, which takes the form of high-level meetings or working-level discussions, is focused on policy issues on the European agenda. It traces its origins to earlier initiatives, such as that launched in 1994 by Jacques Delors – ‘A soul for Europe’ – which aimed to find ways to build an ethical, moral and spiritual dimension into European integration and policy-shaping. The draft Constitutional Treaty of 2004 included provisions on regular, open and transparent dialogue between EU institutions, and representatives of churches and religious communities, and of non-confessional or philosophical communities. Although the Constitutional Treaty was rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands, its successor, the Lisbon Treaty, adopted in 2007 and in force since December 2009, preserved the same provisions in its Article 17 TFEU.

The European Parliament has stressed the importance of constant dialogue among, and with, religious and non-confessional and philosophical communities. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it sought to give substance to the provisions of Article 17 TFEU, primarily through organising dialogue on subjects of interest for the EU and its citizens. The European Commission and the Council also hold regular Article 17 TFEU dialogue sessions and high-level meetings.

This is a further updated version of a briefing last issued in November 2020.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Article 17 TFEU: Dialogue with churches, and religious and philosophical organisations‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union (EU) is doing to fight disinformation and the ‘infodemic’.

A growing number of governments, as well as foreign and domestic non-state actors such as extremist movements, are using increasingly sophisticated techniques, including algorithms, automation and artificial intelligence to spread disinformation (meaning deliberately deceptive information) in Europe. With the war in Ukraine, foreign and particularly Russian actors are increasingly interfering in the media and on social networks. One of their main aims is to create confusion and polarise society, thus undermining democracy. The EU has stepped up its efforts to protect its democratic processes from manipulation.

Action taken by the European Parliament

The European Parliament has consistently pushed for a joint European response to disinformation and called for more resources to fight disinformation in EU countries and its neighbourhood. It has done so via its budgetary powers, as well as through hearings and resolutions (further details are available here).

In a resolution of March 2022, based on the work of a Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE), Parliament acknowledges that the EU’s lack of awareness and counter-measures makes it attractive to interference by malicious foreign actors, endangering democracy. It therefore calls for:

• a common strategy and a series of specific measures, such as, banning Russian propaganda channels and requiring platforms to do their part to reduce information manipulation and interference,
• more public funding for independent, pluralistic, and widely-distributed media and fact-checking institutions,
• preventing foreign actors from hiring former high-level politicians.

In March 2022, Parliament set up a new special Committee on Foreign Interference (INGE2). The committee will identify gaps in EU legislation that could be exploited for malicious purposes. It will have a year to present its recommendations.

The European Parliament’s anti-disinformation team monitors and analyses disinformation, cooperates with other institutions and civil society, and organises training and awareness raising activities. The unit can be contacted at europarl-spox@ep.europa.eu. The Parliament also has a webpage on ‘How to fight disinformation‘ and shares in-house research as well as information on media literacy and reliable sources through its social media channels.

Action taken by the EU as a whole

The EU’s 2018 action plan against disinformation and the 2020 European democracy action plan have resulted:

• more support, including funding and training, for quality journalism and media literacy,
• a code of practice on disinformation (see related Q&A) between leading social networks, online platforms and advertisers. The signatories commit to employing best practices against disinformation, taking down fake accounts and reporting on their actions. In May 2021, the Commission published guidance to strengthen this code – more information in this press release),
• a digital services act, proposed by the European Commission in December 2020. This aims to create a safer digital space in which the fundamental rights of all users of digital services are protected (more information here).
• the InVID project (which stands for ‘In video veritas‘ – or ‘In video, there is truth’), partly funded by the EU. The project aims to tackle the problem of fake videos on social media, which spread conspiracy theories and other falsehoods. The platform allows users to carry out a reverse image search of videos to detect whether the images have been used in a different context and/or manipulated.
• an EU-supported Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA), bringing European fact-checking organisations and researchers together to fight against disinformation.

Action taken by the European Council

Faced with the threat of Kremlin disinformation campaigns, the EU set up an ‘East Strat Com Task force‘ in March 2015. The Task Force exposes false claims from actors close to Russia that seek to undermine the EU and manages a debunking site called ‘EUvsDisinfo‘.

EU countries and institutions now have a Rapid Alert System (RAS), which helps them to share knowledge about disinformation. The system was used ahead of the European elections in May 2019, and to combat false information about coronavirus during the pandemic.

Coronavirus and the ‘infodemic’

The coronavirus public health emergency triggered an ‘infodemic’ – a confusing flood of information, not all of which is accurate. To help people to find science-based answers to their questions, the European Parliament’s European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) set up a dedicated website that includes a list of useful fact-checking initiatives.

Further reading

• How to spot when news is fake, animated graphic available in all EU languages, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), February 2019
• Trump’s disinformation ‘magaphone’: Consequences, first lessons and outlook, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), February 2021
• Foreign interference in democracies, Topical Digest, Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE), September 2020
• The sharp power of knowledge: Foreign authoritarian meddling in academia, Study, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), December 2019
• Regulating disinformation with artificial intelligence, Study, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), March 2019

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The role of the European political parties, often under-estimated in the past, has increased significantly over the years. Today, they are important coordinators within the EU political system, carrying out a variety of activities that can be classified conceptually as ‘vertical’, ‘horizontal’ and ‘diagonal’ coordination.

This EPRS study explores the growing ‘politicisation’ of the European Council and the increased coordination role which European political parties appear to play in the context of the European Council.

The parties’ main coordination activities are clearly their respective ‘pre-summits’, held just ahead of European Council meetings. These pre-summits serve multiple purposes for the parties – including coordinating positions for the imminent European Council discussions, long-term strategising, communication, socialising and networking – with the importance of each varying between the different parties.

A case study looking at the nomination of the EU’s new institutional leadership in 2019 illustrates the importance of the European political parties’ role in coordinating between EU leaders in the European Council.

Read this study on ‘European political parties and the European Council: A pattern of ever closer coordination?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Under Vladimir Putin’s watch, Russia hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Other authoritarian regimes, such as China’s and Qatar’s, have engaged in similar ‘sports-washing’ activities to gain international credibility and divert attention from their troublesome human rights records. However, Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine put an end to sport’s neutrality. In the past few weeks, multiple sports governing bodies and international federations have moved to exclude Russia from major sporting events, thus depriving its regime of a precious soft power.

The end of sport’s neutrality

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, a year after the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had awarded the 2014 Winter Olympic Games to Sochi. Six years later, on the day of the games’ closing ceremony, Russia invaded and subsequently annexed Crimea. Notwithstanding Russia’s continuing occupation of the region, FIFA – the international football governing body – decided to hold the men’s World Cup in Russia in 2018.

Liaisons dangereuses
Sponsorship is a handy tool for regimes seeking to cleanse their reputation, and Russia has used it to this end while also promoting its business interests. The way Russian state-owned gas producer Gazprom has invested in some European national leagues often speaks of these business interests.
Gazprom was the main sponsor of Schalke 04 – a football club based in one of Germany’s coal-producing districts – since 2007, when Germany was shifting away from coal to natural gas and when the Nord Stream 1 pipeline – owned and operated by Gazprom – was entering its final design stage. On 28 February, Schalke 04 announced that it had terminated its partnership with Gazprom.
Similarly, in 2010, Gazprom became the main sponsor of FC Red Star Belgrade, just when the Serbian government was considering signing agreements for the construction of the South Stream pipeline. The club has resisted pressure to distance itself from Gazprom, with UEFA arguing ‘it is a matter for individual clubs’.

Fast forward to 24 February 2022: Russia’s military assault on Ukraine provoked a somewhat different response, which put an end to sport’s neutrality. Indeed, the IOC condemned Russia’s breach of the Olympic Truce adopted by the UN General Assembly and, after initial hesitation, on 28 February it called on individual federations to ban Russian athletes from participating in any international events until further notice. The International Paralympic Committee followed suit on 3 March: in a reversal, citing threats by several federations to boycott the 2022 Winter Paralympics, it banned Russian (and Belarussian) athletes from competing in the games.

Similarly, in a joint statement of 28 February, FIFA and UEFA (the Union of European Football Associations) announced their decision to suspend ‘all Russian teams, whether national representative teams or club teams … from participation in both FIFA and UEFA competitions until further notice’. In recent history, only South Africa faced similar sanctions during the apartheid era. The Russian Football Union unsuccessfully appealed the ban to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which upheld the sanctions.

FIFA and UEFA’s decision came after they came under intense pressure from individual countries to go further in their sanctions, with FIFA initially having stated that Russia could compete as the ‘Football Union of Russia’ and play matches outside the country. Indeed, Poland, Sweden and Czechia refused to play World Cup play-off games against Russia. England, Scotland and Wales quickly followed suit. UEFA also decided to strip Putin’s hometown, St Petersburg, of the Champions League final, the most important club football event of the year. Similarly, UEFA terminated a deal worth €40 million a season with energy company Gazprom (see box), a major sponsor of the Champions League since 2012.

Experts argue that the IOC’s, FIFA’s and UEFA’s latest reactions have been opportunistic: seemingly, the bodies remained neutral for a long time to preserve their commercial ambitions and only reacted when they felt the need to move in line with global opinion.

In parallel, almost 40 sports and culture ministers from around the world – including from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK, which together with the US make up the G7 club of most developed economies – published a statement calling on international sports federations to cut ties with Russia and ‘show solidarity with the people of Ukraine’.

Spurred on by the overwhelming global public outrage against the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the spirit of solidarity with the Ukrainian people, dozens of international sports federations severed their ties with Russia and banned its national teams from participation in international competitions.

The Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) relocated the 2022 St Petersburg Open to Kazakhstan. The International Tennis Federation (ITF) cancelled all events in Russia, excluded its team from international events and suspended the Russian Tennis Federation’s membership. However, the ATP and the World Tennis Association (WTA) refused to yield to international pressure and allowed individual players to continue taking part in competitions, but not under the Russian national flag. The ATP, the WTA, the ITF and the four Grand Slam tournaments donated US$700 000 in support of the Tennis Plays for Peace campaign, which aims to provide humanitarian relief to Ukraine, and to the Ukraine Tennis Federation.

Three of Russia’s most popular winter sports – ice hockey, biathlon and figure skating – were also impacted. The International Ice Hockey Federation, the International Biathlon Union and the International Skating Union banned all athletes from Russia from events until further notice.

The International Volleyball Federation suspended all Russian national teams, clubs and officials; stripped Russia of the right to host the 2022 Volleyball Men’s World Championship in August 2022; and will relocate games that were to take place in Russia in June and July. The European Volleyball Confederation announced a similar ban. The International Basketball Federation and the International Gymnastics Federation followed suit.

EU and sports movement’s response

On 4 April, under the French Presidency of the Council, the EU ministers for sport backed initiatives to help Ukrainian athletes continue their activities. The French Minister for Sport, Roxana Maracineanu, praised in particular sports clubs from EU countries for receiving Ukrainian sportsmen and women, providing them with the necessary infrastructure and equipment, and integrating Ukrainian athletes into clubs and teams.

Initiatives undertaken by the sports movement
The Hungarian Swimming Association has helped host Ukraine’s junior national swimming team to enable athletes to continue their training. The Italian Swimming Federation has offered a training camp to 12 elite swimmers and four coaches from Ukraine. Italy has also hosted Ukraine’s national artistic swimming team and 30 young Ukrainian volleyball players. Similarly, a semi-professional female soccer team that fled the war in Ukraine has found shelter and a new training ground at the German Bundesliga club 1.FC Cologne. National canoe federations across Europe have also offered joint support to Ukrainian athletes affected by the ongoing conflict. The International Canoe Federation is coordinating assistance provided to over 120 people, including 51 senior athletes, 51 juniors and 25 paracanoe athletes. Senior athletes have been offered accommodation in Romania and Bulgaria, while junior ones have been welcomed at various sites in Poland, Hungary, France, Germany and Estonia.

EU ministers also watched a video testimony from their Ukrainian counterpart, Vadym Huttsait, who called for more sanctions against Russian and Belarussian athletes.

Spyros Capralos, president of the European Olympic Committees, recalled the collaboration with national Olympic committees from Poland, Finland, Estonia, Romania, Austria and Italy in offering accommodation and sports equipment to Ukrainian athletes.

Assistance from the Olympic Movement
The wider Olympic Movement has also provided humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian sports community. Olympic champion and IOC Member Sergii Bubka, in his capacity as president of the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine, has been tasked by the IOC with coordinating the various projects. The IOC has already released an initial US$200 000 to address the most pressing issues and is prepared to help coordinate all humanitarian action in the long term through the Olympic Refuge Foundation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Impact on athletes and sports competitions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Frederik Scholaert.

The Russian war against Ukraine has a significant impact on the EU seafood sector. Increased prices for energy and raw materials have led to high operating costs for fishermen, aquaculture farmers and fish-processing companies. The European Commission has responded with emergency measures, adapting State aid rules and activating exceptional support from the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF).

Impact

The EU fisheries and aquaculture sector was affected by rising energy prices in the course of 2021, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a further escalation in energy costs. Marine gasoil prices are reaching peaks that are more than double compared to early 2021 (see Figure 1). Prices are exceeding €1 per litre in many EU countries, while, according to the sector, EU vessel operations are only profitable up to €0.60 per litre. Many EU fishermen are mooring their boats and warning of a shortage of fresh fish. Black Sea fisheries face direct impacts from the war, in particular for Romanian vessels that used to fish close to Ukrainian waters and are now advised to stay away from the conflict zone. Aquaculture and fish processing companies are also affected by increased energy costs, as well as by high logistic costs and trade disruption. Although import bans do not cover seafood from Russia (apart from caviar and shellfish products added in the fifth round of sanctions), trade flows are severely hampered, particularly affecting EU fish-processing companies that rely heavily on supplies of whitefish from Russia.

Average monthly marine gas oil prices for the three main EU fishing countries (Jan 2016-Mar 2022). Emergency measures

An exchange of views took place in Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries on 16 March 2022, with Members calling for support for operating costs, to prevent a complete closure of the sector. A joint statement by 13 Member States, submitted ahead of the Agriculture and Fisheries Council on 21 March 2022, urged the European Commission to come up with specific proposals. Parliament’s resolution on food security, adopted on 24 March 2022, called for broad emergency measures for the seafood sector, including compensation for income lost, support for temporary cessation of activities and storage aid.

On 23 March 2022, the Commission adopted a temporary State aid framework to support the economy in the context of Russia’s invasion. It allows Member States to grant fishery and aquaculture companies up to €35 000, to provide liquidity support in the form of state guarantees and subsidised loans, and to provide aid to compensate for high energy prices. Measures under the framework can be combined with aid under permanent State aid rules and are valid retroactively from 1 February until the end of 2022.

On 25 March 2022, the Commission triggered the EMFAF Regulation crisis mechanism (Article 26(2)), by declaring the occurrence of an exceptional event causing significant disruption to markets. This allows Member States to compensate operators for lost income or additional costs, as well as producer organisations that store fishery products. Member States can define specific measures in their operational programmes and the support will be available from 24 February 2022 until the end of the year. In addition, a possible upcoming amendment to the fund for the previous programming period, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), could free up remaining unused budget from that fund to help the sector.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Support for the fishing, aquaculture and fish-processing sectors‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Beatrix Immenkamp with Simona Tarpova.

Outraged by Moscow’s illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine, the EU Member States have adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions against Russia, in cooperation with the US, Canada, the UK and other G7 countries, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) members, and others. Below is a timeline of the sanctions adopted in response to Russia’s decision, announced on 21 February 2022, to recognise the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in Ukraine as independent entities, and Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The timeline does not include EU sanctions adopted in 2014 in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

For further information, see:

• Western sanctions and Russia: What are they? Do they work?, EPRS, February 2022.
• Russia’s war on Ukraine: New EU sanctions, EPRS, March 2022, and update of April 2022.
• Council of the European Union and the European Commission websites.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU sanctions in 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen.

The impact on EU food markets of Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to be multi-faceted, with many companies already struggling with shortages of food ingredients and packaging materials. Using alternative ingredients requires altering labels, but this could mean months of testing recipes and waiting for new packaging with accurate labels. EU and global food prices are rising, but so are production costs, and transport and energy prices.

Feared impacts in food sector

The impact of Russia’s aggression on EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine trade in agri-food products has been immediate. Ukraine normally supplies almost half of the cereals (52 % of EU maize imports) and vegetable/rapeseed oils (23 % and 72 % of EU imports respectively) and a quarter of the poultry meat imported to Europe, and Russia is a major global exporter of fertilisers, vegetable oils, wheat and barley. The two countries together account for more than 30 % of world wheat exports and nearly 30 % of barley exports. Russia is also a major exporter of white fish (40 % of global production), and supplies 16 % of the Alaskan Pollock used in the fish processing industry. Since the Russian invasion, prices on wheat futures markets have increased by 70 %. EU food prices are 5.6 % higher than they were last February. Grain and oilseed prices are rising to record highs, as it is difficult to predict how long the disruptions in supplies will last and how severe they will be. It is not certain if Ukrainian farmers will be able to harvest or plant their crops in the coming months or years.

EU countries are in very different positions regarding their dependency on Russian and Ukrainian imports. For example, Russia’s share of Finland’s wheat imports is more than 80 %, whereas for Greece it is only 20 %. For fertilisers, Finland and Estonia both import more than 70 % from Russia, whereas the Netherlands and Sweden import less than 15 %.

Shortages of sunflower oil, wheat and corn

FoodDrinkEurope, which represents the European food industry, cautions that stocks of some critical raw materials are already running low and prices are rising steeply. Using alternatives means changing the list of ingredients on the package – but the waiting time for new packaging material is several months. Changing and testing a new recipe normally takes a year; now it must be done in a few weeks. Product reformulation and ingredient label adaptation will add to costs, which are likely to be passed onto consumers. FoodDrinkEurope calls for temporary flexibility on food labelling and official controls across the EU to help companies deal with the rapidly changing availability of ingredients. In some countries, inspection departments have already been asked to show leniency if alternative ingredients do not immediately show on product labels.

FEDIOL, representing the EU vegetable oil industry, warns that the EU sunflower oil supply is critical. The European and global food industry is competing for the supplies and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to replace the approximately 200 000 tonnes per month normally imported to EU from Ukraine at short notice. Sunflower seed oil that was destined for biodiesel is now being redirected back to the food market. The latest warning comes from the confectionery industry, which is running out of sunflower lecithin – an emulsifier that is crucial in their products. The restaurant and food service industries also often rely on sunflower oil for cooking and frying meals. Uncertainty over sunflower oil supplies is also boosting prices for its alternatives, such as rapeseed, palm and soy oil.

The World Food Programme warns that the war could prompt an extremely serious global food crisis. Ukraine and Russia account for more than half of the cereal imports of North Africa and the Middle East. (See EPRS paper on the war’s impact on food security.) Exports from other countries are likely to be limited, as governments will try to ensure domestic supply. Both Russia and Ukraine have already suspended exports or introduced export licences for their key agricultural commodities (cereals, corn, sunflower oil, and also poultry and eggs), to protect their own food security. The closure of Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the lack of an operational railway system to compensate may aggravate the situation, as warned by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

The EU imports 52 % of its maize from Ukraine. Maize is an important ingredient in animal feed, and supply disruptions could affect in particular pig and chicken farms across Europe. In a meeting in March 2022, the European Commission noted that a number of Member States had signalled critical shortages of animal feed in the coming weeks, or may have supply issues in the mid- to long-term following the war in Ukraine. Ukraine is a major source of imported cereals in several Member States, with maize, grains, sunflower seeds, rapeseed, flaxseed and soybean mentioned as the commodities worst affected. To address possible shortages, traders could try to secure imports from other non-EU countries, but strict maximum residue levels (MRLs) set for pesticides in products imported to the EU can pose a problem. The Commission therefore suggested that Member States facing acute shortages could make use of an article in the MRL Regulation enabling them to set temporary national MRLs very quickly. National MRLs must, however, be limited in time, and the products concerned are not to be traded with other countries. Spain and Portugal were the first countries to make use of this possibility.

Fertilisers, energy and other concerns

Russia is the world’s biggest supplier of fertilisers, and second largest exporter of potash, a key ingredient in fertilisers. The recently adopted sanctions will oblige the EU to replace the import share of Russia and Belarus, respectively 60 % for potash and 35 % for phosphates. In the EU, some fertiliser producers have temporarily halted production, as energy costs were too high and some companies have even ceased to accept further orders as prices and availability are very unclear for the rest of spring 2022.

In the first days of the war, energy prices spiked and further impacted on the production costs of, for example, vegetables grown in heated greenhouses; in animal farming, electricity is needed for ventilation, lighting and other electric equipment, such as milking machines. High fuel prices have also increased transport costs. These simultaneous disruptions to harvests and global fertiliser production are likely to cause merging crises in global food markets, which were already strained by the Covid‑19 pandemic.

As Western brands withdraw from Russia to express condemnation of the country’s invasion of Ukraine, food companies operating in Russia are facing a moral dilemma because of the role they play in access to nutrition. Some groups have suspended the sale of some of their brands, while continuing to supply essential goods such as basic foods, dairy products and infant nutrition. Some brands worry about consumer boycotts if they continue their business as usual.

The FAO also warns of other risks associated with the invasion, such as Ukraine’s ability to control animal diseases, like African swine fever, which has already been reported in the region in pigs and wild boars.

Immediate EU food policy action

On 23 March 2022, the Commission adopted a communication on safeguarding EU food security and reinforcing the resilience of food systems. Agriculture commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski has emphasised that, in the light of the Russia’s war in Ukraine, ‘agriculture has become a crucial security policy’. While there is no immediate threat to food availability in the EU at present, to keep food affordable, the Commission will allow EU countries to use reduced value added tax (VAT) rates on food and temporarily allow farmers to use areas that were to be left fallow for biodiversity for food and feed production. In addition, the Commission adopted a temporary crisis framework to enable EU Member States to support affected companies, and has set up an expert group within the European food security crisis preparedness and response mechanism (EFSCM), as part of its food crisis contingency plan. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on 24 March 2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan.

The Commission’s last-minute decision in March to delay two highly anticipated Green Deal proposals (on the sustainable use of pesticides and nature restoration) was fiercely criticised by environmentalist non-governmental organisations. Speaking at the meeting of Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on 31 March 2022, Food Safety Commissioner Stella Kyriakides assured Members that the EU would continue to move towards a system that was more shock resilient. The delayed proposals should still be published before summer 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU food policy implications‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Caprile.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, a country known as the ‘breadbasket of Europe’, is raising fears of a global food crisis, further exacerbating existing food security challenges worldwide. Much depends on the response of the international community, including the EU, to a number of rapidly evolving scenarios.

Impact on global food supplies and food security

There is widespread international concern that Russia’s war will provoke a global food crisis similar to, or worse than, that faced in 2007 and 2008. The war comes at a time when the global food system was already struggling to feed its growing population in a sustainable way, under the pressure caused by climate change and the Covid‑19 pandemic.

Percentage share of global exports in 2021 CommodityUkraineRussiaRussia and UkraineWheat10 %24 %34 %Maize15 %2 %17 %Barley13 %14 %27 %Sunflower oil31 %24 %55 %Sunflower cake61 %20 %81 %Vegetable oils__10 %White fish (Alaska Pollock)_16 %_Fertiliser mineral intermediates* 13 % Finished fertilisers 16 % Food calories traded globally6 %5.8 %11.8 %

Russia and Ukraine are key agricultural players, together exporting nearly 12 % of food calories traded globally. They are major providers of basic agro-commodities, including wheat, maize and sunflower oil, and Russia is the world’s top exporter of fertilisers.

Several regions are highly dependent on imports from these two countries for their basic food supply. Russia and Ukraine, combined, supply over 50 % of cereal imports in North Africa and the Middle East, while Eastern African countries import 72 % of their cereals from Russia and 18 % from Ukraine.

The war’s impact on global food supply will depend on its duration and the evolution of various scenarios, centred on three factors:

• a significant reduction in exports and production of essential commodities from both countries, caused by the war and not the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, which, intentionally, did not target the agricultural sector. Overall, the European Commission estimates that ‘up to 25 million tonnes of wheat would need to be substituted to meet worldwide food needs in the current and the next season’;
• a global spike in prices of food supplies and inputs needed for agri-food production (fertilisers and energy), which were already at record levels before the war;
• the international response to the above, which could either amplify the effects of the crisis (mainly by uncoordinated export bans or speculative measures) or mitigate them (applying lessons learnt from the 2007‑2008 food crisis). A number of countries, other than Russia and Ukraine, have already imposed or announced their intention to impose some control over exports of essential agricultural commodities, including Egypt, Argentina, Indonesia, Serbia, Turkey and, in the EU, Hungary.

Expected impact on EU food security

Food availability is not currently at stake in the EU. The block is largely self-sufficient in key agricultural products, as well as in most animal products. However, the EU is a considerable net importer of specific products that may be difficult to substitute in the short term, such as sunflower oil and seafood. Moreover, the crisis has exposed the dependency of EU agricultural production on a number of key imported inputs: energy, animal feed and feed additives, and also agricultural fertilisers. The EU’s vulnerability to market distortions in fertiliser trade might be particularly acute, since fertilisers represent 18 % of input costs for arable crops. The EU relies on Belarus and Russia for 59 % of its potassium fertiliser imports, while 31 % of EU nitrogen fertiliser imports (for which the natural gas price is the main factor) come from Russia. Furthermore, food affordability for low-income households, already affected by the pandemic, will be further jeopardised. Already in 2020, 8.6 % of the overall EU population were unable to afford a meal with meat, fish or a vegetarian equivalent every second day.

Expected impact on global food security

According to FAO estimates, in addition to the 720 to 811 million people already facing chronic hunger in 2020, Russia’s war in Ukraine risks raising – by 7.6 to 13.1 million – the number of undernourished people in 2022 and 2023. Jordan, Yemen, Israel and Lebanon are among the countries most at risk, as they rely heavily on basic commodities imports, with significant shares from Russia and Ukraine. African countries will also have difficulties facing market disruptions and rising prices. Meanwhile, the higher prices and shortages will have a serious impact on food assistance for fragile countries. In Ukraine itself, the United Nations World Food Programme estimates that 45 % of the population are already ‘worried about finding enough to eat’.

Food security at the top of the EU political agenda: Swift EU responses

The EU leaders’ 10‑11 March Versailles declaration urged the Commission to present options to address the rising food and input prices and enhance global food security in the light of Russia’s war. Drawing on lessons learned from the pandemic, the Commission swiftly presented a package of measures. These were set out in a 23 March communication ‘Safeguarding food security and reinforcing the resilience of food systems’, including short-term and medium-term proposals, at both EU and Member State level. Most measures can be implemented within existing instruments, mainly through the common agricultural policy (CAP). In parallel, the Commission announced the postponement of two highly-anticipated Green Deal legislative proposals: on the sustainable use of pesticides and nature restoration targets in the EU.

On 24 March 2022, the European Parliament adopted a comprehensive resolution calling for an ‘urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine’, supporting many actions proposed in the Commission’s package. Members emphasised the need to maintain security of food supplies, in both the EU and vulnerable countries, when analysing the objectives set in the biodiversity and ‘farm to fork’ strategies. Parliament also called for safe food corridors to and from Ukraine to deliver aid and goods.

Safeguarding food security and reinforcing food system resilience: Immediate EU response
– €500 million support package for EU farmers most affected by the crisis (up to €1.5 billion if complemented by Member States’ national envelopes);
– Market safety net measures to support specific markets (e.g. the pigmeat sector) and increased levels of direct payment advances, later in 2022;
– New self standing Temporary Crisis Framework for State aid;
– Possibility for Member States to derogate from certain greening obligations in 2022 to bring additional agricultural land into production (i.e. cultivation of fallow land under the ecological focus areas);
– Preservation of the EU single market, avoiding export restrictions and bans;
– Support through the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD): complementing Member States’ action to provide those most deprived with food and/or basic material assistance;
– Possibility for Member States to apply reduced rates of value added tax and encourage economic operators to contain retail prices;
– Use the new CAP strategic plans to prioritise investments that reduce dependency on gas and fuel and inputs such as pesticides and fertilisers;
– €330 million EU emergency support programme for Ukraine.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Impact on food security and EU response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

The war in Ukraine led the agenda of the April 2022 plenary session in Strasbourg. Members held two important debates: on EU protection for children and young people fleeing the war, and on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24‑25 March 2022, which covered the latest developments and EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation. Parliament also debated a number of Council and Commission statements on: the outcome of the EU-China summit of 1 April 2022, the ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding respect for EU values in Poland and Hungary, violations of the right to seek asylum and non-refoulement in the EU Member States, the Sixth Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the urgent need to adopt the minimum tax directive, the situation of marginalised Roma communities in the EU, and mental health. In an adjustment to the structure of the plenary agenda, question time with the Commission has been reintroduced. Members questioned President Ursula von der Leyen on progress on the Commission’s political priorities over the past two years. Members then questioned Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), on the EU’s security and Strategic Compass. Another debate with the HR/VP focused on the situation in Afghanistan, in particular the women’s rights situation. Several debates and votes on legislative files also took place, including on the Schengen evaluation mechanism.

Revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system

In line with the EU’s climate ambitions, the European Commission’s ‘Fit for 55’ proposals seek to revise the entire EU 2030 climate and energy framework. Members debated the first legislative proposal from the package – a proposed revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system (ETS). The world’s first and largest carbon market, the ETS aims at reducing greenhouse gas emissions by capping the volume of emissions permitted and encouraging trading of unused allowances. However, a surplus of emissions allowances has built up due to recent economic crises. The proposed revision of the market stability reserve aims to correct this, by maintaining the already doubled intake rate (24 %) and minimum number of allowances placed in the reserve (200 million) to December 2030. Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) agreed with the proposal, stressing that it will avoid further increases in the surplus. Members adopted the committee’s report as Parliament’s first-reading position, allowing interinstitutional negotiations to begin.

Data governance act

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached between Parliament and the Council on the first of the Commission’s proposals on an EU data strategy. The data governance act should set the rules for sharing or trading data for legitimate uses – such as medical research or combating climate change – whilst preserving data rights. The co-legislators reached a compromise on re-use of publicly held data, limiting public authorities’ ability to grant rights to data and ensuring they seek consent. Parliament also succeeded in tightening the rules for ‘data brokers’. Organisations wishing to share data for the common good will have to register as ‘altruism organisations’ and follow a Commission rulebook. Parliament also insisted on strengthening aspects of the composition and tasks of the proposed European data innovation board, which will enforce the act.

Trans-European energy infrastructure

Well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) had insisted that the proposed revision of the rules on trans-European energy infrastructure projects should require energy projects to be more environmentally sustainable and exclude fossil fuel infrastructure. Major energy infrastructure projects benefit EU citizens by boosting the single market and securing EU supplies, and such projects of common interest are therefore sometimes eligible for EU funding. The committee argued for a wider role for the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), and for a new stakeholder committee to ensure projects can call on good expertise. The committee’s report also called for a transitional period to 2029, as well as for the regulation to cover CO2 storage, and for a derogation for already-included natural gas projects. Members debated and adopted the agreed text reached during interinstitutional negotiations on the rules governing funding of major energy projects.

Use of vehicles hired without drivers for the carriage of goods by road

Parliament debated goods vehicle hire rules, in its second reading of a proposal to loosen restrictions on transport operators. The European Commission’s proposal to grant haulage companies the same right to hire vehicles without a driver in another Member State as in their own Member State originally aimed at harmonising the rules across the EU. However, Parliament and Council wished to preserve Member States’ ability to protect their national vehicle tax bases from market distortion. Members approved the proposed draft agreement reached by the Council and Parliament that allows countries to restrict their own haulage companies from hiring vehicles without drivers in other EU Member States, but prevents them from restricting goods vehicle hire outright, if all the rules are observed.

Amending budget 1/2022: Adjustment of the multiannual financial framework

Following delays in launching certain programmes, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) reiterated its concern regarding the effect of such payment delays on the Union’s recovery. To prevent payment crises, the committee called on the Commission to present any proposals for payment increases immediately in future. Members approved the Council position, thereby definitively adopting draft amending budget 1/2022 which seeks to strengthen the 2022 EU budget by transferring €12 billion in commitments from 2021. Further transfers will be made to the budgets of subsequent years of the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework.

Guidelines for the 2023 budget – Section III

Parliament’s guidelines for the 2023 EU budget (Section III – European Commission) launch the annual budgetary debate. Underlining the need for a just transition to a greener economy, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) highlighted the importance of economic, social and territorial cohesion. The BUDG committee’s report adopted by Parliament lists a number of budgetary priorities, including a stronger health union, the green and digital transitions, fundamental rights and the rule of law. The report also underlined the need to spread payments evenly throughout the period of the current multiannual financial framework. The guidelines provide the basis for Parliament’s trilogue negotiations on the 2023 budget, ahead of the European Commission’s proposed draft budget.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without a vote, a mandate for negotiation from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committees on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets.

Members also approved, with votes, a mandate for negotiation from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee on the proposal for a directive on corporate sustainability reporting, and from the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) and Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) Committees on the proposal for a directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – April 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Christiaan Van Lierop.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shocked the world and caused devastation in the country. As millions flee the war-torn nation, Europe is currently witnessing its largest movement of refugees since World War II. With cohesion policy having proved effective in mobilising emergency support during the coronavirus crisis, the European Commission has put forward two proposals that seek to adapt cohesion policy rules to facilitate the rapid rollout of funding to help Member States host Ukrainian refugees.

Background

Within the cohesion policy framework, Member States can already draw on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) to help them fund measures to address the challenges of migration. These resources may be used to fund infrastructure, equipment, products and services in areas such as health, education, employment and social inclusion, and to support investment in reception centres. The Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU) initiative under Next Generation EU also funds measures in these areas. In addition, food and basic material assistance may also be provided from the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD). The scale and urgency of the situation, however, arguably calls for the introduction of new measures that allow the swift delivery of funding to help people where it is needed most.

Against the background of the coronavirus crisis, the Parliament and Council adopted two regulations in 2020 to make spending under the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund (CF) more flexible, not least by allowing Member States to apply a co-financing rate of 100 % for programmes supported by these three funds in the 2020‑2021 accounting year. The success of these two packages, the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative and Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus, highlighted the ease with which cohesion policy funds may be adapted to support emergency measures in EU countries. However, while Europe is still recovering from the impact of the Covid‑19 pandemic, many Member States now face an even more pressing emergency, as they welcome unprecedented numbers of people escaping Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Help for refugees in Europe (CARE)

Published on 8 March 2022, the Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE) proposal aims at allowing Member States to provide emergency support for people who have fled Ukraine following Russia’s invasion, by increasing the flexibility of cohesion policy funding rules. Amending the Common Provisions Regulation governing the rules on the use of the 2014‑2020 European structural and investment funds and the Regulation on the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, the CARE proposal puts forward four changes to cohesion policy rules to speed up and simplify the delivery of EU funding to help countries hosting Ukrainian refugees. Firstly, CARE extends the application of the 100 % co-financing rate for cohesion policy programmes to the 2021‑2022 accounting year, easing the burden for Member States. Secondly, it allows Member States and regions to transfer resources between programmes under the ESF and the ERDF to fund projects helping people fleeing Ukraine, which means that projects not usually eligible under a given fund can receive support. Thirdly, Member State expenditure on operations to support Ukrainian refugees will be eligible for EU support as of 24 February 2022, the date of Russia’s invasion. Lastly, the proposal simplifies reporting and makes it easier to modify programmes supported by the FEAD, removing the need for a Commission decision.

Following the Council’s 16 March 2022 decision to endorse the text without amendment, Parliament adopted the CARE proposal on 24 March 2022, under the urgent procedure and without amendment. Council adopted the legislative act unanimously on 31 March 2022. The final act was signed on 6 April 2022.

Types of emergency support
CARE can provide Member States with emergency funding to help them cater to refugees’ basic needs, such as ensuring access to temporary accommodation, food or medical care. It can strengthen Member States’ capacity to support refugees by funding infrastructure or staff working with refugees and support refugees’ long-term integration by financing housing, employment, social inclusion and education. CARE Plus, increased pre-financing from REACT-EU resources

With significant numbers of people continuing to flee Ukraine in the weeks following Russia’s invasion, the need to provide an increasing number of new arrivals with housing, material assistance and social services has placed an additional strain on the public finances of many Member States, particularly those that share a border with Ukraine. While the CARE proposal already provided Member States with easier access to funding to help support their efforts in this area, the EU recognised the need to relieve the pressure on national budgets by speeding up the rollout of funding. On 23 March 2022, the Commission published a proposal for a regulation, which sets out plans to provide additional pre-financing for 2014‑2020 programmes supported by cohesion policy funds and the FEAD, to be paid under REACT-EU. Specifically, the Commission proposes to increase pre-financing from 11 % to 15 % in all Member States. This percentage rises to 45 % for Member States where arrivals from Ukraine between 24 February 2022 and 23 March 2022 number over 1 % of their national population. Amending the Common Provisions Regulation and the FEAD Regulation, the proposal is expected to deliver total pre-financing of around €3.4 billion.

Following the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24‑25 March 2022, which called on the Commission to work on additional proposals to strengthen the rapid disbursement of EU funding for refugees and their hosts, the Commission modified its original proposal of 23 March 2022, publishing an amended proposal on 31 March 2022. Noting that one of the best methods of making EU funding available is to use simplified cost options – which allow easier and faster spending of cohesion policy funds and cut red tape – the proposal establishes a new unit cost, which Member States can use to facilitate financing of basic needs and support for refugees. Under the proposal, the unit cost will be €40 per person per week, to be paid for each full week or partial week that the person is in the Member State concerned, for a maximum of 13 weeks following the person’s arrival in the EU. Like the CARE proposal, Parliament adopted the CARE Plus proposal under the urgent procedure, without amendment, on 7 April 2022. In line with its note of 1 April 2022, Council is expected to adopt the Commission proposal rapidly, without amendment.

European Parliament’s position

During the plenary debate of 7 March 2022 on the implementation of 2021‑2027 cohesion policy, Members expressed their unwavering solidarity with Ukraine and its neighbours. Noting that Europe and its cohesion policy must respond and provide additional support, Members confirmed that the Parliament’s Regional Development (REGI) Committee stood ready to amend the cohesion regulations to facilitate and enable the provision of immediate support for cities and regions hosting Ukrainian refugees.

The CARE proposal was presented during the REGI committee meeting of 15 March 2022. Committee Members were unequivocal in their support for the Commission’s proposal, noting that, as the Covid‑19 pandemic had demonstrated, cohesion policy is the way in which the people of Europe express solidarity with one another. However, Members highlighted the need to consider the impact that these migratory flows were likely to have on cohesion policy in the future, noting that it would undoubtedly be necessary to provide additional funding for Member States and for the regions. In this context, Members emphasised that the emergency measures currently being taken and that would need to be introduced must not be seen as restricting the overall aims of cohesion policy in any way.

First reading without committee report (Rule 163): 2022/0075(COD); Committee responsible: REGI.
First reading without committee report (Rule 163): 2022/0096(COD); Committee responsible: REGI.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU cohesion policy support for refugees‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has boosted the already high prices of oil and gas in the European Union, posing a question mark over sustainable deliveries of energy to the bloc. The EU is heavily dependent on Russia for its oil and gas. In 2021, two-fifths of the gas Europeans burned came from Russia. More than a quarter of the EU’s imported crude oil came from the country. The European Commission has announced plans to cut the EU’s dependence on Russian gas by two-thirds this year. Meanwhile, Russia has demanded that it is paid for its gas in roubles, rather than in euros or dollars, as stated in the contracts. The G-7 industrialised countries have dismissed the plan. EU Member States are divided over including a ban on energy imports from Russia among sanctions imposed on Moscow. Such an embargo would put a squeeze on European households, probably leading to gas rationing. However, it would cut Russia off from a major source of the hard currency that it uses in part to finance the war.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from international think tanks on the impact of the war on global and European energy markets. Analyses on the Ukraine war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Removing Russia from the European gas balance: A major role for Caspian gas
Atlantic Council, March 2022

DeRussification of European natural gas imports by 55 bcm in 5 years: A three-pronged strategy to reduce, reroute, and reserve supplies
Atlantic Council, March 2022

Can Europe manage if Russian oil and coal are cut off?
Bruegel, March 2022

How to wean Europe off Russian gas as swiftly as possible
Bruegel, March 2022

The Kremlin’s gas wars
Bruegel, February 2022

The EU gas market and policy and the war in Ukraine
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

How the war is affecting the Russian gas sector
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

A dangerous dependence on Russia: Germany and the gas crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

The US embargo on Russian energy resources: The consequences for Russia
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

When the taps are turned off: How to get Europe through the next winter without Russian gas
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

Europe must stop paying for Russia’s war
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

The EU must triple down on green investment
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Phasing out Russian gas, UK-EU relations and Hungary’s response to the war
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

High energy prices threaten the EU emissions trading system
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

EU can stop Russian gas imports by 2025
E3G, March 2022

The need and opportunity for Europe’s energy independence
Friends of Europe, March 2022

Same shock, different effects EU member states’ exposure to the economic consequences of Putin’s war
Hertie School, Jacques Delors Centre, March 2022

Economic consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
IfO, March 2022

Russian energy exports and the conflict in Ukraine: What options for Italy and the EU?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Can the EU do without Russian gas?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2022

Could the Ukraine crisis accelerate a longer-term policy shift away from fossil fuels?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

Higher oil prices stemming from Russia-Ukraine war may be temporary
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Russia’s energy role in Europe: What’s at stake with the Ukraine crisis
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2022

Die Bedeutung russischer Gaslieferungen für die deutsche Energieversorgung
IW Köln, February 2022

The ‘do no significant harm’ principle: Two possible interpretations
LUISS School for European Political Economy, February 2022

A (E)U-turn from Nord Stream 2 towards a European Strategic Gas Reserve
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

What does the gas crisis reveal about European energy security?
Free Network, January 2022

Russia-Europe tensions threaten co-dependent gas markets
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2022

If Russia invades, sanction its oil and gas
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2022

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Ukraine war and energy supply‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou with Simona Dimitrova Tarpova.

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) organised a roundtable on 23 March 2022, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Anthony Teasdale, Director-General of EPRS, opened the event, welcoming practitioners and policy analysts’ expert views on the war’s implications for security and defence, refugees, energy, food and arms supply. The discussion, moderated by Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service at EPRS, assessed the change in the European Union’s position and strategic agenda to fit the new geopolitical realities.

In a keynote speech, David McAllister, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, summarised the EU response to military aggression and the likely impact on EU policies. He applauded the EU and its allies’ immediate, determined and united response, as well as the unprecedented nature of the sanction packages adopted. Sanctions are aimed at inflicting high costs on Russia’s financial, defence, energy, transport and technology sectors, but other EU frameworks and measures also support Ukraine: the European Peace Facility (providing €1 billion for the purchase and delivery of weapons); the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; and the Temporary Protection Directive (ensuring assistance to Ukrainian citizens and their government). David McAllister also emphasised the need to maintain an operational supply chain and assist Member States in managing the inflow of refugees.

Focusing on the EU’s long-term security and defence strategy, David McAllister recognised Russia’s war on Ukraine as a defining event for the bloc’s future policies. Referring to the Versailles Declaration, he noted that bolstering defence capabilities, reducing energy dependencies and building a robust and sustainable economic base should be a central priority. Regarding defence, he suggested that the EU could provide added value to existing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) capabilities (via cybersecurity, for example), while using the European Defence Fund and working towards establishing a European defence union. David McAllister concluded by encouraging effective implementation of EU strategies, the reduction of strategic dependencies (i.e., on technologies, medicines and food) and a united and decisive approach.

Richard Tibbels, Head of the Eastern Partnership Bilateral-Relations Division of the European External Action Service (EEAS), provided additional details on the EU response from the EEAS perspective. He highlighted three dimensions of the Union’s reaction to Russia’s non-compliance with international norms – sanctions, diplomatic endeavours and support for Ukraine. He also noted that the EU is ready to adopt further sanction packages to underline the message that violations of international law are unacceptable. The April EU-China Summit is one example of such diplomatic efforts. In terms of providing support to Ukraine, Richard Tibbels noted that the EU is contributing to the country’s resilience by providing defence equipment, funding for cybersecurity, emergency and humanitarian assistance and has synchronised Ukraine’s electricity grids with the Continental European Grid. The next steps are enshrined in the Versailles Declaration, which he described as ‘the road map to the future’. The declaration covers Ukraine’s reconstruction and EU accession application, as well as Europe’s energy security, economic independence and enhanced security and defence. However, he noted the EU needs to address the impact of the war on third countries’ food security, the collection of evidence of war crimes and the spread of disinformation.

In response to Etienne Bassot, who highlighted the fundamental shift in Germany’s defence and energy policies, Daniela Schwarzer, Executive Director for Europe and Eurasia at the Open Society Foundations, explained the reasons behind these developments. Although Germany’s former strategy was to engage Russia, a new understanding of the security threats to the EU and especially Eastern Europe requires taking a different political direction. Discussing Germany’s decision to suspend the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline plans and to provide military equipment to Ukraine, she raised the question of whether energy can be utilised as a sanctions strategy in the short term. Daniela Schwarzer stressed that it is crucial to consider the cost of sanctions and the degree of public support across the EU. Specifically, she suggested that Germany should initiate the implementation of solidarity mechanisms and refugee inflow management in a manner sustainable to European society.

Suzana Anghel, Policy Analyst with the European Council Oversight Unit at EPRS, compared the European Council’s reactions to crises and noted that the Council had anticipated the war and agreed on an initial response in advance. She emphasised the role of the Versailles Declaration and Strategic Compass in shaping the EU’s long-term defence strategy. Now that leaders have acknowledged the dependencies, it is crucial to ensure the coordinated and cost-effective implementation of measures to counter vulnerabilities. The broad political consensus on the need to reduce energy dependency, along with energy prices, provide a good example.

In view of the Commission’s proposal on obligatory gas storage with an 80 % target for 2022 and 90 % for 2023, Lasse Boehm, Head of the Economic Policies Unit at EPRS, warned that even full capacity gas storage would only deliver 30 % of demand in winter 2022‑2023. This is due to unevenly distributed liquid natural gas (LNG) infrastructure and gas storage capacity in the EU. Consequently, other solutions will be necessary, such as reducing energy consumption, increasing the percentage of renewable energy, coordinating mechanisms and setting clear targets. He suggested the situation requires a swift and calculated approach that considers the significance of energy security for the economy and the impact on the public and environment.

Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels, addressed four invasion-related topics: relations with China, US President Biden’s visit to Brussels, the EU strategic decisions and the fiscal implications of sanctions. He indicated that sanctions adopted by the EU and the G7 signal to China that violation of international norms is unacceptable. He warned, however, that SWIFT restrictions are incomplete and have allowed Russia to strengthen the rouble and avoid hyperinflation. To deter China from challenging international rules and invading Taiwan, the EU should demonstrate resolve regarding the costs of sanctions – as economic independence and a strong geopolitical stance can be expensive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine nevertheless provides an opportunity for the Biden Administration to improve the transatlantic relationship vis-à-vis Russia and China.

Acting Head of the External Policies Unit in the Members’ Research Service at EPRS, Elena Lazarou reviewed the EU’s overall response to geopolitical trends and its development of security and defence policies. She noted that the move to boost defence spending has been linked to Russia’s actions in the past and that EU public support for defence and related expenditure increased following the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. She identified two outcomes of the ongoing war: the return of ‘great power’ politics and the role of multilateralism. The war has also highlighted emerging trends, such as the use of conventional warfare in combination with digital technology, the growing battle of influence between democratic and authoritarian states, and challenges to international norms. Finally, Elena Lazarou pointed to the potential of the recently endorsed Strategic Compass, which presents guidelines on advancing EU security and defence.

Written by Fearghas O’Beara.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 drew attention to the close relationship between Vladimir Putin’s regime and the Russian Orthodox Church. The latter has strongly backed Putin’s war and has long provided theological and ideological justifications for his domestic and international actions. The Church’s overtly political approach has contributed to deep divisions within the wider Orthodox world, including a formal split with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and significant tensions with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The role of religion in Putin’s regime

One unexpected consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), which had ruthlessly oppressed religion, was a huge resurgence in church membership, religious belief and practice in many of the successor states. A recent Pew Forum survey found that 71 % of Russians identified as Orthodox, along with 78 % of Ukrainians, 73 % of Belarusians and 92 % of Moldovans. A newly confident Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) viewed itself as a repository of Russian national identity, and Moscow as the ‘third Rome’ with primacy over the Orthodox Churches in those countries and beyond. At home, Putin has passed laws targeting ‘non-traditional’ religious minorities with fines, detention and criminal charges.

The ROC quickly aligned itself with the Putin regime, a process accelerated since the election of Kirill as ‘Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia’ in 2009. Claiming canonical jurisdiction over much of the former USSR territory, the current ‘Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church’ permanent membership includes, inter alia, metropolitans (bishops) of ‘All Ukraine’, ‘All Belarus’, ‘All Moldova’, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The key doctrine elaborated by the Church, in tandem with the regime, over the past decades is the Russkiy Mir or ‘Russian world’, (however ‘mir‘ also translates as peace). This ideology envisages a quasi-messianic role for Russia in saving Christian civilisation from the decadent West through the spreading of Russian language, culture and values, by re-dominating countries formerly within the USSR, and exerting influence throughout the wider Orthodox and Western world. In 2007, Putin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation, which de facto spreads this ideology around the world, working in close cooperation with the ROC.

Thus, various experts have suggested that Russia’s war on Ukraine has a religious dimension, and that Putin’s desire to conquer Kyiv is part of a ‘spiritual quest’. Putin himself laid out his Greater Russia vision in a long article in July 2021, entitled ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’. In it, he claims that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are the same people whose ‘common baptismal font’ is Kyiv with the conversion to Christianity of Prince Volodymir (Vladimir in Russian) in 988. The narrative makes clear that Russia’s enemies are located to the west. These, especially at the end of the 16th century, were ‘Polonising and Latinising’ Russian lands and ‘ousting Orthodoxy’. Putin compares the creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to those past events, clearly omitting the Ukrainian perspective. For Putin, Ukrainian identity or statehood have ‘no historical basis’ and are a geo-political tool to weaken Russia. The current Ukrainian leadership are characterised as ‘radicals and neo-Nazis’, and Putin leaves no doubt that his intention is to create ‘a single large nation, a triune nation’.

Division within eastern Orthodox Christianity

Long before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the close alignment between the ROC and the Putin regime had contributed to splits within Orthodoxy. The ROC suspended its own membership of the Conference of European Churches in 2008. Ever since Ukrainian independence in 1991, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had been seeking autonomy, culminating in the recognition of its independent status by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I in 2019, a goal on which former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko was personally engaged. Already, in 2016, when the Ecumenical Patriarch attempted to hold the first global Council of the Orthodox Church in Crete, it was boycotted by the ROC, but also by the Bulgarian and Georgian Orthodox Churches, both under strong Moscow influence.

The invasion has accelerated these divisions. Within Ukraine, a significant part of the church had remained faithful to Moscow, as a filial entitled the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Nevertheless, its leader, Metropolitan Onufriy, has appealed to Putin for an ‘immediate end to the fratricidal war’, referring unambiguously to Russia’s ‘military action against Ukraine’. Russia’s war has also been condemned by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, as well as leaders of the Orthodox Churches of Romania, Greece, and even Georgia, which had aligned itself with Moscow in the past. Another initiative was taken by a group of Orthodox theologians, who issued a ‘Declaration on the Russian World (Russkii Mir) Teaching’, condemning the ‘fundamentalist, totalitarian’ character of the doctrine promoted by the ROC under Kirill, which had ultimately led to ‘Putin’s unconscionable and horrendously destructive invasion of Ukraine’. Divisions have also emerged within Russia itself; on 2 March a group of 233 ROC priests launched an appeal for peace, urging Russian soldiers be brought home, and stating that Ukrainians should be allowed to decide their own destiny.

Peace initiatives of religious actors

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been described by some as a 21st century ‘religious war’, the EU has increasingly engaged with religious actors in pursuing its foreign policy goals, including tapping into their potential for conflict resolution and peace-building. In the current context of a split within Orthodoxy, some quiet religious diplomacy by Western Christian church leaders has taken place. Notably, Russian Patriarch Kirill took part in two distinct on-line meetings on 16 March, with the Archbishop of Canterbury, head of the worldwide Anglican Church, and with Pope Francis, head of the Roman Catholic Church.

The Pope’s Nuncio (ambassador) to Ukraine – a Lithuanian archbishop who previously served at the nunciature in Moscow – has remained in place in Kyiv and continues to liaise with Ukrainian political and church authorities. On 8 March he received a letter from the Mayor of Kyiv, Vitaliy Klitschko, inviting Pope Francis to visit the city, as a means of ‘paving the path to peace in our city, country and beyond’. While the Pope has not ruled out such a visit, given the view of Patriarch Kirill that Ukraine is part of his ‘canonical territory’, it could be counter-productive. Francis and Kirill have only met once, in Havana in 2016, so an alternative démarche could be a meeting on ‘neutral ground’. Vatican insiders have speculated that one possibility would be Jerusalem, as Francis could stop off on his forthcoming visit to Lebanon, which he announced on 21 March.

In parallel to contacts at the highest level, there have been exchanges between the Russian Orthodox and Catholic Churches at the level of their respective international and EU affairs arms. The Commission of Catholic Bishops’ Conferences of the EU (COMECE) called upon Patriarch Kirill to ‘appeal to Russian authorities to immediately stop the hostilities against the Ukrainian people’, stressing his influence among Russian people. However, in his reply, Metropolitan Hilarion, Chair of the ROC’s Department for External Church Relations, posited the war as a crisis ‘between the West and Russia’, referred to the ‘long-suffering land of Ukraine’ and reiterated their view that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is part of the Moscow Patriarchate. All these positions align closely with the official narrative of the Kremlin. Hilarion also suggested that COMECE should work with the EU ‘in order to prevent further escalation’, an indication of where the ROC considers fault for the war lies.

Meanwhile, the World Council of Churches (WCC), of which the Russian Orthodox Church has been a member since 1961, wrote to Kirill on 2 March asking for his mediation ‘so that the war can be stopped’. The (Romanian Orthodox) Acting General-Secretary of the WCC called on the Patriarch of Moscow to ‘raise up your voice on behalf of the suffering brothers and sisters, most of whom are also faithful members of our Orthodox Church’. In his response on 10 March, Kirill again used Kremlin rhetoric, viewing the war as a confrontation ‘between the West and Russia’, stating that Western ‘political forces’ had conspired to use Ukraine to ‘make brotherly peoples enemies’, and that all Western efforts to integrate Ukraine were founded upon a ‘geopolitical strategy aimed at weakening Russia’.

The reply also laid the blame on the Ecumenical Patriarch for the schism in Orthodoxy, by recognising an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 2019. This could limit the scope of Bartholomew to mediate towards a peaceful solution, a potential role suggested by European Commission Vice-President Margaritis Schinas following his exchange with the Ecumenical Patriarch on 19 March.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The religious dimension‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.